Doing the Unthinkable:
Discontinuity in thinking and acting
Judith Martens
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J. A. M. Bransen
Second supervisor: Dr. M. J. Becker
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and
Religious Studies
Radboud University Nijmegen
May 2014
DANKWOORD
Het schrijven van deze scriptie heeft langer in beslag genomen dan ik van te voren dacht, maar ik
heb geen enkele spijt van de extra tijd die ik ervoor heb uitgetrokken. In die extra tijd heb ik
ontzettend veel zinnige discussies gehad over het onderwerp, veel extra literatuur gelezen en
een veel breder denkkader ontwikkeld waarbinnen ik nu over handelen, intentionaliteit en
kwaadaardige handelingen kan nadenken. Dat is terug te vinden in mijn scriptie, maar is vooral
iets dat ik met mij mee zal dragen. Dat was niet gebeurd zonder de begeleiding van Jan Bransen.
Ik wil hem dan ook hartelijk danken voor de keren dat wij samen kwamen, de inhoudelijke
discussies die we hadden, en de door hem gesuggereerde literatuur. Gesprekken waarin hij een
enkele keer al ruim vooraf zag dat een argument ergens naartoe leidde (het belang van rollen)
om mij vervolgens de ruimte te gunnen om een maand later dezelfde conclusie te trekken.
Bedankt voor de balans tussen het vinden van mijn eigen weg en begeleiding.
Verder wil ik graag in het bijzonder nog twee mensen bedanken die veel van mijn gedachten
hebben aangehoord en mee hebben gedacht over de opbouw en uitwerking van mijn scriptie.
Wil Martens en Bas Leijssenaar, bedankt voor jullie tijd en aandacht op bijna alle momenten van
het proces.
Contents
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1
2. Common Morality ........................................................................................................................................ 3
2.1 Common Morality from a Philosophical Point of View ..........................................................................5
2.2 Common Morality from a Psychological Point of View ..........................................................................9
2.3 Combining Two Approaches of Common Morality ............................................................................... 11
3. The Unthinkable ....................................................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Choices, Consequences and Personal Character .................................................................................... 15
3.2 Unwanted Desires and Volitions .................................................................................................................. 17
3.3 Volitional Necessities and the Unthinkable ............................................................................................. 18
3.4 Thinking versus Acting ..................................................................................................................................... 20
3.5 Thinkability versus Doability......................................................................................................................... 21
4. The Stanford Prison Experiment ........................................................................................................ 23
4.1 Introduction to the Experiment .................................................................................................................... 24
4.2 The Counts: From Bad to Horrible............................................................................................................... 26
4.3 Becoming Prisoner and Guard....................................................................................................................... 29
4.4 The Stanford Prison Experiment and the Unthinkable ....................................................................... 33
5. Silencing....................................................................................................................................................... 35
5.1 Virtuous Silencing ............................................................................................................................................... 35
5.2 Evil Silencers......................................................................................................................................................... 37
5.3 Evil Silencers – return to the SPE ................................................................................................................. 39
6. Blind Spots and Biases ............................................................................................................................ 42
6.1 Role Playing and Ethical Fading.................................................................................................................... 43
6.2 Switching Perspectives ..................................................................................................................................... 45
6.3 Biases and the Unthinkable ............................................................................................................................ 47
7. Silencing the Unthinkable ..................................................................................................................... 48
References ....................................................................................................................................................... 54
1. Introduction
Horrible behavior seems to be the one constant factor throughout human history. Wars leave us
questioning what damage humans will not do to one another. Up to this day bullying and
harassment are everyday practices. These and other examples of horrible behavior leave us
puzzled, partly because we cannot imagine that we would display similar behavior if we were to
find ourselves in likewise situations. Evil acts seem to stand so far away from our own acts that
we find it unimaginable we would act in a similar way. The philosopher Harry Frankfurt has
coined the term ‘the unthinkable’ to refer to those actions wherefore we have all the power, yet
which we cannot put ourselves to because of ‘mental obstacles’ (they are unacceptable and
unimaginable). This way of describing evilness appears highly attractive, for it expresses the
feeling of incomprehension that we endure when others do evil deeds. Unfortunately, as I will
explain below, the concept of ‘the unthinkable’ fails to grasp what is at stake when people do evil
deeds and Frankfurt’s approach is incomplete at best.
With this thesis, I try to advance our understanding of how people can find themselves acting
evilly and how behavior can get out of hand. All people fall under the scope of this investigation,
not only some serial killer but you, me, your friends and my parents. It is about all sorts of
wrong1 behavior, from small wrongdoings to evil crimes.
Certain actions are generally accepted as good, others as bad. Common morality describes how
we have general, shared, ideas about what ought and what ought not to be done. Saying what
should be done often has a counterpart; whenever we emphasize something should be done, we
imply that there are other things that should not be done. This implies that having a shared sense
of morality (commonsense morality) is always accompanied by a commonsense should not of
which some actions will be unthinkable. Such actions will generally be seen as wrong, hurtful,
and unimaginable. Is knowing what is perceived as unthinkable sufficient to not act upon it? I
doubt it is. Both in current times and in history we see people acting in immoral ways that we,
but also their contemporaries, find unacceptable and unimaginable. It is scary to see how people
can do things that horrify and puzzle others. It makes one wonder if the neighbor, a friend, an
enemy or maybe oneself is capable of such actions too.
1
There is much discussion going on about the concept of evil and how it relates to the concept of wrong. People want
to distinguish these two from one another for doing something evil intuitively feels worse than doing something that
is bad. Around the questions ‘how they are to be distinguished’ an extensive discussion exists. For the purpose of
this thesis this discussion is not relevant, for also wrong deeds are better to be avoided and sometimes seem to
‘happen to us’. therefore I will use both terms as were they replaceable.
1
What is typical about actions that appear ‘unthinkable’ is that they still appear unimaginable
after they have happened, after people acted according to what was thought to be ‘unthinkable’.
Even after knowing, due to for example World War II, of what horror we are capable, we still
find it unimaginable we would act the same. Many people who acted horribly during that time
still have trouble explaining why they acted like they did and how they not only acted horrible in
one situation, but over and over again. Even if one fears that others could act wrong again, one
cannot imagine oneself or those close to oneself to do so. As we will see, the idea of ‘the
unthinkable’ can (on its own) not explain why we both keep on thinking and acting in an
unthinkable way (repetitions could be within one person or throughout history).
To demonstrate that humans of all kind can lapse into bad behavior in a very short span of time,
I will use a description of the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE). This experiment shows how
ordinary college students started to display very disturbing behavior within only five days.
Findings in the SPE suggest we are capable of acting in accordance with the unthinkable. Worse
even, that we are capable to do so over and over again. I will use the SPE to test Frankfurt’s
theory and to see what remains of its explanatory power. The SPE will help point at some
questions that remain unanswered in Frankfurt’s theory, especially those concerning the
doablility of the unthinkable.
The ‘silencing account’, as described by McDowell and Garrard, offers a very natural conception
of how certain options of acting become invisible, therewith giving a possible answer to these
questions. It serves both to explain heroic acts and fairly evil acts. I will use the idea of silencing,
as coined by John McDowell and elaborated by Eve Garrard, to better understand how the
unthinkable can become doable and repeatable while remaining unthinkable. Silencing seems to
offer a good explanation of the question why we deviate from what we would normally want and
expect to do. When silencing, a possible path of acting and the reasons to do so are silenced (no
longer seen) because of another overriding reason. This seems obvious for virtuous silencing
because, for example, we can immediately understand why many reasons fade away when one’s
partner is in danger. However, it is far from obvious for evil silencing. Evil silencing requires a
separate explanation. I shall argue that social-psychological research on biases provides insights
that can explain evil silencing. By applying these insights to evil silencing, I hope to attest that
the unthinkable, when seen in a frame of common morality and enriched with an account of
silencing, remains a plausible concept that can help us understand why some acts are
unimaginable and yet remain actionable.
2
I will first argue in favor of the existence of a common morality that is shared by all, mainly using
Gert2 and Haidt3. Their theories provide conceptions of agents and agency that connect well with
Frankfurt’s4 idea of agency. The idea of common morality explicitly argues for shared moral
intentions, which Gert and Haidt describe in great detail. Shared intentions can also be found in
Frankfurt’s theory, but with less substantiation. Frankfurt, on the other hand, develops his
concept of agency and the influence of character and volition in greater detail. His conception of
human agency will be put to use in chapter three. Based on this conception I will investigate the
concept of ‘the unthinkable’. This will result in a preliminary but seemingly credible way of
explaining how we experience actions as evil deeds. Frankfurt’s conceptualization gives,
however, rise to some new questions. Frankfurt does especially not explain how we can do the
unthinkable, as is demonstrated in the chapter on the Stanford Prison Experiment5 that shows
that we can act in unthinkable ways. The last two chapters are devoted to explaining how
intuition and reasoning can be thrown off road, thereby explaining how we can do the
unthinkable. First, through a conceptual analysis of reasoning that is out of balance, supported
by the concept of silencing.6 Second, by introducing what social psychologists call biases.
A better understanding of how we are capable of doing the unthinkable, and doing it over and
over again, can give insight in how we can prevent this from happening. Or so I hope.
2. Common Morality
Many moralities and theories on morality explicitly compete with each other on being and
representing the moral. This diversity can give one the feeling that opinions on morality are far
apart. Common morality provides a general moral framework which is claimed to be shared by
all humans. I want to use this framework as a basis for understanding shared unthinkable
actions. The focus of ‘common morality’ on agreement – instead of diversity – gives a basis for an
understanding of why wrong deeds are unimaginable for the majority of people in general.
B. Gert, "The Definition of Morality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, URL
= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/morality-definition/>.
3 J. Haidt, “Morality”, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3 (2008) p65-72; Haidt & Kesebir, “Morality”, in S. Fiske, D.
Gilbert, & G. Linzey (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th edition. Hobeken, NJ: Wiley (2010), pp. 797-832.
4 H. F. Frankfurt, The Importance of What we Care About: Philosophical Eessays. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1988; H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right, Stanford University Press 2006.
5 P. G. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, Understanding How Good People Turn Evil, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New
York 2008.
6 J. McDowell & J. G. McFetridge, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 52 (1978), pp. 13-42; E. Garrard, “The Nature of Evil”, Philosophical Explorations,
1 (1998), pp. 43-60.
2
3
Wrong acts, acts that we detest when they are performed, have to be acts that people in general
find unacceptable. Regarding something to be unacceptable cannot be about single individuals
finding an act (or acts) unacceptable. Only when it is a shared idea that a certain act is
unacceptable can it be meaningfully retained as being unacceptable after an individual acted in
that specific unacceptable way. Say that Joe is a practicing vegetarian. One day he finds himself
eating meat. Joe can now think that eating meat is actually not such an unacceptable thing as he
had always thought and perhaps he will continue eating meat for the foreseeable future. This is
in no way problematic for society (at least not for our society, where the idea that eating meat is
unacceptable is not widely shared). Now consider the following case. Say that Jane is against
killing, but one day she finds herself bashing someone’s head in. This of course has an impact on
the individual level (Jane and her poor victim), but also on the level of society. Exactly because
the idea that killing is unacceptable is widely shared, it makes sense to retain this idea and to
keep thinking that we are not allowed to do such a thing. Just imagine what society would be like
if we were constantly thinking that all other people were potential murderers. As Gert states, we
will accept moral rules because they do not only restrict people’s behavior, but also bring
securities that help us avoid suffering.7
Morality can be described as an essentially contested concept.8 There exists a widespread
agreement on importance and general meaning of the concept, but not on the best realization
and implementation of it. Because of the ongoing disagreement about the best realization of
morality, users of the concept are often found discussing the use and application of the term,
rather than settling on an agreed definition. This contestedness can partly be explained through
the two ways ‘morality’ is used; a normative and a descriptive way.9 When one defines morality
in a normative way one accepts, as part of it, a concept of rational persons that all endorse a
specific code as a moral code.10 When morality is perceived in a descriptive sense it refers to
codes of conduct that are put forward and accepted by some group, society or individual.11 The
descriptive perception of morality has recently become more prominent, among others by the
B. Gert, Common Morality: Deciding what to do, Oxford University Press, NY 2007, pp. 8-13.
W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.56, (1956), pp. 167–198. An
essentially contested concept is a concept about which many definitions exist that always stride for being the only
one. Art, religion, and democracy are concepts that are also said to be contested.
9 B. Gert, “Definition of Morality”.
10 There are many different codes and they regard other behaviors as immoral, therefore there is much disagreement
on the normative definition of morality. Seeing morality as a normative concept implies that all rational persons
endorse that concept of morality, independent of their religious beliefs, their upbringing, or the society they are part
of (B. Gert, Common Morality, preface). Ethical relativists deny the existence of a universal normative morality; only
in the descriptive sense can morality refer to a code of conduct.
11 Being outside of that group, this descriptive definition of “morality” has no implications on one’s behavior.
7
8
4
work of Haidt,12 who has been influenced by the views of David Hume and tries to present a
naturalistic account of moral judgments.13 Within this descriptive use of morality, both
philosophers and psychologists look for common grounds that are widely, if not universally,
accepted by mankind. Those common grounds could, if found, be considered as the normative
core of morality. So even when morality is defined in a descriptive way, researchers on common
morality are still looking for a common ground that can be perceived as normative or normgiving.
To describe a concept as being essentially contested does not only point at disagreement, it also
implies there is a level of agreement. This idea of ‘agreement within disagreement’ is
substantiated, among others, by Gert14 and Haidt & Kesebir15 as common morality; a shared
moral basis that allows for differences. I will use the concept of common morality because it can
help explain how the unacceptability of certain acts is shared by many. It can also give insight in
how we sometimes fail to do what is right, or even do something considered evil. I will draw on
Gert, Haidt, and Haidt & Kesebir to give an account of common morality. Although they take
different perspectives on morality, they arrive, I believe, at the same fundamental conclusions.
The line of thought that I am developing in this thesis is a combination of the fields of philosophy
and psychology, and the authors mentioned above each start reasoning from one of these
perspectives. Putting them together is meant to give a broader and more substantiated
perspective on common morality, and is certainly not meant to criticize one of the accounts on
the basis of the other. The roughly painted picture of common morality will give the right
background to show the relevance of my thesis.
2.1 Common Morality from a Philosophical Point of View
According to Gert, common morality is “the moral system that thoughtful people implicitly use
when making moral decisions and judgments”.16 All versions of theoretical and religious morality,
as written down by Kant, Mill, or in Christianity or Islam are revisions of this common morality.
What makes these revisions problematic is that they try to give one single answer for moral
cases, while according to Gert multiple answers are often possible and acceptable. Positing only
one of many possible answers to be the correct answer automatically implies that the other
answers incorrect. Gert assumes that because we share a basic set of moral ideas there is space
J. Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail, A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological
Review, 108 (2001), pp. 814 – 834.
13 B. Gert, “Definition of Morality”.
14 B. Gert, Common Morality.
15 J. Haidt & S. Kesebir, “Morality”.
16 B. Gert, “Common Morality”, p. 4.
12
5
for the attribution of different degrees of importance for the different aspects of the basic set of
moral ideas.17 If Gert is right, this explains why a diversity of possible and preferable answers
exists, while we are still able to stack them all under one theory.
Gert’s definition of moral people requires that they are also rational people. He claims that a
moral agent must have the following three rational characteristics.18 1) He/she should have a
minimal intelligence, including some ability to reason and use past experience to learn from. The
minimal intelligence is described as comparable to the intelligence of a ten year old and includes
knowledge like ‘knowing that people want to avoid pain and are vulnerable’. 2) A moral agent
must know the immediate and short-term consequences of most of her actions. 3) A moral agent
should possess volitional abilities: evidence should lead to beliefs of how the world is, and
functions and acts should be based on these beliefs. Gert assumes that all people are willing to
accept such a minimalistic view on the intelligence of mankind.19
Moral persons are not solely rational. They also have other characteristics, which make it
understandable that we actually care about morals and moral acting. We care about which
morality others use to guide their actions, the reason being that there might be bad
consequences for ourselves and those around us if they do not accept a morality that we find
acceptable.20 Gert assumes that morality is only concerned with behavior that affects other
people (causing death, pain, loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure). Furthermore, he assumes that
people all share features that benefit from moral and/or pro-social behavior, such as: 1) Humans
are vulnerable to suffering harms (like death, pain, disability, or deprivation of freedom and
pleasure). 2) Humans want to avoid those things that bring suffering. 3) Accepting rules to avoid
suffering is seen as rational. Furthermore, we should acknowledge that 4) rational people are
fallible and 5) rational people do not have all the knowledge and hence make mistakes.21
According to Gert “morality is an informal public system applying to all rational persons,
governing behavior that affects others, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal”.22 Seeing
morality as an informal system entails that the moral rules are no universal guide for all moral
situations. Differences in the moral frameworks people have are caused by the relative
importance they give to different harms. Some may choose a painful operation over an early
B. Gert, “Common Morality”, Preface & pp. 4-5.
Ibidem, pp. 87-88.
19 Ibidem, pp. 81-90.
20 Ibidem, pp. 5-13.
21 Ibidem. pp. 5-13.
22 B. Gert, “Definition of Morality”.
17
18
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death, others may not. That morality is a public system does not mean that everyone always
agrees on all the decisions that are made, but only that all disagreements occur within a
framework of agreement. “Basketball can be a public system even if referees can, within limits,
disagree in their judgments in calling fouls; but all players know that what the referees call a foul
determines what is a foul”.23 Moral agents can, and will, disagree in their moral judgments. These
disagreements will, however, fit within a shared framework. This agreement, concerning which
rules are moral rules, explains why morality can be a public system even though it is an informal
system. Rules about violating moral rules can of course also be fitted within this idea.
Cheating, deceiving, injuring, or killing another moral agent in order to gain money for shopping
or for a holiday is generally not considered as morally justifiable.24 Morality does, however, not
only forbid certain actions, it also promotes pro-social behavior. Still, the failure to act charitably
on every possible occasion does not require justification in the same way that any act of killing,
causing pain, deceiving, and breaking promises requires justification. For Gert, morality
encourages charitable action, but does not require it; it is always morally good to be charitable,
but it is not immoral not to be charitable.25
Some immoral acts can have a very small impact and hence breaking the moral rule that forbids
them can be seen as ‘not such a bad thing’. For example, tossing one’s soda can on the streets
does not necessarily imply the end of the world as we know it, although it might be considered
to be immoral. This leaves one with the question ‘why one should still behave moral’ in those
cases. Sometimes, direct reasons for acting moral are simply not convincing. Thus, people might
be tempted to use small lies, and sometimes they regard stealing as a proper option to avoid
being hungry, even though they would not starve if they would not steal. However, this type of
behavior cannot be tolerated, since if everyone would act in this way it would lead to an
unsustainable situation. In those cases indirect reasons can bring one to still do the morally right
thing. If not just oneself but many people would act in a certain immoral way, the act that ‘was
not that bad’ would no longer be condonable. The consequences of one person breaking a moral
rule with small impact are not the problem, but many people breaking the same moral rule could
lead to insurmountable problems. It is pure arrogance to think that one has the right to act
immoral where everybody else does not have that right. And “arrogance is incompatible with the
B. Gert, “Definition of Morality”.
B. Gert Common Morality, B. Gert, “Definition of Morality”.
25 One could argue there are two sorts of pro-social behaviors: 1) those behaviors that are perceived obligatory
(saving a drowning child) and 2) those pro-social behaviors that are not obligatory (helping every neighbor with his
grocery shopping). Where the line between obligatory and volitional pro-social behaviors should be drawn is not of
importance here.
23
24
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impartiality required by morality.”26 Arrogance is a character trait that ought to be avoided by all
rational people and therefore an indirect reason to act moral.27
Despite direct and indirect reasons pushing persons towards moral acting, there are still people
acting immorally. “Every rational person is aware that all people want her, regardless of any ends
she might have, not to act immorally, at least with regard to themselves”.28 Every rational person
will, most likely, also want all others to do the same. However, some rational people might not
want to support common morality.29 This can be due to religious beliefs or the belonging to a
dominant group. In both cases the view of common morality is broken by a view that applies to a
certain group. Within larger groups, as religious groups often are, those who follow a certain
religious vision are in large numbers. This makes it possible to ignore others without feeling the
consequences oneself. According to Gert30 these dominant and/or religious groups have beliefs
that obstruct common morality. Eliminating these beliefs will lead to endorsing common
morality again. This can explain why certain groups sometimes act out of line with common
morality without noting the problematic consequences for a larger community.
To summarize: Gert’s conception of morality presupposes that most, if not all, humans possess a
minimal rationality that results in the existence of a common morality. This minimal rationality
amounts to ‘implicit thinking’ about which effects one should prefer given one’s selfish and
social nature. Differences in how we think one should act within specific circumstances can be
explained by the relative importance individuals give to the different harms (and goods) that are
agreed upon within the framework of common morality. One should keep in mind that a huge
overlap remains, even when differences are accepted. It is mainly the implicitly rational
prohibition of acts that cause harm and pain that make someone act moral. This framework, Gert
thinks, is endorsed by all people, meaning that those acts that are breaking these rules are
generally seen as wrong.
B. Gert “Common Morality”, p. 134.
Gert, as we will see in Haidt as well, makes a differentiation between the questions “why be moral” and “why act
moral”. The first question gives a broader ground to substantiate reasons for acting morally right. By acting the
latter question, one only looks at the moment, potentially missing reasons to act moral that lie in a broader
perspective.
28 B. Gert, Common Morality, p. 82.
29 Ibidem, pp. 81-82.
30 Ibidem, pp. 81-82.
26
27
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2.2 Common Morality from a Psychological Point of View
Haidt and Kesebir31 compare empirical studies of morality, altruism, and pro-social behavior,
and bring results of these disciplines together. Based on empirical findings they suggest that
morality may be simply too heterogeneous and multifaceted to create one grand unified theory
of morality with single answers to every single question.
While discussing morality, Haidt and Kesebir32 think one should return to the question “why be
moral?”, as in their opinion the general tendency to focus on “why act moral?” is too shortsighted.33 They are thereby returning to an Aristotelian kind of ethics. Being moral should
partially happen through learning by practice, examples, and stories instead of through learning
by following rules. Asking the “why be moral?” question emphasizes practice and habit, rather
than knowledge and reasoning. Virtues are then skills of social perception and action that must
be acquired and refined over a lifetime.34 Narrowing the scope of ethics to the question “why act
moral?”, as utilitarianism and deontology have tended to do, would lead us away from stories,
character, and habit.35
Human nature is defined as partially selfish and partially characterized by empathy and
reciprocity.36 Society has to deal with the selfishness of people and morality plays an important
part in this. The multiple existing and defensible moralities known over the world are different
because there are multiple solutions to deal with selfishness.37 “Moral systems are interlocking
sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved
psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make
cooperative social life possible.”38 This does not mean it is always easy to repulse selfishness.
Haidt and Kesebir distance themselves from the division between ‘emotion’ (or affect) and
‘cognition’. They consider emotions as being a form of cognition. Rather, they distinguish
between intuition and reasoning (being both a type of cognition). (a) (Moral) intuition is
described as “seeing that something is … (good/bad, likeable/dislikeable)”: the sudden
appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling about the
Haidt and Kesebir, “Morality”.
Haidt and Kesebir, “Morality”, pp. 797-800.
33 Ibidem, p. 798.
34 P. M. Churchland, “Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues”, Topoi 17 (1998), pp.84-86; J. McDowell,
“Virtues and Reason”, Monist 62 (1979), pp. 131-132.
35 J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, p. 798.
36 Ibidem, p. 800.
37 Haidt and Kesebir use the view on moral pluralism as defined by R. A. Shweder, N. C. Muck, M. Mahapatra & L. Part,
“The “Big Three” of Morality (Autonomy, Community, and Divinity), and the “Big Three” Explanations of Suffering”,
in eds. A. Brandt & P. Rozin, Morality and health (pp. 119-169). New York: Routledge, 1997.
38 J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, p. 800.
31
32
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character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of
search, weighing evidence, or inferring conclusions.39 (b) (Moral) reasoning is “conscious mental
activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to
reach a moral judgment.”40 These last processes are intentional, effortful, and controllable, as is
their awareness.41 Intuition is the most used cognitive form, guiding most decisions. Intuition
plays a key role in moral decision making as well. Reasoning is a process that often takes place
after an intuitive judgment is already made. This first judgment can and will direct the
arguments that are used in reasoning about one’s judgments.42 So it can be said that there is a
relevant difference between ‘making oneself believe that it would be best to do X’ and ‘finding
oneself to believe that it would be best to do X’.
Haidt and Kesebir distinguish three functional principles guiding moral judgments: (1) intuitive
primacy, (2) moral thinking is for social doing, (3) and morality binds and builds. The first
principle, intuitive primacy, states that most of human mental life is made up of automatic
intuitive processes, moral intuition being one of them.43 This signifies that reasoning, at least
most of the time, comes after intuition, if there is any reasoning involved at all. In moral thinking
reasoning seems to have less power and independence than in other forms of thinking. When
reasoning about morals, a variety of motives push people towards finding support for the
conclusions already reached by (faster) intuitive processes. Reasoning involves multiple steps,
and any one of those steps could be biased by intuitive processes. One famous bias is that people
search only for relevant arguments and evidence.44 Reflection is thus not excluded, but its effects
remain rather unclear within Haidt and Kesebir’s theory.45
Haidt and Kesebir, secondly, presume that much of human cognition was shaped by natural
selection for life in intensely social groups: moral thinking is for social doing.
46
This second
principle that guides moral thinking entails that cognition is socially situated and has social
functions. Moral language and reasoning evolved to enable communication, not truth finding.
J. Haidt and F. Bjorklund, “Social Intuitionist Answer Six Questions about Morality”, in ed. W. Sinnott - Armstrong,
Moral psychology: Vol. 2. The cognitive science of morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2008, p. 188.
40 J. Haidt, “Emotional Dog”, p. 818.
41 J. A. Bargh, “The Four Horsemen of Automaticity. Awareness, Efficiency, Intention, and Control in Social Cognition”,
In eds. J. R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull, Handbook of Social Cognition (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 1994, pp. 2-4.
42 J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, pp. 801-808.
43 J. A. Bargh and T. L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being”, American Psychologist, 54,(1999), pp. 462479.
44 D. Kuhn, The Skills of Argument, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 169-170.
45 See J. Kennett and C. Fine, “Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand up?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12
(2009), p. 83.
46 J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, pp. 808-814.
39
10
And if one would find oneself in discussion, convincing others with arguments might have
mattered more than telling the truth.
The third principle, morality binds and builds47, concerns the human capacity for cumulative
cultural learning; this capacity can increase the importance of group-level selection and the
entitativity of the group an individual belongs to (the perception of a group as pure entity), and
thus decrease individual level pressures. It also leaves room for solving problems that arise in
social groups, such as the free-rider problem.
Five so called hypothetical foundations of morality give substance to these three principles.48
The five foundations of morality are 1) avoiding harm and caring (we are concerned with
suffering of ourselves and others, caring and compassion are part of the care side of harm/care)
2) fairness and reciprocity (general concerns about unfair treatment, cheating and other more
abstract notions of justice and right), 3) in-group/loyalty (people have obligations to other
group members, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal, 4) authority and
respect (the various roles we have oblige us to show respect, obedience and so on), 5) purity and
sanctity (concerns about both physical and spiritual contagion, including wholesomeness,
control of desires and the virtue of chastity). These five foundations that are commonly shared
result in general intuitions on morality that all share, in common morality.
Summarizing Haidt and Kesebir, humans are social beings that also have egoistic characteristics.
Morality is about being social. Moral judgments are intuitive and the intuitions about morality
are commonly shared due to five hypothetical foundations. Intuition and reasoning should not
be taken as two completely different things; they are both cognitive processes. In general, people
will act on their intuitions and reasoning will, most of the time, follow those intuitions with
arguments that can underpin the intuitive judgments. Social evolution is at the basis of our
moral intuitions.
2.3 Combining Two Approaches of Common Morality
Both discussed approaches take a different starting point, which give a different emphasis to
their theories. Gert is, first of all, opposed to the idea that there is only one moral theory, or that
moral theories exclude each other’s solutions. Although there is no moral theory that can tell us
exactly what to do in every situation, the diversity of possible moral decisions falls within the
lines of common morality. Haidt and Kesebir are keen on pointing out how intuition and
reasoning are both cognitive capacities. Intuition comes first in many occasions, directing what
47
48
J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, pp. 814-821.
Ibidem, pp. 821-823.
11
arguments are used and what our moral judgment is. Starting both from different angles, they
use different terminology. This makes some differences between both theories of common
morality appear bigger than they actually are.
Both approaches disclose a common morality that is shared by (almost) all. The different
solutions to moral problems can be attributed to the fact that individuals have their own
hierarchy of which sufferings and losses in freedom are more important (Gert) and to the
different possible ways in which societies deal with selfishness (Haidt and Kesebir). The
framework is largely shared by all because each individual cares about avoiding suffering and
accepting rules to avoid suffering (Gert), or by avoiding harm, and advancing fairness, loyalty,
respect and sanctity (Haidt and Kesebir).
Morality is based on human nature, assuming that all humans have a minimal rationality. This
rationality is comparable to that of a ten year old in Gert’s writing. Haidt and Kesebir attribute
the moral decisions we make to intuition. They separate reasoning from intuitive decision
making, but intuition is a matter of cognition. I believe this is an area where one might think the
two approaches to be miles apart from one another, purely through the words that they have
chosen. If one looks more precisely at the kind of rationality that Gert supposes, this is, however,
very close to the intuitive process Haidt and Kesebir talk about: it is about ‘knowing that people
avoid suffering’ and ‘learning from experience’.
Compared to Gert, Haidt and Kesebir describe some extra characteristics of human nature and
agency, making a clear distinction between intuitions and reasoning and stating that intuition
plays the lead role. This explicit emphasis on intuition sets reasoning aside as the cognitive
capacity that makes us explicitly and consciously decide how to act in moral situations.49
Both approaches also give insight in why people sometimes fail to do what is moral. According to
Gert an individual can be distracted from common morality by following the specific rules and
ideas of a dominant group.50 Haidt and Kesebir focus on the balance between social life and
selfishness, saying selfishness is the reason we deviate from the moral path.51 Gert assumes that
reasons of self-interest are normally compatible with acting morally. If they are not, we need
49
Gert seems to be more interested in morality’s capacity to provide ‘rational justifications’ of what we find ourselves
wanting to do. This seems to make the apparent differences between Gert and Haidt and Kesebir even smaller.
50 B. Gert, Common Morality, pp. 81-82.
51 J. Haidt and S. Kesebir, “Morality”, p. 800.
12
indirect reasons to be drawn to the moral choice.52 However, this implies that self-interest can,
and sometimes will be a reason to act immoral in his theory too.
The discussed approaches leave an important point disregarded: sometimes we experience that
our intuitive choices deviate from what we think we ought to (and also would like to) do. In
extreme situations, such as World War II, we see people acting against their own expectations.
Doing something immoral can sometimes be a choice, like collaborating with the enemy in order
to protect oneself, that obviously goes against common morality, yet can be explained through
self-interest. But what happens in those situations where we do what we never expected to do,
for example turning in Jews without there being an obvious reason for it? Do we want the moral
behavior, but are we unable to act accordingly? Or do we often not realize our choices are nonmoral or immoral? The next chapter will investigate what it means to do something we want to
do, but also, more importantly, what it means to do things that we do not want to do or, even
more, find unthinkable, but that we still do anyway.
3. The Unthinkable
Through using Frankfurt’s theory on agency, intentionality, and the unthinkable, I will combine
and extend two important points that I have derived, in the previous chapter, from the different
approaches concerning common morality. These points are: (1) (almost) all human beings share
the capacity to intuitively and implicitly think and act morally, 2) due to human nature these
intuitions are shared to a large extent among all humans. Frankfurt agrees that some values are
shared by (almost) all humans,53 but he argues that we differ in the relative importance we give
these values.
„In addition to their interest in staying alive, people generally have various other
similarly primitive and protean concerns as well, which also provide them with
reasons for acting. For instance, we cannot help caring about avoiding crippling
injury and illness, about maintaining at least some minimal contact with other
human beings, and about being free from chronic suffering and endlessly stupefying
boredom. We love being intact and healthy, being satisfied, and being in touch. We
cannot bring ourselves to be wholly indifferent to these things, much less
categorically opposed to them.”54
B. Gert, Common Morality, pp. 132-134.
H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, p. 38.
54 Ibidem, p. 38.
52
53
13
Since these desires come naturally to all human beings, they are regarded as necessary human
aspects.55 This does not mean they are equally important to everyone. Individuals differ in the
importance these desires have in their practical reasoning.56 All this fits perfectly with the idea
of a common morality as described in chapter two. While parts of Frankfurt’s account fit nicely
with the theories of common morality, he also provides deeper understanding of what happens
on the individual level when people choose certain actions, especially where he attempts to
explain why certain acts are considered to be unimaginable (‘unthinkable’ in Frankfurt’s
terminology) by human beings. People, sometimes without even knowing why, do things that
they themselves and other people consider unthinkable to do. However, if these things are really
considered to be unthinkable at both the group level and individual level, how come that
individual people can do them? We saw that, from the perspective of theories of common
morality, we cannot explain how individual people – intuitively or deliberatively – can choose to
do what they and others find unthinkable. In short: we cannot explain how people can choose to
do what is perceived as lying outside the domain of possible choices for acting. Intuitively, this
shortcoming of common morality leads me to think that a distinction ought to be made between
what is perceived as unthinkable but can become doable, and what is unthinkable and undoable.
It is my guess that Frankfurt’s theoretical framework provides enough conceptual building
blocks for me to come up with such an account. Frankfurt’s attention to the different weight
people’s desires have in their practical reasoning, his specific attention to people’s volitions and
reflections, and his development of the concept of ‘the unthinkable’ make that his theory
provides a great starting point for an attempt to understand why and how we do evil deeds.
We saw that Haidt and Kesebir pointed to the different values people attach to their five
hypothetical foundations of morality.57 Frankfurt also offers an explanation why people
sometimes differ in their choice of action and sometimes even fail to act in line with moral rules.
Different people have different desires and goals, causing conflicting desires. Sometimes they
strive for the same hard to obtain desires and goals to be fulfilled, causing competition. This
implies that moral rules sometimes can – and will – go against what we actually want to do, or
want to achieve.58 What an agent wants can go together with, or stand in opposition to, the rules
of the society we live in and common morality. What we care about is very individual and hence
often different from moral rules that are generally applicable.59 If we agree with Frankfurt’s
H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, p. 38.
It might be superfluous to add, but the balance of reasoning that is talked about is not of a conscious reflective kind
(at least it need not be). These processes are highly automated.
57 Haidt and Kesebir, “Morality”, pp. 821-823.
58 H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 20-22.
59 Ibidem, pp. 20-22.
55
56
14
argument, the conclusion follows that we will not always choose moral action over our
(personally) preferred action.
A major difference between the discussed approaches on common morality (Gert, Haidt &
Kesebir) and Frankfurt’s theory on agency is the attention given by the latter to volitions and
reflections. Although Frankfurt’s explanation of action is based on building character and
making intuitive decisions, his theory also includes a moment of distance in which one reflects
on one’s character. A character is not only developed through what we experience (what
happens to us), but also through what we want to do with what we experience: we are reflective
beings. Frankfurt argues that the ‘unthinkable’ can only exist against a background of things we
‘care about’. The things we love imply that certain actions that would hurt or damage what we
love are unacceptable and therefore unthinkable. When interpreting the concept ‘unthinkable’ as
such we can explain why people cannot bring themselves to doing evil deeds, and cannot
imagine they will ever be able to act in evil ways. A highly intuitive idea, one that can help us to
further understand why we attempt to avoid harmful behavior and why this is so much part of
our human nature. Based on Frankfurt’s conception of character and the conception of the
unthinkable that he has built on it, I will try to understand how we can do what is commonly
deemed unacceptable and unthinkable. First, I will introduce Frankfurt’s opinions on volitions,
choices, and character, elements that are ‘new’ in the sense that they were not discussed by me
in the section on common morality. Second, I will turn to the concept of the unthinkable as
Frankfurt develops it. Ultimately, a conclusion will follow on what it entails to do the
unthinkable.
3.1 Choices, Consequences and Personal Character
Caring and loving others, things, and activities is at the heart of Frankfurt’s theory. Frankfurt
sees, of course, that being as free as possible is valued highly in contemporary society. He
emphasizes, however, that free choices always also involve necessities. Every choice we make
(because of things we care about) has determining consequences for ourselves. Such
consequences are an expression of our freedom, according to Frankfurt.60 Saying that choices lead
to necessary consequences does not show that we are not free. Rather, it illustrates that building
personal character involves boundaries and setting boundaries. Our necessities result in acts we
associate with as well those acts we dissociate from.
60
H. F. Frankfurt, “On the Necessity of Ideals”, in eds. G. G. Noam, T. E. Wran; The Moral Self: Building a Better
Paradigm. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press 1993, pp. 18-20.
15
Frankfurt states that in general we do not choose what the objects of our love and care are.
Loving and caring ‘happen’ to us. These desires and wants that befall upon us are called firstorder desires (or volitions). It is impossible to explain why my neighbor likes to take care of his
chickens and I like to read books; these preferences in first-order volitions somehow pop up and
develop.61 Yet these cares are at the basis of our character. What we care about and love can
arise for many reasons. Cares can come from imperatives of tradition, from style, intellect, or
ambition. This does not mean that our first order volitions are fully beyond our will. We do have
influence on how the objects of love and care appear in our actions, through what Frankfurt calls
‘second-order volitions’ (and higher-order volitions). Higher order volitions are volitions about
volitions and volitions to act on volitions.62 We can confirm or deny first order desires by
directing actions through selective identification with certain attitudes and preferences.63 In
doing so, we take responsibility for these attitudes and preferences. Humans cannot literally
produce their character, but they do take responsibility for it through their higher order
volitions.64 Every person develops reactions to his/her first order volitions. Both identification
with and dissociation from first order volitions derive from the capability of forming higher
order volitions as reactions to our first order volitions. While our first order volitions are not
chosen, it does not follow that our relationship to what we care about is wholly non-cognitive
and without reason. “There is considerable room for reason and argument in the clarification of
ideals and in the evaluation of their worthiness.”65 The actions of an agent reinforce the caring,
creating automaticity in reactions to situations. These automatic, intuitive actions are then in
line with their (higher-order) volitions.
Frankfurt formulates a theoretical framework in which agents attempt to have a fully integrated
self. His answer to the question of how we can integrate all the different (and often conflicting)
volitions a person can have is the idea of a hierarchy of volitions.66 A fully integrated self has
harmony in all (levels of) volitions. Harmony implies a) knowing the desires, b) not deceiving
oneself about them, and c) acting on them.67 Conflicts between volitions that do arise have to be
resolved in order to be a fully integrated self; this can be done by searching for (even) higher
order volitions and outlawing deviating lower ones.68 An agent that has constituted
H. F. Frankfurt, “Necessity of Ideals”, pp. 24-25.
H. F. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII 5-20 (1971), pp. 8485.
63 H. F. Frankfurt, “Necessity of Ideals”, pp. 19-21.
64 H. F. Frankfurt, Taking ourselves seriously, pp. 21-23.
65 Ibidem, p. 26.
66 H. F. Frankfurt, Importance, pp. 172-174.
67 Ibidem, pp.163-164.
68 Ibidem, pp. 172-174.
61
62
16
himself/herself without ambivalence is also called wholehearted.69 Self-knowledge is crucial in
acting wholeheartedly; only by knowing one’s volitions one can act and react on them through
higher order volitions.70 Frankfurt’s argument, for as far as we have discussed it, gives us an
integrated picture of the influence of both ‘automatic’ and ‘reasoned’ strivings on producing our
actions.
3.2 Unwanted Desires and Volitions
What are the implications of Frankfurt’s ideas for our understanding of evil actions? As we
generally cannot decide which first order volitions we have, we also cannot decide having or not
having unwanted (possibly evil) first order volitions.71 Frankfurt mentions that we have a dark
side consisting of rebellious desires that we simply do not want to identify with.72 Like all first
order volitions, these unwanted volitions, of which some could be called dark or evil, befall on
us. Frankfurt, however, also explains how higher order volitions can help us to overcome
intensely unwanted, despised, desires. Through higher order volitions we can try to keep the
influence of unwanted desires as small as possible. Dissociation (by not endorsing) of volitions
diminishes their power to function as motives to act on. The fact that, in general, humans do not
want to endorse despised desires, can be explained within the framework of common morality:
there are certain acts that we all want to avoid and hence, we would also rather not experience
the desire to do these acts. The sort of unwanted desires talked about here, is of course not
about, say, eating fifteen cookies in one minute. Although this might be unwanted, it is not the
type of unwanted looked for. Killing fifteen people in one minute, just for fun, is unwanted in the
way meant here.
How do our varieties of volitions lead us to actions? Frankfurt calls reasons that are motivating
actions ‘practical reasons’.73 Everybody has goals in life, and practical reason helps tell if our
attempts to reach these goals will benefit from certain actions. Whether or not a reason, or a
combination of reasons, is sufficiently motivating for an action depends on a combination of
factors. Not every kind of reason has equal force. Wishes, things we care about, and things we
love, are examples of different kinds of reasons with different forces. A goal is far more effective
in motivating action than a wish, for we identify ourselves more with our goals. They are part of
our personality. We will be more willing to put a lot of energy into reaching a goal we care much
H. F. Frankfurt, Importance, pp. 163-164.
What we care about can and will change throughout live, meaning that if someone is a fully integrated self at some
point, he will have to reevaluate and reorder his higher order volitions over time. H. F. Frankfurt, Importance,
pp.163-164. H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 21-22; pp. 45-50.
71 Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 10-11.
72 Ibidem. pp. 10-11.
73 Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 13-14.
69
70
17
about than in fulfilling a wish we deem important. Yet, if something comes easy, a simple desire
might be sufficiently motivating to act. Eating ice-cream can be a very real desire, but it will
never have as much power as, for example, the love for one’s partner.
„When we do care about something, we go beyond wanting it. We want to go on
wanting it, at least until the goal has been reached. Thus, we feel it as a lapse on our
part if we neglect the desire, and we are disposed to take steps to refresh the desire
if it should tend to fade. The caring entails, in other words, a commitment to the
desire.”74
Unwanted desires will in most cases not pull one to action, since they will not be supported by
higher-order volitions and one will not be committed to the desire to fulfill the unwanted desire.
Thus, one might expect unwanted desires to have little impact and to do little harm.
3.3 Volitional Necessities and the Unthinkable
The things we care about form boundaries within which we act.75 We identify with what we care
about and this affects us, both in positive (acting) and negative (neglecting, leaving aside) ways.
Caring implies necessities in order to hold onto the thing one cares about. A person will
“purposefully direct his attention, attitudes, and behavior in response to circumstances germane to
the fortunes of the object about which he cares.”76
Not doing certain things is as much a consequence of caring as doing things for the same
underlying reason or goal. The aversion to acts that are unfavorable to what we care about is an
endorsement of the fact that we care about it.77 Unthinkable acts are acts that are contrary to our
goals, reasons, and higher order volitions. They are the actions one feels most aversion towards
because they go against what we care about and love (our volitional necessities). From this we
can conclude that saying that something is unthinkable is a very strong and intense thing to say.
The necessities that come from care and love are subject to change “as a consequence of
alterations in the contingent circumstances from which volitional necessities derive”.78 This implies
that changes mainly happen through changed circumstances. The process of changing what we
care about is slow and indirect. Choices in how we act are made if several impulses and desires
exist at the same time. Then, persons can and have to “negotiate” their own way of acting, based
H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 18-19.
H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, pp. 19-20.
76 H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, p. 20.
77 Ibidem, p. 21.
78 H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, p. 21.
74
75
18
on their impulses, desires, and higher order volitions.79 This negotiation is supported by higher
order volitional features and allows us to distance ourselves from certain impulses and desires
while – at the same time – identifying with the impulses and desires we now choose to act on.80
If some dispositions are set, then a continuous interaction exists between these dispositions and
those things we distance ourselves from respectively associate ourselves with. This means that
the choices we make are based on the dispositional desires and impulses we have, and on
influences resulting from negotiation and former negotiations. Negotiation offers the
opportunity to change through an internal force. Summarizing, we could say that change in
character and actions can be caused by changing circumstances and through sequences of
negotiations. Those things we care about have been endorsed and chosen hundreds of times,
reaffirming our caring about them.81 Changing them needs many repetitions of new behavior,
reinforcing other cares.
Caring and loving give us reasons to act and goals to pursuit. But they do not only offer reasons
and goals, they also offer limits.82 A woman loving her husband and desiring a stable long term
relationship also is not looking for relations with other men. The limits that develop through
love and care bring with them the notion of unthinkable actions. It seems impossible to think we
might ever act against the wellbeing of those we love and care about. She cannot imagine herself
to be identical to the agent that would consider other men. She can think about the action, but
not from the point of view of the ‘agent’ of such an action. It is impossible for her to imagine the
actions performable. Love and care thus bring volitional laws that have to be respected and are
binding.83 That something is unthinkable is not a problem but a desired thing, for these things
are unthinkable as a result of our caring. Something being unthinkable implies that we cannot do
it even though it is possible. If everything were there to act in that way, we only lack the
willpower to do it. The unthinkable is unthinkable and unimaginable because of who we are (not
due to the situation).
Although people might think or feel they know their own character, sometimes they might be
surprised to find themselves acting differently than expected. In order to act on higher-order
volitions they need a lot of knowledge on what they care about and what their volitions are. Just
like someone is not always aware of the (unwanted) desires that drive them and the values they
have, someone can also be staggered by the things they want to do or find unthinkable. I will
H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 13-14.
H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, pp. 19-20.
81 H. F. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously, pp. 45-50.
82 H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, pp. 19-20.
83 Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
79
80
19
argue that this leaves room for actions no-one had never thought they would perform. Does the
idea of the unthinkable, as positioned by Frankfurt, leave enough room for explaining a situation
where people act in ways they find themselves unthinkable?84
3.4 Thinking versus Acting
The concept of unthinkable acts follows from cares and higher order volitions that were acted
upon many times before. Frankfurt’s idea of an ‘unthinkable’ thus implies an ‘unactionable’. One
does not claim something to be unthinkable, unimaginable, expecting yet to act upon it a second
later. Yet, we have the impression that unthinkable acts can be acted upon, even while acting in
such a manner remains unthinkable, based on examples of unthinkable behavior in the past.
Frankfurt does not reflect on situations in which one acts based on thoughts that are perceived
as unthinkable. He does, however, describe the reverse situation, where something thinkable
becomes unthinkable. I will first describe his example of thinkable actions that become
unthinkable and reflect on what this means, from there I will conclude what it means if the
unthinkable is doable within his framework. But let me emphasize the difference between
thinkable and unthinkable first. Finding something thinkable does not mean one is extremely
positive about it; one’s opinion can be within the whole range between hyper positive and even
slightly negative (studying micro-biology or hurting someone who is attacking me, are both
thinkable actions for me, even though they have no (explicitly) positive associations for me). The
unthinkable, however, is not so broadly defined, it comprises only those acts that really go
against an agents higher order volitions and character and therefore always are really and truly
unthinkable. Saying that something is unthinkable is thus much stronger than saying something
is thinkable.
What happens when something thinkable becomes unthinkable and/ or undoable? Sometimes,
we think that we are capable of performing a specific action, but we discover that we cannot do
it the moment we are faced with a situation that demands that specific action. Frankfurt gives an
example about the use of nuclear weapons to illustrate this point.85 Military officers volunteered
for an assignment involving the use of nuclear weapons. They practiced for possible attacks and
said to be willing to use the material when asked to. One day, the situation seemed different; the
officers thought they had to use the nuclear weapons for real – not for practice. Many officers
found themselves unable to perform the required action. They thought they would be capable of
84
One concern here is what ‘to act’ is supposed to mean. Sometimes we seem to act incontinently, or unfree, on such
occasions we do not really act, we do not take the ‘agent-position’. However, to me, a conclusions that we are
innocent in such cases is unwanted. Later on I will argue how this acting can still be linked to desires and volitions
and yet divert us from our wholeheartedness.
85 H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, pp. 20-21.
20
using them, but, at the moment of acting, they found themselves incapable of actually doing so.
The action was unthinkable, but they only found out at the moment of performance.86 The
moment they had to act seems to function as a reality check on what they really care about: the
soldiers discover that they are incapable of performing a certain act. I will argue we can also find
ourselves doing something we would have never imagined ourselves to do.87 But I will argue this
has different implications.
One would expect a match between thinkable and doable and unthinkable and undoable. The
manifold examples in history and in the Stanford Prison Experiment show this match is not
always there, and therefore I want to make a distinction between (un)thinkable and
(un)actionable. I will first explain some further what I want to distinguish and what it implies,
then I will zoom in on unthinkable acts that seem actionable.
3.5 Thinkability versus Doability
Frankfurt’s concept of unthinkable implies an unactionable. Saying something is unthinkable
could be equated with saying something is unactionable. When something is unthinkable
because it goes against one’s higher-order volitions, it would be strange if one could still act in
such a way. Yet, as examples like using chemical weapons and WWII show, only in acting it
becomes fully clear whether we are – or are not – capable of acting in a certain way. This acting
can teach us something about the relationship between what one finds unthinkable and acts that
lie in line with what one finds unthinkable. This moment of acting has shown people to be
capable of doing the unthinkable in the past. Together with Frankfurt’s example of thinkable acts
that appear undoable, therefore, I want to distinguish between four possible categories of
actions.
I.
II.
An action is thinkable and doable.
An action is unthinkable and undoable.
III.
An action is thinkable yet undoable.
IV.
An action is unthinkable yet doable.
These categories are not mentioned as such by Frankfurt, although category I, II, and III are
explicitly described in his work. As Frankfurt is trying to clarify different issues, his attention has
never been on this IVth category. But his idea on the unthinkable does imply these four
categories which seem relevant, and problematic, in the light of my thesis. I believe that the IVth
category is problematic and needs explanation, most certainly if the unthinkable actions that are
86
87
H. F. Frankfurt, "Necessity of Ideals“, p. 21.
Ibidem, p. 21.
21
acted upon go against shared common moral principles. Before I explain this last point further, I
shall first sketch the four categories of actions that I want to explicitly distinguish.
Category I contains those actions that are endorsed by higher-order volitions and are actionable
and often done. Loving and caring for one’s family involves regular activities that one does
because one cares, such as preparing dinner, washing clothes, hugging each other. These
activities are done and thinkable. Category II contains the actions that are dismissed by higherorder volitions and are (therefore) not performed. The aforementioned possibility to kill fifteen
people in one minute is unthinkable and undoable. Both category III and IV are problematic, in
the sense that they do not match well with Frankfurt’s idea of a wholehearted person. They are
similar in the sense that our thoughts are not compatible with how we find ourselves acting.
Category III contains those cases in which we thought we could do something, yet find ourselves
actually unable to do it. In accordance with the example of the chemical weapons, in the end we
experience certain higher-order volitions too important to consider an action an option. But also
stop smoking can appear relatively simple and thinkable yet undoable to many. As we may not
have thought through all possible conclusions that follow from our loving and caring, it seems
probable that an (at first) thinkable act not only is undoable, but is undoable because it is
unthinkable for the agent. The agent encounters a situations in which he is confronted with
something that was never given much thought, and now that there is more attention to this
subject, it is discovered that the action appears unthinkable and undoable. Category IV, where
something unthinkable is done, is more problematic. As pointed out before, claiming something
to be unthinkable is a very strong claim: acting in an unthinkable way really goes against ones
higher-order volitions, one’s character. This entails that one is familiar with the aversion,
otherwise one would never claim it to be unthinkable. Therefore, I assume that Frankfurt would
say that unthinkable actions are those actions we most certainly will not perform because we
lack the will power to do so (or because the will power to do something else is too strong).
Calmly, joyfully, intentionally killing an old man on a bright day just because you dislike the color
of his shoes is unthinkable.88 Everyday experience, history, and research in social psychology
show us, however, that what seems unthinkable can become doable in the right – or should we
say wrong? – situation. From a perspective of common morality, it is understandable that many
unthinkable acts are not only unthinkable for one individual; they are generally considered
unthinkable. When one person acts in an unthinkable way, the act will remain unthinkable for all
other people and through common morality it remains – in a sense – unthinkable for the actor
88
A flying human being that is using no technology is also unthinkable, but this follows from the fact that it is
undoable. The concept ‘unthinkable’ to Frankfurt implies that the undoability follows from the unthinkability.
22
too. For if someone cares about common morality, this implies caring about common
unthinkable actions that emerge from it. Common moral unthinkable acts are a part of our
shared ground for living together, which means it is highly important these actions remain
unthinkable. Since not all things unthinkable will be (commonly) shared, I propose a distinction
between two versions of category IV:
IV-A: The unthinkable action is personal and has no moral relevance to the lives and wellbeing of
others, such as Joe who has a vegetarian lifestyle and considers eating meat unthinkable. He saw
a documentary on animal farms (non-Orwellian of course) and now visualizes these animals and
their pain every time he even thinks about meat, making it unthinkable to eat meat. If Joe eats
meat (for whatever reason, maybe it smelled real good and he was really hungry and there was
nothing else available), his (personal) unthinkable would become actionable (without a moral
problem). This would be a personal matter; he acts contrary to this second order volition
(although one might have to change his volitions in order to become a wholehearted person
again). It, however, is not a problem for society.
IV-B: The unthinkable action is unthinkable in the sense of common morality. We have seen this
with the example of Jane bashing someone’s head in, or the way some individuals acted during
WWII (and as we will see in the SPE). The fact that people did act in unthinkable ways back then,
does not change our feeling that an unthinkable act happened, nor does it change the
unthinkability of those acts as perceived by others, and I will argue it is possible that the idea of
unthinkability did not change for the actors either.
Actions that are unthinkable in the sense of common morality, are harder to understand and also
of higher importance to society. What does it mean if we act in line with what is commonly
perceived unthinkable? Does it change the unthinkability of such and act? And if it does not
change the unthinkability of an act, then what does change? In order to answer this question I
will introduce the Stanford Prison Experiment.
4. The Stanford Prison Experiment
In this section I will discuss the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) 89, a ‘one of a kind’ experiment
during which people did a lot of unthinkable acts. In doing so I hope to shed some light on what
it means to do deeds that are commonly perceived as unthinkable. This will lead to both a
critique on and an extension of Frankfurt’s theory. For a better understanding of my critique and
89
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect.
23
extension, it is important to keep the following main points of Frankfurt’s concept of agency and
the unthinkable in mind. First, from what we enduringly love and care about arises
simultaneously the unthinkable. Second, people have not only wanted and positive desires, they
also have unknown, possibly unwanted, desires. Some of these latter (possibly unwanted)
desires are not endorsed by higher order volitions, but this does not automatically mean they
are totally extinguished.90 Third, building character takes time and practice, since disregarding a
desire is not easily done. These points are important because they make clear we can be
unaware of our (unwanted) desires and volitions, for example because we never encountered
situations in which they prevailed – we never learned to distance ourselves from them.
The chemical weapons example I used in the previous chapter is most certainly a moral
situation. However, the question Frankfurt addresses is not about the moral aspect of this
situation: it does not consider whether using chemical weapons is considered the right thing to
do, even though this might have been the reason why some of the soldiers refused to use the
weapons for real. The example serves to show how an action that appeared thinkable suddenly
became unthinkable. The case of the Stanford Prison Experiment brings different aspects to
light. During the experiment, guards found themselves capable of actions they had considered
unthinkable before and still found unthinkable afterwards, partly because these actions went
against their ideas about how people should be treated. However, they were capable of doing the
same unthinkable thing over and over again. Even with reflective moments in between their
actions, during which they explicitly expressed a dislike of their own previous behavior, they still
often repeated the behaviors. I will now turn to a description of the experiment, after which I
will consider its implication for the concept of the unthinkable.
4.1 Introduction to the Experiment
The SPE was initially set up to learn about the culture among prisoners within prison life. While
the experiment was planned to last two entire weeks, it was stopped after five days. The reason,
however, was not misbehavior on the side of the prisoners, but misbehavior on the side of the
guards and the resulting psychological distress the prisoners were in after only a few days.91 In
merely five days regular college students became brutal people that seemingly diverted
A women married for many years, could find herself in love with someone else. This feeling is unwanted to her
without it being a ‘unwanted desire. It, however, does not mean she can get rid of the feeling at once.
91 P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, pp. 174-194.
90
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themselves by frustrating, bullying and overpowering co-students; students that were put in
their role of prisoner by lot, a fact that all were aware of.92
The experiment lasted five horrible, torturing days.93 In general, it can be said that the prisoners’
treatment worsened every day. Some of the events were incidental; other events repeated
themselves over the days. I will emphasize the behaviors that got out of hand and repeated over
the days, for these behaviors were not only unthinkable at first, but they remained unthinkable
throughout the experiment (as we see in the reflections of the guards) and were yet done again
and again. Therefore, the counts (central gatherings during which was checked if all prisoners
were present and which were also meant to discipline the prisoners) that took place several
times a day are the main focus in this chapter. Doing something one had imagined unacceptable
(unthinkable) once might be explained as a mistake. Doing something that is unthinkable over
and over again, in ever worse variations, asks for another explanation. Doing the unthinkable
again, after having realized one did it before and after having explicitly rejected it as being
unthinkable is truly problematic. In order to better understand the experiment and the counts, I
will start by shortly introducing the SPE.
To make the division between guard and prisoner clear and kick-start the feeling of being in
prison, the experiment started off with real police cars picking up the prisoners and bringing
them to prison.94 Embarrassment and a loss of individuality were inflicted by assigning all
prisoners a number. To make their individuality disappear even more, all prisoners got the same
clothing (a mock dress) and stockings to cover-up their hair. To instill a sense of inferiority they
were deloused, not allowed to wear underwear, and got a chain around their ankle. Guards were
recognizable by wearing reflecting sunglasses that hid their identity and a Billy club and uniform
that were meant to bestow them with authority.95
The days were divided in three shifts, made up of three guards (making for nine guards in total).
Each shift had to check if all prisoners were present. Furthermore, each shift had its own tasks,
Before participants were invited to take part in the Stanford Prison Experiment, they had to do multiple
psychological tests. All participants scored within the range of ‘normal’ on all tests. Other subscribers were not
invited for the actual experiment. (P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect)
93 The events are described in the book “the Lucifer Effect”, which also includes an analysis of how it was possible that
this experiment escalated; an analysis of the same sort of events in Abu Ghraib prison; and the livelong influence the
experiment had on the participants. The events and abuses at Abu Ghraib show remarkable resemblance to the
occurrences we find in the experimental setting, making this description more important for these kinds of horrible
actions are still happening.
94 P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, pp. 23-39.
95 Ibidem, pp. 40-56.
92
25
depending on the time of day (providing lunch, taking care of bed time, toilet visits, tidying the
prison).96
All participants – both guards and prisoners – of the mock prison had some difficulty identifying
with their new roles at first. In order to get the guards started, they were given the task to teach
the prisoners what their responsibility as citizens of the county was.97 Very little was organized
in the beginning of the experiment, but structure emerged quickly. Many realistic prison
experiences were set up, including visitor hours, bed time, extra rules, a priest visit, and even a
parole board.
There is one thing to add to this introduction. Fairly in the beginning, one of the prisoners had a
small mental breakdown and talked to the team that was conducting the experiment. He was
offered the option to either get out of the experiment, or choose to stay. If he would stay, he
would be backed by the guards to not further induce his stress reaction. He chose to stay, but
then (surprising the team) told all other prisoners upon his return that they could not get out.
That although this was an experiment, they did not let him leave. This gave the prisoners an
experience of being in real prison.
4.2 The Counts: From Bad to Horrible
The count was introduced at first for two reasons. Firstly, it was meant to acquaint the prisoners
with their numbers. Secondly, it was a moment to check if all prisoners were present. Counting
was also used to discipline prisoners, like in many real prisons.98 During the five days the
experiment lasted, there was a change of nature in the counts. They started as a routine to
memorize the ID numbers, but evolved to an open forum for guards to display their total
authority over the prisoners. I will illustrate this by describing some of the counts.
The day of arrival 99 prisoners were treated fairly mildly. Some power testing by the guards
occurred, both in order to see what they could ask from prisoners and to surpass the other
guards in their assignments.
“That was pretty good, but I’d like to see them at attention.” The prisoners
reluctantly stand erect at attention. “You were too slow in standing tall. Give me ten
push-ups.”100
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, pp. 17-22.
Ibidem, pp. 40-56.
98 Ibidem, pp. 40-56.
99 Ibidem, pp. 40-56.
96
97
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Later that day during another count a guard told the prisoners, with a big grin on his face, that it
was going to be a lot of fun. The guards told the prisoners that the better they performed, the
shorter the count would be. The prisoners were told to face the wall holding their hands against
it. They were prohibited to talk, unless they wanted to stand there all night. They had to count
quickly and loudly. To show their power and depreciate the prisoners, the guards made sure
every try was doomed to fail. The guards told the prisoners first that they counted too quickly,
and then that they counted too slowly. New, creative ways of counting were introduced for the
guards’ amusement, and when they did not come up with a new idea they simply told the
prisoners it was not good enough and made them start another time.
At one point there was an obvious struggle for dominance going on between two of the guards,
and some prisoners noticed this. One of the prisoners laughed about it, which caused the first
real angry reaction of one of the guards:
“Hey, did I say that you could laugh, 819? Maybe you didn’t hear me right.”
Hellmann is getting angry for the first time. He gets right up in the prisoner’s face,
leans on him and pushes him back with his billy club. Now Landry pushes his fellow
guard aside and commands 819 to do twenty push-ups, which he does without
comment.101
That same evening, the prisoners were requested to sing their numbers and then commanded to
do jumping jacks and push-ups for their poor singing quality. At the end of the last count of that
day, a guard asked if the prisoners enjoyed it. One prisoner honestly said ‘no’, for which he was
forcefully put in solitary confinement.102 During this evening of arrival the guards are already
getting more used to their roles and enjoy the power that comes with it.
On the first day the prisoners still had some difficulty taking the procedure seriously. The
counting went much the same, some singing was included again, and tasks were developed for
prisoners that failed the guards. The evening count had a new touch to it: where guards were
looking for reasons for punishment before, they now plainly gave punishment for no good
reason. The provocations also went further: the prisoners were told not to laugh, and then one of
the guards told a joke. The prisoners neatly complied and did not laugh, for which they were
punished because it was the wrong response. Obviously, there was no good response in this
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 47.
Ibidem, p. 49.
102 As the experiment took of solitary confinement was only for severe cases of disobedience, and to be used to a
maximum of one hour and with one prisoner at a time. This maximum in time was soon to be broken. Also a second
closet was made available for holding two prisoners in solitary confinement at the same time.
100
101
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situation. When the nightshift came in there was another count. A new element was added: the
prisoners had to sing the rules they were ordered to follow. The count took forty minutes of
standing still, legs spread, and hands held up against the wall.
103
The guards ended with a
humiliating assignment, having the prisoners sing ‘punishment’ in higher and higher keys.
The fourth day brought rebellion and rebellion brought punishment. One of the prisoners
was in solitary confinement, all tied up. The rest of the prisoners had to skip lunch and stand
with their face towards the wall for another round of counting and singing. At some point one
prisoner was singing ‘row, row, row your boat’, where the others were doing jumping jacks on
the rhythm. Amazing grace was sung next, while doing push-ups.
Later that day, the first sexually suggestive assignments were given during a count; they had to
perform a scene from the Frankenstein movie as part of the count. One prisoner was saying his
lines to another prisoner, who was standing with a chair above his head, his genitals visible.
They were instructed to tell each other they were in love. Meanwhile, the guards were pushing
them together. The next sexually suggestive game was leapfrog. Because of the movements the
clothing was ever more revealing, and one of the guards started to feel uncomfortable. Not all
guards felt this embarrassment, and one guard explicitly referred to the sexual position the
prisoners stood in and asked one of the prisoners if he would like to be doing it ‘doggy style’. The
prisoner responded that it would be rather obscene and they returned to playing leapfrog. The
guard who felt uncomfortable with the action brought the action back to the ‘normal’
counting.104
On the fifth and last day four out of nine prisoners were absent due to stress reactions
(from skin irritations to mental breakdowns). In no way was this situation reflected in the
activity of the guards. There was no reflection on the harshness of their treatment and how it
might be the cause of the absence of so many prisoners. When one of the prisoners went on a
hunger strike, it mainly pissed the guards off: they decided to do a count at one a.m. The basic
ritual of counting and singing was interrupted by guards yelling and cursing and the assignment
to say ugly things to co-prisoners. Then again, sexual abuse showed its ugly head. A shouting
guard pointed to a hole in the ground:
103
104
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, pp. 57-79.
Ibidem, pp. 130-173.
28
“See that hole in the ground? Now do twenty-five push-ups, fucking that hole! You
hear me!” 105
Prisoner after prisoner obeyed. A second sexual game was devised. Some of the prisoners had to
bend over, showing their naked butts, the other prisoners had to hump them. Although the
bodies of the prisoners never touched, they were simulating sodomy.
This was the last count the prisoners went through. It seems like a climax after many days of
torture, yet one should not interpret it like this. The guards did not know that this would be their
last evening. For them, this count was one of many that would follow.106
During the five days the experiment lasted the count changed from semi-annoying sessions
to horrible everlasting sessions including anger, debasement, calling names, and sexual
harassment. Some guards tried to impress the other guards and took ever more brutal steps to
surpass each other. The prisoners obeyed ever more strictly to the commands of the guards, and
what started as a game became serious business in a rapid pace. As the next section with some
comments of guards and prisoners will show, both guards and prisoners were shocked by their
own behavior upon reflection. Zimbardo (the lead researcher) was so involved he did not see
what was happening under his command before the experiment stopped. Many co-workers
visited the site, only one questioned what was happening. Unthinkable acts were performed,
repeatedly. And it seems as if when participants realized what they had done, these acts were
still unthinkable. Was it the new situation and the role they had to play that made them behave
like they never did before and in contradiction to their character?
4.3 Becoming Prisoner and Guard
At first, both prisoners and guards struggled identifying with their role as prisoner and guard.
Reports show this changed quickly, playing the role – and later on maybe even identifying with
the role – became easier and more palpable. Within five days it was sometimes forgotten the
prisoners were humans too.
“One of the prisoners, 5704, was not cooperating at all, so I decided to put him in
the Hole [solitary confinement]. By that time, it was regular routine. He reacted
violently and I found that I had to defend myself, not as me, but as the guard. He
105
106
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 172.
Ibidem, pp. 174-194.
29
hated me as the guard. He was reacting to the uniform; I felt that was the image he
placed on me. I had no choice but to defend myself as a guard.”107
This guard also said he sometimes forgot that the prisoners were human beings. “I simply
thought of them as ‘prisoners’ losing touch with their humanity´.108 Although this happened only
for short periods of time, it is remarkable. Even more so when we realize that these prisoners
were no real prisoners and everybody involved was aware of this fact. Another guard found the
prisoners ‘very sheepish’ and regarded them as sheep, ‘I did not give a damn as to their
condition’.109
A comment of a prisoner illustrates the confusion that took place in the prisoner’s heads:
More and more as the experiment went on, I could justify my actions by saying “it’s
only a game, and I know it and I can endure it easy enough, and they can’t bother
my mind, so I’ll go through the actions.” Which was fine for me. I was enjoying
things, counting my money, and planning my escape. I felt my head was pretty
together and they couldn’t upset me, because I was detached from it all, watching it
happen. But I realize now that no matter how together I thought I was inside my
head, my prison behavior was often less under my control than I realized. No matter
how open, friendly and helpful I was with other prisoners I was still operating as an
isolated, self-centered person, being rational rather than compassionate. I got along
fine in my own detached way, but now I’m aware that frequently my actions hurt
others. Instead of responding to their needs, I would assume that they were as
detached as I and thereby rationalize my own selfish behavior. […] I had separated
my mind from my actions. I probably would have done anything short of causing
physical harm to a prisoner as long as I could shift the responsibility to the
guards.110
The diaries and interviews also show that the guards did not always behave as they expected
themselves. There were actions that in general are considered unthinkable to do, and that also
the guards and prisoners describe as ‘not done’ and unacceptable (unthinkable); remarkably
enough after having done them. The following quotes of both guards and the experiment leader
illustrate this point some further.
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 156.
Ibidem, p. 157.
109 Ibidem, p. 157.
110 Ibidem, p. 167.
107
108
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The experiment leader: “The negative power on which I had been running for the past week, as
superintendent of this mock prison, had blinded me to the reality of the destructive impact
of the System that I was sustaining. Moreover, the myopic focus of a principal research
investigator similarly distorted my judgment about the need to terminate the experiment
much earlier, perhaps as soon as the second normal, healthy participant suffered an
emotional breakdown. While I was focused on the abstract conceptual issue, the power of
the behavioral situation versus the power of individual dispositions, I had missed seeing the
all-encompassing power of the System that I had helped create and sustain.”111
Zimbardo admits that what he did, and allowed to be done, was terrible. He failed to stop the
abuse and supported the system of arbitrary rules and procedures that made it possible for the
guards to abuse the prisoners to such extents. Throughout the book he remarks several times
how he cannot understand anymore how he could let this happen. His authority and role could
have easily changed the situation in the SPE and reduced the amount of harm that was inflicted.
His reflections continue.
“However, in the past week I had gradually morphed into a Prison Authority Figure.
I walked and talked like one. Everyone around me responded to me as though I
were one. Therefore, I became one of them. The very nexus of that authority figure
is one that I have opposed, even detested, all my life-the high-status, authoritarian,
overbearing boss man. Yet I had become that abstraction in the flesh. I could ease
my conscience by noting that one of my principal activities as the good, kindly
superintendent was restraining the overeager guards from committing physical
violence. That restraint merely allowed them to divert their energies into more
ingenious psychological abuses of the suffering prisoners.” 112
Three points can be derived from this quote of the experiment leader. 1) He did not expect this
behavior, 2) it is contrary to his character and higher order volitions and 3) his actions seem to
be instrumental: they are purposeful. The following quotes by some of the guards show that and
how they also cannot understand what they did during the SPE.
111
112
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 179.
Ibidem, p. 180.
31
Guard Varnish: “I was surprised at myself… I made them call each other names and clean out
toilets with their bare hands. I practically considered the prisoners ‘cattle’, and I kept
thinking I have to watch out for them in case they try something.” 113
Guard Vandy: “My enjoyment in harassing and punishing prisoners was quite unnatural for me
because I tend to think of myself as being sympathetic to the injured, especially animals. I
think that it was an outgrowth from my total freedom to rule the prisoners, I began to
abuse my authority.”114
Guard John Landry: “After I talked to the other prisoners, they told me I was a good guard and
thanks for being that way. I knew inside I was a shit. Curt [Banks] looked at me and I knew
he knew. I knew also that while I was good and just to the prisoners, I failed myself. I let
cruelty happen and did nothing except feel guilty and be a nice guy. I honestly didn’t think I
could do anything. I didn’t even try. I did what most people do. I sat in the guard’s station
and tried to forget about the prisoners.” 115
In sum, these statements suggest that something being doable does not imply it also becomes
thinkable. The guards and the experiment leader clearly repulse their own behavior and they
also reflect on how their behavior in the SPE stands far apart from their normal behavior and
how they would characterize themselves. The experiment shows many situations in which one
of the guards felt uncomfortable with the actions of themselves and of fellow guards. It was, as
for the experiment leader, 1) against their expectations, 2) against their character and higher
order volitions, and 3) against their self-description. Nobody, however, ever interfered and
together they ‘allowed’ the situation to get out of hand. Some guards did help the prisoners in
discrete ways, but no one cooperated with fellow guards or fellow prisoners to initiate changes
in the situation, nor did anyone clearly take stance. As the behavior worsened over the days, the
experiment also seems to demonstrate that doing the unthinkable once makes it easier to do it
again and in ever worse variations. Has the unthinkable become doable once, or forever? And
can we still claim that it remains unthinkable? In the next part I will discuss the meaning of the
SPE for the concept ‘unthinkable’.116
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 187.
Ibidem, p. 187.
115 Ibidem, p. 188.
116 It is interesting to note that Zimbardo, leader of the experiment, was asked to look at what happened in the Abu
Graib prison because, although more extreme, the behavior had a lot in common between both situations. What we
see in the SPE did not only happen there, but was repeated in a real prison.
113
114
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4.4 The Stanford Prison Experiment and the Unthinkable
The Stanford Prison Experiment shows a lot of unexpected and unwanted behavior. The way the
guards treated the prisoners can often be described as (personally and socially) wrong and
unthinkable. That the idea of the unthinkable implies such behavior to be ‘undoable’ is
undermined by the behavior of the guards. In Frankfurt’s description being ‘unthinkable’ implies
that if all requirements are present (the material, the power and freedom to act) something will
still restrain the action from happening: the agent finds the action unthinkable, due to something
he/she cares about and loves. This entails the agent should find the action unthinkable now and
in the foreseeable future, for volitions do not change that fast. The actions of the guards were, I
believe, unthinkable in this strong sense of the word. And yet they were done.
Four things are especially striking with respect to the fact that the unthinkable became doable in
the SPE. 1) The fact that unthinkable things are doable at all. 2) That those unthinkable actions
are doable over and over again. 3) That the unthinkable action actually worsened over time. 4)
The retrospective view of prisoners, guards, and the experiment leader and the gap between this
perspective and the moment of acting. Many times the actions, although done, remained
unthinkable also on reflection.117
It seems pleasing to claim these students were abnormal – that their behavior was the exception
– for it is hard to believe that one self would act the same. Therefore I would like to repeat that
the students that participated in the SPE were tested according to many scales and were found
to be normal on all these tests. When reflecting on their behavior, they often talk about their
empathy (and how their normal acting was based on empathy) and how they lacked empathy at
the moment of acting in the experiment. They also realize their behavior in the SPE is not in line
with common morality. This partly shows in how they dissociate themselves from what they did
during the experiment. Therefore, we can assume that these students normally did care about
others and about morality; their higher order volitions are against the deeds they did and they
normally do not behave like this. Yet, in a very short period of time, they went awry. They reflect
on themselves as normally feeling empathy, but somehow failed to do so during the SPE. This
can only leave one feeling puzzled.
The guards indicated they only felt guilty after the action, not during the action. Only afterwards
they saw what they had done and how this did not fit with what they normally valued. Some
guards described ‘in between moments of realization’, but these moments did not cause them to
Haidt would say an agent that acted against his own reasons would make up arguments afterwards, here we see
people that partly do not understand their own behavior.
117
33
stop or alter their actions. Others realized what they did only after the entire experiment was
over. Hence, it looks more like they did the unthinkable than that the unthinkable became
thinkable (the actions became doable, not thinkable). It seems highly improbable that the
participants of the Stanford Prison Experiment appreciate the desires and values that drove
them to acting as being values they recognize to be their core values or higher order volitions.
Neither before nor after their actions does this seem to be likely. So the least one could say is
that these agents acted not wholehearted. But that seems to be weak a claim. It seems as if a
different character emerges at the moment of the horrible acting compared with how these
people would describe themselves to be and how they probably normally are. These findings
clearly contradict the expectations one has about acting on the basis of the theory of volitional
sustained habitual actions as described by Frankfurt.
It seems probable that the moral compass was not working in a situation that was so different
from what these college students experienced before. Experience makes it easier to understand
what is morally good (or at least permissible) to do: we then know more promptly what to think
of a certain situation and which reactions are appropriate. It seems plausible the SPE was a
situation without such intuitions: with no authority to follow (in the right or wrong direction),
no examples to follow, and no former experience with this kind of a situation, the field was open
to all kinds of possible behavior that was out of the normal pattern of these college students.
What does this mean for the relation between the (moral) values of the participants and their
actions? Does this suggest that they (and hence we) do not know their own higher-order
volitions as well as they think they do? Does an agent know his values, but are they capable of
temporary disappearance when it encounters a certain (unexpected) situation? The SPE shows
that participants acted in unthinkable ways, several times and while remaining the opinion that
this type of behavior is unacceptable and unexpected (they are surprised and embarrassed by
their own behavior). Their quotes certainly show they felt uncomfortable with their behavior, as
it did not reflect how they normally are. If they acted in a way that was against their character
one would expect – based on Frankfurt’s theory – either (a) they would change their higherorder volitions, or (b) they would change their behavior in future times. From a common moral
point of view, option (a) is unlikely for they would have to dismiss generally accepted moral
principles in order to see this behavior as acceptable. In the quotes we see how guards,
prisoners, and experiment leaders alike turn away from their former behavior. Option (b),
however, is also unlikely, for we see repetition of wrong behavior after reflection. Hence the
question that remains, is how it is possible, even after reflective moments where one loathes
one’s own behavior, that one still behaves the same and in contradiction to one’s own caring and
higher order volitions? How can it be that the unthinkable remains unthinkable, both after
34
acting and acting again in an unthinkable way? I hope to provide a conceptually nuanced
explanation of this fact by introducing the concept of silencing.
5. Silencing
Acting wrongly – as described in the SPE - goes against (most) human’s caring and higher order
volitions. Both from a personal and from a common moral perspective the acts in the SPE are
unwanted and, as I have argued, in some cases also unthinkable. Yet these acts happened,
against all the caring, loving and higher order volitions. And people can do these unthinkable
acts time after time, and – even more important – after realizing these acts are wrong and should
not be repeated. The balance of practical reason that normally leads one the right way seems to
be malfunctioning at these moments. Good habitual and reflected reasons no longer function as
reasons to act – or not act.
Silencing is a concept that tries to explain how and why a balance of practical reasoning a) has
no influence and b) is led astray. I believe the concept of silencing, as developed by John
McDowell118 and elaborated by Eve Garrard119 can help explaining this type of repetition of
wrong deeds while maintaining the framework of higher-order volitions, unwanted desires and
the unthinkable.120
5.1 Virtuous Silencing
Why an agent shows certain behavior can be explained in terms of the reasons they have to
choose one of multiple ways of acting. In the silencing argument it is assumed that the action
that is chosen is not some random choice: reasons determine the best action. Apart from the
possibility that an agent estimates the importance of reasons wrongly, it is assumed that they
opt for the ‘best’ choice (best should not per se be read in a moral way). Practical reasoning121
J. McDowell, “Virtues and Reasons”.
E. Garrard, “Nature of Evil”.
120 I only use the concept of silencing to understand how the unthinkable can become doable, I do not intend to define
evil through the use of the concept, as Garrard does.
121 J. McDowell (“Virtues and reasons”) and E. Garrard (“Nature of Evil”) assume that we normally balance our
reasons: the right action is a reasonable action. Most actions have reasons for and against them, and practical
reasoning makes us act one way or the other. Wrong actions are those actions for which we have not enough reason
or not the right reason. The result of practical reasoning and the continent choice – the best choice, what we ought
to do – normally go together. This conception of doing the right thing either has to assume there is a personindependent moral right and wrong for (almost) everything or that the right thing need not always be the morally
right thing (for everyone). Also, although not mentioned by Garrard, there is room for mistakes within this theory: if
someone is not familiar to all the reasons or oversaw something important this can lead to a wrong act. Also not
mentioned but to me important is the possible disagreement between individuals what might be considered the
right thing. Character needs to be build and in order to do so experience is needed.
118
119
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can be seen as putting the weights of all the reasons on a scale until it tips over to a side. One or
several reasons then outweigh other reasons.
In certain situations, reasoning about what to do seems unnecessary and even undesired, as is
sometimes argued with regard to the ‘drowning wife example’.122 In such cases, the reason(s) for
doing A (saving one’s wife) are so demanding that it is useless to even consider doing B (saving
the other woman that is drowning in the same pool).123 McDowell124 argues for this reasoning
structure in various cases, saying that when the requirements of virtue are categorical
imperatives (in the eye of the actor), the reasons for acting otherwise no longer count as
reasons. The other possible actions need not be outweighed. Such virtuous reasons silence the
other reasons. There is no scale that tips towards the side of virtue; there is no overriding of
other reasons. One option is available and what would normally constitute reasons for acting
otherwise is silenced.125
McDowell uses Aristotelian theory on character ethics to explain the distinction between
overriding and silencing. Silencing is based on a virtuous character. It is an automaticity that is
the result of character-building practice. There is no place for weighing of reasons, and for
certain reasons overriding others any more. Silencing then is a result of incorporated practice.126
To explain his idea some further, McDowell introduces a temperate (silencing) person who easily
resists physical pleasure, despite the fact that he is no less able to enjoy physical pleasure than
any other person. The temperate person’s categorical imperative insulates the prospective
enjoyment of physical pleasure from engaging his inclinations at all. Ergo: the joy that physical
pleasure might bring counts for no reason to him. A temperate person is different from a
continent (non-silencing) person who considers all practical reasons (and probably struggles to
say no to such pleasures) and then acts appropriately. The virtuous man lacks the struggle the
continent man experiences, and only sees the virtuous option.127 For McDowell the idea of
silencing is connected to that of a categorical imperative. Such categorical imperatives explain
silencing because they are strong – overwhelming –reasons pro certain actions.128
122
B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality”, in: Moral Luck, Cambridge university press 1981, pp. 17-18.
Here I am not referring to automatic behavior. This might be behavior that was once considered and now has an
auto-response that was once a reflected choice.
124 J. McDowell, “Virtues and reasons”.
125 McDowell uses the notion of categorical imperatives, which seems to be a misfit with the here used idea of
common morality. Common morality, however, does not dismiss the categorical imperative, it only emphasizes that
it is not the only possible and correct way of looking at morality.
126 J. McDowell, “Virtues and Reasons”, pp. 26-28.
127 Ibidem, pp. 26-28.
128 Ibidem, pp. 28-29.
123
36
A virtuous person is not choosing or weighing at all, there is no practical reasoning in this sense
involved. A virtuous person simply does the continent thing. In Haidt’s theory of intuitionism the
virtuous person just acts on his moral intuition and does not see a reason at all to rationally
reconstruct his motives for so acting. When silencing, the continent choice has become an
automatic response, it is ingrained in the agent’s character. This connects very well with
Frankfurt’s idea of habitualized higher order volitions and how they direct one towards certain
actions and away from others. The more such actions are practiced, the more automatic these
reactions will come. Virtuous silencing could then be seen as the moment were one’s character
has grown thus strong, one no longer even automatically reflects on the reasons for what should
be done.
5.2 Evil Silencers
McDowell only argues why silencing can be used for understanding the difference of virtuous
and continent deeds. According to Garrard, silencing is seen in several different situations, she
distinguishes heroic (virtuous) silencing, romantic silencing, silencing out of fear, and evil
silencing.129 I will treat them in this order. Garrard only uses a hypothetical example, I will
reflect on the SPE for some examples that effectively took place. This will enable us to see how
evil silencing can happen, making it possible to do the unthinkable.
Heroes quite often say things like ‘I just couldn’t do anything else’. A study of non-Jewish
rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe contains remarks like ‘there was no decision to make’, ‘what else
could I do?’ and ‘I don’t make a choice. It comes and it’s there.’130 Obviously, in Nazi Europe there
were many other decisions to make, yet somehow these individuals failed to notice these other
options and risked their lives to take care of Jewish families. These people, who claim they had
no other choice but to help, silenced the other reasons.131 Although this is not explicitly said by
McDowell nor by Garrard, silencing seems to always exist out of two parts: (a) a silencing reason
that is so strong that it takes away all force of (b) silenced reasons. The other reasons no longer
exist for the person in an acting perspective, while they actually remain valid reasons from a
reflective perspective.
129
In principle, there are countless other forms of silencing possible, but Garrard mentions these four and my goal is
to illustrate the principle and end with evil silencing, creating no need for an investigation into further forms of
silencing.
130 K. R. Monroe, M. C. Barton and U. Klingemann, “Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in
Nazi Europe”, Ethic 101 (1990), p. 103.
131 J. McDowell and I. G. McFetridge, “Moral Requirements”, pp. 26-27.
37
Garrard argues that silencing is also found in ‘romantic situations’.132 The love for one’s partner
will make one overlook other men / women as potential partners: others are no longer real
options as they might have been before the loving relationship. The reasons why other men
could be attractive are ‘swept over’. Fear can also silence interest in those things we normally
might consider interesting.133 Garrard considers the example of an arachnophobe who does not
want to see a spider up-close: ‘I don’t care how interesting and unusual that spider is’, I might say
to an entomologist friend, ‘I don’t want to look at it close up’.134
All these cases have similar characteristics. When confronted with the silenced reasons one
would acknowledge them to be reasons, but somehow they have no influence on the decision
how one acts. This goes for heroic deeds, romantic deeds and deeds out of fear for spiders. We
have something (the virtuous, or the fearsome, for example) that is thus important (it imposes
itself upon us) that we keep our focus on this particular thing and away from other things. The
question now is: can we understand evil silencing along the same lines?
Garrard thinks we can, and gives the following example to show how evil silencing can occur.
She makes a distinction between evil silencing and being ignorant of certain facts. On this basis
she differentiates between harm that was done to Jews in WWII and the improbable case that
dolphins also had personhood and what that would mean to the harm caused to these animals.
In the hypothetical example with the dolphins it is argued that humans were ignorant of the
personhood these dolphins had. Looking back at the harm that was caused to these animals after
we learned that they have personhood, we should feel horrible. This harm, however, would be
relatively innocent compared to the harm done to Jews in WWII. Because not acknowledging
Jews to be persons is a different thing from being ignorant of the personhood of dolphins. There
is a difference between being ignorant and knowing/ having the suspicion that not all reasons
are taken into account. Only in the case of the Jews there is silencing of reasons. Jews are
somehow known to be persons, but this ‘knowledge’ is not taken into account. So indeed,
silencing could be an explanation of wrongdoing here. But yet, compared to the other examples
of silencing, heroic, romantic and arachnophobe, there is a difference.
In order to elucidate this difference I will recapitulate the similarities and differences between
the four different types of silencing. A) In all the cases the reasons that silence certain other
reasons and possible reactions to a situation are very strong (a feeling of obligation, love, fear for
spiders; fear for the cruel sanctions of the German authorities). B) For all of them it is also true
E. Garrard, “Nature of Evil”, p. 51.
Ibidem, p. 51.
134 Ibidem, p. 51.
132
133
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that the reaction is automatic and incorporated. C) But with regard to reasoning there seems to
be a difference between ’the Jews’ and the other three examples. In the last-mentioned three we
can presume that no reasoning took place. It is difficult, however, to think that reasoning was
completely and always absent in the case of the Jews. It is hardly imaginable that the thought
that Jews are persons did not at all pop up. D) This difference could very well be related to a
second difference. In the cases of virtuous and romantic silencing the incorporated automatic
reaction results in reasonably desired behavior. In the case of silencing out of spider-fear there
are clearly no good reasons, but the reaction can be seen as acceptable. But what is the case with
evil silencing? The actions in this case are reasonably unacceptable and against normal
character. Being against reason they would normally not be incorporated upon reflection. That
would also explain why these reasons unavoidably pop up occasionally. But yet they are
negated, without really being weighted. The silencing of obviously relevant moral reasons might
be complete at certain moments in time, however, this never means that the agent will identify
himself with his automatic behavior as he does when silencing virtuously. In a next step I want
to ascertain this first, provisional analysis of evil silencing by its application to the SPE.
5.3 Evil Silencers – return to the SPE
Let us return to the SPE to see if it is really a plausible explanation that the unthinkable became
doable through evil silencing. The way evil silencing was analyzed provisionally above for the
question of helping the Jews will be repeated here with the example of the SPE. The following
questions have to be answered. A) Which could be the strong and overwhelming reasons for the
participants to behave so badly? B) Can we imagine that the reaction is incorporated and
habitual? C) Would the reaction on reflection be reasonably unacceptable? D) Did the
participants (sometimes) reflect upon their (bad) behavior and were they yet continuing it? I
will first repeat some key parts of the quotes which, I believe, give insight into the moments
were guards possibly silenced perfectly good reasons to (not) act. Then I will return to these
four questions.
Several guards reported to be surprised by their own actions and the mismatch between their
behavior and how they conceive themselves to be. One guard reported: “I was surprised at
myself… I practically considered the prisoners ‘cattle’…”135, “My enjoyment in harassing and
punishing prisoners was quite unnatural for me … I think that it was an outgrowth from my total
freedom to rule the prisoners, I began to abuse my authority.” 136 What happened sometimes only
hit them weeks after the experiment was over. Another guard reported: “The absolute cruelty of
135
136
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 187.
Ibidem, p. 187.
39
this event … does not hit me until weeks later…”137 This indicates that at times the realization
might dawn in retrospect, but it will dawn, and that is what matters.
Also Zimbardo – experiment leader and superintendent – found himself behaving quite unlike
himself. He felt blinded by his role and the system that he was sustaining.138 He clearly behaved
in an unwanted and – at least to him – unacceptable way: “The very nexus of that authority figure
is one that I have opposed, even detested, all my life – the high-status, authoritarian, overbearing
boss man. Yet I had become that abstraction in the flesh.”139
In these quotes we see clearly what was indicated before: these normal people acted in
abnormal ways and only afterwards they realized they acted different from ‘normality’ (and
from what common morality prescribes). Hence they do something they normally reject (think
of as unthinkable) and still reject it afterwards. Can their actions be explained in terms of evil
silencing? Let us return to the four questions posed before to clarify this.
A) Which could be the strong and overwhelming reasons for the participants to behave so badly?
What line of thought, what desire can explain the silencing of perfectly good options in favor of a
bad reaction? Based on the statements in the SPE we can pin down at least three possible desires
and volitions that could cause silencing. 1) The desire for power and authority, 2) the desire to
fulfill a role as others expect one to, and 3) fear for the other and for possible penalties if one
does something outside the expectations. When someone just quits playing their role this will
probably lead to reactions/sanctions that are unwanted and painful, and this makes one stick to
the assigned role. Also, within a role certain behaviors are sometimes more accepted than
outside this role (the exercising power between prisoner and guard is different from the power
between two students meeting). It seems as if these desires and volitions can – in the SPE, and
probably in other situations too – be so overwhelming as to force one to do the unthinkable and
unacceptable.
B) Can we imagine that the reaction, or the desire underneath the reaction, is incorporated and
habitual? How can automatic desires and volitions that normally do not push to action suddenly
do? Normally if a situation repeats itself, the same automatic reactions will repeat too. This
makes it hard to see how behavior that was never showed before can automatically trigger
behavior. Yet, the guards acted automatically, based on the desires mentioned in A), while
afterwards they were also reflecting on a gap between these actions and their normal behavior.
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 191.
Zimbardo about his own experience. P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 179.
139 P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p.180.
137
138
40
To do something automatically one has never done before, the situation must trigger this
automaticity. As it appears to me, it is most likely this will happen if the situation is new and/or
unfamiliar: new behavior can settle – based on automatically activated desires and volitions –
making a small start in creating a new automaticity if the situation repeats itself. The SPE was an
unfamiliar situation for the participants and their normal automatic reactions might not have
been triggered through the unknown situations (and the new role they played in this situation).
The new role, played in a new situation made it appear, without much volitional control. So
instead of a moment of reflection before acting, it is plausible that desires and/or volitions that
are normally ignored were followed in this unknown situation.
C & D) I will take the last two questions as one, since their answers imply each other. C) Would
the reaction on reflection be reasonably unacceptable? And D) did the participants (sometimes)
reflect upon their (bad) behavior and were they yet continuing it? The citations in paragraph 4.3
and 5.3 show clearly that the guards reflect and that upon reflection they find their own
behavior unacceptable. They reflect on the misbalance between how they normally behave –
their character – and how they behaved during the SPE. If that would not be the case – if their
actions would follow from their character – it would really make them evil people since their
actions would follow from their evil character. The guards in the SPE are not evil persons; they
had to play evil roles. A ‘character’ is also used to express ‘one is playing a role’. One does not
want to assume all these people in the SPE to be evil persons, rather one assumes they made a
‘mistake’ and ‘regret’ their behavior once they are conscious of what they did. This is also what
some of the citations in the reports of the SPE show. This insinuates that people who act evilly
seem to have a disbalance between their reflective perspective and their perspective of action.
They do not want to act evilly, they do not think they will act evilly, and after having acted evilly
they think that they will not act evilly again once they realized they did something evil. And yet
they do it, time and time again.
Answering all these questions, I believe we can conclude that doing the unthinkable can be
understood by means of the concept of silencing, although a highly specific type of silencing,
which is different from the romantic, heroic, and fear-based silencing, because of a gap between
what one would do based on reflection and what one does based on silencers. Against this
background, I believe one more question remains that needs clarification. During the course of
the SPE there are moments of reflection and realization. How can one continue to silence after
such moments of realization? Before realization of what one has done we could say there is no
awareness of the wrong deeds that follow from automatic reactions at all. After such a moment
of realization the gap should be visible to the agent, making it harder to understand why
silencing repeats itself. I wish to review some psychological concepts which I believe to be
41
helpful in clarifying how this is possible. The cognitive mechanisms I will describe cannot only
help us understand how repetition of unthinkable deeds is possible after a moment of
realization of what one has done. It will also help us reflect some further on the question, which I
roughly tried to answer in the last two paragraphs: how can desires and reasons that normally
do not lead to action possibly lead to silencing other reasons? I have indicated some reasons
(power, authority, role playing/ identification, fear), but can these desires alone silence other
reasons for acting?
6. Blind Spots and Biases
For virtuous silencing it is rather clear what kind of reasons the silencing comes from and how it
can repeat itself: the automatic response can be seen as the result of years of practice. But what
mechanisms can explain evil silencing? The SPE suggested three possible silencing desires and
fears that could possibly automatically trigger an evil response: 1) The desire for power and
authority, 2) the desire to fulfill a role as others expect one to, and 3) fear for the other when not
satisfying expectations. But what makes it possible that these three drives – and possibly some
more desires and fears – silence other reasons, although the behavior is somehow known, and
sometimes also reflected upon as being wrong? This section will show some possible
explanations that can help to further understand how silencing happens. These descriptions are
in no way meant to describe all cases of silencing, they are merely meant to show how silencing
in evil deeds is possible, to further underpin that this possibility could help in understanding
how the unthinkable becomes doable. Other cognitive mechanisms, than those dealt with here,
might be useful in explaining this too. I do not intend to be complete, rather I try to make a
stronger case for the possibility that silencing in evil deeds is possible, making it understandable
how one does the unthinkable while it remains unthinkable.
It is standard knowledge in social psychology that perceptions of what is happening are
‘colored’.140 According to mainstream psychological theory two main reasons for this coloring
are a) the desire to have a consistent world view and b) the desire to have a positive selfimage.141 The implied ‘colorings’ are called biases. Biases result from one-sided, non-neutral
points of view that distort and misrepresent the facts.142 A bias can explain why we behave
differently than an undistorted balance of practical reasoning would predict: our ‘lens’ does not
M. H. Bazerman and A. E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots; Why we Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do about It,
Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 2-7.
141 R. P. Bagozzi, “The Self-Regulation of Attitudes, Intentions, and Behavior”, Social Psychology Quarterly 55(1992), p.
192.
142 M. H. Bazerman and A. E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots, pp. 2-7.
140
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reflect all reasons (or does not reflect them equally well). Just as silencing takes away the
balancing of practical reasoning, our biases make possible reasons on a cognitive level
disappear. I will argue that the kinds of distortions which I will elaborate on in this chapter are
found in the SPE. I will connect them to the unthinkable and to silencing.
A deformation of the perception of actions, objects, people, or groups makes it possible to
understand why one makes specific (non-logical) decisions. The deformed perceptions seem
perfect perceptions to the observer: a biased view is not noticed by the biased person. The bias
obscures also the fact that one is biased.143 Due to biases people have distorted pictures of their
situation. This can help to explain how practical reasoning sometimes is out of balance. I will
describe two types of biases – the tendency to think from a specific role and its related
perspective, causing so called ‘business decisions’ and ‘ethical fading’,144 and the automaticity to
switch perspectives depending on the situation one is in.145
6.1 Role Playing and Ethical Fading
Practical reasoning takes into account that there can be – and often will be – different actionpaths possible. But it also seems to take for granted that one individual will, based on what they
care about, always choose the same thing. Often the possible choices one can make can be
viewed from multiple perspectives. A different perspective can make certain possible choices
more valuable, and others less. A mother, for example, taking care of her child while working at
home might at some point choose to let her child watch TV. This allows her some time to focus,
where she normally, as an educator, would not choose this option. An ethical perspective
(wondering what is the right thing to do) is but one of many possible perspectives. It makes
sense that someone does not always takes this perspective into account. When a person has
ethics high on his/her priorities and is asked to look from a different perspective, their focus will
most likely shift, making the ethical perspective to weigh less. A ‘business perspective’ – that
focusses on what is at stake in a situation and on the role an agent has in it – narrows the view
on what is all happening. In general the focus will be on different facts and questions than moral
The ‘blind spot bias’; E. Pronin and M. B. Kugler, "Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection Illusion
as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007), pp.565–578. Doctors, for
example, believe they are not influenced by the financial incentives they receive for prescribing drugs to their
patients. However, research shows that they are influenced and are prescribing the promoted drug more often.
While trying to think about the patient’s health, they somehow start seeing the promoted medicine as the best
option. Those doctors – that receive incentives for medicine X – find medicine X significantly more helpful than
doctors that do not receive these incentives. Dysfunctional arguments are made up to prescribe the drug more often
and objectivity is lost while the biased person will explicitly experience himself/herself as non-biased.
144 A. E. Tenbrunsel and D. M. Messick, “Ethical Fading: The Role of Self Deception in Unethical Behavior”, Social Justice
Research 17(2004), p. 232.
145 Tenbrunsel, Diekman, Wade-Benzoni and Bazerman, “Why We Aren’t as Ethical as We Think We Are: A Temporal
Explanation”. Research in Organizational Behavior 30 (2011), pp. 155-164.
143
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questions, such as profit or the required amount of time.146 This narrowed down way of looking
at the ‘facts’ is the usual way of cognizing. Often people are put in a certain role with a
corresponding focus. For those students that were guards in the SPE a ‘business perspective’
could mean they only looked at how to best react to the current situation, without thoughts on
the bigger picture (this is only an experiment; these prisoners are actually students, good
people). Ones framed by, for example, the guard’s role and responsibilities the alternatives are
narrowed down. A specific perspective often causes the ethical perspective to disappear and is
therefore connected to ethical fading.147
Experiments show that when decisions are split up and people are only responsible for small
parts of the process, they will in most cases only think from this role: they only have
responsibility for their part of the process. This makes it also harder to see the ethical dilemmas
people are facing in the decisions they have to make.148 The last financial crisis, for example,
showed many people that made business decisions and were culpably ignorant while playing
their role in ‘the lending game’. They engaged in seemingly harmless behaviors without
consciously recognizing they were doing anything wrong.149
“Mortgage lenders who only vaguely understood that buyers couldn’t afford the homes
they wanted, the
analysts who
created mortgage-backed securities without
understanding the ripple effect of such a product, the traders who sold the securities
without grasping their complexity, the bankers who lent too much, and the regulators
biased by the lobbying efforts and campaign donations of investment banks.”150
All the individuals mentioned in the above quote can hardly be blamed directly for the failing
financial system and the economic crisis, yet they all participated in something that was clearly
wrong. A multitude of people was aware of the unethical behavior of others and of themselves,
but did not act to prevent it.151 A cognitive bias can help us understand how a certain role in life
or in a work environment can put an agent in a certain state of mind, and make him only
consider certain aspects without thinking about the others. With respect to the SPE this implies,
for example, that guards were preoccupied with their roles, meaning the requirements of
keeping the prison in order and the prisoners under control. The fact that these prisoners and
the prisoner-situation were situated and non-real are then easily overlooked, as well as the fact
146
A. E. Tenbrunsel, K. A. Diekman, K. A. Wade-Benzoni and M. A. Bazerman, “Aren’t as Ethical“, p. 232.
Ibidem, pp. 155-164.
148 Tenbrunsel and Messick, “Ethical Fading”, p. 232.
149 M. H. Bazerman and A. E. Tenbrunsel, Blind Spots, pp. 70-73.
150 Ibidem, p. 3.
151 Ibidem, pp. 2-3.
147
44
that their prisoners were humans too. We can find this line of thought in some of the quotes we
saw before, such as “I simply thought of them as ‘prisoners’ losing touch with their humanity. This
happened for short periods of time, usually when I was giving orders to them.” Within this line of
thought, where prisoners are no longer seen as people, one can better understand how evil
silencing happens and can happen again if one thinks continuously from the same role and
perspective. From within a role, one can understand why certain reasons matter more than
others, and how the perspective can make reasons appear thus strong they are capable of
silencing other reasons. Reasons that normally would not be considered would, within a certain
perspective, seem highly relevant. Possibly they appear sufficiently relevant to silence other
reasons. From the perspective of a guard that has to direct prisoners around it is highly
functional to view them as prisoners, as a group of people. It is less necessary – or less useful – to
see them as co-student. If a role can sufficiently change someone’s perspective, therewith
changing the importance of certain reasons, this can explain why ethical fading happens; the
ethical perspective literary disappears.
6.2 Switching Perspectives
The cognitive bias that can explain ethical fading through role taking can help to explain why
one acts in the same wrong way every time one takes the same role. Nonetheless, upon a
moment of realization that what one has done was wrong one would expect to be more alert the
next time one steps into the same situation. A different sort of bias concerns the often present
gap between what people think they will do and what they actually do. Research shows that
during reflection people tend to look more at the bigger picture and how their behavior reflects
their personality such as ‘I want to treat people the way I want to be treated too’. 152 At the
moment of acting the focus is on direct concerns and ideas such as ‘how to get this prisoner to
sing along’. This switch in perspective can explain the gap between acting in a certain role and
reflection and the possibility of repetition of unwanted behavior after realization. A study about
inappropriate job interview questions nicely shows the difference between predicted (desired)
behavior and actual behavior.153 Female students predicted what they would answer a thirtysomething male interviewer if he would ask them: “do you have a boyfriend?”, “do you find me
desirable?”, or “do you find it appropriate for women to wear bras to work?” 68% said they
would refuse to answer such questions in a job interview. When a thirty-two year old male
interviewer actually asked the offensive questions none of the students refused to answer. After
the interview, the main argument for answering these inappropriate questions was that the
E. A. Tenbrunsel, et al., “Why We Aren’t as Ethical”, pp. 154-155.
J. A. Woodzicka and M. LaFrance, “Real versus Imagined Gender Harassment”, Journal of Social Issues 57 (2001), pp.
15-30.
152
153
45
interviewees wanted to get the job. Norms and ethical values easily disappeared while the
students were focused on the task at hand (getting the job) and not on what would be the right
thing to do. It is noteworthy that the interviewed persons believed that they would not answer
such questions the next time. Both before and after the questions are asked most individuals
believe they will refuse to answer. Only at the moment the question pops up, it appears harder
than expected to not answer; we see a switch in perspective and the agent allows itself
something it normally dismisses as wrong. In the Milgram experiments154 we see the same
pattern. People predict they would never go along with the request of the experimenter, yet
most people do go along (and shock the other participant with high voltages) once they are
confronted with such requests in the real situation. Before they know it they are already in the
middle of the experiment and the experimenter ‘must know what they are doing’.155
These two biases together seem to suggest that at moments of reflection we take a (fairly)
neutral perspective, taking abstract principles into account. At the moment of acting, more
concrete matters and certain roles push the agent to see certain aspects as more or less
important, moving away from the more abstract and general perspective. Once in the situation
and in a certain role there are many details to pay attention to, details one never thought of
when predicting what one would do.156 In a way an agent literally does not see the wood for the
trees when they are in action. Upon reflection they tend to forget the individual trees again and
return to the bigger picture. This change of perception explains how a difference between how
people act and how they think they will act can exist without a feeling of inconsistency or a lack
of wholeheartedness.
Due to this change in perspective and the accompanying absence of a feeling of acting out of
character, the feeling of wholeheartedness might not be at stake. Wholeheartedness itself,
however, certainly is. If people are so different in their opinion (when reflecting) and in their
acting this is problematic for wholeheartedness (Although the actor still might experience
himself as wholehearted). A switch in perspective can help explain why an agent acts differently
than predicted by themselves. It can also explain why it happens time and again: the reflection
has no grip at behavior at the moment of action. In the SPE we see the guards, the prisoners, and
the experimenter behaving differently from how they would expect themselves to. When
154
S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental view, Harper & Row, New York 1975, pp. 4-7, pp. 27-31.
One might wonder what the participants in the Milgram Experiments thought after the experiment was over:
would they expect to react the same again, or would they believe they had learned their lesson and never repeat the
same mistake again? The confidence that the behavior would not be repeated would, obviously, be no guarantee that
the behavior actually would not be repeated when found in the same, or a similar, situation.
156 A. E. Tenbrunsel, et al., “Aren’t as Ethical”, pp. 156-160.
155
46
confronted with this behavior they clearly reflect on the gap between their action in daily life
and in the SPE. The reflection on their thoughts and feelings at the moment of acting would – on
a reflective level – never lead to the actions as they did during the SPE, creating confusion and
disappointment about one’s own character. All participants in the SPE behaved in – to
themselves and others – unexpected ways, non-fitting to their choices when reflecting. Together,
acting from a certain role and the switch to a more abstract level when reflecting, these two
cognitive biases can explain why the reasons that can cause silencing prevail and possibly
silence other reasons.
6.3 Biases and the Unthinkable
Our thoughts about what we want and expect to be doing can differ considerably from how we
actually behave, due to biased perspectives. The role we takes upon us and the specific problems
of the moment can distract us from what we thinks that ought to be done. Therewith biases
provide arguments on how we can fail to notice the higher order volitions that are at stake, and
on how we can fail to notice the inconsistency between behavior and thought.
Within a certain definition of the situation the values and higher order volitions might be nonrelevant and therefore not taken into account: they are no part of the weighing of practical
reasoning. Two citations from the SPE – one from a prisoner and one from a guard – which were
already quoted above, express this quite clearly.
[…] I had separated my mind from my actions. I probably would have done
anything short of causing physical harm to a prisoner as long as I could shift the
responsibility to the guards.157
This prisoner followed the directions from the guards as he was supposed to in his role as
prisoner. This is a perfect example of making ‘business decisions’ and acting from a role: the
prisoner neglected the ethical perspective and looked at the situation from a specific, role-bound
perspective. Now let us turn to a quote from a guard:
I simply thought of them as ‘prisoners’ losing touch with their humanity. This
happened for short periods of time, usually when I was giving orders to them. I am
tired and disgusted at times, this is usually the state of my mind. Also I make an
actual try of my will to dehumanize them in order to make it easy for me.158
157
158
P. G. Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 167.
Ibidem, p. 157.
47
This guard tried to make the situation easy for himself by making only business decisions as a
guard. He stopped thinking about the whole situation from the perspective of a human, ethical
being. This enabled him to see the prisoners in ways that helped him ease his own burdens. He
saw them as less than human, as prisoners instead of seeing them as fellow human people.
Systematic cognitive biases can substantiate why we look in a non-objective way at a situation,
which can change the balance of reasons, making silencing in evil cases a possibility. The
moment of reflection happens within a different ‘state of mind’, which is lost when the action
starts again, making it hard to break with unwanted and unthinkable behavior. A ‘business
perspective’, a role that is taken within a situation, and a switch in perspective between
reflecting and acting, can explain why someone thinks they should and will do A, while ending
up doing B. This underpins how reasons can become more or less important depending on the
perspective and moment; certain reasons can tip the scale of practical reason to a different side.
These reasons, or the desire driving these reasons, could be so present they silence other
reasons, creating space for evil silencing. The unthinkable, that is unthinkable on a reflective
level due to higher order volitions, becomes actionable from a certain perspective – a role –
while remaining unthinkable on the reflective level, explaining the gap that we saw when people
silence and behave wrongly.
7. Silencing the Unthinkable
I started this thesis with the question how people come to do things they find unimaginable and
unacceptable. An important second question was how they are able to do these unimaginable
things time and again. Studies in the field of social psychology provoked my wondering and I
was convinced that I could use them to identify and explain the fascinating phenomenon of
people that want to act ethically and yet act very wrongfully. I started my journey by
investigating common morality to argue that many unimaginable things are shared in their
inconceivableness and that it is very important that most – if not all – perceive these things as
inconceivable. The framework of common morality provided also reasons for shared thoughts
about wrong acts, claiming that all people are somehow aware of the importance of acting
morally, and we have good reasons to find these matters important. Even if we take this claim
about all people down a bit and say that most people in western democratic countries see the
importance of shared morality and act in accordance with that, the results of studies such as the
SPE remain worrying, to say the least. Most people in the SPE acted against common morality,
while they clearly belong to the just now indicated group of decent people.
48
To understand what it signifies for an act to be unimaginable, I introduced the theoretical
terminology of Frankfurt: the term ‘the unthinkable’, which gives a possible understanding of
unimaginable acts, using a wider theoretical framework of intentionality, desires, and volitions.
Before introducing Frankfurt’s theory, the problem of acting against one’s beliefs was framed in
terms of common morality – of people acting against common moral thought. Against the
background of common morality, which is also Frankfurt’s background, ethically unimaginable
behavior appears on both the individual and collective level. On an individual level it is about
people acting against what they care about – their own caring and higher order volitions – and
doing do the unthinkable. Because an agent cares about individual matters and about shared
common morality, they refrain from certain wrongdoings. The idea that the unthinkable can be
doable is, as such, however, not found in Frankfurt’s theory. Yet we can be sure that unthinkable
acts are done. This point has been proven by many historical examples, has been demonstrated
in experimental research, and is evident in the SPE. To start the discussion about the
unthinkable that is yet done, I split unthinkable acts up in ‘individual unthinkable acts that were
done’ and ‘shared unthinkable acts that were done’.159 For this last category it is sure, based on
common morality, that the actions remain unthinkable, also after they are done. Within
Frankfurt’s framework there is no room for unthinkable action that is done, nor for unthinkable
action that becomes thinkable (higher order volitions do not just change in a split second). To
further investigate unthinkable action that becomes doable, examples from the SPE were
introduced. The students that participated in this experiment were all tested on their
psychological normality, and proved to be ‘normal’, but did unthinkable acts, and a lot of their
thoughts and afterthoughts were recorded providing insightful material to further reflect on
these matters. What were their thoughts and in what circumstanced did they do the
unthinkable?
We saw that the participants of the SPE were perplexed by their own behavior, sometimes even
divested, and often they only fully realized afterwards that what they had done was wrong. They
were confused and baffled by their own behavior and by how at odds it was with their normal
behavior and (ascribed) character. They described how they felt these actions – which they
performed themselves – were wrong, therewith showing that the unthinkable can remain
159
I split the distinction between unthinkable and thinkable up as follows: (I) We find an action thinkable and doable.
(II) We find an action unthinkable and undoable. (III) We thought an action thinkable yet find it undoable. (IV) We
thought an action unthinkable yet find it doable. I further divided (IV) into (IV-a) Personal unthinkable action and
(IV-b) common (moral) unthinkable action.
49
unthinkable even though it also is –temporarily or permanently – doable and done.160 Four
things were especially striking with respect to the fact that the unthinkable became doable in the
SPE. 1) The fact that unthinkable things are doable at all. 2) That those unthinkable actions are
doable over and over again. 3) That the unthinkable action actually worsened over time. 4) The
retrospective view of prisoners, guards, and the experiment leader and the gap between this
perspective and the moment of acting. Many times the actions, although done, remained
unthinkable also on reflection.161 The unthinkable is doable, but appeared to remain unthinkable
at the same time.
The SPE also indicates some desires and volitions that could explain the choice for unwanted
behavior, for example desires for power, authority and ease. These desires and volitions were,
however, in imbalance with the agent’s character as could be derived from the reactions of the
guards on their own actions. How was this possible? I introduced silencing as a possible
explanation for the gap in Frankfurt’s interpretation: the balance of practical reasoning is no
longer functioning when reasons are silenced making it possible to choose and show reactions
one would normally never show. This could maybe explain why one acts out of line with one’s
character, with what an agent perceives as unthinkable. I also indicated a difference between
different types of silencers. All types have to have a highly automated character in order to shut
down processes of reasoning, but the outcomes of heroic and romantic silencing clearly are in
line with the balance of practical reasoning. For silencing out of fear this logic already is less
present: an agent may well want to get rid of their fear, yet they can be highly influenced by this
fear to act in certain ways. And even if an agent does not want to get rid of their fear, it is still not
as logical to silence out of fear (for spiders), as it is to silence out of love for one’s partner or to
silence out of virtuous motives. In the case of – supposedly unwanted – evil silencing the link
between the silencer and the agent’s character is even less evident. Some reasons might sound
tempting – the power one gains, or the ease that accompanies an evil choice – but they should
normally not pull to action considering the harm done. To explain why one can start to see such
reasons – power, or ease – as good reasons, as good silencers, I introduced the concept of biases,
mechanisms that deform one’s perspective. A business perspective, often belonging to a certain
role, can force an agent to focus on certain reasons, making other reasons less present (causing
ethical fading): it is an explanation of how certain reasons can occur as more important
I do not intent to claim that the unthinkable only can become doable, it might be that the unthinkable, over time,
also becomes thinkable. However, the fact that the unthinkable derives from years of caring, it is unlikely an opinion
will change overnight, yet the unthinkable behavior is shown at once.
161 Haidt would say an agent that acted against his own reasons would make up arguments afterwards, here we see
people that partly do not understand their own behavior. They do not need to make up reasons afterwards for they
do not realize what they have done in the first place.
160
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(changing the balance of reasons), or even silence other reasons. If a reason that normally does
not count as a reason to act can become a reason to act due to biases and silencing, this can
explain why an agent acts as such while maintaining their – different – ideas about how they
should act.
Another main question in this thesis was how an agent cannot only do the unthinkable (once),
but can do it time and again, and even after a moment of reflection of what harm they have
done? Silencing could, again, offer an explanation. To understand why one would silence time
and again the other described bias – switching perspectives – could shine some light. The
unthinkable exists because of what one cares about; those cares are formed over the years and
change only slowly. One moment of reflection will not often – if at all – change an agents
behavior, but even if one time of reflection could change their behavior, there would still be a
barrier, because a reflective decision is not directly found in an agent’s behavior hours, or days,
later. Switching in perspective creates a difference between moments of reflection and ‘thinking
in action’. The agent has a different focus depending on this. The more concrete focus during
acting generates less space for attention for general, more abstract rules, such as morality. This
can account for the fact that an agent reflectively thinks A (I want to act morally), but in a
moment of action does B (which is less moral), time and again. Especially if a situation is
unknown or very hectic – when it is less likely that behavior is in line with one’s character and is
practiced and automated – will an agent be more easily led to doing the unthinkable and from
there repeat this behavior.
Rewinding this train of thought it looks as follows: an agent often is biased, for example because
they act from a certain role or within the moment. In this role chances are that they
misrepresent information, they look through the lens of their roles, and do not think from their
character (all of their higher order volitions and abstract principles such as moral rules). This
leads to different action than the agent would choose for if asked at a reflective moment (where
they would think from their character). The bias may present a certain fact or reason thus
strongly, making it appear so important that it silences all other reasons. On a reflective level,
and looking at the agent’s character, their behavior is possibly completely out of line: they do
something that they consider unthinkable. The agent may even go home and realize that they did
something ‘unthinkable’. Yet their behavior is still likely to occur again, for they will be biased
again the next time they find themselves in the same situation, silencing any other option.
However much they want to act differently on a reflective level, their actions in the moment are
not affected by this reflection. By and large the introduced concepts seem to give a plausible
explanation of doing the unthinkable, even if in moment of reflection one sees or feels that what
one has done is wrong.
51
What are the implications for a conception of actions that are unthinkable yet doable? I think
there are two major points that are important and need attention, one practical and one
theoretical question. Let me first introduce the theoretical issue. The gap between acting in the
moment and thinking about how to act raises several other questions too. If taking a certain
perspective (or taking on a certain role) can lead to different choices, what does this mean for
the wholeheartedness of a person? Is an agent during reflection one agent, while they also knows
four (if not more) roles – which they would also appear to be? From those different roles
different choices, different characteristics seem to follow. What does this bring around? Are we
wholehearted, and if so, in what sense? Should all these different roles also be compatible with
one another? And if they differ, how far can this differentiation go before it becomes absurd and
we no longer talk about one character?
On a more practical level, one should realize that people will now and then act against their
higher order volitions, and there can be a gap between what one wants to do – based on
reflection – and what one actually does. This gap is not easily overcome, realizing that the
chosen path was unwanted and ‘deciding’ to do it differently the next time is no guarantee for
change. Based on this knowledge ethical programs might be developed differently, with more
focus on practice to automatize morally desired reactions. One would also have to think about
ways to interfere the existing pattern that one wants do break. If an agent is capable of changing
their behavior after realizing that they acted in an unwanted way, this interference can become
routine practice that would produce reasonable, and yet habitual control of our unwanted
desires. But of course, unwanted actions would first need to be discovered and then changed one
by one. Only by practice we will be able to prevent ourselves from unwanted volitions to take
over control. But practice can only take place after realization of the gap between action and
higher order volitions.
This also means that the main problem in avoiding these types of unwanted – and in the worst
cases unthinkable – acts is that they happen automatically: automaticity makes us often act in
line with our character, and not out of line with our character and higher order volitions. Since
we do not expect automaticity to lead us the wrong way, chances are very low that the unwanted
behavior is detected or corrected. An agent does not expect to be acting out of line with their
higher order volitions and they certainly do not expect to cross boundaries that are very
important to them. It makes perfect sense to not check automatic reactions – that would make
the automaticity useless – but since automaticity can come from both wanted and unwanted
desires and volitions, there is room for such errors as in the SPE. How can we best deal with this
important gap between wanted and unwanted automatic reactions (and wanted and unwanted
52
silencing)? Maybe we should talk and think more about one’s own and others’ roles, what
implications these roles have and how they relate to the bigger picture.
Since an agent will not expect themselves to act in an unthinkable way this entails that they will
be very poorly protecting themselves against their unwanted desires, against the happening of
such unwanted acts. The fact that unwanted desires had formerly not showed themselves is,
unfortunately, no guarantee that they are nonexistent. Frankfurt emphasizes that suppressing
unwanted desires is hard, suppressing unwanted desires that are unnoticed can only be harder.
On a meta-level: if reflecting one time does not change an agent’s behavior, just as acting once in
a certain manner will not change their thoughts, how can an agent, or society, create a smaller
chance of acting in unwanted ways? The relation between reflection and action is highly complex
and can cause unwanted action, such as in the SPE, to happen, in what ways can we reverse this
effect? And how do we get people to change in positive ways? This question can be asked both
on an individual level and for a society as a whole. It seems likely some of the environmental
factors in the SPE caused the participants to act out of line with their character. Would practice,
or supervision, or small details in the environment make a change?
53
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