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Zachary W. Deibel
HIST 481: Major Seminar II
Senior Thesis and Capstone Project
Capstone Advisors: Professor Kate Haulman
University Honors in History
Spring Semester – May 1, 2013
A “Just Sensibility of the Nation:”
Classicism and the Formation of Early American Foreign Policy
The election of 1800 ushered in a new era of American politics. The voters’ support for
republican, agrarian, and anti-Federalist perspectives marked a fundamental transition of power
away from the tradition of leaders like George Washington and Alexander Hamilton. The
different political philosophies between these two factions became increasingly evident as the
Republican era brought America into its first post-revolutionary war, its largest period of
continental expansion, and its most significant statement of foreign policy until the start of the
twentieth century. These ideologies, and the different heritages from which these ideas originated
marked the key differences between the Federalist mindset and the principles of Republican
politics. Foreign policy, then, became the arena through which leaders of the early republic at the
beginning of the nineteenth century aimed to establish a unique mindset that combined
Enlightenment perceptions of liberty with classical foundations of international relations,
resulting in an emphasis on preserving democratic-republican ideals in pursuit of American
global interests.
Washington, Adams, and Hamilton all advocated an isolationist attitude toward foreign
policy. Hamilton stated, “It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were
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continually agitated.”1 For the Federalists, the classics were institutionally commendable, and
their examples of oligarchy and republic provided excellent models from which to draw
inspiration and contribution for the founding of governmental structures. Federalist political
theories that focused on preserving social order were rooted in “an English frame of reference,”
one inevitably tied to classical republicanism and ancient political theory.2 The Republican era
would mark America’s first true foray into foreign affairs as an actor on the geopolitical stage,
culminating in the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The decisions, however, that
precipitated American entry into global politics combined a use of classical ideology with
contemporary knowledge and experience, all while infusing a uniquely American perspective
into foreign policy.
During the Republican period under Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, each leader took
different lessons from classicism that helped to produce three distinct philosophies toward
foreign affairs. Each president combined elements of his predecessor’s policies with new
interpretations of history, antiquity, and political thought. The classics taught each of these
administrations different lessons that produced significantly different philosophies toward
foreign affairs. Jefferson’s idealism focused on the classics as educational tools that taught
rhetorical and political theory, while providing valuable lessons for alternative diplomatic
practice and foreign policymaking. Madison’s political and diplomatic realism used a classical
framework blended with contemporary conditions to produce a foreign policy fixated on
pursuing US domestic interests and defending its natural rights as a nation. Monroe’s pursuit of
1
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, “Federalist No. 9: The Union as a
Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” Jim Manis, ed, The Federalist Papers: A
Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication (State College: Pennsylvania State University,
2012), 37-38.
2
Joyce O. Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s,
(New York: New York University Press, 1984), 94.
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an expansionist, protectionist imperialism dictated order as independent from the “classical”
concepts of empire and foreign affairs, revealing a stark departure in American political tradition
from the principles of antiquity. In essence, this is an intellectual history of the classics’
influence on early American foreign policy, in an attempt to further understand the dynamic
ideologies that informed each administration.
Although other intellectual traditions like Christianity and the Enlightenment thought
influenced the founders, classicism, whether allocated to the republican or liberal tradition,
provided the foundation for a developing, uniquely American foreign policy that drew examples
from the past while forming new norms about policy, foreign affairs, and diplomacy. Contrary to
the often-endorsed arguments of historians like Gordon Wood and Bernard Bailyn, the founders
did not depart from the classics by 1789. Throughout the early years of the republic and
antebellum periods, the leaders used classicism, an understanding of classical republicanism, and
an awareness of antiquity as educational standards from which to draw both rhetorical training
and ideological foundation. Additionally, the founders’ understanding of classicism provided
historic and political examples of the ways policies and governments could both improve and
impair society.
From 1800 to 1824, there was a significant movement away from classical realism as a
mode of foreign policy. Rather than pursue aggressive, militarily inclined, power-focused foreign
policy, hallmarks of the classical realist school of thought, the presidents of the early republic
shaped a foreign policy that “existed to defend, not define, what America was.”3 Though other
intellectual traditions, like Christianity, Anglican legal structures, and the Enlightenment all
heavily influenced the founders, classical thought provided the foundation for developing a
3
Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World
Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 37.
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uniquely American foreign policy that drew on examples from the past while forming new norms
about policy, foreign affairs, and diplomacy. By the end of Monroe’s presidency, the US had
moved toward a neo-classical entity, one that accepted the past as both a model and anti-model
for how to pursue foreign policy. It relied on three major tenets—continental expansionism,
global exclusivism, and Atlantic isolationism—the origins and foundations of which become
clear under further analysis of each president’s administration. A firm understanding of and a
gradual movement away from traditional, classical foreign policy marked the Republican era of
American politics.
Survey of Scholarship on Early American Foreign Policy
Historical scholarship concerning the classics and foreign policy focuses on the debate
over the extent to which republicanism or liberalism influenced early American political
philosophy. Typically, John Locke, Adam Smith, and the other figures of the Enlightenment
dominate discussions on the foundations of domestic policy in early America. Historians like
Louis Hartz and Richard Hofstadter contend that American history, particularly that of the early
and nineteenth century, was “profoundly informed by Lockean values of liberty, economic
individualism, and property rights,” as Claire Goldstene summarized.4 The influence of
Enlightenment thought on the early American period is incredibly apparent throughout the
writings and philosophies of many of the nation’s first leaders. However, nearly a decade after
Hartz and Hofstadter credited Enlightenment thought as the framework for American political
culture, Meyer Reinhold suggested it was the classics that first influenced early
4
Claire Goldstene, “‘America was Promises’: The Ideology of Equal Opportunity, 1877-1905”
(PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2009), 13.
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conceptualization of American politics.5 Within the world of historical scholarship, this claim
spurred a new discussion of classicism’s influence on American politics.
As classical influence on domestic policy was a revived and relatively nascent discussion,
historians were cautious to consider the same influence on early American foreign policy. The
research methods oscillated between consulting the personal writings of major players in the
early American period and legal documents detailing the events of the period. These studies’
efficacies varied, but these historians often utilized their contemporaries’ arguments to begin an
oppositional approach or to complement their own contentions. In the end, the examination of
intellectual foundations of early American foreign policy produced a canon of historical
literature that would unanimously concede, notwithstanding debates over its permanence or
character, the precedence of classical ideologies in young republic’s geopolitical strategies.
This scholarly consensus, however, is not without internal debates, discussions, and
contentions. It is impossible to ignore the presence of classical references in early American
rhetoric. The classics, according to Caroline Winterer, were institutionalized in American college
curricula during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These same colleges “served
as training grounds for the ideological architects of the American Revolution and its aftermath.”6
Political discussions also circulated around the classics. Winterer retells how Thomas Jefferson
scoffed at “Patrick Henry’s classical posing,” claiming that the revolutionary orator had never
made significant insights about or mentions of classical “heroes” and philosophers.7 The
5
Meyer Reinhold, Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States
(Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1984), 18.
6
Caroline Winterer, The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American
Intellectual Life, 1780-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 16.
7
Caroline Winterer, “Thomas Jefferson and the Ancient World,” in A Companion to Thomas
Jefferson, ed. Francis Cogliano (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2012), 382.
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presence of classical thought in early American politicians’ lives, however, did not close the
debate on its influence on their foreign policy.
The first significant debate over such claims originated from the assertion that classicism
was a temporary force on American politics. Though his work suggests the enormous influence
of classical thought on revolutionary rhetoric and ideology, Reinhold argued in Classica
Americana, “No sooner was the national life inaugurated under the Constitution in 1789 than
classical learning began precipitously and conspicuously to decline in usefulness, acceptance,
and vitality.”8 In addition, Reinhold contended that American republican ideals of the future
nation would reflect a unique, American, “national system,” not the “ornamental” nature of
classical authority.9 Other historians agreed. Bradford Perkins’ first volume of The Cambridge
History of American Foreign Relations follows Reinhold’s contention that early statecraft sought
to be inherently republican, and shed the classical themes that pervaded antiquated policies often
associated with Europe. The characteristically American commitments to republicanism and
individualism, Perkins argues, instigated “radical departures from the dominant values of
Europe.”10 The volume moves through the entire period of early American history, tracing the
development of this uniquely American diplomatic strategy that marked a shift away from
traditionalist, classical thinking as early as the end of the revolution.
Perkins considers expansionism to be a critical component of early foreign policy,
simultaneously invoking survival, self-interest and insistence on an aggressively American form
of statecraft.11 In The American Age, Walter LaFeber agreed. His work traces the “roots of
8
Reinhold, Classica Americana, 175.
Ibid.
10
Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865, vol. 1 of The Cambridge
History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10.
11
Ibid., 13
9
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American Foreign Policy” through the Revolution, but contends that as early as 1776, rhetoric,
policies, and treaties indicated a shift away from “Old World” thinking to that of a new,
American world.12 By the end of the 18th century, LaFeber argues, Americans had taken a “major
turn” away from the revolutionary foreign policy rooted in idealism and classicism toward the
realist, “American freedom of action” against other states.13 Gordon Wood’s volume within The
Oxford History of the United States complements Reinhold’s, Perkins’, and Leferber’s
contentions. Though he concedes a certain level of classical permanence, Wood argues: “By
1815, the classical Enlightenment in America was over…and many of the ideals of the
Revolution…had been modified or perverted.”14 Wood’s perception of American diplomacy
rests in the same uniqueness contended by the aforementioned historians. Wood additionally
claimed in a later work, “In the decades following the Revolution, ancient Rome lost much of its
meaning for Americans…”15 Though he concedes that Ancient Greece contributed more to later
discussions, Wood’s early republic is one defined more by a “neoclassical revolution,” not
necessarily a neoclassical period of governance or policymaking.16
To some historians, however, the classics were never a fleeting ideological framework. In
The Founders and the Classics, Carl Richard addresses Wood and Reinhold specifically,
arguing, “Although classical republicanism and liberalism are two distinct constructs, the former
12
Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the
Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 22.
13
Ibid., 50
14
Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 4.
15
Gordon S. Wood, “The Legacy of Rome in the American Revolution,” The Idea of America:
Reflections on the Birth of the United States (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 76.
16
Ibid, 73.
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ideology provided the latter’s intellectual foundation.”17 Richard’s analysis contends that the
classics comprised “intellectual tools” the founders used to interpret sources of knowledge that
followed (Christianity, Whig philosophy, and liberalism, to name a few) their education in
antiquity.18 Caroline Winterer indicates that Jefferson’s entire intellectual life was shaped by that
same antiquity. His childhood education in the classics “profoundly” affected his political,
social, and moral thought, as he worked for education’s standardization in the classics.19
Winterer contends that Jefferson, along with other revolutionaries, drew on the Greek and
Roman models for “the noblest examples of good government, moral virtue, and artistic and
literary excellence.”20 In another article entitled “The Big Picture,” Winterer reveals that
“antiquity” was not simply the world of ancient Greece and Rome. Instead, it comprised the
whole Mediterranean region and the entirety of the “classical period,” extending from the earliest
Macedonians to the Anglo-Saxon invasions.21 Winterer’s argument contributes to Richard’s
insistence toward the lasting influence of classicism; Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries
were fixated on the classics as a foundation for intellectualism and, inevitably, leadership.
Developing from Winterer and Richard, some scholars have indicated that the use of the
classics in foreign policy not only changed over time, but also took on characteristically different
identities within the Republican period. Additionally, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe each used
the classics in different ways to produce different approaches to foreign policy. Robert Smith’s
Keeping the Republic contends three dominating concepts of “virtue” pervaded American
17
Carl Richard, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s. New
York: New York University Press, 1984), 5.
18
Ibid., 8, 10.
19
Caroline Winterer, “Thomas Jefferson and the Ancient World,” 384.
20
Ibid., 380.
21
Caroline Winterer, “The Big Picture: The Ancient Mediterranean in Early America,”
Common-Place 8, no. 4 (2008), http://www.common-place.org/vol-08/no-04/reading/ (accessed
September 28, 2012).
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political thought: classical, Whig, and yeoman virtue. Whig virtue pursued the preservation of
law, order, and the standards set forth by the republican government, the preferred “virtue” for
Hamilton and Adams. Yeoman virtue explored the individualistic and independent concept of
human nature that agrarian republicanism endorsed. Classical virtue, to Smith, extended “from
Greek and Roman models” to “seventeenth-century English revolutionaries.”22 Richard
Matthews’ analyses extend the divisions even further, arguing that Jefferson and Madison both
had very different uses of the classics and approaches to policy. Walter McDougal and Paul
Seabury also provide characteristically different understandings of Monroe as producing a
unique “national temper” toward foreign affairs during his presidency.23
Joyce Appleby’s understanding of the Republican era presents a different role for the
classics in policymaking. Appleby states, “Liberty in the classical republican tradition pertained
to the public realm and not the private…Virtue and liberty were indissolubly linked in classical
republican theory.”24 This idea suggests that the Republican era’s use of the classics was a blend
of political and ideological heritage. In order to be free, the United States needed to embody
classical virtue and values like honor, principle, and, most importantly, liberty. However,
Appleby points out that Jefferson and others’ understanding of the “Republican Vision” relied on
a classical virtue, reformed by the liberal thought of Locke and Hobbes.25 For Appleby, the
22
Robert W. Smith, Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 7.
23
Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States of
America (New York: Random House, 1960), 50.
24
Joyce O. Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s,
16.
25
Ibid., 21-22.
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American political system combined past ideologies and traditions with an awareness of the
limits inherent in classical republicanism and other European modes of thought.26
Many scholars argue that the founders and early statesmen considered antiquity as an
example from which they could take warning of future hazards and to which they could improve
a great deal. LaFeber posits that the formation of the Constitution, to Madison, was the solution
to “a 2,500-year-old problem that the greatest minds—Aristotle, Montesquieu, Hume—had
believed could not be solved: how to maintain a just and democratic system over an area as vast
as the United States.”27 Americans were beginning to expand on the classics, which were not
formulas for political success but examples that sometimes needed reevaluation, even
improvement. In “Madison’s Realism and the Role of the Domestic Ideals in Foreign Affairs,”
Greg Russell presents the idea that under Madison, American foreign and domestic policy served
as “workshops of liberty,” through which classical republican concepts could be applied and
revised as methods of understanding state affairs.28 Additionally, according to Russell, concepts
like the “sovereign equality of states,” “imperialism,” and “statesmanship” could be better
understood if examined with a classical lens, which Madison often did.29
For this group of scholars, the Republican era represented an entry into foreign policy
that represented a departure from the classics as exact models for policymaking. Instead, they
served as intellectual lessons that begged both improvement and expansion in contemporary
practice. Unlike Wood, Reinhold, LaFeber, Perkins, and others, this analysis will contend that
the founders did not completely abandon their classical republican ideals. Instead, the founders
26
Ibid., 23.
Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 33.
28
Greg Russell, “Madison’s Realism and the Role of the Domestic Ideals in Foreign Affairs,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 719.
29
Ibid., 714.
27
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used the classics as educational standards to draw rhetorical training, ideological foundations,
and allegorical example for the need to continually improve and advance government, society,
and policy. Over time, the use of the classics certainly changed, as previous scholarship clearly
indicates. Nonetheless, the classics remained a critical heritage for foreign affairs throughout the
Republican era.
A Note on Context and Methodology
To examine Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe’s foreign policy ideologies, it is important
to define relevant different theories and political terminology. In essence, the following analysis
suggests that each president of the Republican period approached foreign policy within a
different theoretical framework, all of which were informed by classical concepts of international
affairs. Classical realism, then, is a critical term for understanding foreign policy’s relationship
with antiquity. Hans Morgenthau, the twentieth century articulator of classical realism, identified
the theory’s central precepts: politics are governed by laws, interests are defined in terms of
power, politics remain separate from culture and other elements of society, and states are not
concerned with virtue or morality, just self-interest.30 The foreign policy of societies like Ancient
Rome and Ancient Greece reflect this classical realist mindset, where war and conflict
constituted the primary forms of international politics.
Contemporary theories of realism have since changed significantly. Modern realism
recognizes other elements within the international system than just states and power, but the
fundamental principles remain the same. Several different theories, combined and mixed
together, constituted the foreign policy approaches of the Republican era presidents. Beyond
30
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 4-12.
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realism, it is important to understand the concepts behind idealism in foreign policy. Within the
idealist approach to international relations, virtues like “law” and “morality” affect global
politics, not just the classical definitions of power.31 Idealists “see the international system as one
based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual
problems. For idealists, the principles of international relations must flow from morality.”32 The
idealism of the Republican era would have distinct differences from twentieth and twenty-first
century concepts, but the primary differences between other theories in regards to power and
interest would remain the same.
In addition to realism and idealism, study of the Republican era’s foreign policy requires
an understanding of imperialism. Morgenthau indicates that modern concepts of empire deal
more with economics and culture than imperialism has in the past. Classically, military
superiority and conquest defined a state’s pursuit of imperialism.33 During the Republican
period, empire would take on a different meaning, one that combined economics, military, and
culture in ways ancient societies could never have imagined. In essence, empire building in the
antebellum period was far different from the expansion of Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, and
other contemporary European powers. Indeed, by 1824, the United States made it clear that “the
American system would tolerate no further extension of European power [into the Western
Hemisphere].”34 These three concepts, realism, idealism, and imperialism, do not completely
characterize the foreign policy of the period. They do, however, provide larger frameworks in
31
Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, Ninth Edition (New York:
Longman, 2009), 507.
32
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition,
43.
33
Ibid., 12-15.
34
Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States of
America (New York: Random House, 1960), 42.
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which to find political elements reminiscent of the foreign policy innovations and developments
that took place from 1800 to 1824. Instead of relying on purely classical concepts, Jefferson,
Madison, and Monroe combined these standards with unique understandings and
implementations of different approaches to foreign affairs.
To identify these approaches, this analysis examines the presidents’ rhetorical, political,
and personal writings. Exploring the rhetoric behind addresses, speeches, and political
conversations is crucial to grasping the various elements of each president’s ideological
foundation for different policies. Studying the treaties, declarations, and other official documents
exchanged between nations, states, or diplomats help shape the motivations for and
characteristics of interstate agreements. Finally, correspondences and letters reveal the behindthe-scenes development of policy objectives and viewpoints. The following paper highlights
references to the classics and statements that mention classical ideologies in Jefferson, Madison,
and Monroe’s policies and statements to determine the ways in which the classics shaped each
president’s different approaches to foreign affairs.
A Survey of Classical Foreign Policy
The term “classical” has come to represent many different intellectual traditions. In some
instances, classical themes can reference any philosophy that originated before the modern era of
human history, encapsulating everything from Plato to Adam Smith, moving from antiquity
through the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. However, this study examines the classics from
their original and fundamental vantage. Early Americans’ understanding of the classics was the
writings, theories, histories, and experiences originating from antiquity, primarily Ancient
Greece and Rome. These two societies, perhaps more than those of any other historic period,
informed and educated Early Americans in civics and political theory. It was, as some historians
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have noted, “the central intellectual project in America,” and “the founders’ very interpretations
of the new dilemmas they faced were often quintessentially classical.”35
The founders’ and early presidents’ first political experiences often circulated around
diplomacy and foreign affairs. For the American republic, foreign policy was a political arena
into which the new nation entered with little preparation or experience. The formation of a
national foreign policy began with an understanding of the issues from classical experiences and
histories derived from antiquity.36 However, instead of simply providing models for conducting
foreign affairs, the classics helped teach valuable lessons through the failure of historic figures
and ideologies with which early American leaders were extremely familiar. Antiquity, then, was
full of valuable stories of success and failure, models and “antimodels.”37 An understanding of
the classics’ notable lessons, then, assisted in forming a uniquely American foreign policy during
the early years of the republic that combined elements of classicism, Enlightenment thought, and
contemporary experience.
This understanding of the classics and antiquity began with the founders’ educations.
Indeed, classical scholarship, accompanied by Christianity, dominated American intellectual life
throughout the nineteenth century and dictated the courses of study within academies and
institutions of learning.38 Through classical scholarship, the founders gained a comprehensive
understanding of society, politics, and civilization during the times of Ancient Greece and Rome.
For early Americans, these two cultures provided the most prevalent historical, political, and
social understanding of antiquity. In order to fully understand the extent to and manner in which
35
Caroline Winterer, The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American
Intellectual Life, 1.
36
Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American
Enlightenment, 8.
37
Ibid., 53, 85.
38
Caroline Winterer, The Culture of Classicism, 9.
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the classics influenced foreign policy during the Republican period, it is critical to consider the
major components, themes, and lessons of both Greek and Roman foreign affairs.
The Greek republic was the first democratically based ancient government from which
the founders drew historical and intellectual example. Before the republic’s formal
establishment, the Greek tyrants Draco, Solon and Pisistratus instituted several reforms aimed at
building Athens into a formidable economic and political force in the Mediterranean world. By
507 BC, the Greek tyrant Cleisthenes transitioned the city-state into a democratic form of
government, based on representation and political freedom. The governmental transition ended
just in time for the Persian invasion of Greece, “a pivotal date for the future of Western culture.”
When the Athenians led the Greek force against Persian invasion, it marked a significant
transition in the nation-state’s dealings with other cities and empires. The defense of the Greek
territory proved to be a defense of Greek culture. Without the Athenian and Spartan military
victories and cooperation during the conflict, the “Greek tradition—principally the concept of the
worth of the individual—” would never have survived.39
Greek culture did, however, survive, and thrive into what is now considered the “Hellenic
age.” In 495 BCE, Pericles assumed power in Athens and began a period in Greek history known
as “idealistic pragmatism.” Pericles sought to expand individualism while still enhancing the
city-state as a center in which “freedom, justice, and beauty” resided. Athens was to be an
exemplar to the world, a city on whose cultural and political contributions the rest of the region
depended.40 A famous “Athenian thesis” argued that the desire for “fear, honor, and interest”
39
This summary, in addition to the subsequent summaries of ancient Greece and ancient Rome,
comes from Robert Lamm’s extensive account of Greek history and its influence on the
formation of Western culture. Robert C. Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture: A Search
for Human Values, Volume 1, 10th edition (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1996), 71-74.
40
Ibid., 94-99.
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justified the drive for empire.41 However, the Peloponnesian War exposed Athens’ shortcomings
as a political entity in the competitive, violent Mediterranean. Though Athens would eventually
gain its relative dominance in the region, the struggle between Athens and Sparta revealed
Athens’ imperial ambitions and Spartan ability to stave off such advances through tactical
military strategy.42
The quarrels of nation-states, however, proved minor in comparison to the ambitious
imperialism of Alexander the Great: “In one extended and remarkable campaign Alexander
brought Greece, Egypt, all of the Persian Empire (including the territory of modern Turkey), and
lands as far east as India, into one vast empire.”43 Alexander sought to create a confederation of
nations and states, one under which each state would retain some degree of autonomy. However,
Greek culture and influence would, under Alexander’s vision, influence the entire empire as a
whole. Alexander, then, looked to establish a “cultural, as well as geographical, conquest.”
Sacrificing democracy, Alexander looked to establish an empire that increased security,
minimized conflict, and brought the achievements of Greek culture to all ends of the earth.44
Beyond the Greek republic, Pericles, and Alexander, the major diplomatic traditions of
antiquity come from that of the Roman republic and subsequent empire. The “Roman” identity
began under a series of Etruscan kings, eventually expelled with the capitulation of Tarquin in
509 BCE in favor of an oligarch-based republic.45 This new government formed under Roman
41
Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “Democracy and Empire: The Case of Athens,” in David Edward
Tabachnick and Toivo Koivukoski, ed., Enduring Empire: Ancient Lessons for Global Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 24.
42
Robert Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture, 94-99.
43
Ibid., 153.
44
Ibid., 154-155.
45
Ibid., 234.
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republicanism, and subsequently contributing to the themes of American republicanism, derived
from six basic principles, according to Mortimer Sellers:
The pursuit of justice and the common good…the rule of law…a balanced
government…a sovereign people…a deliberative senate…an elected
magistracy…ordered liberty…and public virtue.46
This reliance on structures and institutions as well as virtues and individuals characterized the
theoretical identity of the Roman concepts of a “republic.” The American system of Republican
democracy would, in essence, draw major principles from this same, antiquated system.47
The Punic Wars constituted the major foreign policy undertaking during the period of
Republican leadership in Rome. The First Punic War was a Roman response to Carthaginian
advances into Sicily. The hastily constructed Roman fleet pushed back Carthage’s navy, but
Hannibal’s advance through the Alps marked the beginning of the second conflict. The Roman
general Scipio (later given the surname “Africanus”) decided to attack the vulnerable
Carthaginian capital, forcing Hannibal to return to his native land, where he was soundly
defeated. The key political change came when Roman troops, after the urging of the statesman
Marcus Porcius Cato, launched a decisive offensive on Carthage, aiming to destroy its threat to
Roman influence in the region. This transition shows the change in Roman attitudes toward
foreign policy: what was once a strategy of attrition and defense became an all-out assault on any
society whose fundamental mission existed in opposition to that of the republic.48 During this
period, the Romans used concepts of “kinship” between other societies to determine foreign
46
David C. Hendrickson, “In the Mirror of Antiquity: The Problem of American Empire,” in
David Edward Tabachnick and Toivo Koivukoski, ed., Enduring Empire: Ancient Lessons for
Global Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 10.
47
Ibid., 9.
48
Robert Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture, 234-236.
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policy initiatives.49 Carthage, for instance, represented a threat to Roman politics and ideology,
and was thus considered an enemy of the republic. These measures of kinship and connection
represented a similar policy later employed by figures like Thomas Jefferson when dealing with
France and Great Britain. Jefferson affiliated politically with nations whose values and principles
reflected those of the American republic.
The Roman Republic itself, despite its attempts to remain an international power within a
republican scheme, did not last through antiquity. While carrying out one of the republic’s key
mission for foreign affairs in Gaul, Julius Caesar began his rise as a military official and
governor. During the Civil War that erupted after his campaigns, Caesar’s crossing of the
Rubicon River and assumption of control as dictator perpetuum effectively ended the authority
of the republic. After Caesar’s assassination, the rise of Octavian, later given the honorary title of
“Augustus,” set in motion the rise of the Roman Empire. This pivotal change caused the most
aggressive classically imperial drive throughout antiquity. The Roman Empire during the pax
romana achieved a historically impressive level of prosperity. The acquisition of lands and the
solidification of Roman territories represented an imperial initiative that usurped the progress of
the republic. In essence, the evolution of a democratic society into a despotic one provided one
of the most sobering lessons from antiquity for the formers of early American foreign policy.
The classical examples of Rome and Greece present, historically, the contention that “one
must choose between the communal honor of a republic and the individual security and wellbeing fostered under an orderly empire.”50 During the Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli called
49
Sue Elwyn, “Interstate Kinship and Roman Foreign Policy,” Transactions of the American
Philological Association, Vol. 123 (1993), 261.
50
Waller R. Newell, “Machiavelli’s Model of a Liberal Empire: The Evolution of Rome,” in
David Edward Tabachnick and Toivo Koivukoski, ed., Enduring Empire: Ancient Lessons for
Global Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 165.
Deibel 19
this contention into question, arguing that republican beliefs and principles can produce an
imperial effort focused on individual security. For the early American republic, “one need not
choose, as the classics had maintained, between a virtuous self-governing republic and an
imperial oikonomia – that, on the contrary, the democratic energies of the people could be the
vehicle for the republic’s expansion…”51 This idea reflected a fundamental departure from the
classical concepts of foreign policy, concepts that produced the theoretical framework now
termed “classical realism,” reliant on defining “interests in terms of power,” and refusing “to
identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the
universe.”52 The theory stresses the importance of states [or nations] as actors, institutionally
anarchic environment within which states coexist, and hence the importance of power as the
master variable to explain broad patterns of states’ [nations’] interaction.”53 Morgenthau’s
theories reflect ancient perspectives applied to contemporary crises, arguing that this realism
reflects the policies and approaches of classical figures, states, and civilizations.54
Classical realism, then, dominated ancient history as the major theoretical approach to
foreign policy. For the early republic, this was the primary form of foreign relations with which
its leaders would have been familiar. An understanding of this perspective originating from
antiquity produces a firmer grasp of the founders’ tendencies to both adhere to and depart from
classical realism and the examples of antiquity. For Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, the ability
to conduct foreign relations as the new American nation necessitated not only departure from the
51
Ibid., 166.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5-8.
53
Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 3.
54
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4-12.
52
Deibel 20
classics’ understandings of power, the international system, and the way in which states interact
with one another.
Thomas Jefferson’s Republican Idealism
Thomas Jefferson’s election to the presidency set up a fundamental shift in early
American political thought, particularly in regards to the classics. The Federalist administrations
had stressed “the mobility of the meritorious,” the right and ability of the select few to rule over
the populace through institutions that represented “traditional expectations about the role of
authority in public life.”55 For Republicans, the American political system provided an
opportunity to break from the structural “assumptions that had dominated European thought for
centuries.”56 Jefferson’s foreign policy stemmed from this same political mindset: American
diplomacy did not need to mimic the traditional dealings between states and nations. Instead, the
new republic presented an opportunity to explore a more idealist approach to global politics.
This idealism, however, began with a firm understanding of antiquity and its intellectual
legacies. Classically, empires like those of Rome and Greece relied on the control of the
aristocracy. For Jefferson, positioning power anywhere but in the majority of Americans would
prove damaging to the republic’s existence as a government with “faith in popular
sovereignty.”57 Jefferson firmly believed that American conduct in both domestic and foreign
affairs would dictate the survival of classical principles as finally actualized under the American
government. In the summer of 1802, Jefferson wrote, “We are in truth the sole trustees for the
55
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 59.
Ibid.
57
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 7, 34-35.
56
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whole race of man now on the globe.”58 It was with this attitude that Jefferson began his
presidency and American entry into global politics. Because of its unique character as a selfgoverning, modern republic, the United States had a responsibility to approach foreign policy
with a different perspective than other governments.
That civic responsibility began, in Jefferson’s opinion, with education. Perhaps more than
any other president, Jefferson advocated a rigorous curriculum rooted in the classics. In a letter
to his nephew, Peter Carr, Jefferson remarked, “For the present I advise you to begin a course of
ancient history, reading everything in the original and not in translations.”59 Jefferson
recommended Carr began with a thorough history of Greece, including Herodotus and
Thucydides, to then be supplemented with a survey of Rome by reading Virgil, Terence, Horace,
and others. From there, Jefferson said, “We will come down to modern history.”60 In essence,
Jefferson saw the classical education as the necessary starting point for his nephew’s education.
In order to understand the present, Carr would have to study and memorize both the triumphs
and failures of the past.
This educational idea dominated Jefferson’s intellectual mindset throughout his entire
life. A background in the classics provided an intellectual framework through which Jefferson
formed not only his political ideologies, but also how he expressed and approached policy
formation, particularly regarding foreign affairs. In his first inaugural address, Jefferson
remarked,
Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which
liberty and even life itself are but dreary things…During the throes and
58
Thomas Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon, 17 July 1802, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed.
Barbara B. Oberg (Princeton: University Press, 1950), 38:90.
59
Anthony Brandt, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Travels (Washington, DC: National Geographic,
2006), 53.
60
Ibid.
Deibel 22
convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man,
seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful
that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful
shore…But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. 61
For Jefferson, the ancient world represented a climactic struggle between man and liberty. The
United States represented the fulfillment of ancient principles of government in a more stable,
less volatile world in which a principled republic might thrive. This concept of the classics shows
an understanding of the American government and its policies as the fulfillment of classical
virtue and expectation.
Thus, a nation built on such valued ideals required a new way of viewing politics. For
Jefferson, the classics served as fundamental starting points for an idealistic foreign policy.
Jefferson sought to distance himself from traditionalism, instead applying classical themes and
morals to liberal institutions and ideologies. As president, Jefferson’s foreign policy reflected an
idealist image of the United States—a nation of opportunity and individual liberty, one that
needed protection and provision in order to succeed. Much of his foreign affairs philosophy
came from his classical education, his frequent visits to France, and his respect for the French
systems of government and administration.62 This exposure to other nations provided Jefferson
with a more global perspective of the United States as a new nation. Jefferson sought to pursue
both a pacifistic and patriotic approach to foreign affairs, one that combined limiting
complications with Britain and expanding the nation territorially as much as possible.63
It was this awareness of his mission as the leader of the nation and protector of the
republic that led Jefferson to pursue a foreign policy that correlated lofty ideals with political
61
Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3469 (accessed April 1, 2013).
62
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 24-29.
63
Ibid., 51-54.
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action. Historian Richard Matthews argues that Jefferson’s political ideology represented an
alternative to the Federalist-versus-Republican model that dominated the early republic. Instead,
Matthews suggests that Jefferson represented the interests of humanistic virtue, communitarian
society with limited government involvement, and a radical interpretation of democracy.64 While
Madison would later suggest that institutions were needed for political security, Jefferson
considers humanity perfectly capable of self-government.65 It is government’s job, then, to
secure a land through which the individual can best achieve that ideal.
Matthews’ portrayal of Jefferson’s political orientation as an oppositional force to the
Federalist delegation of power away from the people indicates not only Jefferson’s awareness of
democracy in societies like Ancient Athens, but also reflects the idealism with which Jefferson
approached his policymaking. Surely, a pragmatic approach would be to root authority in
institutions and check the power of the masses. Jefferson believed in “a wise and frugal
Government, which …shall leave them [men] otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.”66
Jefferson indicated the need for a government that focused on individual authority and counted
on every citizen to “fly to the standard of the law” without demand from an oligarchy or
institutionalized elite. In return, the government would only serve to protect citizens from losing
their natural rights. In this sense, his philosophy directly opposed the Federalist reliance on
institutions and hierarchies in government that dealt with foreign and domestic policy within the
64
The radicalism referenced here is offered in opposition to the Federalist opinions about the
rule of the people. For Matthews, Jefferson was the singular alternative to the English system
and the Federalist system of government. See Matthews, Richard K. The Radical Politics of
Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1984, 1718.
65
Ibid., 18.
66
Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3469 (accessed April 1, 2013).
Deibel 24
same classical mindset. Jefferson’s idealism in foreign affairs extended from his domestic
approach, which indicated a similar departure from traditional political thought.
Jefferson sought a uniquely American foreign policy, produced from an awareness of the
past, an understanding of the present, and a unique hope for the future. Jefferson wrote, “Before
the establishment of the American states, nothing was known to History but the Man of the old
world…Here [in the American states] every one may have land to labor for himself if he
chooses…”67 The security of the nation, then, is primary if the individual is to reach his full
potential and receive the opportunities that are his natural right. Jefferson sought, through foreign
policy, to create “a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with
the rich productions of their industry.”68 Jefferson continued, “I contemplate these transcendent
objects, and see the honor, the happiness, and the hopes of this beloved country committed to the
issue and the auspices of this day…”69 Here, Jefferson sees the importance of creating a land
able to support the “fruitful” efforts of its laborers, as well as one diplomatically capable of
trading their “rich productions.” Jefferson’s rhetoric is one of deep commitment to individual
rights, but also a dedication to preserving and protecting the fragile republic.
Jefferson’s policies indicate this same commitment. During the Barbary Wars, a series of
conflicts with Moroccan pirates looting American ships, Jefferson revealed his intention to
safeguard American economic liberty. In a letter to the president, Henry Dearborn restates the
orders he is to give to the naval official named Commodore Morris: “You will protect the
commerce of the United States by all the means in your power, against any of the Barbary
67
Ibid., 31.
Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center.
69
Ibid.
68
Deibel 25
powers who shall openly declare war, or actually commence war, upon the United States.”70 This
mindset reflects two key characteristics of Jefferson’s foreign affairs. First, Jefferson demands
protection for American commerce as an extension of the powers and attributes of the United
States. An affront to American enterprise abroad warranted a political response. Jefferson saw
the United States’ economic interests as critical to its fulfillment of the republican vision.
Second, Jefferson tells Morris and Dearborn to utilize “all the means in your power,” not just
their diplomatic or military abilities. Instead, Jefferson indicated the United States employ all
aspects of policy to protect its interests, not simply the traditional expressions of power and
influence.
In a letter from Jefferson to his Secretary of State, James Madison, Jefferson summarizes
the “Emperor of Morocco’s declaration of war” on the United States in 1802.71 Jefferson’s
response was not simply a power-based move that sought to solely defeat the Barbary powers
militarily. Jefferson, by taking swift action against an easily defeated opponent, “freed American
commerce in the Mediterranean, aroused patriotic fervor at home, and awakened a new respect
among foreigners for the United States.”72 The war, for Jefferson, provided far more than simply
a military victory over another state. It was an expression of Jefferson’s belief in defending the
nation’s commerce and integrity abroad. As Jefferson described the nature of the conflict in 1802
and its recent developments, he observed, “I have desired Mr. [Secretary of the Navy Robert]
Smith to recommend a liberal attention in our officers to the interests of Sweden in the
Mediterranean, and if peace with Morocco does not take place this year, I should think it proper
70
Henry Dearborn to Thomas Jefferson, 15 Aug. 1802, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed.
Barbara B. Oberg, 38:222-223.
71
Ibid., 282-3.
72
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Meredith
Corporation, 1969), 101.
Deibel 26
that we should undertake the forming a permanent league of the powers at war…”73
Interestingly, Jefferson argues that if peace is not achieved soon, the United States should form a
league with other states against the Moroccan pirates.
This concept in foreign affairs was at the same time entirely new and rooted in the
classics. Though antiquity offers examples like the Delian League of Ancient Greece and the
triumvirates during Rome’s transition from republic to empire, none was considered with a
“liberal” attention, one that suggested mutual interest and political ideology. Here, Jefferson’s
idealism shows with surprising clarity. Rather than risk future losses in the Moroccan conflict, he
considers forming a cooperative relationship with any other state “at war, or who may from time
to time get into war with any of the Barbary powers.”74 This concept represents an idealist
strategy toward international politics, particularly in its willingness to “see the international
system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to
overcome mutual problems.”75 The conflict with the Barbary pirates was an unconventional war,
one that identified Jefferson as willing to utilize different types of international affairs to achieve
policy goals—primarily, the defense of the new republic, the continuance of republican
principles, and the nation’s interests at home and abroad.
The Louisiana Purchase marked perhaps Jefferson’s most consequential foreign policy
effort. At his second inaugural address, Jefferson explained his rationale for the decision:
I know that the acquisition of Louisiana has been disapproved by some, from a
candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its
union. But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate
effectively? The larger our association, the less will it be shaken by local
passions; and in any view, is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi
73
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 23 Aug. 1802, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed.
Barbara B. Oberg, 38:282-3.
74
Ibid.
75
Joshua Goldstein, International Relations, 43.
Deibel 27
should be settled by our own brethren and children, than by strangers of another
family? With which shall we be most likely to live in harmony and friendly
intercourse?76
Here, it is evident that Jefferson intended for the Louisiana territory to serve as a new swath of
land over which American virtue could be spread. It was an attempt not to conquer other lands or
construct an imperial interest. The decision was, instead, intended to establish new territory into
which the United States could expand its labor and production. For Jefferson, this meant the
fulfillment of his dream for an agrarian republic.77 The Louisiana Territory might provide an
excellent arena through which the individual labor of agrarian Americans could be achieved.
Jefferson sought to build American influence through nonconventional concepts of expansion
and acquisition. By seeking out other approaches beyond classical expressions of power, the
idealist Jefferson looked to execute early American foreign affairs in a uniquely non-classical
way.
In response to a letter from Pierre Samuel DuPont in 1802 (one year before the purchase),
Jefferson states, “Be assured that your idea that we think of the conquest of Louisiana, is not that
of a single reasonable and reflecting man in the US.”78 To acquire the Western territories,
Jefferson did not want to employ the classical ideas of imperial expansion and conquest. In fact,
Jefferson is even cautious about gaining the land through financial or diplomatic means. He
continues, “At present we should consider an enlargement of our territory beyond the Mississippi
to be almost as great a misfortune as a contraction of it on this side.”79 Jefferson said “the day
may come” where the United States would seek to acquire the Louisiana territory, but he wished
76
Thomas Jefferson, “Second Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3491 (accessed April 1, 2013)
77
Robert W. Smith, Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy, 7.
78
Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, 5 May 1802 in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, 37:418.
79
Ibid.
Deibel 28
to not only deliberate with advisers and diplomats before beginning the process of acquisition.
Especially considering Jefferson’s concerns that the United States was “in debt, and wish[ed] to
pay our debts.”80 Jefferson’s hesitation to forcibly acquire the French territory indicates his
recognition of the traditional means by which territory disputes were resolved. However,
Jefferson considers the classical route unwise, and instead looks to peaceably resolve the issue
by combining diplomacy with debate.
Some historians consider the Louisiana Purchase an instance where the “realist triumphed
over the theorist” because of his willingness to abandon his affinity for France and the precedent
for isolationism.81 However, these tactics reflect a truly idealist sentiment when examined
relative to the classical concepts of realism and pragmatic action. By exploring other options of
securing the Louisiana territory during the disputes between Spain, France, and Great Britain,
Jefferson looked to form policy through building diplomacy and avoiding military conflict.
Jefferson’s idealism rested on innovation; merely sticking to certain actions and policies without
adaptation produced application of formula, not viable theoretical approaches to international
politics. Realistically, the United States did not have the resources to conquer the territory or
wage war with a major European power. If Jefferson was fixated within a classical mindset, he
would have either prepared for a classical conquest and built up the military, or abandoned the
goal of expanding America territorially until it could do so through force. Instead, Jefferson’s
idealist mindset enabled him to negotiate diplomatically with different nations and powers as a
means of eventually securing acquisition.
Jefferson’s enactment of the Embargo Act serves as another example of his idealistic
view toward early American foreign policy. Jefferson intended to use the embargo to impair
80
81
Ibid.
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 104.
Deibel 29
European profits from American trade as a means of coercing the British into cooperation, while
simultaneously avoiding war.82 This action, much like the Louisiana Purchase, revealed
Jefferson’s commitment to a non-classical approach to foreign policy. Though his intentions
were rooted in the virtues developed throughout his classical education (the preservation of
virtuous government and society), his policies reflected his unwillingness to use force and
conventional power. Instead, Jefferson sought to achieve foreign policy gains through diplomacy
and trade sanctions. Jefferson’s ideal foreign policy aimed at preserving the republic and
avoiding conflict that might threaten its existence as an independent, rights-bearing nation.
Jefferson’s balance between understanding hard power and pursuing soft power and diplomatic
solutions reveal both his awareness of classical, realist foreign policy approaches and his
preference for a more idealist concept of power.
The Embargo Act placed “an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of
the United States. No vessels…shall be allowed to depart from any port of the United States
without having previously obtained a clearance…”83 Jefferson sought to protect the agrarian,
production-based element of the republic with this measure, though it proved to be largely
unsuccessful. Instead of attacking British vessels and exerting military power as a means of
securing fair and profitable trade for American laborers, Jefferson used non-traditional means of
interstate action to protect the republic he believed had to be “preserved in its agricultural
state.”84 Jefferson sought to defend the nation and its people with “benign possibilities” for
82
Robert Smith, Keeping the Republic, 123.
“The Embargo Act of 1807,” The Napoleon Series: Research Subjects: Government &
Politics, updated July 2002, accessed April 1, 2013, http://www.napoleonseries.org/research/government/us/c_embargo.html.
84
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 37.
83
Deibel 30
diplomatic conduct, while also ensuring the nation had adequate resources to fulfill its domestic
vision for each individual citizen.85
Jefferson also sought “benign possibilities” when dealing with Indian affairs. In an 1802
letter to the Miami, Poutewatamie, and Weeauh tribes, Jefferson advocated that “peace, brothers,
is better than war. In a long and bloody war, we lose many friends and gain nothing. Let us then
live in peace and friendship together, doing to each other all the good we can.”86 Jefferson’s
attitude toward Native Americans was paternalistic, at times condescending, and ultimately
supremacist, but he did not advocate violent conquest. Instead, Jefferson sought peace and
cultural assimilation. His approach did not reflect a classical mindset of domination—Jefferson
sought neither total subjugation nor political incorporation. Instead, Jefferson looked to bring
Indians into the fold of American culture, eventually replacing their native cultural condition
with that of the United States. In a report to Congress in 1802, Jefferson offered a summary of
Indian affairs in regards to their acculturation. He observes the Indians “becoming very sensible
of the baneful effects produced on their morals, their health, and existence by the abuse of
abundant spirits.”87 Jefferson shows concern for their ethical and medical wellbeing, as ignorant
85
The phrase “benign possibilities” comes from Paul Seabury’s explanation that “idealists
foresaw benign possibilities as nations became increasingly interdependent; realists saw in such a
tendency the source of further friction, since rival [national] interests could collide more
frequently. The security and interest of the nation were primary components of realist doctrine;
the welfare of the individual and of humanity in general were the focuses of idealist concern.”
Paul Seabury, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements
and Ideas, DeConde, et. al., eds., (New York: Scribner, 1978), 856-857 ; Charles Stromer,
“International Relations 101: Realism & Idaelism,” Charles Strohmer,
www.charlesstrohmer.com, accessed March 26, 2013. <www.charlesstrohmer.com/internationalrelations/international-relations-101/realism-idealism/>.
86
Thomas Jefferson to “Brothers & Friends of the Miamis, Poutewatamies & Weeauhs,” 7 Jan.
1802, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, 36:286.
87
Ibid., 440.
Deibel 31
inhabitants of the republic to whom the nation should extend an adopting hand, but should by no
means extend the rights of citizenship.
In a letter to the Seneca, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Munsee Indians, Dearborn referred to
Jefferson as, “Your Father the President of the United States is in his heart a friend to all his red
children, and will at all times listen to their complaints and do all that is in his power for their
comfort.”88 In this rendering, Jefferson is the natives’ savior, bringing them survival and
civilization during the rapid approach of modernity. In his 1803 address to the Choctaw Nation,
Jefferson remarked, “I am glad, brothers, you are willing to go and visit some other parts of our
country. Carriages shall be ready to convey you, and you shall be taken care of on your journey;
and when you shall have returned here and rested yourselves to your own mind, you shall be sent
home by land.”89 The United States provides Indians with a window into civilization, dominated
by technological advances to convince them of the benefits of gaining access to American
culture. This attitude reflects one of the darker aspects of Jefferson’s idealism. He firmly believes
in his ability to bring American Indians into “part of his great family,” a portion of the
population who will, rather than retain their own identity, come to take up the American persona
and virtue.90
Jefferson’s attitudes toward slavery might help to inform this attitude. In 1814, Jefferson
wrote, “Until more can be done for them [slaves], we should endeavor, with those whom fortune
has thrown on our hands, to feed and clothe them well, protect them from ill usage…”91
88
Ibid., 633.
Thomas Jefferson, “Address to Brothers of the Choctaw Nations,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3479 (accessed April 1, 2013).
90
Henry Dearborn “To Seneca, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Munsee Indians,” 24 Feb. 1802 in The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Barbara B. Oberg, ed., 36:633.
91
Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, 25 Aug. 1814, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul
Leicester Ford, (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1904), 11:419.
89
Deibel 32
Similarly, Jefferson considered Indians to be in need of American charity and goodwill, as nature
had not endowed them with the same “fortune” that had been allocated to America’s elite. Even
in official political dealings, Jefferson looked to establish a common rhetorical and political
relationship between the American government and Native Americans. In a treaty with the
Chickasaw signed in 1805, the first article begins by painting a picture of an “embarrassed”
Chickasaw nation, saved from “heavy debts” and “being destitute of funds to effect important
improvements in their country” by American investment.92 The treaty then spells out the various
territories ceded to the United States, marking American charity and American legal agreement
over the land exchange. In this sense, Jefferson looks to use the same political systems and
philosophies toward Native Americans that are applied to the American people. Nonetheless, his
idealism shows he is willing to use American political ideologies and moralities in both domestic
and foreign affairs, as both are components of a larger “internationalism.”93 However, his
idealism does not imply that Native Americans should be incorporated as citizens. As their
“benevolent” father, Jefferson seeks to assimilate them into American culture, but not its politics.
In the end, ideas steered Jefferson’s concept of foreign affairs. The intellectual
foundations comprised of Enlightenment thought and ancient writings set the stage for Jefferson,
in 1800, to continue his fundamental innovation of old systems in search for a political approach
that fit the American republic. Jefferson used the classics and antiquity as backgrounds for
rhetoric and policy, and his idealistic outlook toward power and foreign affairs produced policies
92
“Chickasaw Treaty: 1805,” The Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/nt003.asp (accessed April 1, 2013).
93
It is anachronistic to consider Jefferson an advocate of exactly the same precepts of Wilsonian
idealism. Nonetheless, the similarities between the two presidents’ opinions of morality as
drivers of state action reveal the departure from classical realism’s separation of policy and
morality, as stated in Morgenthau. David Steigerwald, Wilsonian Idealism in America (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994), 17. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11.
Deibel 33
like the Embargo Act, which, though ambitious, failed to effectively protect American industry.
Though Jefferson pragmatically approached political decisions based on the institutions at his
disposal, his ideas were the primary drivers in his policy and his decision-making regarding
foreign affairs. Though unconventional statecraft can be traced back to ideas like the Delian
League, Jefferson’s classical education revealed the destiny of classical realism as conflict.
Instead, Jefferson departed from antiquity in looking for ideological alternatives to policy
making.
This is not to say that Jefferson’s idealism was entirely successful. Though Jefferson saw
the Louisiana Purchase as an expansion of territory upon which the yeoman might fulfill his
dream of an agrarian republic, the controversial measure was largely seen as the state
overstepping its limits within the republican structure and counterproductive to Jefferson’s
mission of limited government. The Embargo Act caused an economic depression, which
brought to head many serious criticisms of Jefferson’s avoidance of conflict and unwillingness to
stand up to British aggression.94 His failure to formulate a productive, positive policy toward
Native Americans set up a century of warfare, persecution, and bigotry toward indigenous
peoples. These failures contributed to the pragmatic and far more delineated foreign policies of
Jefferson’s successors. Though Madison’s pragmatism and Monroe’s imperialism reflect
different interpretations of the classics, both of these presidents looked to avoid Jefferson’s
idealism, as it indicated a dedication to principle that, while admirable, proved ultimately
ineffective in establishing the United States within a firm, powerful stance on the international
scene. Jefferson’s idealist approach indicated a fundamental separation from his successors and
highlights foreign policy’s multifaceted character during the Republican era. Crises threatening
94
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 125-126.
Deibel 34
the nation’s existence and America’s growing role in the hemisphere would provide fundamental
transformations of policy within the 16 years after Jefferson’s tenure.
James Madison’s Defense of Liberty through Diplomacy
Thomas Jefferson’s election to the presidency in 1800 marked a key shift in national
politics. Twelve years of federalist direction under George Washington, John Adams, and
Alexander Hamilton came to an end, and the anti-Federalist, Democratic-Republican faction
assumed control of the executive. By 1808, at the end of Jefferson’s second term, the young
nation had borne witness to significant events and policies that truly changed American identity
in the geopolitical realm. The Louisiana Purchase increased the size of the nation dramatically,
while the conflict with the Barbary Pirates showed American willingness to combat nations and
powers threatening its political and economic liberties. However, James Madison’s presidential
administration would have an even greater impact on foreign relations and the American conduct
of international affairs.
The tradition of classical thought and education shaped Madison’s approach to
international affairs immensely. However, during the period of Republican democracy under
Madison, the President not only drew elements of policy from his predecessors, but also applied
his own interpretations of history, antiquity, and political philosophy to political issues. Madison
pursued a diplomacy of sagacity and reason, utilizing the classics as lessons for American
foreign policy, which fixated on preserving and defending the political and ideological integrity
of the nation, incorporating different elements of classical republicanism, liberalism, and
democracy. Madison’s philosophical attitude toward the use of power, his preference for
diplomacy and negotiation over force and aggression, and his intellectual legacy as a reviser of
classical political thought as a means to pursue a unique policy for the United States reveal not
Deibel 35
only his awareness of antiquity, but his willingness to develop these traditions as intellectual
aides in forming policy, not simply mimic history as a policy model.
Before exploring Madison’s particular policies and their connection to the classics, it is
important to consider his intellectual contributions to American politics before taking office. The
Constitution of the United States offers a tangible manifestation of Madison’s political
philosophy. As its primary author and composer, Madison’s document reflects the statesman’s
willingness to revise and improve classical examples. The classics pervade nearly every
component of the Constitution, from its rhetoric and symbolism to its legal structure, which also
has deep roots in English common law and Enlightenment thought.95 For historian Meyer
Reinhold, “the influence of the classics in America reached its acme” during the composition and
ratification of the American Constitution.96 The Constitution took ancient and Enlightenment
ideals and reworked them into a system that created a uniquely American governmental system.
For instance, among many other principles (combining freedom with stability, avoiding decay,
and the separation of powers), the founders took the idea of an appointed assembly from ancient
Roman examples, recognizing the limits of “direct assembly government.”97 In this sense, the
Constitution indicated an understanding of the classics as an intellectual tradition to be expanded
and improved upon, not a basic model through which American foreign affairs could be
conducted.
95
Meyer Reinhold, Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States,
24-25.
96
Ibid., 24.
97
Ibid., 102. Reinhold points out several sources for these institutions, including Polybus’
“constitution of Rome of the end of the third-early second centuries BCE.” Though no
innovations were “direct” adoptions from antiquity, the principles and founding ideas of these
Constitutional ideas had their origins in the classics.
Deibel 36
Though typically grouped into a “Republican Era” dominated by figures like Thomas
Jefferson, Madison’s policies bear distinct differences from Jefferson’s conduct of foreign
affairs. Richard Matthews presents a compelling case for Madison’s realism that reflected a
pragmatic approach to international politics, not a classically motivated or idealistically focused
mindset. Instead, Matthews argues that Madison’s early concept of the American “empire” was
one focused around reason.98 Matthews states, “Although Madison studied history, he also
warned against a ‘blind veneration for antiquity,’ preferring instead that reasonable men base
their decisions on ‘the lesson of their own experience.’”99 Studying the past, for Madison,
opened up avenues through which the United States could pursue its own unique foreign policy
objectives and not be limited by other traditions of policy making.100 The early republic could
establish its own approach to foreign policy that circulated around reason and a different form of
pragmatic realism Madison espoused.
There were six basic components to Madison’s theory of reason: the use of the American
government and its innovative structures to preserve order, the protection of individuals and their
rights through those structures, little individual control over government, the importance of
reason, a strong state that recognized the need to preserve Hobbesian authority and Lockean
individual rights, and power as an instrument of protection, not aggression.101 In a letter to
Thomas Jefferson in 1809, Madison states that, in regards to relations with Britain and France,
“We shall proceed with a circumspect attention to all the circumstances mingled in our affairs;
but with a confidence at the same time, in a just sensibility of the Nation, to the respect due to
98
Richard K. Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of
Reason (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 244.
99
Ibid., 8.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid., 22-23
Deibel 37
it.”102 Here, Madison notes that while he will consider the positions of Great Britain and France,
his major concern is with preserving the nation and remaining confident in its autonomy and
diplomatic sovereignty of both action and thought. This sort of diplomatic consideration is hardly
classical in nature. Classical realism depends, ultimately, on the expression of power for selfinterest and survival through the military and violent conflict; Madison suggests survival can be
ascertained by diplomatic, discerned action.
Yet, the classics make up only some of the intellectual traditions from which Madison
developed his pragmatic realism. Robert Smith considers three main virtues that contributed to
American foreign policymaking. Classical virtue, for Smith, “was drawn primarily from Greek
and Roman models…Classical virtue meant a devotion to the public good, republican
government, liberty, and the subordination of private interest.”103 Yet, Smith suggests that Whig
virtue “sought to mitigate rather than suppress private interest and therefore reduced personal
virtue to respect for the constitution and adherence to the law.”104 To counter these virtues,
which seem to develop one from the other, Smith indicates that figures like Jefferson and
Madison adopted yeoman virtue, one that focused on preserving the “agrarian political
economy” and limiting military conflict.105 It is important, however, to keep in mind that
affiliation with one of Smith’s particular virtues does not suggest mutual exclusion. Instead,
Madison needed a firm understanding of the classical virtue in order to pursue that of the
yeoman. In his first inaugural address, Madison remarked:
Under the benign influence of our republican institutions, and the maintenance of
peace with all nations whilst so many of them were engaged in bloody and
102
The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series, ed. J.C.A. Stagg, (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1992), 2:55-56.
103
Robert W. Smith, Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy, 5.
104
Ibid., 6.
105
Ibid., 7.
Deibel 38
wasteful wars, the fruits of a just policy were enjoyed in an unrivaled growth of
our faculties and resources. Proofs of this were seen in the improvements of
agriculture, in the successful enterprises of commerce, in the progress of
manufacturers and useful arts, in the increase of the public revenue and the use
made of it in reducing the public debt, and in the valuable works and
establishments everywhere multiplying over the face of our land.106
Here, Madison suggests that the combination of republican institutions, peaceful foreign policy,
and a dedication to the agrarian, land-based economy that produced prosperity for the United
States. Madison’s observation that the country has avoided “wasteful wars” shows his awareness
of the classical tendency to approach disagreements between states with conflict as being an
unproductive and catastrophic approach for the United States to take. He suggests that
“improvements of agriculture” and “multiplying over the face of our land” account for the
solidification of American values, rooted in the principles of yeoman virtue.
In this sense, yeoman virtue shows how the founders perceived the classics as neither
exemplars of policy nor models for society. Carl Richard observes that the founders perceived
many classical traditions not only as models, but also as “anti-models, those ancient individuals,
societies, and government forms whose vices they wished to avoid.”107 For even as “the most
important difference between classical and modern republicanism was that the classical state was
designed to wage war, and Americans generally sought to avoid war as subversive of republican
government,” if Madison had not understood warfare and its effect on ancient empires and
civilizations, he would not have been inclined to avoid it and its “subversive” effects.108
Nevertheless, Madison led the United States directly into the warfare his ideological
inclinations would seemingly avoid. The War of 1812 had its origins in diplomatic disputes and
106
James Madison, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3482 (accessed February 1, 2013).
107
Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American
Enlightenment, 85.
108
Ibid., 9
Deibel 39
small skirmishes that traced back to the American War for Independence, and dealt primarily
with the issues of British impressment of American soldiers and the construction and
maintenance of British forts in American territories.109 In his request for a declaration of war
from the American Congress, Madison said, “Without going back beyond the renewal in 1803 of
the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaired wrongs of inferior
magnitude, the conduct of her government presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as
an independent and neutral nation.”110 Here, Madison’s language emphasized both American
independence and neutrality, critical to the idea that the United States stood as a nation whose
rights were just as inviolable as the individual rights it protected for its citizens.
Madison, however, did not ask Congress to declare war outright. The institutions he
formed within the Constitution were far too important as safeguards of legislative authority and
as protectors of the intellectual tradition he advocated. Instead, Madison utilized his training in
classical rhetoric, evident in statements like, “We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a
state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward
Great Britain.”111 Here, Madison implied that the United States had committed no aggression,
and now stood ideologically superior as peacemakers, yet practically disadvantaged by its lack of
readiness for the coming war. He ended his address by acknowledging that his statement coupled
with further deliberation will “enable Congress to decide with greater advantage on the course
due to the rights, the interest, and the honor of our country.”112 Madison suggests to Congress
two different courses of action: “Whether the United States shall continue passive under these
109
The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, “Special Message to Congress on the Foreign
Policy Crisis,” The Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3614
(accessed February 1, 2013).
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
Deibel 40
progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of
their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of
Events…”113 Here, the president offers Congress two potential courses of action, the first being
tolerance and capitulation, the other being to use “force in defense of their natural rights.” War
becomes, for Madison, something the United States has the right to wage as a response to
aggressions from an outside empire. Madison’s rhetoric is indicative of an understanding of
classicism, but his policy reflected a pragmatic, realistic approach. The British offences of
impressment, naval aggression, and territorial infringement presented a direct threat to American
prosperity. Madison eventually realized the need to wage war, despite his disregard for it.
After the War of 1812, Madison largely considered the conflict a victory for yeoman
republicanism, which would serve as an exemplar to the world.114 Madison reassured Congress
that the war had safeguarded the “freedom and safety of all and of each,” and demonstrated “the
capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful
nation…”115 Yet, the critical ideological moment for the War of 1812 concerned the motivation
to go to war. Though the United States was expanding and building up its young nation,
Madison’s push for war did not originate from an overwhelming desire to build an American
empire throughout the hemisphere. Madison felt the need instead to defend the United States and
its sovereign interests against external threats, not assert dominance over competing nations.
Madison thought peace should be the first course of action for the new nation, and that through
neutrality, the United States would protect its domestic security and American values of
republican government: “It has been the true glory of the United States to cultivate peace by
113
Ibid.
Smith, Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy, 136.
115
The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, “Fifth Annual Message to Congress,” The
Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3623 (accessed March 29, 2013).
114
Deibel 41
observing justice.”116 This idea marks the key difference between Madison’s realism and that of
the classics. Classically, peace was a luxury. However, the concepts of power and self-interest in
the ancient world dictated that conflict and war was necessary to achieve security and prosperity.
Madison, conversely, stressed the importance of peace and diplomacy in statements like the one
above to not only justify war but also define victory. In the declaration for war, Madison
identified that a state of war existed between the United Kingdom and the United States.117 The
declaration of war itself takes up one sentence in the proclamation. The remainder of the address
is dedicated to urging Americans to remain diligent “in preserving order, in promoting concord,
in maintaining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the
measures which may be adopted by the constituted authorities for obtaining a speedy, a just, and
an honorable peace.”118 This is the declaration of a president whose primary goal is preserving
the republic, protecting its rights as a nation, the rights of its citizens, and maintaining civil peace
and order.
The treaty that ended the war provides further evidence that Madison was less concerned
with the classical concept of power to defend the United States from outside aggression than he
was with solidifying a peace that embodied the unique American perspective. The war ended in
what amounted to a stalemate, with peace negotiations finally taking place after nearly three
years of conflict. American victories late in the campaign convinced British capitulation to the
first article of the treaty, which stated that “all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever
116
The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3482 (accessed February 1, 2013).
117
The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, “Proclamation of a State of War with Great
Britain” The Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3615 (accessed
February 1, 2013).
118
Ibid.
Deibel 42
taken by either party form the other during the war…shall be restored without delay…”119 The
public received the terms as an American victory, partly because of their actual language, but
more after General Andrew Jackson’s routed the British at New Orleans weeks after the treaty
had been signed.120 However, the fact remains that the Treaty of Ghent brought a true diplomatic
finish to what Madison saw as a war of aggression against American prosperity. The main
objective of British belligerence was to wane American influence in the region through
economic measures and naval warfare. That objective did not succeed, and it was Madison’s
pursuance of a policy that sought to simply defend, not conquer, that ensured restitution of
American holdings.
Madison’s other foreign policy objectives reflected a similar emphasis on defense over
offense. Relations with American Indians presented a difficult ideological conflict for an
administration that preferred projecting the United States as a defensive nation. Madison’s policy
toward Indians continued the early American preference for negotiation with tribes over conflict,
as evidenced in treaties and agreements reached with Native American representatives. In the
1816 treaty with the Chickasaw nation, the first article emphasizes, “Peace and friendship are
hereby firmly established, and perpetuated, between the United States of America and
Chickasaw nation.”121 Additionally, the treaty sought to reimburse the Chickasaw nation with
reparations tiered over a period of ten years and varying across regions of the territory.122
119
The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, “British-American
Diplomacy: Treaty of Ghent, 1814,” The Avalon Project,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ghent.asp (accessed February 1, 2013).
120
Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, 696.
121
The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, “Treaty with the
Chickasaw: 1816,” The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/nt004.asp
(accessed February 1, 2013).
122
Ibid.
Deibel 43
To suggest that agreements like the treaty of 1816 were amicable, exchanges between
two equally diplomatic parties would be naïve, considering the coercive and deceptive tactics
often employed by American negotiators. It is important to note, however, that Madison’s policy
toward American Indians advocated diplomacy, a tactic later administrations would abandon
altogether. The diplomacy Madison sought, however, was one that looked to limit conflict and
upheaval. As he spent most of his foreign policy attention on the war with Great Britain,
Madison continued Jefferson’s precedent for cultural and social interaction with Native
Americans and avoided political incorporation. For Madison, dealing with Native Americans as
simply another nation, not as a portion of the American population or as a political responsibility
of the American government, proved easier and more pragmatic considering the United States’
goals during the early Republican period.
Additionally, when examining Madison’s political ideology, it is important to distinguish
the nineteenth century concept of nation from the modern concept. The Indian nations that
occupied the American continent were regarded as independent entities, and deserved diplomatic
attention, along with all other states. In his first inaugural address, Madison stated his firm
intention “to cherish peace and friendly relations with all nations having correspondent
dispositions, to maintain sincere neutrality toward belligerent nations; to prefer in all cases
amicable discussion and reasonable accommodation of differences.”123 Additionally, Madison’s
fundamental understanding of government differed from that of the classics. The republic, for
Madison, was not meant to be an exact replica of the Roman or Greek models, but was instead a
different system whose policies, especially its foreign affairs, revealed stark differences from
antiquity.
123
James Madison, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3482 (accessed February 1, 2013).
Deibel 44
For the Roman republic, an oligarchic structure of society focused on limiting the
influence of the masses, while retaining a government representative of elite interests that
operated in the best interest of society.124 During this period, the Roman Republic sought an
empire founded in its commitment to preserving their society. To do so, the Romans needed to
counter the expansion of the Carthaginian Empire in the Mediterranean.125 The subsequent Punic
Wars revealed Roman willingness to pursue warfare as a means of expanding its empire abroad
and solidifying its dominating role in the known world.126 The civil structure of the Roman
Republic, however, closely resembled the institutions and governmental structure the Federalists
sought to create in the United States.127 The Federalist vision idealized the early period of Roman
republicanism, where, having thrown off the yoke of Etruscan kingship, Romans looked to
solidify control over their homeland through an innovative governmental system of oligarchies
and assemblies.128
For Madison, however, the Roman Republic represented exactly the institutions that
Jeffersonian Republican thought scorned. As Joyce Appleby points out, the debate between
Republicans and Federalists was centrally concerned with social class.129 Much like the early
Romans, Federalists saw the separation of classes as essential to preventing majority tyranny and
protecting traditional social, political, and economic institutions, which were steeped in classical
virtues and ideas.130 According to Appleby, the Republicans noticed that “what alarmed many
ordinary people as well as a distinguished group of upper-class political figures [Republicans]
124
Robert C. Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture: A Search for Human Values vol. 1,
10th ed., 234-5.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Meyer Reinhold, Classica Americana, 321-323.
128
Robert Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture, 233.
129
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 93-94.
130
Ibid., 94
Deibel 45
was the Federalist expectation that the new American political institutions would function within
the old assumptions about a politically active elite and a deferential, compliant electorate.”131
Madison saw this classical structure as limiting, since classical foreign policy was one
largely dictated by active uses of power and force as a means of survival and self-interest, as
evidenced in the Roman Republic’s campaigns to counter Carthaginian threats to its authority.132
Madison’s policies, when taken in comparison to classical examples, seem to bear resemblance
to the actions of Pericles, an Athenian general whose reign brought prosperity to the city-state.
This is not to say Madison was overly concerned with Pericles as an ideological or political
model. Though he certainly learned about Pericles, there are no references to the Athenian ruler
in Madison’s own writings. However, when compared with one another, the two commanders’
philosophies are surprisingly similar.
Pericles pursued an “idealistic pragmatism” that looked to put the prosperity of the state
above all else.133 Athens represented true “freedom, justice, and beauty” to the rest of the world,
and Pericles sought to sustain those virtues without threatening the state’s survival through
military campaigns.134 Madison bears a fundamentally similar philosophy to that of Pericles:
defending the state and pursuing American interests did not necessarily translate to an
aggressive, classically realist foreign policy. When conducting foreign affairs, Periclean Athens
focused on building alliance systems and solidifying its identity within the Mediterranean
context. It used the Delian League to confront its aggressive neighbor, the Persian Empire, and
foreign policy was largely seen as a means of protecting prosperity, not expanding it.135 Though
131
Ibid., 73
Robert Lamm, The Humanities in Western Culture, 233-235.
133
Ibid., 95.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
132
Deibel 46
Athenian hubris and conflict with Sparta after Pericles’ death would ultimately change the
system, Pericles’ rule during Athens’ “Golden Age” is comparable to Madison’s efforts to
defend the nation from outside forces while still pursuing policies to promote and produce
American prosperity.
In essence, Madison was a classical revisionist. He incorporated elements of a classical
education and awareness of classical theory into practical, realistic policy. Defending liberty was
his main objective when framing the Constitution, and his presidential policies pursued that same
freedom, emphasized especially in his unique foreign policy. The early American empire that
Madison administrated was not a classical one. Instead, it emphasized the use of power when
needed to defend the institutions and ideologies of the nation. As Gordon Wood indicates,
Madison participated in a movement that sought to “create the kind of free and ordered society
and illustrious culture that people since the Greeks and Romans had yearned for.”136 American
foreign policy produced “radical departures from the dominant values of Europe,” which had
their institutional foundations in antiquity.137 Madison’s policies were no less innovative. For
Madison, the United States was not a disseminator of liberty, but a “workshop of liberty,” but it
needed vigilant defense from outside aggression.138 Madison’s perception of American foreign
relations revolved around “a concept of national interest that made room for the workings of
power and moral principles in statecraft.”139 In other words, Madison could defend the morality
of liberty and individual freedom while still utilizing power when it was realistically needed to
preserve the order and security of the United States. Even during the war, Madison was
136
Gordon Wood, Empire of Liberty, 4.
Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire: 1776-1865, vol. 1 of The Cambridge
History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10.
138
Greg Russell, “Madison’s Realism and the Role of Domestic Ideals in Foreign Affairs,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 25 (1995): 720.
139
Ibid.
137
Deibel 47
cognizant of this duality. In an address to Congress, Madison stated, “Under such circumstances,
a nation proud of its rights, and conscious of its strength, has no choice but an exertion of the
one, in support of the other.”140 Here, Madison departs from Jefferson by considering the defense
of American rights and expressing its ability to act as a key national player. Though Madison had
explored alternative policy, he, unlike Jefferson, was willing to force armed conflict in defending
American economy, politics, and society. However, both Madison and Jefferson understood the
importance of acting in defense of virtue, not expressing ideas through conflict.
During the Republican era, the classics underwent a distinct transformation as intellectual
tools for political thinking. The classics provided Madison with foundational lessons to be
learned and improved upon. His foreign policy recognized the need to defend not only the
American states, but also their institutions and ideals when assailed by other powers. Madison
sought to use an informed, realistic approach to diplomacy and foreign affairs that focused on
utilizing power when necessary. Hard power, however, was not the only determinant of
authority, and Madison’s tenure as president focused on defending American ideals within an
system of pragmatism, one that exerted force abroad but avoided the overextension and
misadministration of classical empires of old. In “Federalist No. 14,” Madison wrote,
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have paid a decent
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a
blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their good sense, the knowledge of their own experience? To this
manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the
example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor
of private rights and public happiness.141
140
Angela Kreider, ed., The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series, vol 7
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2012), 82.
141
James Madison, “Federalist No. 14,” The Federalist Papers: A Penn State Electronic Classics
Series Publication, 62.
Deibel 48
Madison’s foreign policy was an intellectual blend of classical models and “anti-models,”
philosophical innovations of the Enlightenment, and American concepts of liberty and freedom,
ideas that would help characterize a nascent American empire. The most consequential imperial
mission of the early national period, however, would come with an even different awareness of
classical ideology, producing policies that would forever change American foreign affairs.
James Monroe and Early American Imperialism
At his first inauguration in 1816, James Monroe made a point to remind the nation of its
prosperous and successful condition. The newly sworn in president remarked, “To whatever
object we turn our attention, whether it relates to our foreign or domestic concerns, we find
abundant cause to felicitate ourselves in the excellence of our institutions.”142 In other words,
the American system of “self-government,” as Monroe called it, produced a nation that had
triumphed over unimaginable adversity. As he began his presidency, Monroe saw the
preservation of the Republic as an expanding, increasingly powerful nation as the primary goal
of both his domestic and foreign affairs. Perhaps most uniquely, the classics helped Monroe
fundamentally understand the type of nation he looked to project onto the world, a benevolent
empire of virtue and freedom, one that looked to preserve not only the American way of life but
also the ability for other nations to adopt that same livelihood.
The Monroe Doctrine, perhaps the most famous component of the fifth president’s
policies, reflected this same attitude of preservation and protection. The most important legacy of
Monroe’s presidency was his definition of what would be considered an “American System” of
142
James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3483 (accessed April 1, 2013).
Deibel 49
diplomacy and foreign affairs.143 In his own writings, it becomes evident that Monroe fully
intended to transform American geopolitical affairs. In an 1818 letter to Andrew Jackson,
Monroe lays out the “three subjects” on which he will base his foreign affairs: “the first, to
preserve the Constitution from injury; the second to deprive Spain and the allied powers of any
just cause of war; and the third, to improve the occurrence to the best advantage of the
country…”144 Here, Monroe defines the American objectives as intending to preserve the
governmental systems in place, prevent the Spanish and other European allies from bringing
conflict into the region, and doing all of this with awareness of what is best for the country.
Monroe stipulated to Congress in 1819, “Our national honor must be maintained, and anew and
distinguished proof be afforded of that regard for justice and moderation which has invariably
governed the councils of this free people.”145 In dealing with Spain and other nations, Monroe
contends that the virtues upon which the American system was founded should be preserved and
kept in the forefront of policymaking at all times.
Monroe considers this to be the major failure of classical republics: even though they
were founded on admirable principles and ideals, it was their failure to blend morality and policy
that caused them to fall. Monroe said of Athens, “There was nothing sound in that government
but the principle on which it was founded.”146 In essence, American success in the face of other
republican failures relies on the nation’s willingness to keep its virtues in the forefront of its
143
Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World
Since 1776, 59. McDougall calls the Monroe Doctrine the starting point of a fundamental
definition of American policy as shaping the international system and transforming that
environment into one reflective of American values and influence.
144
James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, 21 December 1818, The Writings of James Monroe ed.
Stanislaus Murray Hamilton (New York: AMS Press, 1969), 6:86.
145
Ibid., 110.
146
James Monroe, The People, The Sovereigns: Being a Comparison of the Government of the
United States with those of the Republics which have Existed Before, with the Causes of their
Decadence and Fall (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co, 1867), 105.
Deibel 50
policy. During his retirement, Monroe published a book called The People The Sovereign, in
which he breaks down the features and failures of the Athenian, Lycedaemean, and Carthaginian
republics.147 The work breaks down the intricate features of each government, revealing the
characteristics that contributed primarily to each individual downfall. All of this, for Monroe, is
an attempt to teach the nation a valuable lesson for policymaking. If the United States understand
the past, Monroe argues that “we shall have gained an eminence which no other nation ever
reached, and from which, if we fall, the fault will be in ourselves, and we shall thereby give the
most discouraging example to mankind that the world ever witnessed.”148 This passage indicates
Monroe’s fixation on the classics as didactic instruments from the past. Like Jefferson and
Madison, Monroe concedes the importance of the past. However, Monroe blatantly points out
that not only does antiquity reveal the shortcomings of other governments, it also illustrates the
importance of the American system as a pivotal moment in existence, the failure of which would
provide “the most discouraging example” of government in history.
Monroe’s use of the classics was not limited to his post-presidential work. In his first
inaugural address, Monroe stated,
If we look to the history of other nations, ancient or modern, we find no example
of a growth so rapid, so gigantic, of a people so prosperous and happy. In
contemplating what we have still to perform, the heart of every citizen must
expand with joy when he reflects how near our Government has approached to
perfection; that in respect to it we have no essential improvement to make; that
the great object is to preserve it in the essential principles and features which
characterize it, and that is to be done by preserving the virtue and enlightening the
minds of the people; and as a security against foreign dangers to adopt such
arrangements as are indispensable to the support of our independence, our rights
and liberties.149
147
Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 20.
149
James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3483 (accessed April 1, 2013).
148
Deibel 51
The rhetoric in this address shows Monroe’s perception of the United States as the most
important, successful form of government in history. That government must be preserved
through adherence to its “essential principles,” and it will only succeed if its citizens reflect those
same virtues. Additionally, Monroe departs significantly from the isolationist mantra of his
Federalist predecessors, Washington and Adams. Monroe argues that “security against foreign
dangers” is critical to the defense of the nation’s political and ideological freedom from the
pretense of history. By the end of his presidency, Monroe’s awareness of America’s relationship
with the classics is even more refined. In his seventh annual address to Congress (the famed
“Monroe Doctrine” speech), the president assures Americans, “The history of the world
furnishes no example of a progress in improvement in all the important circumstances which
constitute the happiness of a nation which bears any resemblance to it [the United States].”150
The success and promulgation of the American mission is reflective of what Monroe considers
the fulfillment of republican ideals that originate in antiquity.
In the same address, Monroe stipulates exactly what would be held as a tenet of
American foreign policy for centuries to come. The Monroe Doctrine represented a fundamental
change in American foreign policy, one characteristically different from not only the postRevolutionary period, but also entirely separate from the idealistic, diplomatic, and deferential
presidencies of Jefferson and Madison. Several elements of the doctrine and Monroe’s
philosophies leading up to its declaration illustrate this change. In 1817, Monroe issued a series
of questions to his cabinet that would help inform his attitude toward foreign policymaking
throughout his presidency. Questions such as, “Has the Executive power to acknowledge the
independence of new States whose independence has not been acknowledged by the parent
150
James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message (Monroe Doctrine),” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3604 (accessed April 1, 2013).
Deibel 52
country, and between which parties a war actually exists on that account?” and “Is it
expedient…to examine the state of those [Spanish] colonies, the progress of the revolution, & the
probability of its success, and to make a report accordingly?” indicate Monroe’s willingness to
establish the United States as a diplomatic power in international affairs by involving America in
the quarrels between colonies and their parent states. Later, Monroe’s official statement shows
his willingness to state firmly how America feels about Europeans establishing, maintaining, and
subjecting colonies in the Western Hemisphere:
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on
their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European
power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere…151
In the statement above, American “peace and safety” represent the primary elements of the
republic Monroe seeks to protect. The doctrine offered a counter to the deteriorated situation
with Spanish imperial possessions in North America, among other European infringements on
American life, politics, and economics. However, Monroe was aware of the implications of a
declaration of support for either side. Instead, Monroe concedes that Europeans are allowed to
manage any “existing colonies.” His pursuit of the doctrine relies on the agreement of mutual
exclusion from politics’ relationship with power. For Monroe, the United States does not need a
grand expression or illustration of military strength. Instead, the American political economy can
help dictate policy. Monroe negotiated the cession of Florida by blending American interest with
an appeal to Spanish inability to secure its territory. America was willing to trade and exchange
with Spain as well as the colonies; it could not compromise either economic relationship.
151
Ibid.
Deibel 53
In the following section of the speech, Monroe institutes approval for Spanish colonies as
independent nations or systems within America.
…But with the Governments who have declared their independence and
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on
just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the
purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by
any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States.152
This dimension of the Monroe Doctrine shows American willingness to steer foreign policy
toward protecting not only American interests in republican government, but also in other new
nations’ interests in independence and self-rule. Monroe’s statement reflects a blend of tactful
language and artful awareness of sovereignty and national rights as he dodges around offending
European interests. Instead, Monroe looks to prevent any further European entries into the
hemisphere. This reflects the predominant theme of Monroe’s legacy: establishing a truism in
American international affairs that the protection of liberty, republicanism, and democracy in the
152
Ibid. The entire Monroe Doctrine is more than just this singular statement. The address
reflects components of the declaration, but a lengthier selection of the language that follows
these excerpts might help in clarifying its many dimensions: “Our policy in regard to Europe,
which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the
globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of
its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate
friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy,
meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in
regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is
impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either
continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our
southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally
impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If
we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and
their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the
true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers
will pursue the same course.” From: James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message (Monroe
Doctrine),” The Miller Center.
Deibel 54
Western Hemisphere is America’s purview. Political theorists often note the significance of
Monroe’s policy. The United States became, for the first time, “a guarantor” of liberty in the
region and a leader of nations in the hemisphere.153
The Monroe Doctrine represents a significant departure from classical foreign policy.
Rather than displaying power by conquering European possessions or fighting European powers
over colonial control, the United States issued a formal declaration. This, for Monroe, embodied
the type of departure America needed to make from its ancient antecedents. In order to succeed,
Americans needed to avoid overextension and involvement in military conflict, but it also needed
to commit to the ideology that produced the nation. The declaration not only pledged protection
to American ideals, but it also fostered and promoted the projection of those principles in the
colonies within the Western Hemisphere.
Though only officially a statement, Monroe’s policies actualized different dimensions of
the Monroe Doctrine. The United States would produce a unified cause, one that prioritized
diplomacy within a regionalization of foreign policy. The beginning of these ideas rested in
Monroe’s approach to Indian affairs. In his first inaugural address, Monroe devoted only two
sentences to his policy toward Native Americans: “With the Indian tribes it is our duty to
cultivate friendly relations and to act with kindness and liberality in all our transactions. Equally
proper is it to persevere in our efforts to extend to them the advantages of civilization.”154 Even
here, in a surprisingly timid statement, Monroe advocates not only diplomatic tendencies toward
Indian relations, but he includes a definitive statement about bringing American “civilization”
(and with it, American ideologies) to Native Americans.
153
Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy, 42.
James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3483 (accessed April 1, 2013).
154
Deibel 55
Throughout his first term, Monroe grappled with American policy toward Native
Americans. Though “purchases” had “been made of lands on conditions very favorable to the
United States, and, as it is presumed, not less so to the tribes themselves,” Monroe’s explanation
of his policy revealed a stark departure from Jefferson’s peaceable attitude toward assimilation
of Indians into American life.155 Monroe asserted, “In this progress, which the rights of nature
demand, and nothing can prevent, marking a growth rapid and gigantic, it is our duty to make
new efforts for the preservation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants.”156
Monroe’s empire will be one in which Native Americans are not simply brought into American
life by extension of their alliance and assimilation with American ideas. Instead, nature itself is
now demanding that America absorb the American Indian as a social dimension of its republic,
but not a political dimension of its citizenry.
On the surface, such an attitude reflects classical concepts of empire—dominating
another culture in favor of another, more powerful one. In fact, Monroe even periodically
ordered forcible subjugation of Native Americans in favor of territorial acquisition and
expansion. In 1817, General Andrew Jackson “was commissioned by the Monroe administration
to chastise the Indians [along the border of Spanish Florida]. His instructions were broad, but he
was empowered to pursue the red men across the Spanish boundary, if necessary.”157 Monroe
used the suppression of hostile Indians as a means of both pacifying native revolt and expanding
American influence in Spanish territories, which became an important goal of Monroe’s
presidency. However, by 1820, Monroe’s language is far more ideological and reflective of his
approach laid out in the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe stated, “We should become their real
155
Ibid.
Ibid.
157
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 169.
156
Deibel 56
benefactors; we should perform the office of their Great Father, the endearing title which they
emphatically give to the Chief Magistrate of our Union.”158 Just as Monroe saw the United States
as the father of republicanism in the region, so too would it serve as the cultural parent for the
uncivilized native population that resided in the attractive American west. This represented a
simultaneous departure from interest in European affairs and arrival of the initiative to move
west and south, expanding the virtuous, cultured, American empire.159
This empire, however, would also abandon the ideologies of antiquity, as it became a
more consolidated and refined political entity. Its concept of order was no longer dependent on
the despotism Monroe himself bemoaned as want to “absorb the whole” of power within a
government.160 American dealings with Spain during Monroe’s presidency illustrate this mindset
of a characteristically American empire. For the early republic, there was no distinction of favor
at the outset of Spanish colonial crisis. In 1817, Monroe assured Congress, “Through every stage
of the conflict, the United States have maintained an impartial neutrality…”161 There was no
incentive for the United States to offer assistance to Spain, a classically motivated, despotic
empire. Nonetheless, support for the fledgling and newly independent colonies would have
caused economic and political strife for the young American nation. Therefore, Monroe focused
more on the security of American possessions in Florida and Louisiana, reminding Congress of
the importance of securing the United States on the North American continent.162
158
James Monroe, “Second Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3601 (accessed April 1, 2013).
159
Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy, 50.
160
James Monroe, The People, the Sovereign, 107.
161
James Monroe, “First Annual Message,” The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus
Hamilton Murray, 6:35.
162
Ibid.
Deibel 57
By the next year, Monroe’s address to Congress showed the decline of Spanish-American
relations. In Florida, Monroe saw “how completely extinct the Spanish authority” had “become,”
a victim of Indian and colonial insurrection against the crown.163 Monroe begins flirting with the
idea of resisting Spanish military efforts in the region that have, through the assaults of both
royal soldiers and privateers, damaged nearby American livelihood and prosperity.164 He assures
Congress that “the right of self defense never ceases. It is among the most sacred, and alike
necessary to nations and to individuals, and whether the attack be made by Spain herself or by
those who abuse her power, its obligation is not the less strong.”165 Monroe offers a warning that
action against Spanish aggression, whether incidental or not, would be a means of defending
American interests as a principled republic, not a way to accumulate power and combat a rival
power. By 1819, Monroe has lost a significant portion of his patience. He notes that the recent
treaty formed with Spain looked to redress two decades of loss “sustained by citizens of the
United States from Spanish cruisers.”166 By the end of the same address to Congress, Monroe
made it clear that the United States could no longer allow royal dominance of colonies so
geographically and principally close to America. Monroe stated, “A virtuous people may and
will confine themselves within the limit of a strict neutrality; but it is not in their power to behold
a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which
naturally belongs to such a case.”167 The American system, then, prevents its government and its
citizens from sitting idly by while other nations struggle for the same independence. Monroe
ends the address by suggesting that the moment at which Spanish success over its colonial
163
Ibid., 77.
Ibid., 78.
165
Ibid.
166
Ibid., 106.
167
Ibid., 112.
164
Deibel 58
possessions seems to be “fruitless” will mark a new understanding, recognition, and acceptance
of republican government in the hemisphere.168
This rhetorical and diplomatic approach did not last long. In 1821, Monroe issued a direct
order to Andrew Jackson “to take possession of the Floridas, and cause Spanish authorities and
troops to be removed to Cuba. It must be equally so to establish the government of the United
States…”169 This initiative marks the true transition into the Monroe Doctrine. Before, Monroe
was willing to use the blend of statecraft he drew from Madison and Jefferson. By the start of his
second term, however, Monroe now sought to establish an empire of principle, one that looks to
reinforce its ideas with a strong expression of power. Though not as self-interested or militarily
inclined as empires of the past, Monroe intends to consolidate the hemisphere into a region of
republican influence.
Clearly, the classics contribute to Monroe’s understanding of policy and republican
institutions. However, Monroe sought to create a fundamentally new form of foreign policy that
expanded on the period’s development of foreign affairs. Preserving America was pivotal to the
survival of this grand American experiment with republicanism. Monroe stated, “We must
support our rights [as a nation] or lose our character, and with it, perhaps, our liberties. A people
who fail to do it can scarcely be said to hold a place among independent nations.”170 Monroe
sought to not only protect but project American virtue into the world. The nation no longer
resided in a corner of the world where liberty thrived; it now served as leader and exemplar of
virtuous government. In republics (classical and modern), Madison argues, “Great virtues and
talents, whenever found, exalt the possessors and increase the energy and stability of the
168
Ibid.
Ibid, 181.
170
James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center,
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3483 (accessed April 1, 2013).
169
Deibel 59
government.”171 It is this view of antiquity that Monroe carries into the present. Virtue and
principle must guide the nation, and its foreign policy decisions must reflect those same ideals.
Otherwise, it will fall into the “universal darkness” that “overspread the earth” after the fall of
republics like Greece and Rome.172
Monroe’s new concept of empire was one in which the United States would help foster
democracy in the hemisphere. By prohibiting European influence in the region, America
remained the only significant power to acculturate the North American Indians into and educate
the rebellious colonies on the merits of republic and government. In his Seventh Annual Address,
Monroe restated a phrase from his first inaugural address: “the excellence of our institutions.”173
This repetition serves as evidence of Monroe’s utmost respect and admiration for the American
system that had developed since 1789. Though classically motivated, Monroe saw the flaws in
classical republics as tragic, yet edifying. The need for a state to solely defend itself through
military force was antiquated, Monroe argued, a condition produced by the era in which that
state existed.174 Now was the time to preserve a “national honor” within the international system.
That honor was, according to Monroe, “national property of the highest value. The sentiment in
171
James Monroe, The People, The Sovereign, 164.
Ibid., 165
173
James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Address,” The Miller Center. The full statement: “It is
unnecessary to treat here of the vast improvement made in the system itself by the adoption of
this Constitution and of its happy effect in elevating the character and in protecting the rights of
the nation as well as individuals. To what, then, do we owe these blessings? It is known to all
that we derive them from the excellence of our institutions. Ought we not, then, to adopt every
measure which may be necessary to perpetuate them?” This reveals Monroe’s inclination to
defend the nation’s lofty principles through a less isolationist and more realistic, self-promoting
foreign policy. The speech identifies Monroe’s philosophy that in order for the American system
to succeed, the nation needs to actively work to “perpetuate” American ideals throughout the
region and the world.
174
James Monroe, The People, The Sovereign, 160-161.
172
Deibel 60
the mind of every citizen is national strength.”175 Monroe’s administration tried to promote the
kind of strength that would assert America as a powerful, self-determining model of republican
statehood for the hemisphere and the world. Though reminiscent of ancient imperial motivations
that drove conquest and consolidation, Monroe’s doctrine sought to establish the United States as
a regional and international leader whose authority adhered to liberal principles of government.
Intellectual Implications
The classics provided a solid educational and philosophical background for the
development of American political ideology. Combined with the influence of Enlightenment
thought, antiquity provided lessons for American politicians in both domestic and foreign affairs.
From these lessons, the Republican era presidents concluded that the United States was “the sole
repository of virtue in the world.”176 It was this virtue that guided Monroe to state the doctrine of
“noncolonization” that limited European involvement in the hemisphere to current colonies and
independent states.177 The different foreign policies of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe offer
examples of varied interpretations of the classics as models, antimodels, and theoretical
challenges for the new nation’s execution of foreign policy.
His philosophical approach toward foreign affairs and those ideas’ manifestations in the
Embargo Act, the Louisiana Purchase, and Indian policy as expressions of American liberty in a
separated world reflected Jefferson’s idealism and political tact. Madison’s realistic yet hopefully
democratic approach to Great Britain and the War of 1812, combined with the continued issue of
Indian affairs, reveal his willingness to use force as a defensive, not aggressive expression of
American values and ideologies. Monroe’s conceptual imperialism, one that looked to build a
175
James Monroe, “First Inaugural Address,” The Miller Center.
Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 112.
177
Ibid., 160-161.
176
Deibel 61
hemisphere of influence, liberty, and security by avoiding European disagreements, revealed his
redefinition of the classical concept of “empire” into one that stressed the importance of
sovereignty and diplomatic relationships between states. In essence, the classics helped inform
each president’s understanding of policy, but within the Republican period, their use of the
classics formed very different attitudes and approaches to foreign affairs.
American conduct of foreign affairs became a primary difference between the Federalist
and Republican administrations. Washington and Adams, whose political philosophies were
founded on classical concepts of institutions, stressed the importance of isolationism, as conflict
with other, more powerful states would threaten the democratic principles of the American
republic. Within this, Washington sought to affirm “the perfect national independence” of the
United States through advocating a primarily isolationist foreign policy.178 As the nation
matured, however, the complex international system revealed the need for American
involvement in global politics and economics. The classics, along with other intellectual
traditions acquired from the Enlightenment, Christianity, and colonial American ideologies,
provided the essential starting point from which the early republic’s administrators reformed and
reworked those concepts into workable, uniquely American forms of policy. Each of the three
presidential administrations between 1800 and 1824 uniquely perceived the character of this
policy and executed its tenets, using different interpretations of the past to inform their
ideologies.
However, combining each and examining them as a change in political philosophy over
time shows a natural progression away from literally mimicking the past and toward an
acceptance of important, classical ideas within a contemporary context willing to incorporate
178
William Henry Trescot, The Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washington and
Adams, 1789-1801 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1857), 282.
Deibel 62
new ideas. In this sense, observing the unique qualities of this period’s American form of foreign
affairs might be considered an expression of “American exceptionalism.” However, this is not
intended to suggest that American forms of foreign affairs developed in the early 1800s were
superior in their originality. Instead, it was imperative to early Americans that the United States
developed innovative ways to justify interstate action within a principled republic. This
motivation reflects the uniqueness of the situation and the necessity for an equally original form
of policy.
Nonetheless, the classics provided a critical intellectual foundation that underlined the
period’s process of developing foreign policy. The past taught Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe
the foundations of both civic and diplomatic affairs, but it was their willingness to correct those
examples that helped preserve and progress the republic. It was neither total veneration of the
past nor complete rejection of history that assisted the United States in its first period of major
foreign policy decision making. Instead, American intellectual foundations educated its leaders
on the consequences of republican government, helping the United States to avoid the errors of
the past in a dedicated, driven attempt to preserve the citizenry, institutions, values, and
principles of the new republic.
Deibel 63
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