Interrogating the tumultuous Relationship between Parliament and the Executive in Kenya
over the past 45 years: Retrospection
By Maurice N. Amutabi (Ph.D
Abstract
This paper provides a historical analysis of the power intrigues between parliament and the
executive in Kenya, over the past 45 years. The focus is on how Kenyan presidents have jostled
for power with parliament, and how they have used executive authority to undermine
parliamentary sovereignty during the First Republic. For over 45 years, the life of parliaments in
Kenya depended on the whims of the President. The President had power to prorogue parliament
or call for elections any time. Under the old constitution, the President determined the life of
parliament, set up its calendar and influenced its decisions. Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel
Moi abused the constitutional provisions that granted them power to control the legislative
branch. Sometimes they went out of their way to abuse this power by calling for snap elections to
deal with their perceived enemies in parliament. Kenyatta used this in 1969 when he called for a
snap general election to get rid of elements sympathetic to his former Vice President Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga, who had broken up with him. Odinga had left the ruling Kenya African National
Union (KANU) party in a huff and founded an opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union
(KPU), after openly disagreeing with Kenyatta. In the snap elections, Kenyatta succeeded in
rigging out all Odinga‟s supporters in parliament. Kenyatta also purged the cabinet and civil
service of all members and civil servants suspected to be sympathetic to Odinga. Former
President Daniel Arap Moi used similar draconian tactics in 1983 when he called sudden general
elections following the 1982 attempted coup. It will vet all executive appointees and provide a
mechanism of checks and balances. This paper will show how under the old constitution in the
First Republic, parliamentary privileges were often suspended to serve the whims of the
President. It will show, how for example, two Members of Parliament, Martin Shikuku and Jean
Marie Seroney were arrested in the precincts of parliament under the pretext of national security,
for accusing Kenyatta‟s regime of covering up the assassination of the popular Member of
Parliament for Nyandarua North, J.M Kariuki. During Moi‟s reign, MPs were often arrested
around parliament buildings and taken into detention. The paper will show that during Moi‟s
period, parliament was used a rubber stamp. For example, in 1982, it was used to change section
2(A) of the constitution which ushered in a one party rule. The paper will provide a way forward
and possible ways in which the new constitutional order in the Second Republic can avoid the
pitfalls of the First Republic.
Key words: Parliament; Executive; Kenya; Second Republic; Speaker
*Prof. Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi teaches at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa,
Langata, Nairobi, Kenya.
Citation Format
Amutabi, M.N. (2010). Interrogating the tumultuous Relationship between Parliament and the
Executive in Kenya over the past 45 years: Retrospection. Kenya Studies Review: 3, 3, 17-.40.
Copyright © 2010 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
21
Introduction
In many democracies across the world, parliaments play a very important role. They act as
important checks on the excesses of the executive and judiciary. As the third arm of government
(besides the executive and legislature) they are supposed to act as the representatives of the
people, and articulate peoples‟ interests and desires. Parliaments are particularly influential in
parliamentary systems, as opposed to presidential systems. Kenya is a presidential system and
has suffered presidential dictatorship for many years. For a long time, Kenya‟s parliament was
regarded as toothless bulldog that did the bidding of the executive. From Jomo Kenyatta (first
President) to Mwai Kibaki (third President), Kenya‟s parliament has suffered a lot oppression
perpetrated by presidential leaders (Adar, 1998). Some scholars have argued that the monopoly
of power by the executive was predicated on the colonial legacy that tended to privilege colonial
governors (Nyong‟o, 1988). Recent studies have revealed that liberalization of politics in the
1990s has created a new impetus on the democratic stage, which has ushered in a new
parliamentary zeal (Murunga and Nasong‟o, 2005).
In this paper, I argue that parliamentary democracy in Kenya has acquired new life and
impetus since the 1990s. Using and citing examples from the 1960s to the present, I will show
that since 1992 when Kenya held its first multiparty politics in forty years, the role of parliament
has increased and there has been rapid increase of participation by many and creation of more
democratic space. I suggest that the rise of parliamentary power in Kenya is predicated on the
change of guard in 2002, which assured the opposition that there was possibility of having a
government in waiting in Kenya. The political actors were ready to wait their turn and were
willing to play the role of loyal opposition. Further, I will argue that there are many factors that
have made it possible for parliament to acquire voice and power in the 2000s and beyond, some
of which are depended on the role of the media, external factors that have tended to be against
excessive presidential powers in Africa, as well as the role of the masses who are more willing to
come out in support of their leaders.
In this paper, I provide a historical analysis of the power intrigues between parliament
and the executive in Kenya, over the past 45 years in order to appreciate the way in which it has
grown in importance and power. The focus is on how Kenyan presidents have pushed for power
to almost the exclusion of parliament. There is need for us to understand how Kenyan presidents
have used executive authority to undermine parliamentary sovereignty during the First Republic.
I demonstrate that for over 45 years, the life of parliaments in Kenya depended on the whims of
the President, in which their words were more respected than the law. Presidential edicts, which
were sometimes issued by the roadside, were implemented almost immediately. They made
decrees, some of which were against existing laws but which were implemented without
reference to any other authority. The President had power to prorogue parliament or call for
elections any time. This will change following the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010.
Under the old constitution, the President determined the life of parliament, set up its calendar and
influenced its decisions. But this is different in the new constitution, in which parliament has its
own calendar and cannot be prorogued or dissolved by the president.
Background to Parliamentary Politics in Kenya: The Colonial Legacy
Kenya‟s parliament is only about 90 years old (Amutabi, 2006). It has origins in the colonial
period. The history of parliamentary structures in Kenya is found in the colonial past, some
ninety years ago (Murunga and Nasong‟o, 2005). The parliamentary system was based on the
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
22
Westminster model. Initially, the colonial parliament was to cater for only white interests but
later expanded to include African and Asian interests (Ochieng, 1980). Because of this colonial
background, Kenya‟s parliament has characteristics that are quite similar to other
Commonwealth countries. It is headed a speaker, who office and is structured like those of other
speakers elsewhere. Throughout the colonial period, parliament in Kenya received instructions
from the monarchy in Britain. Although semi-autonomous, the colonial parliament was really an
instrument of the king or queen, throughout the colonial period.
It was not until 1919 that Kenya colony enacted the Legislative Council Elections
Ordinance. The ordinance provided for the election of 11 Europeans, with the first election
taking place in 1920. In 1924 the Legislative Council (Amendment) Ordinance made provision
of the election of five Indians to represent the Indian community and one Arab to represent the
Arab community. The Indians and Arab representatives were elected by members of their
respective communities. In 1924, provision was made for nomination of a clergyman to represent
the interests of Africans and the Rev. J.W Arthur was elected to represent Africans interests on
the Legislative Council. In 1934 a second clergyman L. J Beecher was appointed to represent
African interests (Ndoria, 1976).
It was not until October 1944 that the first African was appointed to the Legislative
Council, occasioned by the retirement of Rev. J.W. Arthur. It is not clear the criteria that the
Governor and the colonial project used to select Eliud Wambu Mathu as the first African
representative to the representative council. Mathu served in the LegCo until March 1957 when
he lost in the first elections for African Members of the Council. The appointment of Mathu was
quite significant to the political process in Kenya for two reasons. First, Africans realized for the
first time that they needed to organize politically in order to have a bigger say in the running of
Kenya. Second, Mathu‟s nomination made some elite Africans to question the criteria upon
which he was appointed, which set them on coalition course with the European hegemonic
structures in Kenya. Whose interests was Mathu representing? Was he capable of representing
African interests? It was for the second reason that reason that the Kenya African Union (K.A.U)
was formed in October, 1944 with the express purpose of helping Mathu in discharging his
responsibility. KAU sought to give Mathu guidance and advise so that he could efficiently
represent African interests in the LegCo (Ogot, 1974; Ndoria, 1976).
The formation of KAU did not go down very well with Europeans. Since KAU was
formed by African elites, many of whom were imbued with radical nationalist ideals; it
immediately ran into problems with the colonial government and many of its members became
targets of the colonial state machinery. To escape colonial vengeance, KAU changed its name
and became known as Kenya African Study Group for a while, under James Gichuru. In 1947,
with the return of Jomo Kenyatta to Kenya from the United Kingdom, African elites reverted to
their old name, KAU (Ochieng‟, 1980; Ndoria, 1976).
In 1947, Canon Beecher retired and was replaced by Beneah Apolo Ohanga as the second
member representing African interests besides Eliud Mathu. The number of nominated African
representatives on the Council was increased to four in 1948. In 1952 African nominated
representatives increased from four to six. During the same year, 1952, Eliud Mathu was
appointed to the Executive Council, but it was Beneah Apolo Ohanga who became the first
African cabinet minister (Ogot, 1974).
Like Mathu, Ohanga served as a minister until March 1957 when he was defeated in the
first contested elections for African Members to the Council in Kenya. It is not hard to explain
why Africans who were nominated to the colonial legislative council lost in the first contested
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
23
elections. Many Africans believed that they were sell outs and nominated because the whites
believed they would serve their interests. The first election of African representatives to the
Legislative Council, were held in March, 1957 (Ochieng‟, 1980).
There were eight members elected representing eight electoral areas for Africans. The
1957 elections seemed to ignite African interest in politics. The newly elected African
representatives seemed to take the cue and refused to accept office in the Government until some
changes were made. They demanded for more representative and equal treatment as their
European, Asian and Arab counterparts. The stalemate forced the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Lennox-Boyd to travel to Nairobi, in November 1957 to resolve the impasse.
Lennox-Boyd held consultations on the constitutional position with various stakeholders, after
which he recommended some changes. The changes appeared in a Kenya Constitution Order -inCouncil, signed by Her Majesty on April 3, 1958 and became known as the Lennox Boyd
Constitution. They remained in force until 1961 (Arnold, 1974).
Two of the recommendations made by Lennox-Boyd Constitution were particularly
significant. First, the seats of the African elected members were increased by six, bringing the
total number to 14. Second, provisions were made for twelve Specially Elected Members. Third,
seats for all elected Members were set at thirty -six. Following the new constitution, elections
were held in March, 1958, in the African electoral areas, which had been sub-divided. One of the
members elected in the 1958 elections was Daniel Arap Moi, who left parliament after 2002
elections, which he did not contest. Africans received a second slot in the cabinet (Ndoria, 1976).
The constitutional framework introduced by the Lennox-Boyd Constitution created an
unlikely outcome. It produced African radicals in Kenya‟s political scene. The radicals in
parliament rejected provisions regarding Specially Elected Members, appointed by the Governor,
because they knew they would all go to whites or Africans willing to support European
hegemony (Delf, 1961). Following the hard line position taken by the elected African
representatives of the Legislative Council, in 1959, they formed a loose group which called the
Kenya Independence Movement (KIM).
Independence and After
The Kenya Independence Movement drew attention from the members of the Kikuyu ethnic
group, who at this time were regarded as largely sympathetic to the Mau Mau Movement. The
leadership was therefore made up members of the Luo ethnic group, with Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga serving as President and Thomas Joseph Mboya as secretary-general. This radical stand
laid the ground work for the role of parliament in Kenya (Amutabi, 2002). It is therefore by no
coincidence that many scholars of parliamentary politics in Kenya regard Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga as the father of opposition and radical politics in Kenya (Adar, 1998).
I would like to suggest that it was on the account of the stand of Oginga Odinga and Tom
Mboya that Kenya moved fast towards independence. This is because the events in Kenya made
the then British Prime Minister Sir Harold Macmillan to acknowledge the inevitability of
granting independence to British colonies. I would also hasten to add that Odinga and Mboya
were probably catalysts to a process that was already underway in the rest of the world. The
world was alit with nationalistic fervor and demands for autonomy, and Kenya‟s parliament was
only a vehicle for driving agenda for the masses, in their demands for „independence now‟ and
not later. Because of the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, many leaders across the
world were starting to believe that it was a matter of when and not if Africa should become
independent. It was shortly after the actions of Odinga and Mboya and their colleagues that Ian
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
24
Macleod, the new Secretary for the Colonies convened a full-fledged constitutional meeting in
January, 1960.
This was to be the First Lancaster House Constitutional l Conference: and was ostensibly meant
to map out the future constitutional development for Kenya, but which in fact led to the
independence of Kenya (Mazrui, 1970).
The Parliament of Kenya was initiated on a rather authoritarian structure and legacy and
which affect its performance for the next fifty years. This is because the Governor was the
President of the Legislative Council and Presiding Officer from inception in 1909 until October
20, 1948 when a more progressive Governor Sir Philip Mitchell, appointed a Member of the
Council, retired judge, William K. Horne to preside at all sittings. Horne in effect became the
first Speaker of the Legislative Council and tried to being about changes, emulating the practice
at the House of Commons. The Governors remained the President of the Council, while Horne
and all his successors acted as Vice President and Speaker of the Council. It was Sir Humphrey
Slade who established many of the rules and regulations in Kenya‟s parliament. He became
speaker on October 13, 1960 and remained in the post until 1970.
Table 1: Percentage Population of Ethnic Groups in Kenya (1999)
Ethnic
group
Kikuyu
Abaluyia
Luo
Kalenjin
Kamba
Kisii
Meru
Others (35)
Non-African
%
Population
22
14
13
12
11
6
6
15
1
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 1999.
Fault lines in First Parliament between KANU and KADU
The First Parliament which was inaugurated from June 7, 1963 to November 7, 1969 was de jure
multi-party and remained strong despite many attempts by the regime of Jomo Kenyatta to
muzzle it (Mazrui, 1970). Slade was independent and this might explain why he was allowed to
serve in this capacity even after independence. Many Africans had faith in him. It is also
possible that he was retained on the account of ethnic factors that could allow Kenyans to select
an indigenous speaker who would be neutral. Slade‟s term came to an end on the commencement
of the Second Parliament on February 6, 1970.
Slade tried to cultivate parliamentary autonomy and his departure saw the waning of
parliamentary authority which saw the executive quickly taking away the rights and privileges of
parliament. Speaker Horne presided till 1955, when he was succeeded by Sir. Frederick
Ferdinard W. Caverndish - Bentinck who presided till October 25, 1960. Speaker Cavendish Bentinck was succeeded by Sir Humphrey Slade on October 13, 1960 whose tenure traversed
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
25
Independence to end on retirement with the commencement of the Second Parliament on
February 6, 1970. As the Independence constitution had provision for a bicameral or two
Chamber Legislature, there emerged two Speakers and two Deputy Speakers, thus Speaker Slade
continued as Speaker of the House of Representatives while Speaker Timothy Chitasi Muinga
Chokwe, was elected to preside over the Senate. With the end of bicameralism in 1966, the
enlarged unicameral National Assembly was presided over by Speaker Slade and Deputy
Speaker F.R.S. De Souza, until the commencement of the Second Parliament.
The title of a linking Speaker, which Speaker Slade had earned for having a tenure running from
the Colonial Legislative Council to the First Parliament of Independent Kenya, was laid to rest
upon his retirement on February 6, 1970, being the first sitting day of the Second Parliament,
1970-74 (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
The 1970-74 Parliament and Frederick Mbiti Gideon Mati as an inept Speaker
The first parliament after independence was powerful and enacted some of landmark legislations
in Kenya. The success of this first parliament can be credited to many factors, one of which was
the charisma of speaker Sir Humphrey Slade. The successor of Sir Humphrey Slade as speaker of
the National Assembly in 1970 was Frederick Mbiti Gideon Mati. Although he had been
proficiently inducted into speakership through serving as acting speaker in the first Parliament,
he was grossly inept. To be sure, Mati was not charismatic. He had a good background as an
academician, was an ex-freedom fighter and Member of Legislative Council since 1961 but this
did not help him much. He had represented Kitui North in the House of Representatives and the
National Assembly, in the period 1963 until election to Speakership on February 6, 1970.
However, Kitui North, then and now, is a backwater constituency and it is possible that Mati did
not have any competition. It is possible that he lacked any strong challenge to the position. His
parliamentary record was not outstanding. As required by the constitution, Speaker Mati
relinquished his elected seat upon assuming the office of Speaker, to which he was re-elected
unopposed by the subsequent four Parliaments until his retirement on April 12, 1988.
What is significant to note is the fact that Mati retained the position of speaker until he
retired in 1988 despite presiding over some of the worst parliamentary sessions that Kenya has
ever had. It was during his tenure that parliamentary authority was significantly eroded. He
presided over some of the weakest and most suspect legislation such as the declaration of Kenya
as one party state in 1982. He served the regime of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi loyally.
These two are are some of the worst regimes in Kenya, in recent memory. Mati was lucky to
serve with capable and more competent deputy speakers who earned more accolades with the
pubic than Mati himself. Some of the deputy speakers included Jean-Marie Seroney. Jean-Marie
Seroney remains as one of the most progressive deputy speakers to ever occupy the position. For
his courage, he was detained by the regime of Jomo Kenyatta.
The second Parliament, 1970 to 74 was presided over by Mati as speaker and Frederick
Lawrence Munyua Waiyaki as his deputy. Waiyaki was related to Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta‟s
personal doctor and one of the cabinet ministers and served Kenyatta‟s interests as speaker. He
had more say on what passed in parliament, and promoted motions that were purely progovernment. It was during the Second Parliament that the Kenyan parliament was seriously
tested when J. M Kariuki was killed by government agents and the matter ended up in
parliament. It was also during the Second Parliament when questions related to the health of a
fragile President Jomo Kenyatta kept recurring in Parliament. It was also during this time that
many intellectuals were detained without trial. As deputy speaker, Waiyaki came to the defense
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
26
of the government all the time. For his efforts, Waiyaki was given a cabinet position during the
Third Parliament. It was however the Third Parliament that really tested Kenyatta‟s government
and is regarded as the most successful in the history of Kenya.
The 1970s decade was particularly tumultuous for Kenya‟s parliament. The tension
emerged from the previous decade which had seen the assassination of popular Minister for
Panning and Economic Development Tom Mboya. As the National Assembly gathered in
Nairobi for the 1970-74 sessions, it was nervous. The country was feeling a stronger hand on
every segment of society, by the Kenyatta regime. The regime was increasingly becoming
dictatorial. The assassination of popular Minister for Power and Communications, Ronald Ngala
on December 1972 seemed to confirm peoples‟ fears that the regime was not going to relent in
dealing with its critics, both real and imagined. The government reported that Minister Ngala had
died from a road accident. The accident had occurred at Konza on the Nairobi-Mombasa Road
on a day he was expected to be attending Jamhuri Day (celebrated on December 12) usually
presided over by President Jomo Kenyatta. What made the death suspicious was the fact that
there were different accounts of the accident. The minister's government driver claimed that he
lost control of the vehicle after bees entered the car, while a different witness said the car rolled
after hitting wildebeests crossing the road. Even as Minister Ngala was buried, the country was
nervous and the Government was aware of this state of heightened nervousness.
The anxiety in the country came to the fold in February 26 1974 when University of
Nairobi students went on strike. Having eliminated all the opposition in the country, and having
cowed parliament into submission, the University remained the only veritable opposition to the
Kenyatta regime (Amutabi, 2002). The University was closed down. Following this, the Vice
President, Daniel Moi went around the country promoting peace and the image of the
government. Moi issued several statements, attacking „enemies‟ of the state, beseeching them to
stop using university students to spread fear and despondency. He urged them to respect private
property (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
Daniel Moi went on attack against proponents of redistribution, who were resentful of
other people's accomplishments (Widner, 1992). When the restrictions on political involvement
came to international attention, the Daniel Moi and the KIambu Mafia led by Attorney General
Charles Njonjo, Minister of State in the Office of President Mbiyu Koinange and Defence
Minister James Gichuru went on the offensive. They attacked „Marxists‟ who were bent on
turnintng Kenya into a communist state. The reference to Marxism, socialism and communism
was always a veiled attack on former Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and his opposition
colleagues. The Kenyatta regime believed that attack on „socialist elements‟ was always received
well in the West. This time however, the attacks went further and even called for the deportation
of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) personnel from Kenya, for the crime of giving the
opposition coverage. The BBC had granted a string of interviews to enemies of the regime such
as Oginga Odinga then under house detention and J. M Kariuki.
By 1974 Jomo Kenyatta was frail, weak and rarely ventured outside the confines of state
houses and lodges. He was rarely seen in public and when he did, it was clear that he was not
well. He walked with assistance and often stopped in mid sentences during his short speeches to
gasp for more air. He ruled through short statements from State House, which recent evidence
now suggests were authored by members of the inner circle of his cabinet. In June 1974, nervous
that J. M. Kariuki and the opponents of the state were gaining increasing popularity, members of
the kitchen cabinet persuaded President Kenyatta to join the discussion on national unity. They
organized rallies at which Kenyatta read short speeches (not lasting more than five minutes) in
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
27
which he implored citizens on the importance of national unity and brotherhood, urging them to
discard ethnicity and sectionalism (Ndoria, 1976).
In the meantime, the demand for social justice became more and more pronounced. The
demand for historical justice over the land question increased in the 1970s. Kenyatta‟s regime
supported land buying companies such as Nyakinyua led by Dickson Kihika Kimani, but such
companies attracted the middle class and those who had access to funds. The ahoi, the hoi polloi
and poor of the poor could not join such land buying companies. This was not helped by the
success of J. M Kariuki‟s crusade to get the poor access to land by organizing funds drives
(haranbees). This land issue was taken over by some Members of Parliament who urged for
redistribution of land in the Rift Valley, to the landless. Kenyatta and his inner circle owned
much of the land to which the peasants had their eyes set. As calls for impartial sharing of
development funds all over the country persisted, the regime‟s pronouncements became more
emphatic and somewhat desperate, especially as J. M Kariuki seemed to be more popular than
the President. Kariuki‟s meetings were attended by thousands and he seemed to have a way with
the crowds, taking full advantage of his youthful exuberance, different from Kenyatta who was
rather old, rumbling and boring.
J. M Kariuki‟s message was getting across and was having an impact. At the back of the
mind of every action by Kenyatta‟s regime in 1970s was parliament. The regime became reactive
to parliamentary debates rather than proactive. The regime was clearly not comfortable with
some MPs, or elements in parliament as such members were known. In one such reaction, just a
day after a parliamentary debate on equity, President Kenyatta attacked the “disgruntled
elements” who sought to undermine the government, at Nakuru‟s Afraha Stadium. He referred
to the elements in parliament as agents (vibaraka) of socialism. At the meeting MPs who
supported the issue were condemned as lazy and pandering to socialist ideals where people
expected to be given free things instead of working for them. Hard working Kenyans (mainly
Kikuyu) were given title deeds for land they had bought in the Rift Valley through Mboi-aKamiti, Ngwataniro and Nyakinyua land buying companies. Kenyatta ordered the Agricultural
Finance Corporation (AFC) to give the hardworking Kenyans loans to develop their lands. At
this time, Kenyatta‟s regime was clearly identified with the Kikuyu and it seemed not to care
about this image so long us it held the instruments of power. The problem was that some of the
politicians opposing the government such as J. M Kariuki, Bildad Kaggia, Waruru Kanja,
Charles Rubia, Mark Mwithaga and scholars such as Ngugi wa Thiong‟o, Maina wa Kinyatti and
Mukaru Ng‟ang‟a were members of the Kikuyu ethnic group. J. M Kariuki was clearly leading
an opposition within the government and Kenyatta was not going to allow it.
Kenyatta took the fight to the backyard of the members of the Kikuyu ethnic group who
opposed his government. Kikuyu members of parliament such as J. M Kariuki, Bildad Kaggia,
Waruru Kanja, Charles Rubia and Mark Mwithaga were vilified. They were attacked for not
working work and encouraging laziness. Kenyatta visited Nyandarua District, the home district
of J. M Mariuki and tore into the MPs record and performance. He asked the people what some
of those shouting the loudest had done for them. When a section of the crowd responded
negatively, the convoy moved to Ol Kalou where Kenyatta urged citizens to reject feelings of
sectionalism and clanism in order to create a unified front capable of pressing forward the wheels
of economic and social development in the district (Widner, 1992). Kenyatta was clearly taking
the war beyond the walls of parliament, to his enemies. He also attacked progressive MPs such
as Bildad Kaggia, attacking them for being responsible for their poverty, which made them make
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
28
noise in parliament. In 1974, President Kenyatta campaigned against MPs J. M Kariuki, Bildad
Kaggia, Waruru Kanja, Charles Rubia and Mark Mwithaga.
However, despite the strong support that their opponents received from the government,
the core members of the parliamentary opposition retained their seats during the 1974 elections.
In Nyandarua North, J.M Kariuki received a landslide victory, despite concerted government
efforts in supporting his opponent and rigging the elections. He won despite the fact that he was
not able to hold campaign meetings for which a permit had been denied. The victory of J. M
Kariuki was not just limited to Nyandarua.
The candidates whom he supported against the establishment candidates also emerged
victorious, while some of his ardent opponents and enemies, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Kenyatta‟s personal doctor Njoroge Mungai, lost their seats. J. M Kariuk must have celebrated
the defeat of Minister Njoroge Mungai for two reasons. First, it was clear that people were
against the men of the regime such as Njoroge Mungai who was a key ally of Kenyatta. Second
it suggested, by extension, that J. M Kariuki was more popular than Kenyatta, for Kenyatta had
openly campaigned for his personal doctor Njoroge Mungai and used state machinery to
mobilize support for him. Largely as a result of J. M Kariuki‟s influence, another Kenyatta
insider Minister of Defence James Gichuru, almost lost and won by a very narrow margin against
a strong opposition candidate in his Limuru Constituency. This diminished performance by
Kenyatta‟s inner circle sent shivers down the spine, of the regime. There was an elevated alert
against J. M Kariuki. What was more is that James Gichuru‟s son, Gitau Gichuru lost in Kikuyu
Constituency, an area that was seen as part and parcel of Kiambu Mafia. The fact that the
influence of J. M Kariuki was spreading beyond Nyandarua, and other Kikuyu districts of Nyeri
and Kirinyaga caused anxiety in the regime. The regime had to act fast. Two of its candidates
had lost due to the influence of opposition elements. Njoroge Mungai had lost due to the
influence of J. M Kariuki, and William Odongo Omamo had also lost in 1974 elections in Bondo
to a candidate endorsed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.
The 1970s Purging of Parliament
Following the poor showing by some government candidates in 1974 elections, Kenyatta decided
to act. Kenyatta nominated the defeated MPs William Odongo Omamo and Njoroge Mungai,
among others, to parliament. This was clearly daring the citizens and his critics, by telling them
that he the power to do what he liked. These individuals had clearly been rejected by the people
at the polls, and by appointing them back to parliament, the regime was clearly not responsive to
democracy and parliament as an institution.
The regime also embarked on a sort of political surgery which it imagined would
resuscitate its declining popularity and fortunes by removing the so-called dissident members
from the cabinet. The surgery saw the removal of the popular and flamboyant MP for Nyandarua
North, J. M. Kariuki from the cabinet alongside his political allies, MP for Butere Martin
Shikuku, MP for Starehe Charles Rubia, and MP for Lurambi Burudi Nabwera from their posts
as assistant ministers in the government.
The 1974 elections were embarrassing to Jomo Kenyatta and he seemed to take the losses
of parliamentary seats by his close allies personally. There was no doubt that the person at the
center of the losses was J. M. Kariuki. It came as no surprise to political pundits and observers
when J.M Kariuki went missing on March 2, 1975. It was in Parliament that the information
about the missing MP for Nyandarua North became known to Kenyans for the first time, through
a question. In a ministerial statement, the Vice President reported that J. M Kariuki was in
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
29
„Zambia‟ on semi-official business. However, several days later, the remains of J. M Kariuki‟s
body were found by a Maasai herdsman, Musaita ole Tunda, in a thicket in the Ngong Hills, near
Nairobi. To forensic scientists, whoever killed J. M Kariuki hated him with a passion because his
his fingers had been chopped off and eyes gouged out. The MP‟s death must have been a brutal
one. There was circumstantial evidence implicating the state for involvement in the
assassination. His Rolex watch (there were few Kenyans who owned such watches at the time)
was found in a bathroom at the police lines at Makongeni Police Station in Nairobi.
What was more instructive was the fact that J. M Kariuki was last seen in the company of
members of Government‟s General Services Unit (GSU) and police on March 2, 1975, at the
Hilton Hotel in Nairobi. The assassination was met with protests throughout Kenya. Large
crowds came out condemning the government for the assassination despite government pleas for
patience as the police investigated the incident. The Kikuyu, Kenyatta‟s ethnic group, was
divided down the middle. There were Kikuyu MPs who strongly believed that the assassination
had the markings of the state all over it, for there were attempts at cover up, especially the initial
government reports which had sought to indicate that J. M Kariuki was in Zambia.
Parliament Investigates the Murder of J. M Kariuki
The assassination of J. M Kariuki seemed to give parliament a new lease of life and
indescribable energy. Following the discovery of his remains, parliament constituted a special
committee to investigate the circumstances surrounding the MP‟s assassination. The special
investigative committee assembled to handle the case consisted many of the friends of J. M
Kariuki. The committee was chaired by a progressive MP, and member for Kimilili Constituency
Elijah Mwangale and members of the committee included Jean-Marie Seroney (deputy speaker
of the House), and MPs Maina Wanjigi (MP for Kamukunji), and Charles Rubia (MP for
Starehe). The government was against the investigations by parliament and seemed to support a
parallel investigation by the police. The select parliamentary committee produced a report
suggesting that members of the police force under the control of members of Kenyatta‟s inner
circle may have been involved in the murder. The report was submitted in parliament where it
was discussed at length with emotions running very high. The government through Vice
President Daniel Moi opposed the report and asked for its rejection, because it implicated the
government and stopped short of naming President Kenyatta in the murder of J. M Kariuki.
The murder of J. M Kariuki and the cover up that followed confirmed Kenyatta‟s regime
as tyrannical and any pretence it had at defending democratic ideals seemed to have evaporated
at this time. The cat was finally out of the bag and the regime now acted as a proper and open
dictatorship. After the voting in parliament on the report investigating the murder of J. M
Kariuki, a minister Pius Masinde Muliro and two assistant ministers, John Keen and Peter
Kibisu, lost their posts. Their mistake was voting against the government on whether to accept
the report of the special investigative committee or merely acknowledging it. The house was
clearly divided and the government started pursuing MPs it believed were against it, in
parliament and outside, and used all manner of schemes to nab them. Kenyatta‟s regime used
every flimsy excuse to search homes of nonconformist MPs and even planted seditious
publications in their residences in order to arrest and charge them for sedition. The regime
violated parliamentary privileges by arresting MPs in the precincts of parliament, something that
had hitherto never happened in any commonwealth country.
Kenyatta used KANU, the political party to undermine elected leaders. Many leaders of
KANU were Kenyatta‟s appointees and not elected because KANU had not held elections since
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
30
the 1960s in the fear that the party would be hijacked by the opposition. The party functionaries
made it very hard for MPs to operate. It was hard to distinguish the party from the government
because regional governments seemed to dance to the whims of party overloads.
As part of the purging, the deputy speaker Jean-Marie Seroney and Butere MP Joseph
Martin Shikuku were both detained in 1975, after Shikuku announced to the National Assembly
that KANU was „dead‟ as a political party because it had failed to abide by the ideals that
brought it to power at independence and had been hijacked by people who did not even fight for
independence. The deputy speaker Jean-Marie Seroney, then in the speaker‟s seat of the House,
agreed with the Member for Butere and replied that Martin Shikuku's motion did not need to be
seconded as the point was “obvious.” Vice President and leader of Government Business in the
House, Moi protested these comments. He led a walkout of the chamber supported by Kenyatta
loyalists on the front benches and a considerable number of ordinary MPs. Kenyatta‟s loyalists
attended the business of the house only when substantive Speaker Fred Mate was in the
speaker‟s chair but walked out as soon as the deputy speaker Jean-Marie Seroney took up the
seat. Parliament was divided down the middle and most of the legislations made in the absence
of the Speaker Fred Mate were not even covered in the parliamentary record, the Hansard. The
continued division in parliament appeared to embarrass and might have been the reason that the
government moved into parliament and arrested the deputy speaker Jean-Marie Seroney and MP
Martin Shikuku and took them to detention.
From then, parliament became a rubberstamp for Kenyatta during his last days, before he
died in 1978. Even though Kenyatta was a master of patronage politics, he seemed to think that
repression had its usefulness. He is widely quoted as saying that “People seem to forget that a
hawk is always in the sky ready to swoop on the chickens.” This metaphor seems to summarise
aptly Kenyatta‟s tactics as president. He often struck unexpectedly and like the hawk or eagle he
often left no evidence where he struck. Only those lucky to survive the attacks from hawk would
recount what happened. Some insiders have averred that sometimes he spoke to his critics in
person, in private. They say that sometimes he would cane them like children but when they
failed to adhere to his demands did he resort to macabre means (Karume, 2007).
Moi’s Purge of Radical MPs from 1979
The Kenyatta regime did not relent in its war against the so-called rebels in parliament. One
rebel, Mark Mwithaga, who was the MP for Nakuru Town was removed from his post after an
election petition that was clearly manipulated. The regime recruited the judiciary in its schemes
to undermine parliament. When the government realized that Mark Mwithanga was going to
contest in the by-election in Nakuru Town Constituency and in which he was projected to win, it
devised another scheme. The government revived an old case in which Mark Mwithaga had been
accused of breaking a door to his house during an alleged domestic disagreement five years
earlier. The truth was that the door had been broken by the police in their attempt to find
seditious material in Mwithaga‟s house. He was quickly hauled before court and charged with
assault and malicious damage to property. This was despite the fact that his wife who had alleged
pressed the charges denied that she had filed them. When the government would not withdraw
the case, she had demanded to settle the issue out of court but the government refused to barge
and proceeded to charge her husband. Mark Mwithaga was found guilty and sentenced to five
years.
There was a government scheme to frame other leaders as well. Another radical MP,
Waruru Kanja, the MP for Nyeri Town was also jailed on false charges and lost his seat. JeanKenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
31
Marie Seroney was released from detention after Kenyatta died, in 1978. He left detention poor
and demoralized. He had committed his entire life to serving the people of Tinderet, his
constituency. The new President Daniel Moi did not agree with him and made sure that he did
not win in Tinderet Constituency in the 1979 elections. Amidst claims of rigging, Jean-Marie
Seroney lost the election and died in 1982. Another parliamentary rebel Martin Shikuku was
detained in 1975-78, and was released by the regime of Daniel Moi. He contested in the 1979
elections and won back his seat as MP for Butere Constituency.
In order to tame Martin Shikuku, President Moi made him an assistant minister in his
government, from 1979 to 1985 when he could not tolerate Shikuku‟s opposition inside and
outside parliament anymore and ordered his detention (Omolo, 2002). Waruru Kanja was also
made an assistant minister by Daniel Moi after winning the 1979 elections. He was jailed
between 1981 and 1982 on framed up charges and defeated in the massively rigged 1983
elections, which was Moi‟s purging of most of the MPs believed to be radical in Kenya‟s
parliament (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
Another perceived radical and MP for Starehe Constituency in Nairobi, Charles Rubia
was also incorporated into government by the new president Daniel Moi. He was appointed to a
full cabinet position after the 1979 general elections in which he won his Starehe seat. He served
as minister between 1979 and 1983. Rubia did not seek to endear himself to the new regime
because it was surrounded by his old enemies, mainly elements of the Kiambu Mafiosi. Attempts
to rig him out failed in 1983 and Daniel Moi left him out the cabinet in 1983. Back to the
backbench, Rubia did what he did well, by demanding for social justice for the landless and
called for redistribution of resources. Charles Rubia became yet another victim of the first
purging by Daniel Moi as president, in 1988. He was expelled from KANU for being a friend of
the enemies of the state. He was accused of being an associate of Charles Njonjo with whom he
accused of planning to overthrow the government. This was rather paradoxical because Charles
Rubia had devoted almost his entire political career in fighting against the excesses of his fellow
Kikuyu elites, especially those from Kiambu. When the wind of change started to flow in Africa,
Charles Rubia was among the first lights of the second liberation. He was detained by Daniel
Moi in 1990 and released in 1991 just when Kenya was moving towards the emerged of
multiparty politics. When he came out of detention, Rubia was never the same again. Like his
colleague in detention Kenneth Matiba, he was rather pale and beaten up. It was clear that his
political career was behind him as the fire he breathed on campaign platforms in the 1970s and
1980s had left him. He was not the same as the energetic mayor that Nairobians had been used
to. He made the right decision not to contest in the 1992 multiparty elections.
Mark Mwithaga came out of prison in 1977 and contested the Nakuru Town seat which
he won. President Moi made him an assistant minister in order to tame him. He served in Moi‟s
government between 1979 and 1983 and lost in the 1983 elections that were massively rigged
against any individuals believed to be radical in parliament (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
The other victim of the purge of Jomo Kenyatta was George Moseti Anyona, the MP for
Kitutu Chache. Anyona was among the MPs that belonged to the „seven bearded‟ sisters and
earned himself the distinction of being the true representative of the people. He was one of the
most persistent critics of government in parliament and was detained by Jomo Kenyatta between
1977 and 1978 when he was released by Daniel Moi. Because of his radical brand of poolitcs, he
was barred from contesting the 1979 general elections. He was believed to be an ardent supporter
and follower of Oginga Odinga. He continued with his activism outside parliament and Moi
regime caught with him and detained in 1982 to 1984 (Ajulu, 2002). When he came out of
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32
detention, he had a meeting with Moi and something seems to have transpired in the discussions
that seem to have changed George Anyona for he never recovered his political vibrancy and
radicalism again.
The vote on the floor of the House against the government marked a negative turning
point in the politics of cabinet Minister Pius Masinde Muliro and Assistant Peter Kibisu.
Masinde Muliro was a political heavyweight but when he was sacked from the cabinet by Jomo
Kenyatta, his political fortunes suffered for a while until 1992 when multiparty politics were
introduced in Kenya. Masinde Muliro was detained in 1977 to 78 for opposing the oppressive
tendencies of the government he served. When he was released from detention in 1979, he was
barred from contesting. He was a political ally of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and enjoyed almost
fanatical support among the Abaluyia. He was also more charismatic than Daniel Moi and there
is no doubt that Moi felt threatened by him. It is the reason that Masinde Muliro was rigged out
of parliament during the 1979 elections, losing to a little known former mayor of Kitale Town,
Fred Gumo. When Masinde Muliro protested, he was promptly detained in between 1982-84.
Muliro got his seat in 1984 after a successful election petition, but he was never allowed to
regain his flavor and stature in parliament. It was not until 1992 that Masinde Muliro regained
his former self and leadership charisma. He teamed up with Jaramogi Oginga Odiinga to form
the mass movement FORD that is regarded as instrumental for initiating Kenya‟s second
liberation.
Like Masinde Muliro, the vote against the government in Parliament in 1975 heralded the
end of his political career. Peter Kibisu was sacked as an assistant minister after the vote and
jailed between 1975 and 1976 on false charges. He was defeated in the 1979 elections by Moses
Mudavadi. From then onwards, his career dimmed.
The Age of the Radicals: Golden Age of Kenya’s Parliament
The Golden Age of Kenya‟s parliament has been associated with “the seven bearded sisters,”
who included Mathew Onyango Midika (Nyando), Koigi Wamwere (Nakuro North, now
Subukia), Chibule wa Tsuma (Kaloleni), Mashengu wa Mwachofi (Wundanyi), and Chelagat
Mutai (Eldoret North), Lawrence Sifuna (Bumula) and Abuya Abuya and George Anyona
(Kitutu East). The radicals rejected politics of patronage which President Moi regime perfected
and used effectively to divide MPs. They gave life to an otherwise „dead‟ parliament, and they
paid a price for it (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). The „seven bearded‟ sisters were accused of being
Marxists, of serving their foreign masters (socialist states) and were systematically haunted out
of the August house one by one, by Kenyatta and Moi regimes The group was the real
opposition within one party system. They were the actual peoples‟ representatives. These radical
MPs were intelligent, forceful and relatively young. They caused anxiety for the front bench and
Government. The sad thing was that they were all systematically purged on trumped up charges
by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes.
Mathew Charles Onyango-Midika was elected MP for Nyando Constituency (now
Muhoroni) in 1979. Because of his deep-seated stand against corruption and excesses of the
state, he was accused of stealing union money, when he served as secretary general of a trade
union of sugar workers. His offer to repay the money was rejected and he was jailed, thereby
losing his parliamentary seat. Onyango-Midika made it back to Parliament in 1983 and was
appointed to a full cabinet position by President Moi,, thereby buying his silence.
Koigi wa Wamwere was first elected to parliament in 1979, after being released from
detention by the Moi regime in 1978. He represented Nakuru North constituency. Because of his
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
33
radical stand against the government, especially his calls for land reforms, he was often harassed
by government agents. He was soon detained after the 1982 attempted coup against the Moi
regime. He was released from detention in 1984 and fled to Norway in 1986. He was elected
back to Parliament in 2002, and was swiftly incorporated in the Kibaki regime as an assistant
minister for Information and Communications. He became silent and an ardent defender of the
Kibaki regime. He lost his former fire and became a status quo MP and lost his seat in the 2007
general elections. It appears like the people of Subukia constituency were comfortable with
Wamwere the radical MP and not the minister.
The dirty tactics used to haunt radical MPs out of parliament were used on youthful MP
for Eldoret North Chelagat Mutai, who was only 24 years when she was elected to parliament.
The Kenyatta regime falsely accused her of inciting people in her constituency to invade a
private sisal plantation at Ziwa and jailed her for six months in 1976. The Moi regime also
pursued her, accusing her for filing false mileage claims as MP in 1983. She sought political
asylum in Tanzania, where she was joined later by another rebel MP James Orengo, who was
running away from the excesses of Moi‟s regime.
James Orengo who was only 29 when he entered parliament, representing Ugenya
constituency in 1980, was also haunted out of Parliament by the Moi regime largely on account
of his radical stand. He was also victimized for associating with the „wrong‟ people, such as the
father of opposition politics in Kenya Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Orengo was targeted by the Moi
regime which accused him of filing false mileage claims as MP. He jumped bail and fled to
Tanzania in 1982 (Amutabi, 2002). Although James Orengo serves as the Minster for Lands in
the coalition government of President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, it is clear
that he has not lost his radicalism and activism. He has been a lot in the news, taking back land
that had been grabbed by the elite members of the Moi regime and returning it to the state.
On his part, George Anyona (MP for Kitutu East) was detained by the Kenyatta regime
in 1977 for his radical stand in parliament and for being a friend of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.
Anyona was released from detention after the death of Kenyatta in 1978. He was however denied
to contest in the 1979 elections when his nomination papers were rejected by the KANUapointed returning officer. Anyona, who had been detained without trial in 1977, required special
authorization by „higher authorities‟ in order to contest. Anyona made it back to parliament after
the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992 on Kenya Social Congress Party, but he was a
pale shadow of his former flamboyance and radicalism and never made an impact in parliament.
Deputy Speakers and Kenya’s Parliament
From the Third Parliament, it looked like only Deputy Speakers were capable of ensuring
parliamentary autonomy because of the substantive speaker Fred Mate appeared to be made of
clay. Therefore, the success of the Third Parliament, 1974-79 is often attributed to the courage
and boldness of the deputy speaker Jean Marie arap Seroney and few back benchers that
included Butere Member of Parliament Joseph Martin Shikuku. Jean-Marie Seroney and Third
Parliament had a great beginning, but unfortunately Seroney‟s tenure as deputy speaker was cut
short by detention on October 15, 1975. The detention of Seroney was the first indication that
Jomo Kenyatta was increasingly becoming dictatorial and nervous about any political differences
in the state. The detention was therefore perhaps the strongest and earliest indication that
Kenyatta‟s regime was captive to party and inner circle interests, of what has been called the
Kiambu Mafia. Jean-Marie Seroney was detained for going along with MP Martin Shikuku when
he declared that KANU was dead. When some pro-establishment MPs asked for substantiation of
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
34
the claims, as the chair, Seroney had indicated that there was no reason to substantiate the
obvious.
The position of Deputy Speaker Jean-Marie Seroney was unique because he was elected
against the state. The Kenyatta regime was against his election as deputy speaker because he was
believed to be a radical. After he was detained in 1975, he was succeeded by rudderless James
Kabingu Muregi, who served till the first sitting of the Fourth Parliament on March 5, 1980
(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).. James Muregi was a miserable individual without any political clout.
He knew what had happened to his predecessor. He projected a rather pitiable image for he knew
that he occupied his position at the whim of the president and his inner circle and was supposed
to do their bidding. He lacked political clout and charisma. He was inexperienced and was
known to pander to the interests of the ruling party bigwigs. From then onwards, the speaker
Fred Mate and his deputies did the bidding of the state.
Some scholars of Kenya‟s parliamentary system have argued that not all the deputy
speakers were pathetic like James Kabingu Muregi (Amutabi, 2007). Some have suggested that
Moses Kiprono arap Keino, the Deputy Speaker of the Fourth Parliament was more intellectually
astute compared to Muregi. He showed some independence, which made Moi‟s regime
uncomfortable with him. This tension led to his abdication from the position before long, when
his term was cut short by his resignation on June 20, 1983. In the early 1980s, Moi had just
survived an attempted military coup and was becoming ruthless in dealing with opponents, both
imagined and real. The resignation of Keino was rather unexpected and arose out of a rather
minor aberration. It came out of a contentious ruling he had made a few days earlier barring the
then Member for Lurambi South, Wasike Ndombi from moving an adjournment motion pursuant
to provisions of Standing Order 20. Keino‟s resignation forestalled the debate on a No
Confidence Motion in him to have been moved by the Member for Bungoma South, Lawrence
Sifuna. There was no successor named afterwards, because the Fourth Parliament was dissolved
by Daniel Moi on July 22, 1983, paving way for snap general elections on September 26 1983.
The 1983 generals were held against a backdrop of increasing nervousness in Moi‟s government.
Since he ascended to power in 1978, Moi had not removed the legacy of Jomo Kenyatta in his
government. There were many elements in his government whom he was uncomfortable with
and he sought to use the elections to get rid of them. This is the reason that many scholars are
unanimous on the fact that the 1983 elections were perhaps the most rigged in Kenya‟s election
history (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
The Fourth Parliament that was convened in 1984 was full of „yes‟ men and women.
Many of the MPs were beneficiaries of the massive rigging that had taken place in the 1983
elections. They were handpicked by Moi and his inner circle of cabinet ministers led by Nicholas
Biwott. in the Fifth Parliament , the position of Deputy Speaker was held by Samuel Kibiebei
arap Ng'eny. As a fellow Kalenjin, Moi believed that Samwel Ng‟eny, the MP for Aldai would
do his bidding. Speaker Fred and his deputy presided over a parliament that was basically a
rubberstamp for President Daniel Moi. The Fifth Parliament passed some of the most suspicious
bills, many of which ended into law. By the time the term of the Fourth Parliament came to an
end it was known for its inaction and harboring political deadwoods. This is the parliament to
which even illiterate individuals such as Mulu Mutisya, Kariuki Chotara, and Ezekiel
Barngetuny served in as nominated MPs (Adar, 1998).
The first sitting of the Sixth Parliament on April 12, 1988 was marked by the retirement
of speaker Frederick Mate after several decades at the helm. Many Kenyans hoped that the new
speaker would invigorate parliament, and inject new life into its affairs. Fred Mate‟s departure
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
35
was a low key affair because apart from overseeing a smooth transition from Jomo Kenyatta to
Daniel Moi, there was nothing else that he did. Besides, the political transfer of power was
largely done outside parliament (Amutabi, 1995).
The ascension of former Deputy Speaker Moses arap Keino to the position of speaker
was hardly surprising. He was the most experienced person, for the position, although not the
most qualified. A few factors seemed to work in his favor. When he had served as deputy
speaker in the Third Parliament, he has resigned in 1983 as a matter of personal principles. It was
also not lost on observers that Moses arap Keino was not a push over and that Moi and his
henchmen would not necessary have the right of way. Although Moses Keino had had a long
parliamentary service stretching to the Second Parliament, he was a bridge builder. He was his
own man and did not belong to the many political camps that oscillated around Moi in the
country at the time – he neither a Njonjo nor a Biwott man. His parliamentary record was also
immaculate, having served on several parliamentary standing and ad hoc select committees. He
had also served as Deputy Chief Whip and Deputy Speaker, which granted him immense
experience. It was largely as a result of these factors that Moses Keino was elected unopposed as
speaker of the House on April 12, 1988. He was slightly better Fred Mate because he was visible
and appeared to make rulings that even KANU did not like. But like when he served as Deputy
Speaker, he appeared very temperamental and was sometimes hasty in his decision-making
process as speaker. He did not believe in horse-trading and was n diplomatic. This was a major
liability in the type of regime under which he served. It therefore came as no surprise when
Speaker Moses arap Keino resigned on May 12, 1991 from his position. No reason was given for
his resignation amidst claims that he was sympathetic to the Njonjo side of the political divide
and was even said to be a Njonjo man. Njonjo men such as Minister Joseph Kamotho were being
bundled out of the party and from their cabinet positions. It is perhaps for this association that the
speaker resigned (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).
Going by the prevailing logic at the time, it was almost automatic that the replacement of
Moses Keino as speaker should come from among the Kalenjin ethnic group. It is not clear what
criteria was used to select the second Speaker for the Sixth Parliament and the fourth Speaker of
the independent Parliament of Kenya because Jonathan Kimetet arap Ng‟eno was not a lawyer
and neither was he a professor of law. He was said to be a university professor before he entered
elective politics but no one seems to know in which discipline he was a professor. Despite many
reservations about his grounding in matters of jurisprudence, Ng‟eno was elected unopposed on
June 12, 1991 as speaker of the National Assembly. Ng‟eno had served in Moi‟s cabinet since
his first term in parliament in 1979, when he was appointed Minister for Basic Education at a
time when there were more illiterates in parliament than degree holders; it is not surprising that
Moi appointed him minister during his first term. He was appointed to the cabinet on his second
term from 1983 as well. His last portfolio before ascending to speakership was as minister of
commerce.
Nge‟no‟s experience in the Fourth and Fifth Parliaments as an MP and a minister was
certainly useful and it counted for a lot. The sixth parliament had many sycophants and the work
of the speaker was to oversee one sided debates which were passed in record times. One can
therefore judge the record of Ng‟eno as speaker because he presided over a largely tame
parliament. There is also nothing to write home about the Deputy Speaker of Sixth Parliament
because he was recruited from the ranks of the blue eyed boys of KANU. Stephen Kalonzo
Musyoka was elected to parliament following a by election and his mentor and benefactor was
the illiterate Mulu Mutisya, a KANU insider. Like the speaker, we cannot gauge the career and
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
36
role of Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka (the current Vice President) in his performance because the
Sixth Parliament was probably the worst in terms of quality in Kenya‟s history. But the Sixth
Parliament had the major distinction of voting to repeal Section 2A of the constitution of Kenya
which had led to Kenya becoming a one party state. What makes this a non issue for the Sixth
Parliament is the fact that the repeal was already decided by Daniel Moi when he called upon the
KANU delegates during their annual meeting in Kasarani to vote for the return of multiparty
politics. Parliament was simply Moi‟s rubberstamp. If he had said no to KANU delegates in
Kasarani, it is possible that parliament would have said no to multiparty politics as well (Masime
and Kibara, 2003).
The Seventh Parliament and Return of Multiparty Democracy in Kenya
Like all previous parliaments in Kenya, the Seventh Parliament largely acted as the rubberstamp
of the executive. It is for this reason that the Seventh Parliament voted to repeal Section 2A of
the Constitution of Kenya following Moi‟s decision at the KANU delegates‟ conference at
Kasarani. Moi had listened to all the speakers in Kasarani, all of whom dismissed the notion of
multiparty politics. They did not know that Moi had a surprise for them. He had made up his
mind to allow the repeal of section 2A knowing well that he had hatched a plan to defeat the
multiparty advocates by diving them. Following the unanimous voting in parliament to repeal
Section 2A, the Constitution of Kenya Act No. 10 of 1991 was enacted on December 10, 1991,
effectively changing Kenya from a de jure one party state to a de jure multiparty state. Daniel
Moi did not want a strong parliament. He wanted KANU to remain a dominant actor even under
the new multiparty dispensation. He made plans in which money was printed and given to
KANU candidates to ensure that they won.
Table 2: 1992 Presidential Elections
Candidate
Percentage Vote
Daniel Moi
Ken Matiba
Mwai Kibaki
Oginga Odinga
36.3%
26.0%
19.5%
17.5%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
Having satisfied the donor demands that Kenya establishes a competitive party situation, he
called for general elections in December 1992. The General elections held in Kenya on
December 29, 1992 were the first multi-party elections and the second since Independence on
December 12, 1963. Many parties contested the 1992 general elections and at least seven parties
were represented in the Seventh Parliament. The parties represented in Parliament included
KANU which for obvious reasons, had majority number of MPs elected under its emblem.
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
37
Table 3: Party Parliamentary Seats at 1992 General Elections
Party
KANU
FORD-Asili
FORDKenya
DP
Others
Parliamentary
seats
100
31
31
% of
(188)
53.2%
16.5%
16.5%
23
03
12.2%
01.6%
Total
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
The other parties with MPs in parliament included the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
in Kenya (FORD-Kenya), the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy - Asili (FORD-Asili),
the Democratic Party (DP), the Kenya National Congress (KNC), the Party for Independent
Candidates of Kenya (PICK), and the National Development Party of Kenya (NDPK). Daniel
Moi did not hide the fact that he did not believe in democracy and went to work to undermine the
process as soon as the 1992 elections were over (Ajulu, 2002). He raided opposition parties and
„bought‟ their MPs urging them to defect to KANU. He succeeded in wooing many MPs from
Ford-Asili, Ford-Kenya and DP. Apili Wawire, the MP for Lugari, elected under FORD-Asili
ticket was the first to defect to KANU and seek reelection under KANU. He won the reelection
but with really nasty lessons. For the games that Moi played with MPs in Kenya, we should give
a brief account of Apili Wawire‟s tribulations in the political games of the time. To defect to
KANU, Apili Wawire had been promised 20 million Kenya shillings. He was given 10 million
before he defected and promised the balance after the by-election. KANU also promised to fund
his campaigns. KANU and Moi honored their promise to fund his by-election and indeed
ensured his reelection. However, after the reelection, Apili Wawire was never paid the balance
but could not come out in the open to make the demand.
Table 6: The Results of 1997 Presidential Elections
Name of Candidate
Daniel Moi
Mwai Kibaki
Raila Odinga
Michael Wamalwa
Charity Ngilu
Percentage vote
40.64%
31.49%
11.06%
8.40%
7.81%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
38
There were many other MPs that defected from their parties during this period and they included
the Ford-Asili for Ikolomani, Japheth Shamalla who defected to KANU; Protus Momanyi,
elected as Bobasi MP under DP and who defected to KANU.
By the time of the dissolution of the Seventh Parliament on November 10, 1997, the
ranks of many parties had been raided by KANU which frustrated the other parties in Parliament
because it passed bills that it wanted and ditched those that did not serve their interests. For
example, PICK and KNC had ceased to be Parliamentary parties by 1997. This was occasioned
by an Election Petition in Court against PICK and defection to KANU by the sole MP elected
under KNC.
Table 7: Party Performance in 1997 General Elections
Name of Party
KANU
DP
NDP
FORD–K
SDP
Safina
Small parties
Seats
seats)
107
39
21
17
15
05
06
(210 % of Total
51%
18.6%
10%
8.1%
7.1%
2.4%
2.8%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
The gender disparity in the first multiparty elections in 1992 was deplorable. Out of the two
hundred and two (202) Members of the Seventh Parliament, only seven (7) were women. Of the
seven (7), three (3) were in KANU while the remaining four (4) were in the Opposition parties
distributed as follows: DP had two MPs: Agnes Ndetei representing Kibwezi and Martha Karua
representing Gichugu Constituency; FORD-Kenya had Phoebe Asiyo representing Karachuonyo
Constituency and FORD-Asili had Mary Wanjiru representing Kinangop Constituency.
However, despite the gender disparity in parliament, women had something to celebrate
in 1993 because for the first time in the history of independent Kenya, a woman was appointed to
the Cabinet by President Daniel Moi. Winfred Nyiva Mwendwa, representing Kitui West
Constituency in Parliament was appointed as minister for Culture and Social Services. Of course
as expected feminists did not hide their wrath against the portfolio that seemed to be typical.
They criticized the appointment because Mwendwa was given a peripheral ministry.
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
39
Table 8: results of 2002 Presidential Elections
Candidat
e
Kibaki
Political
Party
NARC
Kenyatta
KANU
Nyachae
FORDP
SDP
CCU
Orengo
Ng’ethe
Votes
3,646,27
7
1,853,89
0
345,152
24,524
10,061
%
of
Total
62.20%
31.32%
5.89%
0.42%
0.17%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
It is now clear why Mwendwa was given a peripheral ministry because she had enough
experience and a solid academic background. She has previously served as an MP in the Fourth
and Sixth Parliaments. She was a third term as MP in 1993.
Between 1993 and 1997, the parliamentary business in Kenya suffered many disruptions
occasioned by defections, moist of which were engineered by KANU. There were 14 defections
in total, necessitating a similar number of by-elections. The defections caused more disturbances
in parliament by occasioning the change in leader of opposition in the house (Ajulu, 2002). At
the time of convening of parliament, the leader of Ford-Asili Kenneth Matiba was the leader of
opposition, but after only one year, his party lost many MPs to KANU. Matiba was replaced by
Ford-Kenya‟s Oginga Odinga as leader of opposition because Ford-Kenya had the second largest
number of MPs in the house after KANU.
Table 9: Results of 2002 Parliamentary Elections
Party
NARC
KANU
FORD-P
SISI
KWA
SISI
Safina
FORD-A
Shirikisho
Seats
125
64
14
2
% of Total
59.5%
30.4%
06.6%
01%
2
2
1
01%
01%
0.5%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
40
IPPG and Minimal Reforms before 1997 Elections
The opposition did not learn their lessons in 1993 when they went to the polls under a
constitution that favored President Daniel Moi and KANU. Many had hoped that the Seventh
Parliament would create laws leveling the playing field before the next elections were held. Moi
and KANU used divide and rule mechanism and made the utterly divided the opposition. The
opposition was not helped by the fact that the leaders were ambitious and divided, with each
hoping to upstage each other (Ajulu, 2002). In 1997 the opposition leaders in parliament realized
that they were running out of time and decided to act. They had known since 1991 that Daniel
Moi did not thrive in chaos and violence and decided to initial chaos on the floor of the house
when Moi was attending the presentation of the 1997 Budget.
The opposition MPs turned the 1997 Budget Speech in the House into a fracas. They
disrupted the budget speech, by calling for political reforms. The chaos by MPs in the House
received a lot of sympathy from the international community and KANU and Moi was soon
forced to negotiate with the opposition or face more international sanctions. At the time, Kenya
was already under some form of sanctions by the World Bank and IMF. The mounting pressure
led to the formation of the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in August 1997. The
problem of IPPG was that it was composed by moderates whose interest was to avoid chaos in
the country. Thus, they pushed for only moderate reforms in electoral laws and pushed for only
those demands that Moi and KANU were willing to accept. Although the IPPG played a pivotal
role in creating some reforms, Moi and KANU still had a huge advantage in the electoral
process. The IPPG recommendations were eventually drafted into Bills and passed by the House.
The Bills introduced several measures affecting provisions in the management of elections and
the administration of peace, justice and security.
Table 10: Results of 2007 Parliamentary Elections
Party
ODM
PNU
ODM-Kenya
KANU
Safina
NARC-Kenya
Ford-People
NARC
Others
Total seats
Seats
99
43
16
14
5
4
3
3
23
210
% of Total
47.14%
20.56%
13.3%
6.66%
2.40%
1.90%
1.42%
1.42%
19.16%
100%
Source: Maurice Amutabi, (2009).
The Seventh Parliament
The Seventh Parliament was unlucky to be presided over by a speaker who was raised under
KANU dictatorship. Elected as speaker on January 26, 1993, Francis Ole Kaparo was the wrong
man for the job in a multiparty democracy (Ajulu, 2002). This is because he never ceased to do
the bidding of Moi and KANU. It is no wonder that KANU hardliners kept reelecting him as
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
41
speaker until they lost the majority in 2007 when he lost the position to the more charismatic and
neutral Kenneth Marende. A lawyer by profession, Francis ole Kaparo, became the fifth Speaker
of independent Kenya at a time when Kenya needed someone to midwife democracy, by pushing
Moi and KANU on the brink. He failed to work with democratic forces and instead collaborated
with KANU and Moi to undermine the democratic process in and out of parliament. Equally
inept and unequal to the task of Deputy Speaker was Bonaya Godana, who elected t the position
on Janaury 26, 1993. A lawyer by training, and former Senior Lecturer and Chairman of the
Department of Public Law at the University of Nairobi, Bonaya Godana was a KANU insider
and had even been mentioned as a future Vice President (during Moi‟s time, it was the highest
one could ever aspire to reach because the presidency had an owner and was under seal). Francis
Ole Kaparo and Bonaya Godana suffocated parliament with KANU agenda, which was
undeniably undemocratic. It is not therefore surprising that the Seventh Parliament did not bring
about a revolution as many had imagined. In fact Kaparo‟s parliament bungled the process for a
new constitution in 1997, 2002up to 2007 when he was bundled out of the position of speaker.
Some scholars have argued that as a KANU insider, Ole Kaparo was one of the obstacles to a
new constitutional dispensation in Kenya (Ajulu, 2002). It was therefore not surprising when Ole
Kaparo came out in 2010 to campaign against the enactment of a new constitution in Kenya.
Concluding remarks
From the foregoing, it is evident that the performance of parliaments in Kenya has been a mixed
bag, with executive clearly having the upper hand in the relationship between parliament and the
executive. Whereas a few MPs have been vocal in ensuring that the executive branch is put in
check while ensuring that the rights of ordinary people are respected, the vast majority of
parliamentarians have tended to avoid confrontation with the executive, making it have its way.
Many MPs have pandered to the whims of the president, keeping a low profile, hoping for
cabinet appointments. Indeed, some of the most radical MPs in Kenya have been „bribed‟ into
silence by cabinet appointments, such as Mathew Onyango Midika.
The problem with Kenya is that the origins of parliament were predicated on the whims
of the executive, the colonial governor. Even after the departure of the colonial governor at
independence, the executive (African presidents) continued to exert a lot of influence over
parliament and the judiciary. In the past, poor pay was blamed for the manner in which MPs
were often bamboozled by the executive through cash handouts and outright bribery to support
unpopular bills. However, this excuse for the poor performance has been discarded in the recent
past because hefty pay packages have not changed the behavior of many MPs. Some scholars
have argued that the reason for MPs jack-kneed actions have to do with a powerful executive.
Many Kenyans are resigned to the fact that politicians, especially MPs are unreliable.
Even the new constitution which was promulgated in 2010 does not offer much for checks and
balances against the executive. Today, many observers seem to agree that the days of MPs who
represented the interests of the people are long gone. They have been replaced by self-seeking
charlatans who engage in shameless horse-trading activities in order to win the next election. The
executive branch has taken advantage of this weakness. Today, the badly kept secret in Nairobi
is that MPs are often bribed in order to vote in a certain way, in parliament. Whoever has money
can buy democracy in Kenya. There are pundits who that with the new constitution providing for
appointment of ministers outside parliament, MPs will become real and speak out more openly
for genuine reasons and not hoping to catch the eye of the executive in order to be silenced by
cabinet appointments. There is no much hope the parliamentary autonomy in Kenya.
Kenya Studies Review Volume 3 Number 3 December 2011
42
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