NUCLEAR
UMBRELLA STATES
A brief introduction to the concept of nuclear umbrella states
By ILPI
The term nuclear umbrella refers to the guarantee
of military protection that nuclear weapons armed
states are seen to extend, if need be with nuclear
weapons, to their non-nuclear weapons armed
allies. Nuclear umbrellas are usually, but not always, explicitly declared. Either way, being under
a nuclear umbrella presumably implies that a nonnuclear weapons armed state enhances its own
protection from being an ally of a nuclear weapons
armed state. There are, essentially, two nuclear
umbrellas, the US and Russia’s.
The term is most commonly used with reference
to the nuclear umbrella that the US provides for all
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949). While NATO’s nuclear umbrella
is primarily based on US nuclear weapons, the UK
and French arsenals are also expected to be drawn
upon in a situation of need. The Unites States’
separate security alliances with Japan (Ampo (aka
Anpo), 1960, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan), and
South Korea (1958, reaffirmed after North Korea’s
2006 test of a nuclear device) place these two countries under the US umbrella as well.
Through its membership in ANZUS (Australia,
New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, 1951),
Australia is also under the US nuclear umbrella.
This umbrella no longer covers New Zealand, who
Nutshell Paper No 4/2011
has opted to withdraw from the nuclear dimension
of ANZUS. In April 2008, during her presidential
campaign, Hillary Clinton proposed to extend the
US nuclear umbrella to Israel and other American
allies in the Middle East. Following her acceptance
of the position of Secretary of State in November
the same year, the proposition has not been publicly repeated, and the status of a possible US – Middle
East nuclear umbrella remains unclear. The Arab
spring, Iran’s sustained nuclear ambition, deteriorating US – Saudi relations and a number of other
factors may lead to a redefinition of this possible
umbrella.
The former Soviet Union’s and the current Russia’s security alliances are also understood as nuclear umbrellas. Unlike the US’, however, Russia’s
has never been officially declared, and remain less
clearly defined. Furthermore, following the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of
the former Soviet Union, half of the former union’s
allies and breakaway states have joined NATO.
The security treaty between Russia and some
neighbouring countries, known as the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), currently includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All of these, however,
are also listed by NATO as ‘partner states’. Other
nuclear armed states, like China, India, Pakistan,
2
Israel and North Korea, are not seen to provide nuclear umbrellas to potential allies.
The notion of nuclear umbrellas has caused considerable controversy, as the idea of extending nuclear deterrence to other states arguably violates the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article I
of this treaty commits the five recognized nucleararmed states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China)
not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology (or
direct and in-direct control over such weapons) to
non-nuclear weapons armed states, while Article
II commits the non-nuclear weapons armed states
to refrain from receiving the same. In the case of
NATO, the ultimate control over the nuclear arsenals of US, UK, and France remain with the three respective governments. In practice, however, NATO’s
nuclear doctrine is a shared policy and US nuclear
weapons have also been stationed on the territory of
other non-nuclear NATO members for decades. This
is seen by many as a clear violation of the NPT.
In response to this criticism, it has been contended
that at the time the NPT was negotiated, NATO’s
so-called nuclear sharing agreements, whereby the
US deploys some of its nuclear weapons in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey,
were unknown to most signatories. Later, as these
agreements have become common knowledge, the
US has stressed that since its own forces control
these weapons, the sharing does not constitute a
breach of the NPT. NATO has also argued that even
if the nuclear weapons that are placed in Europe
may be carried and released by planes belonging
to their host countries, this would only happen
in a situation of war, in which the NPT would no
longer be binding. Both the Non-Aligned Movement and critics inside NATO maintain that nuclear sharing, a key part of NATO’s joint strategy,
violates the spirit, if not the text, of the NPT. The
final document of the 1985 Third Review Conference of the NPT emphasizes that the treaty is controlling under “any circumstances”, hence also in
times of war. Land-based US nuclear weapons have
also been deployed in Taiwan, the Philippines and
South Korea, but these were removed in 1974, 1976
and 1991 respectively.
The case of New Zealand demonstrates that nuclear umbrellas may pose a problem where they
overlap with nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ).
Following the proclamation of the South Pacific
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga,
1985) and the domestic measures that New Zealand introduced to obey to what it considered to
be the imperatives of the zone, the US no longer
considered New Zealand to be under its nuclear
umbrella. This resulted in a severe diplomatic row
between the United States and New Zealand. New
Zealand has continued to insist that it will obey the
obligations of the Rarotonga Treaty, as well as the
domestic legislations underpinning it. Conversely,
Australia remains under the US nuclear umbrella
while also being party to the Rarotonga Treaty.
The compatibility of these two regimes under international law has yet to be thoroughly examined
and clarified in a satisfactory manner.
As for the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone (CANWFZ, 2006), the US, the UK and France
have objected to a clause stating that this treaty
will not affect the rights and obligations of the
signatories to previous international agreements.
This becomes a problem in relation to the so-called
Tashkent Treaty (1992), to which Russia and all bar
one member of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but not Turkmenistan) are
signatories. The Tashkent Treaty makes clear that
an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. The US, UK and
France therefore consider the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Tashkent Treaty as
incompatible. Pending a clarification of this issue,
the three nuclear weapons armed NATO members
await ratification of the additional protocols of the
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which is
necessary for the zone to take full effect.
International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) provides analytical work, juridical briefs, and policy advice within international law,
human rights, corporate social responsibility, governance, and country/conflict analysis. ILPI is established with the conviction that the combination of academic excellence and operational policy experience facilitates “hands-on” solutions and
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worldwide.
Cover photo: Luxembourgian-registered NATO E-3 AWACS flying with three American Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter
aircraft in a NATO exercise in 2003 (Photo: U.S. Government / Creative Commons. Duotone added).
The production of this paper was made possible thanks to support from the Government of Norway.
Published: December 2011
Copyright: International Law and Policy Institute © 2011
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