THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service
A^
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Weapons Systems and Programs
Permitted Under the Tentative SALT II Accord
Robert G. Bell
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
January 4, 1979
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Weapons Systems and Programs
Permitted Under the Tentative SALT II Accord
Introduction
Since the initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
in November 1969, a major source of controversy among American policy-makers
has been the question of which criteria should be used to measure the
results attained in specific phases of the negotiations.
To be sure,
there has been agreement throughout the U.S. foreign policy and national
security community that any SALT agreement must satisfy three core criLterJ^a:
/«
The agreement must be equal and balanced. While certain asymmetries
in force posture and deployment are unavoidable, SALT must provide for
strategic parity in an aggregate sense and not afford or be perceived as
affording one side or the other significant strategic advantages.
<z •
The agreement must not compromise crisis stability; i.e., it must
provide on a long-term basis for the essential
party's strategic retaliatory forces.
The agreement must be ver^iay^.
It must not create opportunities
for cheating or evasion that could undermine the achievement of the two
goals cited above.
Despite agreement on these three inviolable standards for judging a
SALT agreement, there has been substantial disagreement as to whether a
particular phase of SALT should be expected to meet a second set of criteria:
Should SALT be expected to preserve the survivability of every element
of each side's strategic retaliatory forces (e.g., bombers, missile submarines and silo-based ICBHs), or simply preserve each side's overall capacity to
CRS-2
ensure a devastatingly destructive
retaliatory strike?
Should SALT be expected to provok
e a dialogue on matters related to
each side 1 s force planning proces
s, thus perhaps reducing the potent
ial for
weapons programs set in motion due
to miscalculation or misinterpret
ation?
Should SALT be expected to create
a spirit of accomodation in arms
control at the strategic level tha
t would "spill over" and facilitat
e
efforts to conclude other arms con
trol negotiations, as well as pro
moting
a spirit of restraint and cooperati
on generally that would moderate
U.S./Soviet competition in all for
eign policy aspects?
Should SALT be expected to revers
e the strategic arms race; i.e.,
should it be expected to establish
a verifiable structure for strate
gic parity and
stability that is at once comprehen
sive (few, if any, loopholes or exe
mptions)
and less expensive (attained at low
er overall levels of strategic wea
ponry)?
The dispute on this second set of
criteria has centered more on the
timing
of attaining any given objective
than on the merits of each object
ive* In other
words, there is little, if any, dis
agreement that each of these object
ives reflect
ideal outcomes of SALT. What is
in dispute, however, is the questi
on of to what
extent it is reasonable to expect
that the goals should be rgfl'M*ed
bv SALT II.
which is one step in an extended,
multi-stage process of negotiation.
It is the position of the Carter
Administration that with the comple
tion
of the SALT II agreement, the Uni
ted States will face a choice bet
ween "a good,
agreement protecting and enhancing
our national securit
at all."
The Administration maintains that
"it is essential to recognize
I?
Department of State. The Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks.
Report No. 46, July 1978, p. 2.
Special
CRS-3
that arms control is only one of the instruments on which we rely.
We cannot
and do not expect it to do everything - nor is it & reasonable objection to
a good agreement that it will not do everything."
_________________________^^^^——f^^^mnBt^BB^ffm^ff********
_______
The 1978 State Department report on SALT previously cited discusses a
number of ideal SALT accomplishments that, in the Administration's view, "as a
practical matter, given the relationship between the two countries, cannot be
2/
concluded at this time":
In recent years there have been many unrealistic expectations for SALT. It has sometimes been seen as a way of
sharply reducing defense spending, or as a means by which
all threats against U.S. forces could be eliminated. Some
have hoped that SALT would usher in a new era of U.S./Soviet
cooperation and do away with military rivalry across the
board.
Such hopes are legitimate, but given the nature of the
relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union, they are unlikely to be quickly realized. NeitherJ
side is ready at this point for far-reaching disarmament
schemes.
The Administration's contention that it is unrealistic to expect that
SALT, at this particular phase (SALT II), could have been more far-reaching
has been subjected to strong criticism from many quarters in Congress, including
Members who believe that SALT II should have preserved the survivability
of the U.S. silo-based ICBM force, those who maintain that completion of
SALT II must be linked to evidence of Soviet restraint throughout the world
as well as Soviet moderation on human rights issues, and legislators who
contend that as an exercise in arms control, SALT II is an abject failure.
I/
Statement on SALT by Mr. Walter Slocombe, Director, DoD SALT Task Force;
inserted in the Congressional Record of April 4, 1978, p. S 4764.
y
State Department Special Report on SALT, op.cit., p. 2.
It is the last of these points of view
the argument that SALT II fails
to provide sufficient constraints on the continuation of the strategic, arms
race
that is the concern of this paper.
Limiting this discussion to the question of
whether too many U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons systems and programs
are
permitted under the evolving SALT II agreement is in no way intended to
suggest that the other concerns do not warrant examination.
Rather, it is
for the sake of focus that this paper addresses only this one dimension of
the
debate on SALT II.
A
The basic complaint of those making this specific criticism of SALT II is
that
the provisions of the agreement are simply too lenient.
Those who espouse this vie
reject the Administration's contention that there is a choice only between
the
currently agreed provisions and no agreement atal1. Rather, they insist
that
the United States could and should return to the negotiating table and seek
more
stringent and comprehensive constraints on each side's latitude to pursue
new
strategic weapons developments.
Implicit in this point of view is the assumption that what is not banned
bv
SALT will most likely be developed by each side, thus precluding any signifi
cant
cost savings and undermining the progress toward greater strategic stabili
ty
and mutual trust that proponents of this view believe SALT should engende
r.
This
view is predicated upon one or more of a number of alternative scenarios:
v *that without the help of specific treaty limitations,
arms controllers on ea
side will not be able to prevail over military/industrial interests promoti
ng the
development of new weapons systems not explicitly banned by SALT II;
that in the absence of comprehensive limitations, each side's "worst case
1'
7v^ *"**
analyses of the prospects of the other side pursuing programs not prohibi
ted
by SALT II will in turn establish rationales for pursuing the new develop
ments;
that the Soviet Union can be expected to
exploit any loophole in the agreement, and due to the dictates of actual
or perceptual equivalence, the United
States will have to follow suit: or
that in order to win the votes of a numb
er of Senators considered to be dissatisfied with SALT II provisions which,
in their eyes, 'favor the Soviet Union, the
Administration will have to commit itself
in advance as the "price" of gaining
Senate approval of the agreement to unde
rtake various strategic weapons systems
and programs, as well as certain theater
nuclear systems, not banned by SALT II.
While proponents of this view recognize
that development or deployment by the
United States of any tactical nuclear or
strategic weapons systems or programs
permitted under SALT II would require cong
ressional budgetary approval in accordance with statutory authorization and appr
opriation processes, they ,fear that
either new, unrestricted Soviet programs
or strong Administration endorsement
of non-restricted weapons systems made in
the context of the debate on SALT II
could prove decisive in foreclosing Cong
ress 1 option of withholding funding for
such programs.
<S^"*
To provide Congress with a frame of refe
rence for assessing the acceptibility
of this aspect of SALT II, this paper deta
ils those strategic weapons systems
If
and programs permitted each side under the
evolving accord.
In each case,
the paper provides a description of the
system or program and explains
its relation to or exemption from pertinen
t provisions of the agreement.
JY
Although SALT II is not final, most
known due to selective disclosures by each provisions of the agreement are widely
on official background briefings and unau side, extensive press reporting based
thorized disclosures, and reports publishe
by a number of congressmen and committees.
d
Unless otherwise cited, all descriptions
of the status of specific weapons systems
SALT II: Major Issues, Library of Congress or programs under SALT II are taken from:
, CRS Report 78-249F [by] Robert G. Bell
December 15, 1978, 137 p.
,
CRS-6
A cost estimate and summary of current views regarding the desirability of pursuing
the system or program is included for each U.S. weapons system or program
discussed in the paper.
U.S. and Soviet Land-Based Ballistic Missile Programs Permitted Under SALT II
Tentative SALT II Provisions
For the purposes of SALT II, the United States and the Soviet Union have
reportedly agreed that with respect to ICBMs, intercontinental range is specified as being 5,500 kilometers (3,410 statute miles) or more.
Thus any land-
based ballistic missile, mobile or otherwise, of an agreed range of less than
i
5,500 kilometers will not be subject to the agreement's provisions. Ballistic
missiles with ranges between 1,500 and 4,000 miles are generally regarded as
%
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
The proposed SALT II Protocol permits_jL&a±jjag of a mobile ICBM_laujacJi£r.
/
\ but
'
(that is, a launcher for a missile with a range^greater
than 5,500 kml)
precludes deploying it during the term of the Protocol.
In addition, the
interim Protocol will ban the flight testing of ICBMs from such launchers.
The proposed Protocol will also prohibit the flight testing and deployment
of "new types" of ICBMs, subject to one exemption on each side.
As a result
of this exemption, each side will be permitted to deploy nng "UPW i-yp*" nf
ICBM during the term of the treaty (through 1985*1.
Lastly, each side will be permitted to substitute existing models of ICBMs
for older models, provided no new ICBM launchers are required and that no
"modern large ballistic missiles" (MLBMs)
for "light" ICBMs.
or "heavy" ICBMs
are substituted
The two parties have agreed that any ICBM larger than th«
current Soviet SS-19 will be considered a "heavy" ICBM.
This provision will
permit the Soviet Union a total force of 308 "heavy" ICBMs, the United States none.
CRS-7
Soviet Land-Based Ballistic Missile Programs
The Soviet Union has deployed two types of mobile IRBMs, the obsolescent
SS-5 and the new SS-20, and has developed and tested, but not deployed, one
type of mobile ICBM, the SS-X-16.
According to the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, the Soviet Union had deployed 100 SS-20 IRBMs as of
July 1978, each of which can carry three kiloton (KT)-range warheads to a disII
tance of 3,000 statute miles.
The SS-20 is comprised of the first two stages
of the SS-X-16, a fact which has led to concern in some quarters that
the SS-20 could quickly be upgraded to an ICBM in a crisis with the
United States, though such a conversion would necessarily degrade Soviet
capabilities against peripheral states.
Nonetheless, since tl
as currently configured has a range of less than that specified in SALJb II
for continental range (3,410 miles), additional deployments of this
mobile ballistic missile could continue under the agreement, and none
of the SS-20s would count against the treaty ceilings.
Development, including flight testing, of the SS-X-16, a three-stage,
solid-propellant, single warhead, mobile ICBM, was essentially complete by
11
the end of 1975.
Under the reported provisions of SALT II, the Soviet
Union would be prohibited during the term of the Protocol from deploying
mobile launchers for the SS-X-16, although testing of such launchers would
be allowed.
Were such mobile launchers tested and developed, the Protocol
would prohibit the testing of the SS-X-16 from such launchers.
Under the
The Military Balance, 1978-1979. The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1978, p. 81. The SS-20 has been tested at longer ranges when
fitted with a single, lower-yield warhead.
I/
U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978, Statement to the Congress by Gen. George
S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1977, p. 11.
CrvS-fc
could
exemption clause to the "new types" ICBM ban, however, the Soviet Union
this
continue flight testing of the SS-16, provided the Soviets designate
as it
ICBM as their one authorized exejn^j"", and deploy the missile, as long
were not deployed on mobile ICBM launchers.
According to published reports, however, the Soviet position insisting
st in
on one "new types" ICBM exemption was not attributable to any intere
deploying the SS-X-16.
Rather, the Soviets reportedly have established a
is "fourth
military requirement for a new "fifth generation" ICBM (the SS-X-16
i
in the
generation") with a throw-weight of 8,000 Ibs. and a single warhead
I/
This new ICBM could be deployed by the Soviet Union
10-20 megaton (MT) range.
gs*
under SALT II under the exemption clause, subject to the pertinent ceilin
h
The three other Soviet ICBMs in the existing (already deployed) "fourt
generation" are the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19.
The SS-17 carries four multiple
of 500 KTindependently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) with a warhead yield
-1 (MT) each and has an accuracy of .3 nautical miles circular error
be
probable (CEP), that is, the average distance by which its MIRVs can
2/
The SS-18, in its second modification or
expected to miss their aim points.
configuration, carries 8-10 MIRVs of 1-2 MT with a CEP of .3 nm.
6 MIRVs of 500 KT-1 MT with a CEP of .25 nm.
The SS-19 carries
As of January 1, 1979,- the Soviet Unior
RVed SS-9s, Us
had deployed 570 SS-17s, 18s, and 19s in substitution for older non-MI
I Interim
and 13s, as permitted under the modernization provisions of the SALT
T7
~
Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 24, 1978, p. 16.
I/
John M. Collins.
American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cubr.r
U.S. and
Missile Crisis. Washington: Georgetown University, 1978, p. 93. All
ise
Soviet military systems descriptions taken from this source, unless otherw
noted.
CRS-9
Agreement.
J7
Under SALT II, this So
viet ICBM modernizatio
n program could
continue up to the agre
ed MIRVed ICBM sublimit
of 820.
There is still uncertai
nty, however, whether
the Soviets could in
turn replace its SS-17,
18, and 19 ICBM force
with "fifth generation
" ICBMs
without violating the
"new types" ICBM ban un
der the SALT II Protoc
ol. One
analyst of strategic af
fairs has recently writ
ten:
^ The agreement's defi
niti
however, will not nece on of a "new type" of missile,
stop developing all bu ssarily require that either side
t one new generation of
based missile, since ne
landw
as a "new type" if they missiles do not have to count
the older generation th are substantially the same as
Soviets 1 new "fifth ge ey replace. For example, the
ne
not yet been fully test ration" systems, which have
at all by this provisio ed, may in the end not be limited
n. 2/
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
, the President's Nati
onal Security Advisor,
has
described the "new type
s" problem in the foll
owing terms:
What is a new type? Is
the improvement of a
type, changing of the
screws, a significant marginal
or not? How about the
improvement
system for an existing introduction of a new guidance
improvements become ma missile? At what point do minor
jo
do improvements become r improvements? At what point
qualitative changes? _3/
One particularly sensit
ive dimension of this
problem concerns the qu
estion
of whether either side
could vastly increase
the number of MIRVs de
ployed on
existing ICBMs and its
{.*
permitted "new type" IC
BM. The United States
and
Soviet Union have repo
rtedly reached agreemen
t that the number of wa
rheads
on existing ICBMs will
be frozen at present le
vels, and that the numb
er of
SALT II: Prospects and
Problems. CRS Issue Br
ief #IB-77030.
Jan M. Lodal. SALT II
and American Security.
Winter 1978/1979, p. 24
Foreign Affairs, Vol.
9.
57,
I/
Text of Remarks by Dr.
Brzezinski, Office of
Secretary, March 1, 19
the Vice President's Pr
78, p. 2.
ess
I/
CRS-10
II
thing in the range of 10.
MIRVs on a "new type" ICBM will be held to some
U.S. Land-Based Missile Programs
le IRBMs or mobile ICBMs,
The United States currently has no deployed mobi
with new generation missiles. The
nor are any U.S. ICBMs currently being replaced
Us, 450 single-warhead Minuteman Us,
present U.S. ICBM force structure of 54 Titan
1!
1975.
July
in
eved
achi
was
and 550 MIRVed (3 warheads) Minuteman Ills
in a three-part program to
The United States is currently engaged, however,
Ills by replacing the missile's
improve the accuracy and yield of the Minuteman
ear warhead with the MK-12A RV and
current MK-12 reentry vehicle (RV) and W62 nucl
guidance system. The combination
W78 nuclear warhead, and by improving the NS-20
2A, W78, and NS-20 improvements
increased yield and accuracy provided by the MK-1
the missile's ability
to the Minuteman III will significantly increase
I/
ers.
cent
and
comm
ed
buri
or
to destroy reinforced targets such as ICBM silos
on 300 of the 550 Minuteman
The United States plans to replace the MK-12 RVs
550 missiles.
Ills and improve the NS-20 guidance system on all
the modernization
This ICBM improvement program is authorized by
would be permitted to
provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and
on the "new types"
continue under SALT II assuming the U.S. position
Fiscal Year (FY) 1978,
definitional issue prevails. As of the end of
T7
u
Lodal, op. cit., p. 249.
l Relations and Senate
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Internationa
Arms Control Impact Statements
Committee on Foreign Relations. Fiscal Year 1979 ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
Joint Committee Print, 95th Cong., 2d sess.; Wash
June 1978, p. 1.
I/
g the characteristics,
Ibid., p. 5. All subsequent information regardin this source.
ms from
cost, and status under SALT of these three syste
CRS-11
the United States had spent $281.4 million on the devel
opment of the MK-12A
and improved NS-20 and $106.9 million on the procuremen
t of these systems.
The United States expects to spend an estimated $264.1
million in FY 79 and
beyond to complete procurement of the MK-12A.
Responding to European alarm that the deployment of the
Soviet SS-20 (a
program not restricted by SALT II) threatens to upset the
balance of theater
nuclear forces in Europe, the United States is currently
considering various
options for developing a "theater mobile ballistic missi
le," including an
extended-range version of the Pershing, an entirely new
mobile IRBM, and
II
versions of other deployed missiles.
According to a recent report, the
Administration is expected to include $100 million in its
FY 79 Department of
Defense supplemental request for deveJ^pm£n£_j2^_aiL gx±£ii
d£drraiig£-JPershine II
2/
missile.
Since the range of this missile would be below that speci
fied as
intercontinental in SALT II, it would not be restricted
by SALT II.
The status under SALT II of various U.S. concepts for remed
ying the
vulnerability of its fixed-silo ICBM force is much more
complicated. The
options being examined by the Administration include ICBMs
deployed in
"buried trenches," ICBMs launched from aircraft or carri
ed in aircraft which
land, unload and launch the missiles, and ICBMs deployed
on submerged barges
off the coasts of the United States. At present, howev
er, despite strongly
divided opinion on the relative merits of these approaches
, the Administration
appears to be leaning toward replacing some or all of its
fixed-silo Minuteman III
T7
For a review of the status of Administration and congressio
nal action on
this matter to date, see: Senator Dewey F. Bartlett, Theat
er
Balli
stic
Missiles,
remarks printed in the Congressional Record, October 4,
1978, pp. S 17143-5.
I/
Washington Post, November 8, 1978, p. A 29.
CRS-12
ICBM force with a "multiple aim points" (MAP) basing system.
Under the MAP concept, a number of ICBMs
either existing Minuteman Ills or
a new-generation ICBM (most likely the MX ICBM or a common MX/Trident II missile)
would be rotated on a random basis between a much larger number of shelters
(perhaps as many as twenty per missile).
Theoretically, an adversary would have
to target every shelter to assure destruction of all missiles, since he would not
be sure which shelter actually contained the ICBM.
The M-X would have a throw-
weight four times that of a Minuteman III and carry about three times as many
warheads.
Cost estimates for the MX/MAP
The Administration has taken the unequivocal position that the United
States will not sign a SALT II agreement that would preclude the various mobile
ba^j-n^^tf^tiafcJSflJ^^SMS ^l^^^ tne entire term of the treaty.
In an August
1978 speech, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown declared that the currentlyagreed SALT II text would "allow deployment of mobile ICBM systems of the type
we are considering ... after the expiration of an interim protocol period
I/
deployment."
for
ready
be
would
systems
ICBM
mobile
before
which would end well
T/
Although U.S. military leaders have strongly endorsed MAP, Defense Secretary
Brown has remained non-committal, pending thorough exploration of the technical and
military aspects of this concept, and President Carter has expressed his belief that
the concept has some very serious defects, including its expense and inherent verification difficulties. MAP^ has also been assailed by groups in the Congress and
academia who are alarmed by what they regard as the negative implications of the
system for arms control. the Federal budget, and crisis stabi|±ty. On November 15,
1978, the Washington Post citeTTomments by unnameySTriciais tnat the Administration had decided to delay a decision on MAP for up to one year. According to this
report, the Administration has also decided to include $190 million in the FY 79
DoD supplemental request for full-scale development of a new-generation ICBM. For
a detailed discussion of Administration attitudes and actions related to MA? cr.:
new-generation ICBM programs, see: SALT II: Major Issues, op.cit., pp. 1-15.
I/
For more information see: MX ICBM, CRS Issue Brief #IB-77080.
I/
Excerpts of speech by Secretary Brown before the American Legion in New
Orleans, printed in Defense/Space Daily, September 14, 1978, p. 46.
f
CRS-13
The Soviets are understood to be extremely skeptical of the U.S. claim
that MAP could be deployed under SALT II once the Protocol expired.
The U.S./
Soviet disagreement on this score stems from conflicting interpretations of
the compatibility of MAP with several agreed SALT II provisions, including:
II
provisions prohibiting deliberate concealment measures which impede
verification by national technical means of compliance; and
provisions banning construction of new ICBM launchers. Will the MAP
"shelters" qualify as "launchers," or will the "launcher" for the new-generation
ICBM be the missile's mobile cannister/transporter?
If the latter, will the
"new types" exemption permit construction of such launchers for__the one new
* *
type ICBM permitted each side?
One question relating to U.S. political strategy deserves mention.
Assuming
that a relative lack of specificity in the final SALT II text does not resolve
these conflicting interpretations, should the United States proceed with MAP
even if it anticipates strong Soviet protests over this action?
In short, if
the "letter" of the agreement does not preclude MAP, is there a "spirit" of the
agreement which does, and even if so, should the United States honor such a
I/
"spirit."
I/
For
see: SALT
1!
For
of SALT I,
a more detailed discussion of the compatibility of MAP under SALT II
II: Major Issues, op.cit., pp. 62-69.
a discussion of Soviet compliance with the ''letter" and "spirit"
see: Ibid., pp. 26-29.
CRS-14
U.S. and Soviet Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Programs
Permitted Under SALT II
Tentative SALT II Provisions
The tentative SALT II agreement will not impose restraints on the deployment of "new types" of SLBMs during the treaty period.
Accordingly, each side
will be free to substitute new SLBMs for older SLBMs or to deploy entirely
new submarines carrying SLBMs, provided it does not exceed the pertinent
SALT Ilce^iJjUigs.
SALT II would include a sublimit of 1200on the combined
total of each side's MIRVed SLBMs and_ICBMs and a sublimit of 820 on MIRVed
ICBMs alone.
Were each side to deploy up to the 820 MIRVed ICBM sublimit,
they could not deploy more than 380 MIRVed SLBMs.
Non-MIRVed SLBMs count
only against the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)
[2400, with a subsequent reduction to 2250] authorized by SALT II.
Soviet aLBM Programs
JSHO^^^^W
As of January 1, 1979, the Soviet Union had an SLBM force
ss-w-4s. 5s, 6s, & 8s and 130 new MIRVed SS-N-18s.
Under SALT II, the Soviet Union will be authori^edtocoritinjietodeployadditional
MIRVed SS-N-18 SLBMs, subject to the 1200 combined MIRVed SLBM/ICBM sublimit.
The Soviets are also reportedly planning to deploy a new Typhoon-class
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) during the term of
SALT II, as well as a new Typhoon-class MIRVed SLBM to be carried on-board
the Typhoon SSBN.
Both of these programs would be permitted under SALT II,
again subject only to the 1200 MIRVed ICBM/SLBM sublimit.
I/
SALT II: Problems and Prospects, op.cit.
CRS-15
U.S. SLBM Programs
The United States currently maintains a force of 656 SLBMs, of which 496
are MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs and 160 are older non-MIRVed Polaris SLBMs.
Under
the Trident program, the United States plans a substantial modernization of its
the SSBN leg of its strategic force Triad.
The Trident program includes the
deployment of a new Trident-class SSBN, deployment of new Trident I SLBMs in
the Trident SSBNs and in at least 10 Poseidon SSBNs, possible deployment of
a longer-range Trident II SLBM (some components of which may be compatible
with a possible common MX/Trident II ICBM), and construction of two Trident
submarine bases.
Each Trident submarine will carry 24 MIRVed Trident I SLBMs.
I/
The first Trident I SLBM is scheduled to be back-fitted into a Poseidon
SSBN in October 1979, and the first Trident SSBN is scheduled for deployment
in January 1981.
Trident is the most expensive U.S. weapons program ever
undertaken; partial program costs for FY 79-83 are estimated at $24 billion,
excluding an additional $3.2 billion for the Trident/Poseidon backfit program.
Deployment of Trident I SLBMs and Trident SSBNs would be permitted under
SALT II, subject only to the 1200 MIRVed SLBM/ICBM sublimit.
Although the
Trident II SLBM could not be ready for deployment during the term of the treaty,
nothing in SALT II will restrict continued development of this weapons system.
II
All information concerning Trident characteristics, cost, and program
schedule from: Trident Program, CRS Issue Brief #IB-73001.
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Bomber Programs Permitted Under SALT II
Tentative SALT II Provisions
The. status of bombers under the tentative SALT II agreement is governed by
the following provisions:
All "heavy" bombers must count against the SNDV ceiling.
A number of
provisions in the text specify what constitutes a "heavy" bomber, including a
clause identifying current "heavy", bombers by nomenclature, one describing the
requisite characteristics of future "heavy" bombers, and one requiring any
bomber or other military aircraft armed with air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) to count as a "heavy" bomber.
All "heavy" bombers armed with ALCMs of "intermediate range" (greater
tha 600 kilometers) must count against the 1320 MIRVed SNDV ceiling.
All military aircraft not categorized as "heavy" bombers are exempted
from SALT II.
Each side may deploy new "heavy" bombers, subject only to the aggregate
SNDV and MIRVed SNDV ceilings.
Soviet Bomber Programs
The Soviet Union has maintained a long-range bomber force of 140 Bear and
Bison bombers for a number of years.
These aircraft are categorized as "heavy"
bombers and would count against the SALT II aggregate SNDV ceiling. In recent years
there has been speculation that the Soviets are developing a new long-range bomber
to replace the Bear and Bison.
Such a modernization program would be permitted
under SALT II, subject to the aggregate S%)V ceiling.
Were such a new bomber
to be armed with ALCMs of "intermediate range," all bombers of this type deployed
would also have to count against the MIRVed SNDV ceiling.
CRS-17
II, perhaps none has proven more
Of all the technical issues related to SALT
in 1974, Backfire is a swingcontroversial than Backfire. First deployed
e the speed of sound and carry a
wing aircraft that can fly at more than twic
shorter than the U.S. B-l bomber
ten-ton payload. The Backfire is slightly
prototype and about two-thirds its weight.
defense community that Backfire
There is general agreement within the U.S.
ter missions and maritime roles.
was developed and is being produced for thea
strategic capability, that is, that
There is also agreement that Backfire has a
United States. For this reason,
under certain conditions it could strike the
Backfire count against the SALT II
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that
nistration's position is that
aggregate SNDV ceiling. Nonetheless, the Admi
the United States receives
Backfire can be excluded from SALT II provided
significantly limiting the Backexplicit assurances which have the effect of
fire' s strategic capabilities.
in disagreement as to the degree
The United States and the Soviet Union are
must meet. The United States
of explicitness that the Backfire assurances
on the number of Soviet tankers
originally insisted on specific restrictions
which air refueling could be
available to support Backfire, the extent to
er could be based. The Soviet
practiced, and the locations at which the bomb
ge, and the United States has
Union held out for a much more general pled
degree of specificity that it
apparently backed off considerably from the
t, however, that the Soviets will
originally sought. There has been agreemen
rate (30-50 a year). There has
not increase the current Backfire production
the Soviet assurances must take;
also been disagreement as to the form which
ared by the Soviet Union or incori.e., whether they will be unilaterally decl
porated in a jointly-signed letter.
CRS-18
U.S. Bomber Programs
With the cancellation of the B-l procurement program,
the United States
currently has no programs underway to replace its aging
force of about 350
"heavy" B-52 bombers with new types. Nonetheless, nothi
ng in the provisions
of SALT II would prohibit the United States from rever
sing jffi rr ; fT" a1
decision and deploying t>*» K-],, -«»*» ^f * to the aggregate
SNDV ceiling. Were
deployed B-ls to be armed with ALCMs of "intermediate-r
ange," they would have
to count against the SALT II MIRVed SNDV ceiling.
The United States is reportedly prepared to declare that
it reserves
the right to deploy a "Backfire-equivalent" manned penet
rating bomber (most
likely the proposed FB-111H) during SALT II without such
a bomber being
subject to the agreement^
To be excluded from SALT II, such a bomber could
not be armed with ALCMs of "intermediate range" and would
have to have
range, payload, and size characteristics that distinguis
hed it from "heavy"
bombers, as specified in the SALT II text.
The United States and Soviet Union have agreed that under
SALT II the
United States may go ahead with its plans to deploy widebodied jet transports
modified to function as Cruise Missile Carriers (CMCs
), provided the CMCs
are designed with "functionally-related observable diffe
rences" (FRODs) that
distinguish the CMCs from similar type commercial aircr
aft. Still unresolved
is the question of the total number of ALCMs that a CMC
will be permitted to
carry. All ALCM-equipped CMCs deployed during the term
of the treaty would have
to count against the SALT II ceiling on MIRVed SNDV.
JY
Washington Post, October 21, 1978, p. A 1.
CRS-19
U.S. and Soviet Cruise Missile Programs Under SALT II
Tentative SALT II Provisions
The nearly-complete SALT II agreement establishes the following provisions
governing cruise missile deployments:
Any cruise missile (whether air-launched [ALCM], sea-launched [SLCM], or
ground-launched [GLCM]), current or future, of a range less than 600 kilometers
(370 miles) is exempt from SALT II.
For example, the new U.S. Harpoon anti-
ship SLCM/ALCM, with a range of about 50 miles, is excluded from SALT II.
Any "heavy" bomber armed with ALCMs of "intermediate range" must count
against the MIRVed SNDV ceiling.
*
Any bomber armed with ALCMs of "intermediate range" is categorized as
a "heavy" bomber and a MIRVed SNDV.
There is no upper range limitation on ALCMs of "intermediate range."
The Protocol will ban the deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs of "intermediate
range;" testing of SLCMs and GLCMs is permitted.
Soviet Cruise Missile Programs
The new Soviet Kingfish AS-6 ALCM, with a range of 160 miles, could be
deployed on "heavy" bombers without that bomber having to count against the
MIRVed SNDV ceiling and could be deployed on other Soviet bombers not otherwise
considered "heavy" bombers under SALT II without that bomber automatically
I/
becoming a "heavy" bomber.
However, the much older Soviet Kangaroo AS-3
and Kitchen AS-4 ALCMs, with ranges of 400 and 450 miles respectively, could
be categorized as ALCMs of "intermediate range" under SALT II.
The Soviets
could develop new ALCMs, SLCMs, or GLCMs, subject to the provisions listed
above.
All Soviet ALCM ranges from The Military Balance, 1978-79, op.cit.
CRS-20
U.S. fcruisaMissile Programs
TmTUnited States is currently developing subsonic SLCMs and ALCMs for
possible deployment as supplements to U.S. strategic retaliatory forces.
In
addition, conventionally-armed SLCMs are being developed for the anti-ship
mission, and both conventionally- and nuclear-armed GLCMs are being considered
for possible deployment as theater interdiction/deep strike weapons systems
I/
program costs for these cruise missile
Total
on the tactical battlefield.
*»**....• •.!....., « i———-————*-•,"-"• ".i-»Jl!'»","••• •*•....!••!• >M'l«'n iUJinjR.1 i-HM!
programs are estimated as follows:
ALCM - $4.184 billion; SLCM (Tomahawk) -
$2.576 billion; GLCM - $1.527 billion.""
<|fcj. •.fi.Mr^r-"- ."-"^y-^y^*"1!^
^
ii^M^^
All of these weapons systems
•BBIf***W*'>*
^^^^vr^^^~-.'? if- * ~V ""*
could be deployed subject to the SALT II provisions previously detailed.
Deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs of ranges greater than 600 kilometers could
not occur until after the expiration of the term of the interim Protocol.
r^~\
{ OtherIU.S. and Soviet Strategic Programs Permitted Under SALT II
Strategic Air Defense Programs
Soviet strategic air defenses currently include about 6,000 radars,
2,650 interceptors, and 12.000 surface-to-^i-r missiles.
Possible improve­
ments that the Soviets could achieve prior to 1985 include deployment of
a Soviet equivalent to the American Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), longer-range interceptors equipped with "look-down/shoot-down11
radars, and over-the-horizon radar.
Such programs could in large measure
II
For a more detailed description of the characteristics and status of U.S.
cruise missile programs see: Cruise Missiles (Subsonic): U.S. Programs, CRS
Issue Brief #IB-76018.
I/
Cost figures from SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary, DoD/OASD (Comp­
troller), November 14, 1978.
I/
The Military Balance, 1978-79, op.cit.
be designed to counter the introduction of ALCMs into tteffit, strategic bomber
force or the possible development of a new U.S. manned fBBttting bomber.
No provisions in the tentative SALT II agreement restridSUfet strategic air
defenses or improvements to these forces.
For a number of years the United States has maintairiUly minimal air
defenses, although a modernization program designed to obne the effective­
ness of these forces is currently in progress.
This prapKiacludes the
assignment of the AWACS to the strategic air defense mi>Hi,deployment of
new radars, and consideration of deploying a new air deiaBfcinterceptor.
There have been recommendations from some quarters in ttriBqpiess and the
Defense Department that the United States respond to Soateiq*loyment of the
Backfire bomber by significantly upgrading its strategizaiEiefenses.
There
would be no restrictions under SALT II to a U.S. moderns*!* or upgrading
«••••—"•••••i
of its air defenses.
Civil Defense
r
One body of opinion within U.S. strategic circles oatHis that Soviet
civil defense programs, combined with efforts to dispeiaBBiharden industrial
plants, threaten to undermine the U.S. ability to ensuxoflk; "unacceptable
damage" would be inflicted in a retaliatory strike.
Otihniiscount Soviet
actually
civil defense capabilities and doubt that the Soviet eoaiprould
"!**"
M
be protected from nuclear attack to any meaningful extern:, lespite the
lack of consensus on the military significance of the Sai&civil defense
I/
For a balanced appraisal see: Soviet Civil Defeaq^EEi Report
NI 78-10003, July 1978, 16 p.
CRS-22
in recent months decided to give
program, the Carter Administration has
capabilities. The Administration
a higher priority to U.S. civil defense
FY 1980 budget for $140 million
will reportedly include a request in the
could ultimately cost $1 billion
to begin a new civil defense program that
relating to civil
There are no known provisions in SALT II
or more.
defense.
Implications for SALT III
Soviet Union were in dispute
Until recently, the United States and the
III that SALT II should establish.
regarding the kind of principles for SALT
ificity of the targets. In describing
The dispute concerned the scope and spec
e, Walter Slocombe, Director of the
the original U.S. position on this issu
DoD SALT Task Force, stated:
ed, it will
It is our hope that when SALT II is sign
d like to
woul
we
And
III.
include targets for SALT
ly ambit­
fair
and
icit
expl
ly
make these targets fair
restraints on
ious - significant reductions, further
modernization. 2j
provided by Paul H. Nitze, the
According to an unofficial description
owing goals, or targets, for the
United States originally proposed the foll
SALT III negotiations:
ing to a level of 1800-2000;
—A reduction of the aggregate SNDV ceil
to a level of 1000-1100;
—A reduction of the MIRVed SNDV ceiling
and MLBM sublimits;
—Further reductions in the MIRVed ICBM
I/
2/
9.
Washington Star, November 16, 1978, p.
Statement on SALT, op.cit.
CRS-23
—Provisions further restricting the development, testing, and
deployment of "new types" of ICBMs and SLBMs;
—Restrictions on strategic air defenses and civil defenses;
II
;
cation
—Steps to strengthen verifi
ives,
The Soviet Union held out for a far more general statement of object
one which contained no fixed numerical targets.
There is now evidently a
and the
fairly general commitment on this issue which is largely agreed,
specificity of the principles is no longer in question.
In effect, the United
ples for SALT III.
States has accepted a considerably generalized statement of princi
Because U.S. interest in achieving the specific types of restraint
side will
originally proposed for SALT III still persists, and because each
nt, it
be free under SALT III to raise any issue which it considers releva
under
is useful to consider the strategic programs permitted each side
original
SALT II in the context of their consequences for attaining the
SALT III objectives proposed by the United States.
In this regard, it would
appear that the following are the principal implications:
SALT II
—Deployments of new strategic weapons systems permitted under
lower ceilings
would not necessarily complicate efforts in SALT III to achieve
each side
and sub limit s in various categories. However, to the degree that
be less
fills out SALT II quotas with new systems, they could conceivably
there
inclined to dismantle recently deployed systems —systems on which
al capital
has been little return, in terms of time on station, on the origin
older SNDVs
investment— than would exist in the case of SALT II, under which
can be dismantled to comply t?j t-fr i-V>p <-PJ ] J
II
in the
Paul H. Nitze. Current SALT II Negotiating Posture. Inserted
18504.
S
p.
Gam,
Jake
r
Congressional Record of November 2, 1977 by Senato
CRS-24
—To the extent that the exclusion of SLBM "new types" and one ICBM "new type 1
from SALT II leads to new SLBM and ICBM deployments on each side (e.g., Trident I
& II, MX, SS-N-18, Typhoon, and perhaps 1-4 "fifth-generation" Soviet ICBMs) , it
would appear that both sides would be rather fully engaged through the 1980s in
proceeding with these strategic weapons procurement programs.
Thus depending
upon the proposed duration of SALT III, it is conceivable that the United
States and the Soviet Union could be favorably inclined to accept in SALT III
more stringent prohibitions against further development of "new types" of
ICBMs and SLBMs.
—To the extent that strategic programs permitted under SALT II provoke
enhancement by each side of its strategic air defenses and civil defenses,
the task of achieving restraint in these areas under SALT III will be greatly
complicated.
—To the extent that a build-up in theater nuclear systems such as the
SS-20 IRBM, Backfire bomber, and Pershing II theater ballistic missile results
from SALT II, either as a consequence of specific exclusions or indirect security
concerns, the difficulty of reaching complete agreement in SALT III will be
increased should it address the overall problem of the theater nuclear balance
in Europe.
—The inherent verification difficulties associated with cruise missiles
deployed under SALT II could handicap efforts in SALT III to strengthen
verification.
—Should the implementation by each side of the various strategic weapons
system programs detailed in this paper contribute to a climate of heighthened
suspicion and mistrust in U.S./Soviet relations, the task of successfully
concluding a SALT III negotiation could become significantly more difficult.