Petroleum Supply of Axis Powers Short of
Wartime Needs
NE of the most serious probBy V. R. Garfias and
TABLE
2, ESTIMATED
CIVIL A N D MII.ITARY
lems now confronting GelCONSUMPTION
OF PETROLEUM
AND RELATED
J. W. Ristori
many-and
one that will af- Cities Service Co.: Memlcler ond Associate,
IN 1940
PRODUCTS
(In Thousands of Barrels)
fect Italy even more seriously if she
A.I.M.E., respectively.
goes to war against England and
. . . . . 240,000
Russia' . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
.
.
.
90,000
France -is that of supplying her petroleum for military purposes, in all Germany'
navy, mechanized army, and air force amount that can only be estimated Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000
Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . 40,000
as well as her industrial and other from certain indications and unac- Hungary .
.
. . . . . .
2,500
counted-for
discrepancies
between
figneeds with the necessary
Switzerland . .
. .
.
.
.
4,000
and related products. This problem, ures of production, civil consumption. Greece . . .
. .
3,000
....
2,000
serious even now, will become vital exports, imports, and storage. Table Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
. . . . .
1,400
should hostilities on a large scale de- 2 shows the estimated cotlsumption Yugoslavia . . . .
Bulgaria . . . .
.
.
.
.
1,100
both
for
civil
and
military
purposes
velop.
Total . . . .
. . . .
.
104.000
If Italy goes to war against Eng- in 1940 by the nations in question,
Illrludes
part
of
Pola~td.
land and France and traffic in the assuming that a large-scale war con- Mediterranean
becomes so unsafe as
T
~
B
L
3.E P R O D U C T
O FI O
PETROLEUM
~
A N D R E L ~ TFUELS
E
D
to deprive that country of p e t r o l e u ~ ~ ~
(In Thousands of Barrels)
hom all oversea sources her supply
Russia'
Romania Germany Poland
Italy2 Hungary
Total
19:<7
200.000
53.000
15.300
3.900
500
272,700
outside of her negligible domestic --.
300
279,000
3,900
500
49,000
17,300
1938
208,000
production will be restricted to what
1,OtM)
299,000
20,000
4,000
1,000
223,000
50,000
she might obtain overland from Ro- 1939"
240,000
55,000
25,000
4,000
1,200
1,800
327,000
1940'
mania. Rut the Romanian oil fields Includes
Albania.
3
Estimated.
Excludes Sakhalin Island pr~ductio.1.
are now supplying practically the en-- -tire needs of the Ra'lkans and in case
no other foreign oil is available to tinues through the year but that only shown in Table 3, care being take11
them owing to sea perils, these coun- Russia, Germany, and Italy, of the to make the estimates for 1940 amply
tries would be deprived of their entire countries listed in the table, are in- large. A comparison of this table with
volved in it. This estimated con- the preceding one shows that the total
supplyRecent consumption of petroleum sumption will aggregate 404,000,000 estimated production of the,=e counand related fuels for civil: purposes
barrels for 1940 or 121,800.000 bar- tries will for 1940 fall at least 77,only, of Russia, Germany, Italy, the rels more than their civil consump- 000,000 barrels short of meeting the
Balkan States, and neighboring coun- tion for 1939. These 1940 estimated total war requirements of Russia, Gertries is listed in Table 1. The world consumption figures seem ultracon- many. and Italy and the peacetime
figures of civil consumption, which servative if the full petroleum war needs of the others.
we have been compiling for the last requirements are to be made available
In case Russia, Germany, and Italy
ten vears, are availablefrom reliable to the three nations in question. Other are engaged in war throughout 1940,
souries and can be corroborated.
writers have estimated the wartime a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 will
Consumption by these countries dur- consumption for military purposes of ~ i v ethe position of each as regards
ing 1939 will be about 282,200,000 Russia, Germany, and Italy at from petroleum supply and requirements
barrels, an increase of 15,200,000 ten to twenty times their peacetime during that year.
barrels over 1938.
consumption for the same purposes,
Russia should have ill 1940 a baland the estimate presented in Table anced production and consumption
But in addition to consumption 2 assumes a much more restricted of close to 240,000,000 barrels. It
for civil purposes, even in peacetime expansion.
has been stated frequently that the
these and other countries consume
Only six of the eleven countries alliance between Germany and Rus-sia will open up large supplies of
A paper presented before the Petroleu~n above referred to are producers of
Division, A.I.M.E., at its Galveston meet- petroleum. their learlv output being petroleum to the former from the
ing, Oct. 7, 1939.
0
,
,
,
,
,
I
I
-
-
- -
J
/
1
/
-
Russia
1937
1 9 3 8 . .
1939'
. .
-
-
~
~~
.
.
.
.
.
.
158,200
164,500
175.000
TABLE
1. CNIL CONSUMPTION
OF PETROLEUM
A N D RELATED
FUELS
(In Thousands of Barr~l.;,
SwitzerGermany
Italy Romania Poland Hungary land
Greece Turkey
45,300
53,000
55.000
20,000
21,000
23,000
12,600
14,200
15.000
2,800
3,400
3,000
1,900
2,000
2,000
3,300
3,500
3.700
2,400
2,400
2500
1,200
1,200
1.200
Yugo-
slavia Bulgaria
900
1,000
1.000
800
800
800
Total
249,400
267,000
282,200
Estimated.
NOVEMBER. 1939
49 1
I
latter country and the difference of
48,000,000 barrels between Russia's
production and her civil consumption in 1939 may indicate a large
exportable surplus of Russian oil.
The fact remains, however, that in
1939 Russia is not exporting oil in
any appreciable
and-has not
been doing so in recent years, her
imports and exports having been approximately equal. Indications to
the contrary notwithstanding, Russia
has no appreciable exportable surplus
after it takes care of its domestic
and military petroleum requirements.
The explanation for the discrepancy
seems to lie in one or more of the
following conditions-actual
Russian
production is smaller than the official figures indicate; actual domestic civil consumption is greater than
reported; o r possibly f o r some years
past Russia has been storing petroleum and using large unreported
quantities in military activities.
Germany, with a production of 25,000,000 barrels of
and
synthetic oils in 1940 against an estimated wartime requirement of 90,000,000 barrels, would show a shortage of 65,000,000 barrels. Table 5
shows that 80 per cent of Germany's
imports in 1938-1939 came from
North and South America and a
blockade might make oil from this
source unavailable to Germany. Only
about ten per cent of Germany's imports in 1938-1939 will be derived
from Romania and only 2 per cent
from Russia.
Italy is estimated to have a 1 9 M
production of 1,200,000 barrels, including the output of Albania, against
a wartime total demand of 40,000,000
barrels, or an indicated deficit of
38,800,000 barrels, to be made up, if
at all, from imports. Under the conditions prevailing during the past
year or so, 61 per cent of Italy's imports have come from North and
South America, and in case of war
the difficulties of maintaining any
such supply in the face of a BritishFrench blockade are obvious. Even
if Italy should gain control of shipping in the Mediterranean she could
scarcely increase her own or her allies' supply unless they gained control
of the Iraq fields. And this could
scarcely be accomplished quickly
enough to afford much relief during
1940 as the Iraq wells and the pipe
-
TABLE
4. ROMANIAN'
EXPORTS
IN 1938
(In Thousands of Barrels)
Crude
Germany . . .
..
114
Czechoslovakia . . . .
802
Total
. . . . . . . . . .
916
-
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
United Kingdom . . . . . . .
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
489
Hungary . . . . . . . . . . .
305
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . .
247
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . .
185
Malta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bunkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miscellaneous . . . . . . .
59
-
Gasoline
3,021
1,149
4,170
1,890
1,785
811
507
646
381
372
363
350
282
279
224
219
194
172
171
109
106
103
....
....
340
-
Fuel Oil
Kerosene or Bunkers Lubricant
1,009
1,214
92
...
336
65
1,345
1,279
92
- 225
23
. .
1,113
1,341
...
.,..
268
...
....
269
..
. . .
42
..
173
941
..
126
115
405
2,655
..
416
299
..
231
116
...
250
264
...
-
....
1,016
242
....
....
....
....
149
155
....
565
-
-
. . .
...
816
85
54
...
....
...
189
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
132
71
2,550
74
71
...
121
- -
Total
5,450
2,352
7,802
2,392
4,239
1,079
776
688
1,495
613
3,912
1,370
629
1,040
224
2,122
521
226
171
298
106
569
226
2,550
1,159
-
2,455
13,474
6,411
11,583
284
34,207
Romanian production in 1938 was close to 49,000,000 barrels of which 34,000,000
was exported, as shown in above table, and approximately 15,000,000 was consumed in
the country or put in storage.
lines to the Mediterranean would
probably be destroyed by their owners before an enemy could take possession. A struggle for control of the
Mediterranean should make shipping
so unsafe that tanker traffic would be
reduced, if not stopped altogether, so
as to force Italy to rely almost entirely, and Germany largely, on
Romanian oil except for such oil as
might escape the blockade.
Reasons for doubting that Russia
has the petroleum to make up any
important part of Germany's estimated 65,000,000-barrel deficiency
have already been given but even if
this reasoning is incorrect and Russia has more exportable petroleum
than the evidence shows, or if she
would be willing to make a supply
available to Germany by restricting
her own usage, still the problems of
transporting enough of it to western
Germany in time to relieve the shortage appreciably appear difficult if not
insurmountable. This task involves
600 miles of tank-steamer transportation on the Black Sea and some 1200
miles bv river o r rail from the Black
Sea coast to the German front.
At any rate, even if Russian petroleum should be available, the difficulties of transporting it to Germany
by any poasible route would be
greater than those of transporting
Romanian oil, which are discussed in
a later paragraph. It seems then,
that the greatest service Germany can
expect from Russian oil is for it to
replace Romanian oil in the Balkans,
and so release greater quantities of
that oil for use by the "Axis Powers."
It may be emphasized again, however,
that there is no evidence that Russia
has any such exportable surplus.
Now how far can the Romanian
fields make good the deficiency?
Romanian petroleum exports in 1938,
as shown in Table 4, aggregated some
34,000,000 barrels, and as shown in
Table 5, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria,
and Yugoslavia are entirely dependent on Romania for petroleum. The
greatest supply which could have
been available in 1938 to the Axis
Powers was the entire 34,000,000 barrels of exports, which would have
been available only if the use of
Romanian petroleum by nations
other than Germany and Italy had
MINING AND METALLURGY
TABLE
5. ORIGIN
OF IMPORTS
OF PETROLEUM
A N D ITSPRODUCTS,
19381939
(In Percentages)
Hungary,
Greece,
Bulgaria,
United
YugoFrom
Kingdom France Germany Italy Turkey slavia Switzerland
U.S.A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
35
24
39
52
...
34
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
...
9
1
...
...
.,.
...
. . .
Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10
44
16
6
Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
...
5
...
. .
...
...
...
Peru. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
5
3
...
...
Trinidad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
...
...
...
...
...
...
Total from America . . 67
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
55
39
3
1
80
43
1
1
12
4
4
8
1
...
...
10
2
-61
10
20
...
---
-
--
52
..
40
...
...
...
26
22
100
30
...
...
48
100
..
...
...
30
15
- - - - - - -
Total from Near East. . . . 10
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
N.E.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Total from Far East. . . . . 21
Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
100
...
100
100
30
5
3
8
1
100
..
-
-
...
...
...
. . .
100
100
-
...
15
15
100
barrels, and Germany with her estimated shortage of 65,000,000 barrels.
Table 5 introduces a comparison
by percentages between the sources of
petroleum imports in 1938-'39 for the
United Kingdom and France and
those of Germany, Italy, and the
southeastern European nations largely
or altogether dependent on Romanian
oil. Only five per cent of the imports
of the United Kingdom and four per
cent of the ~ r e n c himports coming
from Romania and Russia would be
under the control of the Axis Powers.
Loss of control of the Mediterranean
would affect British imports by an
additional five Der cent and French
imports by 39 per cent. However, increased imports from American fields
could unquestionably make good all
these losses provided ample overseas
transportation could be arranged.
~ h kpicture presented above does
TABLE
6. IMPORTS
BY PRODUCTS,
1938, IN PERCENTAGES
United
Turkey Hungary Greece Bulgaria
Kingdom France Germany Italy
Crude Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
85
...
83
...
15
57
32
Gasoline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8
5
33
...
26
32
15
6
. .
Kerosene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
29
...
3
24
Lubricants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
0.8
...
2
...
7
1
8
...
Benzol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.2
...
...
...
...
Residuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..
9
...
...
...
...
Fuel Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6
37
35
38
15
71
been eliminated, and Romania had
been allowed to utilize 15,000,000
barrels for domestic needs. Such a
readjustment of supply in this general region would be a difficult and
time-consuming process at any time
and certainly could not be accomplished during war without grave
danger of dislocating Germany's
supply of other materials from these
nations, which are important to her.
Even if it could be accomplished,
however, there would be during 1940
only 35,000,000 barrels of Romanian
oil available to Italy and Germany,
against a deficit of lOa,000,000.
Romania's 1940 production is estimated at 55,000,000 barrels and total
domestic consumption at 20,000,000
barrels, leaving an exportable surplus
of 35,000,000 barrels to make up a
deficiency of 65,000,000 barrels in
Germany and close to 39,000,000 barrels in Italy, or a total of 104,000,000
barrels. But even assuming Germany
could have in 1940 all the 35,000,000
barrels of available Romanian oil,
transportation of this oil to Germany
NOVEMBER. 1939
Yugoslavia Switzerland
85
3
6
3
. . .
55
5
4
would require an endless chain of not present all of the serious aspects
cars, loading in Romania and unload- of &e situation of Italy and ~ e . & a n ~
ing in Germany at the rate of more in regard to petroleum supply for no
than 900 cars per day, for European attention has been paid to the type of
tank cars have an average capacity petroleum products needed-a barrel
of about 120 barrels. Western Ger- of crude oil has been considered as
many is about 1200 miles from the equivalent to a barrel of any needed
fields or 24Q0 miles for the round refined product.
Table 6 shows the distribution of
trip, and tank-car trains could
scarcely be expected to travel more the imports in 1938 of the countries
than 200 miles per day under war- listed in Table 5 among- the various
time conditions, so that twelve days petroleum products in percentages of
would be required for the round trip the total imports, as they have been
for each car, making a minimum re- during recent peacetime conditions.
quirement of some 11,000 tank cars, Such inferences as that France, and
or close to 300 trains in continuous Italy to a less extent, has a large reoperation. Even if this feat be ac- fining capacity and can manufacture
complished, Germany would still be a considerable portion of her needed
30,000,000 short of its requirements products if the crude oil is available,
and no provision has been made in and that Germany and Great Britain
this calculation to take care of Italy's are more dependent on
alestimated import requirements of ready manufactured when imported,
38,800,000 barrels for 1940. If Ro- are obvious; also that Germany might
mania's exportable surplus of 35,- still suffer a stringent shortage of
000,000 barrels in 1940 is considered gasoline even if she could secure a
as being allotted to Italy to make up crude-oil supply. A blockade against
her deficit of 38,800,000 barrels, it marine shipments of gasoline to Gerleaves her short by nearly 4,000,000 many appears of great importance.
Naturally, the amount of petroleunl
and petroleum products held in storage particularly by Germany and
Italy will directly affect the situation,
but it is difficult to conceive of oil
stocks in sufficient quantity lo alter
the uosition as outlined for more than
a few rnoriths of active warfarc.
If the present European war continues throughout 1940 the facts presented support certain inferences of
which the more irriportant are:
i l ) A successful blockade of petroleum arid its products against German) and an) active allies it n ~ a y
gain is one of the most effective
weapons of Great Britain and France.
( 2 ) Russia has not a sufficient exportable surplus of petroleum. either
on a peace or wartime basis, for thal
countrv to be of much assistance iu
supplying Germany's needs. Even if
the Russian supply were available,
difficulties of transportatiori appear
insurnlountable at least during 1940.
13 I The Romanian fields. even
under complete Gertnari control,
would fall 30.000.000 l~arrelss h o r ~
of providing Germany's wartime
needs in 1940; and the transportation
of such large supplies of oil from
Romania to G ~ r m a n y would be extremely difficult if not impossible.
( 4 ) Italy's entrance into the war
as an ally of Germany would increase
Germany's petroleum difficulties as, if
an efficient blockade be maintained
against the Axis Powers, Italy would
have to get practically all her oil supplies from Romania, lessening by
that amount the volume available for
Germany. Under the circumstances.
it is far more advantageous to Germany to have Italy as a neutral.
( 5 ) The evident ways in which
Get many might avoid or lessen the
dangers of a stringent petroleum
shortage are :
( a ) Make peace or bring the war
lo a successful ending before she exhausts her stored supply of petroleum
products.
( b I In conjunction with Italy or
other countries as an active ally or
allies, secure control of shipping in
the Mediterranean and of the Iraq
fields and the Iraq-Mediterranean
pipe line.
I'C) Have Italy maintain its neutrality as long as possible.
i d ) Avoid coming to a break with
the Balkan countries, which no doubt
would be greatly disturbed by a shortage of petroleum.
Because of its treaty with Russia
and the subsequent occupation by
that country of the Polish-Romania11
frontier, it will be difficult for Gerinany to take actual possession of the
Romanian fields as she did during
the World War, and one wonders
what will happen to Germany should
its relations with Russia cease to be
friendly. Obviously it should be comparatively easy for Russia to control
these fields or at least to Drevent Germany from controlling them. Should
Russia or any other power directly or
indirectly deprive Germany of Romanian oil during this war the results would be catastrophic, for Romanian oil is absolutely vital to
Germany even if it cannot supply all
her wartirrle needs.
Prospectors like J i m Hogan, shown above with his burros on the Arizona desert, h u e made many o f the
original finds that Bureau of Mines project e n g i ~ e r sare now investigating, as described b y John W . Finch
in the article beginning on the opposite page. Photograph courtesy S . Paul Lindau.
494
MINING AND METALLURGY