Globalizing the Ethics of Care: Policy, Transformation, and

GlobalizingtheEthicsofCare:
Policy,Transformation,andJudgment
KariMetaGreenswag
Athesissubmittedinfulfilmentofrequirementsforthe
degreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Science
2016
Abstract
Thisthesisarguesthattheethicsofcareisanimportantlensthroughwhichtoviewcomplex
internationalmoralandpoliticalcontexts.Specifically,Iarguecareethicsoffersadifferent
perspectivethanhumanrightsdiscourses,becausetherelationalperspectivecareethicsoffers
generatesdifferentquestions,andthusdifferentanswers,aboutthemoralandpoliticallandscape
thanthetraditionallyindividualistperspectiveofmainstreamhumanrightstheories.Thisthesis
doesnotdenytheusefulnessofhumanrightsanalysis,butinsteadquestionstheirassumedprideof
place,especiallywhenassessingandaddressingcontextssuchasseverepoverty,genderandrace
oppression,andtheactivityofcareworkitself.Further,thisthesisarguesthattheethicsofcareis,
insomesituations,thebetterphilosophicaltoolforthetaskathand.
FionaRobinson’sbodyofworkonaglobalethicofcareiscentraltothisproject.Sheclaims
thatglobalinstitutionalrelationsstructureourlivesandourrelationshipswithothers,andassuch,
areaprimetargetforacriticalcareanalysis,revealingthewaysinwhichgovernments,corporations,
andsocialnormsshapeourlives.Inparticular,herfocusisonhowsuchinstitutionsperpetuate
harmfulrelationsofpower,whichcontinuetomarginalizewomenandtheworkofcareitselffrom
publicconsideration.Thiscriticalcareanalysisprioritizesunderstandingtherootcausesofsuch
moralandpoliticalcontextsinordertotransformthewayinwhichweapproachandjudgethese
contexts,whichinturnwouldallowustocraftlongerlastingandmoreholisticsolutions.
Theglobalcareethic,however,hasfacedsharpcriticismaboutitsabilitytobea
prescriptivetheorybecauseofitscontextualflexibility.IengagewiththeworkofDanielEngster
andKimberlyHutchings,whoeachcritiquetheglobal,criticalethicofcare.Engsterarguesthat
criticalcareethicsistooflexibletobepracticable,especiallywherepublicpolicyisconcerned,and
assuchhearguesa‘carebased’humanrightstheoryprovidesbetteractionguidance.Conversely,
Hutchings’critiqueofcareethicscriticisestheuniversalizationofthestandpointofcare,whichthen
negatesitsusefulnessinmakingintelligiblemoraljudgmentsacrosscultures.
IrejectEngster’s‘caring’humanrightsandarguethatcareethicscanbeasubstantiveguide
forpublicpolicy.IdosobycritiquingEngster’sversionofcaretheory,andthenusingcareethicsto
examinerealworldcasestudiesofpublicpolicytodemonstrateitspracticalapplications.Ialso
rejectHutchings’finalclaim,arguingweneednotrelinquishthestandpointofcareasanimportant
moralpointofview.Instead,Iarguethatthecriticalethicofcareis,infact,abletooutlineameans
bywhichwecanreachmoralandpoliticaljudgmentsacrosscultures,spurringthetransformationof
ourmoralandpoliticallandscape.
2
Preface
Ideclarethattheresearchpresentedhereismyownoriginalworkandthatalltheassistance
receivedinpreparingthisthesisandsourceshavebeenacknowledged.Ialsodeclarethatthisthesis
hasnotbeensubmittedtoanyotherinstitutionfortheawardofadegree.
3
Acknowledgements
Nothinginlifeisaccomplishedalone,andthatisespeciallytrueforadoctoralthesis.Thisthesis
wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupport,kindness,andgenerosityofmyfamily,friends
andcolleagues.
Agreatmanythankstomyfriends,TimCaldwell,LisaYang,andEleanorandShannon
Hanlen,fortheirsupportduringthistime.Yourpatienceandunexpectedgenerosityhavebeen
instrumentalinthecompletionofthisthesis.Iamgratefultohavefriendswhohavehelpedmeas
muchasyouhavethesepastseveralyears.
MysincerestthankstomycolleaguesattheUniversityofSydney,whohaveencouragedand
inspiredmeoverthepastthreeyears.Inparticular,IoweDr.LouiseRichardson-Self,Dr.Millicent
Churcher,SarahDrewsLucas,InjaStracenski,andYarranHominhagreatdeal.Yourconstructive
feedbackondraftchaptersandyourexpertisewereinvaluabletome.Moreimportantlyyour
friendship,forgedinthesharedexperienceofphilosophicalinquiry,hasbeenasourceofmuch
neededhumourandunderstanding.
Iamdeeplygratefultomyprimarysupervisor,Dr.MoiraGatens.Iconsidermyself
incrediblyluckythatIhavebeenabletobenefitfromherexperienceandcareforthelastthreeyears.
Itisthroughherdedicationtoahighqualityofphilosophicalthoughtandwritingthathaspushed
metoimprovemyownworkmorethanIthoughtpossible.Herinsighthasbeeninstrumentalinthe
completionofthisthesis,andherunderstandingandkindnessabulwarkagainstvariousmomentsof
upheaval.
Lastly,Icouldneverhaveaccomplishedthislong,arduousprocess,withoutmyfamily.
ThankyoutoRhonddaBryde,mymother-in-law,whosegenerosityandkindnesshasbeenmuch
appreciatedoverthelastseveralyearswhileIhavebeenanAmericaninafaroffland.Iwouldlike
tothankmysister,Dr.AnnaGreenswag,forsometimesprovidingawelcomedistraction,a
sympatheticear,andthehopethatthereislifeafteryoucompleteadoctorate.Iamgratefultomy
father,DouglasGreenswag,notmerelyforhisinterestinmywork,butalsoforneveronesecond
lettingmethinkthatanythingwasbeyondmygraspsimplybecauseofmygender.Hissupport
throughoutthisendeavourhasbeenanextensionofthesamethroughoutmywholelife:
unwavering.
Tomyhusband,TravisBryde,Icanneverbethankfulenough.Hehassacrificedmuchover
theyearstosupportmecompletingthisproject,andhehasbeenvitaltohelpingmemaintain
perspectiveandmyownphysicalandmentalwellbeing.Hehaseverbeenanamazingpartner,
4
someonewithwhomIcanengageinadebateandtestideasagainst,whilealsobeingapersonwith
whomIcanentrustwithallthings.Hisloveandcarehavebeenconstant,whichhavehelpedto
sustainmethroughoutthisproject.
Finally,mydeepestthanksareformymother,LindaRusch.Shehasinspiredme,
encouragedme,supportedme,andlovedmeformywholelife.Itwasmymotherwhotaughtme
whatfeminismwas,whatitmeanttobeafeminist,evenbeforeIknewsuchawordexisted.Her
determinationandworkethic,whichsheinstilledinme,ensuredthatIneveroncethoughtofgiving
up.Shehascounselledmethroughpostgraduatelife,helpededitdraftsofchapters,andalways
foundtimetotalk,eventhoughwehavebeenseparatedbythePacificOcean.Icouldnothave
imaginedcompletingthisprojectwithouther,anditistoherthatIdedicatethisthesis.
5
Table of Contents
Introduction..........................................................................................................................................8
ChapterOne:AConceptualHistoryofCareEthics............................................................................21
Section1–TheGenesisoftheEthicsofCare.................................................................................22
Section2–TheDevelopmentofaPoliticalEthicofCare..............................................................29
Section2.1–ThreeMajorCritiquesofEarlyCareEthics.............................................................29
Section2.2–APoliticalEthicofCare...........................................................................................31
Section3–ThePracticesofCare....................................................................................................42
ChapterTwo:GlobalizingtheEthicsofCare......................................................................................47
Section1–ACriticalEthicsofCare................................................................................................48
Section2–GlobalizingCare............................................................................................................52
Section3–GlobalMoralContexts.................................................................................................58
Section3.1–Difference...............................................................................................................60
Section3.2–Exclusion.................................................................................................................62
Section3.3–Gender....................................................................................................................65
Section3.4–ViolenceandHumanSecurity.................................................................................68
ChapterThree:CareEthicsandHumanRights..................................................................................74
Section1–HumanRightsDiscourses.............................................................................................75
Section1.1–WhatareHumanRights?.......................................................................................75
Section1.2–TheAdvantagesofHumanRights..........................................................................83
Section2–TheCareEthicsCritiqueofHumanRights...................................................................85
Section2.1–FirstCritique:StructuralHarmsofGlobalization....................................................85
Section2.2–SecondCritique:CulturalandGenderBias.............................................................91
Section2.3–ThirdCritique:EthicsofSocialReproduction..........................................................96
Chapter4:CanCarebeaFoundationforHumanRights?...............................................................103
Section1–CareastheHeartofJustice?......................................................................................104
Section1.1–CareandaTheoryofRationalObligation............................................................104
Section1.2–CaringHumanRights............................................................................................110
Section2–CritiqueofEngster’sCaringHumanRights................................................................117
Section2.1–FirstCritique:UncriticalDependence...................................................................118
Section2.2–SecondCritique:MinimallyFeminist....................................................................123
Chapter5:CareEthicsandPublicPolicy..........................................................................................131
Section1–PolicyStagesTheory..................................................................................................132
Section2–TheLensofCareandIssuesinPublicPolicy..............................................................135
Section2.1–AgendaSetting.....................................................................................................137
Section2.2–PolicyFormulation................................................................................................141
6
Section2.3–Decision-Making...................................................................................................145
Section2.4–PolicyImplementation..........................................................................................147
Section2.5–PolicyEvaluation..................................................................................................153
Chapter6:AProblematicMethod?..................................................................................................160
Section1–CareEthicsandStandpointTheory............................................................................161
Section1.1–FeministStandpointTheory..................................................................................162
Section1.2–CareasaStandpoint?...........................................................................................164
Section2–FeministInternationalEthics.....................................................................................168
Section2.1–TheBackground....................................................................................................169
Section2.2–CritiqueofRobinson’sGlobalCareEthic..............................................................171
Section2.3–Hutchings’EthicalMethod...................................................................................175
Section3–TransformationandJudgment..................................................................................180
Section3.1-Transformation.....................................................................................................180
Section3.2-Judgment...............................................................................................................182
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................188
Bibliography......................................................................................................................................198
7
Introduction
Thelasttwentyyearshaveseenadecreaseinabsolutelevelsofseverepoverty,withthenumberof
peopleinseverepovertyhalvedfrom1990to2010,suchthatthereare900millionpeoplein
povertyor12.7percentoftheglobalpopulation.1Thelargestdecreasesinpovertyhavebeenin
ChinaandIndia,andtheWorldBankestimatedthatin2015thoseinseverepovertyonlycomprised
9.6percentoftheglobalpopulation.2Therehasalsobeenmarkedsuccessintheeducationof
womenandgirls,withanincreaseinthenumberofgirlsreceivingprimaryandsecondaryeducation,
andanincreaseinthenumberofcountriesthathaveachievedgenderparityinprimaryand
secondaryeducation(from36countriesin2000to62countriesin2015).3Therehasalsobeenan
increaseinlegalreformsaddressingwomen’sconcernssuchasmoreequitablefamilylaws,stronger
lawsagainstsexualharassment,andprotectionsforparentalleaveandchildcare.4
However,inspiteofthesesuccesses,thegrowthandincreaseinprosperityisnotevenly
distributedacrosscountries.5Evenwithincountrieseconomicinequalityisontherise,whichis
oftenlinkedtoincreasedpoliticalandsocialinequality.ArecentreportoninequalityinOECD
Countries6demonstratesthatevennominallyprosperous‘developed’nationsarebeginningtoface
everincreasinglevelsofunequalwealthdistributionandincome.7Further,tryingtopinpointthe
exactcauseofinequalityisnearlyimpossible.Whilesomepointtoincreasedglobalization,illadvisedtaxationschemes,orashiftinthejobmarket,itismorelikelythatacombinationoffactors
isresponsibleforthepervasiveinequalitywefacelocallyandglobally.Compoundingtheproblemis
agrowingawarenessthatcurrentsolutionsarelargelyineffectiveatcurtailingtherisinginequality.8
Further,womenandgirls,onaverage,continuetofacestructuralbarrierstohealth,
education,housing,technology,andfinancialindependence.Recentdatasuggeststhat“[e]ven
wherewomenandmenarebothjustaslikelytoliveinapoorhousehold,womenaremorelikelyto
bedeprivedinotherkeyareasofwell-being,suchaseducation,andlesslikelytohavean
independentsourceofincomethroughpaidwork,whichcanresultintheunevendistributionof
1
"DevelopmentGoalsinanEraofDemographicChange,"(WashingtonD.C.:WorldBankGroupand
InternationalMonetaryFund,2015),32.
2
Ibid.
3
"GenderandEfa2000-2015:AcheivementsandChallenges,"(Paris:UNESCO,2015),3.
4
"ProgressoftheWorld'sWomen2015-2016,"(UnitedStates:UNWomen,2015),29-32.
5
"DevelopmentGoalsinanEraofDemographicChange,"7.
6
ThecurrentcountrieswithOECDMembershipare:Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Chile,CzechRepublic,
Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Israel,Italy,Japan,Korea,
Luxembourg,Mexico,Netherlands,NewZealand,Norway,Poland,Portugal,SlovakRepublic,Slovenia,Spain,
Sweden,Switzerland,Turkey,UnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.
7
"DividedWeStand:WhyInequalityKeepsRising,"(Paris:OECD,2011),22.
8
Ibid.,38.
8
powerandresourceswithinthehousehold.”9Theausteritymeasurestakenbysomenationsin
responsetotheGlobalFinancialCrisisof2008havealsopushedwomenbackintotheroleofthe
caregiver,becausesuchwomennolongerreceivechildcare,eldercare,healthcareandotherkinds
ofsupportthathadpreviouslyenabledthemtoenterthelabourmarket.10Thecurrentrough
estimateisthatwomenandgirlsperform2.5timesasmuchofthedomesticworkasmendo,11
signallingthatalthoughtherearepoliciesthatprioritizewomenenteringthelabourmarketasa
matterofequality,thereislittlethathasbeendonetomakethedivisionofcaringlabourmore
equitable.
WomenandgirlsintheGlobalSouthstillstruggletoreceiveaneducationaswell.The
genderdisparityineducationwidensathighereducationlevels,andthepoorestgirlsintheworld
stillcontinuetofacethelargestobstaclestoevensettingfootinaschool,letalonefinishingtheir
education.12Thechallengesthatwomenandgirlsfacearesignificantandinclude:structuralbarriers
anddiscriminatorysocialnorms,childmarriage,longtraveldistancestoschools,thecostsof
education,alackoffemaleteachersandgender-sensitiveteachertraining,13andsexualharassment
fromoldermalestudentsandevenmaleteachers.14Additionally,thegenderbindcutsbothways,
sometimesforcingboystodropoutbecausetheirfamiliesneedthemtopursueemployment,owing
tothemale-breadwinnersocialnorm.15Nevertheless,womenandgirls,onaverage,facemore
challengestotheirprosperitythanmenandboys.Theyarealsomorevulnerableingeneraltothe
indirecteffectsofconflictandnaturaldisasters,whichincludesbutarenotlimitedtoincreased
migration,ahigherlikelihoodofbeingadisplacedpersonorrefugee,gender-basedviolence,which
includesrape,humantrafficking,forciblemarriage,andforcedpregnancy.16
Womenarealsonearlyhalfofallinternationalmigrants,leavingtheirhomesinthetoseek
workabroad,andasof2015,makeup48%oftheinternationalmigrantpopulation.17Further,while
migrationbetweennationsintheglobalSouthhasoutpacedmigrationfromtheglobalSouthtothe
globalNorth,18femalemigrantsoutnumbermalemigrantsinNorthAmericaandEurope,whereas
9
"ProgressoftheWorld'sWomen2015-2016,"45.
Ibid.,49.
11
Ibid.,84.
12
"GenderandEfa2000-2015:AcheivementsandChallenges,"3.
13
Ibid.,4.
14
Ibid.,29.
15
Ibid.,4.
16
ThereseMcGinnetal.,"ShelterfromtheStorm:ATransformativeAgendaforWomenandGirlsinaCrisisProneWorld,"(Columbia:UnitedNationsPopulationFund,2015),21.
17
"GlobalMigrationTrendsFactsheet2015,"(http://iomgmdac.org/global-trends-factsheet/:International
OrganizationforMigration,2016),5.
18
Ibid.,7.
10
9
menoutnumberwomeninAfrica,Asia,andparticularlyWesternAsia.19Apossiblereasonforthe
differenceinthedistributionofmenandwomenmightbeduetotheincreasedglobaldemandfor
inexpensivecarers,eitherprofessionally(asnurses,hotelstaff,orineldercarefacilities)or
informallyasdomesticcarers.Whilewomeninthesesituationsmostoftenleavebehindtheirown
families(whichinturnareoftencaredforbyhiredhelporextendedfamilynetworks,creatinga
‘globalcarechain’),womenintheinformalsectoraregenerallymorevulnerabletoawidevarietyof
abuses.Suchwomenarealsomorelikelytobetraffickedpersons.Sadly,humantraffickingremains
alargeindustry,garneringnearly$150billion(US)peryear.20Further,theUnitedStates
governmentrecognizesthathumantraffickingtaintstheentireglobalmarket,allowingthe
continuationofslavery,childlabour,forcedlabour,andprostitutionthroughvariousmethodssuch
asdebtbondage,removalofpassports,andotherunsavourymeans.21Themethodshuman
traffickingarecloselyrelated,andoftenrunparallelto,patternsofinternationalmigration.
Inotherwords,despitethesuccessesduringthelate20thandearly21stcenturyinlowering
theabsoluterateofpovertyandimprovingthelivesofwomenandgirlsonaverage,itisatbesta
qualifiedsuccess.Thereisarisingtideofinequalitythataffectsnotjustsomenations,buttheentire
world.Womenandgirlsstillfaceoverallreducedlifechoicescomparedtotheirmalecounterparts,
receivinglessschooling,lesshealthcare,andareoftenplacedingreaterlevelsofinsecuritydueto
naturaldisastersandhumanconflict.Also,womenaremorelikelytosufferabusewhenthey
becomeinternationalmigrants,eitherlegallyorthroughhumantrafficking.
Ingeneral,humanrightsdiscourseshavebeeninstrumentalincombatingtheproblemsof
poverty,thediscriminationandabuseofwomenandgirls,andtheinjusticesofhumantrafficking.
However,itismycontentionthathumanrightsalonearenotenough,becausetheycannotalways
accountfortherootcausesofstructuralinequalitynordotheynecessarilygiveusthetoolsto
transformhowwethinkaboutsocialjusticewithregardtotheperspectiveofcare.Thereisa
growingconsensusthatinordertoeradicate,ratherthanreduce,theseproblems,wemustmore
deeplyinvestigatetheirstructuralcauses,22cultivatewidercommunityengagementbybuildingupon
existingnetworks,23andincorporateagreaterunderstandingoftherolethatcareprovisionplaysin
allofourlives.24Wemustbeabletobetterclarifywhytheseproblemsoccurinthefirstplace,we
mustunderstandtheunderlyingnormsandinstitutionalsupportsofsuchproblems,andwemust
19
"InternationalMigrationReport2015(Highlights),"(NewYork:UnitedNations,2016),1.
"TraffickinginPersonsReport",(WashingtonD.C.:UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,2015),13.
21
Ibid.,13-8.
22
"GenderandEfa2000-2015:AcheivementsandChallenges,"32.
23
"HealthinAllPolicies:ReportonPerspectivesandIntersectoralActionsintheAfricanRegion,"(Brazzaville:
WHORegionalOfficeforAfrica,2013),7,10.
24
"ProgressoftheWorld'sWomen2015-2016,"132.
20
10
attempttosolvetheseproblemsinawaythatbringstotheforetheknowledgethatcareis
necessaryforallhumanbeings.
Thecentralargumentofthisthesisisthatthecriticalethicsofcareprovidesadifferent
perspectiveontheinternationalrealmincomparisontohumanrightsdiscourses,andthatthis
perspectiveisavaluableone.Itcanbeusedasalensthroughwhichtoviewinternationalmoraland
politicalcontexts,offeringnewinformation,newmotivations,andtheabilitytoprovidecrosscontextualjudgments.Additionally,itisabletoguideustowarddifferentsolutions,whichenable
thetransformationofourworld.Inthefirstinstance,Iarguethatthecriticalethicsofcarecanbe
usedasalensthroughwhichtoviewtheseglobalmoralcontextsandhighlightthepoliticalnatureof
theprovisionofcare.Forexample,throughthelensofcarewecanseehowalackoflegal
protectionsforparentalleavecanunfairlyimpactwomenandhaveprofoundeconomicandsocial
consequences.Italsohaspoliticalconsequences,forwhenwomencontinuetoberelegatedtothe
privatesphere,theyareoftenrenderedunabletoparticipatefullyinpoliticaldiscourse.Thelensof
carecanalsodemonstratehow,whenthoseintheglobalNorthimportdomesticcarers,theydo
morethanimportlabour,theyalsoimportaffection,tenderness,andotherformsofemotional
investment,whichmeansthatsuchwomenarenotonlyexploitedfortheirlabour,butalsofortheir
love.25Thisloveisredirectedawayfromtheirownchildrenandtowardthechildrenofthosewho
have,tosomedegree,abrogatedtheirowncaringresponsibilitiesinfavourofotherpursuits.The
ethicsofcaregivesusthetoolstoinvestigateandunderstandhowthesecontextsimpactreal
people’slivesastheylivethem,andtheirrootcausesaswell.Thefoundationforsuchcontextsis
oftenduetothestill-stronglinkbetweenwomen,femininity,andcareprovision,anditisalinkwe
mustworktowardbreaking.Nottosaythatcareprovisionisunimportant,quitethereverse:that
caringshouldbeahumanactivity,notsolelyafemaleone.Careethicsstronglyfightsthe
devaluationofcareandtheconcurrentdevaluationofthosewhoprovideandreceivecare,as
thoughcarehadnopoliticalramifications,orthatthosewhoengageincarearethemselvesnot
properpoliticalsubjects.
Itisthesekindsofanalysesthatmostmainstreamhumanrightsdiscoursescannotprovide.
Becausehumanrightsdiscoursescannotprovidethesedifferentkindsofanalyses,theyarealso
unabletoprovideadifferentarrayofsolutions.Therefore,Iarguethatthedifferentviewofferedby
thecritical,feministethicsofcarecanprovidenotonlynewinformation,butnewkindsofsolutions
aswell.Wecannotrelyon‘businessasusual’tofostergreaterequality.Thatidearunscounterto
25
ArlieRussellHochschild,"LoveandGold,"inGlobalWoman:Nannies,MaidsandSexWorkersintheNew
Economy,ed.BarbaraEhrenreichandArlieRussellHochschild(NewYork:HenryHoltandCompany,2002),224.
11
thedatathatindicatestherisingrateofinequalityintheworldinspiteofstatedhumanrights
commitments.Wemustreachfornewwaysofseeingtheworld,whichprovidenewwaysofsolving
theseveryrealproblemsexperiencedbyrealpeople.ThisdoesnotmeanthatIarguethathuman
rightsshouldbeabandoned:farfromit.Rather,Iarguethathumanrightsalonecannotaddressthe
complexmoralandpoliticalcontextsthatexistintheworldtoday.Weneedanothertool,andthat
toolistheethicsofcare.Lastly,Iarguethatthedifferentsolutionsofferedbyacareanalysiswould
leadtothetransformationofourworld.Itwouldnotbeafasttransformation,ratheraslow,
gradualone,sustainedindialoguewithothersabouthowcareisbestaccomplished.Yet,itwould
beatransformationallthesame,towardaworldwheretheconcernsofcareareseenasprimaryto
humanlifeandgivengreaterconsiderationthantheyaretoday.Alongsidethatcomesadeep
feministcommitmenttoovercomingthebarrierserectedbypatternsofpowerthatinturnfoster
harmfulpatternsofexclusionbasedonrace,gender,class,sexualorientation,andreligion.Itisnot
acommitmenttoerasingourdifferences,butinsteadacommitmentnottoallowourdifferencesto
bethereasonforbarringparticulargroupsofpeoplefrommakingpoliticalchoicesabouttheirown
lives.
InChapterOne,Iexploretheconceptualhistoryoftheethicsofcare,investigatingits
beginnings,outliningthecritiquesofearlycareethics,andexploringitsdevelopmentintoarobust
politicalethic,whichlaidthefoundationforaglobalcriticalethicofcare.Ibeginwiththeworkof
CarolGilligan,whoin1982publishedherbookInaDifferentVoice,whichchallengedthethen
prevalentassumptionsaboutthetrajectoryofhumanmoraldevelopment.Theassumptionwasthat
the‘highest’levelofdevelopmentoccurredwhenpersonsembracedaKantian-like,rule-based
universalmorality.26Gilliganarguedthatwomenreasondifferentlythanmeninmoralmatters,
focusedmoreonhowtobalancetheresponsibilitiestheyhaveinvirtueofbeinginexorably
embeddedwithinawebofrelations.27NelNoddings,publishingonlytwoyearsafterGilliganin1984,
usedGilligan’sworkasastartingpointtofurtherrefinethescopeofcareethicsanddemonstrate
thatitwasanimportantmoraltheorythatcouldguideourinterpersonalinteractions.Noddingsin
particularfocusedontheimportanceoftheemotionalaspectofcaring,andtheimplicationsofthe
relationalontologyofcareethics.28Theethicofcare,then,waspredicatedontwobasicideas.The
firstisthattraditional‘male’moralitieswereunabletoencompasstheexperiencesofwomen,and
thattheassumptionof‘gender-blindness’intraditionalmoralitiesactuallyservedtoobfuscate
26
CarolGilligan,InaDifferentVoice:PsychologicalTheoryandWomen'sDevelopment(Cambridge,Mass.:
HarvardUniversityPress,1993),22.
27
Ibid.,62.
28
NelNoddings,Caring,aFeminineApproachtoEthics&MoralEducation(Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia
Press,1984),49.
12
importantmoralquestions.Thesecondideawasthattheethicsofcarebeginsfromtheviewpoint
ofhumans-in-relationship,andthemoralquestionbecomeshowwebestfulfilourcaring
responsibilities,ratherthanhowonebestfulfilsone’sobligationsbaseduponabstract,rule-like
duties.ItwasinherbookthatGilligancoinedtheterm‘ethicofcare,’andsincethenthetheoryhas
grownfromitssmall,andsomewhatcontroversialbeginnings.29
However,thisearly(‘orthodox’)careethicswasnotwithoutitschallengers.Thethreemajor
critiquesofthis‘orthodox’careethicswerethat:1)theethicsofcarecouldonlyeverbeaprivate
morality,notsuitedforpublicconcerns;302)thatcareethicswasunabletoanswerquestionsof
justice;31and3)thatcareethicsservedtoreinforceinsteadofchallengepervasivenormsabout
gender(i.e.thatwomenareessentiallycarers).32Thesecritiques,however,insteadofdoomingcare
ethics,benefitedthetheory.Inordertoanswerthesecriticisms,theethicsofcarewasdeveloped
intoapoliticalethic.TheworkofJoanTronto,EvaFederKittay,andVirginiaHeldwereinstrumental
inshiftingthescopeofcareethicstoexpresslyincludepoliticalconcerns.Theirworkshowedhow
questionsabouthowourrelationshipsarestructured,howcareworkisallocated,andhowcare
workis(under)valuedaredeeplypoliticalquestions.33Thislaterversionofcareethicsisasharply
criticaltheory,posingdifficultquestionsabouttherootcausesofmoralandpoliticalproblems.It
requiresustoexaminetheunderlyingnormsofrace,gender,class,andability,tochallengethe
relationsofpowerthatstructureourlivesthateitherhinderorenablegoodcaringrelations,andto
understandhowperceptionsofdifferenceandpatternsofexclusionareperpetuatedthroughthose
verynormsandrelationsofpower.Ratherthanfocusingonlyonrelationsbetweenpersons,the
criticalethicsofcareexamineshowthepoliticalshapesthewebsofrelationsweinhabit.Further,
thiscriticalcareethicisablenotonlytocritiquepresentarrangements,butcanalsoofferpositive
guidanceinhowtoassessandprovidesolutionstomoralandpoliticalproblems.Tronto’spractices
29
Thephilosophicalcommitmentsoftheseoriginalethicsofcarefeministshave,ofcourse,evolvedsincethe
1980s,butinthisprojectIamprovidinganaccountofthedevelopmentofcareethics,andthesearguments
constitutetheoriginalconceptualframeworkofthetheory.Gilligan,forexample,tookonthecriticism
regardingherfocusonwhitemiddleclasswomenandco-authoredabookwithJillMcLeanTaylorandAmy
Sullivanentitled“BetweenVoiceandSilence:Womenandgirls,raceandrelationships”(1995)thatfocusedon
theracialandsocio-economicdimensionthatwasmissingfromherfirstbook.Noddingsalsohasafocuson
thephilosophyofeducationandcontinuestoproduceworksarguingforincorporatingtheethicsofcareinto
education,notonlytoinfuseeducationalinstitutionswithcaringpractices,buttoaidintheethicaleducation
ofchildrenaswell.Someoftheseworksinclude:“TheChallengetoCareinSchools:AnAlternativeApproach
toEducation”(1992),“JusticeandCaring:TheSearchforCommonGroundinEducation”(1999),and“ARicher,
BrighterVisionforAmericanHighSchools”(2015).
30
MaryGDietz,"CitizenshipwithaFeministFace:TheProblemwithMaternalThinking,"PoliticalTheory13,
no.1(1985):25.
31
VirginiaHeld,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006),68-9.
32
Dietz,20.
33
EvaFederKittay,Love'sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency,ThinkingGender(NewYork:
Routledge,1999),38.
13
ofcare(attentiveness,responsibility,competence,andresponsiveness)arethebasicguidelinesfor
action,amethodbywhichthegoalsofcareethicsmightbepositivelyenacted,aswellasprovidinga
standardmeasureofsuccessforanyaction.34ThesepracticesasformulatedbyTrontoalsoserveas
thegroundsforhowthelensofcarecanthenbeappliedtointernationalmoralandpolitical
contexts.However,thispoliticalaspectofcriticalcareethicswouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout
thecritiquesoftheearly,‘orthodox’ethicsofcare,andalsoowesmuchtotheworkofearlycare
theorists.Theconceptualhistoryofcareethicsdemonstratesthattheethicsofcareisatheorythat
canadaptandevolvebaseduponcritique,abletoexpanditsscopeandoffernewinsights,
motivations,andsolutionstomoralandpoliticalproblems.Althoughthecoreofcareethics,its
relationalontology,hasremainedunchangedsinceGilligan’sbook,thewayinwhichweunderstand
themoralcontentofourrelationshasexpandedconsiderably.Notonlymustwebalanceour
responsibilitiestoparticularothers,butwebegintounderstandthatourrelationsthemselvesare
structuredbylargerforces,norms,institutions,andpatternsofpowerthatservetounderscorethe
deeplypoliticalnatureofhowandwhywecareforparticularothers.
Thecriticalethicsofcareexpandedthescopeofcareethics,makingexplicitthatthemoral
problemsthatariseincaringrelationsarealsoprofoundlypoliticalones.Thisview,thatnormsand
institutionsshapeourcaringrelations,laidthefoundationforexpandingcareethicstotheglobal
level.InChapterTwoIfollowthepioneeringworkofFionaRobinson,whowasthefirsttoarticulate
aglobal,criticalethicofcare.InthischapterIarguethattheethicsofcareisanimportantand
viabledifferentperspectiveincomparisontohumanrightsdiscourseswhenitcomestoaddressing
globalmoralandpoliticalcontexts.Further,becausethecriticalethicofcarechallengesthe
pervasivenormsandinstitutionsthatshapeourcaringrelations(oftenshapingthemtoour
detriment),itisaimedatthetransformationoftheinternationallandscapeinordertofosterbetter
caringrelationsbetweenpersons.35Ireviewtheuniqueinsightsthatareofferedbyacriticalcare
ethic,aswellasunpackthedifferentpracticesofcare(attentiveness,responsibilityand
responsiveness)usedbyRobinson.ThissetofpracticesdoesnotneatlymaptoTronto’sformulation,
whichincludesamarkedlydifferentconceptionofresponsivenessandafourthpracticetermed
‘competence.’Fromthere,Iclarifyhowwecanjustifiablyusetheethicsofcareontheinternational
level.Inbrief,theargumentisthatifweacceptthattheethicsofcareisabletoassessandprovide
moralguidanceandjudgmentforrelationships,andthattheinternationalrealmisasetof
relationshipsbetweeninstitutionsthatstructureourinterpersonalcaringrelations,thencareethics
canandshouldbeusedtoanalyseandjudgemoralandpoliticalcontextsontheinternationallevel.
34
JoanC.Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare(NewYork:Routledge,1993),108.
ElisabethConradi,"RedoingCare:SocietalTransformationthroughCriticalPractice,"EthicsandSocial
Welfare9,no.2(2015):123.
35
14
Itis,touseaturnofphrase,‘turtlesallthewaydown,’thatis,everyoneexistswithinawebof
relationsthatdoesnotstopatstateboundaries.36Thebenefitsofsuchananalysisisthatitopens
upnewareasofmoralandpoliticalinquiry,newmotivationsforaction,andevendifferentpossible
solutionstoproblems.Specifically,wecanbegintoseecertaincontexts,onesthatwerepreviously
notconsideredtobeofexpressmoralorpoliticalconcerninternationally.Inthischapter,Ifocuson
thecontextsofdifference,exclusion,gender,andviolencetohighlighthowtheethicsofcarecan
‘makeseen’thebackgroundassumptionsthatarepartofourcurrentinternationallandscapethat,
infact,servetorenderpeopleunabletofulfiltheircaringobligationsortoreceivethecarethey
need.Intheaforementionedcontexts,Iarguethatthepracticesofcareareanimportantguideto
transformingtheinternationalrealm,basedontheabilityofacareanalysistoenableustochallenge
ourassumptions,offernewmotivationsforaction,andsuggestdifferentkindsofsolutions.
InChapterThreeIdirectlyengagewithhumanrightsdiscoursestoclarifywhatImeanwhen
Iclaimthatcritical,feministcareethicsoffersadifferentlensthroughwhichtoviewinternational
moralandpoliticalcontexts.Becausetheethicsofcareisoftencastinoppositiontohumanrights,it
isnecessarytospendtimeunderstandingwhathumanrightsareandthebenefitstheyofferwhen
addressingglobalmoralcontexts.However,Iargueagainsttheclaimthathumanrightsshouldbe
ouronly,oreventheprimary,toolweusewhenthinkingaboutandworkingtoaddresscomplex
internationalmoralandpoliticalcontexts.First,Idoacknowledgethathumanrightsliteratureisa
vastarea,andassuchIpresentmoreofasummarythanadetailedpictureofhumanrights.Istrive
topresentafairpictureofwhathumanrightsare,examiningtheworkofprominentrightstheorists
suchasThomasPogge,CharlesBeitz,andJamesGriffin,37todemonstratethatinspiteofthe
differencesbetweentypesofhumanrightsdiscourses,theyneverthelesshavetwoimportant
featuresincommon:theyareconsidered1)tobeasetof(sometimesnegotiable)moralandpolitical
standardsthatareaimedatprotectingwhatitmeanstolivea‘human’kindoflife,which
subsequently2)generateclaimsofdutyuponinstitutionsandindividuals.38
Further,humanrightsdiscoursesaresimilarenoughinbasicstructuresuchthattheycanbe
understoodasprovidingthesamekindsofbenefits,aswellasbeingvulnerabletothesamekindsof
critique.Thefirstbenefitofhumanrightsisthattheyarestrongclaimsofjustice.Theyare
expressedintermsofdutiesandobligations,whichcanservetodefinewhotherelevantactorsare,
36
FionaRobinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations(Boulder,Colo.:
WestviewPress,1999),45.
37
Althoughthesephilosophersarebynomeansexhaustiveofhumanrightsliterature,theydorepresentthe
mainproponentsofthosehumanrightsdiscoursesthatareaimedatthereductionofseverepovertyand
generallychampioningwiderenforcementofhumanrightsinternationally.
38
DuncanIvison,Rights(Stocksfield:AcumenPublishingLtd,2008),200-1.
15
avoidingpossibleambiguitywhenassigningresponsibilityforparticularharmsdonetoothers.
Second,humanrightsalsomarkoutproblemsthatareofinternationalconcern,issuessuchas
severepovertythattranscendnationalboundariesanddonotstopatethnic,religious,orsocial
divisions.Lastly,humanrightscanalsoprovideclearguidanceforpolicymakers,inthattheyare
standardsthatareset,andarelesslikelytobestalledbycontextualfactors.Yet,inspiteofthese
benefits,humanrightsarenot,norshouldtheybe,ouronlymeansbywhichtoaddressmoraland
politicalcontextsinternationally.Thecarecritiquebringstotheforeaspectsoftheinternational
realmthathumanrightsdiscoursesfrequentlyoverlookordeemasoutsidetheirscope,and
althoughthefirstandsecondpointsofthecritiquearenotnecessarilyuniquetothefeministethic
ofcare,itwascritical,feministcaretheoristswhoputthesecritiquestogethertoformalarger,more
sustainedcritiqueofmainstreamhumanrightstheories.First,humanrightscanoverlookthe
embeddedstructuralharmsofglobalization,suchasthewayinwhichrelationsofpowerfoster
harmfulformsofexclusion,ortheemotionalexploitationoftransnationalmigrantcareworkers.39
Secondly,thecarecritiquehighlightsthathumanrightsalsocarrywiththemculturalandgender
biases,becausehumanrightscomefromaveryspecifictraditionthatdevelopedinWesternEurope
andwasoftenfocusedonmenormale-ledhouseholdsuntilthelastcentury.Thesebiasesserveto
renderinvisiblethewayinwhichdifferenceisobscuredinfavourof‘sameness’andhowgender
deeplyaltersthewayinwhichhumanrightsclaimscanbemade.40Finally,humanrightsare
generallyunabletoencompassissuesofsocialreproduction,i.e.theworkofcareitself,whichmeans
thatcare,underahumanrightsdiscourse,isoftendevaluedormarginalized,alongwiththosewho
giveandreceivecare.41Thus,thesecritiquesofferverygoodreasonsnottosolelyrelyonhuman
rightstoprovidetheanswerstointernationalmoralandpoliticalproblems.Yet,thisdoesnotmean
thatweshouldabandonhumanrightsaltogether.Rather,weshould,asIargue,usethelensofcare
toprovideadifferentmeansofunderstandingmoralandpoliticalcontexts,supplyingdifferent
motivations,andsuggestingawiderarrayofsolutionsthatcanleadtosubstantialtransformationfor
thebetter.
Inlightofthecarecritiqueofhumanrights,andthelingeringproblemwithcareethics(that
itsflexibilityrendersittoounwieldytoaddressglobalmoralconcerns,whichareassumedtorequire
‘harder’answersintheformofrightsstandards),areasonablesolutionmightbetocraftasetof
‘caring’humanrightsthatincorporatesthebestofboththeories.InChapterFour,Iexaminethe
39
AnnetteCBaier,"TheNeedforMoreThanJustice,"inJusticeandCare,ed.VirginiaHeld(Colorado:
WestviewPress,1995),55.
40
VirginiaHeld,"FeministTransformationsofMoralTheory,"PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch50,
no.Supplement(1990):327.
41
Robinson,63.
16
attemptDanielEngstermade,andultimatelyconcludethatcombiningcareethicsandhumanrights
doesnotprovideasatisfactorykindofcaretheory.42Engstersuggeststhathis‘caring’humanrights
wouldprovidehumanrightswithacross-culturallyacceptablefoundation(care)insteadof
somethingcontentiouslikehumandignityoragency.Healsoarguesthatacriticalethicofcare
cannotofferguidanceforpublicpolicy,andassuchitistooambiguouswhenitcomestoproviding
answerstoglobalmoralproblems.43Engsterarguesforarationaltheoryofobligation,basedonour
mutualdependence,inordertogroundourvariouscaringobligationsandjustifythepurchaseof
caringhumanrights.Wehave,heargues,residualresponsibilitiesofcaretodistantstrangerswhen
theirowncirclesoffamily,friends,andcommunityareunabletofulfiltheirhumanrights.44
WhileIamsympathetictoEngster’spracticalaims,andsomeofhisproposedsolutions,
therearetwomajorproblemswithhistheory.ThefirstproblemwithEngster’srationaltheoryof
obligationisthatitisbuiltuponanuncriticalacceptanceofdependence.Engsteragreeswithcare
theoriststhatour(inter)dependenceisaninexorablefactofourlives,butwhathefailstomakeclear
ishowourveryrelationsofdependenceareshapedbyglobalandlocalpatternsofpower,suchas
normsofgenderandrace,economicforces,andpoliticalforces.Becausethecaringhumanrights
Engsterdevelopsarebuiltuponhisrationaltheoryofobligation,whichinturnisbaseduponan
uncriticalviewofdependence,Iarguethathiscaringhumanrightswouldonlyservetoperpetuate
theharmsofdifference,exclusion,gender,andviolence.Thesecondproblemisthatheclaimsin
ordertohavewideacceptabilityandbroaduptakeofhistheory,hemustmakehisrightsminimally
feminist,i.e.notincorporatestrongclaimsforwomen’sequalstatusorpoliticalparticipation.Not
onlyisthisdisingenuoustothehistoryofcareethics,butIarguethatbynotpushingforstronger
feministcommitmentshiscaringhumanrightswouldstillleaveroomforwomentobestrongly
linkedtocare.Thismeansthatcareandwomenwouldbothremaindevalued,andthatwomen
wouldcontinuetobeexcludedfrompower.Further,Iarguethattakentogether,theseproblems
makeitveryunlikelythatcaringhumanrightscouldaddressthecomplicatedcontextofthe
transnationalmigrantcareworker,anditsdarkeraspect,humantrafficking.Withouttheabilityto
seehowglobalandlocalpatternsofpowerimpactpeople’sdependencerelations,andwithoutthe
42
Notthatweshouldavoidreimagininghumanrightsfromdifferentperspectives.JenniferNedelsky’swork
onrelationalrightsprovidesanexcellentexampleofthisverygoal,thoughherworkismorefocusedonthe
legalaspectsofrightsnotnecessarilythemoralaspect.Myconcernhere,however,isspecificallyaboutthe
‘ground-level’politicalandmoralrealtyofpeople’slivesastheylivethem,embeddedinrelationsthatare
shapedbyinstitutions,publicpolicy,andsocio-culturalnorms.Thepointhere,then,isthatEngster’sattempt
wasproblematicbecauseofthekindofcaretheoryheproduced,notnecessarilytheoutcomeforhuman
rights.
43
DanielEngster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),
162.
44
Ibid.,171.
17
genderanalysisofastrongfeministtheory,wecannotfullyengagewiththeunderlyingcausesof
transnationalmigrationortrafficking,andthereforecannotbegintofindlastingsolutions.Insum,I
arguethatthisattempttocombinecareethicsandhumanrights,becauseitremovesvitalpartsof
careethics,isa‘non-starter.’Doingsodoesnot‘solve’theproblemofthepracticalapplicationof
careethics,butinsteadallowsthesameproblemsfoundinhumanrightsdiscoursestocontinue
unchallenged.
InChapterFive,Iargue,indirectanswertoEngster’soriginalcritique,thatthecriticalethics
ofcarecan,infact,beusedasaguideforthepublicpolicyprocess.Thischapterutilizesthepolicy
stagestheoryinordertobreakdowntheprocessofpolicymakingintomoreintelligiblesteps,
althoughIacknowledgethecomplexandoftencyclicalnatureofpolicymaking.Withthepolicy
stagesasa‘roadmap’forthepolicyprocess,Ishowhowalthoughhumanrightsdiscoursesoffer
somebenefitstothepolicyprocess,theethicsofcarecanalsobeusedateachstageofthepolicy
processtouncovertherootcausesofsocialproblems,offerdifferentkindsofsolutions,guidepolicy
decision-makersandpolicyimplementation,aswellassuggestdifferentstandardsforthesuccessor
failureofapolicy.ThroughoutthechapterIfocusonrealpolicy,realcasestudies,andreal
outcomesinordertodemonstratetheproblemsthatarisewhenweassumethathumanrightsalone
canprovideafullandcompletesetofsolutionstothecomplexmoralcontextsthatexistinthereal
world.Whatisnecessary,Iargue,isamoreflexiblemoralguidethatplacesanemphasisonthe
contextualnatureofanyproblem,andtheimportanceofunderstandinghowpolicyaffectsthelives
ofrealpersons.Iarguethatthedifferentperspectiveaffordedbythelensofcareisanimportant
additiontoourpolicyprocesses,locallyandglobally,andthatthroughpolicywecanachievesomeof
thetransformativepotentialofcritical,feministcareethics.Themajorshiftwouldbebringinginto
focushowpolicycanshapeourcaringrelations.Wewouldbeabletobegincraftingpolicythat
enablesustofulfilourcaringresponsibilities,toourselvesandothers,where‘productive’workfits
intoourlivesascarers,ratherthancareworkfittingintoourlivesas‘productive’citizens.45
Thefinalchapterofthisthesisaddressesonelastcritiqueoftheethicsofcare,which
challengesitstransformativepotential,andtheassumedabilityofcareethicstoenablemoral
judgmentinparticularcontextsfromtheuniversalperspectiveofcare.AsKimberlyHutchingspoints
out,itisthemethodologyofcareethicsthatissuspect,becauseitissimilartofeministstandpoint
theory.Theproblemwithfeministstandpointtheory,andthuswiththeethicsofcare,isthree-fold.
First,bothhaveauniversalizingaspect(thatofcareorwomen’sexperiences)thatsitsuneasilywith
theunderstandingthatallknowledge,especiallyethicalknowledge,issituatedandcontextual.
45
FionaWilliams,"AGoodEnoughLife:DevelopingaPoliticalEthicofCare,"Soundings,no.30(2005):29.
18
Second,whileboththeoriesassumethatdominantdiscoursesareill-suitedtohandlesomemoral
contexts,suchastheabilityofhumanrightsto‘see’issuesofcare,neithertheoryexplicitly
incorporatestheunderstandingthatthey,too,havelimitsinscopeandapplicability.Third,the
standpointforeachtheorygroundsalargermoralandpoliticalproject,whichrestsonthe
problematicuniversalizingaspectofthetheory.Essentially,theclaimisthattheethicsofcaredoes
notgofarenoughinrejectinguniversalistfoundations,norcanitfullyaddressembeddedgender
biases.46Thegoal,claimsHutchings,shouldbetomarkoutafeministethicalmethodthatentirely
eschewsanyuniversalclaims,andinsteadfocusesonthespecificfeministconcernsthatshe
elaborates,whichismeanttoleadtoamorematerialkindoftransformationoftheglobalmoral
politicallandscape.47Itisnotthattheworldwillmerelybe‘morejust’,butratherthatsomekindsof
harms,suchasthemassrapesoftheBosnianwar,wouldbeunabletobeconceivedofinthefirst
place,i.e.rapeisnolongeranabhorrent,thoughgrimlyexpected,partofwarfare.
WhileIconcedethattheethicsofcareandstandpointtheoryhavesimilarmethodologies,I
rejectHutchings’conclusions.First,Iarguethatthetransformativepotentialofcareethicsisrooted
notinitsabilitytorendercertainmoralcontextsunthinkable,butratherinitsabilitytoengagewith
themoralcontextswefacetodayandtoviewtheminadifferentway,workingtounderstandtheir
underlyingcausesandimaginedifferentkindsofsolutionsfromtheperspectiveofcare.48Even
thoughisnotthekindoftransformationthatHutchingsendorses,doesnotmeanitisnot
transformationatall.Rather,itistransformationthatworksthroughexistingwebsofrelationsin
ordertoreshapethem.Second,IusetheworkofSeylaBenhabibtosupportmyclaimthatcare
ethicscanunderwritemoraljudgmentsfromtheuniversalstandpointofcare.49Inshort,the
argumentisthatbecausecareisapartofeveryhumanlife,itcanserveasashared‘touchstone’
betweenpersonsengagedindialogue,allowingpeoplefromdifferentcontextstohaveashared
pointofcommonalitythatcantranscendtheirdifferences.50However,wemustalsobehonest
aboutourowncontexts,andhowourparticularcircumstancescancolourourjudgments.By
acceptingthevulnerabilityofjudgmenttheethicsofcareisabletotakeonboardthecritique
elaboratedbyHutchings,andhasgainedamorenuancedmethodofethicaljudgment.Intheend,I
concludethattheethicsofcareretainsitstransformativepotentialandabilitytomakeethical
46
KimberlyHutchings,"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"ReviewofInternationalStudies26,no.05
(2000):119.
47
Ibid.,113.
48
FionaRobinson,"CareEthics,PoliticalTheory,andtheFutureofFeminism,"inCareEthicsandPolitical
Theory,ed.DanielEngsterandMauriceHamington(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015),307.
49
AlthoughthecontentofBenhabib’sworkspecificallydealswithArendt’sinterpretationofKant,the
methodologyofherargumentisonethatcanalsobeappliedtotheethicsofcare.
50
SeylaBenhabib,SituatingtheSelf:Gender,CommunityandPostmodernisminContemporaryEthics
(Cambridge:PolityPress,1992),124.
19
judgments.Itisafeministtheorythatiswellsuitedtotoday’smoralandpoliticalinternational
landscape,onethatcanbeutilizedrightnowinordertobegintransformingtheworldfromits
currentstateintoaworldthatenablesbeneficialcaringrelationsinsteadofperpetuatingharmful
ones.
20
Chapter One: A Conceptual History of Care Ethics
Thehistoryoftheethicsofcareinphilosophyisrelativelyshort,emerginginthelate1970sandearly
1980s,butsincethattimeithasgrownfromitsrootsinmoralpsychologyintoaglobalpoliticalethic.
Inthischapter,myprimarygoalistoprovideameasureofcontextforthegenesisofcareethicsand
traceitsevolutionintoapoliticalethicaltheory.Careethicsbeganbyquestioningtheprimacyof
deontologicalethicaltheoriesandtheearlystrainsofcaretheorychampionedawholesalerejection
ofKantian,neo-Kantian,andrightsbasedethicaltheories.1Idonotsubscribetosuchversionsof
careethics.Instead,Irejecttheprimacyofdeontologicalethicsandhumanrightsapproachesinthe
globalpoliticalandmoralarena.Thehistoryofcareethicsprovidesreasonsforthisrejectionand
thefurtherclaimthattheethicsofcareilluminatesmoralandpoliticalproblemsthatKantianethics
andhumanrightsapproachesareeitherunabletoencompassortofullyexplain.Usingthelensof
careethicsmakesvisibleparticularmoralandpoliticalsituations(relationships,carework,
dependence,exclusion,gender,race,andclass)inadifferentway—awaythatprovidesnew
information,motivations,andsolutions.IdevelopthisideamorefullyinChaptersTwoandThree,
andinthischapterIfocusmoreonthehistoricalandconceptualcontextthatlaidthefoundations
foraglobalethicofcare.
Ibeginwiththeearly‘orthodox’careethics,exemplifiedbytheearlyworkofCarolGilligan
andNelNoddings.ThenIwillexplorehowphilosophersJoanTronto,EvaFederKittay,andVirginia
Helddevelopedtheethicsofcareintoapoliticaltheoryinresponsetothethreemajorcritiquesof
earlycaretheory.AsItracethehistoryofcareethicsinthischapter,Iwillhighlightkeyfeaturesof
thetheory.InparticularIfocusonthemoralsituations(orcontexts)illuminatedbythelensofcare
asthetheorycontinuedtogrowfromitsrootsintoaviablepoliticalethic.Astheethicsofcare
continuedtogrowandexpandinscope,thetheorybegantoencompassnotjustnormsaboutcare
itself,relationships,andgender,butalsonormsaboutrace,class,sexualorientation,dependence,
exclusion,andevenviolence.Thisexpansioncontinuedastheethicsofcarebecameglobalized,
whichisaddressedinChapterTwo.Lastly,Iwillbrieflyoutlinethecodifiedsetofcaringpractices
thatJoanTrontodevelopedandthatothercaretheorists,suchasFionaRobinsonandOlena
Hankivsky,havecontinuedtoutilize.ElaboratingTronto’scaringpracticessetsthestagefor
1
However,thisquestioningdoesnotnecessarilyleadtoacompleterejectionoftheimportanceorthe
usefulnessofKantianethicaltheoriesorofhumanrightsdiscourses.AsdiscussedinChapterThree,human
rightsdiscoursesofferwaystoidentifyandaddressglobalmoralproblems,however,asIarguethroughout
thisthesis,humanrightsalonearenotenoughtofullyaddressallthecomplexglobalmoralproblemsthatexist
intheworldtoday.
21
demonstratinghowtheglobalcriticalethicofcarediffersfromearlierpoliticalconceptionsofcare
theory.
Section 1 – The Genesis of the Ethics of Care
In1982,CarolGilliganpublishedInaDifferentVoice,aworkonpsychologicalmoraldevelopment
thathadprofoundimplicationsforhowmoralconcernsmightvaryalonggenderlines.Noddings’
bookCaring(1984)continuedinmuchthesameveinasGilligan’swork,contrastingwhatshetermed
amale-moralitywithafemale-morality.Bothsuggestedthatmenandwomenhaddifferent
methodsofmoralreasoning,andthatthe‘male’moralityandthe‘female’moralitycouldnotbe
substitutedforoneanother.Noddingsstatesthatuntilthetheorizationofthisnewmorality
emerged,“ethicshasbeendiscussedlargelyinthelanguageofthefather:inprinciplesand
propositions,intermssuchasjustification,fairness,andjustice.Themother’svoicehasbeen
silent.”2Theclaimisthattheuniqueexperiencesandperspectivesofwomenhadbeenabsentfrom
moralreasoning,eitherthroughinattentionoractivelysilencingdissentingviewpoints.Whatcare
ethicsbegantoelaboratewasanalternativemoralepistemology,a“differentwayofidentifyingand
appreciatingtheformsofintelligencewhichdefineresponsiblemoralconsideration.”3Careethics
wasbaseduponauniquestandpoint,afeministstandpointthatviewedthemoralworlddifferently
fromtraditionalethicaltheories.4Thisnewsourceofmoralknowledgewasimportantbecauseit
challengedthesupposed‘gender-blindness’oftraditionalmoralities,uncoveringamalebias,which
inturnmeantthatwomen’sexperiencesandsubsequentmoralcontentremainedintheprivate
realm.5Further,GilliganandNoddingsbothclaimthatwomen’sexperiencesopenedupanewway
oflookingattheworld,arelationalontologywhereallpersonsareunderstoodasexistinginthe
contextoftheirrelationswithparticularothers.Theydidnotclaimthatonlywomenviewedthe
worldthisway,butthatwomenweremorelikelyto,andthatthisrelationalperspectiveprovidesa
moreaccuratepictureofhumanlife.
Thephilosophicaltheoryofcareethicshasrootsinmoralpsychologyandthepsychological
studiesofNancyChodorowandCarolGilligan.Chodorow’sworkinthe1970schallengedthethencurrentmasculinebiasofpsychoanalytictheoryandexploredthepsychologyofgenderidentity
formation.Thisworkfocusedonhowgenderidentityformationimpactedthewayinwhichmen
2
Noddings,1.
MargaretUrbanWalker,"MoralUnderstandings:Alternative"Epistemology"foraFeministEthics,"Hypatia4,
no.2(1989):16.
4
Thereistensionbetweenthesituatedstandpointofcareethicsandtheuniversalclaimofcare,andthat
tensionwillbeaddressedinChapterSix.
5
Held,"FeministTransformationsofMoralTheory,"327.
3
22
andwomenengageinrelationships,particularlyrelationshipsofdependence.6Gilligan,awareof
Chodorow’swork,andfrustratedwiththeapparentmale-centricbiasintheworkofpsychologist
LawrenceKohlberg,withwhomshehadworked,undertookareviewofKohlberg’sstudy.Shealso
organizedherowninterviewswithfemalesubjectstodemonstratethatwomen,onaverage,tended
touseadifferentkindofmoralreasoningthanmen.Kohlbergoriginallyperformedaseriesof
interview-basedexperimentstoexplorethemoraldevelopmentofgirlsandboysastheygrewinto
adulthood.However,Kohlberg’ssix-stage7hierarchyofmoraldevelopmentwasbasedonhisstudy
ofeighty-fourboysoveratwenty-yearperiod,8thusembeddingamalebiasinhismethodology.
Kohlbergclaimedthathissixstageswereuniversal,buthisstudyproducedtheoutcomethat
womenwere,ingeneral,judgedtobemorallydeficientwhencomparedwithmen;thatiswomen
consistentlyarrestedinthethirdstagewhereasmenwereoftenableto‘progress’tolaterstages,
whererelationshipstooksecondplacetoabstractrules.9Themajorityofwomenseemedtobe
stuckintheconcrete,relationalstage,withfewdevelopingtothesixthandhigheststageofthe
Kantianandabstractstageofmoraldevelopment.
GilliganidentifiedtwomajorproblemswithKohlberg’sresults.First,thathisresultswere
heavilybiasedtowardsapre-conceivedideaofwhattheso-called‘highestandbest’levelofmoral
developmentmightbe,thatis,amoralityfocusedonrightsandnon-interference,aneo-Kantian
modelofethics.10Second,theresultsseemedtoreinforcetheideathatwomenwerenotasgoodat
moralreasoningasmen.ThefirstproblemwasaresultofthewayinwhichKohlbergestablishedhis
baselineformoraldevelopment.Todeterminehissixstages,Kohlberginitiallyonlyinterviewed
boysandmen.Gilligan,bycontrast,foundinherownsetofinterviewsthatwhenwomenarethe
baselinefordeterminingwhatmoraldevelopmentis,moralproblemsarisefromcompeting
responsibilities,notcompetingrights.11ThewayinwhichKohlbergresearchedthestagesofmoral
developmentwasalreadyskewedtopresentmenasbeingmoremorallydeveloped,because
Kohlberg’sresearchcountedtheexperiencesofmenasthoughtheywere‘universal’.Thisbiased
baselineproducedthesecondproblemthatGilliganidentified.Ratherthanaskwhythedata
6
OwenFlanaganandKathrynJackson,"Justice,Care,andGender:TheKohlberg-GilliganDebateRevisited,"
Ethics97,no.3(1987):629.
7
Thesixstagesaregroupedintothreepairedsets.ThefirstsetisPre-conventionalmorality,whichcontains
stagesoneandtwo,stageoneisconcernedwithavoidingpunishment,andstagetwoisconcernedwithselfinterest.ThesecondsetisConventionalmorality,containingstagesthreeandfour,wherestagethreeis
concernedwithinterpersonalaccordandconformity,andstagefourisconcernedwithauthorityandsocial
order.ThethirdsetisPost-conventionalmorality,containingstagesfiveandsix,stagefivebeingsocial
contractmorality,andstagesixbeingmoralitybasedonuniversalethicalprinciples.
8
Gilligan,18.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.,22.
11
Ibid.,19.
23
seemedtoshowwomenas‘lessmorallydeveloped’thanmen,andthusinvestigateifthescaleof
moraldevelopmentbasedonlyonmenwasproblematic,Kohlberginitiallyseemstoaccepthis
resultsasafactofmoralpsychology.
Gilliganrejectstheprimacyofmale-centrictheories,andinparticularsherejectstheidea
thatKantianethicsshouldholdprideofplaceamongethicaltheoriesasthe‘end’ofmoral
development.Thisworkinthefieldofpsychologywasparalleledbyfeministphilosophers,
particularlySaraRuddickandNelNoddings.SaraRuddickadvocatedanunderstandingofcare
throughtheprocessofmothering.Thoughshedidnotclaimthatonlywomenweremothers,she
didputtheconceptsofmotherhoodandbirthattheforefrontofherethicalreasoning.VirginiaHeld
notedthatuntil1980andRuddick’sarticleMaternalThinking,“thepracticeofmotheringhadbeen
virtuallyabsentfromallnonfeministmoraltheorizing,therewasnophilosophicalacknowledgment
thatmothersthinkorreason,orthatonecanfindmoralvaluesinthispractice.”12Thepointfor
Ruddickwastwo-fold,firstthattheuniqueexperiencesofwomen,especiallytheactivitiesof
motheringandcaregiving,hadpreviouslybeenignoredinmoralphilosophyandsecond,that
throughaphilosophicalinquiryintomotheringandcaregiving,onecouldfinddifferentkindsof
answerstomoralproblems.13Otherphilosophers,suchasNelNoddings,identifiedanadditional
problemwithmainstreamethicaltheories14asignoringthesphereofprivaterelationships,thatis,
issuesoffamilyandfriends,andhowtonegotiateconflictsbetweenandamongtheseprivate
relationships.Thisrejectionwascoupledwiththeinsightthat“[m]anypersonswholivemorallives
donotapproachmoralproblemsformally.Women,inparticular,seemtoapproachmoralproblems
byplacingthemselvesasnearlyaspossibleinconcretesituationsandassumingpersonal
responsibilityforthechoicestobemade.”15ForNoddings,theethicsofcareisheavilygroundedin
concretesituations,asthatwaswherewomen’sexperienceslay,incontrasttothe“traditional
logicalapproachtoethicalproblemsthatarisesmoreobviouslyfrommasculineexperiences.”16Like
Gilligan,Noddingsworkedtodemonstratethatpreviousethicaltheorieswere,perhaps
unintentionally,biasedtowardsamoremasculineexperience,whichfocusedondutiesand
obligations.This,inturn,wouldmeanthatforawomantocountasorbeconsideredasamoral
actor,shemustadoptthemasculineframeworkandleavebehindthefeminineandtheethical
concernsthatfelloutsidethescopeofdutiesandobligations.17
12
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,26.Emphasisintheoriginal
SeeSaraRuddick,MaternalThinking,(1989).
14
Kantianethics,utilitarianism,andtoalesserextent,virtueethics.
15
Noddings,8.
16
Ibid.
17
AnnetteCBaier,"WhatDoWomenWantinaMoralTheory?,"Nous19,no.1(1985):56.
13
24
TherejectionoftheprimacyofKantianethicsforearlycaretheoristsrequiredthecreation
ofanewkindofethicaltheory.Althoughearlycareethicsfacedheavycritiqueandcriticism,itwasa
turningpointinfeministethicsbecauseitdemonstratedafirmshiftawayfromfeministreadingsor
critiquesofKantianorutilitarianethicsandthedevelopmentofapurelyfeministethic.18Forboth
GilliganandNoddings,thefirstsalientpointofdifferencebetweencareethicsandKantianethics
regardedtheontologicalviewofpersonsandself-identity.Theethicsofcarerequiresthe
understandingofpersonstooccurwithinwebsofrelationshipswithparticularothersinsteadofa
focusontheindividualasadiscreteagent,whocanbethoughtofinabsentiafromtheirparticular
relationshipswithconcreteothers.Gilliganclaimsthisisanintegralpartofhowwomenreason
morally,andthatrelationshipsthemselvesaredeeplyconstitutiveofanyindividual’sself-identityor
personhood.Inherworkshefoundwhatshebelievedwasadeepdifferenceinthewaymenand
womenmightconstructtheirmoralidentities.19Men’sself-identityismeasuredagainstabstract
idealsofperfection,whereaswomen’sself-identityisassessedthroughparticularactivitiesofcare,20
whichunderscoreasocialdimensionoftheiridentity.Gilliganclaimsthatthisisborneoutbyhow
menandwomenunderstandrelationships,wheremenfocusonahierarchy,whichexpresses“the
wishtobealoneatthetopandtheconsequentfearthatotherswillgettooclose.”21Conversely,
womenviewthemselvesasbeinginawebofrelationships,wherethereis“thewishtobeatthe
centreofconnectionandtheconsequentfearofbeingtoofaroutontheedge.”22Thecontrast
betweentheconceptualrelationshipmodelsofthehierarchyandtheweb,forGilligan,
demonstratesthedifferenceinhowmenandwomenthinkaboutthemselvesasmoralagentsand
subsequentlyreasonmorally.23Becausewomenappearedtoreasonfromthisrelationalstandpoint,
thismeansthatfeelingsofempathyandsympathyarenolongerseenasmoraldeficiencies,butare
instead“essentialcomponentsofadultmoralreasoningatthepostconventionalstage”andthus
“women’sapparentmoralconfusionofjudgmentbecomesasignoftheirstrength.”24Thedeep
concernsoftheselfasamoralagentimpactshowtheagentapproachesandsolvesmoralproblems,
18
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,23.
Interestingly,MarilynFriedmanarguesthatwhatGilliganuncoveredwasnotthe‘differentvoice’ofwomen
assuch,butratherthatshe“discernedthesymbolicallyfemalemoralvoice,andhasdisentangleditfromthe
symbolicallymalemoralvoice.”(1995,65,Emphasisintheoriginal).TheideaisthatthemoralvoiceGilligan
uncoveredis,tosomedegree,isamoraldichotomythatsheexpectedtoexist.Friedman,however,doesnot
takethistomeanthatcareethicsiswithoutmerit,ratherthatthiskindofexpectationpointstoconceptionsof
justiceandcarethataredisassociatedfromeachother.Whatmustbedoneisrethinkbothconceptsinorder
toobtainabetterpictureofourmoralreasoning.
20
Baier,"WhatDoWomenWantinaMoralTheory?,"62.
21
Gilligan,62.
22
Ibid.
23
Theimageryofthewebisusedincontrasttoahierarchy,suchthatinaweb,therearedifferentpointsof
lateralconnection,asopposedtoaverticalstratificationofrelations.
24
Benhabib,149.
19
25
andforcareethicsisfirmlyconnectedtotheemotionalconnectiontotheconcreteother.Thus:
“Sincerelationships,whencastintheimageofhierarchy,appearinherentlyunstableandmorally
problematic,theirtranspositionintotheimageofawebchangesanorderofinequalityintoa
structureofinterconnection.”25
Women’sidentity,asconstructedwithinawebofrelationships,groundsaunique,nonrightsbasedapproachtomoralproblems.Thisconceptionofidentityasconstitutedinrelationship
istherelationalontology,orthe‘relationalturn,’thatisafundamentalpartofcareethics.Noddings
alsounderscorestheimportanceofthisrelationalontologybecauseallcareworkisdonewiththe
understandingthat“[t]heethicalselfisanactiverelationbetweenmyactualselfandavisionofmy
idealselfasone-caringandcared-for.Itisbornofthefundamentalrecognitionofrelatedness;that
whichconnectsmenaturallytotheother,reconnectsmethroughtheothertomyself.”26Wefirst
understandourselvesinrelationtoothers,andcaretheoryassertsthatthisistheonlywayto
understandtheself.Thenwerealizethatwearein,whatNoddingscalls,concentriccirclesofcare:
family,friends,acquaintances,andfinally,distantstrangers.Wemustbepreparedtocareforallof
them,thoughinrelationtostrangersshenotesthatwhilewemightnotbeboundtocareforthem
inaverydirectandlastingway,one“canremainreceptive”27tothecaringneedsofdistantothers
withoutbeingtightlyobligatedtothem.Intheearlyethicsofcare,thefocuswasprimarilyonhow
onecaresforone’s‘nearestanddearest,’becauseemotionalcaringovervastdistanceswouldprove
difficultorevenimpossible.Thisfocusontheemotionalaspectisanobstacletoglobalizingatheory
basedaroundthepracticesofcareandhowthisobstacleisovercomeisexplainedinChapterTwo.
Regardless,theimportanceofrelationshipscannotbeunderstatedbecausethe“selfandotherare
interdependentandthatlife,howevervaluableinitself,canonlybesustainedbycarein
relationships.”28Relationshipsbetweenpeoplearewhatfostercareinthefirstplace,andalsoallow
ustounderstandhumanlifeasinherentlyinterdependent.Thisisinstarkcontrasttothetraditional
moralviewofallpersonsasautonomousindividuals,wheretraditionalunderstandingsofautonomy
oftencontrastsharplywiththeconcernsofnurturanceorbonding(i.e.care).Thisdichotomyserves
toreinforcethatautonomyisnecessaryforpolitical,publiclife,whereascareworkisbestleftinthe
privaterealmofhomeandfamily.Traditionalmoralitiestendtoentrenchthisunderstanding,and
converselytheethicsofcareservestohighlighthowtraditionalmoralitiesunnecessarilyrestrictthe
scopeofmoralreasoning.29
25
Gilligan,62.
Noddings,49.
27
Ibid.,47.
28
Gilligan,127.
29
Benhabib,158-9.
26
26
Becauseoftherelationalontology,responsibilityisunderstooddifferentlythroughthe
ethicsofcare.Gilligannoted,“Developmentforbothsexeswouldthereforeseemtoentailan
integrationofrightsandresponsibilitiesthroughthediscoveryofthecomplementarityofthese
disparateviews.”30Thismeansthatwomenunderstandthat“rightsandresponsibilities[take]place
throughanunderstandingofthepsychologicallogicofrelationships.”31Moralreasoningforearly
careethicswasnotaboutrights,buttheneedtobalancethecompetingresponsibilitiesthatpeople
hadinvirtueofbeinginrelationshipswithparticularothers.Thefullyrealizedmoralagentwould
thenbeonewhocouldnegotiatebetweentheconflictingrelationshipsinvolvedwhilerespectingthe
rightsofothers;theycouldcareandbefairatthesametime.Gilligan’ssubsequentwork,basedon
interviewswithwomenwhoaregoingtohaveorhavehadanabortion,underscoresthisconception
ofresponsibility,because“womenimposeadistinctiveconstructiononmoralproblems,seeing
moraldilemmasintermsofconflictingresponsibilities.”32Noddingsalsoinvestigateswhatitmeans
tobalanceresponsibilitiesofcare.Shearguesthatthroughtheethicsofcareourobligationsare
self-limiting.Inthiscontext,‘self-limiting’meansthatourobligationstocarebecomelessbindingas
theyarefurtherfromtheimmediatesphereofourconcern,becausethosewhoareclosesttous
havethegreaterclaimonourcareduetoemotionalcommitmentandawillingnesstobecome
engrossedwitheachother’sneeds.However,asNoddingsstressed“Weareneverfree,inthe
humandomain,toabandonourpreparednesstocare.”33
Noddingsalsomoreexplicitlyinvestigatesthewaysinwhichemotionalattachmentto
particularotherscanandshouldplayaroleinmoralreasoning.Shenotes,“Feelingisnotallthatis
involvedincaring,butitisessentiallyinvolved.”34Concernsoflove,joy,evenfrustrationandanger
areimportantintheethicsofcare.Emotionsmustbeaccountedforandbroughttotheforefor
considerationandanalysis.Ifonedeniesemotionsaplaceinmoralreasoning,onedownplaysan
integralpartofthehumanexperience.Inpart,webecomeengrossed,35thatis,invested,becauseof
emotions,eventhough“thisengrossmentisnotcompletelycharacterizedasemotionalfeeling.”36It
isthiscombinationofemotion,investment,andmotivationthatformsthebasisofwhatitistocare
andperformmorallygoodcare.Importantly,Noddingsdoesnotsaythatallcareisgoodcare,or
thatallcareisdoneinamorallygoodmanner.Sheacknowledgesthatcaringcangowrong.Itis
possiblethatthecared-forpersoncanbecomeanobjectofcaring,orthatone’sworriesaboutcaring
30
Gilligan,100.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.,105.
33
Noddings,86.
34
Ibid.,32.Emphasisintheoriginal.
35
‘Engrossment’forNoddingsisatechnicalterm,suchthatone’smotivationalenergiesaredirectedtowarda
particularotherinwhomoneisinvested.
36
Noddings,33.Emphasisintheoriginal.
31
27
canshiftinward,focusedontheselfandtheburdenscaringplacesonthecaregiver.37Insteadof
deemingallcaringmorallygood,theethicsofcareseekstofindawaytomorallyevaluateclose,
caringrelationships.
Thesepsychologicalandphilosophicalinvestigationsintothedistinctivemoralexperiences
ofwomen,alongwiththeethicalexplorationoftheworkofcare,resultedinamajorshiftinhow
moralreasoningisunderstood.Startingwitharejectionof‘masculine’theories,38particularly
Kantianethicsanditsfocusontheindividual,theethicsofcareemphasizedtherelationalityand
interdependenceofpersons.Intheearlyethicsofcare,careworkitselfwasseenasasourceof
informationabouthowpeoplereasonmorallyintheeveryday,particularlywithregardtothe
experiencesofwomen.Becausewomenwere(andare)themainprovidersofcaretoothers,itwas
theirexperiencesthatprovidedthemostinformationabouthowanethicsofcarefunctions.It
underscoresthatattentiontoparticularpersons,ratherthangeneralized,abstractpersons,entailsa
differentepistemologicalstandpoint,whichrequiresadistinctivekindofunderstandingaboutthe
world.39Partofthisunderstandingistherelationalontologyofcareethics,whichstressestheselfas
constructedinthecontextofrelationshipswithothers,andthemoralquestionsthatareembedded
withinthoserelations.40
Fromthesebeginnings,manyotherwomenfoundtheideaofcareethicstoresonatemore
stronglywiththeirownexperiencesandhavegreaterimpactupontheirdailyliveswhencompared
withtraditionalethicaltheories.However,theethicofcarefacedsharpcriticism,notonlyfrom
Kantianandutilitarianethicalandpoliticalphilosophers,butfromfeministphilosophersaswell.In
thenextsectionIexaminethreeprimarycritiquesofearlycareethics.Iclaimthatbecausecare
ethicswasforcedtoanswerthesethreecritiques,careethicswasthenabletodevelopintoaviable,
fully-fledgedpoliticalethic,withcodifiedpracticesofcaretoprovidegreaterstructuretothetheory.
Whiletheearly,‘orthodox’caretheorybegantheinvestigation,thedevelopmentofapoliticalethic
ofcarelaidthefoundationforaglobalcriticalethicofcare.
37
Ibid.,12-3.
‘Masculine’theoriesbeingthosetheoriesjudgedtohaveabuilt-inmasculinebias,wheretheexperiencesof
menareconsidereduniversallyapplicable,andcanstandinor‘count’fortheexperiencesofwomen.
39
Walker,17.
40
Itisbeyondmyscopetofullyunpackthesubtleconnectionsbetweenepistemologyandontology.Formore
onthispoint,particularlywithreferencetocareethicsandotherrelationaltheories,seeMargaretUrban
Walker(1989).
38
28
Section 2 – The Development of a Political Ethic of Care
Theethicsofcareoffersmorethanadifferentmorality,butalsoadifferentgroundingforpolitical
philosophy.JoanTrontoarguedthatanethicofcarecouldonlybeworkableifpoliticalinstitutions
themselvesarefirstcriticallyassessedbyastandardofcare.41Thisstep,craftingtheethicofcare
intoapoliticaltheory,wasvitalfornotonlyaddressingthemajorobjectionstotheethicofcare,but
alsoforprovidingthegroundworkforaglobalcriticalethicofcare,whichisfurtherexploredin
ChapterTwo.42Inthissection,Iwillfirstbrieflyintroducethethreemajorcritiquesofearlycare
ethics.43ThenIwilldemonstratethatbyansweringthesecritiques,theethicofcarewasableto
developintoapoliticalethic,becausecarephilosophersarguedthatthelensofcarecouldilluminate
previouslyobscuredor‘unseen’problemsofprivate,publicandpoliticalpractices.AsItracethis
development,Iwillalsohighlighthowthescopeofthelensofcarecametoincludedifferenceand
dependenceasareasofmoralandpoliticalinvestigation.
Section 2.1 – Three Major Critiques of Early Care Ethics
Thefirstcritiqueoftheethicofcareisthatitcanonlybeaprivateethic,orevenworse,thatit
actuallyservestoreinforcethesplitbetweenthepublicandtheprivate.44Theassumptionisthat
the‘orthodox’ethicofcarecouldnotbeappliedtoapubliccontextbecausewhatitisconcerned
withisprivate,interpersonalconcerns,andassuchithasnopurchaseinpoliticalreasoning.To
understandthiscritique,itisimportanttodefinethisparticularterminology,namely,theprivate,
thepublic,andthepolitical.First,Iconsidertheprivateastherelationshipswehaveinourdaily
liveswithparticularothers,friendsandfamilyaremostcommon.Thepubliciscommonly
everythingoutsidethatprivatesphereofone’sownlife.Thepublichasmultipleparts,acivilsociety,
themarketplace,andapoliticalrealm.Civilsocietyincludesstrangersonatrainorinaparkwho
inhabitapublicrealmtogether,whereasthemarketplaceisamoreparticularsubsetofthepublic,
whichincludestheworkplace.Thepublicalsoincludesthepoliticalrealm,whichcanbeunderstood
asthestateandthepowerthestatehaswithregardtoitscitizens,andalsowhatthestatemight
oweitscitizens.Therefore,itismoreprecisetospeakoftheprivate,thecivil,themarketplace,and
41
Tronto,157.
ThroughoutthisthesisIusetheterms‘globalethicofcare’,‘criticalethicofcare’,‘feministethicofcare’,
and‘critical,feministcareethics’interchangeably,andfromthispointforwardIconsider‘careethics’to
denotethefeministcriticalethicofcare.The‘orthodox’ethicsofcarewillhereafteralwaysbereferredtoas
such.
43
Thesearenottheonlycritiquesofcareethics,butthreeofthemajorones.Gilligan’sworkinparticular
facedheavycriticism.Someofthosecritiquesare:1)thatinspiteofherrejectionofhierarchy,sheherself
createdanothermoralhierarchy;and2)shehadanoverlyindividualistoutlookonresponsibility,andshe
embeddedracialandclassbiasbyonlyinterviewingwhite,middleclasswomeninherabortionstudy.See
KathleenLeague(1993)forthefullargument.
44
Dietz,25.
42
29
thepolitical,eachmarkingadifferentsetofrelationships.Consideringtheethicofcarebeganby
arguing“thatinthesphereofinterpersonalrelations,itisdesirablethatanagentbeswayedinher
thinkingbyherpartiality,herparticularfeelingsofcareandconcern,towardtheother,”45itis
evidentwhythisobjectiontookroot.Anethicbasedonparticularbondsofaffectioncanremain
parochialandsuitableonlytotheprivaterealm,andthereforecannotfunctionwhenthereareno
bondsofaffectionpresentorpossible.Thebasicassumptionaboutthepublicandpoliticalrealmsis
thatmoralitiesintheserealmsrequireanabstractsetofrulesallpersonscouldbeexpectedto
adhereto,withoutneedingtorelyonkindnesstoaddresspublicmoralproblems.46Forthisreason,
itwaslongthoughtthatKantianorutilitariantheoriesweremoreaptforthepublicandpolitical
realmsthananythingbuiltonsentimentornotionsofcare.47
Thesecondmajorcritiqueoftheethicofcarecomesfromthebeliefthatthetheorycannot
addresstheproblemsofjustice,andconverselythatjusticecannotalwaysanswertheproblemsof
care.AnethicofjusticemightbeunderstoodastheexpressionofKantianorutilitarianethicsasa
rights-basedsystem,concernedwithissuesoffairnessandequaltreatmentbythestate,whichwas
partofthedominantmoralandpoliticallandscapeofthe20thandearly21stcenturies.Rights
discourseshavebeeninstrumentalinimprovingthelivesofwomenandotheroppressed
populationsthroughoutrecenthistory.Fromthewomen’ssuffragemovement,tocivilrights,gay
rights,minorityrights,andrightsofthedisabled,theethicsofjustice—basedeitherinKantianor
utilitarianethics—hasbeenmobilizedinthebidtoreducetheinequalityandoppressionintheworld.
Rightslanguagehasbeen,andcontinuestobe,verypowerful.48Early,‘orthodox’careethics,onthe
otherhand,wasunderstoodasprimarilyfocusedonsmall,privatemoralconcerns,abouthowto
balancecompetingresponsibilitieswithparticularothers.Careandjusticewereseentobe
concernedwithdifferentspheresoflife,andassuchcaretheoryhadnopurchaseonquestionsof
justiceandthereversewasalsotrue:ananalysisofjusticecouldnotbeappliedtotherealmofcare.
Forexample,howcouldcarehaveaplaceinacourtroomoralegislativebody?Itcouldnotspeakto
whatrightsshouldbeupheldorhowaparticularrighthasbeenviolated.Similarly,questionsof
rightsandfairnessmightseeminappropriatewhenengagingincaringrelations.Thiscritiqueis
closelylinkedtothepublic/privatecritique,becausecarewasseenasaprivateconcern,whereas
45
JeanKeller,"Autonomy,Relationality,andFeministEthics,"Hypatia12,no.2(1997):154.
JeremyWaldron,"WhenJusticeReplacesAffection:TheNeedforRights,"HarvardJournalofLaw&Public
Policy11,no.3(1988):634.
47
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,23.
48
Ibid.,140.
46
30
justiceisapublicconcern.Iftheethicsofcarecouldnotcrossthepublic/privatedivide,thenit
couldnotanswerquestionsofjustice.49
Thethird,andlast,majorcritiqueofthe‘orthodox’ethicsofcare,particularlyfromother
feminists,wasthatcareethicsseemedtodemonstratethattherearefundamentaldifferences
betweenmenandwomen,andthatthesedifferencescarryovertohowmenandwomenreason
morally.Thuscareethicsactuallyservestoreinforcetherelegationofwomentoasecond-class
status.Theethicsofcare,onthisaccount,onlyservedtofurtherentrenchgendernorms,andother
formsofoppression,notcombatthem.50Thetensionherearisesoutofahistoryofwomen
traditionallybeingcaregivers,theearlyfeministdrivetore-thinktraditionalgenderroles,andthe
lingeringquestionregardingthepossibilitythatmainstreamethicalmodelsaresomehowinherently
male-centric.Theanxietyabouttheethicsofcarereinforcinggenderessentialism(especiallythe
ideathatwomenareessentiallycarers)stemsfromtheworrythattheethicsofcareaspresentedby
thosesuchasGilligan,Noddings,andparticularlyRuddick’sbrandofcaretheorybasedonthe
practiceofmothering,wouldonlyservetoreinforce“aone-dimensionalviewofwomenascreatures
offamily.”51Theobjectionisthattheethicofcaredoesdescribeadifferentkindofmorality,buta
moralitythatisusedmostlybywomen,asifitdescribessomethingessentialaboutwomen
themselvesthatwomenaremeanttobecarers.Thispictureofwomenasnaturalcarersisatodds
withthelargerfeministprojectofchallengingtheverygendernormsthathistoricallyrelegated
womentothehomeandtheprivatesphere.52
Section 2.2 – A Political Ethic of Care
Withouttheabovecritiquesandtheneedtorespond,theethicsofcaremighthaveremainedasit
wasinitsearlystages,focusedprimarilyoninterpersonalrelationshipsandthecompeting
responsibilitiestheyentailed.Critical,feministcareethicsemergedasadifferentmoral
epistemologythatcouldfunctionasalenstoreimaginehowwethinkofmoralandpolitical
problems.53Becausethecoreofthecritiquesoutlinedabovehastodowiththepublic/private
divide,questionsofjustice,andsociallyconstructedgenderroles,caretheoristsrespondedtothese
critiquesbycraftingapoliticalethicofcare.Inthissection,Idemonstratehowapoliticalethicof
careansweredthethreemajorcritiquesofearlycareethics.Ascareethicswasusedtoexaminethe
49
Ibid.,68-9.
UmaNarayan,"ColonialismandItsOthers:ConsiderationsonRightsandCareDiscourses,"Hypatia10,no.2
(1995):135-6.
51
Dietz,20.
52
SusanMendus,"DifferentVoices,StillLives:ProblemsintheEthicsofCare,"JournalofAppliedPhilosophy10,
no.1(1993):20.
53
Walker,20.
50
31
political,itexpandedtherangeofmoralconcerntoincludeideasaboutdependenceanddifference,
challengingtraditionalmoralandpoliticalviewsoftheseconcepts.Vitaltothisenterprisewasthe
workofJoanTronto,EvaFederKittay,andVirginiaHeld,whocontinuedtherejectionofdominant
theories,inparticularthatofJohnRawls,asthe‘best’waytoassessapoliticalsystem.Theworkof
Tronto,Kittay,andHeld,althoughprimarilyfocusedonthenationalpoliticalrealm,wasanother
necessarysteptowardthecreationofaglobalcareethic.
Attendingtothecritiquethatearlycareethicscanonlybeaprivatemorality,Trontoand
Heldmaketwopoints:firstthatthecritical,feministethicsofcarecallsintoquestionthe
private/publicdivide,andsecondthattherelationalvaluesidentifiedintheethicsofcareare
applicabletothepublicrealm.Trontoarguesthatitispossibletouse“aconceptofcarethatwill
serveasthebasisforrethinkingmoralboundariesand,byextension,theterrainofcurrentmoral
andpoliticallife.”54Theethicsofcareseekstochallengetheboundariesortheverydefinitionofthe
differentspheresoflife(i.e.,theprivate,civil,marketplace,andpolitical).Trontocallsintoquestion
thesharpdividebetweenthemoralandthepoliticalthatsomephilosophersseektomaintain.Inso
doing,sheclaimsthatitispossibletoseehowamorality,specificallytheethicofcare,canhave
politicalpurchaseandgreateffect.Thisquestioningofthemoralboundariesofeverydaylifespeaks
directlytothesupposedinabilityof‘orthodox’careethicstobeapublicmorality,andchallengesthe
entrenchmentofthepublic/privatedivideitself.Inaddition,asHeldargues,theperspectiveofcare
callsforareorganizingoftheprivatesphere(suchasthedomestictasksofcooking,cleaning,child
care,andeldercare),and“anadequateunderstandingoftheethicsofcareshouldrecognizethatit
elaboratesvaluesasfundamentalandasrelevanttopoliticalinstitutionsandtohowsocietyis
organized,asthoseofjustice.”55Peopleincivilsocietyandthepoliticalrealmcanbeassessed
throughthelensofcare,becauseallpeopleareinrelationtoeachother;personsare
interdependentnotindependent.56Thisinterdependenceholdstrueeveninwider,lessintimate
socialcontextsbecausepoliticalsystemsareinexorablyshotthroughwithcountlessdependencies
thatarenecessaryfortheprocessesofdailylife.
First,justasthecritical,feministethicsofcareseekstorethinktherelationbetweenpersons
indiscretespheresoflife“relationsbetweenthespheresofsocietyalsoneedtoberethoughtfroma
feministpointofview.”57Becausetheethicsofcarecanbeusedtoquestionthepublic/private
divideitself,wecanseehowtheboundarybetweenthetwospheresoflifehasalreadybecome
blurred.Forexample,publicconcernshavealreadybroachedtheprivaterealmofthefamilyin
54
Tronto,101.
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,18.
56
JoanC.Tronto,"CareasaBasisforRadicalPoliticalJudgments,"Hypatia10,no.2(1995):142.
57
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,65.Emphasisintheoriginal.
55
32
termsofcustodybattles,alimonypayments,anddomesticviolencelegislation.Yet,akintohow
justicehasbeeninsertedintotheprivate,critical,feministcareethicschargesthata“fairerdivision
ofresponsibilitiesforcare,thecaremadeavailablethroughtheinstitutionsofthewelfarestate
needstobestrengthenedaswellasreformed.Careandjustice,then,cannotbeallocatedtothe
separatespheresoftheprivateandthepublic.”58Theethicsofcare,ratherthanbeingasolely
privatemorality,insteadworkstochallengebasicassumptionsabouttherealmsofhumanlife:in
thisinstanceabouthowwedivideconcernsintopublicandprivatecategories.Weshouldbe
scepticalofmovestorelegatetheorieslikecareethics,withitsfocusonparticularothers,tothe
privatesphere,infavourofrelyingonmoreabstract,universalistethicsforpubliccontexts.59
Perhapsnothingiscompletelyoneortheother,considering“asasocietywecannotdowithout
dependencyworkinthenarrowestsenseandthatstandardtheoriesignorethismostfundamental
workandformofrelationship.”60Usingthelensofcaretoviewpersonsasbeingsituatedin
relationshipswouldalterhowwereasonmorallyandpolitically.Theserelationsof
(inter)dependence,andtheworkofcare,fostercontinuedhumanlife,andapoliticalcareethic
wouldexpandthescopeofpublicconcernaswellasprovideguidanceinaddressingthese
concerns.61
Second,asourwebsofrelationsextendeveroutwards,apublicconceptionofcareis
necessaryforthebettermentofourgovernments,oursocieties,oureconomies,andour
environment.Notonlycananethicofcareassessourpersonalrelationshipsbut:
Ifweunderstandcareasanimportantvalueandframeworkofinterpretationfor
governmentaswellasforthesphereofthepersonal,wewillapproachmanyoftheissues
involvedintherelationbetweengovernmentandtheeconomydifferentlyfromthosefor
whomthegovernmentshouldbeonlytheprotectorofrightsorthemaximiserofpreference
satisfaction.Wecanseehowgovernmentshouldfostercaringconnectionsbetween
personsandputlimitsonthemarketsthatunderminethem.Theethicsofcareprovides
groundsforarguingthatweshouldcareaboutoneanotherasfellowmembersof
communities,includinggraduallyoftheglobalcommunityonwhichthefuturehealthofour
mutualenvironmentsdepends.62
Thekindsoflawsaboutfamily,welfare,housing,andtaxationstructurethewaysinwhichweare
abletofulfilourcaringresponsibilitiestoparticularothers.Care,asacriticalstandardof
governmentaction,canchallengethewaysinwhichlawsandpoliciespreventpeoplefromcarrying
58
Ibid.,69.
Walker,23.
60
Kittay,38.
61
Iamreferringheretomorethanonlyphilosophicalinvestigationandguidance,butamorematerial
guidanceintermsofincorporatingcareethicsintothepolicyprocess.SeeChapterFiveforamoreindepth
argumentfortheviabilityofcareethicsinpublicpolicy.
62
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,119.
59
33
outtheircaringresponsibilities.Further,thelensofcarecanserveasadifferentstandardof
politicalparticipationbyaskinghowthestructuresofinstitutionalrelations“combinewithtypical
situationstoenableordeformtheabilitiesofallconcernedtohearandbeheard.”63Theethicsof
careisatheorythatcanfindpurchasewithineverysphereofhumanactivityandchallengethevery
lineswedrawbetweenthem.Innowayisthecritical,feministethicsofcarea‘mere’private
morality.Rather,itisapowerfultoolthatcanbeusedtoquestionnegativeassumptionsaboutthe
feasibilityofcareasapublicgood.
Oncecareisusedtoaddressthepublicrealm,thentheunderstandingofotherrelated
conceptsbegintoshift.Inparticular,whenassessingthemoralqualityofanypoliticalsystem,there
needstobesomesetofstandards,andTrontoclaims“careservesasacriticalstandard.”64Ifthe
politicalismeasuredbyastandardofcare,thekindsofquestionswecanposeofanypolitical
systemarealtered.Questionsaboutneedsanddesertshiftawayfromtheideathatpersonsare
entitledtowhattheyhavebecausetheyhave‘earned’it,andtowardtheideathat:“peopleare
entitledtowhattheyneedbecausetheyneedit;peopleareentitledtocarebecausetheyarepartof
ongoingrelationsofcare.”65Thelensofcarealsoprovidesawindowintorelationsofpowerthat
colouroureverydaylives,because“peoplecanbeindifferentpositionsvis-à-visthosewhocarefor
them.”66Extendingthistothepoliticalmeansthatcareethicscananalysethewaysinwhich
governmentsandpublicpolicystructureourlivesandthecaringrelationsweengagein.
Fromthispointwecanrespondtothesecondcritiqueof‘orthodox’careethics:thatcare
cannotaddresstheproblemsofjustice.Heldmakestheclaimthatjusticeandcarecannotreplace
oneanother,butthatconcernsofjusticeinformcaringpractices,andthatcaringpracticescanbe
subjecttotheconcernsofjustice.67Forexample,welfareandsocialservices,beingstateconcerns,
oftenoperateonanethicofjustice,thatthecitizenryhavecertainrightstobeprotectedtosome
degreebytheirgovernmentsagainsttheperilsofmodernlife.Yet,theburdenofpovertyandcaring
forothersmoreoftenfallsuponwomen,suchthatwomenaremoreoftenplacedinvulnerable
positions,caughtbetweentheircaringresponsibilitiestodependentsandtheneedtoprovidefor
themaswell.Heldnotesthatthereshouldbe“greatlyincreasedpublicconcernforchildcare,
education,andhealthcare,infusedwiththevaluesofcare.”68Itisnotenough,therefore,tosimply
claimone’srights,andawaitgovernmentstofulfiltheirobligationsproperly,butrather,theethicof
63
Walker,23.
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,154.
65
"CareasaBasisforRadicalPoliticalJudgments,"146.
66
Ibid.,145.
67
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,68-9.
68
Ibid.,69.
64
34
caremaybeusedtoimposearesponsibilitytomeetthoserights.Conversely,traditionalspheresof
caremightalsorequiremorefairness,i.e.morejustice.Thereislittlejusticeinthetraditional
divisionoflabourinthehome,evenlesssowhenwomenareoftenworkingandcomehometowhat
iscalledthe‘double-day,’wheretheymustalsoprovidethebulkofthecareworkaswell.This
domesticsphere,atraditionalseatofcare,hasalreadybeensubjecttothelensofjusticeintheform
ofdivorceproceedings,custodybattles,anddomesticviolencelegislation.Whilesuchpracticesare
emotionallycomplicatedandsometimesvolatile,nevertheless,concernsaboutjusticehavebeen
factoredintothesituation.Intheend,Heldarguesthat“caringrelationsshouldformthewider
moralframeworkintowhichjusticeshouldbefitted.”69Thisisbecausewhilejustice-basedethics
proclaimaformalequality,itdoessoontheassumptionthatallpersonsshouldbeextendedequal
treatment.Howeverequaltreatmentasapoliticalgoodfailstoincorporatetheprofoundwaysin
whichdifference(gender,race,class,sexualorientation,andability)affectshowweliveourlives
andcanservetoreinforcedeeperinequalities.70
Kittay’scritiqueoftheoriesofjustice,however,ismuchmorepointed.Sheheavilycritiques,
andrejects,theliberalpoliticaltheoryofJohnRawls.SherightlyarguesthatalthoughRawls’theory
containsacommitmenttoequalityandliberty,itfails“toattendtothefactofhumandependency
andtheconsequencesofthisdependencyonsocialorganization.”71Kittay,importantly,beganto
bringideasaboutdependenceintothecritical,feministethicsofcare,anddemonstratedthat
relationsofdependencematterwhenitcomestoethicalandpoliticalthinking.Sheshowshowthe
lensofcarecouldilluminatemoralandpoliticalproblemsthattheoriessuchasRawls’eitherignored
orcouldnot‘see,’i.e.theywerenotconsideredtobeproblemsforaliberalpoliticaltheory,but
throughthelensofcarewererevealedasvitallyimportantareasofpublicmoralconcern.
AlthoughRawls’liberalpoliticaltheorychampionedtheidealsofliberalism,equalityand
liberty,Kittayclaimsthispresumptionofequalityis,inandofitself,aproblem.Apresumedequality
blindsustotherealityofthevastinequalitypresentintheworldtoday,andtherelationshipsof
dependencethatpermeateourlives.Shenotesthat,“[b]ecausedependencystronglyaffectsour
statusasequalcitizens(thatis,aspersonswho,asequals,sharethebenefitsandburdensofsocial
cooperation),andbecauseitaffectsallofusatonetimeoranother,itisnotanissuethatcanbeset
aside,muchlessavoided.”72Anethicofjustice,especiallyaRawlsianone,presupposesafully
functioningandfullyinformedadult,butsuchpeoplearefewandfarbetween,andassuchanethic
69
Ibid.,71.
Differenceisoneoftheaspectsthatthelensofcareisuniquelysuitedtoexamine.SeeChapterTwofor
moreonthistopic.
71
Kittay,76.
72
Ibid.,77.
70
35
ofjusticeseemstocontainastartingpositionthatisfartooabstractedfromtherealitiesofday-todayexistence.Childrenaredependentupontheirparents,anagedpersonisdependentuponhisor
hernurse,whointurnisdependentuponhisorheremployer.Even‘fully-functional’adultsare
dependent.Consideraheterosexualcouplewithchildren,andwefindthatahusbandisoften
heavilydependentuponhiswifeforseveralkindsofcare,becausefrequentlysheistheonewho
attendsmorecloselytothechoresofdailylife:cooking,cleaning,andcaringforchildren.For
example,oneofthemorerecentvaluationsoftheworkdonebyafulltimestayathomemotheris
upwardsof$112,962ayear(intheUnitedStates),andeventoreplacethecareworkofamother
whoalsoworksoutsidethehomewouldcostover$60,000ayear.73Thetraditional‘autonomous’
male,thebreadwinnerofthefamily,isunavoidablydependentuponothers,especiallyhiswife,for
hiscare.Incontrast,mostliberaltheoriesportraydependenceasafailureonthepartofthe
individual,insteadchampioningindependenceandself-sufficiency,bothimpossibleideals.74Critical
careethicsviewshumanlifeasmovingthroughdifferentstates,adependentchild,perhapsless
dependentasanadult(thoughstillinterdependent),andthenoncemoredependentasonegrows
old,eachstatewithvaryinglevelsofvulnerability.Kittaydeveloped,asanalternativetothe
Rawlsianliberalideal,theconceptofthedoulia,75whichencompassestheideathat“[j]ustasthe
caretakerhasaresponsibilitytocareforthedependent,thelargersocietyhasanobligationto
attendtothewell-beingofthecaretaker.”76Thisconceptwouldservetobringtobeara
responsibilityuponthepublic,andthusgovernments,tocareforthosewhoarealreadycaringfor
others,becauseifcare-giversarenotthemselvesmaintained(andoftenduetotimeandfinancial
constrainstheycannotalwaysadequatelycareforthemselves),thecarethattheirdependents
receivecansufferaswell.Theethicsofcarecanhighlightthewaysinwhichgovernmentshave
responsibilitiestotheirconstituentsthatgoesbeyondmerelyrespectingtheirrights.Thelensof
careilluminatesthosetowhomgovernmentshaveandshouldfulfiltheirowncaring
responsibilities.77
EventhoughHeldandKittaydemonstratethattheethicsofcarecouldaddressjusticeissues,
therewasstillalingeringaboutdoubtwhether‘orthodox’careethicsprovidedanintelligiblepicture
73
BlaireBriody,"WhatAreStay-at-HomeMomsReallyWorth?,"TheFiscalTimes,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/05/04/What-Are-Stay-at-Home-Moms-Really-Worth.Accessed
20May2015.
74
MaryGDietz,"ContextIsAll:FeminismandTheoriesofCitizenship,"Daedalus116,no.4(1987):5-6.
75
ThisconceptisbasedupontheGreeknotionofthedoula,thepersonwhocaresforthenewmothersothat
themothermayfocusuponcaringforthechild.
76
EvaFederKittay,"Welfare,Dependency,andaPublicEthicofCare,"SocialJustice25,no.1(1998):134.
77
Thisideaisexpandeduponwhencareethicsisglobalized,andwillbeexaminedinChapterTwo.Inshort,
globalcareethicsallowsustochallengetherelationsofpowerthatmostoftenhinderpersonsinfulfillingtheir
caringresponsibilities,andalsoquestionswhyourresponsibilitiesareapportionedincertainways:i.e.why
womenshoulderthemajorityofcaringlabour.
36
ofreciprocity.Theproblemisthatwithoutanintelligiblepictureofreciprocity,theethicofcare
cannotfullyattendtoconcernsofjusticebecausejusticerequiresameasureofreciprocityto
functionproperly.Toaddressthisdoubt,caretheoristshavearguedthatcaretheorycanprovidea
coherentpictureofreciprocity.In‘orthodox’careethics,Noddingsclaimsthatreciprocityis
achievedwhentherecipientofcareisableto,throughwhatevermeans,acknowledgethatcarehas
beengiven.78Itneednotbeverbalorevenwritten,butsomekindofbodylanguageorevena
meaningfulmomentofeyecontactmightbeenoughtoqualifyasreciprocity.However,thisconcept
ofreciprocityisnotrobustenoughforthepoliticalrealmwhereactorsdonotnecessarilyhavesuch
closerelations.Inthepolitical,itisassumedthatsomethingmoresubstantialthanmere
acknowledgementisrequiredforreciprocitytohaveoccurred.
Kittayreturnstothekeyfeatureoftheethicsofcare:ourrelatedness,todevelopadifferent
notionofreciprocitythathasamoresubstantialoutcome.Ifourequalityisconnection-based,if
“wecanseeeachindividualnestedwithinrelationshipsofcare,wecanenvisionrelationshipsthat
embracetheneedsofeach.”79Allofourrelationshipsarenested,orlinked,tooneanother,andour
communitiesarewideandcapableofmuch.AsKittayexplains:
Thischainofobligationslinkingmembersofacommunitycreatesasenseofreciprocity
betweenthosewhogiveandthosewhoreceivethatraisestheexpectationthatwhenoneis
inthepositiontogivecare,onewill,andwhenthatpersonisinneedanotherwhoissuitably
situatedtogivecarewillrespond.Itisareciprocityofthosewhoseetheirequalityintheir
connectionwith,andobligationtoward,others.80
Insteadofatraditional‘payitback’notionofreciprocity,Kittaysuggestsa‘payitforward’
understanding.Thusanytransaction(sotospeak)ofcare(orrightsandduties)isnotbi-directional,
butamulti-directionalweb.Ourcareorourfulfilleddutiesflowfromusandarefocusedonsome
other,andinturntheircareanddutiesflowfromthemtoothers,andeventuallyreturntous.This
formulationofreciprocitybasedontheethicsofcarerejectstheideathatcaretheorycouldonly
supportreciprocitywithinkinstructures,butinsteadplacesanemphasisonthefactthat“the
affectiveboundariesofreciprocityarefluidandarenotfixedbykinshipalone.”81Reciprocityispart
ofcritical,feministcareethics.Insteadofreciprocityimaginedasatwo-wayinteractionbetween
twoindividuals,wecanpicturereciprocityasaseriesofconnectionsbeginningwithourselves,
stretchingtowardparticularothers,andfromthosepersonsontoothers,untiltheconnectionloops
aroundtousonceagain.OurwebofrelationsensuresthatwhilethoseIcareformightnothaveany
directresponsibilitytocareforme,otherpersonsmight,andaslongascaringneedsaremetandwe
78
Noddings,74.
Kittay,Love'sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency,66.
80
Ibid.,68.
81
Williams,23.
79
37
alltakepartintheworkofcare,reciprocityispossible.Thisdoesnotmeanthatallpersonswilltake
partinthewebofrelationsandthislessdirectkindofreciprocity,butlikeanethicofjustice,care
ethicsclaimsthatthosewhofailtodosoarebadmoralactors.
Trontoapproachesreciprocitybyarguingthatanethicofcareisimportantforajustpolitical
system,andactuallyhelpstopromoteabetterdemocraticnation.Trontonotes,“unlessa
democratictheorydealssubstantivelywiththequestionof‘whocares,’itresultsinanaccountof
politicsthatmisconceivescitizensandtheirlives,overvaluingtheirlivesasworkers,devaluingtheir
livesaspeopleengagedinrelationshipsofcare.”82Todootherwiseobfuscatescaregivers,care
receivers,andthesheeramountofcareworkthatisnecessaryforanysocietytofunction.Whilean
ethicofcareseekstochallengeinequality,andacknowledgestheinequalitiespresentinpolitics
today,itpresumesonewayinwhichhumanbeingsareallequal(andperhapsthatisagoodplaceto
beginapoliticaltheory):weareallcarereceivers.Ifweweretoviewallcitizensascarereceivers,
then“citizens’needsforcareandtheirinterdependentrelianceonotherstohelpthemmeettheir
caringneedsbecomesthebasisforequality.”83
Justiceandcareneednotbethoughtofasopposingopposites.Theycanbetheorizedas
complementary,abletotakeonaspectsofeachother,suchasequalityandreciprocity,orasVirginia
Heldargues,thatcareisthewidermoralframeworkintowhichjusticefitsasonecomponent.84
Regardless,byrejectingoratleastquestioningtheprimacyofdominantpoliticaltheories,apolitical
ethicofcarecanbeusedtoexpandthescopeofjustice,illuminatingthewaysinwhichstandard
theoriesofjusticefailtoencompassallpersonsandhumanactivity,particularlythosewhodothe
workofcare,thosewhoaredependentuponthecareofothers,thepoliticalimplicationsof
difference,dependence,andtheworkofcareitself.AnnetteBaiernotesthatindominantmoraland
politicaltheories,theimportantrelationshipswererelationshipsbetweenequals,andhistorically
thosewhowerenotequaloftenwereoutsidethescopeofmoralandpoliticalthought.Eventhough
previouslymarginalizedpersonshaveoften‘gained’ameasureofequalitybeforethelawinmost
Westernstates,shearguesthatwecanquestionthematerialcontentofthisequality.Certainly
somevulnerablegroupshaveachieveddesiredprotectionsinthisway,butit“somewhatmasksthe
questionofwhatourmoralrelationshipsaretothosewhooursuperiorsorourinferiorsinpower.”85
Itisthisinsight,thatcareethicscanbeusedtoassessrelationsofpowerthatmakescritical,feminist
careethicsarobustcriticallensforthepoliticalsphere.Thelensofcarecanilluminatethepower
82
JoanC.Tronto,CaringDemocracy:Markets,Equality,andJustice(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,
2013),26.
83
Ibid.,29.
84
VirginiaHeld,"TheMeshingofCareandJustice,"Hypatia10,no.2(1995):131.
85
Baier,"TheNeedforMoreThanJustice,"55.Emphasisintheoriginal.
38
thestatehastostructureourrelationswithparticularothers,whichrevealsnewinformationabout
ourlivesandhowwelivethem.
Theethicsofcare,whentranslatedintoapoliticaltheorychallengesthetraditional
public/privatedivideandexpandsthescopeofjustice.Inthisprocess,italsointerrogatesmanyof
thesocialnormsthathaveoftenrelegatedwomentotheroleofthecaregiverandsubsequent
secondarycitizenstatus,directlychallengingthethirdcritiqueof‘orthodox’careethics(thatcare
ethicsinfactservestoreinforceinsteadofchallengegendernorms).Agoalofcritical,feministcare
ethics,ratherthanreinforcethepictureofwomenasessentiallycarers,istorejectgender
essentialismthatclaimswomenormenareessentiallybetteratparticularroles,i.e.thatwomenare
carersandmenareproviders.Careethicsinsteadclaimsthatcaringisahumanactivitythatmen
mustfullyparticipateinaswell.Careethicscanalsobeusedtoassessthepoliticalimplicationsof
gender,andtheeffectsocialpolicyhasondifferentgroupsofpeople,suchasmenandwomen,but
alsotheimplicationsofrace,class,ability,age,andsexualorientation.Theethicsofcarechallenges
thegenderbiasandassumptionspresentinotherstrainsofmoralthought.AsHeldnotes,theethics
ofcaredoesnotmerely“acceptanddescribethepracticesofcareastheyhaveevolvedunderactual
historicalconditionsofpatriarchalandotherdomination;itevaluatessuchpracticesand
recommendswhattheymorallyoughttobelike.”86Unlikethe‘orthodox’ethicsofcare,thepolitical,
feministethicofcaredoesnotsayanythingessentialaboutwomen;ratherithighlightsasafailure
anypracticethatcontinuestodevalueandmarginalizetheworkofcareandthosewhogiveand
receivecare,highlightinghowdifferentsociallocationsproducedifferentexperiencesforcarers.For
example,awhite,middle-classwomanperformscaringlaborunderdifferentconditionstoa
transnationalmaledomesticworkerfromthePhilippines.Racializedconceptionsofpersons,
intersectedwithgeopoliticalorigin,andgendercombinetocreateacomplexpictureofwho
performscaringlaborandunderwhatconditions:itisthispicturethatthecritical,feministethicsof
careiswellsuitedtoexamining.
Further,justbecausetheethicsofcaredescribesandinvestigatesanarenathatwomen
traditionallyhaveoccupieddoesnotmeanitequateswomanhoodandcarework,whichinturn
allowsmentoreceivea‘pass’exemptingthemfromcarework,ormaintainapositionof“privileged
irresponsibility.”87AsKittaynotes:“Dependencyworkisdonenotonlyinthehome,butinnurseries
andhospitalsaswell.Still,whereaffectionalanddomesticlaborisassignedtowomen,dependency
workisalsoassignedbygender.”88Evenintherealmofprofessionalcarework,womenand
86
Held,TheEthicsofCare:Personal,Political,andGlobal,39.
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,146.
88
Kittay,Love'sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency,30.
87
39
racializedpersonsarestillthemajorityofdependency(care)workers,andsuchpeopleareoften
underrepresentedinpositionsofpower,eitherpoliticallyoreconomically.Careethics,instead,can
become“atoolforcriticalpoliticalanalysiswhenweusethisconcepttorevealrelationshipsof
power.”89ThoseinpowerareoftenabletobewhatTrontoterms‘care-demanders,’peoplewho
expecttobecaredfor,butdonotdoanyofthecaregivingthemselves.Theyseektobegivenafree
‘pass’onthebasisoftheirearningpower,ortheirgender,butmostlybecause“theyareengagedin
otheractivitiesthatthey(and,presumablysociety)deemaresimplymoreimportantthancaring.”90
Suchpassesillustratethattherearesomeforwhomcaringisnotimportant,largelybecauseitis
renderedinvisible.The‘care-demanders’takeforgrantedtheworkofmaids,childcarers,and
janitors,amongmanyothers.Shouldcareprovidersdisappear,however,theneedforcarewould
becomeveryapparent.Personsinpositionsofpower,these‘care-demanders,’arejustas
enmeshedinwebsofcareasanyoneelse,theonlydifferenceisthattheyareunawareofit.Indeed,
thosewhorelymostheavilyon‘unseen’carearethemostvulnerabletoitsdisruption.However,
thelensofcareilluminateshowpowermatters,andhowcare,especiallythecommodifiedcareof
thetransnationalcareworker,takesplacewithinunequalrelationsofpower,oftentothedetriment
ofthecareworker.91Thesepowerfulcare-demandersfrequentlyholdapositionof‘privileged
irresponsibility.’Oftenthosewhoholdpositionsofprivilegedirresponsibilityarethosewho
consumeorpayforcare,andincreasinglywomenintheglobalNorthconsumecarebyemploying
transnationalmigrantcarerstocarryoutcaringlabourinthehome,whichreinforcesinequalities
betweendifferentlysituatedwomen.Itisnotassimpleasamale/femalebinary,butratherhow
differentkindsofworkisvalued,suchthatcareisde-orundervalued,andthereforesotooare
thosewhoperformthecaringlabour.IncreasinglyintheglobalNorth,migrantwomen,who
experiencemultipleformsofdifference,includingracial,ethnic,linguistic,andnational,undertake
thecareworkofthosewho‘havemoreimportantthingstodo.’Theethicsofcare,however,
questionsthepoliticalandsocialmeansbywhichnormsaboutgender,race,nationalorigin,andthe
workofcareitselfarereproducedtothedetrimentofthosewhoshoulderanundueburdenofcare.
Insteadofreinforcinggenderstereotypes,caretheoristsrejecttheprimacyofcurrent
dominantethicalandpoliticaltheoriesthattreatequalityas“anassociationofequals[which]has
trainedourgazeononesideofthesexualdivisionoflabour:theinclusionofwomenintothemale
half.”92Muchworkhasalreadybeendonetobringwomen,especiallyintheGlobalNorth,intothe
89
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,172.
Ibid.,33.
91
FionaWilliams,"MigrationandCare:Themes,ConceptsandChallenges,"SocialPolicyandSociety9,no.3
(2010):387.
92
Kittay,Love'sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency,15.
90
40
publicsphere,workthatwasnecessaryinthefightforgenderequality,butitisnotenoughthat
womenareincludedinthetraditionalmalerealm.Menmustalsobefullyincorporatedintothe
traditionalfemalerealminorderforamorematerialequalitytoberealized.Thepoliticalethicsof
carechallengestraditionalgendernorms,wherewomenandthefemalegenderhaveattaineda
symbolicassociationwithcarework,vulnerability,anddependency;wherevulnerabilityand
dependencyinparticularholdnegativeconnotationsoffailureforanindividualundertheliberal
conceptionoftheperson.Theethicsofcareseekstorelocatetheconcernsofvulnerability,
dependency,andneed.Insteadofvulnerability,dependence,andneedremainingstatestoavoidor
asahallmarkofindividualfailure,thosewhoareinsuchstatescanbeviewedaspersonswho
requireextracare,fullintheawarenessthatatsomepointinthepastandatsomepointinthe
future,allpersonsrequiresuchcare.Beyondtheusualexamplesofchildren(whorelyonadultsfor
materialandsocialsupport),thedevelopmentallyandphysicallydisabled(whoareusuallyaccorded
somemeasureofaidoutofasenseoffairness),theveryill(whomightnotalwaysreceivethesame
standardofcare),ortheveryold(whoagainareoftenmarginalized),everyoneisinaconstantstate
ofvulnerability,dependency,andneed.Theproblemwiththepoliticalliberalconceptionofequality
isthat“vulnerabilityanddependencyeasilybecomeseparatedfromtheidealselfandlocalizedin,or
projectedontoothers:weakor‘needy’people.”93Instead,anethicofcare“situate[s]vulnerability,
ambiguityanddependencywithinthemoralsubject.”94Doingsoavoidsthedangerousotheringthat
mightoccurwhenonlyothersareneedy.Thewell-offindividualmightbelievethattheyarenot
needyinthattheyhavebeenabletomeetalltheirneeds‘ontheirown,’butthisisnotthecase.
Likelysomeoneelsecleanstheirhome,tendstheirgarden,cookstheirfood,andcaresfortheir
childrenorelderlyparents,inadditiontothegoodsandservicesprovidedbythegovernmentand
fundedbyavastpooloftaxpayers.
Byrejectingtheprimacyofdominantethicaltheories,thecritical,feministethicsofcare
strivestoofferamorecomplete,holisticconceptionofhumanbeingsbecauseofitsviewofpersons
asrelationalandinterdependentinsteadofashighlyindividualizedandautonomous.Theethicsof
careisnotafemalemoralityorawoman’sethic,butratheraprofoundlyhumanethicthat
challengescurrentconceptionsofgenderandthegendereddivisionofworkandpowerpresentin
andperpetuatedbythecurrentstructuresofsocialandpoliticalpower.Whiletheethicsofcare
developedfrominvestigationsintotheuniqueexperiencesofwomen,itsoughttousethose
experiencesasastartingpointtobetterunderstandhumanrelationshipsandmoralissuesthathad
beenpreviouslyoverlookedbytraditionalphilosophy.Inparticular,apoliticalethicofcare
93
SelmaSevenhuijsen,CitizenshipandtheEthicsofCare:FeministConsiderationsonJustice,Morality,and
Politics,trans.LizSavage(NewYork:Routledge,1998),57.
94
Ibid.
41
challengesthepublic/privatedividebyusingcaretoexpandourpoliticalconcernstoquestionsof
carework,dependency,relationshipsandresponsibilities,andnormsaboutgender,race,sexual
orientation,andclass.Inansweringthecritiquesthatwerelevelledattheearlyethicsofcare,later
caretheoristscreatedarobustpoliticalethicthatbroughtcaretotheforeasapublicgoodthatmust
bepartofourpoliticaltheorizingandunderstandingofjustice.Todootherwiseistoengagein
privilegedirresponsibilityandignoretherealneedsofrealpersons.Politicalsilenceontheseissues
onlyservestoreinforcetheirinvisibility,andtheinvisibilityofthepersonswhodocareworkorare
caredforbyothers.Thisisapowerfulpoliticalethicthat,atbase,rejectstheprimacyofdominant
politicaltheories,suchasthe‘mainstream’politicalliberaltheoryofJohnRawls,becausealiberal
politicaltheoryaloneisnotenoughtoaddressthemoral-politicalproblemsthatcontemporary
societiesface.Somethingmoreisneeded,andthatistheethicsofcare.
FromthepoliticalethicdevelopedbyphilosophersTontro,HeldandKittay,itispossibleto
beginthinkingaboutcaretheoryassomethingthatcouldbeappliedglobally,notonlyasaglobal
ethic,butalsoacriticalethicthatinvestigatesthepoliticalunderpinningsthatservetoperpetuate
thevastscaleofsufferingandinequalityintheworldtoday.Beforeturningtothecriticalglobal
ethicofcareinChapterTwo,IwillfirsthighlightthepracticesofcareasdevelopedbyJoanTronto.
UnderstandingthesepracticesisimportanttoforegroundtheworkofFionaRobinson,who
developedaglobalethicofcare,wherethesepracticesbecamepartofthelensofcarethatisused
touncovernewinformation,newmotivations,andnewsolutionstoglobalmoralproblems.
Section 3 – The Practices of Care
Apoliticalethicofcarenotonlyrespondstothecritiquesofearlycareethics,butalsoprovidesa
positiveguidetoactionthatcorrespondstotheactivitiesofcare.Trontodevelopedananalysisof
thepracticesofcaretoprovideamoreformalmeansofactioninthepoliticalrealmonthebasisof
critical,feministcareethics.Becauseitisaguideforaction,caremustbeunderstoodasapractice.
Careasapracticeisanalternativetoviewingcareasanemotionoraprinciple,butisrather
somethingthatprovokesandfostersaction,withagoalandamethodofcarryingitout.95Lastly,
becausethepracticesofcareserveasguidesforaction,thesepracticescanalsoserveasastandard
ofsatisfactioninrelationtotheprocessofcaringitself.Ifthecareprovideddoesnotmeetthe
standardssetoutbythepracticesofcare,thenthecare-receivercannotbesaidtobewellcared
for.96Thesepracticesworktobetterclarifywhatcareis,howitfunctions,andbywhichstandardwe
mightmeasurethecompletionofcare.Thiswillbeespeciallyimportantoncecareisfullyintegrated
95
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,108.
Ibid.,110.
96
42
intoapoliticalframework,becausepoliticalactionneedstohaveastandardofcompletionanda
scaleofsuccess.97
ThepracticesofcarethatTrontooutlinesareattentiveness,responsibility,competence,and
responsiveness.Trontocoupleseachpracticeofcarewithwhatshecallsphasesofcarethatsignify
differentkindsofcaringthatpersonsengagein,whichservestoclarifywhatotherwisewould
remainanambiguousconcept.Robinsonutilizesonlythreeofthesepractices,thatofattentiveness,
responsibility,andresponsiveness,foldingcompetenceintotheotherthreepractices.Robinsonalso
refinesallofthesepracticesforuseonthegloballevelasdiscussedinChapterTwo.However,
understandingthefirstformulationofthesecaringpracticesallowsustoseethedifferencebetween
Robinson’sworkandtheworkthatprecededher.
Thefirstphase,caringabout,correspondstothefirstpractice:attentiveness.Caringabout
iswhereonepersonrecognizestheneedforcaretotakeplace,buttakesnopersonalresponsibility
forit.Trontopointsoutthatcaringaboutcanbeseeninthepublicrealmbysociety’sresponseto
thehomeless,notjusttheindividualresponse.98Tocareabout,onemustpracticeattentiveness,for
ifwearenotattentive,“thenwecannotpossiblyaddressthoseneeds.Bythisstandard,theethicof
carewouldtreatignoringothers—ignorance—asaformofmoralevil.”99Forexample,anemployer
whoignoresthefactthatanemployeeisasingleparentandhasseveralsmallchildren,yetdemands
theyworkovertime,wouldnotbeattentivetotheneedsoftheiremployee,andthuswecouldjudge
theemployerasengaginginmorallybadbehaviour.
Attentivenessisimportantbecauseitreinforcestherelationalaspectofcare.Someone
mustbeattentivetosomeoneelse,suchthatwhenIamattentivetoanotherIdosofroma
particularposition.AsAlisonJaggarnotes:
Turningourattentioninwardaswellasoutwardencouragesreflexiveconsiderationofwhat
theagentbringstothesituation,herinterests,herlocation,thecontext,herwarrantfor
intervention.Conceivingmoralreasoningasinteractiveencouragesreflectionnotonlyon
themoralimplicationsforothersofactionorinactionbutalsoontheimplicationsforthe
self,howitexpressesordevelopshermoralcharacter.100
Becausepartofcareethicsistheacknowledgementandunderstandingofhowconcreteparticulars
matterdeeplytoourmoralandpoliticallives,wecannotescapethefactthatwearealwayslocated
somewhere,andareembeddedincertainkindsofknowledge.Thepracticesofcareareinformedby
97
Formoreonusingcareasastandardofsuccessofpoliticalaction,specificallyinpublicpolicy,seeChapter
Five.
98
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,106.
99
Ibid.,127.
100
AlisonM.Jaggar,"CaringasaFeministPracticeofMoralReason,"inJusticeandCare,ed.VirginiaHeld
(Colorado:WestviewPress,1995),191.
43
thedifferentmoralepistemologyofcareethics,thesituatedviewoftherelationalmoralagent,as
someonewhomusttakeintoaccounttheknowledgethatinformsourdailylives.101Thisdifferent
standpointunderscorestheimportanceoftherelationalontologyofcareethics.102
Thesecondphaseofcareistakingcareofandcorrespondstothepracticeofresponsibility.
Inthisphase,eithertheindividualorthegroupassumessomemeasureofresponsibility:“taking
careofinvolvestherecognitionthatonecanacttoaddresstheseunmetneeds.”103Thecaring
practiceofresponsibilityiswherethe“responsibilitytocaremightrestonanumberoffactors;
somethingwedidordidnotdohascontributedtotheneedsforcare,andsowemustcare.”104The
notionofresponsiblyhereisflexible,suchthatoneisnotnecessarilyobligatedasothermoral
theoriesmighthaveit,butratherwefulfilourresponsibilitiesaswearebestable,orfindanother
waytofulfiltheneedifweareunable.Becausecareethicsrecognizesthatallpersonsaremoreor
lessdependentuponothersatanygiventime,notbeingabletofulfilone’scaringresponsibilitiesis
notnecessarilyafailure.Itis,however,amoralfailuretodenythatonehascaringresponsibilities
regardlessofone’sabilitytofulfilthoseresponsibilitiesatanygiventime.
Thethirdphaseiscare-giving,which“involvesthedirectmeetingofneedsforcare,”105and
correspondstothepracticeofcompetence.Care-givingisdifferentfromtakingcareof.Takingcare
ofanothercanbeaccomplishedthroughfinancialmeans,butTrontoseparatesoutfinancialsupport
fromthephysicalworkofcare-givingtounderscoretwoimportantpoints.First,thatmoneywillnot
alwayssolvethecaringneedsofothers.Forexample,althoughmoneywillprovideforhigherquality
longtermelder-care,therestillremainstheactuallabourofcaringthatneedstobedonetoattend
totheneedsofanother,whichiscare-giving.Second,thatonecannotsubstitutetakingcareoffor
care-giving.Thesearenotinterchangeablephasesofcare,andassuchonecannotcountfor
another,allowingforthosewhofinanciallysupportotherstomaintainapositionofprivileged
irresponsibility.Onecannotignoreone’sresponsibilitiestoengageinthelabourofbeingaparentin
favourofanarrowfocusonfinancialsecurity,asthoughtakingcareofone’sfamilygaveonea‘pass’
onperformingcaringlabour.Thusthepracticeofcareassociatedwiththisphaseiscompetence.
Onemustbeacompetentcare-giver,ifoneistogivecareproperly,andcompetencewillguard
101
Walker,24.
However,thereisacritiqueaboutwhetherthefeministstandpointofcareoffersatrulytransformative
feministethic,anditwillbeaddressedinChapterSix.
103
Tronto,MoralBoundaries:APoliticalArgumentforanEthicofCare,106.
104
Ibid.,132.
105
Ibid.,107.
102
44
against“[i]ntendingtoprovidecare,evenacceptingresponsibilityforit,butthenfailingtoprovide
goodcare,meansthatintheendtheneedforcareisnotmet.”106
Thefourthphaseofcaringiscare-receivingwhichcorrespondswiththepracticeof
responsiveness.107Thisstagefocusesontheonereceivingcareandcanbeusedasameasurefor
whetherornotparticularcaringneedshavebeenmet.ThoughTrontoacknowledgesthat
perceptionsofneedscanbewrong,theneedofthecarertoproceedwiththetasksofcaremightbe
lessimportantthanthecarereceiver’sneedforsomethingelse,e.g.“apersonwithmobility
limitationsmayprefertofeedherself.”108Thosewhoreceivecare,iftheyareable,shouldrespond
insomewaysothatthecare-givercanbettercareforthem.Thepointhereisthatthefeedbackof
theonewhoisreceivingcareisofvitalimportanceforthecaretocontinueandtoensurethatthe
careisgoodinsofarasitmeetstheneedsoftheonewhoisbeingcaredfor.
Thepracticesofcare,asoutlinedhere,arenotexactlythesameonesthatareusedby
Robinsonormyselfwhenarguingforaglobalcriticalethicofcare.Theimportanceofintroducing
thepracticesofcarehereistoprovideacontrastforhowRobinson’scriticalethicofcareisdifferent
fromtheearly,‘orthodox’careethicsaswellasthepoliticalethicofcarethatgrewinresponseto
thethreemajorcritiquesofearlycareethics.Certainlytheglobalethicofcareretainsthefocuson
relationships,thebalanceofresponsibilities,gender,race,class,anddependence,butitalso
incorporatesandquestionsnormsthatperpetuateexclusionandviolence,aswellasexpanding
inquiriesintothesocialnormsaroundallformsofdifferenceandhowwemightbestnegotiate
differenceinapoliticallandscape.
Fromitsinceptioninthelate1970stoearly1980s,theethicsofcaregrewfromaninquiry
intothepsychologyofwomen’smoralreasoning,intoanethicbasedupontheideathatmoral
questionsandanswerscouldbefoundwithincarework,toarobustpoliticalethicthatchallenges
entrenchedpatternsofpowerthatperpetuateharmfulsocialnorms(particularlythoseabout
gender),thepublic/privatedivide,andtheprimacyofliberaltheoriesofjustice.Aglobalcriticalcare
ethiccontinuesquestioningtheprimacyofdominantliberalpoliticaltheories.Inparticular,it
questionsdominanttheoriesofinternationalrelationsandtheprideofplacegiventohumanrights
discoursesontheassumptionthathumanrightsarebestsituatedtoaddressglobalmoralconcerns.
Theethicsofcareisapoliticalethicthatcantransformthewayinwhichweviewcomplexmoral
problemsintheworldtoday.Usingthelensofcare,exemplifiedbythepracticesofcare,allowsus
106
Ibid.,133.
Ibid.,134.
108
Ibid.,108.
107
45
touncovernewinformationaboutglobalmoralconcerns,providenewkindsofmotivations,aswell
asaidinthedevelopmentofnewsolutionstotheseconcerns.
46
Chapter Two: Globalizing the Ethics of Care
InthischapterIargueinsupportofglobalizingthecritical,feministethicsofcareasameansto
provideadifferentandimportantperspectiveontheinternationalsphere,encompassingpolitical,
economic,andsocio-culturalconcerns.Thisperspective,Iclaim,cangiveusnewinformationabout
substantiveissuessuchasglobalpoverty,especiallythekindofpovertyexperiencedbythosewho
aremarkedoutascarers(eitherbygendered,racialized,orgeopoliticaldifference,orany
combinationthereof),andsubsequentlyprovidenewmotivationsandmethodsofactiontoremedy
suchissues.Thisshiftinhowweseeandaddresssuchissuesalsomeansthattheethicsofcareisa
transformativeethic.IwillcloselyfollowtheworkdonebyFionaRobinson,whohaspioneeredthe
effort.ItshouldbenotedthatIdonotarguecareethicsshouldbeusedinsteadofinternational
humanrightsdiscourses.Ibelievethathumanrightsdiscoursesoffertheirownimportant
perspectivesandanswerstoissuesofhumansufferingandinjusticesacrosstheglobe.Rather,
consideringthecomplexityofsomeofthemoralcontexts1thatexistintheworldtoday,Iholdthat
humanrightsisnotalwaystheappropriateethicaltheorytoassessmoralcontexts,asIwilldiscussin
ChapterThree.Therearemoralcontextsthatarebetterservedbyusingacriticalethicsofcareas
thetoolofanalysis.
Thisisnottosaythattheglobalethicsofcareiswithoutitscritics.DanielEngsterclaims
thatalthoughtheethicsofcareisanexcellenttoolforcritique,itcannotsuggestpolicyorprovide
guidanceforinstitutionalframeworks.Ifcareethicsisunabletosuggestsolutionstotheproblemsit
identifies,thenitisnotabletofunctionasaninstrumentofjusticeasdiscussedinChapterOne.
KimberlyHutchingsmakesadualargument.First,thatbecausecareethicsholdsassumptionsabout
theuniversalityofcare,itembedsgenderassumptionsintoitsapproachandthusisnotan
acceptablefeministinternationalethic.Second,thatRobinson’sapproachistooinconsistentto
haveprescriptiveforce.IwilladdressEngster’sclaiminChapterFour,andHutchings’claimin
ChapterSix.However,itisimportanttoforegroundthemheretoavoidtheimpressionthatthe
criticalglobalethicsofcareissomehowtheperfectanswertoallourtheoreticalproblemswith
creatinganinternationalethicaldiscourse.Itisnot.Idoubtthatthereisanyoneanswer.
1
Robinsonusestheword‘contexts’insteadofissuesbecauseRobinsonwantstoavoidthelanguageof‘ethical
issues’forthreereasons:1)sherejectstheideathat“theissuesthemselvesareinsomemeasurediscrete,
distinct,andseparatefromoneanother;”2)“becausethereareethicalissues,theremustalsobesomenonethicalissuesininternationalrelations;”and3)“thattheissuesthemselvesmayberegardedasdistinctfrom
moralvaluesandethicalideasembeddedinthem.”(Robinson,1999,137.Emphasisintheoriginal.)Theethics
ofcarerejectsthisseparationistmindset,ofbreakingthingsdownintoisolatedissues,someethical,somenot,
thatarefreefrombias.Instead,Robinsonelectstotalkabout‘contexts.’
47
Instead,Itakethepositionthatwhileinternationalhumanrightsdiscoursescanprovide
valuableinsights,humanrightsneednotbeouronlymethodtoaddressinternationalethical
concerns.Forexample,manywomen’sgroupsusehumanrightslanguagetobringattentionand
legitimacytotheirconcernsandproblems.However,humanrightsdiscoursesingenerallackthe
abilityto‘lookunderthehood’andfindthesourceofthoseproblemsembeddedwithinthesocial,
cultural,religious,political,andeconomiccontexts.Anothertoolisrequired.Theethicsofcareis
suchatool,allowingustoexamineglobalmoralcontextsthroughanewperspective,andprovidea
betterunderstandingoftherootcausesoftheseproblems,andnewmethodsforaddressingthem.
First,Iwillprovideabriefreviewofthecritical(political)2ethicofcarethatgroundsglobal
careethics,anddemonstratehowtheworkofFionaRobinsonissubtletydifferentfromother
politicalcareethics,largelyintermsofhowRobinsondefinesandmobilizesthepracticesofcareand
expresslytakesontheabilityofcareethicstojudgeacrossculturaldivides.Second,Iwillturntothe
justificationforusingthecriticalethicofcareonaglobalscale.Third,Iwillhighlightfourmoral
contextsthattheethicsofcareiswellsituatedtoassesstodemonstratehowtheethicsofcare
wouldtransformhowweseeandaddressglobalmoralcontexts.Thesefourcontextsaredifference,
exclusion,gender,andviolenceasitrelatestohumansecurity.
Section 1 – A Critical Ethics of Care
BeforeIprovidethejustificationforusingcritical,feministcareethicsonaglobalscale,itis
importanttoreinforcethedifferencesbetweenacriticalethicofcareandtheearlier‘orthodox’care
ethicsofGilliganandNoddings,andalsotodrawoutthesubtledifferencesbetweentheworkof
RobinsonandotherpoliticalcarephilosopherslikeTronto,Kittay,andHeld.RecallfromChapter
One,thattheorthodoxethicsofcareistypicallyassociatedwiththeprivatesphere—thehome,
betweenfriendsandfamily,andtheemotionalinvestmentofcaring—ratherthanthe“widersocial
causesofsufferingandneed.”3Insteadoftryingtoextendemotionalcaringtoitsverylimits,
RobinsontakesthetrackopenedbyTronto,Kittay,andHeld,whousecareethicstocritically
examinethestructuresofpowerandexclusionthatarepresentintheworldtoday.Certainlythese
threepoliticalcaretheoristsarecriticalcaretheorists,buttherearedifferencesbetweenthese
earlierpolitical/criticalcarephilosophersandRobinson.ThemaindifferenceisthatRobinson
focusesonbeingabletomakecareserveasacriticalstandardforinternational(andthereforeintercultural)moralandpoliticaljudgment,andsheaccomplishesthisbydevelopingadifferentanalysis
2
Iusetheterms‘political’and‘critical’ethicofcareinterchangeablytodenotethesamething.Acriticalcare
ethicisconcernedwiththepolitical,andapoliticalethicofcareisinherentlycritical.Theyareoneandthe
same.
3
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,131.
48
ofthepracticesofcarediscussedinthepreviouschaptertoincreasetheirscopeandtheirflexibility
astoolsofanalysis.
Acriticalcareethicfocusesonhowinstitutions,norms,andrelationsofpowershapeour
relationships,eitherenablinggoodformsofcareorperpetuatingharmfulones;careethicsisusedas
alenstoassessrelations.Itdoesnotentailtheclaimthatwecareequallyaboutallpersonsinany
kindofuniversalsense,butthat“[care]reliesonexistingandpotentialrelationsamongmoral
agentsandthecapacityofthoseagentstolearnhowtolistenandrespondtotheneedsofothers.”4
Thecriticalethicsofcareavoidstheproblemthatwouldoccurforglobalcareethicsifwewereto
baseituponNoddings’accountofcare,wherecaringbecamelessobligatoryasrelationsbecame
moredistant.5Instead,acriticalcareethicsuggeststhataperson’scaringresponsibilitiesarenotan
injunctiontocare,butinsteaditisassumedthatwealreadydocare,andwedosoinamultidirectionalwebofrelations.6Thecriticallensofcareallowsustounderstandhowpatternsofpower
(international,national,economic,andsocio-cultural)shapeandalterthecaringrelationshipswe
havewithparticularothers.
Thiscriticallensofcare,however,doesnotofitselfcreateuniversalnormsorrules.Lacking
universalnormsorrulesmakesmoraljudgmentdifficultandrisksdevolvingintomoralrelativism.
Whenjudgingbetweendifferentmoralclaims,becausetheethicsofcaredoesnothaveastandard
setofprescriptionsassuch,itcouldbethoughtthatthereisanopenquestionwithhowtojudge
“therelativevalidityofthosemoralclaims.”7Moraljudgmentsformedinspecificcontextsmightnot
alwaysbeintelligibleinadifferentcontext.Thecritiqueiscorrecttoadegree.Unlikehumanrights
discourses,careethicsdoesnotseektocreateasetofover-archingnormativerules.Forexample,
theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)canserveasatrumporbulwarkagainstharmful
valuesandculturalcontextsthatwehaveintheworldtoday.However,theargumentsforanethic
ofcarearebaseduponscepticismofthepossibilityofagrandunifyingethicaltheorythatis
formalizable,i.e.ruleproducing.Takentogether,itmightleadonetotheconcernthattheethicsof
caredevolvesintomoralrelativism,especiallywhenwerecallthatthefocusofcareethicsis
supposedtobeontheconcreteandtheparticular.Thisresultsinquestionssuchas:howcancare
4
Ibid.,40.
Noddings,47.
6
TovePettersen,"ConceptionsofCare:Altruism,Feminism,andMatureCare,"Hypatia27,no.2(2012):376.
7
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,40.
5
49
ethicsfunctionasacriticaltoolifitcannotjudgethedisparatevaluesystemsintheworld,andhow
canitbeappliedgloballyifitisactuallyrelativisticintermsofitsmoraloutcomes.8
Indirectanswertothosequestions,severalpointscanbemade.First,careethicsdoes
privilegeasetofvaluesandpractices:thevaluesandpracticesofcare.Pointinfact,careismeant
toserveasacritical,universalstandardformoraljudgments,andimportantlycareisastandardof
judgmentthatismuchmoreflexiblethanrightsstandards.9Moraljudgment,fortheethicsofcare,
is“basedonthepossibilityofmakingevident,inparticularcontexts,whatmakes[relationships]
healthyandnurturing,oroppressiveandexploitative.”10Thenormativequestionisnot,solely,
aimedathowIfulfilmycaringresponsibilities,butwhataspectsofourpoliticalandsociallives
impact(forgoodorill)thekindsofrelationshipsandresponsibilitiesIhave.Certainly,this
formulationismoreambiguousthantheoriesofhumanrights,butitsveryambiguityallowsfora
greaterflexibilityinapplyingcritical,feministcareethicstoconcretesituationsastheyarise.The
habitoflookingforrule-basedanswers,likethosethatareproducedbyinternationalhumanrights
discourses,isnotalwaysbeneficialnorisitalwaysnecessarilygoingtoproducetheanswerthatwill
solvetheproblem.Itispossiblethatsuchanswerscansometimesobscurethedeepcomplexitythat
underliesmanyglobalproblems,suchaspoverty,andespeciallythepovertythatwomenface
aroundtheglobe,asoneexampleofpersonswhoarecodedas‘carers’.Thisleadstothesecond
point,namely,thebenefitsofapplyingcareethicstointernationalrelationsisthatitwillilluminate
moralcontextsthathumanrightsoftenoverlookordonoteven‘see’andthuscannotaddress,such
ascomplexcasesofdifferenceandexclusion,bothofwhichhaveprofoundimpactsonothermoral
contextssuchasgenderandviolence.Thelensofcare,then,canbeusedtoexpandthelimitsof
moralandpoliticalthought.11Third,althoughthereisnoclaimtoaspecificsetofuniversalizable
moralrules,thereisonethingthatholdsacrossallhumancultures:peopledolivewithinwebsof
relationships,andrequireabareminimumofcaretoatleastsurvive.Thisstatementisnotinfused
withanynormativecontent,however,andisinsteadtheontologicalstartingpointofcareethics.A
criticalethicsofcareisanothertoolbywhichonecananalyseandassesscomplexethicalsituations,
inadditiontohumanrightsdiscourses.ItisimportanttoreaffirmthatIdonotadvocateaneither/or
8
Thisisanechooftheargumentpresentedagainstorthodoxcareethics,thatitcouldnotaddressjustice
concerns.Moralrelativism,accordingtoRobinson,states“therecanbenocriteriaforjudgingbetweenmoral
systemsorforascertainingasingleobjectivetruth.”(ibid.,41.)
9
Thetensionbetweentheuniversalstandardofcareandthepracticalaimofcaretheorytobeflexibleand
sensitivetocontextwillbeaddressedinChapterSix.
10
FionaRobinson,"Care,GenderandGlobalSocialJustice:Rethinking‘EthicalGlobalization’,"JournalofGlobal
Ethics2,no.1(2006):15.
11
Benhabib,164.
50
situationforcareethicsandhumanrights,butratheracknowledgethatbothhavetheirspecificuses
withintheinternationalcontext,andbothhavetheirparticularbenefits.12
Focusingmorecloselyonmoraljudgment,Robinson’sglobalcriticalcareethicusesthe
practicesofcareasastandardmeasurefornormativeandpoliticalcontexts.Thefirstpracticeis
attentiveness,whichmeanswemustacceptthattherecanbenoassumedideal,abstract,or
universalmoralsituation.Rather,thosewhopracticeacriticalethicsofcare“mustlistentoand
learnfromtheparticularstandpointofrealindividuals.”13Thepracticeofattentivenessrequiresus
tobesensitivetotheneedsandthesituationsofotherpeoplewithoutascribingtothemthelabelof
Other.14UnlikeTronto’sversionofattentiveness,whichcanbeunderstoodas‘flagging’aproblem
orperspective,Robinson’sapproachtoattentivenessrequiresmoreengagement,anactivekindof
listeningwherewemustnotonlybeawareofamoralcontext,butbepreparedtoengageand
interactwiththosewhoexperiencetheparticularcontext.
Thesecondpracticeisresponsibility,whichisa“primarymoralvaluebecause[theethicsof
care]arguesthatmoralactionandsocialchangerequirearecognitionofindividualandshared
responsibilities.”15RobinsonextendsTronto’spracticeofresponsibilitytogroupsandinstitutionsto
underscorethepointthatinstitutionshavetheabilitytoshapeourparticularcaring
responsibilities.16Forexample,societieshaveacollectiveresponsibilitytowardtheirleastfortunate,
andtheinstitutionsinasocietythataidthehomelessandhungryallowforcollectiveresponsiblyto
havetangibleoutputs,andthoseinstitutionsalsoservetostructurethewaywethinkaboutand
relatetotheleastfortunate.Ifsuchservicesarehandledbythestate,aidingtheleastwelloffcan
beunderstoodasapublicgood.Incontrast,ifsuchserviceswerehandledbyprivatecharities,aid
forthehomelessandhungryisseenasoptionalandevensupererogatory.Thelensofcareshows
thatthewayinwhichresponsibilitiesarehandledbyinstitutionsmatterstoourparticular
relationshipswithotherpeople.
Thelastpracticeisresponsiveness,whichmeanstheethicsofcareisapracticalmorality
witha“concretevisionofagencyandaction.”17WhileTronto’spracticeofresponsivenessfocuses
12
SeeChapterThreeforalargerdiscussionofthebenefitsofhumanrightsandthecarecritiqueofhuman
rightsdiscourses.
13
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,39.
14
ForsomeonetobeOther,inthissense,isthatwhichisalienordifferentfromtheparticularpointof
reference,andthatbeingdifferentisoftenseenas‘lesser’or‘bad.’
15
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,39.
16
Inamorerecentbook,CaringDemocracy,Trontoalsodiscussesgroupandinstitutionalresponsibilities,
whichisveryclosetoRobinson’sexpansiononTronto’searlierbook,MoralBoundaries,howeverTrontois
largelyfocusedonthenational,democratic(andthusWestern)context,ratherthantheinternational.For
moreonthepracticeofresponsibilityinacaringdemocracy,seeTronto(2013).
17
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,39.
51
uponthecare-receiverandtheneedforfeedback,Robinson’sformulationofthepracticeof
responsivenessmeansthatactionmustfollowintent,anddosoinatimelymanner.Policycannot
bemadeandthenignored,norcancommitmentsbeagreedtoandthenabandoned.Intention
aloneisnotenoughtogarneranactormoralpraise.Instead,themoralworthofourinteractionsare
largelydependentuponourconcreteactionsastheyflowfromourintentions.Acriticalethicsof
careisnotpreoccupiedwithnecessarilyprescribingmorallygoodactionstakenindividually,or
assessingthemoralworthinessofaperson’smentalstate.Instead,themoralqualityoftheactions
peopleand—moreimportantlyformypurposeshere—institutionstakeareassessedbywhetheror
nottheyfulfiltheircaringresponsibilitiesandareinlinewiththepracticesofcare,andiftheyalso
enableotherstodothesame.18Forexample,intermsofpersons,fulfillingone’scaring
responsibilitiescouldbeunderstoodasthenormalday-to-dayactionstakenbymostparents,orby
nursesataretirementhome.19Intermsofinstitutions,thepracticesofcaremightbebetter
understoodintermsofsocialwelfare,howthepoliciesinplacecanenableindividualstofulfiltheir
caringresponsibilities,suchasthecasewithAustralia’scarerpension,whichprovidespaymentsto
thosewhoprovidecareforanelderlyordisabledfamilymember.
Throughthelensofcare,institutionsarerecognizedasforcesthatshapeourrelationships
withothersandinturnhowwecareforthoseothers.Acriticalethicsofcaretakesthebasic
conceptsfromthemore‘orthodox’careethicsandextendsittoencompassmorethanindividualsin-relationships.Acriticalethicsofcareisfocusedonhowentitieslikegovernments,corporations,
andNon-GovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs)enableorhinderusasindividuals-in-relationshipsto
fulfilourcaringresponsibilities,thehinderingofwhichiswhatcreatesthemoralcontextsthatwe
mustaddress.Next,Iwillprovideanargumentforthejustificationofapplyingacriticalethicsof
careglobally,aswellashighlightingitspotentialasatransformativeethic.
Section 2 – Globalizing Care
Iarguethatitisnotonlypossible,butalsothatitisjustifiabletousecritical,feministcareethicsasa
toolofassessmentandtransformationofglobalmoralcontexts.Thecriticalethicsofcareisfirstand
foremostatoolofassessment,amethodofdiscoverytouncoverwhatunderlyingforceshave
contributedtotheproductionandperpetuationofgrossinjusticessuchasextremepoverty,
18
Fromthispointforward,whenIwriteaboutresponsiveness,IamalwaysusingRobinson’sconceptionof
responsiveness,notTronto’s,unlessotherwisespecified.
19
Here,Iamnotnecessarilydiscussingtheproblemswiththedifferencebetweenunpaid(parents)andpaid
(nurses)carework,noramIdelvingintoconcernsaboutthepoorpaycareworkersreceiveandhowitcanbe
seenasapartofthedevaluingofcare.Suchconcernsareincrediblyimportant,andwillbeaddressedasI
continue.
52
systemicviolence,andgenderandracialdiscrimination.Further,oneofthemorevaluableaspects
ofthecriticalethicsofcareisthatitisatheorythat,whileaimingfortransformation,firmlyworksto
dealwiththeworldasitistoday.Bythis,Imeanitdoesnotrelyonanykindofidealtheorytoframe
it,nordoesitseektocreateasharpbreakbetweenthepresentandsometransformedfuture.The
kindoftransformationthatcareethicsprovidesismorereformthanrevolution,anditisonethatis
basedonnewunderstandings,andalsosuggestswaysthatcaringpracticesthemselvescanenable
transformation.20Careethicscanbeusedbydifferentinstitutionswithdifferentaims,butstillbe
firmintheuseofcareasacriticalstandardandabasisformoraljudgment,andreinforcethe
importanceofcaringpracticesinourlives.Inthissection,Iwillprovideanoverviewoftheglobal
ethicofcareandinthenextsectiondiscussinmoredetailtheuniqueadvantagestheethicsofcare
offerswhenworkingwithmoralcontextscentredondifference,exclusion,gender,andviolence.
Usingaglobalethicofcaredependsuponacceptingtheideathatthecurrentstateofglobal
affairscanbeunderstoodasaseriesofrelationshipsbetweenstates,corporations,othergroups,
andspecificpeopleandthattheethicsofcarecanbeusedasacriticaltooltoassessthose
relationships.Itisnotthemerefactofglobalizationthatmakesthecriticalethicsofcareviableasa
globalethic.Ratheritisthefactthatthecurrentglobalsituation“forcesustoconfronttheunique
paradoxofincreasinginterrelatednessinthecontextofprofounddifferences.”21Nations,
companies,andpeoplelivewithinawebofglobalrelationships,whichrequiresustobeguidedby
thepracticeofattentivenessinordertounderstandhowindividuallivesareconstitutedbytheir
particularlocationwithinthiswebofglobalrelations.Ifoneacceptsthatrelationshipsprovide
multipleseatsofmoralconcern,andthatthecritical,feministethicsofcareiswellsuitedto
assessingrelationships,thenitfollowsthattheethicsofcarecanbeusedinaglobalcontextbecause
relationshipsexistbetweeninternationalentities.Itcannotsaywhethersomeone’smentalstateis
virtuous,orwhethersomeone’srightshavebeenmetorviolated.Bothoftheseassessmentscan
stillbeincrediblyvaluable,buttheydonotthemselvesholdalltheanswerstotheoften-complicated
ethicalsituationsthatexisttheworldover.Theethicsofcareinsteadcanassessthemoralcontent
oftherelationshipbetweeninternationalactors,anditcanalsogobeyondsimpleassessmenttoa
criticalquestioningaboutwhatabadrelationshipisandwhatmakesthatrelationshipoccurinthe
firstplace.Theserelationshipscanperpetuatepatternsofunequalpower,difference,andexclusion,
anditisthesimplefactthattheserelationshipsexistthatjustifiesourabilitytousearelationalethic
likecareethicsasatoolofassessmentofthecurrentglobalorder.
20
Conradi,118.
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,45.
21
53
Toillustratethevalueofusingcareethicstoassessinternationalrelationships,considerthe
‘globalcarechain’wheresomewomenmigratefromtheirhomecountriestoahostnationinorder
tofindbetterpayingemployment.Manyofthesemigrantwomenworkinhomes,carefacilities,or
asnursestomakeupforacaredeficitincurredbywomeninahostnationworkingoutsidethe
home,alackofpeoplewillingtotakeonlow-pay,low-statuscarework,oranursingshortage.22
Thesemigrantwomenareoftenmothersthemselves,wholeavebehindchildrenandfamily,to
whomtheyremitmuchoftheirpay.Thosechildreninturnneedlookingafter,sooftenlocalwomen
inthehomecountryarenanniesthemselves,leavingtheirchildrenbehindtolookafterthechildren
ofawomanworkingoverseas.23Thesecarechainsarenottheproductofso-called‘freechoice’(and
inChapterThreeIbrieflydiscusshowthelensofcareilluminatesideasaboutfreedomandchoice),
ratherthereareglobal“interlockingsystemsofoppressionthatproducedomesticworkersandthe
womenwhodependuponthem.”24By‘produce,’itisimportanttomakeclearthattransnational
careworkersarenotimaginedtohavenochoice,noautonomy,orcannotresisttheforcesof
globalizationasthoughtheywereperfectlyoverwhelming.Rather,thepointisthatthecurrent
patternsofpowerthatexistlocallyandgloballyproducethesetofchoicesthatsomewomenface,
andtheacknowledgmentthatthesechoicesaresometimessoconstrainedastonotbe‘free.’25
Transnationalworkerscertainlymakechoices,anddosowiththebestinformationtheyhave
availabletothem,andhavealreadybeguntoresisttherelationsofpowerthat,inpart,constitute
theirlivesasdomesticworkers.Forexample,theInternationalDomesticWorkersNetworkoperates
in47countriesandismadeupofoverhalfamilliondomesticworkers.26
Thepatternsofpowerthatproducethechoicesdomesticcarersfaceareaninterplay
betweennormsaboutgender,carework,‘productive’work,nationalandforeignpolicy,and
economicandsocialpressurescombinetocreatethefactorsthat:1)pullwomentowardwealthy
nationstofillthecaredeficitcreatedby‘Western’womenengaginginthelabourmarket;and2)
pushwomenoutoftheirhomecountriestoprovidemorematerialsecurityfortheirown
dependents.AsFionaWilliamsnotes,thereisamarkedpreference,atleastinsomeEuropean
countries,for‘mothersubstitutecare’,andnotesthatequalityforsomeonewomenhascometo
meanadeeperinequalityforotherwomen,thosewhotakeuptheundervaluedworkofcarethat
‘working’womennolongerhavetimetoperform.27AsAllisonWeirargues,theprimaryfocusmust
22
FionaWilliams,"MarketsandMigrantsintheCareEconomy,"Soundings,no.47(2011):23-4.
Hochschild,19-21.
24
AllisonWeir,"GlobalCareChains:Freedom,Responsibility,andSolidarity,"TheSouthernJournalof
Philosophy46(2008):170.Emphasisintheoriginal.
25
SeeChapterThreeforwhatImeanwhenIsay‘free’choices.
26
"InternationalDomesticWorkersNetwork,"http://www.idwfed.org/en.3October2016.
27
Williams,"MarketsandMigrantsintheCareEconomy,"26-7.
23
54
beontheimmigrantcareworkersandthequestionofwhether“theywouldbedoingthesejobsat
alliftheglobaleconomydidnotforcethemtoleavetheirimpoverishedhomecountriestocarefor
thechildrenofthewealthy,”28doesmoretodirectlyaddressthefraughtpositionthatthe
transnationalcareworkerinhabits.Examplesoftheglobalcarechainwillbepresentthroughout
thisthesisandserveasaprimescenariotoillustratehowthelensofcarecanofferadifferent
perspectivethanhumanrightsdiscourses,whichIwilladdressinChapterThree.
Anotherpointinfavourforusingcareethicsinternationallyisthatthefocusonrelationships
meansthatwhenassessingthemoralimpactofanypolitical,social,oreconomicpolicy,thereisa
differentstandardofwhatitmeansforhumanbeingstoflourishandthrivewherecareandits
‘reproductive’tasksarejustasvitalastraditional‘productive’labour.Careethics,anditspracticeof
attentiveness,turnsourgazetoaspectsofglobalizationthatarenotoften‘seen’bysomeofthe
moremainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses.ForallthatIhavediscussedtheimportanceoffulfilling
one’scaringobligations,itisjustasimportanttoassess“thewayinwhichmoralandsocial
responsibilitiesareassignedanddistributedwithindifferentsocial-moralsystems,andexamining
theattendantpowerrelationsandmaterialconsequencesofthosedistributions.”29Forexample,
considerthe‘doubleday’—wherewomenengageinpaidworkoutsidethehomeandcaringworkat
home—thatmanywomenexperienceasareadyexampletodemonstratethewaysinwhichsocial
responsibilitiesareoftenunevenlyandunfairlydistributed.Thereasonscouldbealackofstate
protectionsforparentstohaveflexibleworkhours,sociallyreinforcednormsaboutwomen,not
men,beingcarers,oracombinationofboththatcontributetothecontinuedexistenceofthe
‘doubleday’.
Whentheconcernsofcareareunderstoodasvitaltohumanflourishing,wecanbegintosee
howthecriticalethicofcarecantransformourunderstandingofglobalmoralcontexts.Usingthe
lensofcare,wecanbegintopictureaworldofprofoundinterdependence,andusethepracticeof
responsibilityasaguideforhowtoassignourcaringresponsibilities,personallyandinstitutionally.
Theincreasedinterconnectednessandinterdependenceoftheworldmeansthatourrelationships
withdistantstrangersarenotsodistantaswemightthink,andthatallhumans(notonlywomen,
andnotonlywomeninandfromdevelopingnations)wouldgreatlybenefitfromrethinkingthe
relationshipbetweenworkandcare,whichcouldcontributetogreaterhumanflourishingaround
theworld.Robinsonnotes,“Thetasksofsocialreproduction—includingfosteringthevirtuesof
caringandthecarryingoutofthepracticesofdailycaringwork—wouldbeseenasimportantforms
28
AllisonWeir,"TheGlobalUniversalCaregiver:ImaginingWomen'sLiberationintheNewMillennium,"
Constellations12,no.3(2005):313.
29
Robinson,"Care,GenderandGlobalSocialJustice:Rethinking‘EthicalGlobalization’,"16.
55
ofcivicparticipation.”30Sheacknowledges,however,thatthiswouldnotbetheonlypartofcivic
participation,butanimportantonethatmakescaringapartofthelivesofallpersons.
Infocusingontherelationalaspectofhumanexistenceandflourishingandtheconcernsof
care,oneoftheglobalmoralcontextsthatacriticalethicsofcarebringstotheforeisthespecific
disadvantagewomenexperienceglobally,andspecificallyintheGlobalSouth.Althoughthereare
substantiveissueswithdeterminingwhetherornottherehasbeena‘feminization’ofpoverty,itis
atleasttruethatbysomeofthemostpopularpovertymetrics,suchastheWorldBank’s
InternationalPovertyLine(IPL),thatthesituationofpoorwomenisnotwelldocumentedor
understood.31Further,becausetheIPLisametricbasedonhouseholds,itcannotencompassthe
waysinwhichthedistributionofhouseholdresourcesisunequal.Forinstance,“moremoneyis
oftenspentforboys’educationthanforgirls’andonhealthcareformenandboysthanforwomen
andgirls.”32NorcantheIPLnecessarilyassessthewaysinwhichmigrantworkersmightearnmore
moneythaninpastdecades,buttheirfamiliesarestillpoor.Inspiteofanincreaseofwomen
engaginginpaidwork,especiallyinexport-manufacturing,therehasbeen“acontinuingerosionof
theirpotentialandexistingsocialentitlements,”33entitlementsthatoftensupportedwomensuchas
childcare,eldercare,andhealthcare.Further,becausewomen’s“livesasworkerscannotbe
separatedfromtheirlivesascarers,”34frictioniscreatedbetweenthewomenwhoworkandtheir
employersbecauseoftheassumptionthatworkandhomeshouldbeseparable.Thisisoneofthe
manypressuresexperiencedbywomen,becausewhilethereisanincreaseofwomeninwagework,
womenarealsoheavilyreliedupontosupplynon-paidcareworkfortheirfamilytosurvive.One
answertotheproblemswomenfaceinworkinginmanydevelopingcountrieshasbeenthe
InternationalLabourOrganization’slabourrightsandstandards.However,theproblemisthatsuch
standardsandrightsareconstructedas‘gender-blind,’35whichdoesnotgiveenoughspacetothe
understandingthatthereproductiveworkofcareisjustasimportanttothesurvivaloffamiliesas
theproductiveworkofpaidlabour.36Instead,theethicsofcareissensitivetothewaysinwhich
gender,race,geopoliticallocationandpowerworktogethertomarginalizesomewomen.For
example,poorerwomenoftenlackaccesstoreproductivehealth,butareneverthelessaccountable
30
Ibid.,20.
AlisonM.Jaggar,"DoesPovertyWearaWoman’sFace?SomeMoralDimensionsofaTransnationalFeminist
ResearchProject,"Hypatia28,no.2(2013):243.
32
Ibid.
33
FionaRobinson,"BeyondLabourRights,"InternationalFeministJournalofPoliitcs8,no.3(2006):324.
34
Ibid.,326.
35
Theproblemwith‘gender-blindness’asavirtueisthatitignoresthewaysinwhichgenderdeeplymattersto
ourmoralandpoliticallives.ThisideaisexpandeduponinSection3.3ofthischapter.
36
Robinson,"BeyondLabourRights,"329.
31
56
fortheirchildrenasthoughtheyhadthesamechoicesaswomenwhodohavethataccess.37This
‘double-bind’asitwere,demonstratesthatseriousattentionmustbepaidtotheparticularsofthe
rootcausesofwomen’spoverty,andwecannotbetemptedbytheluxuryofassumptions.
Critical,feministcareethicschallengeshowweviewtherelationshipbetweenworkandcare,
andbringsforwardtheunderstandingthatcareisnecessaryforhumanbeingstosurviveandthrive,
thatis,toflourish.Ourcaringresponsibilitiescertainlyexist,andthecaringpracticeofresponsibility
incriticalcareethicsdemandsthatweinvestigatewhytheyexistastheydonow,andmakeclear
thatthereisnothing‘necessary’abouttheircurrentconfiguration.Thisleadstothetransformative
forceofcareethics.Theshiftinperceptionnecessaryforthiskindoftransformationdoesnotneed
tooriginatefromthestate,because“careasacriticalpracticecanitselfinspireandchallenge
conventionalthinking.”38Transformationitselfissomethingwepractice,andwecanunderstand
transformationassomethingthatwedoinrelationtoandwithparticularothers.Thepossibilityof
socialtransformationthroughthepracticesofcarearebasedontheideathatwhenweact
differentlywearedoingtwothingsatonce:1)“demonstratinghowtoactbetter;”and2)
“counteractingbadpractice,suchasimprovingbadconditionsorflawedorganisations.”39Such
transformationsarealreadyoccurringindevelopingcountriesaroundtheworld.Different
organizationsofwomenworkersarecoalescinginordertoprotecttheinterestsoftheirmembers
andtohelpthembalance‘productive’workandcaringlabourinwaysthatdonotleavethemwith
thelargershareofthesumtotalofthetwo.SuchorganizationsincludeNariUddugKendraand
UthsaoandPhulkiinBangladesh,andtheverysuccessfulSEWA(Self-EmployedWomen’s
Association)inIndia.40Theseorganizationsenactdifferentkindsofpractices,demonstratingthat
thereareotherwaystoactthatcanmeettheirneeds,andworkingagainstthebadinstitutional
practicesthatledthemtocreatetheirownorganizationsinthefirstplace.Theyaredemonstrating
howthestateshouldhavebeentreatingthem,andassuchpracticingthetransformationthatthe
statewouldnotenactitself.Additionally,successstoriessuchastheoneslistedabovecouldvery
wellservetocallattentiontothewaysinwhichgovernmentsandotherinstitutionshavefailedthe
verypeopletheyshouldhavebeensupporting.Theseorganizationsservetodemonstratethatthere
wasagapingovernmentalsupportandwecanusethelensofcaretoquestionwhythatgap
occurredandwhatmadeitpoliticallyacceptable.
Lastly,acriticalethicofcareisnotsimplyawaytoprotecthumanflourishingwithin
relationships,buttoprovidedirectionforethical(i.e.morallypraiseworthy)globalization.The
37
Kittay,"Welfare,Dependency,andaPublicEthicofCare,"127.
Conradi,123.
39
Ibid.,124.Emphasisintheoriginal.
40
Robinson,"BeyondLabourRights,"335.
38
57
increasedinterconnectednessofpersonsandinstitutionsisanevermorevisiblefactorofhumanlife.
Simplylookingatwheremyfoodcomesfromdemonstratesthatnationalisolationishardlypossible
oratruthfulpictureoftheworldformoststatesintheearly21stcentury.Thequestionbecomes
howtobestadjustsocialandpoliticalpolicytoglobalizeethically,giventheinterconnectednature
ofmodernhumancivilization.Usingthelensofcare,coremoralproblemswouldshiftfromwhat
rightstoprotectandhowtoprotectthem,toissuesaboutdependence,vulnerability,andthe
relationsofpowerpresentintheworldthatcanpreventhumanflourishing.Withdifferentcore
moralproblemsidentified,therewouldbeasubsequentshiftinthekindsofpolicyandgovernment
programsthatareinplace.Ultimatelyitwouldmean“fosteringaglobalcultureofcare.”41While
thevaluesofcarewouldbeprioritized,thatdoesnotmeanthatcarewouldberomanticized.Oneof
thebenefitsofcareethicsisthatitisself-critical,asitmustalwaysguardagainstconcernsabout
parochialismorpaternalism.Itcanbeself-correcting,becausecentraltocareethicsisthe
knowledgethatothersdonotshareourownbackgroundassumptions,andthetheoristmustbe
sensitivetothatinarealandmeaningfulway,guidedbythepracticeofresponsiveness.Thismeans
thattheethicsofcareiswellsuitedtouncoveringdeeplyheldnormsthatpervadethecurrentglobal
order.ItistosomeofthesenormsthatIturntonext,demonstratinghowtheethicsofcarecan
shedlightontheseoftenunseenorignoredglobalmoralcontexts.
Section 3 – Global Moral Contexts
Thefocusofthissectionistoprovideconcreteexamplesofthecapacityofthecritical,feminist
ethicsofcaretoassessglobalmoralcontextsandprovideacriticalanalysis.Thetransformative
effectofapplyingcritical,feministcareethicswillbeaddressedinChapterFivewhereIdiscussthe
intersectionofcareethicsandpublicpolicy.Here,Iammoreinterestedindemonstratingoneofthe
benefitsofacriticalethicsofcare,whichgivesgreaterattentiontothebackgroundconditionsof
inequalityandinjustice.Manyofthesebackgroundconditionshavetodowithissuesofsocial
reproduction,whicharenecessaryforhumanlifetocontinue.Theseissuesincludethedivisionof
responsibilityforcarelabourinthehomeandthecommunity,thelackofresourcesforcare,the
statusofcareworkers,andthatcareworkiseitherlow-paidorunpaid,whichsustainsacycleof
inequalityandexploitation.Oneofthemajorareasofinvestigationforglobalcareethicsisthe
transnationalmigrationofcare,i.e.‘globalcarechains.’Thesecomplexchainsofcaredemonstrate
thatcareisatransnationalissue,thatcareshortagesmatter,andthatperhapsnormsaboutcareand
41
"Care,GenderandGlobalSocialJustice:Rethinking‘EthicalGlobalization’,"22.
58
workneedtochange,especiallynormsthatfosterracialandgenderinequality.42Alloftheseissues
arereflectedandinfluencedbymacroeconomicpoliciesinstitutedbybothdomesticand
multinationalinstitutions.43
Arelatedbenefitofexaminingthesecontextsthroughthelensofcareisthattheanalysis
thatcareethicsprovidespresentsachallengetothenormsthatunderlietheseissuesandcreate
systemicmarginalizationandvulnerabilityonaglobalscale.Thenormsarounddifference,exclusion,
gender,andviolenceareprimaryexamplesofsitesofmoralconcernthatcanbeassessedand
investigatedbytheethicsofcare.Further,thisanalysiscanprovideadifferentperspectiveonthe
waysinwhichweunderstandsuchmoralcontexts.44Thisdifferentperspective,inturn,canprovide
newreasonstoactandnewsitesofpotentialtransformation.
AswillbemorefullyexploredinChapterThree,contrastingtheethicsofcarewitha
standardhumanrightsapproachcanprovideverydifferentperspectivesoninjustice.Humanrights,
whileoftenusedtoidentifyanexistingsiteofinequalityorinjustice,doesnotnecessarilytellus
anythingaboutwhyaparticularinjusticeoccursinthefirstplace.Forexample,weacceptthatthere
isahumanrightagainstracialdiscrimination.However,thisrightonlysaysthatracialdiscrimination
iswrong;itdoesnothingtoinvestigatewhysomeonemightholdracistviews,norcanitchallenge
powerfullyheldracistviews.Theproclamationofrightstellsus“verylittleaboutwhy[some]are
unabletoexercisethoserights.”45Theethicsofcare,ontheotherhand,wouldseektoexaminewhy
someonewouldholdsuchviewsinthefirstplace,andperhapsfindingthatthereisafeedbackloop
betweenpervasivesocialnorms,legalsanctions,andpersonalignorance.Then,onemightbeable
tonotonlydeterminethatracismis,ofcourse,wrong,butisalsoabletounderstandhowracismcan
takeholdinthefirstplace.Ofcourse,simplyunderstandingsomethingdoesnotautomaticallyfix
theproblem,butmycontentionisthatadeeperunderstandingwillprovideawiderrangeofoptions
whenattemptingtocombatpervasiveandinsidiousproblemslikeracism,whereoftentimesthe
reasonsaracistholdsforbeingracistarenotthatcleartoevenherorhimself.Greater
understandingleadstogreaterpotentialfortransformation.
42
FionaWilliams,"InandBeyondNewLabour:TowardsaNewPoliticalEthicsofCare,"CriticalSocialPolicy21,
no.4(2001):485.
43
Robinson,"Care,GenderandGlobalSocialJustice:Rethinking‘EthicalGlobalization’,"20.
44
RecallIamusing‘contexts’asRobinsondoes,insteadofcallingthem‘problems’or‘issues.’SeeFootnote1
inthischapterforamoredetailedexplanation.
45
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,49.
59
Section 3.1 – Difference
Oneofthemainbenefitstousingthecritical,feministethicsofcareforglobalmoralcontextsisthat
itcanbeamorenuancedandsubtleapproachtohandlingproblemsandissuesthatarisefromthe
needtobalanceincreasedconnectednessandtheprofounddifferencesthatstillexistintheworld
today.Usingthelensofcare,weseethatdifferenceshouldnotbeerasednorshoulditbeanexcuse
tocontinuetoavoidmattersofdeepmoralconcern.Instead,theethicsofcareprioritizes
“[r]ecognizingandrespectingtheworthofhumandifferences”46inordertochallengenotionsthat
simplytreatingothersasthesameisenoughtocombatinjustice.Theethicsofcareinsteaddenies
thatdifferencenecessarilycreatessocialdistance,nordoesitassumethatassimilationofdifference
isthesolution.47Rather,anethicsofcare,withthepracticeofattentiveness,questionsbackground
assumptionsaboutwhat“makessomedifferencessalientandothersunimportant.”48
Differenceisbestunderstoodasexisting“inthecontextofarelationship.”49Fordifferences
tobeidentified,arelationshipmustexistinordertogivethatdifferencemeaning.Forexample,
considertheFilipinawomenwhomigratetoCanadathroughaguestworkerprogram.Manyof
thesewomenleavebehindtheirownchildrentocareforthechildrenofoften,whitemiddle-class
women.TheFilipinanannyandthefamilythathiredherhavearelationship,asdothegovernments
ofCanadaandthePhilippines,andoneoftheresultsofthatrelationshipistheguestworker
program.TheinequalitybetweenCanadaandthePhilippinesintermsofbargainingpositionand
overallstandingintheglobalrelationsofpowerisapartofhowtherelationshipbetweenthefamily
andthenannyareconstructed.Canada,andthustheCanadianfamily,hasthegreaterparityofthe
power,andassuchhasmoreabilitytoexertthatpoweroverthePhilippinesandtheFilipinananny.
Withoutthetransnationalguestworkerprogram,Canadianswouldnotnecessarilyconstruct
Filipinasasbeingprimecandidatesfordomesticwork.Thelensofcare,hereguidedbythepractice
ofattentiveness,canuncoverhowpublicpolicy,liketheguestworkerprogram,canfosterand
perpetuateformsofdifference,especiallyracializedformsofdifferenceinthisinstance,thatserve
toconceptuallyconnectnon-whitewomenandgoodprovisionofcare.AsAllisonWeirnotes,
eliminatingraceandclassoppressionisvitaltoovercominggenderoppressionaswell.50These
differencesinraceandclassallowfortheperpetuationofharmfulconceptionsofothers,andalso
standinthewayoflargergendersolidarity,dividingwomenintocare-consumersandcare-providers.
Ifwearetoresolvetheproblemsthatconstructionsofdifferencecangenerate,wemustbeaware
46
OlenaHankivsky,"ImaginingEthicalGlobalization:TheContributionsofaCareEthic,"JournalofGlobalEthics
2,no.1(2006):100.
47
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,100.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.,155.
50
Weir,"TheGlobalUniversalCaregiver:ImaginingWomen'sLiberationintheNewMillennium,"316.
60
ofthewaysinwhichdifferenceitselfisperpetuatedthroughnorms,institutions,andotherrelations
ofpower.
Differenceisconstructedinrelationship,andthoserelationsarealsoshapedbythevery
normssurroundinghowdifferenceishandledandperpetuated,anddifferencecanbefurther
enforcedthrough“thestructuralandnormativeinequalitiespresentintheglobalcapitalistpolitical
economy.”51HowdifferenceisconstructedcanservetorendersomepersonsasOther,assomeone
whoisonlyfitforcertainkindsofwork,oracertainplaceintheworld,thatdoesnotholdthesame
kindofassumedworththatotherrolesarefavouredwith,suchasthatofaprofessorordoctoror
evenawhitecollarofficeworker.Thiskindofdifferencecanbelinkedtotheworthofaperson,
wherethosewhoengageincaringlabourareoftenseenasworthlessthanthosewhoengagein
‘productive’work.Further,whendisparategroupsholdtodifferentvaluesystems,thiscanbeused
asareasontonotengageinasharedmoralprojectatall.
Importantly,thecaringpracticeofattentivenessrequiresustoengagewiththeracialized
contextofcare,andhow“changingregimesofcareprovisionreconstitute,forbetterorforworse,
existingracialdivisionsoflabour.”52Canadianwomenareoftenseenas‘freed’fromhavingtobea
stay-at-homemother,havingtobeseenas‘essentially’awifeandmother.Feminismhasdonea
greatdealforCanadianwomen,andmillionsofotherWesternwomen,gainingsuchwomenentry
intotheworkforce.Whathasnotmaterializedalongsidesuchliberation,however,isa
correspondingculturalshiftthatwouldfirmlyde-couplewomenandchildrearing,incorporating
menmorefullyintothesphereofdomesticlabourinsteadofallowingcareto‘passon’frommento
womenorracialized‘other’persons.Somewomenavoidhavingtoworka‘double-day,’byhiring
nannies,andinordertokeepcostsdownitiseasiertohirewomen53whowilldogoodworkbutfor
lessmoney.Here,itispossibletoseeaverysubtle,racializedkindofdifferenceatplayinsituations
likethis.Forexample,Filipinawomenareconstruedas‘different’fromtheiroften-whiteemployers,
inthattheyareconsideredmoresuitedfordomesticwork,trustworthyintermsofchildcare,and
willingtoacceptlesspaythanfullCanadiancitizens,byvirtueoftheimageofthe‘goodFilipina
mother.’Further,thelabourrightsthatprotectaCanadiancitizenfromworkplaceabusedonot
necessarilyextendinfullmaterialformtotheFilipinananny.Becausethematerialcircumstances
areverydifferent,andthereissomuchlessoversightindomesticwork,treatingthecitizenworker
andthetransnationaldomesticworkerasthesamedoesnotnecessarilypreventorcallattentionto
51
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,114.
Williams,"InandBeyondNewLabour:TowardsaNewPoliticalEthicsofCare,"484.
53
Anditisoftenwomenwhoarehiredtobenannies,reinforcingthepossibilitythatthereisstill,inoursocioculturalstructure,somethingthatdeeplylinkswomenandchildrenthatresultsinamarkedpreferencefor
womentobecaretakersinsteadofequallyqualifiedmen.
52
61
possiblesitesofinjustice.Then,becausetheCanadianfamilylivesincloseproximitywiththe
Filipinawoman,theassumeddifferencescanbereinforcedandperpetuatedbecausetheirmain
contactwithFilipinopersonsandcultureiswithaFilipinadomesticworker.Howwedefinepeople
asdifferentandthereforeasdeservingdifferentkindsofprotectionsisalsopartofthesocial
constructionofdifference.Thisisimportanttounderstandbecausedifferenceisoftenapreludeto
harmfulexclusionarypractices.
Section 3.2 – Exclusion
Exclusionisoftenpredicateduponandcanalsoproduceperceived,negativetypesofdifference.In
theinternationalsystem,exclusionisoftenaccomplishedthroughcitizenshipandasenseofnational
belonging,andatthesametimedefiningtheselfinrelationtoOthers.IrisMarionYoungexamined
thispoliticalphenomenoninthecontextofracialandsocialgroupswithinastate,notingthat“[t]he
idealofcommunity[…]validatesandreinforcesthefearandaversionsomesocialgroupsexhibit
towardothers.”54Thiscanalsoholdtrueforthenation-state,whenthenationitselfisidealizedas
beingcomposedofcertainkindsofpersons,thisunderwritestheexclusionofthosewhoare
differentfromtheideal.Thecritical,feministethicsofcarecanofferanimportantlensonexclusion
becauseofthe“constructionofidentitylinkedtocitizenshipandnationality.”55Thepracticeof
citizenshipandidentitybuildinginrelationtoaparticularnation-statenecessarilyexcludesothers,
markingthosenon-citizensasdifferentfromcitizensandimposingastructureonourcaring
responsibilities.Thisisnottosaythatstatesthemselvesaretheproblem,orthattheyshouldbe
abolishedinfavourofsomesortofworldgovernment.Rather,thepointisthatwhenpursuinga
theoryofethicalglobalization,wemustbeattentivetotheconstructionofidentityandpatternsof
exclusionthatservetokeepbillionsofpeopleinpositionsofinsecurity,aswellashowtheworkof
careitselfcanbeobscuredfromdeeperconsideration.
Justlikedifference,exclusioncannothappenwithoutarelationship.56Itisalwayswithinthe
contextoftwoormoreactors.Theethicsofcare,asarelationalethic,iswellsuitedtouncovering
theoftencomplexwaysinwhichinternationalorganizationsandnationalgovernmentsinteract,
withtheglobalrichoftenbeingabletodictatetermstotheglobalpoor.Careethics,guidedbythe
practiceofresponsibility,canalsocriticallyassesshowthoseexclusionaryinternationalrelationships
54
IrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990),235.
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,114.
56
Itshouldbenotedthatalthoughdifferencecanleadtoprofoundandveryharmfulexclusion,theethicsof
caredoesnotseektohandlethemasiftheywereoneandthesame.Whendifferenceisunderstoodasa
relationalconstruct,neithernecessarilyethicallygoodnorbad,wecanandshouldfindwaystorespect
differencewithoutfallingintoexclusionaryhabits.
55
62
impactthelivesofrealpeoplewithinthecontextoftheirconcretepersonalrelationships,because
normsandinstitutionsshapehowwecarryoutourcaringresponsibilities.Thesekindsoftensions
areplayedoutallovertheworld.LetusonceagainusetheexampleoftheFilipinadomesticworker
holdingaplaceofemploymentwithaCanadianfamily.Shehasleftherhomecountry,andin
predominantlyCaucasianCanadasheisanethnicminority,unabletogainthesamebenefitsof
citizenshipinherhostcountry.57Sheisexcludedfromthebenefitsofthecountryinwhichshelives,
eventhoughshemightpaytaxestothatcountry.Sheisresponsibleforthecareofchildrenwhoare
citizens,butisnotapartofthefamily.Further,thiswomanisinauniquepositionofvulnerability,
oftenunabletodemandovertimepay,daysoff,andisdependentuponavisatocontinuetowork.
Whileperhapsnoneofherrightsarebeingviolated,atleastnotinacivicsense,sheiscertainlynot
‘oneofus’toCanadians,butrather‘oneofthem’,anOther,someonewhoispresenttodothework
thatnooneelsewantstodo.Herdifferenceispartofherexclusionfromthelargerdiscussionabout
whythereisademandfortransnationalmigrantlabour,orwhyWesternwomenandmenfeelthe
needtohiredomesticworkersinthefirstplace.Inamorematerialsensesheisalsoexcluded,by
herlackofcitizenship,frombeingabletovotetostrengthendomesticlabourlaws,aswellbeing
unabletouseherownvoicetogiveventtoherconcerns.58TheFilipinanannyinthisinstancefaces
morethanonetypeofexclusion:fromhavingapoliticalvoiceandfromhavinghercareneeds
attendedandrespondedto.Herrelativelackofpowerinthecontextofothershavingmuchmore
poweroverherispartofwhatallowssuchexclusionstohappeninthefirstplace.Throughthelens
ofcare,wecanseethatwhenthebalanceofpowerissoheavilyskewed,thegloballydisadvantaged
cannotalwaysputpressureonthemorepowerfultodealfairlywiththosewhoareoften
marginalizedandexcluded.
Critical,feministcareethicswouldalsochallengethewaysinwhichconsiderationsofcare
arealsoexcludedfrompublicconcernaswell.Thisexclusionofcarefrompublicconcernoccursnot
onlythroughlegislation,butthroughaccountingmetricsaswell.TheUnitedNationsSystemof
NationalAccounts(UNSNA)isstilloneofthemostwidelyusedaccountingmetrics,butitreliesona
‘consumptionboundary’where“manydomesticandpersonalservices[…]donot‘count’whenthey
areproducedandconsumedwithinthesamehousehold.”59Thisallowsfortheworkofcaretobe
renderedinvisible,tobeexcludedfromconceptionsof‘work’,whichservestokeeptheworkofcare
andthosewhoprovideit(oftenwomen,and/orracializedpersonsfromdifferentgeopolitical
57
FionaRobinson,TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity(Philadelphia:TempleUniversity
Press,2011),73.
58
Williams,"MarketsandMigrantsintheCareEconomy,"27-8.
59
MarilynWaring,"CountingforSomething!RecognizingWomen'sContributiontotheGlobalEconomy
throughAlternativeAccountingSystems,"GenderandDevelopment11,no.1(2003):35.
63
locations)frompublicconsiderationandunderstanding.Whencareisrelegatedtotheprivate
sphere,whenitisseenasonlyamoralconsiderationforthefamilyorclosefriendships,thenwe
excludefromviewthewaysinwhichcareisprofoundlyshapedbypolitical,economic,andcultural
patternsofpower.Rather,ifasIarguedinChapterOneandSection2ofthischapter,we
understandthatinstitutionsprofoundlyshapeourrelationswithparticularothers,andthathowwe
careforothersisnotnecessarilyfixed(i.e.thereisnothing‘natural’aboutanyofthewayswe
currentlyprovidecare),60thencareitselfmustbeincludedinpoliticaldiscourse,nationallyand
internationally.Theimperativetoincludecareininternationalpoliticsispredicateduponthe
understandingthatnotonlydonationalpolicieshaveinternationalscope(inthecaseoftheFilipina
nanny,orcasesofimmigrationorrefugees),butthatthepracticesofcare,especiallyhowcaring
responsibilitiesareportionedoutbetweenpersons,arealreadyinternationalized.61Wemustbe
abletounderstandthecurrentmigrationofcareworkbetweennations,andthelensofcareensures
thatweincludetheseconcernswhenwereasoninternationally.
Theethicsofcare,asananalyticaltool,seekstouncoverthewaysinwhichexclusionis
createdandperpetuatedthroughouttheinternationalrealm.Thequestionofexclusion—who
countsandwhodoesnotcount—hasbeenlongapartofwhatpoliticalphilosophyhasbeenvery
concernedwith.Forexample,inthelastfewdecadestherehasbeenunprecedentedeconomic
growth,butthisgrowthhasnotbeenevenlydistributed.Whiletheso-calledWest(orGlobalNorth
assomelabelit)hasprofited,manynationsintheGlobalSouthhavemoredebt,greaterlevelsof
“poverty,hunger,exploitationoflabour,destructionoftheenvironment,[and]cultural
devastation.”62Thisunequalplayingfield,inpartproppedupbytheconstructionofdifference,can
determinewhohasa‘voice’—orattheveryleastwhose‘voice’isthe‘loudest’—intheconversation
aboutglobe-spanningissues,likeinternationaltradeagreements,orenvironmentalprotections.The
trans-nationalisationofcareworkexemplifiestheunequalpowerrelationsthatexistintheworld
today,becauseacaredeficitinonepartoftheworldcreatesenoughofademandforlabourthat
somewomenfromothernationsbecomemigrantcareworkerstofulfilthatdemand,andleave
behindthemacaredeficitintheirhomecountry.63Theseunequalpowerrelationsallowthe
continuedexclusionofcareworkers,andeventheconcernsofcareitself,frompolitical
consideration,thusshapingourcaringresponsibilities.
60
Tronto,"CareasaBasisforRadicalPoliticalJudgments,"145-6.
Williams,"InandBeyondNewLabour:TowardsaNewPoliticalEthicsofCare,"486.
62
Hankivsky,101.
63
Williams,"InandBeyondNewLabour:TowardsaNewPoliticalEthicsofCare,"485-6.
61
64
Section 3.3 – Gender
Theethicsofcareis,atitsroots,afeministethic,andassuchitexpresslyexaminesthelivesof
women.However,itisimportanttoconsidermorethanfemininityandhowwomen’slivesarelived.
Theethicsofcare,constructedascriticaltool,canbeturnedtoourconstructionsofgenderona
largerscale.Itisimportanttotakeacriticaleyetotheconstructofmasculinityjustasmuchasthe
constructoffemininity.Bothconceptsofgendershapetheworldthatweliveinandinfluencethe
moralchoicesthatallpeoplemake.Theethicsofcareconsidersthemoralimplicationsofgender
beyondbasicsocialjustice,whichturnsontheideathatnooneshouldbediscriminatedagainston
thebasisoftheirgender.Instead,theethicsofcareaskshowbeinggenderedaltersthewayin
whichweexperiencetheworldaroundus,andhowthatgenderedexperiencecanbeunderstoodas
asiteofmoralconcern.64However,thepointisnottosaythatthereisanythingessentialabout
menorwomen,norisittosaythatourindividualbehavioursarethetarget.Instead,thegoalisto
lookatthewaysinwhichinstitutionsandnormsshapeourrelationshipsaswellasourconstructions
ofgender.Further,becausenowtherearefewerformallystatedprescriptionsbasedongenderin
people’slives,especiallyintheWest,thewaysinwhichbeinggenderedaffectsaperson’slifeis
oftensubtleandnotexplicitlyobvious.Careethics,throughthepracticeofattentiveness,canbe
usedtodrawattentiontotheselessobviousproblemsandthroughcriticalanalysisidentifypossible
sitesoftransformation.Althoughgender,byitself,isnottheendofanalysis,becausetheethicsof
careisabletoacknowledgetheintersectionofraceandgeopoliticallocationtohowgenderis
constructed.However,inthissectionIfocusongenderinisolationtobringtotheforehowcare
workitselfisdeeplylinkedtoourconceptionsoffemininityandmasculinityinordertochallengeour
genderedassumptionsaboutcareworkandresistthecontinueddevaluationofcare.
Typically,thecritical,feministethicsofcarefocusesonhowthefeminizationofcareis
legitimizedandsustained,andthatofcareasasocialandeconomicissue.65Thiscanbeunderstood
asthewaysinwhichcaringworkisrelegated,throughofficialandunofficialmeans,towomen.For
example,womenareoverrepresentedinprofessionslikeearlychildhoodcare,eldercare,nursing,
andotherkindsofemploymentthatareprimarilyconcernedwithcaringreproductivelabour.66This
overrepresentationcaninturnreinforcetheideathatthosearepositionsandtasksthatwomenare
suitedto,thatis,caringisafeminineactivity.Incontrast,theethicsofcareclaimsinsteadtheidea
thatcaringisahumanactivity,andthatallpeopleregardlessofgendermustfulfiltheirowncaring
64
Robinson,TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity,35.
Ibid.,36.
66
NancyFolbre,"ShouldWomenCareLess?IntrinsicMotivationandGenderInequality,"BritishJournalof
IndustrialRelations50,no.4(2012):600-1.
65
65
responsibilities.Becauseofthisfocus,oftennormsaboutmasculinityhavebeenpushedtothe
sidelines;however,thenormsoffemininityarelinkedtothenormsofmasculinity.67
Normsofmasculinityhaveoftenbeenappliedtothosewhoarebiologicallymale,whether
theyagreewiththemornot,muchthesameashowfemininityhasbeenappliedtowomen.
However,theideaisnottotargetspecificindividualsthroughacriticalcareethic,butinsteadto
assesstheinstitutionalmeansthatproducesandperpetuatesthesegendernorms.Usingcareethics,
wecanuncoverthewaysinwhichgendernormsareperpetuatedthroughinstitutions,andthe
relationshipbetweentheconceptionsofmasculinityandfemininity.Justasmanygendernormsfor
womenseemtoreinforcetheideathatwomenare,atbase,carers,itseemsthatmanygender
normsformeneitherprivilegenon-caringactivityorgosofarastostigmatizemenwhodoengage
incaringreproductivelabour.Incontrasttowomen,menareoverrepresentedasCEOs,politicians,
soldiers,andintheSTEM(science,technology,engineeringandmath)fields.Menareexpectedto
engagein‘productive’workoutsidetheprivatesphereordomesticconcerns.Further,becausemen
havebeeninthesekindsofpositionsforsolong,itreinforcestheideathatmenaresuitedorbest
equippedforsuchkindsofwork.Thesemale-centricnormshavebeentermedhegemonic
masculinities,andarenottakenasanythingessentialaboutanyindividualorevenallmen.Rather,
“[hegemonicmasculinities]explainsasetoffluid,sociallyconstructednormsabout‘maleness’that
areconstitutedbyandembeddedinsocialstructuresandinstitutions.”68Families,schools,work
placesandotherinstitutionsallcontributetothegenderingofanindividual,andthisholdstruefor
normsaboutmasculinityaswellasnormsaboutfemininity.
Yetthisgendereddivisionoflabour,inandofitself,isnotthewholeoftheproblem.The
problemdeepenswhenonetypeofworkisseenas‘better’orasmorepraiseworthythantheother.
Often,itisproductivework,notreproductivelabour,whichisseenasthe‘better’option,more
‘fulfilling,’orevenabletoinfusetheproductiveworkerwithgreatermoralworthbecausetheyhave
‘contributed’tosocietyasawhole.Thisisincontrasttoreproductivelabour,whichhasthe
connotationofnotcontributinganythingmaterialtosociety,andoftenthosewhoengagein
reproductive(care)labourareingreaterpositionsofvulnerabilityduetolowerlifetimeearningsand
lesseconomicsecurity.Eventheemotionalattachmentsthatareapartofcareworkcanrender
thosewhodocareworkmorevulnerable,“discouragingthemfromdemandinghigherwagesor
changesinworkingconditionsthatmightadverselyaffectcarerecipients.”69Notonlyisonetypeof
67
Robinson,TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity,82.
Ibid.,39.
69
Folbre,607.
68
66
worklessvalued,butthosewhoengageincarework(paidandunpaid)areofteninfarmore
vulnerablepositionsthanthosewhoengagein‘productive’work.
ThinkingfurtheronthecaseoftheFilipinanannyandtheCanadianfamily,wecanseehow
theethicsofcarecanbeatoolofanalysis,revealingthewaysinwhichgendercanbeamoral
contextbybeingattentivetotheparticularsofthecase.Inthissituation,wecanaskquestionssuch
as:whyissomuchofthedomesticpressureonwomeninCanadasuchthatmanywomendeemit
necessarytohireananny,andwhydomalepartnersnotperformanequalamountofcarework?
Doemployersnotofferflexiblehourstoallowforpickingupchildrenfromschool,dotheynotoffer
paternityleave,orofferonlymarginalmaternityleave?WhodoestheCanadiangovernmentaccept
asguestworkers,andwhomdotheyturnaway?Isitmostlywomenwhoareallowedinthecountry
toworkbecausetheyare‘better’domesticworkers?Aremennothiredatthesameratebecause
theyare‘notgood’inthedomesticsphere?Additionally,wecanalsoaskwhatthepressuresarein
thePhilippinesthatdrivethesewomentoseekworkabroad.Itisnotonlyaboutthegendernorms
ofthehostcountryinthisinstance,butalsoaboutthewaysinwhichwomenviewtheirownnation
andhowthegenderdynamicsoftheirhomecanputpressureonthemtocareforfriendsorfamily
intheonlywayavailabletothem:byleaving.Takentogether,itispossibletoseethatthegender
normsinvolvedallowCanadian(andpresumablythesesituationsoccurismostotherhighly
industrializedWesternnations)womenandmentoabrogatetheircaringresponsibilities,atleast
insofarastheypaysomeoneelsetoreartheirchildren.Foralthoughhiringanannymightensure
thechildrenarelookedafter,theparentsinsuchcasesarenotthemselvesmeetingthestandardsof
carewithregardtotheirownchildren.Further,thesituationmeansthatFilipinawomen‘choose’to
neglecttheirpersonalcaringresponsibilitiesinordertoprovidefortheirchildren,leavingtheir
childrenwithfemalerelativesoraclosefemalefriend,orevenhiringanannyoftheirownwiththeir
remittances.70
Consideringcareethicsviewsrelationshipsasaseatofmoralconcern,thenwecanseehow
theethicsofcaredeemstheabovesituationmorallyproblematic.Thesystems,institutionsandthe
gendernormsinplayallowaselectfewtoavoidtheircaringresponsibilitiesbyhavingothersneglect
theirown.Thisexampleservestohighlighttheroleinstitutionsplayintheconstructionofgender
roles,andthewaysinwhichtheycontributetomorallyproblematiccontextswherewomenare
linkedtothe‘lesser’workofcare,whilemenareexpectedtopursuethe‘better’productivework.
70
Whilethosewomenwhobecomemigrantcareworkersdo,insomesense,choosetoleavetheirfamiliesto
workabroad,itisnotanunboundedchoice.Itisachoicepredicatedonsometimesverydesperateneeds.I
donotdiscussthegrayareasofchoicehere,butitshouldnotbecontroversialthattransnationalmigrant
workersarenotmakingacompletely‘free’choice.SeeChapterThreeforadiscussiononthe‘free’choices
thatsomewomenhavetomake,andthattheyarereally,asAllisonWeircallsthem‘impossiblechoices.’
67
Thisexamplealsounderscorestheprivilegedstatus‘productive’workreceives.Thisisanother
instanceof‘privilegedirresponsibility,’wherebypeople,mostoftenmen,receivea‘pass’fromtheir
caringresponsibilitiesdueto‘providing’fortheirfamilyinamonetarysense.Thisideaispredicated
onthestillpervasiveideathatmenarethebreadwinnersortheeconomicearnerinthefamily.71
Further,theirstatusastheeconomicearnermeansthatmenareinapositionofgreaterpower
socially.Privilegedirresponsibilitydoesnotnecessarilybreakdownwhenwomenenterthework
forceeither.Althoughthe‘double-day’isstillaconcern,thisexampledemonstratesthatwomen
canengageinprivilegedirresponsibilityaswell,andstillperpetuateracialandgendered
assumptionsaboutcaringlabour.
Thelensofcareallowsustounderstandhowbothmenandwomenare“affectedbythe
institutionalcontextinwhichcareisprovided,”andthattheissueathandisnotthatoffeminine
valuesagainstmasculinevalues,but“howtoreconfigurefemininityandmasculinityinwaysthat
couldmoveustowardsmoregenderequalityalongwithhigherqualityofcare.”72The
transformativepotentialofcareethicswithregardtogenderliesintheunderstandingthateven
merelyquestioningthevalidityofcurrentgendernormsweakensthenormsandtheinstitutional
supportforthosenorms.Oncewebegintoquestionthepowerthatgendernormshavetoshape
ourcaringrelations,wearethenabletounderstandthatnotonlyaregendernormschangeable,but
soareourrelationsofcare.73Thereisnothing‘natural’aboutthewayinwhichcareiscurrently
provided,andchallengingtheseassumptionsisthefirststepwemusttakeifwearetohavemore
materialequalitybetweenthegendersandintermsofwhoprovidestheworkofcare.Althoughas
perRobinson’spracticeofresponsiveness,itistruethatwemustdomorethanquestionnormsifwe
aretoachievethekindoftransformationthatistheultimategoaloftheethicsofcare.Doingso
requiresareimaginingofpublicpolicy,whichIwilladdressinChapterFive.Next,however,Iturnto
thecareanalysisofviolenceandhumansecurity.
Section 3.4 – Violence and Human Security
Apersistentconcernininternationalrelationsishowtoconceptualiseandunderstandviolence,and
therearedoubtsthat“theethicsofcarecanappropriatelyaddressviolenceagainstwomen,from
violenceinintimaterelationstotheso-calledpublicviolenceofwartime.”74Yet,thesetypesof
situationsareonesthatanethicofcareshouldbeabletoaddress.Careethicsdoesacknowledge,
“thatviolenceisanaspectofhumanrealitythatmustbeexpected,butwecansuccessfullyworkto
71
Folbre,609.
Ibid.,612.
73
Ibid.,610.
74
Robinson,TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity,36.
72
68
containit.”75Violenceisapartofhumanlifeasitstandstoday,andthecritical,feministethicsof
careisaimedatreducingthelegitimacyoftheuseofviolencelocallyandglobally.Questionsabout
violencecanbeunderstoodtobeabouthumansecurity,afieldofinquirythathasarisenincontrast
tothefieldofnationalsecurity.Thequestionhasbecomeaboutthesurvivalofindividuals,instead
aboutthesurvivalofstates.76Alackofsecuritycanbeunderstoodasmanythings,butoftenitisthe
positionofbeingvulnerable,marginalized,andpoor,aconditionthatroughly1.2billionindividuals
inhabittoday.77Liketheotherglobalmoralcontextspreviouslydiscussed,thelensofcare,andits
attendantpractices,canbefocusedonthetopicsofviolenceandhumansecuritytoidentify
underlyingcausesandpossiblesitesoftransformation.
Themorenuancedapproachofcriticalcareethicscanuncoverthewaysinwhichinsecurity
andviolencearemadepossiblebynotonlyeconomicconditionsbutalsothroughmoral
understandingsrelatedtogenderandthewaysinwhichwomenandothercarers(racializedwomen
andmen,andtransnationalcarersfromtheGlobalSouth)havebeendevaluedonaglobalscale
becauseofculturesorideologiesthat“denigratethemoralvaluesandactivitiesassociatedwith
caring.”78Further,thisisnotonlyamoralproblem,butapoliticalproblemaswell,becausetheways
inwhichviolenceiseithermadelegitimateorillegitimatedependsoninstitutionalstanceson
particulartypesofviolence.Forexample,althoughtheremightbelegalcodesagainstdomestic
violence,thelocalinstitutionssuchasthepoliceandhospitalsmightnotfullyengagewithvictimsor
perpetratorstostopsuchactions,ortheymightsimplynotengageatallandallowtheviolenceto
continue,abrogatingtheircaringresponsibilities.Careethics,guidedherebythepracticeof
responsiblyaswellasresponsiveness,wouldaskwhysuchinstitutionallaxityoccurs,inadditionto
posingquestionsregardingwhatfactorscontributetosuchviolenceinthefirstplace.Theroot
causesofdomesticviolencecannotbeeasilypinpointed,butcanencompassseveralfactorssuchas,
thehistoryoflegallysanctionedmaleviolenceagainstwomen,thetroublingfactthat“womenare
notexemptfromtheinfluenceofmainstream,masculinistunderstandingsofdomesticviolence”79
(i.e.thatwomeninternalizethemaleperspectiveofviolence,suchthatthey‘shouldhavestayed,’or
‘shouldn’thavemadehimsomad’),andthatdomesticviolencemostcertainlydoesnotoccur
betweentwoadultsofequalstanding.Rather,thelensofcarecanhelpuncovertheasymmetrical
relationsofpowerinvolved,anduncoverhowthepublic/privatedivideservestoreinforcetheidea
thatmaleviolenceagainstwomenoccursinprivate,notpublicspaces,orthatdomesticviolenceis
75
VirginiaHeld,"CantheEthicsofCareHandleViolence?,"EthicsandSocialWelfare4,no.2(2010):126.
FionaRobinson,"TheImportanceofCareintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanSecurity,"Journalof
InternationalPoliticalTheory4,no.2(2008):168.
77
Ibid.,169.
78
Ibid.,177.
79
PaulaWilcox,"Communities,CareandDomesticViolence,"CriticalSocialPolicy26,no.4(2006):729.
76
69
notnecessarilyapublicconcern.Becausecareethicsposesaseriouschallengetothepublic/private
divide,aselaboratedinChapterOne,wecanthenseethatdomesticviolenceisoneformofmale
violenceagainstwomenthatcannotbeunderstoodinisolation.80
Violence,then,isoneofthemajorreasonswhypeoplearerenderedinsecure.Human
security,anditsopposite,humaninsecurity,areanucleusofethicalissuesfortheethicsofcare.Itis
mostconcernedwiththeways“ournormativeandontologicalunderstandingsofsecurityserveto
reinforce,ratherthanchallenge,existingrelationsofpower,thusperpetuatingandevendeepening
conditionsofinsecurityformuchoftheworld’spopulation.”81Thenormsaboutwhatitmeanstobe
secure,whatsecurityis,andhowitisobtained,allserveinmanywaystorendersomefewpeople
secureattheexpenseofmillionsofothers.Forinstance,thepriceofmakingAmericanssecurefrom
terroristthreatshavemadeitthatmuchmoredifficultforrefugeestoreachtheUnitedStates.
Whenrefugeescannotescapethepersecutionorviolencethatdrivesthemfromtheirhomes,they
areeffectivelytrappedinaconditionofinsecurity.Thesecurityconcernaboutterrorismasathreat
tohumanlivesprivilegesthelivesofAmericansoverthelivesofotherswhomightalsobevictimsof
terrorismwhohavebecomerefugees,butarenotAmericancitizens.Acareanalysisofterrorism
andterrorists,however,wouldaskwhyterrorismoccursinthefirstplace,whatpolitical,economic,
andpersonalpressuresmakeviolenceanattractiveoptiontosome.Thegoalwouldbeto“reduce
theappealofviolence”82ratherthanusingmilitaryintervention,whichoftenresultsinmore
violence,instability,anddeprivation,i.e.thebackgroundconditionsformoreterrorism.
Whencareismadecentraltoquestionsofhumansecurity,wecanseewhoisresponsible
(throughthepracticeofresponsibility)forcareandunderwhatconditionstheyhavetoperformthe
workofcare.Thisinturncanrevealmuchaboutthesocio-politicalconditionsofrace,genderand
classinanygivensociety.Whensuchconditionsareuncovered,wecanseethewaysinwhichsocial
normsarereinforcedthatinturncancontributetocontinuedinsecurity.83Akintotheproblemwith
establishinganobjectivestandardofpoverty,asperAllisonJaggar’sworkdiscussedinSectionTwo
ofthischapter,caretheoristsrecognizetheproblemswithattemptingtoholdtoanobjective
standardofinsecurity.Rather,astheethicsofcareisbasedonafeministrelationalontology,an
understandingofhumansecurityshouldbeunderstoodfromthepositionthat“thecontinuityoflife
andasenseofsecurityinpeople’sday-to-daylivesareimpossiblewithoutrelationsandnetworksof
careandresponsibility.”84Afeministcareethicsincorporatestheeffectsofgender,race,class,and
80
Ibid.,735-6.
Robinson,TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity,40.
82
Held,"CantheEthicsofCareHandleViolence?,"122.
83
Robinson,"TheImportanceofCareintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanSecurity,"178.
84
TheEthicsofCare:AFeministApproachtoHumanSecurity,44.Emphasisintheoriginal.
81
70
geopoliticswhenitcomestounderstandingsecurity.Thefocusisnotonanyindividualactor,but
therelationsamongtheactors.AsRobinsonnotes:
Changingthelenstofocusnotonanysingleactorbutontherelationsamongthoseactors—
relationshipsthatareresponsibleforthemaintenanceoflifeitself—isimportantnotonly
becauseitrecognizesthevaluesandactivitiestraditionallyassociatedwithwomen.Italso
questionsthedenigrationandfeminizationoftheseactivitiesanddemonstratestheir
importancetomitigatingconditionsofinsecurity—formenandwomen—inavarietyof
contexts.85
Humansecurityisnotanobjectivecondition;itisnotanabsolutethingthatisexperienced
individually.Instead,careethicsunderstandsthatnoone“experiencessecurityorinsecurity
‘alone’.”86
Critical,feministcareethicsidentifiessecuritythreatsasonesthatpresent“anexistential
threattomaintenanceandflourishingoftherelationalwebsthatconstituteandsustainall
persons.”87Ananalysisofcasesofviolenceandinsecuritymustuncovertherootcauses,and
investigatethewaysinwhichsuchthreatsareplayedoutinpeople’severydaylives,andasper
Robinson’spracticeofresponsivenessrequirereal,concreteactionwhichcanbeguidedbythe
answersgeneratedbythepracticesofattentivenessandresponsibility.Engaginginthiskindof
reflectiveanalysisopensuptheunderstandingthathumansecurityisnotonlydependentupon
protectionsagainstgrossinstancesofviolenceorunjustgovernmentaction.Instead,thefieldof
humansecurityisopeneduptofactorssuchasenvironmentaldisastersorhealthconcerns.Bothof
thesesituationsseewomenfacingthemajorityoftheburdenforhandlingtherelatedworkload.
Womenaremoreoftencaretakersofextendedfamilyinbothinstances,andinthecaseofnatural
disasterswhencivilorderisdisrupted,aremoreoftenvictimsofviolenceandsexualassault.Further,
thecaseofHIVinsub-SaharanAfricaisaprimaryexampleofhowwomenaremoreadversely
affectedbythediseasethanmen.Womenmoreoftencareforthesick,thusmissingwork(andpay),
andcanlosetheirjobsduetoalackofothercaringoptionsforsickfamilymembers.Incasesof
violence,naturaldisastersorhealthproblems,womenareofteninthemostinsecuresituations.88
Theethicsofcareasks,inadditiontoitsusualquestionaboutwhywomenaretheprimary
reproductivelabourer,whatnormsareatplayinthemoralandsociallandscapethatalsocontribute
tosuchinsecurity.Further,itwoulddeterminewhichpoliticalinstitutionsarepresentthatmightaid
orevenhinderthosewhoarecarers,andwhichinstitutionsandpracticesareinplacethatmight
preventsuchinstancesofinsecurityinthefirstplace.
85
Ibid.,45.
"TheImportanceofCareintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanSecurity,"182.
87
Ibid.,184.
88
McGinnetal.,21.
86
71
Importantly,itisnotenoughtoexaminethecausesofinsecuritywithinnationsalone.A
globalcriticalethicofcaremustalsoassesstherelationsofpowerpresentwithintheinternational
realmthatcontributetohumaninsecurity.Forexample,forallitsgoodintentions,thefoodaidthat
theUnitedStatessendstomanyAfricannationsdoesfeedpeople,butalsocancollapselocal
farmingduetotheabilityoftheUnitedStatestoundercutgrainprices.Thisdearthofworkforces
manypeopleintoastateofdeepinsecurity,unabletomakeaprofitfromtheirworkanylonger.
WomenintheglobalSouthoftenfindthemselvespushedintotheinformalsectorforworktomake
endsmeet,oropttoworkabroadbutinsodoingcanbecometraffickedasadomesticorsexworker
withnowaybackhome.Womenintheinformalsector,locallyorinternationally,haveevenless
protectionsthanintheformalsector,regardlessofthesocio-morallandscape.89Neitherarewomen
theonlyonesaffected.Childrenofwomenwhoexperienceinsecuritycannotalwaysgotoschool,
theydonotalwaysgetenoughtoeat,andtheirlifeoptionsshrinkdramatically.Men,whoareout
ofwork,mightabandontheirfamiliesorseekworkelsewhere,butthisalsoputsthematrisk,
becausewhentheyarecutofffromtheirfamilies,theydonotnecessarilyhaveaccesstothekindsof
carethatmightbecomenecessaryiftheyaresickorinjured.Italsoisolatesmenfromtheir
relationships,whichmayperpetuatefeelingsofdisconnectionandunderwritesthe‘freedom’to
engageinviolencetomeettheirindividualneeds.
Thewaysinwhichhumansexperienceinsecurityandviolencearecomplex,butthese
complexsituationsdohaveamajorbenefit:theyofferaplethoraofsitesfortransformation.For
example,theUnitedStatescouldalteritsfoodaidpolicy,perhapsdonatingbetterqualityseedand
onlyprovidingenoughfoodtoaidlocalsthroughaplantingseason,whichcouldgivefarmersa
chancetobettertheirowncropyields.Westernnationswouldthenhavetochangetheirthinking
aboutaid,perhapsseeingaidasawaytohelpothersimprovetheirownlivesratherthanasan
expansivekindofgift.Thelocalgovernmentcouldofferbetterservicesforitscitizens,perhaps
recognizingthatamoreeducatedandhealthierpopulaceisjustasmuchapartofthesurvivalofthe
stateasismilitarydefence.Lastly,andmostdifficult,gendernormscouldbechallengedtoquestion
whywomenfaceanunfairshareofthereproductivelabourinvolvedinmaintainingafamily,
understandingthatsuchnormsareembeddedinlocalandnon-localinstitutions.Althoughthislast
siteoftransformationisthemostdifficult,itmightbethemostworthwhile.Itisnottosaythat
womenshouldbe‘freed’fromthetaskofreproductivelabour,norisittovalorisecare.Rather,care
89
Theterms‘informal’and‘formal’fordifferentkindsofworkrefertowhetherornotthetypeofemployment
iscontractualormoreadhoc.Forexample,officeworkofmostkindsisinthe‘formal’sectorwhereduties
andbenefitsareformalizedincleararrangements.Theworkofthemigrantfruitpickerisinthe‘informal’
sector,becausethedutiesandbenefitsareleftmoreambiguous,oftentotheadvantageoftheemployer.
72
ethicsadvocatesashifttoviewingreproductivelabourasinfusedwithissuesofgreatmoralconcern
thatareimportantforallhumanbeingstobeactivelyinvolvedwithmaintaining.
Ihavearguedthatifoneacceptsthatthecriticallensofcareethicscanassessmoraland
politicalrelationships,andthatthecurrentgloballandscapecanbeconceivedofasaseriesof
institutionalrelations,thenusingtheethicsofcareonaglobalscaleisreasonablyjustifiable.
Further,thatthelensofcare,guidedbythepracticesofcare,isbettersuitedthan,forexample,
humanrightstheoriestoidentifytherootcausesofmoralcontextssuchasdifference,exclusion,
problematicgenderrelations,andviolenceandhumansecurity.Becausethecritical,feministethics
ofcareengendersthisdeeperanalysis,itcanalsobeusedtoidentifypossiblesitesoftransformation,
placeswherewecanaltertheverymoralandpoliticalpracticesthatproducecomplicatedmoral
contextsinthefirstplace.AlthoughKimberlyHutchingsdoubtsthatcareethicsproperlychallenges
gendernorms,andlacksprescriptiveforce,IrejectthisviewinChapterSix.Further,caretheorists
arguethatNGOsandgovernmentscantakeactionnowtoaltertheglobalpoliticallandscapebased
ontheanalysisofcare.IwilladdressthispossibilityinChapterFive,whenIexaminecareandpublic
policy.
Next,however,itisimportantthatIaddresswhatIhaveonlyreferredtointhischapter:
internationalhumanrightsdiscourses.InChapterThree,Iwilldiscusswhatinternationalhuman
rightsare,wheretheyhavecomefrom,andhowtheyfunctiontoday.Iwillfocusprimarilyonthe
mainstreamunderstandingofhumanrightsbecausetheyhavethemostpurchaseininternational
politicaldiscourse.Iwillexploretheiradvantages,andthenIwilloutlinetheirdisadvantagesfrom
theperspectiveoffeministcareethics.Careethicsitselfisacritiqueoftraditionalhumanrights
discourses.Yet,owingtothefactthathumanrightsdiscoursesareverypowerful,Iwanttomaintain
anunderstandingthatcritical,feministcareethicsandhumanrightscanworkside-by-side.Wedo
notneedtocombinethem,butinsteadmightbebetterservedbyusingeachforaveryspecific
purposewhenexaminingglobalconcernsofinequalityandinjustice.Thisisnotaneither-or
scenario,butawaytoexpandourmoraltoolkitbydenyingthatonetheoryisallthatisnecessaryto
handlethewidevarietyofethicalproblemsthatarepresentintheworldtoday.
73
Chapter Three: Care Ethics and Human Rights
Ihavearguedthataglobalcriticalethicofcarecanbeusedasananalyticaltoolthatcanprovidea
differentperspectiveontheinternational:atoolthatgivesusnewinformation,newreasonstoact,
andnewwaystoaffectsocialandpoliticaltransformation.Thepreviouschapterdemonstratedthe
justificationforusingcritical,feministcareethicsonaglobalscaleandarguedthatcareethicscan
uniquelyaddressparticularmoralcontexts,whichareofteninvisibletootherapproaches.Ionly
occasionallystatedthattheethicsofcareoffersadifferentperspectivethaninternationalhuman
rightsdiscourses.ThatglossisrectifiedhereasIarguethatalthoughhumanrightshavean
importantplaceinourglobalmorallandscape,theyneverthelessfailtomakevisibleorencompass
particularharmsthatpeopleexperience,eveniftheirhumanrightshavebeenmet.
Certainly,humanrightsareimportant,inpartbecausetheyhavebecomeawidespread
discoursethathasreachednearlyglobalcoverage.However,rightsdiscoursesofferfarmorethan
merelypracticalbenefits.Theyhavegreatpowertoidentifycasesofgrossinjusticeorinequality,as
wellasofferlegitimacytomanymarginalizedgroupsthatwishtobeheardbytheglobalcommunity.
Rightsdiscoursescanalsoofferargumentsforwhywehaveveryrealandbindingobligationsto
distantstrangers,andmanywhowriteoninternationalhumanrightsdiscoursesdosowithaneyeto
atleastreducingsevereglobalpoverty.Ihardlydisagreewiththegeneralaimsofthosewhodo
workoninternationalhumanrights.Rather,Iquestiontheideathathumanrightsareourfirst,best,
oronlyoptionwhenitcomestoglobalmoralcontexts.
Myunderlyingaimistoshowthekindoftheoreticalframeworkthatweusecanprofoundly
shapehowweseetheworld,whatwethinkofasproblems,andwhatkindsofsolutionsare
availabletous.Whentalkingabouttheworld,politically,economically,andculturally,“itisindeed
interpretationallthewaydown,”orinotherwords,“inthesocialworldthereisalwaysmorethan
onestorytotell.”1Thekindoftheoryanyphilosopherhasaboutanything,especiallyan
internationalpoliticalandethicaltheory,iscloselytiedupinwhattheywanttoexplain,whichin
turnrestsupontheirbeliefsandvalues.2Whereandhowweliveimpactsourunderstandingofthe
world,andcanaffectthekindoftheorywebelieveisnecessarytoanswertheproblemsthatwe
identify.Iarguethattheefforttocreateamorejustworld,aworldwithlessinequalityand
sufferingcanonlybeaidedbyexpandingourmoraltoolkit,notrestrictingittoahomogenous
discourse.
1
SteveSmith,"Introduction,"inInternationalRelationsTheories:DisciplineandDiversity,ed.MiljaKurkiTim
Dunne,andSteveSmith(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),3.Emphasisintheoriginal.
2
Ibid.,5.
74
InthischapterIfirstprovideabriefoverviewofinternationalhumanrightsandtheirmain
features.3ThenIwilldiscusssomeofthebenefitsofusinghumanrightsdiscourses.Lastly,Iwill
arguethatinspiteofthebenefits,theproblemsinherentinhumanrightsdiscoursesmeanthatwe
cannotrelyonhumanrightsalonetoprovidealltheanswerstothecomplexmoralcontextsthat
existintheworldtoday.ThethreecritiquesthatIfocusoninthischapterareconcernedwith:1)
thequestionableabilityofhumanrightsdiscoursestocombatthestructuralharmsofglobalization;
2)theculturalandgenderbiasofhumanrights;and3)thathumanrightsdonotoften‘see’the
pressing,morallycomplexissuesofsocialreproduction.Onthebasisofthesecritiques,Ireaffirm
myargumentthatnotallcasesofglobalmoralconcernarenecessarilyrightsissues.
Section 1 – Human Rights Discourses
InthissectionIbeginwithanoverviewofwhathumanrightsactuallyare,exploringthetwomajor
featuresandthreebackgroundassumptionsthatareapartofmostmainstreamhumanrights
theories.Second,Ilookatthedistinctadvantagesthathumanrightsofferwhenapproaching
internationalmoralconcerns.
Section 1.1 – What are Human Rights?
Moderninternationalhumanrightstheoriesarehardlymonolithic.Thereareawidevarietyof
humanrightstheories,oftendividedroughlyintothe‘moral’and‘political’conceptionsofhuman
rights.Theyoftendisagreeaboutwhatgroundsthetheory,beithumandignityorhumanagency,as
wellaswhocountsasanagent,andhoweachtheorydefinesagency.4Yet,therearetwoimportant
pointsofcommonalitythatwecanfindacrossthedifferentdiscoursesthatexisttoday.Thefirstis
thatrightsthemselvesarestandards,regardlessofthespecificlistofrightsthatanyphilosopher
mightenumerate.Thesecondisthathumanrightsareenforceableclaims.Takentogether,the
standards,whatevertheymaybe,enumeratedbyrights,generateclaimsuponothersthatcanand
shouldbeenforced.Therearealsothreeassumptionsthatoperateinthebackgroundofmost
humanrightstheories.Thesearetheassumedequalityofpersons,theuniversalityofhumanrights,
andthathumanchoiceisimportantandshouldbeprotected.Althoughthespecificsmightbe
different,mainstreamhumanrightsdiscoursessharetheseimportantfeatures.
3
IacknowledgethatIcannotgiveafulltreatmenttointernationalhumanrightsdiscourses.Icanofferonlya
shortoverviewthathighlightsthemoreprominentideasabouthumanrights.
4
FordiscussionsofhumandignityinhumanrightsseeMarthaNussbaumCreatingCapabilities:TheHuman
DevelopmentApproach(2011)andMichaelIgnatieffHumanRightsasPoliticsandIdolatry(2001).
75
Section 1.1.1 – Human Rights as Standards
Thefirstsharedfeatureisthat“humanrightsaremeanttoprovidecertainsharedstandards–orat
leastasharedframework–forevaluatingandcriticizingvariouspracticesofpoliticalsocietiesin
relationtotheirmembers.”5Thisdoesnotmeanthatthelistofstandardsthemselvesmustbe
agreedupon.Rather,humanrightsdiscoursesagreeingeneralthatthereshouldbealistof
standardsthatcanbeusedasawaytoevaluatehowapoliticalinstitutiontreatsitsmembers.The
agreementtohaveevaluativestandardsmeansthattherecanbeopendiscussionaboutwhatkinds
ofstandardsareappropriate,andalsoentailsanexpectationoffuturejudgment;wejudgeor
evaluatesocietiesbaseduponasetofhumanrightsstandards.Sometheoriesaremoreexpansive
thanothers.Somephilosophers,suchasThomasPogge,allowformoreexpansivesetsofhuman
rights,atleastusingtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)asawaytodemonstrate
howpolitical,economic,andevensocialrightscanhaveinternationalscope.6Conversely,thereare
thosewhoseektoprovideanarrowsetofhumanrightsstandards,suchasJamesGriffinand
MichaelIgnatieffwhoexpressconcernabouthumanrights‘inflation’.
Thedifferencebetweenhowexpansiveorhownarrowhumanrightsstandardsaredepends
onwhatthosestandardsaremeanttoappealtoorprotect.Therearemanydifferentaccountsof
thegroundsofhumanrightsstandards.Sometheoriesgroundhumanrightsonhumandignityor
humanagency,whichareseenasnecessarytolivea‘human’kindoflife.Theoriessuchasthisare
oftenlabelledas‘moral’conceptionsofhumanrights.While‘moral’humanrightsdiscoursesdo
functionasabulwarkagainstpoliticalpower,theyfocusmoreupontheindividualandhowto
maintaintheactivityofhumanlifefortheindividualinapoliticalenvironment.JamesGriffin,for
example,identifieshumanrightsas“protectionsofourhumanstandingor,asIshallputit,our
personhood.”7Ourpersonhood,asGriffinsuggests,isamorallyinfusedconceptthatencompasses
allthethingsnecessarytolivingourlivesashumanbeings,whichallowshimtoincluderightsto
educationinadditiontobasicsubsistence.8
Othertheoriessetoutminimalstandardsforthefunctioningofhumansocietyandestablish
thesestandardsinordertoprotectthekindofsocietythatallowshumanbeingstoflourish.9Thisis
amore‘political’conceptionofhumanrights.Thefocusbecomeslessaboutthemoralfoundation
ofrights,butratherhowhumanrightsfunctionasapracticewithinanypoliticalsystem.Charles
Beitzisaproponentofhumanrightsasapractice,andhewrites:“[o]nemightthinkthatalthough
5
Ivison,200-1.
ThomasPogge,WorldPovertyandHumanRights,2nded.(Cambridge:PolityPress,2008),183.
7
JamesGriffin,OnHumanRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),33.
8
Ibid.
9
Ivison,204.
6
76
peopledisagreeaboutthecontentofhumanrights,theymightagreeabouttheroleofhumanrights
inpracticalreasoningabouttheconductofglobalpoliticallife.Thisroledefinestheconceptofa
humanright.”10Humanrightsasapracticefocusesonhowwenegotiatethepoweranypolitical
organizationhasoveritsconstituentmembers,beitanationalpoliticalorganizationorthe
internationalconglomerationofpoliticalpowerthathasbecomeevenmoreprofounddueto
increasingglobalization.Theemphasishereisonthepracticalworthofhumanrightsinthepolitical,
withoutanycommitmenttoanunderlyingmoralfoundation.
Humanrights,then,regardlessofthedifferencesbetweenspecifictheories,protectwhatis
assumedtobenecessarytoliveasahumanbeing,andthatisoftenunderstoodasprotectinghuman
agency.Again,wecometoaconceptthathasamultiplicityofinterpretations.ForGriffin,human
agency(whichheunderstandsasinterchangeablewithautonomy11)iswhatunderlieshisvery
conceptofpersonhood.Heexplainsagencyashavingthreeparts:1)tobeanagent“onemust(first)
choseone’sownpaththroughlife—thatis,notbedominatedorcontrolledbysomeoneor
somethingelse(callit‘autonomy’),”122)“one’schoicemustbereal;onemustatleasthaveacertain
minimumeducationandinformation,”13and3)“othersmustalsonotforciblystoponefrom
pursuingwhatoneseesasaworthwhilelife(callthis‘liberty’).”14Humanagencycanthenbe
understood,accordingtooneinterpretation,asbeingabletomakechoicesthatarenotunduly
constrained,thatarewellinformed,andthatcanbeactedupon.Therefore,ifhumanagency,so
understood,isourverybasisofbeingaperson,thenhumanrightsmustprotectourabilitytomake
andactuponourchoices.15Thisisnottheonlyunderstandingofagencyorautonomy.ForPogge,
autonomyisslightlydifferent.Itisunderstoodasbeingabletodevelopandliveoutone’sownidea
ofwhatitmeanstoflourish,whereflourishingiswhenahumanbeingconsiderstheirlifeisgoodor
worthwhileinabroadsense.16Torespectaperson’sautonomyisto“accepthismeasureofhis
flourishingaswellashiswayofarrivingatthismeasure.”17Autonomyinthissenseisnotabout
givingone’sselfdirectives,butrather“havingone’sowndirectives:apurposeofone’sown.”18
Thepointisthatalthoughtheremightbedifferentexplanationsforwhatagencyis,human
rightstheoriesthatprivilegetheimportanceofagencyaimatlargelythesamegoal:groundingrights
intheideathathumanchoicematters,especiallywithregardtoone’sownlife.Becauseourchoices
10
CharlesRBeitz,TheIdeaofHumanRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),99.
Griffin,33.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.,34.
16
Pogge,33.
17
Ibid.,37.
18
Ibid.
11
77
aboutourownlivesareimportant,eitherformoralorpoliticalreasons(orboth),humanrightsare
meanttoserveasprotectionsforthechoiceswemakeaboutourlives.Humanrightscanthenbe
viewedasthestandardsbywhichwedeterminewhatisnecessarytoliveahumanlife.Forexample,
weholdthatpartoflivingasahumanbeingmeansthatweshouldhavesomemeasureofbodily
integrity,andourchoicesshouldnotbecurtailedbyforce.IfIchoosetopeacefullyprotesta
governmentaction,Ishouldnotbesubjecttoofficiallysanctionedphysicalharm.Itmightnotbethe
caseherethatIhaveahumanrighttoprotest,butthatIhavetherighttoprotestinapeaceful
mannerwithoutsufferingphysicalharmforactinguponmychoices.Therightinthisinstanceis
aimedatprotectingmychoicebypreventingthestateharmingmeforthatsamechoice.
Section 1.1.2 – Human Rights as Enforceable Claims
Thesecondfeaturecommontomainstreamhumanrightstheoriesisthathumanrightscomposea
setofenforceableclaims.Humanrights,asasetofstandards,meanverylittleunlesstheyhave
politicalandlegalpurchase.Thismeansthatwithrightscomedutiesorobligations,akindof
authorityheldagainstindividualsorinstitutions.Forarighttohaveauthorityitmustbeabletobe
heldagainstsomeoneorsomething;inotherwords,itistheobverseofaduty.Therequirementof
specificity,andthedegreetowhichanyclaimisbinding,varies.Inthecaseofinternationalhuman
rights,thequestionofwhoaretheduty-holdersiscontentious.ThomasPoggeprovidesoneanswer,
statingthat:
Whilethegovernmentmay,then,betheprimaryguardianofhumanrightsandtheprime
measureofofficialdisrespect,thepeoplearetheirultimateguardianonwhomtheir
realizationcruciallydepends.Enduringrespectofhumanrightsis,then,sustainednotjust
bythecountry’sconstitution,itslegalandpoliticalsystem,andtheattitudesofitspoliticians,
judges,andpolice.Itissustainedmoredeeplybytheattitudesofitspeople,asshapedalso
bytheeducationsystemandtheeconomicdistribution.19
Humanrightsclaimsareprimarilystandardsthatshouldbeenactedthroughone’sownnational
government.However,Poggeextendsthisfurther,makingthesalientpointthatanypolitical
organizationisdependentupontheattitudesofitsconstituentmembers,allofwhomplayanactive
roleindetermininghowanynationalgovernmentsustainsitscommitmenttothestandardsof
humanrights.Humanrightscanbeunderstoodashavingmultiplelevelsofdutyholders.Thefirst
levelisthelocalgovernmentanditsrepresentatives.Thesecondlevelaretheordinarycitizensof
thenationitself,whoexpresstheirowncommitmenttohumanrightsdependinguponwhothey
voteintooffice,intheirindividualpractices(suchastheirshoppinghabits),andtheirendorsement
ofcertainbehaviourswhichshowrespectforother’shumanrights.Inordertohavepurchaseatthe
19
Ibid.,69.
78
internationallevel,then,wemustbeabletodrawaconnectionbetweentheglobalpoorandthe
globalwealthy.Poggedoessobymakinganargumentbasedontheincreasedeconomic
globalizationofthelastseveraldecades,whichissummarizedsuccinctlybyDuncanIvisonasfollows:
[T]hereisasetofeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions–includingnorms,rules,practicesand
processes[…]–thathaveaprofoundeffectonthequalityoflifeofindividualsandpeoples
aroundtheworld.Itfollowsthatithasaprofoundeffectonthecapacityofstatesand
peoplestoexerciseformsofpoliticalagencyinorderingtheirlivesastheyseefit,according
totheirownconceptionsoftherightandthegood.20
Thecurrentglobaleconomicorderembodiesasetofpracticesandnormswhichoverallcontribute
totheharmexperiencedbytheglobalpoor.Theharmofseverepovertyisnotonlybeingpoor,but
alsothefactthatbeingsopooroftenrendersoneunabletomakechoicesforherorhimself,let
aloneactuponthem.Essentially,thecurrentlevelofpovertypreventsoverabillionpeoplefrom
exercisingtheirhumanagency.
Theglobaleconomicorder,furthermore,isunderstoodasastructuresupportedbywealthy
nationsandtheircitizen-members.Humanrightsclaims,then,canbemadeagainstanygiven
officialinstitution(oftengovernments),andalsoagainsttheindividualswhosupporttheinstitutions.
Therefore,globalhumanrightsclaimsarenotonlyheldagainstnationalgovernments(one’sownor
anotherthatiscontributingtoasuchharms),noronlyagainstinternationalbodies,butagainst
thoseindividualmemberswhocontinuetosupporttheinstitutions,nationalandglobal,that
contributetoseverepovertyandtheprofoundlimitingofhumanagencyaroundtheworld.Itisnot
enoughtosaythatinstitutionshaveadutytostopharmingpeople,butthatthosecitizenswho
supportthoseinstitutionsmustworktochangehowtheirinstitutionsfunctionwithinthe
internationalsphere.Forexample,whiletheUnitedStatesFederalgovernmentshouldceaseits
grossviolationsofhumanrightsinGuantanamoBayprison,itisalsoincumbentuponUnitedStates
citizenstotakeactionandinformtheirrepresentativesthattheydonotsupportthecontinued
operationoftheprison.Thiscaseislessnuancedthanthecomplexinteractionsthatservetocreate
andperpetuatesevereglobalpoverty,butthepointremainsthatalthoughvastpoliticaland
economicinstitutionshavepower,theyareneverthelessmadeupofindividualswhocanandshould
reiteratetheirsupportfortheenforcementofhumanrights.Afailureofinstitutionstoliveuptothe
obligationsplaceduponthembyhumanrightsclaimsdoesnotonlyreflectontheinstitutions
themselves,butalsoontheindividualsthatsupportthoseinstitutions.Accordingtosomehuman
rightstheories,then,whenourinstitutionsfail,wehavefailed.
20
Ivison,200.
79
Thisconnectionbetweenindividualsandinstitutionsisnottheonlywayinwhichtheorists
havedescribedhowhumanrightsfunctionasenforceableclaims.Beitz,forone,focusesmore
narrowlyonaninstitutionalmodel,notnecessarilyclaimingthatindividualscanberesponsiblefor
institutionalfailure.Hedescribesfivefeaturesofinternationalhumanrightsdoctrine,which
emphasizehumanrightsasmorethanprotectionsagainstthreatstopersonalsecurityandliberty.
First,they“guaranteesomerecourseagainstarbitraryuseofstatepower,butalsotoprotectagainst
varioussocialandeconomicdangersandtoguaranteesomedegreeofparticipationinthepolitical
andculturallife.”21Hestressesthatnosinglestrategyisrequired,butthathumanrightscanbe
implemented,oftenthroughpolicy,inmanydifferentwaysandstillbeacceptable.22Further,
becauseoftheheterogeneousnatureofhumanrights,“notallofthehumanrightsofcontemporary
doctrinecanplausiblyberegardedasperemptory.”23ThisisinparticularareferencetotheUDHR,
suchthatdependingoncircumstance,ahumanrighttoholidaypaymightnotbeintelligible.For
example,inthecaseoffamilyorsubsistencefarmerswhoarenotemployedbyanyone,their
holidaysaretakentocoincidewiththegrowingseason,iftheycantakeaholidayatall.Beitzalso
notesthathumanrightsinsomemeasuredependoncertainbackgroundassumptionsthat“certain
typesofinstitutionseitherdoorcanbebroughttoexist.”24Becausehumanrightsdonotmake
sensewithoutsomemeasureofenforcementorlegal-likeframework,thereareinstitutionsthat
mustorshouldexistinorderforhumanrightsasapracticetofunction.Lastly,Beitzpointsoutthat
“humanrightsdoctrineisnotstatic.”25Itischangingandchangeable,dependingonthehuman
rightsneedsofthepopulace,anddependingonhowweengagewithhumanrightsasapracticeof
enforceableclaims.Humanrights,forBeitz,isathingthatwedo,somethingthatweengageinand
shapeaswetalkaboutitandtrytoenforceitthroughouttheworld.Itdoesnotexistasasetof
staticstandardsalone,butasapracticewherewemakespecialkindsofclaimsuponothersthatwe
expecttobeenforced.
Section 1.1.3 – Three Assumptions of Human Rights
Therearethreebackgroundassumptionsthataresharedbythevastmajorityofmainstreamhuman
rightstheories.Theseassumptionsarenecessaryifhumanrightsaretobeacogentsetofstandards
thatcanfunctionasenforceableclaims.26Thefirstpointisthathumanrightsdiscoursesconsiderall
humanbeingstohaveequalstanding.Here,itisimportanttorecallthathumanrightstheoriesare
21
Beitz,29-30.
Ibid.,30.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.,31.
26
Justbecausetheyareassumptionsdoesnotmeanthattheyareinandofthemselvesproblematic.Iwill
discusstheproblemswiththeseassumptionsinSection2,butitisimportanttokeepinmindthatthese
assumptionshavegreatpowerandpurchaseinpoliticaldiscourseandarenotcritiquedlightly.
22
80
notahistorical.Modernhumanrightstheorieshavegrownoutofthenaturallawtradition.27Alarge
partofthatnaturallawtraditionwasthethenradicalideathatallmen(white,able-bodied,
propertiedmen)wereequal,whichhassincebeenextendedtoallpersons.Thiscanbefoundinthe
workofThomasHobbeswhowrote:“Naturehathmademensoequall,inthefacultiesofbody,and
mind…”28andJohnLockewhowrotethatallmenwereequalbecausetheywereall“the
workmanshipofoneomnipotent,andinfinitelywisemaker…”.29AlthoughinmoresecularWestern
societies,thebasisofequalitybecamemoreremovedfromreligiousgrounds,thelingeringideaof
theequalstatusofallhumanbeingsremainsastrongandimportantbackgroundconditionfor
humanrightstheoriestoday.Withouttheassumptionofhumanequality,humanrightscanlose
someoftheirpurchase,becauseitbecomespossibletoignorethehumanrightsclaimsofothersif
theyareconsideredlessthanotherhumans.Historyprovidesuswithmanyexampleswherethishas
beenthecase,inthemassgenocidesofthe20thcentury,wherethoseinpowerhaverenderedsocalledundesirablegroupsaslessthanhuman.Thosepersonslabelledasundesirablecouldnot
makebindinghumanrightsclaims,nordidtheyrequirethestandardsoflivingthatmosthuman
rightsdiscoursesseektoprotect.Further,currentevents,suchastherefugeecrisisduetothe
Syriancivilwar,demonstratethatthesepervasivemoralharmsstilloccuronagrandscale.
Therefore,forhumanrightstobecogent,wemustassumethatallhumanbeingshaveequalmoral
worth,regardlessofthesource(orlackthereof)ofthatmoralworth.
Thesecondassumptionisthathumanrightsareuniversal.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthelist
ofrightsenumeratedbyanyparticularhumanrightstheoryisuniversal,andholdsforeveryonefor
alltimeinsomesortofahistoricalfashion.Humanrightsareuniversalinthesensethatcertainparts
ofhumanlifeareconsideredworthprotectingforallhumanbeings.Historically,humanrightsfirst
explicitlygaineduniversalscopeaftertheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofManandCitizen(1789),
whereitwasdeclaredthatcertainrightsappliedtoallpersonsratherthanbeingrightsofa
particularpeople.30However,this‘universal’aspectwasnotcarriedoutinpractice,andnon-citizens
wereleftwithnowaytomakerightsclaims.31Nearly150yearslateraftertheFrenchDeclaration,in
1948,whentheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswasapproved—afterthreeyearsofdrafting
andreview—itwasaturningpointforhowinternationalpoliticswerenegotiated.Althoughthe
UDHRisstilleasiertoendorsethanenforce,ithasatleastprovidedthefirsttrulyuniversal,
internationalbaselineforthejudgmentofpoliticalcommunitiesnotourown.Ifgovernmentsfailed
27
Ivison,48.
ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,ed.C.B.MacPherson(London:PenguinClassics,1981),183.
29
JohnLocke,SecondTreatiseofGovernment,ed.C.B.MacPherson(Indianapolis:HackettPublishing
CompanyInc.,1980),9.
30
LynnHunt,InventingHumanRights(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,2007),21-2.
31
HannahArendt,TheOriginsofTotalitarianism,3rded.(London:GeorgeAllen&UnwinLtd.,1967),291-2.
28
81
toguaranteethehumanrightsoftheircitizens,thosegovernmentscouldbeunderstoodaslacking
legitimacy,andcertainlyopentojudgmentifnotintervention.32Inmorerecentscholarship,
however,anotherwaytoaccomplishthisuniversalityistopitchitatamoreabstractlevel,andleave
thedetailsofhumanrightsimplementationtodependlargelyonlocalconditions.Griffinnotes:
Weshouldexpectabstractlyformulatedrights,whenappliedtotheconditionsofa
particularsociety,tobeformulatedinthelanguageofitstimeandplaceandactualconcerns,
andweshouldexpectnooneparticularlytonoticewhenthemovedownthescaleof
abstractionpassesfromglobaltolocalvocabulary.Weshouldclaimonlythatuniversalityis
thereatthehigherlevels.33
ThesehigherlevelsthatGriffinmentionsaretheimportantpartsofhumanlifethatweseekto
codifyandprotectwhentalkingabouthumanrights.Theuniversalityofhumanrightsisconcerned
withthefundamentalthingsthatarenecessaryforallhumanseverywheretohaveinordertolivea
‘human’kindoflife.Inspiteofthedisagreementaboutparticularstandards,thereisoften
agreementaboutwhatthestandardsaremeanttoprotect.
Lastly,thethirdassumptionisthathumanchoiceisvitallyimportanttolivinga‘human’kind
oflife,andiswhatallhumanrightsaremeanttoprotect.InSection1.1.1ofthischapter,Iunpacked
Griffin’sunderstandingofhumanagency,asbeingmadeupofautonomy(beingabletodecidefor
one’sself)andliberty(beingabletoactonthosechoices).Althoughtherearedifferent
understandingsofagencyintermsoftheparticulars,thecommonthreadbetweenthemisthatof
beingabletolivealifeofone’sown.Theabilitytomakechoices,actonthem,anddecideforone’s
selfhowtolive.Forexample,nothavingenoughfoodtosurvivewouldcertainlycurtailmyabilityto
makechoicesandactuponthem.Mychoiceswouldreducetoasubsistencelevelrationale,unable
toengagemyabilitytothinkandchoseformyselfthekindoflifethatImightactuallywanttolive,
insteadoftheoneIamforcedtolive.ThehumanrightsclaimherewouldbethatIshouldhave
accesstothebasicnecessitiesoflivinginorderformetomakemoremeaningfulchoicesaboutmy
life,notsimplyabouthowImightobtainenoughcaloriestosurviveanotherday.Thisclaimdoesnot
meanthatImustbeprovidedwithgourmetdinners,butthatattheveryleastImightbeextended
emergencyfoodaidtorelivetheimmediatedangerofdeath,andthenbegivenaccesstoworkor
educatedonimprovedfarmingtechniques.OnceIamnolongerindangerofstarving,Icanthen
makechoicesaboutthelifeIwanttolive,andtakestepstowardachievingthatlife.This,however,
doesnotmeanIamguaranteedthekindoflifeIwant.Instead,humanrightsclaimsareaboutbeing
abletoact,withoutanykindofinsurancethattheactionswillresultinsuccess.Thereisagreater
32
Hunt,205-8.
Griffin,50.
33
82
emphasisplacedupontheabilitytoactinlightofone’schoices,thanwiththesuccessorfailureof
anyparticularhumanaction.
Ingeneral,then,humanrightsareuniversalinthesensethattheyaimtoprotectthesame
thing,typicallyhumanagencyortheabilitytoactonthechoicesonemakesaboutone’sownlifeand
theequalityofallhumanbeings,i.e.theequalrightofallpersonstobeabletomakechoicesabout
theirownlives.Theframeworkofhumanrightscanbeunderstoodasbeingasetofnon-static
standards.Thedisagreementaboutwhatstandardstoincludeislessimportantthanthefactthat
weagreethatthereshouldbeasetofstandardsinthefirstplace.Lastly,thesestandardscanbe
usedasenforceableclaims,creatingadutyorobligationuponothers(institutionsandindividuals).
Thedetailsvary,butthebasicnotionsremainthesameacrossaplethoraofhumanrightstheories.
Next,Iwilllookatthedistinctbenefitsofhumanrightsdiscourses.
Section 1.2 – The Advantages of Human Rights
Thegeneralfieldofhumanrightshasdistinctbenefitsthatarepartofthereasonwhyhumanrights
remainpowerfulinthepoliticalandmorallandscapetoday.First,humanrightsarestrongclaimsof
justice,becausehumanrightsareaimedatpreventingharmfromofficialinstitutions.For
institutionstobelegitimate,theymustprovidesomekindofjustificationtoindividualsforthe“rules,
lawsandnormstowhichtheyaresubject.”34Abidingbythestandardsthathumanrightssetout
seemstoofferameasureofthatpoliticallegitimacytogovernmentsandotherinstitutions.Pogge
callsthefailureofgovernmentstoprotectthehumanrightsofitscitizens‘officialdisrespect’asa
waytoseparateitfromamoreprivatekindofwrongdoing.Henotesthatofficialwrongsareoften
seenasworsebecausetheyharmandfrightenmorepeopleand“masqueradeunderthenameof
lawandjustice.”35‘Official’moralwrongsarenotsubversionsorperversions,butarealloutattacks
onthe“veryideaofrightandjustice.”36Humanrights,then,derivetheirstrengthfrombeing
understoodasstandardsforjustice.Foragovernmenttoengageinofficialdisrespectofaperson’s
humanrightsisforthatgovernmenttoattacktheveryconceptofjusticeandforfeitclaimsof
politicallegitimacy.Whatwethinkofasjustice,orasaninstitutionbeingjustifiabletoits
constituentmembers,hasbecomeagovernmentabidingbythehumanrightsclaimsthatits
membersmake.
Second,humanrightsservetoidentifyissuesofinternationalconcern.Beitzexpandsonthis
idea,notingthathumanrightsare:“normsworkedoutforoneamongmanypossiblesituationsof
34
Ivison,211.
Pogge,65.
36
Ibid.
35
83
humaninteractionfoundinaworldorderinwhichpoliticalauthorityisvestedprimarilyinterritorial
states.”37Humanrightsarenormativeguidelinesforinternationalinteraction,especiallywhenthere
areissuesofinternationalconcernathand.Beitzsinglesoutrightstofreedomfrompoverty,rights
ofpoliticalparticipation,andthehumanrightsofwomenasallbeingparadigmcasesofhuman
rightsdoctrinegrowingtoencompasssuchissuesasbeingofinternationalconcern.Inthecaseof
therighttobefrompoverty,forexample,Beitznotes:
[W]henoneassertsahumanright,oneissaying,amongotherthings,thatinternational
agentshavereasonstoactwhendomesticgovernmentsfail.Inthecaseofseverepoverty,it
isplausibletobelievethatintypicalcasestherewillbereasonsforactionavailableof
significantweight,evenifthecontentsofthesereasonsandthenatureandextentof
requiredactiondependonfeaturesoftheindividualcase.38
Humanrightsaremorethanstandardsofdomesticpoliticallegitimacy,theyarealsoclaimsofjustice
thatcancrossnationalbordersandcreatebindingobligationsoninternationalagents.Theagentsin
questionmightbeothernations,NGOs,orindividuals.Althoughthedetailswillvaryfromcaseto
case,theweightofinternationalhumanrightsclaimsisstillverystrongandtiedtoanon-localized
ideaofjustice.Wecannotjustifytotheglobalpooranynon-actiononourpartinthefaceofa
failureoftheirdomesticsystem,whetherornotwewereresponsibleforthefailureinthefirstplace.
Thisisonlyonepartiallypresentedcase.Thepointisthathumanrightsmarkoutproblemsthatare
ofinternationalscope,whichcannotbeconsideredasonlyalocalproblem,andalsorequirea
measureofinternationalactiontosolve.
Lastly,humanrightshaveapracticalbenefitofbeingabletoofferguidanceforpublicpolicy.
Humanrightsnormscanofferguidancewhendevelopingandshapingpublicpolicytoaddress
identifiedmoralproblems.Thisdoesnotmeanthatpolicymustbethesameacrosscultures.
Differentculturesmightemphasizedifferentelementsofanyparticularhumanright,butthecore
normswouldremainthefoundationforpolicy.39Policycanbeseenasareasonable,practical
extensionofhumanrightstheory.Forexample,thehumanrighttobefreefromphysicalharmcan
takemanydifferentformsinpublicpolicy,wherethesamerightcangrounddifferentlawsand
policies.Itcanspawnapolicyagainstpolicebrutality,aswellasallowpolicetouseforcetoprevent
harmtoinnocentby-standers.Thewayinwhichpolicyinterpretsandmakeshumanrightsnorms
manifestisnotabsolute,andtheyarenotperfect.AsGriffinnotes,“moralphilosophycannot
realisticallyaspireultimatelytoabolishthiselementofpolicy;itsmorerealistic,butstillambitious,
37
Beitz,160.
Ibid.,173.
39
Griffin,127.
38
84
aimistoarriveatthebestpolicy.”40Policyisassessedonthebasisofhowwellitperformsthe
desiredfunctioninsocietyandhowwellitenactshumanrightsnormsinthepracticalandlegal
sphereoftherealworld.41
Theseareimportantadvantagesofhumanrights,onesthatweshouldnotoverlookwhen
tryingtoaddresscomplexproblems,suchasglobalpoverty,andparticularlythepoverty
experiencedbywomenandgirlsaroundtheworld.Thusfar,mygoalhastobeentoofferafair(if
verybrief)pictureofwhathumanrightsare,howtheyfunction,andwhattheyofferasatheoryand
apractice.Thisdoesnotmeanthathumanrightsare,norshouldtheybe,ouronlyanswertothe
complexglobalmoralcontextsthatexistintheworldtoday.Inordertodemonstratewhyhuman
rightscannotfullyencompassallofourinternationalproblems,Iturntothecareethicscritiqueof
mainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses.
Section 2 – The Care Ethics Critique of Human Rights
Careethics,atitsbeginning,grewoutofquestioningandcritiquingmainstreamethicalandpolitical
theories,includinghumanrightstheoriesandtheirassumedprimacyforaddressingglobalmoral
concerns.Yet,thecritical,feministcarecritiqueofhumanrightsdoesnotrequirethatweabandon
theprojectofhumanrightsaltogether.AsRobinsonnotes:“Whileawholesalerejectionofnotions
ofindividualrightsandobligationsissurelyundesirable,onemaystillaccepttheprofoundmoral
incompletenessofanethicsdominatedbytheseconcepts.”42Nevertheless,thecarecritiquecalls
attentiontothefactthat“ourmoralvocabularymustextendbeyondrightsifwearetocreateafull
andrichlanguagewhichiscapableofaddressingthevarietyofmoralproblemsconfrontingthe
internationalcommunity.”43Humanrightscannotandshouldnotbeouronlyrecoursewhen
addressingglobalmoralcontexts.Idemonstratethatalthoughhumanrightsdiscoursescertainly
haveparticularbenefits,theyalsooverlookparticularmoralissuesandareunabletoaddressthe
rootcausesoftheseissues.
Section 2.1 – First Critique: Structural Harms of Globalization
Thefirstcritiqueisthathumanrightsdiscoursescannotalwaysbestaddressthebackground
conditionsofharmandinsecuritythatoccurbecauseoftheprocessesofglobalization.Human
rightscanbeunderstoodtobe“afeatureof,ratherthanachallengeto,globalizationandglobal
40
Ibid.
Formoreonhumanrights,theethicsofcare,andpublicpolicy,seeChapterFive.
42
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,49.
43
Ibid.,63.
41
85
governance.”44Thepointisthathumanrightsdiscoursesarenotnecessarilysensitivetoorcritically
reflectiveabouttherelationsofpower45thatcanmakethepracticeofhumanrightsproblematicon
thelevelofinternationalrelations.Onthelevelofinternationalrelations,humanrightsaremore
thanatheory.Theyare,asBeitznoted,apractice.Theyareapracticethatismostoftencontrolled
bythosewithagreatershareofglobalpower,liketheUnitedStatesandotherWesternnations,as
wellastheUnitedNations,theWorldBank,andInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).Thiskindof
controlismadeeasierbecausehumanrights,atleastasfarasthemainstreamtheoriesgo,arenot
gearedtolookattherelationsofpowerthatoperateinthebackgroundofthecurrentglobalorder.
Becausehumanrightstheoriesarenotnecessarilywellequippedtotakepowerrelationsinto
account,theycanoftenfailto‘see’thefullarrayofproblemsattendantontheenforcementof
humanrightsclaims,orthefulldepthofanyparticularproblem,suchasthecasewithexclusionary
practices.Failingtofullyappreciatethedifferencesinpowerintheinternationalrealminmany
wayscanmaskthecomplexmoralrelationshipswehavewith“thosewhoareoursuperiorsorour
inferiorsinpower.”46
RecallinChapterTwoIarguedthatthelensofcareisuniquelysuitedtouncovering
particularglobalmoralcontexts,oneofwhichisexclusion.Exclusionisaveryrealandendemic
featureofthecurrentinternationallandscape,inspiteofthefactthathumanrightsareunderstood
tobeuniversal.Thisisbecausewhenwethinkabouttheimplementationofhumanrightsas
enforceableclaims,theyrequireapoliticalbodytodotheworkofenforcingthem.Inthecurrent
globalorder,thepoliticalbodyinquestionisoftenassumedtobestates,andso“theentitlementto
andtheexerciseof[…]rightsthatone’sstatusasa‘citizen,’asamemberofthebodypoliticwillbe
established.”47Thismeansthatcitizenshipstatus,andthesubsequentabilitytoexerciseone’srights
withrespecttoagovernmentisoneofthewaysinwhichexclusioncanoccur.Whilebeingaforeign
nationalinahostcountrydoesnotstriponeoftheirrights,itcertainlymeansthatonehasa
differentkindofidentity,whichinvariablyaltershowwellone’srightsareenforced.48AsFiona
Williamsargues,transnationalcareworkersareoftensubjecttobeingmadevulnerablebecauseof
44
"HumanRightsandtheGlobalPoliticsofResistance:FeministPerspectives,"ReviewofInternationalStudies
29(2003):179.
45
ToreiteratetheconceptfromChaptersOneandTwo,relationsofpowerarethewaysinwhichinstitutions
shapeourlives.Ontheinternationalstage,then,relationsofpowerarethewayinwhichinternationalpower
structuresshapetherelationshipsbetweeninstitutionssuchasnationalgovernments,oftentothedetriment
ofthosenationsandorganizationsthatarelesspowerful.Further,thisskewedrelationshipisnotnecessarily
seenasproblematicbythosewithpowerbecauseitisnot‘seen’atall,i.e.peopleinsuchpowerfulinstitutions
arenotawareoftheirprivilege.
46
Baier,"TheNeedforMoreThanJustice,"55.
47
SeylaBenhabib,"Citizens,Residents,andAliensinaChangingWorld:PoliticalMembershipinaGlobalEra,"
SocialResearch66,no.3(1999):724.
48
Ibid.,727.
86
“alackofcitizenshipstatus,devaluedasworkersintheisolatingprivatizedeconomyofhousehold
labour,subjectaswomentointimate,personalizedandemotionallyexactingcarework,and,as
‘other’nationals,enteringsituationsheavywiththehistoriesofracialisedsubordination.”49
Critical,feministcareethics,however,callsintoquestionourcurrentjustificationsfor
multiplekindsofexclusion.Forexample,theFilipinanannyinCanadacannotvoteinherhost
countrytochangethewaysinwhichsheistreated.AlthoughsheworksinCanadaforaCanadian
family,shehasnovoiceinhowherlegalstatusisconsidered,andherabilitytovoiceanygrievance
ormistreatmentcanbeseverelycurtailedsoastobenonexistent.Careethics,inthissense,
providesasharpchallengetocurrenttrendsofglobalizationandglobalgovernance,becauseit
woulddemandthatshehaveavoice,thatshebeabletohavegreaterinputonhersituation.Or,on
aninstitutionallevel,thatthepoliciesofCanadaandthePhilippinesbeassessedtodeterminewhy
transnationalmigrationisnecessaryforFilipinawomenandwhyhavinganannyseemsnecessaryfor
theCanadianfamily.
Humanrightsdiscourses,ontheotherhand,cannotalwaysseewhattherootcausesofsuch
problemsareinthefirstplace,includingthenormsthatmaybeatworkinparticularcultures.The
Filipinawomanmighthavearighttofairpayandnottobemistreated,but“[p]roclaimingthatthe
poor,theneedy,andthepowerlesshaverightstellsusverylittleaboutwhytheyareunableto
exercisethoserights,andaboutwhoisresponsibleforwhatsortofactiontoaltertheirstateof
povertyandpowerlessness.”50Theproclamationofrightsmustbeteamedwitharobusttheoryof
obligationandmoralmotivationforactiontooccur.AsoutlinedinSection1,humanrightsare
standardsandenforceableclaims;theymustbeactedoninsomewayforthemtomakesense.
Evenongenerousaccountsthatdemandanation’scitizenmemberstakeresponsibilityforthat
nation’sbadactionsathomeandabroad(andassuchthereisatheoryofobligationthatputsthe
responsibilityforhumanrightsdoctrinesinthehandsofallpersons),thereisstillnovitalmoral
motivationtocompelaction.ForhumanrightstobeacteduponinthecaseoftheFilipinananny’s
politicalexclusion,Canadianfamilieswouldhavetoactivelystartcampaigningforreforms:eitherto
votingrightsortotheguestworkerprogram.Yetevenifhumanrightsobligatedcitizenstotake
suchaction,humanrightscannotassessthegendernormsthatgroundthepracticeofwomen
workingthe‘double-day,’orthecompanypoliciesthatcanbepunitiveforwomenwithyoung
children,suchasnoflexiblehoursorunpaidorlow-paidmaternityleave,thatcareethicsidentifies
asacontributingfactortotheFilipinananny’ssituation.Becausethenormsidentifiedbycareethics
49
Williams,"MigrationandCare:Themes,ConceptsandChallenges,"386.
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,49.
50
87
aretypicallyseenas‘private’concerns—not‘public’—theyarenotnecessarilygoingtofallunderthe
purviewofhumanrightsdiscourses.
Further,humanrightsdiscoursescannotalwaysseethefullscopeoftheharmsofthe
structuralpatternsofglobalization.Thetransnationalmigrationofcareworkisnotmerely
exploitinglabour,butalsoanemotionalexploitation.Humanrightscannotaccessthewaysinwhich
transnationalcarersareisolated,emotionally,fromtheirowndependents,orthewaysinwhich
theirchildrensufferemotionallyandintellectuallycomparedtotheirpeers,inspiteofincreased
materialsecurity.51Itisthisemotionalexploitationthatthelensofcareiswellsuitedtoexamine,
andverymuchapartofthestructuralpatternsofpowerthatservetocreateandreinforceunequal
relationsbetweenpeople,locallyandglobally.Wecanbegintounderstand‘love’asanexported
resource,becausethecarerisemotionallyinvestedinhercharges,andthisaffectionisextracted
fromtheemotionalenergythatwouldnormallyhavebeendirectedtowardherownfamily.52For
example,when‘Western’motherswereaskedabouttheirdecisiontoemploynannies,theyfocused
onthenanny’srelationshipwiththeirownchild,praisingtheotherwoman’smotheringskills,not
acknowledgingwhatthewomanhashadtogiveupandleavebehind.53Humanrightsdiscourses,
whiletheycanaddresspolitical,economic,andsomesocialproblems,arenotnecessarilywell
equippedtohandletheemotionalaspectoftransnationalmigration,orothermoralcontextsthat
areinexorablylinkedtoemotionalattachment.Emotionalexploitationoremotionaloutsourcingis
difficulttoseethroughthelensofhumanrights,anditisoneofthepatternsofglobalizationthat
mustbeunderstoodifwearetocommittoamoreethicalkindofglobalizationthatIarguedforin
thepreviouschapter.Thelensofcare,however,isuniquelysuitedtoacknowledge‘importedlove,’
makeclearwhyitcanremainunseen,andguideoursolutionsforthistroublingaspectof
transnationalcaremigration.
Becausethestandardsandclaimsofhumanrightscannotaddressorsometimeseven‘see’
thebackgroundconditionsofglobalmoralcontexts,thismeansthathumanrightscanleaveinplace
relationsofpowerthatservetoperpetuatetheharmsthatexistintheworldtoday.Whilehuman
rightshavedonemuchtocorrectsomeoftheinjusticesinthepastcentury,theyarenotenoughto
combatthevastarrayofinjusticesstillpresentintheworld.AsWilliamsargues,“home-basedwork
isolatestheworker,makestheworkinvisible,andrendersdifficultformsofcollectivemobilization
forrights.”54
51
Hochschild,22.
Ibid.,22-4.
53
Ibid.,26.
54
Williams,"MarketsandMigrantsintheCareEconomy,"27.
52
88
Iarguethroughoutthisthesisthatcritical,feministcareethicscanofferusauniqueinsight
onthemoralproblemsthatarepresentintheinternationalrealm,andthatinsightcanunderwrite
newkindsofmotivationandnewpathsofactionthatwouldnotbeavailablebyclingingstubbornly
totheideathathumanrightsisouronlymoraltoolintheinternational.AsGriffinwrites:
Humanrightscoveronlyonespecialpartofmorality;thereareverymanyhighlyimportant
moraldomainsoutsidethedomainofhumanrights:forexample,certainconsiderationsof
justiceandfairness,someformsofequality,andmanycasesofoneperson’scrueltyto
another.Inaddition,humanrightscanbeatstakeinwaysthatarenotespeciallyimportant:
aprettyminorlibertymightbeatstake,oraminorexerciseofautonomy.Ifsomuchofsuch
verygreatmoralimportancefallsoutsidethedomainofhumanrights,caninfants,the
severelymentallyhandicapped,andsufferersfromadvanceddementianotfindthe
protectiontheydeservethere?55
Muchisleftoutsidethesphereofhumanrights,byGriffin’sformulationcertainly,butIdo
notthinkitisuniquetoGriffin’saccountofhumanrights.Thismeansthatwhilehumanrights
certainlyhaveaidedpeopleinthepast,theyarenotenoughtoaddressthecomplexnatureof
exclusionorinternationalrelationsofpowerastheystandtoday.
However,mainstreamhumanrightshavemorerecentlybeenreaffirmedintheUnited
Nation’sSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),whichpaycloserattentiontothebackground
conditionsofglobalmoralandpoliticalproblems.TheSDGisalistofseventeendevelopmentgoals
thatarestronglyrootedinhumanrights,expressadeepcommitmenttogenderequality,and
directlyaddressthegrowinginequalitiespresentintheworldtoday.56Thesegoals,andthe
developmentworktheyhaveproducedhavebeenbeneficialtothousandsofpeoplesincetheir
creationin2012.TheSDGs,andtheUNreports,specificallyfocusonpoverty,migration,trafficking,
andthefactthatwomen’sunpaiddomesticworkisasignificantfactorofwomen’scontinued
oppressionandmarginalization.57Additionally,thesegoalsstresstheimportanceofleavingnoone
behind,inincorporatingoftenoverlookedpopulations,suchaselderlywomenwhoareroutinely
excludedfromthescopeofdevelopmentpolicyandwork.58
InspiteoftheexcellentworkthattheSDGshaveproducedaroundtheworldalready,these
goalsentailsomeofthesameblind-spotsasotherhumanrightsdiscourses.Aprimeexample,inthe
caseofGoal5:GenderEquality,thedocumentationforthisgoalfocusesontheneedforwomento
55
Griffin,95.
"UndpSupporttotheImplementationofSustainableDevelopmentGoal1:PovertyReduction,"ed.United
NationsDevelopmentProgram(NewYork:UnitedNations,2016),4.
57
"UndpSupporttotheIntegrationofGenderEqualityacrosstheSdgsIncludingGoal5,"ed.UnitedNations
DevelopmentProgram(NewYork:UnitedNations,2016),4.
58
"LeaveNoOneBehind:Ageing,Genderandthe2030Agenda,"ed.UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
(NewYork:UnitedNations,2016),1.
56
89
havemoreeconomicfreedom,politicalaccess,rightsonparwithmen,andthelostopportunity
coststhatwomenexperiencebyperformingthebulkofthecaringlabour.59Suchconsiderationsare
heartening,andthecommitmenttowomen’spoliticalandeconomicempowermentshouldbe
applaudedalongwiththeacknowledgementofoneofthemajorfactorsstandinginthewayof
women’sempowerment.Yetthroughouttheentiredocument,menarelargelyabsent.Inthe
sectionabouttheimportanceofwomenworkingoutsidethehomewhilehamperedbybeing
‘burdened’withthebulkofthedomesticlabour,menarenotmentionedatall.Thereisno
correspondinglanguagetobringmeninsidethehomewhilemovingwomenoutsideofit.This
signalsadualproblemfortheSDGsforallthattheyareamoreprogressiveembodimentofhuman
rights.First,thegoalsstilldonotfullytakeintoaccounttherolethatmenandhegemonic
masculinitiesplayinwomen’scontinuedoppression.AsdiscussedinChaptersOneandTwo,men
oftenreceivea‘pass’fromperformingcaringlabour,owingtotheirstatusas‘productive’workersor
simplybybeingmenandthusnotexpectedtodowhathastraditionallybeen‘women’swork.’
Additionally,hegemonicmasculinities,asdiscussedinChapterTwo,donotsayanythingaboutany
singlemaninparticular,butinsteadarethewaysinwhichproblematicmasculinevalues(suchasthe
falseidealofindependence)arereproducedandperpetuatedthroughofficialandunofficialmeans.
TheinvisibilityofmenintheGoal5documentationispredicateduponandentrenchesthispictureof
menasoutsidethescopeofwomen’sempowermentandgenderequalitymoregenerally,ignoring
thatgenderandempowermentareconstructedbyourrelationshipswithothers.Women’s
empowermentandeconomicandpoliticalpowerwillnotbeaccomplished,notfully,without
incorporatingmenintothepicture.Second,thelanguageofGoal5’sdocumentationcontinuesto
privilege‘productive’workoverandabovetheworkofcare.Whilecertainlywomencanandshould
participateinpubliclife,inthemarketplaceandthepoliticalsphere,itisdangeroustoassumethat
thiskindofworkismoreimportantthantheworkofcare,theworkthatsustainsthecontinued
survivalofeveryhumanbeing.ThelanguageofthedocumentationaroundGoal5doesnot
acknowledgethatonceawomanisworkingoutsidethehome,thensomeonewillhavetoperform
thecaringlabourthatsheusedtodo.Thissecondproblem,therefore,tiesintothefirst,becauseif
menarenotincorporatedintothegoalsofgenderequalityandsharingtheloadofworkinand
outsidethehome,thenthesegoalsmightonlyservetoreproducecontinuedgenderinequalityand
thedevaluationofcarework.
59
"UndpSupporttotheIntegrationofGenderEqualityacrosstheSdgsIncludingGoal5,"4-5,8,10.
90
Section 2.2 – Second Critique: Cultural and Gender Bias
Thesecondmajorcritiqueofhumanrightsdiscoursesisthattheycarrywiththemculturaland
genderedbiases.Humanrightstheoriesasawholehavegrownoutofalongtradition,begunin
Europe,thatstartedwithnaturallawtheoryandbecameageneralrightstheorythoughtheworkof
ThomasHobbes,JohnLockeandthroughtheFrenchandAmericanRevolutions.Mostofthese
theoristsalsoassumedthattherightsofmenwerespecifictomen,andwomenwereattendant
uponmenaspartofthehousehold.60Tobesure,inthelastcenturymuchhaschangedabouthow
rights,andhumanrightsinparticular,negotiatetheroleofwomenandculturaldiversity.Women
andoppressednon-Europeangroupshaveutilizedrightslanguageinordertoasserttheirclaimsand
togainamoremateriallyequalstandingtoEuropean-descendedmen.Thisdoesnotmeanthat
modernhumanrightstheoriesclaimthattheycanbeunderstoodasahistorical,asa‘viewfrom
nowhere’withoutanyculturalorgenderedbackgroundassumptionsnecessaryforthemtooperate.
Careethics,however,explicitlyaimsatuncoveringthewaysinwhichourculturaldifferencesand
ourgenderaffectourlivesandassuchtheyareimportantmoralandpoliticalsitesofinvestigation
andpotentialtransformation.
Therootoftheproblemhere,Iargue,isthathumanrightsarepredicatedontheideaof
equality,whichisoftenunderstoodassameness.Thiskindofequalityisonethatmanypeoplein
theWesterntraditioncometoexpectandholdinhighregard.61However,thisassumptionof
samenesscanobscurethegenderedandracializedrelationsofpowerthatexist,andthatourethical
livesarestructuredbyandthroughtheserelationsofpower.Theneedfor‘women’shumanrights’
andorganizationsthatarecentredaroundinvestigatingthehumanrightsabusesthatareuniqueto
women,insomemeasurecallintoquestiontheabilityofhumanrightsanalysestotreateveryone
thesameandstillprotectagainstprofoundkindsofinjustices.Itisonlythroughrecognizingour
differences,andhowourdifferencesresultindifferenttreatment,thatwecancometorectifysome
ofthesystemicstructuralmistreatmentthatthegloballyvulnerableexperience.InChapterTwo,I
arguedthatourdifferenceshaveaprofoundaffectonourlives,andwecanunderstandthatthere
aredifferentsetsofnorms,differentexpectations,anddifferentvaluesattachedtopeopleonthe
basisoftheirgender.Assumingallpersonsarethesameistoignorethedifferencesthatcanaffect
andaltersomeone’slife.62Also,ifhumanrightsanalysesassumeallpersonsarethesame,thisbegs
thequestion:whatisthebenchmarkof‘sameness?’Oftenthatbenchmarkisunderstoodtobethe
European-descendedmalewhotypicallyhasbeentherecipientofrightsfromthebeginning.The
60
CarolePateman,TheSexualContract(Cambridge:PolityPress,1988),48,52.
Robinson,"HumanRightsandtheGlobalPoliticsofResistance:FeministPerspectives,"176.
62
Held,"FeministTransformationsofMoralTheory,"327.
61
91
goalofhumanrightsanalyseshastobringeveryonetothesamelevel,whilenottakingintoaccount
theembeddedculturalandgenderdifferencesthatclaimsofsamenesshabituallyoverlook.
Pushingbackagainstthiskindofcritique,JamesGriffinpresentsthehumanrightstheorist
withtwooptionswhenitcomestonegotiatingculturaldifference.First,wecanacceptthathuman
rightsisunalterablyaWesterndiscourse,andhopethatotherculturesadopthumanrightsbecause
theyfinditacceptableorabetterwayofdoingthings.Thatis,thesecultureswillnegotiatetheir
ownrelationtoWesternidealsofautonomyandliberty,andmakethehumanrightsclaimsthey
deemnecessary.63Alternately,wecanfindnon-Westernorindigenousbeliefsthatmightsupport
thecaseforhumanrightsorsomethinglikethem.64Griffinnotdoesthinkthatthedifferences
betweenculturesareasgreataswemightthinkthemtobe,andthatweexaggeratethe
“disagreementbetweensocietiesoverhumanrights.”65However,Griffinassertsthatthefirstoption,
acceptinghumanrightswithitsWesternculturalbackground,isthebetteroption.Heargues
againstthesecondoptionbecausealthoughitmightmaketheconversationeasiertostartabout
humanrightsbylookingforlocalvaluesthatareakintoWesternautonomy,justice,fairness,and
libertytheconversationmightcomeapartinthoseearlystages.Hewrites:
Ausefulhumanrightsdiscourseisnotmadepossiblejustbyagreeingonthenamesofthe
variousrights,whichisallthatagreementonthelistsecures.Weneedalsotobeableto
determineafairamountoftheircontenttoknowhowtosettlesomeoftheconflicts
betweenthem.66
Differentculturesmayhavedifferentideasoffairness.Forexample,oneculturemayextend
fairnesstoallpersons,whileanotherculturehasseparateconnotationsoffairness-for-menand
fairness-for-women.Thehumanrighttofairtreatmentunderthelawthencanallowformenand
womentobetreateddifferentlywhenitcomestothesamelegalstatute.OnGriffin’saccount,the
conceptoffairnessmustbethesameeverywhereforthehumanrighttobeconsistent.Another
pointGriffinmakesisthatWesternidealshavebeenusedtohelpoppressedgroupsasserttheir
humanrightsagainstWesternpowers.HisprimaryexampleisIndia—oftencastasaspiritual,mystic
counterpointtoWesternrationalityandscience—whichoverlooksIndia’s“longtraditionofsecular
rationality,scientificinvestigation,andfreedomofthought.”67HepointsoutthatIndiaappropriated
ideaslikeautonomyandlibertytogaintheirindependencefromtheBritish.68Griffinconcludesthat
63
Griffin,137.
Ibid.,137-8.
65
Ibid.,138.
66
Ibid.,140.Emphasisintheoriginal.
67
Ibid.,141.
68
Ibid.,141-2.
64
92
adoptingWesternthoughtisnotnecessarilybad,anditissomethingeveryculturecannegotiatefor
itself.
Griffin,atleast,admitstotheculturalbackgroundthatcomeswithahumanrightsdiscourse.
Heprivilegestheconceptshumanrightsembodyandtheentailedculturallyspecificprioritiesfora
veryclearandcogentreason.However,Robinsonargues,andIagree,thattheculturalbiasof
humanrightsisinherentlyproblematic.Further,humanrightsalsoentailagenderedbiasthat
ignoresthewayinwhichconstructionsofgendershapeourlivesandeventhekindsofhumanrights
claimswemake.69Herargumentisthattheinfluentialorganizationsofglobalcivilsociety,likethe
WorldBank,theIMF,othernorthern-basedNGOs,andsocialmovements,relyonhumanrights
discourseto“promoteasetofvaluesthatareheavilygenderedandwhichreflectaWesternbias.”70
Becauseofthisgenderandculturalbias,Iarguethathumanrightshaslimitedapplicationsforthose
persons“whoaremademostvulnerablebytheprocessesofglobalization.”71Consider,forexample,
thatpoorwomenintheglobalSouthhaveexperiencedgreaterlevelsofvulnerabilityduetothe
processesofglobalization.Theyaremostoftensupportingtheirfamiliesfinancially,andcaringfor
thememotionallyandphysicallyaswell.Thismeanstheyarecarryingamassiveburdenthatmight
notexactlybeaviolationoftheirhumanrights,butcertainlylimitsthechoicestheycanmakeabout
theirlives.Iftheirpayisjustenough,andtheirhoursarenottoomany,andtheirworking
conditionsnottoobad,thenthoseintheglobalNorthmightconsiderthatthecostofdoingbusiness
andnotconsideritmorallyproblematicthatthesewomenexperiencetruncatedlifechoices.
ReturningtothecaseoftheFilipinananny,evenifshehasdecentpay,andworksforagoodfamily
thatdoesnottakeadvantageofher,sheisstillinCanadainsteadofinherhomecountry,nearher
ownchildren.Itmighthavebeenherchoicetogointotheguestworkerprogram,buthowfreeis
herchoice,howmuchisshelivingalifeofherown,whenthatwasthebestwaytomakemoneyto
provideforherchildren?Inmanywaysshehassacrificedherownconceptionofagoodlifefor
herselfinorderthatshemightprovideforherchildren,andallowaCanadianwomantohaveher
ownconceptionofthegoodlifeaswell.Iamnotsayingthatcaringforone’schildrenissomething
onlywomendo,butoftenthatwomeninpoorernationsassumemuchmoreoftheburdenandthat
theyareoftendoingsowithouttheaidofmenforaplethoraofreasons.Currentsocialnormsplace
theburdenofcareonwomen,andinordertoshoulderthatburdenmanywomensuffer,whileat
thesametimeallowingmentoexperience‘privilegedirresponsibility,’wheretheymayreceivea
‘pass’ontheircaringobligationsinvirtueoftheirmasculinityorengaginginmore‘worthwhile’
69
RefertoChapterTwo,Section3.3formoreonhowgenderisanimportantmoralandpoliticalcontextthatis
identifiedandbestassessedthroughthelensofcare.
70
Robinson,"HumanRightsandtheGlobalPoliticsofResistance:FeministPerspectives,"162.
71
Ibid.
93
work.72Sufferinglikethisisnotnecessarilyahumanrightsviolation,andthusnot‘seen’byhuman
rightsdiscourses.Humanrightsarenotuselessforwomen,buttheycannotencompassalltheways
inwhichsocialnorms,globalization,governments,institutions,andotherpeopleharmwomen
becausehumanrightsdonotpaycloseattentiontothehistoricalandculturalcontextofwomen.
Thiscritiquemightberesolvedbycreatingaspecialcategoryofhumanrightsforwomen.
However,Beitz,respondingtoargumentsforwomen’shumanrights,claimsthattheydonotneedto
beunderstoodasaspecialsetofrights,butmerelyarethesamerightswithsomeunique
considerationofwomen’sreproductiveissues.Betizdoesacknowledgethatthecriticismofthe
public/privatedivideinhumanrightsdiscoursehasvalidityandthatwomenareoftenunderspecific
kindsofthreatsparticulartowomen.Yet,hewritesthatasidefromissuesofreproduction,“the
interestsofwomenwhicharesubjectsofdistinctivevulnerabilityareperfectlygeneral—theyare
mainlyinterestsinphysicalsecurityandpersonalliberty.”73Thegoal,forBeitz,istoargueagainst
theideathattalkingaboutthehumanrightsofwomenisinherentlyproblematic.Hethinksthere
aregoodreasonstotalkaboutthehumanrightsofwomenbecause:“Thehumanrightsofwomen
areproperlyconsideredmattersofspecialconcernbecausecertainimportantinterestsofwomen
aresubjecttogender-specificformsofabuse.”74Beitzconsidershowthehumanrightsofwomen
mightoverrideculturalpracticesthatareheavilyoppressiveofwomen,becausethehumanrightsof
women“seeknotonlytodisallowcertainformsofconductbythestateandtomandatechangesin
lawandpolicy,butalsotochangepatternsofbeliefandconductinthesurroundingsocietyand
culture.”75Forexample,itisnotenoughthatwomenbeconsideredtohavearighttobefreefrom
physicalharm,butthattheculturalpracticesandbeliefstakeonthenormofwomen’sbodiesas
beinginviolate.Thiscouldbedemonstratedastherapeofwomenbeingfullyprosecutedinsteadof
theoffenderpayingoffawoman’s(oftenmale)relatives,oracultureabandoningthepracticeof
femalegenitalmutilationinfavourofamoresymbolicceremonyofagirlbecomingawomaninthe
community.
Here,itisimportanttorecallthatBeitzseeshumanrightsnotonlyasatheory,butalsoasa
practice.Ifhumanrightsaretoberealized,theymustbeactedupon.Thepracticemightrequire,in
thecaseofgrossviolationsofwomen’shumanrights,heavyintervention.Thequestionbecomesifa
localgovernmentfailswomen,dooutsideagentshavecompellingreasonstointervene?Beitz
answersthisbyclaimingthatNGOscanbeconsideredrelevantagents,becauseitisoftenNGOsthat
72
SeeChapterOne,Section2.2andChapterTwo,Section3.3formoreonprivilegedirresponsibility.
Beitz,188.
74
Ibid.,189.
75
Ibid.,194.
73
94
bringwomen’sissuestointernationalattention.76ThesuccessofanNGOisoftenmeasuredby
workingwithlocalstochangebeliefsandpracticesby“offeringinformationandpersuasionrather
thanbyimposingsanctions.”77ThesuccessfulNGOisonethatengageswithlocalpeopleinorderto
furtherthepracticesofhumanrightsdiscourses.Thiscanmeanthatstatesarenotnecessarily
requiredtointervenewhenwomen’shumanrightsareunderattack.Further,onthequestionof
whetherornotwomen’shumanrightsareaspecialclass,andthusundercuttheuniversalidealsof
humanrightthemselves,Beitzresponds:“Mosthumanrightsofwomenareopentothesamerange
ofprotectiveandremedialactionbyoutsideagentsasmostothercivilandpoliticalrights,sothe
problemaboutfeasibilityinthespecialcaseneednotbeespeciallytroublingforwomen’shuman
rightsasaclass.”78Thesourceofwomen’shumanrightsisthesameasmen’s,andBeitz,likeGriffin
andIvison,doesnotrequirethatafullyfleshedoutlistofrightsbethefinalwordonwhatexactly
ourhumanrightsare.Theyallaccepttheneedforhumanrightstochangeandgrow.Certainly,this
formulationofrightsismorewomen-friendlythandocumentsliketheUDHR,whichcontainsbuilt-in
assumptionsthathouseholdsexist,whichareoftenassumedtobemale-ledhouseholds,andthus
canoverlookunfairtreatmentwithinafamilyormarginalizefemale-ledhouseholds.
Itistelling,however,thatBeitzacknowledgedatleastonecase,thecaseofreproduction,
wherewomen’srightscannotbethesameasmen’s.79Pregnancyiscertainlyaconditionuniqueto
women,andissueslikeabortion,forcedpregnancy,oralackoflegalrightstotheirownchildren
wouldrequireaspecialsetofrights.Thisopensupourabilitytothinkofwaysinwhichgender
oppressioncanoccurwithoutanyhumanrightsviolations.Thepointisnottosaythathumanrights
discourseisuseless,butthatitdoesnotcoverthemultiplewaysinwhichwomencanbeandare
harmedbygovernments,otherinstitutions,culturalpractices,andeventheirownfriendsandfamily.
Itiscertainlynotaviolationofawoman’srightsif,inaheterosexualrelationship,thewomanstays
athometocareforthechildren.Sheandherhusbandcouldhavesatdownuponlearningshewas
pregnant,lookedattheirfinancialsituation,thepriceofgoodqualitydaycareandtheirrespective
incomes,anddeterminedthatshewouldhavetostayhomeuntilthechildrenwenttoschool.There
isnorightbeingviolated,andonemightsaythedecisionwaspurelyafinancialone,butthatdoes
notmeanshewillnotsufferfrommentalisolation,boredom,depression,greatervulnerabilityto
abuse,northatshewillnotmissherwork,especiallyifshefoundherworkparticularlyfulfilling,her
longtermcareergoalsmaysuffer,andshemaysubsequentlyexperiencepovertyinheroldage.
Careethicswouldaskwhyshehadtostayhome,andwhywasherhusbandmakingmoremoney,
76
Ibid.,195.
Ibid.,196.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.,188.
77
95
andwhywastherenoaffordabledaycare.Surelyitisalsoimportantforbothparentstobondwith
youngchildren,andonecouldquestionwhythemaleparentdoesnothaveflexiblehourssohe
mighthavethatemotionalbondwithhisownchildrenaswell.Iargueitistellingthathumanrights
cannotapproachtherootcausesofwomen’scontinuedoppressionandmarginalizationormen’s
privilegetooutsourcetheircaringobligations,evenifallofawoman’shumanrightshavebeenmet.
Section 2.3 – Third Critique: Ethics of Social Reproduction
Thelastcritiquecritical,feministcareethicslevelsathumanrightsdiscoursesisthattheycanoverly
focusontheindividualagent,andtoocloselycircumscribewhocountsasanagentinthefirstplace.
Thismeans,veryoften,internationaltheorisingbasedonmainstreamhumanrightsdiscoursescan
losesightoftheimportanceofhowweliveinrelationtootherpeople.Thelanguageofrights
cannotalwaysadequatelyencompasscertaingoodssuchas“economicandsocialsecurity,the
fulfilmentofbasichumanneeds,andtheculturalsurvivalofgroups,”80becausesuchgoodsare
predicatedheavilyonsocialresponsibilityandcare.Forthemostpart,humanrightsdiscoursesare
aimedatprotectingtherightsoftheindividual,notnecessarilydisconnectedfromtheirwidersocial
andpoliticalframework,butwiththeprimaryfocusbeingtheindividualasamoralagent.81
Careethicsandhumanrightsdefinethenormativeagentverydifferently,andhowwe
definethenormativeagenthasrealimplicationsforhowweunderstandsocialreproduction.For
somehumanrightstheories,thenormativeagentisanyhumanbeing,regardlessofageor
intellectualdevelopment.Griffin,however,restrictswhocanbeconsideredanormativeagent.He
disallowsinfantsandveryyoungchildren,thementallyhandicapped,andthesenilefrombeing
considerednormativeagents,becausetheylackagency,thatis,theabilitytodeterminealifeof
theirown.ThisdoesnotmeantheydonothavemoralworthforGriffin,butthattheycannotmake
humanrightsclaims.82Healsorejectstheideathatbecauseinfantshavethepotentialtobefully
humanorthattheyexistinastateofuniquevulnerability,theyshouldbeprotectedasthoughthey
80
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,63.
Iacknowledgetheimportantworkdoneongrouprights,inparticularindigenousrights,inordertoprotect
therightsofspecific,historicallyoppressedandmarginalizedculturalgroups.DuncanIvisonarguesthatsome
groups,particularlyindigenousAustraliansmighthavegrouprights,becausegrouprightsinthiscaseprotect
certaincrucialinterestsofthegroupasawhole(2003,323).Ivisonalsoarguesforgroup-differentiatedpublic
policythatgoesbeyondthetraditionalprotectionsofindividualpoliticalandsocialrights(2005).However,
humanrightsinthemainstreamarestillmoreoftenaimedattheindividual.Often,ifonedoesincludea
humanrighttoculturalprotection,itiscastinthelightoftheindividualhavingarighttobeabletoparticipate
andnotbeundulybarredfromengagingintheirculturalheritage.Forexample,Articles22and27ofthe
UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsbothsuggestthatitistheindividualwhohastherighttothecultural
lifeofthecommunity,notthatanyculturalgroupinandofitselfhasrights.Additionally,theUnitedNations
DeclarationoftheRightsofIndigenousPeoplesalsocodifyandaffirmcollectiverights.
82
Griffin,92.
81
96
werefullnormativeagentsandhadtheabilitytomakehumanrightsclaims.Griffindoesnotthink
potentialityorvulnerabilitybythemselvesareenoughreasontoprotectsomething;thethingin
itselfmustbeworthpreserving,andtheintuitionsbehindsuchmethodsmustbe“accommodated
byanadequateethics.”83Griffinseestheproblemofpotentialityagainwhenoneappliestheoriesof
personalidentity,orconsciousness,totheideaof‘person’toseeifinfantscanbeconsidered
personsonthataccount.84ButitisnotasthoughGriffinthinksthatnon-normativeagentsdonot
haveanyrightsorthattheydonothavemoralworth.Instead,hewantstostipulatewhatis
necessaryforhumanrightsinorderforhumanrightsthemselvestobelessunwieldyandmore
streamlined.85Thepointisthateventhoughhumanrightsmightbeconsideredtoapplytoall
humanseverywhere,equally,thedebateaboutwhocounts,aboutwhoisinandwhoisout,isstill
pertinenttohumanrightsdiscourses.Thisisbecauseofthefocusontheindividual.Iftheindividual
personistheseatofconcern,thenwemustdeterminewhatkindofpersonisallowedtomake
humanrightsclaims.Iwillnotfurtherexplorethedebateaboutwhocountsasahumanrights
claimant,butmerelynotethatthedebateitselfsignalsthathumanrightsanalyses,ingeneral,give
lessconsiderationtotherelationsinwhichindividualsexistandtheattendantissuesofsocial
reproductionthatarenecessaryforindividualstocontinuetosurviveandeventhrive.
Thecritical,feministethicsofcare,ontheotherhand,bringstotheforeissuesof
relationshipsandsocialreproduction,whicharenotoftenseenwhenthefocusisontheindividual
asanormativeagent.Humanrightsare“notendsinthemselves,butguaranteesoffreedomwhich
allowindividualstopursuechosenendswithoutobstruction.”86Rightsanalysesplacegreatervalue
ontheindividualpersonbeingabletomakechoicesforthemselvesandactuponthosechoices.
Focusingnarrowlyontheprotectionofindividualchoicesmeansthatotheraspectsofhumanlifeare
renderedlessimportantordevalued.Theverytimeone‘chooses’tospendoncaringactivitiescan
bedevalued.AsYanqiuZhouillustrates,thedominantmodeoftemporalunderstanding,which
valuestimespentonproductivelabourtendstomarginalizeandsupersedethetimespenton
reproductivelabour.This‘choice’,whichismostlyassociatedwithwomen’slives,canservetoreentrenchthepublic/privatedivideintermsofnotonlyspace,buttimespentonparticularkindsof
labourandwho‘shouldbe’doingsaidlabour.87Takingthetimenecessarytoengageinreproductive
labourisunavoidableforourcontinuedsurvival,butwhospendstimeoncaringlabourisconstituted
bythechoiceswemake,whichareirrevocablyboundbytiesofobligationtofriendsandfamily.The
83
Ibid.,85.
Ibid.,86-7.
85
Ibid.,94.
86
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,63.
87
YanqiuRachelZhou,"Time,SpaceandCare:RethinkingTransnationalCarefromaTemporalPerspective,"
Time&Society24,no.2(2015):167-8.
84
97
assumptionthatourabilitytochooseenablesourindependenceallowsustooverlookour
fundamentalinterdependence,andthatsometimesour‘freedom’ofchoicenecessarilycurtailsthe
choicesofothers,suchthatothersareforcedtomakeimpossiblechoices.88However,asAllison
Weirargues,ifweprioritizeanunderstandingofinterdependencewecanreimaginefreedomof
choiceasfreedomfromhavingtomakeimpossiblechoices:89doIworkorcareformychildren,doI
gooverseasandearnenoughtosupportmychildrenorstayandcareformyagingparents?The
carelensallowsustomoredeeplyinvestigatewhatitmeansforhumanbeingstosurviveandthrive,
andalsowhatitmeansforustomakechoicesinthecontextofrelationships.Protectingthe
freedomofthetransnationalcareworkerwouldmeanthatwemustaskwhatinstitutionalpatterns
havepushedherintomakinganimpossiblechoiceinthefirstplace,whichareacombinationofthe
demandforcareabroadandthemultiplekindsofinstability(economic,political,andsocial)inher
homenation.
Therequirementsofsocialreproductionarevitaltasksthatmustbeaccomplishedforthe
continuedsurvivalofindividualsandthehumanspecies.Wemustcometounderstandthatrights
andresponsibilityarenotalwaysthesamething.Wemightbeobligatedonthebasisofrights,but
responsibleformuch,muchmore.Forexample,itisupfordebatewhetherfuturegenerationsor
potentialpersonshaverights.AccordingtoGriffin,theydonot.However,wemightstillhavea
responsibilitytofuturegenerationstopreservetheplanetandpreventwidescaleecologicaldisaster
andmassextinctions.IfGriffiniscorrect,thathumanrightscanandshouldonlyapplytonormative
agents,andtherearealimitedsubsetofhumansthathavewhathecallsfullagency,thenwestill
mightberesponsibleforthosewhoarenotnormativeagents.Itisimportanttonotethatthosewho
arenotnormativeagentsforGriffin—infants,theveryyoung,theveryold,andthementally
disabled—arethoseforwhommuchcareisrequired.Themoralworthofsuchpersonsisnot
undercutbytheirlackofnormativeagency,becausetheystillrequirecare.Care,asamorally
infusedtermofassessment,critique,andpolicyguidance,withitsrelationalontologycan‘see’
globalmoralcontextsthathumanrightsdiscoursesoftenoverlook.Suchcontextsincludethe
FilipinanannyinCanadaonaguestworkerprogram,whohadtoleavebehindherownchildrento
supportthem,whereherpoliticalexclusionmightnotbeconsideredahumanrightsviolation.Care
ethicscanalsoassesstheunderlyingnormsandlawsthathinderherabilitytodirectlycareforher
children,becauseshealsomusthireorentrustanotherwomanwithherchildrenbecauseshemight
nottrusthermalepartner,orhemightnotbeavailabletocareforhischildrenatall.
88
Weir,"GlobalCareChains:Freedom,Responsibility,andSolidarity,"170.
Ibid.,167.
89
98
Inresponsetothiscritique,therightstheoristmightsaythatnotallrightstheoriesplace
unduefocusontheindividual,andthiswouldbecorrect.Hegelianrightstheoriesareheavily
investedintheimportanceofthesocial,andtherelationshipsthatpeopleengagein.Theproblem
withHegelisthatheclaimstherelationshipbetweenparentsandchildrenis“subversiveofmorality
formalecitizens,whoseprimaryloyaltyshouldbetotheuniversalrationallyrealizable,inhisview,
onlyatthelevelofthestate.”90TryingtorescueHegel’srelationalrightsforfeministtheoryis
fraughtatbestandtroublingatworst.Theassumednaturalnessofmaleandfemalegenderrolesis
notsomethingthatcanbeneatlycutoutofHegel’swork,andalsoperpetuatestheproblemof
categorizingcareasalesseractivitythanpoliticalparticipation.Thetasksofsocialreproduction
shouldnotbeglorified,butneithershouldtheybedevalued.Weshouldunderstandsuchtasksasa
necessarypartofhumanlifeandsurvival,andasiteofmoralengagementandmoralcomplexity.
Incontrast,Nedelsky’srelationalrightsareverymuchrootedinthefeministtradition,and
oweagreatdealtothetransformativeinsightsofcareethics,althoughshedoesnotseeherworkas
amoralproject.91Shefocusesonthelegalaspectofrights,andassuchherbrieftreatmentof
internationalhumanrightspointstotheideathatinadditiontoconcernsabouttheir
implementation,wemustalsopayattentionto“whohasdefinedtherightsinquestion.”92
AccordingtoNedelsky,inorderforhumanrightstobeconsidereduniversallylegitimate,the
processesthatproducehumanrightsmustthemselvesbelegitimate,wherelegitimacyisobtained
throughdemocraticallyjustifiablemeans.93WhileNedelsky’sworkpointstotheinfluencethatcare
ethicshashadonsomestrainsofhumanrightsdiscourses,especiallydrawingouttherelational
aspectofrightsandautonomy,thisdoesnotmeanitcanstandinforcareethics.Ivison,whenhe
wrotethatrelationalagencyandrelationalrightsarefeasible,alsonoted:
[I]norderforustobecapableofformingmeaningfulrelationships,andfulfillingour
obligationsinthefirstplace,certainconditionsarerequired,includingachievingcertain
basiccapabilitiesandthusbeingprotectedfromharmsthatpreventusfromdoingso.Not
alloftheseharmsarebestaddressedthroughhumanrights,buttheyremainonewayof
markingoutandidentifyingthesecapabilitiesandtheharmsthatcanbefallthem.94
Certainlyrelationalrights,likeNedelskydevelops,areagoodguideforhowthelawcanmarkout
possiblewaysinwhichpeoplehavebeenharmed(morallyandlegally),however,critical,feminist
careethicsisanimportantdifferentmoralperspectivethroughwithwecanviewtheinternational
90
VirginiaHeld,"FeministMoralInquiryandtheFeministFuture,"inJusticeandCare,ed.VirginiaHeld
(Colorado:WestviewPress,1995),158-9.
91
JenniferNedelsky,Law'sRelations:ARelationalTheoryofSelf,Autonomy,andLaw(Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress,2011),87.
92
"ReconceivingRightsandConstitutionalism,"JournalofHumanRights7,no.2(2008):162.
93
Ibid.
94
Ivison,Rights,207.Emphasismine.
99
realm,whichbearsonpolitical(localandglobal),economic,andsocio-culturalnormsandpractices.
Thedifferentmoralstandpointcareethicsoccupiescannotbeoverlooked,becausethemoral
dimensionofinternationalpoliticalcontextsisanimportantpartofhowweaddressthem.
Anotherapproach,whichhasbeeninstrumentalinchanginghumanrightsdiscourse,isthe
capabilitiesapproachfirstauthoredbyAmartyaSenandthenfurtherdevelopedbyMartha
Nussbaum.SenpioneeredthecapabilitiesapproachinhislandmarkTannerLecturein1979titled
“EqualityofWhat?”,andlaterarguedthatthecapabilitiesapproachshouldbeusedtohelpexplain
andexpandhumanrightstheories,unpackingthedifferencebetweentheopportunityandthe
processaspectsofhumanrights.Byopportunity,Senmeans,“whetherapersonisactuallyableto
dothethingsshewouldvaluedoing.”95Theprocessaspectofhumanrightsisthecontingentmeans
ofhowtheopportunityiscarriedout.Senclaimsthatbecausethecapabilityapproachhighlightsthe
formeroverthelatermeansthetheoryresistsafocusonincomeandprimarygoods,whichcould
notpayattentiontohow,forexample,apersoninawheelchairwouldnotnecessarilybeabletodo
thesamethingsasapersonwiththefulluseoftheirlegs,ifgiventhesamecircumstancesand
goods.96Sen’swork,however,stillbearsthemarksoftheeconomicdiscourseoutofwhichitarose,
andassuchhasanover-focusoncounting,ontallyingupresults,anddoesnotnecessarily
incorporateacorrespondingsenseofmoralmotivation:i.e.“Whyshouldonecareaboutindividuals
andparticularcapabilities?”97Further,Sen’sworkisnotnecessarilyacriticallyfeministpictureof
humanrightsanddoesnotincorporateconcernsaboutcareandtheinstitutionalwaysinwhichour
livesourstructured,andassuchIhavenotincorporatedSen’scapabilitiesapproachinthisthesis.98
Nussbaum,conversely,critiquesSenforhislackoffeministfocusandoverlookinghow
institutionsplayaroleinourlives.99ForNussbaum,thecapabilitiesapproachiseitherasupplement
oranalternativetohumanrightstheories.100Insomeofherearlywork,sheexplicitlyalbeitbriefly,
incorporatestheunderstandingthatweareallnecessarilydependentbeings,andthatsociety
shouldcareforthosewhoareinextremeconditionsofdependency“withoutexploitingwomenas
95
AmartyaSen,"HumanRightsandCapabilities,"JournalofHumanDevelopment6,no.2(2005):153.
Ibid.,153-4.
97
DesGasperandThanh-DamTruong,"DevelopmentEthicsthroughtheLensesofCaring,Gender,andHuman
Security,"InstituteofSocialStudiesWorkingPaperNo.459(2008):16.
98
Inaddition,muchhasalreadybeenwrittenaboutSen’sapproach.SeeMarthaNussbaum(2011,2002),
GasperandTruong(2008),andIngridRobeyns(2011)forfeministcriticalappraisalofSen.Myapproachtakes
thetreatmentofNussbaumandTruongtobemorerelevanttotheachievementoftheaimsofthisthesis.
99
MarthaNussbaum,CreatingCapabilities:TheHumanDevelopmentApproach(Cambridge,MA:Harvard
UniversityPress,2011),39.
100
"Women'sCapabilitiesandSocialJustice,"inGenderJustice,Development,andRights,ed.Maxine
MolyneuxandShahraRazavi(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),48.
96
100
theyhavetraditionallybeenexploited,andthusdeprivingthemofotherimportantcapabilities.”101
Further,Nussbaum’slistofcapabilitiesexplicitlyincorporatestheimportanceofemotionand
affiliation,whichentailsbeingabletohaveimportantformsofsocialinteractionandtonotbe
discriminatedagainstonthebasisofgender,race,sexualorientation,religion,nationalorigin,caste,
orethnicity.102WhileNussbaum’scapabilitiesapproachsharesmanyofthesamefeminist,critical
goalsastheethicsofcare,herworkdoesnotnecessarilytargetthehistoricalconditionsofcurrent
inequalitiesortherelationsofpowerthatproduceandperpetuateglobalmoralandpolitical
contexts.Nussbaum’swork,likemainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses,focusesoncorrectingfor
currentinjusticeswherethecapabilitiesoftheindividualagentaretheprimarylocusofconcern.
Thisisavitalgoal,butthecritical,feministethicofcarefocusesonuncoveringandunderstanding
therootcausesofinjustice.Careethicsshiftsthefocusofourreasoningthecomplexinterplay
betweennormativecommitments(rootedinlocalandglobalculturalpractices),politicalpower,and
economicforcesthatunderwritethecontinueddevaluationandmarginalizationoftheworkofcare
itself(andsotoocare-giversandcare-receivers)frompublic,politicaldiscourse.Thismeansthat
whileNussbaum’sworkisanexcellentsupplementforhumanrightsdiscourse,thegoalandfocusof
herworkissubstantivelydifferentfromthecritical,feministethicofcarethatisthefocusofthis
thesis.Inspiteofsomesharedpriorities,thoseofcareandaffiliation,careethicsworksforthe
transformationofthemoralandpoliticallandscapebybriningcare—withitsrelationalontology,its
emphasisonuncoveringtherootcausesofoppression,marginalization,andexclusion,andits
investigationofconditionsunderwhichpeoplegiveandreceivecare—tothecentreofourpolitical
reasoning,notthecapabilitiesofindividualpersons.
Critical,feministcareethics,withitsrelationalontology,encompassesawiderrangeof
humanactivitythanmostmainstreamhumanrightstheories.Itseesmanypeoplewhoarenot
oftenseen,thosearenotconsidered‘normativeagents,’andinvestigatessituationsthatareoften
sitesofdominationandoppressionbutnotnecessarilyhumanrightsviolations.Ifthereisonething
thatsomerightstheorists—suchasJamesGriffinandDuncanIvison—andcaretheoristslikeFiona
Robinsonagreeon,itisthathumanrightstheoriesalonearenotnecessarilyenoughtocombatthe
vastarrayofhumansufferingthatoccursintheworldtoday.
Humanrightsmostcertainlyfulfilafunctionintheinternationalpoliticallandscape.They
areexcellentasastartingpointfordisparategroupstocraftamutuallyagreeablesetofstandards,
orasawaytosingleoutgrossinjustices.Humanrightsalsooffercertainpracticalbenefits,inthat
theyareunderstoodasstrongclaimsofjustice,markoutissuesofinternationalconcern,and
101
Ibid.,66.
CreatingCapabilities:TheHumanDevelopmentApproach,33-35.
102
101
provideclearguidanceforpublicpolicy.However,Ihavearguedthathumanrightscannotaddress
everycomplexcontextintheinternationalsphere,andassuchitisnotalwaysthecorrecttoolfor
thetaskathand.Thecarecritiqueofhumanrightsdemonstratesthatinspiteofthebenefitsof
humanrights,itcanoverlookthestructuralharmsofglobalization,importculturalandgenderbiases,
andcandevaluetheconcernsofsocialreproduction.Thesecritiqueshavemoralandpolitical
significance.Careethics,becauseitisfirstatoolofcriticalassessment,ismoresuitedtolooking
‘underthehood,’toidentifythedeeperrootsofanymoralsituation.Futher,itcanprovide
guidanceastohowtoaddressthepervasiveandoften‘unseen’normsorpracticesthatleadto
negativeoutcomesassociatedwithdifference,exclusion,gender,andoftenculminatinginviolence.
However,therejectionofhumanrightsdiscoursesasaprimarymodeofanalysisdoesnot
entailthatcareethicscanfunctionasaguideforpublicpolicy.Inlightofmygoaltoputforwarda
practicallyapplicabletheory,itmightseembeneficialtousecaretheorytogroundasetofhuman
rightsstandards.Thiswouldseemareasonablesolutionconsideringthatoneofthemajorbenefits
ofhumanrightsdiscoursesisthattheyarefunctionalpublicpolicyguides.Inthenextchapter,I
examinetheworkofDanielEngster,whocreatedatheoryofcaringhumanrights,whereoneofhis
aimswastoofferamorepracticalsolutionforcarebasedpublicpolicy.AlthoughIamsympathetic
toEngster’sgoals,andsomeofhisproposedsolutions,hisworkdemonstratestheexactreasons
whyweshouldatleastbescepticalofattemptstomeldcaretheoryandhumanrights.Iarguethat
Engsterdevelopsaconstructionofcarethatisunabletomakevisibletherelationsofpowerthat
shapeourrelationshipswithparticularothers,andassuchhispracticaloutcomesarenotwell
groundedonthebasisofcare.Weshouldresistattemptstolessenthecritical,feministcapacityof
careethics,andinsteadworktodemonstratethatcriticalcaretheoryitselfcanserveasaguidefor
publicpolicy,whichisthesubjectofChapterFive.
102
Chapter 4: Can Care be a Foundation for Human Rights?
Inlightofthecarecritiqueofmainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses,itmightseemreasonableto
createasetofhumanrightscentredonacoreideaofcare.ThisisexactlywhatDanielEngsterset
outtoaccomplishinhisbook,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory.Heattemptedto
createasetofhumanrightsthatwerenotvulnerabletocarecritiques,andtohaveatypeofcare
theorythatcouldguidepublicpolicy.However,Engster’sdefinitionofcareandhisresultant‘caring’
humanrightsisnotwithoutitsownproblems.Inthischapter,IwillcritiqueEngster’stheoryintwo
parts,bothfocusedonhowEngster’scaretheoryisnotnecessarilysuitedtoaddressingoreven
‘seeing’therelationsofpowerthatstructureourlivesinthefirstplace,andwhichareoftentheroot
causeoftheproblemshestrivestoaddress.First,Engsterusesthefactthatweexistinwebsof
dependencerelationstogroundhistheoryofrationalobligation.TheproblemisthatEngsterisnot
criticalofthoseverydependencerelations,andnottakingacriticallenstodependencerelationscan
allowforacontinuationofentrenchedpatternsofpower.ThismeansEngster’scaretheorycannot
addresstherootcausesofoppression,marginalization,andtheirattendantharms.Second,because
Engsteronlyhasminimalfeministcommitments,1Iwillarguethathiscaretheorycannotassessthe
genderedrelationsofpowerthatexistinlocalandglobalcontexts.WhileEngsterarguesthat
womenshouldnotbeoppressedormarginalized,anditisclearheisawareofculturalandhistorical
considerations,Iwillexplorehowalackoffull,materialequalityispartoftheveryoppressionand
marginalizationthatareapartofwomen’slives.ThismeansthatEngster’scaringhumanrightsare
vulnerabletothesamekindofcritiqueasmainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses,asdiscussedinthe
previouschapter.
MycritiquealsodemonstratesthatEngster’scaringhumanrightsarenotwellsuitedto
evaluatingtransnationalcarecontexts,particularlythemigrationofcareworkersandhumansex
trafficking.AlthoughEngsterdoesacknowledgethatweshouldbecriticalofpoliciesandpractices
thatengenderpovertyandsuffering,becausehisowndefinitionofcareisnotsufficientlycriticalof
existingpatternsofpower,andhiscaringhumanrightsareonlyminimallyfeminist,westillneeda
theorytodothejobofcriticalassessment.Thecriticalethicsofcare,asIarguedinChapterTwo,is
wellsuitedtoprovidesuchanassessment.ContrarytoEngster,Iclaimthatitisvitallyimportantto
maintainthecritical,feministdimensionofcareethicsifcareethicsistoprovideasubstantively
differentperspectivethanmainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses.WhilethatstillleavesEngsterwith
theclaimthathiscaretheorycanguidepublicpolicy,IargueinChapterFivethatacriticalcareethic
1
Engster,13-5.
103
canalsoserveasaguideforpublicpolicy.Therefore,wedonotneed‘caring’humanrightsinorder
toprovideasubstantivealternativetohumanrightstoaddressglobalmoralcontexts,eitherby
criticallyassessingthemorprovidingpolicyguidance.
Section 1 – Care as the Heart of Justice?
Inthissection,IwillprovideabriefoutlineofhowandwhyEngsterdevelopshistheoryofcaring
humanrights.Heoffersathoroughoverviewofanadmittedlyincomplete2setofstandardsfor
domestic,economic,andinternationaljusticeonthebasisofcaretheory.First,Iwillunpack
Engster’sownparticularversionofcaretheory,whichusesarationaltheoryofobligationtocreate
bindingdutiesofcare.Second,IwillshowhowEngster’scaretheoryinformsanddevelopsasetof
caringhumanrightsandelaboratesomeofitspracticaloutcomes.
Engsterprovidesthreereasonsforwhyatheoryofcareshouldbemadefoundationalto
theoriesofjustice.First,Engsterclaimsthatno“theoryofjusticecanbesaidtobeconsistentor
completewithoutintegratingtheinstitutionalandpolicycommitmentsofcaretheory.”3Because
Engsterfirmlysupportstheideathatcareiscentraltohumanlife,hearguesthatcaremustbemade
centraltotheoriesofjusticebecausethiswouldbetterreflecttheactualmaterialconditionsoflife.
Second,Engsterclaimsthatcaretheoryoffersbetterjustificationsforawelfarestatethan
traditionalliberaltheoriesofjusticeandamoreflexibleapproachtopublicpolicy.4Third,heclaims
thatcaretheory“suppliesaminimalbasicmoralitythatcanhelptomediatethecultural,religious,
andmoraldifferencesamongpeople.”5However,whilethesearecompellingreasons,andwhile
therearepointsofcommonalitybetweenEngster’stheoryofcareandthefeministethicofcare,Ido
notadvocateusingEngster’stheoryofcareasafoundationforhumanrights,becauseitdoesnot
criticallyengagewithhowourdependencerelationsareconstructedandonlyhasminimalfeminist
commitments.Rather,Iwillarguethatthecritical,feministethicsofcareshouldbemaintainedasa
discreteethical-politicaltheory.
Section 1.1 – Care and a Theory of Rational Obligation
Engsterdevelopshisownspecificcaretheorybecausehearguesthatthekindofcaretheory
advocatedby‘orthodox’careethicists,likeGilliganandNoddings,istoonarrow,whilethefeminist
criticalpoliticaltheoryofcareofferedbyJoanTrontoistoobroad.Instead,heseekstofindamiddle
2
Ibid.,241.
Ibid.,5.
4
Ibid.,15-6.
5
Ibid.,16.
3
104
groundbetweenthetwoandtoprovideabetterfoundationforamoralandpoliticaltheory.6The
firststephetakesistoofferadefinitionofcaringthatmeetsthetaskofofferinga‘middleground.’
Second,hedevelopsatheoryofrationalobligationtoenforceourmoralcaringduties,andthirdhe
outlinesadistributionofourcaringduties,includingtodistantstrangers.BecauseEngsterclaimswe
havedutiesofcaretodistantstrangers,heisthenabletojustifyasetofcaringhumanrightsthatis
morallybindinginternationally.
Section 1.1.1 – Engster’s Definition of Caring
Thedefinitionofcaring,forEngster,restsuponwhatheviewsasthethreemainaimsofcare.He
summarizesthefirstaimasfollows:“Whenwecareforindividuals,wemostbasicallyhelpthemto
satisfytheirvitalbiologicalneeds.”7Thisincludesaccesstogoodssuchaswater,food,shelter,
medicalcare,protectionfromharm,andevenimportantphysicalcontactforyoungchildrenand
infants.Thesecondaimofcaringistohelp“individualsdevelopandsustaintheirbasicorinnate
capabilities;”8i.e.theskills(social,psychological,andpractical)thatenablebasicsocialfunctioningin
aparticularsociety.Thisincludesspeech,reasoning,imagination,emotion,literacy,andnumeracy,
amongothersthatareparticulartoanygivensociety.Somesocietiesmightviewcomputeruseasa
basiccapability,whileothersmightrequirememberstolearnhowtohuntandtrackgame,thusthis
aimofcareisnecessarilyflexible.Thethirdaimofcareis“helpingindividualstoavoidharmand
relieveunnecessaryorunwantedsufferingandpainsothattheycancarryonwiththeirlivesaswell
aspossible.”9Engsterdefinescaresoastoensurepeoplecanlivetheirlivesandfunctionintheir
ownspecificsocietywithasfewimpedimentsaspossible.
Hisdefinitionofcarealsoreliesonthreevirtuesofcare.Thesevirtuesaredirectlyinspired
byTronto’spracticesofcare.Engsterenumeratesthevirtuesofcareasattentiveness,
responsiveness,andrespect.10
Attentivenessmeansnoticingwhenanotherpersonisinneedandrespondingappropriately.
[…]Responsivenessmeansengagingwithotherstodiscerntheprecisenatureoftheirneeds
andmonitoringtheirresponsestoourcare(whetherverbalornonverbal)tomakesurethey
arereceivingthecaretheyactuallyneed.[…]Byrespect,Idonotmeananythingsostrong
asequalrecognitionofothersbutmoresimplytherecognitionthatothersareworthyofour
attentionandresponsiveness,arepresumedcapableofunderstandingandexpressingtheir
6
Ibid.,23-4.
Ibid.,26.
8
Ibid.,27.Emphasisintheoriginal.
9
Ibid.,28.
10
ThedistinctionbetweenEngster’scaringvirtuesandthepracticesofcareincriticalfeministcareethicsisnot
problematicbecauseitisnotthisdifferencethatrendershiscaringhumanrightsuncritical;ratheritishis
constructionofdependencethatdoesso.ThispointismorefullyexploredinSection2ofthischapter.
7
105
needs,andarenotlesserbeingsjustbecausetheyhaveneedstheycannotmeetontheir
own.11
Care,onEngster’saccount,thus“include[s]everythingwedodirectlytohelpothersmeettheirvital
biologicalneeds,developormaintaintheirinnatecapabilities,andalleviateunnecessarypainand
sufferinginanattentive,responsiveandrespectfulmanner.”12Itisimportanttonotethat,although
Engsterviewscareasanactivitythatrequiresdirectconnectionbetweencarerandcarerecipient,
hedoesstipulatecollectivecaringasakindofcare,wherethestatecaresforthosewhoareinneed
bydevelopingpoliciesthatdirectlyhelpindividualsmeetthoseneeds.13Thus,heisabletoavoidthe
samecritiquethe‘orthodox’ethicsofcarewassubjecttoasoutlinedinChapterOne:thatcaring
couldonlyeverbeaprivateconcern.Forexample,Engsterarguesthatoneofthegeneralfunctions
ofacaringnationalgovernmentwouldbetoincorporatetheunderstandingthatevenwhenthereis
arelativelyprosperoussocialenvironment,“somecapableindividualsmaynotbeabletosatisfy
theirbasicneedsatminimallyadequatelevels.”14Wethusrequirestatepoliciestoaddressthe
situation,suchashousingassistance,jobtraining,andevenbasicunemploymentinsurance.
Engster’sdefinitionofcarethusfunctionsasajustificationforthewelfarestate.Engsterarguesthat
hisdefinitionofcaretheoryisabletoofferabetterjustificationforawelfareframeworkthan
traditionaltheoriesofliberaljustice,15althoughthoseparticularclaimsarebeyondthescopeofmy
argumenthere.16Theproblem,asIwillargueinSection2ofthischapter,isthatEngsteruncritically
acceptsourdependencerelationsasafoundationforalargertheoryofcaringrights,whichcould
leaveunchallengedharmfulnormativeassumptionsaboutgender,race,ability,age,citizenship,and
sexuality.
Section 1.1.2 – A Theory of Rational Obligation
Onthebasisofthisdefinitionofcare,Engsterutilizesatheoryofrationalobligationaboutourcaring
responsibilitiestoexplain:1)whywemustcareforotherpersons;and2)howcarefunctionsto
enablemoraljudgment.Heclaimssuchatheoryisnecessaryforthreereasons.First,withoutsuch
adefenceofcaring,itis“notself-evidentwhypeopleshouldencouragethedevelopmentof
sympathyandcompassion.”17Second,becausehistheoryofobligationextendstoevendistant
strangers,itcanbeusedtocounterthecritiquethatcaretheorycanbeusedtosupportparochial
11
Engster,30-1.
Ibid.,31.Emphasisintheoriginal.
13
Ibid.,36.
14
Ibid.,91.
15
Ibid.,94.
16
ForEngster’sjustificationofacaringnationalgovernment,anditsfeatures,seeEngster(2007),thechapter
titled“CareTheoryandDomesticPolitics.”
17
Engster,37.
12
106
limitstocaring,i.e.supportfurtherexclusion.Third,arationaltheoryofobligationcanfunctionto
strengthenordevelopsympathyandcompassion,whichalsoworkstoavoidare-entrenchmentof
thereason/emotiondichotomythatEngsterclaimshasbeenusedbybothcareandnon-care
philosopherstoclaimthesupremacyofoneovertheother(wherecaretheorists,Engsterclaims,
prioritizeemotion,whereasKantianorutilitarianphilosophersprioritizereason).18Importantly,he
doesnotclaimthatarationaltheoryofobligationwillcompelmoraltransformation.Rather,the
theoryofrationalobligationcanserveasalogicalandconsistentguidetomarkoutmoralor
immoralactionsonthebasisofcaretheory,i.e.provideaguideformoraljudgments.19
Engster’stheoryofrationalobligationborrowsheavilyfromEvaKittay’saccountofour
caringobligations.Shearguesthatbecausewehavereceivedcare,weinturnareobligatedtogive
caretoothers.Ourwebofrelationships,ineverexpandingconcentriccircles,determinesthecaring
obligationswehavetowardothers.Further,wedonotnecessarilyjustcareforthosewhocaredfor
us,assometimesthatisimpossible.Instead,wecareforthosewhoaredependentuponusatany
givenpointintime.20Engsterformalizesthisideaandproducesatheoryofrationalobligationto
arguewhyweareobligatedtocareforparticularothersandseethecareclaimsofothersas
legitimate,whichisasfollows:
1. “Allhumanbeingscanbeassumedtovaluetheirsurvival,thedevelopmentandfunctioning
oftheirbasiccapabilities,andtheavoidanceoralleviationofunwantedpainandsuffering—
unlesstheyexplicitlyindicateotherwise.”21
2. “[A]llhumanbeingsdependuponthecareofotherstosurvive,developandmaintaintheir
basiccapabilities,andavoidoralleviateunwantedpainandsuffering.”22
3. Therefore,“allhumanbeingscanbesaidatleastimplicitlytovaluecaringasanecessary
goodandtomakeclaimsonothersforcarewhenweneedit,meaningthatweatleast
implicitlyassertthatothersshouldhelpustomeetourbasicneeds,developandmaintain
ourbasiccapabilities,andavoidoralleviatepainwhenwecannotreasonablyachievethese
goodsonourown.”23
4. “Inclaimingcarefromothers,weimplythatcapablehumanbeingsoughttohelpindividuals
inneedwhentheyareabletodosoconsistentwiththeirothercaringobligations.”24
Lastly,Engsterarrivesattheguidingprincipleofhistheoryofrationalobligation,theprincipleof
consistentdependency,asameanstovalidateourclaimsofcareuponothers,andother’sclaimsof
careuponus:
18
Ibid.
Ibid.,39.
20
Kittay,Love'sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency,29.
21
Engster,46.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.,48.
19
107
5. “Sinceallhumanbeingsdependuponthecareofothersforoursurvival,development,and
basicfunctioningandatleastimplicitlyclaimthatcapableindividualsshouldcarefor
individualsinneedwhentheycandoso,weshouldconsistentlyrecognizeasmorallyvalid
theclaimsthatothersmakeuponusforcarewhentheyneedit,andshouldendeavorto
providecaretothemwhenwearecapableofdoingsowithoutsignificantdangerto
ourselves,seriouslycompromisingourlong-termfunctioning,orunderminingourabilityto
careforothers.”25
Restingontheprincipleofnoncontradiction,Engsterclaimsthatthistheoryofrationalobligation
servesasamoralbasisfortherighttocare,andthatthosewhodonotupholdtheirmoraldutyto
carenotonlybehavehypocritically,but“renouncethewebofcaringuponwhichtheirownlives,
society,andhumanlifegenerallydepend.”26
ThisdoesnotmeanthatEngsterassumeswehavea‘natural’instincttocare.Rather,moral
motivationmustbecultivatedinpersons,especiallywhenweconsiderwhatweoweinmoralterms
todistantpersonsorpersonswhohavetraditionallybeenmadeOtherbydominantgroups.Engster
makesaseriesofpracticalsuggestionsastohowasocietymaycultivatethiskindofmoral
motivation,fromadvancedparentalleavepolicies,tomoreexpansiveearlychildhoodcare,topublic
educationreforms,andevenaninvestigationintotherolethemediaplaysinhowweperceivethe
practicesofcare.Hesuggeststhatthereareveryrealandconcretewaystocultivatealargercare
movementbyemployingparticularstrategiessuchasfavouringuniversalovermeanstested
programs(becauseuniversalprogramshavebeenfoundtofostercaringbetweengroupsofpeople,
whilemeans-testedprogramsoftenentrenchraceandclassbiases27),workingwithbusinessesto
changethedynamicsofworkandcare,28and“highlighttheuniversalvulnerabilityofindividualsand
themoraldutytocare.”29Engsteralsoidentifiesthegenderingofcareasareasonwhycarehas
beenhistoricallydevalued(particularlyinthecontextofplacesliketheUnitedStatesandAustralia),
andalsoasaconditionthatcurtailslargersocialmotivationstocareinthefirstplace.30
Section 1.1.3 – Distribution of Caring Obligations
Engsterarguesthattheultimatebenefitoftherationaltheoryofobligationisthatwehavearightto
care,becausewe“canallmakevalid—thatis,justifiable—claimsonothersforcarewhenweneed
it.”31Yet,thisdoesnotmeanthatallindividualsmustextendcaretoallotherindividuals.Thereis
notnecessarilyaone-to-oneexchangeofcaring.Instead,Engsterstratifiesourcaringobligationsin
25
Ibid.,49.
Ibid.
27
"StrategiesforBuildingandSustainingaNewCareMovement,"JournalofWomen,Politics&Policy31,no.4
(2010):299-300.
28
Ibid.,301-2.
29
Ibid.,305.
30
TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,223.
31
Ibid.,53.
26
108
ordertoensureamoretargeted,logical,andpracticaldivisionofourcaringresponsibilities.The
basisforthisdivisionofcaringdutiesistheargumentforassignedresponsibilitybyRobertGoodin.
Theargument,insum,isthatwhilewehavegeneralmoraldutiestoallothers,wehavespecial
moraldutiesthatare‘distributedmoralduties’thataremoreeffectivewhenparticularpersonsare
assignedparticulartasks.32Thisargumentgroundsthejustificationthatwecanandshouldbe
investedinthecareofparticularothers,althoughthisdoesnotprecludethefactthatwehave
residualresponsibilitiestodistantothers.33TheupshotforEngsteristwo-fold.First,this
distributionunderpinsthejustificationforasetofinternationalcaringhumanrights.Second,itis
meanttoprovideawell-structuredframeworktoguideouractionandavoidtheambiguitiesthat
Engsterarguesareproblematicforotheraccountsofcareethics,particularlyTronto’sand
Robinson’scritical,feministaccounts.34Additionally,itisimportanttounderstandhowEngster’s
caringhumanrightsrestuponthisdistributionofcaringresponsibilities,becausehiscaringhuman
rightsareultimatelygroundedonanuncriticalacceptanceofourdependencerelationsandthuscan
actuallyperpetuatethesameproblemsasmainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses,asdiscussedinthe
previouschapter.
AccordingtoEngster,ourcaringobligationsarestratified,wherethefirstobligationiscare
ofself,predicatedontheviewthatonemustbeabletocareforone’sself,andthatindividualsare
usuallybestabletodeterminetheirownneeds.Further,becauseifpeoplecannotprovideadequate
careforthemselves,thentheyareunlikelytobeabletoprovideadequatecareforothers.Lastly,
Engsterprovidesthecaveatthatself-sacrificingcareshouldalwaysbeconsideredsupererogatory.
Thesecondobligationistoourintimaterelations(generallyourfriendsandfamily,butwecanalso
considerthatdoctors,nursesorothersincaringprofessionshavethesesecondaryobligationsto
theirpatientsduetothespecificcircumstancesoftheirrelationship),becauseweareusuallybest
situatedtounderstandtheneedsofourintimaterelationsbetterthanothercompatriotsor
strangers.Thissecondaryobligationcanalsoextendtostrangers,however,inemergencysituations,
whereproximityanddesperateneedarecombined.Ourthirdtierofobligationistothosewholive
incloseproximityorshareasocialrelationship(neighbours,clubmembers,andcompatriots),
becausewearebettersituatedtounderstandtheirneedsthanstrangers.Wearejustifiedto
prioritizethecareofourcompatriotsoverstrangersbecausesuchpersonshavethepotentialto
becomefutureintimaterelations,aswellasthefactthatcompatriots,especiallyfellownational
citizens,arepartofthelargersocialenvironmentwealldependuponforourcare.Thefourth,and
lastlevelofobligationistodistantstrangers.Thisisbecauseweareoftenunabletofully
32
Formoreonassignedresponsibilities,seeGoodin(1995).
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,55.
34
Ibid.,2.
33
109
understandtheirneeds,andhavelittletonocontrolovertheinstitutionsthatgovernthe
distributionoftheirresources.Rather,ourresidualresponsibilitytocarefordistantothersisbest
carriedoutbyenablingthemtocareforthemselvesandtheirintimaterelationsandcompatriots.35
Engsteracknowledgesthatthisdistributionofcareallowsthenatureofourcaring
obligationstoremainindeterminate,sohesuggeststhreeguidelinesforaprincipleofresponsibility
forhowwecandeterminewhodoeswhatkindofcaring.First,henotesthat“weassumeaspecial
obligationtodoourbesttoprovideatleastadequatecareforindividualswhenwetakesomeaction
thatindicatesourintentiontotakeonprimaryresponsibilityfortheircare.”36Suchisthecasewith
parentswhochoosetohavechildren,orwithpersonswhochoosetobecomedoctors.Second,he
arguesthenormsthatundermineacaregiver’sowncareneedsaremorallyunjustifiable,likethe
normthatwomencareforchildrensometimestothedetrimentofthemselves.Theguidelinehereis
thatthecaringneedsofothersshouldnotnecessarilysupersedethecaringresponsibilityonehasto
one’sownself.Third,thereisaresponsibilitytoprovidecareforthoseindividualswhorequireit,
andforthosewhoarethemselvescaregivers.37Itisthisdistributionofcaringobligationsthatgives
hiscaringhumanrightsinternationalpurchase,becauseourresidualresponsibilitiesdemandthat
wecarefordistantotherswhentheirownfriends,family,andnationareunabletocareforthemin
thefirstplace.
Section 1.2 – Caring Human Rights
Itisourresidualdutyofcarethatobligatesustocarefordistantstrangers,accordingtoEngster.
Further,becauseEngsterstrivestoavoidambiguousclaimsaboutwhatinternationalglobalcare
mightlooklike,hedefinesasetofhumanrightsgroundedonhisparticulartheoryofcare.The
reasonheseeksto‘cutamiddleground’betweencareandhumanrightsisbecauseboththeories
have,inhisview,problematicdrawbacksthatarebestcorrectedthroughmergingthetwotheories
together.Theproblemwithhumanrights,heclaims,isthatthemoralstatusofhumanrights
remainscontentiousandlackssubstantivecross-culturalagreement,whichresultinadiluted
enforcementofhumanrightsstandards.38Regardless,itishiscritiqueofRobinson’scriticalethicof
carethatisimportanttounderstandformypurposes.Hedoesnotethatthecriticalethicofcareis
meantto“identifyandchangesocialinstitutionsthatmakeindividualsneedyanddependentinthe
35
Ibid.,55-8.
Ibid.,58.
37
Ibid.,59.ThisissimilartoKittay’sconceptionofthedoulia,aconceptIdiscussedinChapterOne,wherethe
widersocietyhasanobligationofcareforthosewhoprovidecaretoparticularothers,whichenablesahigher
standardofcareoverallanddoesnotunfairlypenalizethosewhocannotengagein‘productive’labour.
(Kittay,1999,143)
38
TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,163-4.
36
110
firstplace,”39andthatoneofthesolutionsRobinsonproposesisto“critically[assess]our
relationshipswithothersand[develop]moreegalitarianpartneringrelationships,”40particularly
withNGOs.Engster’schargeagainstRobinson’scriticalethicsofcareisthatwhileitprovidesuseful
descriptionsofhowtocareforothersininternationalrelations,“itdoesnottellusenoughabout
whomorwhatweshouldcareabout,”41andbecauseitis“[f]ramedsoabstractly,Robinson’stheory
provideslittlepracticalguidanceforpolicymakers,activists,andthegeneralpublicinthinkingabout
whatitmightmeantocareforothersabroad.”42Instead,heclaimsthatgroundinghumanrightsin
caretheoryproduces“anormativeinternationalrelationstheorythatappliestoallhumanbeings
regardlessoftheirculture,religion,ormorality,andcanprovidesubstantiveguidanceforcrossculturaldialogueamongdiversepeoplesaboutthemoraltreatmentofallhumanbeings.”43
However,beforeIoutlineEngster’snotionofcaringhumanrights,Iwillverybriefly
foregroundmyresponsetoEngster’scritiqueofRobinson.IwillarguemorefullyinChapterFiveof
thisthesis,contraEngster,thatthecriticalethicsofcarecanbeasubstantiveguideforpublicpolicy.
IclaimthatEngsterdoesnotgiveenoughcredittowhatacriticalcareethiccanactuallyaccomplish.
FionaRobinsonconstructedacriticalethicsofcareasalensforinternationalrelations.Therefore,
althoughRobinsonarguesforunderstandingthesufferingofrealpersons,shetargetssolutionsat
theglobal-institutionallevel.Thismeansthatthevitalquestionsarenotaboutfulfilmentof
obligationsorrights,butratherthemorevitalquestionsareabouthowcareisstructured.Whyare
importantformsofcare,suchaschildoreldercare,physicalandmentalhealth,andeducationso
lackingintheworld?Whyiscareundervalued,andwhyarecarersoftenwomenorracialized
persons?44AsIarguedinChaptersOneandTwo,thequestionofwhoandwhatwecareaboutis
alreadyansweredbyacriticalcareethic.Itisnotthatweareobligatedtocare,buthavea
responsibilitytocarryoutthepracticesofcareinthecontextofourparticularrelations.Therefore,
guidanceforpolicymakerscanbefoundinaskingquestionsthatallowustoseethewaysinwhich
ourcaringrelationshipsareconstructedbynationalandinternationalpolicy,pervasivesocialnorms,
andeconomicforces.45Thesedifferentquestionsresultinnewinformation,whichinturncanallow
ustoconsidernewsolutions.Thegreaterconcern,onacriticalcareaccount,ishowandwhycareis
structuredinparticularways,andthewaysinwhichpeoplearemadevulnerableandunabletocare
39
Ibid.,160.
Ibid.,161.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.,162.
43
Ibid.
44
FionaRobinson,"GlobalCareEthics:BeyondDistribution,BeyondJustice,"JournalofGlobalEthics9,no.2
(2013):133-4.
45
SeeChapterTwoforalargerdiscussiononthekindofanalysisthatacriticalethicofcarecanprovide,
particularlyaboutinternationalmoralcontexts.
40
111
fortheirparticularrelations.Engsterfocusesonwhomustcare,andonthequalityofcarerequired
butglossesoverthecriticalforceofcareethics,whichseekstoidentifyimpedimentstofulfillingcare
obligations.
ReturningtoEngster’scaringhumanrights,heclaimsthatwhilenationalgovernmentshave
theprimaryresponsibilitytosecurethehumanrightsoftheircitizens,ifanygovernmentcannotdo
so,itfallstotheinternationalcommunitytoassumetheircollectiveresidualresponsibilitiesto
ensurehumanrightsstandardsaremet.Engsterallowsthattherearelimitstosuchaid,thatsucha
responsibilitytowarddistantothersonlyholdswhenone’scloserresponsibilitieshavebeen
fulfilled.46Suchaidwould,heclaims,actuallybesimplebecauseasmallpercentageoftheabovepovertyincomeofpersonsinmostindustrializednationswouldbeabletounderwritethecostof
suchefforts.47Further,thesecaringhumanrightsareminimalmoralstandards,whichmeansthat
thelistofhumanrightsbecomesveryshort,especiallywhencomparedtotheUniversalDeclaration
ofHumanRights.Theyareasfollows:1)arighttophysicalsecurity;2)arighttosubsistencegoods
andadequatecaretosurvive,develop,andfunction;3)therighttopersonalandsocialcare
necessaryfortheirbasiccapabilitiesandfunctioning;4)therighttoworkandearnasufficientliving;
5)therighttocarefordependentsandselfwithoutundueinterference;6)therighttoasafe
workplace;7)therighttounemploymentanddisabilityinsurance;8)therighttoprotectionagainst
discrimination;9)therighttoaresponsive(thoughnotnecessarilydemocratic)government;and10)
therighttoenterintorelationshipsfreefromcoercion.48Thisshort,targetedlistofhumanrights,
groundedinourresidualobligationtocareforthosewhoarenotcaredfor,isabeneficialoutcome
ofhistheory,accordingtoEngster.CertainlythislistismuchshorterthantheUniversalDeclaration
ofHumanRights,andmoregearedtowardfulfillingEngster’sdefinitionofcareasoutlinedinSection
1.1.1.However,thisstate-centricfocusfeedsintomycritiquethatEngster’scaringhumanrights
couldoverlooktheplightofthetransnationalcareworkerbecauseitremainsanopenquestion
whichgovernmentisresponsiblefortherightsofcitizensoverseas,particularlythoseworkinginthe
informalsector.
Thesecondbenefit ofthisminimalstandardofcaringhumanrights,accordingtoEngster,is
thatitislesscontentiouscross-culturally,whichprovidesgreaterpurchaseforcross-cultural
dialogueandjudgment.Thereareminimalstandardsforcivilandreligiousfreedoms,aswellas
46
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,171.
Ibid.,172.
48
Ibid.,170-1.
47
112
nationality,culturalexpression,andself-determination.49Whilecaringhumanrightswouldnotbe
abletosupportthesamerightsasarobustsetofliberalhumanrights,theywouldnevertheless
supportsuchrightswhentheybecomeamatterofbasicsurvivalorfunctioning.50Forexample,a
righttofreespeechmightsometimesbeprotectedbycaringhumanrightswhencensorshiplaws
inhibitbasicfunctioning.Theclaimisthattheserightsarelesscontentious,becausetheycanoffer
“apracticalstandardfordeterminingtheminimallyadequatecareofindividuals.”51Thus,crossculturaljudgmentcanbelessproblematic,andcantakeplaceinadialogueformat,guidedbythe
caringvirtues.
Take,forexample,femalegenitalmutilation(FGM).Onemightarguethat,foraparticular
culture,FGMenablesthebasicfunctioningoflocalwomenbecausewithoutFGMtheyarenot
considered‘marriageable’andassucharevulnerabletonothavingaplaceintheirsociety.Engster’s
counter-argumentisthathowevermuchFGMmightbeunderstoodbyindividualsinacultureas
enablingsocialfunctioning,itneverthelessiswrongbecauseit“deprive[s]girlsofsensationand
feeling,cause[s]themsuffering,andthreaten[s]theirsurvivalandlong-termhealth.”52Thedialogue
thatweengageintomakethiscross-culturaljudgment,however,mustbeguidedbythevirtuesof
care:wemustbeattentive,responsive,andrespectful,andpursueadialogueeventhoughitis
difficult.AlthoughEngsterisnotexplicithere,wecouldsaythatonatheoryofcaringhumanrights
itisnotacceptabletopromoteonekindofrightoveranother.Wecannotpromotesocial
functioningoverandabovebasichealthandsurvivalwhentherearealterativeoptionsavailableto
promotethesamekindofsocialfunctioning;awomanmayreceiveanother,lessharmfulwayto
markoutherstatusasamarriageablewoman.However,asIwillargueinmycritiqueinthe
followingsection,becauseEngster’stheoryisonlyminimallyfeministandlacksacritical
investigationintodependencerelations,hisapproachcouldoverlookotherformsofoppressionthat
womeninsuchculturesface,leavingsomeproblematicaspectsofinterpersonalrelationships
unchallenged.ThismeansthatEngster’stheoryisnotnecessarilysubstantivelydifferentfrom
mainstreamhumanrightsdiscoursesasitcannotprovideathoroughlydifferentperspectiveon
globalmoralcontexts.
TheremainingquestionforEngstertoanswerishow,afteronehasengagedindialogue,we
aremeanttofulfiltherightsofothersonthisaccount.Heoutlinestwogeneralprinciplesofcaring
49
Thiswouldnotprecludehavingamorerobustsetofliberalhumanrightsinadditiontocaringhumanrights.
IdonotthinkEngsterwouldfindthatproblematic.SeeEngster(2007),pages176-7forafulldiscussiononthe
topic.
50
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,173-4.
51
Ibid.,179.
52
Ibid.
113
humanrights,whichfollowfromthenatureofhisdefinitionofcare.First,“[t]hegoalofcaring
shouldbetoenabletoindividualsandfamiliesasmuchaspossibletocareforthemselves.”53
Second“[l]ocalpeoplesandgovernmentsshouldbeinvolvedasmuchaspossibleintheformulation
andimplementationofprogramsdesignedtohelpthem.”54Also,therearedifferentmethodsto
fulfilourcaringhumanrights,eitherthroughdirectaid,throughcapacitybuilding,orthrough
changestointernationallaw,yetthepointshouldbetofollowtheprinciplesasoutlinedregardless
ofthemethodused.55Engsterdoesnotprioritizesupplyingdirectaid,however,becausedirectaid,
particularlyfoodaid,canoftenhaveharmfuloutcomessuchasthecollapseoflocalfoodmarkets
andincreaseddependenceonforeignaidingeneral,althoughsomeemergencysituationswarrant
suchassistance.56Abetterstrategy,accordingtoEngster,wouldbetohelplocalpersonsdevelop
thesocialinfrastructureforgoodstheyneed.Suchmethodswouldincludeextendingloansto
governmentstobuildschools,bridges,andhospitals,shouldtheydecidethatiswhattheyneed,and
towithholdloansfromgovernmentsthatareirresponsibleorbehavebadlytowardtheirpeople.57
Engsteralsodoesgivesomeweighttothecriticalcarelenstohelpidentifypoliciesthatrender
distantpersonsunabletocareforthemselves,buthepointsoutRobinsondoesnotspendmuch
timedevelopinghowcareethicscansubstantivelyguidepolicy.58Engstersuggeststhatcertain
internationaltreatiesmightbealteredtoallowforabetterstandardofcareworldwide,suchas
internationalintellectualpropertyagreementsthathave“restrictedtheaccessofmanypeoplein
poorcountriestobasicmedicines.”59Further,asapracticalconsideration,whengovernmentsdo
behavebadly,ratherthanhavealopsided,self-interestedeffortbyonenation,theremustbe
consensusfromtheinternationalcommunity,ideallythroughinternationalorganizationsand
regulatorybodiesthatdeclaresomegovernmentsillegitimateandsuspendtheborrowingor
resourceprivilegesofsuchgovernments.60Engsterfurtherclaimsthatwhensuchdeclarationsand
subsequentwithholdingofresourcesisnotenough,itmightbejustifiabletoundertake
humanitarianinterventiontofulfilthehumanrightsofdistantstrangersbasedonourresidual
responsibilitiestocareforotherswhentheirlocalinstitutionshavefailedthem.Engsterarguesthat
caretheory“justifiestheuseofmilitaryforcetoensurepeople’sphysicalsecurityandsupporttheir
abilitytocareforthemselves.”61Ifagovernmentfailstofulfiltherightsofitspeople,ithas,
53
Ibid.,182.
Ibid.
55
Ibid.,183.
56
Ibid.,184.
57
Ibid.,185-7.
58
Ibid.,187.
59
Ibid.,190.
60
Ibid.,189.
61
Ibid.,193.
54
114
accordingtoEngster,voideditsrightstosovereigntyandnon-interferencebecausesuchrightsare
predicatedonthegovernmentcaringforitspeople.Whenarighttosovereigntyisvoidedbygross
harmscommitteduponapeople,combinedwitharesidualdutytocarefordistantstrangers,care
theoryalsojustifiestheuseofhumanitarianmilitaryintervention.62Engsteralsostipulatestwo
additionalrequirements.First,suchoperationscannotbefutile.Theymusthaveachanceof
success,whichisdefinedas“notonlyprotectingindividualsfromimmediatethreatstotheirsurvival
andfunctioningbutalsoreturningthemtotheirnormallivesasquicklyaspossible.”63Second,a
representativeinternationalbodymustalsoauthorizesuchinterventions,andEngstersuggeststhe
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilasonesuchoption.Heacknowledgesthatthiswouldhighlyrestrict
thedeploymentofhumanitarianmilitaryintervention,becauseitwouldthentrulybeamethodof
lastresort.64
Beforeconcludingthissection,Engster’streatmentofmilitaryandhumanitarian
intervention,usingcaretheorytojustifytheiruse,requiresabriefcomment.Clearly,caretheory
mustbeabletoaddressviolentmoralcontexts,andIarguedasmuchinChapterTwo.Justasclearly,
asEngsterrecognizes,caretheoryjustifiesonlythemostrestrainedandreasonableusesofforce,
becauseviolencedisruptstheimportantcaringpracticesofhumanlife.Notably,theuseofcare
theoryinmilitarythoughthasalreadybegun.DanielLevinearguesthatthelensofcarecanbe
importantincounterinsurgencyoperations,becausecareethics“dealshead-onwithquestionsof
howtobuildrelationshipsinthepresenceofcoercion,powerimbalance,force,andeven
violence.”65Bytakingintoaccounttheimportanceofrelations(betweencounterinsurgents,civilians
andinsurgentsincombination66),andusingthepracticesofcareasapartofanewmilitaryethos
(wherecourageisreimaginedasholdingbackfromviolencewhileunderthreat67),thelensofcare
wouldallowformilitaryforcestoconductcounterinsurgencyoperationsinamoremoralmanner.
Theabilityofcareethics,then,tofunctioninamilitaristicsettingisbeginningtotakeshapeinthe
literature.However,inEngster’sworkthereislessattentionpaidtotheabilityofcaretheoryto
assess,critique,andsuggestsolutionstoaddresstherootcausesofviolenceinthefirstplace,and
lessentheneedformilitaryinterventionsintotal.68Itmightbethecasethatinordertoprevent
moregrievousharms,someforceorviolenceagainstbelligerentaggressorsmightbenecessary,but
thisshouldalwaysbeaccompaniedbystrategiestoundercuttheappealofviolence,“todeterand
62
Ibid.
Ibid.,194.
64
Ibid.,194-5.
65
DanielH.Levine,"CareandCounterinsurgency,"JournalofMilitaryEthics9,no.2(2010):140.
66
Ibid.,150.
67
Ibid.,155.
68
VirginiaHeld,"MilitaryInterventionandtheEthicsofCare,"TheSouthernJournalofPhilosophy46(2008):
14.
63
115
restrainratherthanobliterateanddestroy;torestrainwiththeleastamountofnecessaryforceso
thatreconciliationremainsopen;inpreventingviolence,tocausenomoredamageandpaintoall
concernedthanisneeded.”69Engsterdoesnotexplicitlyincorporatetheunderstandingthatoneof
themainprioritiesofcareethicsistoaddresstherootcausesofviolence,tomakeviolenceitselfthe
leastappealingoptiontomarginalizedandhistoricallyoppressedgroups.Engster’scaringhuman
rightsassumesthepermissibilityofviolenceandmilitaryintervention,whichisnotsubstantively
differentfromthekindsofjustificationshumanrightsdiscoursesprovideforintervention.For
example,ThomasPoggesuggeststhatnationsshouldnotsinglysupplythiskindof‘aid’,butifsuch
actionswereauthorizedorenactedbytheUnitedNations,theycouldbeacceptable.70Whilethereis
nodoubtthathorribleviolencestillhappensintheworldtoday,andthatcareethicsmustbeableto
addressviolence,modernorganized,militarizedviolenceislessaboutexpansioniststatepolicyasit
wasinthepast,andmoretodowithwhatmightbeunderstoodas‘terrorist’violence.Because
terroristsareusuallygroupsofpeoplewhohavebeenoppressedormarginalized,violenceisoften
seenasthebestmeanstoaddresstheirparticularconcerns.Instead,ifweweretogivesomefocus
tothegrievancesofsuchpersonsratherthanonlyontheirmethods,thenwemightbeabletoavoid
violenceinthefirstplace.71
IagreewithEngster’saimtofosterbetterandmorecareworldwideandlesseningthescope
ofseverepovertyandhumansuffering.Additionally,Engsterallowsthatcaringforothersabroad
doesentail“criticallyassessingnationalpoliciesandinternationallawinordertodeterminewhether
theyhindertheabilityofdistantpeoplestodevelopresponsivegovernmentsandcarefor
themselves.”72However,IarguethatEngster’sdefinitionofcarecannotsupportthesamedepthof
analysis,andthusisunabletoprovidethesameinformationasacriticalethicofcare.Itisthis
problemthatisconsistentthroughoutEngster’sdiscussionofcaretheory:hisformulationofcare
theorydoesnotcriticallyexamineourdependencerelations,andassuchitcannotprovidethe
necessarykindofinformationaboutglobalmoralcontextsifweareunderstandandtransformour
globalmorallandscape,asIarguedinChapterTwo.Lackingcriticalscope,Engster’scaretheory
cannotaccesstherootcausesofsufferingandvulnerability,andassuchhiscaringhumanrightsdo
notposearobustalternativetomostmainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses.Itismycritiqueof
Engster’scaringhumanrightsthatIturntonext.
69
Ibid.,17.
Pogge,159.
71
Foralargerdiscussiononterrorism,violence,andtheprevalentkindsoforganizedviolencethatareinthe
worldtoday,seeHeld(2008),Held(2010),andRobinson(2011).
72
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,190.
70
116
Section 2 – Critique of Engster’s Caring Human Rights
IamsympathetictoEngster’saims,andfindsomeofhissolutionstoalackofpoliticalconsideration
forcarelaudable,suchasparentalleaveandchildcaresupport,andthefocusoninternational
capacitybuilding.However,intryingtocutamiddlegroundbetweenacriticalethicofcareand
mainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses,Engsterhaslargelyremovedthecritical,feministlensfrom
caretheory,whichgeneratesseriousproblems.ThecritiquesIdevelophereservetodemonstrate
thatEngster’scaringhumanrightsactuallyarevulnerabletothesamecriticismthatcareethics
levelsatmainstreamhumanrightstheories.Thatbeingthecaseitisunclearwhy,ifwewanta
moraltheorythatprovidesadifferentperspective,weshoulduseEngster’scaretheory,becauseit
overlookssomeofthesamemoralcontextsashumanrightsdiscourses.
Inthissection,IputforwardtwocritiquesofEngster’stheory.Myfirstcritiqueexamines
howEngsterusestheconceptofdependenceasfoundationaltohisrationaltheoryofobligationto
care.Iclaimthatbecausehisbrandofcaretheoryisnotcriticalofourdependencerelations,itis
notsuitedtoaddressthebackgroundconditionsofpowerthatshapeourdependencerelations,
whichmeanswecanbeledtooverlookdeeplymorallyproblematicissues.Mysecondcritiqueis
thatEngsterhasmadetheethicsofcareminimallyfeminist,whichmeansthatEngster’scaring
humanrightsdoesnotencompassthewaysinwhichwomenexperiencetruncatedlifechoices
aroundtheworld,norwhywomeninparticulararerenderedmorevulnerableintheaftermathof
disasters(naturalorman-made),orwhywomenandchildrenoftenexperiencemoreseverelevelsof
povertythanmen.
Combined,theseproblemsmeanthatEngster’stheoryofcaringhumanrightsisill-equipped
tojudgeandhandlemanytransnationalconcerns,particularlyonesaroundthetransnational
migrationofcare,anditsdarkersideofhumansextrafficking.Thelatterisdoublydifficultbecause
Engsterhasremovedsexualactivityfromhisscopeofconcernwhenhedefinedtheactivityofcaring
inthefirstplace.Heclaimsthatitisnotapartof‘basicsurvival,’becauseitpertainstothe
generationoflife,notthesustenanceofit.73Further,Engsterfailstoincorporatesexualactivityinto
hisunderstandingof‘basicfunctioning,’alongwithreligion,art,andsports,becausetheyarepartof
aconceptionof‘thegoodlife’74whichhetriestoavoidbecauseofthecontentiousnatureofdebates
aboutwhatconstitutesagoodlife.Certainly,Engstermightrespondthathumantraffickingisan
issueofbodilyintegrity,butthatdoesnottelluswhyhumantraffickingoccursinthefirstplace,and
therootcausesofsextraffickinghavetodowith,amongotherthings,sexualactivity.Tryingto
separatetheeconomicsofsextraffickingfromthemoreintimateconcernsofsexualgratification
73
"RethinkingCareTheory:ThePracticeofCaringandtheObligationtoCare,"Hypatia20,no.3(2005):52.
Ibid.,53.
74
117
wouldcreateanincompletepictureofsextraffickingasawhole.Importantly,wemustreinforcethe
understandingthatthepointofcritical,feministcareethicsis,asRobinsonputsit,“notto‘transfer’
carefromonespheretoanother(i.e.,thepublicsphere)but,rather,todeconstructthegendered
dichotomiesthathavecreatedtwoseparaterealmsofhumanexistence.”75
Engstercouldcountermyobjections,pointingoutthathedoesstatethatcriticalanalysisis
requiredifoneistofullyaddressmoralproblems.Therearethreelocationswherehemakessuch
statementsinhisbook.76However,Iclaimthatanysuchcriticalassessmentthatproceedson
Engster’stermswouldbeinadequate.Suchacriticalassessment,forEngster,wouldlikelybebased
uponhisownparticulardefinitionofcaringandhiscaringhumanrights,especiallyinthe
internationalrealm.77WhileEngsterdoesprovidenormativestandardsdefiningwhatoughtbethe
case,andevenprovidessuggestionsforhowtoinculcateamorecaringattitudeamongpeople
(focusedontheUnitedStates),thesestandardsareunabletoencompassthewaysrelationsof
power(gendered,racial,sexual,national,economic,andinternational)shapeourverylives,orhow
differenceandexclusionaremademanifest.
Inshort,whileEngstercouldclaimhedoesprovideacriticalanalysis,itisnotthesamekind
ofanalysisthatthecriticalethicsofcarecanprovide,andassuchhisanalysiscannot‘see’thesame
problems,norcanitsuggestsubstantivelydifferentsolutions,asIwillargueinChapterFivewhenI
examinetheabilityofcareethicstoguidepublicpolicy.Iargue,instead,thatitisvitallyimportant
toretainthecriticalandfeministdimensionsofcareethicsifitistobesubstantivelydifferentto
humanrightsdiscourses,notjustanothertypeofhumanrightsdiscourse.
Section 2.1 – First Critique: Uncritical Dependence
Partofacritical,feministethicofcareisanunderstandingthatcaringpracticesexistwithinpatterns
ofpower“bothmaterialanddiscursive”78andareconstitutedbyideasaboutgender,race,age,
ability,andlocation.Careethicsisandmustbe“inherentlycritical,inthatitquestionsbothour
normativeassumptionsaboutcaringpracticesandvalues,aswellasthebasesonwhichdecisions
aboutthegivingandreceivingofcarearemade.”79Becausecaringpracticesareoftenthesubjectof
suchpatternsofpower,anethicofcaremustbecriticaloftheverypracticesthatshapehowpeople
75
FionaRobinson,"CareEthicsandtheTransnationalizationofCare:ReflectionsonAutonomy,Hegemonic
Masculinities,andGlobalization,"inFeministEthicsandSocialPolicy:TowardsaNewGlobalPoliticalEconomy
ofCare,ed.RianneMahonandFionaRobinson(Vancouver:UniversityofBritishColumbiaPress,2011),131.
76
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,161,87,90.
77
Inallfairness,Engsterdoesnotexplicitlyelaboratethemethodofanalysis,thoughonemightassumeitisan
analysisbaseduponhisdefinitionofcaringandhiscaringhumanrights.
78
Robinson,"GlobalCareEthics:BeyondDistribution,BeyondJustice,"132.
79
Ibid.,135.
118
careforothers,andunderstandingthecircumstancesunderwhichcaringpracticesoftenoccur.This
criticalaspectdoesmorethanrevealthattherehasbeenaninjustice,becauseitalsorevealsthe
causesofsuchaninjusticeinthefirstplace.80Forexample,criticalcaretheorydoesnotjustpointto
girlsbeingdeniedschoolingasawrong,butalsoinvestigatestherootcausesofgirlsbeingdenied
schoolingastheyareembeddedwithinaparticularculturalcontext.Neitherdoescareethicsexpect
theretobeonereason.Acritical,feministcareethicswouldbeabletoilluminatetheintersectionof
thesocio-culturalandeconomicrealitiesthatexistinaparticularsocietythatshapethesegirls’lives,
suchasfamiliespossessingonlylimitedfundsandhavingtochoosewhichchildrentosendtoschool,
oraculturalbiasagainsteducationforwomenandgirls.
OneplacewherethislackofcriticalanalysisisevidentisinEngster’stheoryofrational
obligation.AlthoughEngsterconstructshistheoryofrationalobligationinsuchawayastoguard
againstthepaternalistic,parochial,andpossiblyharmfulsidetocare,histheoryofobligationcannot
explainhoworwhythoserelationsofdependenceareconstructedandhowtheyarepossibleinthe
firstplace.Thismeansthathistheorycouldleaveintactsomeofthestructuralharmsof
globalization,likepatternsofexclusion,justasmainstreamhumanrightsdiscoursesdo.Engster
arguesforarationaltheoryofobligationbasedupontheprincipleofconsistentdependency,81but
hedoesnotseriouslyinvestigatethepatternsofpowerthatcreatethatverydependence.He
acknowledgesthatthereisahistoryofwomenbeingtiedtotheworkofcarebysocialnormsabout
gender;82however,suchanacknowledgementdoesnotbegintoapproachhowsuchnormsare
perpetuatedorentrenchedthroughvariousformsofpower,suchasthenormative,economic,and
political.TherearetwowaysEngstermightclaimthathistheoryservesasawaytopreventunequal
relationsofpower.First,hemightclaimthathisdefinitionofcareanditsguidelinesaremeantto
preventanunequaldistributionofcaringlabour.Second,hiscaringhumanrightsarealsomeantto
serveasasetofstandardstopreventpowerfulinstitutionsfromdenyingusourrighttoengagein
caringrelations,andthegivingandreceivingofcare.Whilesuchstandardsareintendedtoprevent
avoidanceofone’scaringresponsibilitiesorallowingharmtocontinue,theydonotquestionwhy
theharmsoccurredinthefirstplace.Further,becausehealsostratifiesourcaringresponsibilitiesso
sharply,thatcaninturnservetofurthernaturalizecertaindependencerelations,includingtheir
unequalrelationsofpower.Forexample,althoughhearguesthatwehaveanobligationtocarefor
our‘nearestanddearest,’hedoesnotbuildinwaystoquestionharmfulrelationsofpowerthatcan
existwithinthefamily.PerhapsEngstermightarguethatwecanchoosetoleaveharmfulclose
relations,butthatdoesnotgiveenoughweighttothepowerofnormsaroundfamilylife,orthe
80
Ibid.,133.
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,49.
82
Ibid.,59.
81
119
legalandemotionaldifficultyofleavingsuchsituations.Rather,theideathatweareobligatedto
careforourfamiliesissomewhatbesidethepoint—wealreadydocare—butthequestionthatis
moreimportantiswhycertainkindsofpowerrelations,evenwithinfamilies,areviewedas
acceptableinthefirstplace.83
Conversely,acritical,feministethicofcareisabletoquestionhow“differentformsof
‘power’cometoexist,andhowtheyaredistributedinsociety.”84Itisnotenoughtosaythat
womenshouldnotshoulderthelargerburdenofcare.Wemustalsoinvestigatethewaysinwhich
normsaboutgenderandcarearestillperpetuatedthroughwidersocialnormsandpolitical
processes,particularlypublicpolicy.Further,thecaringpracticeofattentivenessrequiresusto
understandhowthesenormsshapethelivesofrealpeople.Forexample,theincreasingnumberof
domesticandcareworkersinprivatehomesinWesterncountrieshasbeenshapedbyseveral
factors:achangefromthemale-breadwinnertoadult-workermodel;shiftsinmigrationpatternsof
womenfromtheGlobalSouthtosupporttheirfamiliesfinancially;andhowtheimmigrationpolicies
ofWesternnationsshapetheflowofmigration.85Equallyimportant,althoughthe‘pull’factorsfrom
wealthynationsarepartofthemigrationofcare,sotooarethe‘push’factors,theconditionsinthe
homecountriesofmigrantsthatcompelthemtoseekworkabroad.Evenifthe‘pull’factorswere
decreased,thesituationoftransnationalmigratecarerscannotbefullyunderstoodoraddressed
withoutunderstandingthereasonswhytheymigrateinthefirstplace,suchasalackofadequate
pay,supplies,andpersonnel.86Thecriticallensofcareilluminatesthesituationofthemigrant
worker,illustratingthatthe“yawninggapbetweenrichandpoorcountriesisitselfaformof
coercion,pushingThirdWorldmotherstoseekworkintheFirstforalackofoptionscloserto
home.”87Onlythroughacriticalanalysisoftherootcausesofmigrationareweabletoseethe
largerpictureofcaremigration,aswellasthecaredrainandtheharmsthatitperpetuates,
especiallyconsideringthatmostwomenwhomigratetodocareworkarethemselvesmothers,who
leavebehindchildrenwhooftendonotadjustwell.88
83
JoanC.Tronto,"CreatingCaringInstitutions:Politics,Plurality,andPurpose,"EthicsandSocialWelfare4,no.
2(2010):161.
84
FionaRobinson,"StopTalkingandListen:DiscourseEthicsandFeministCareEthicsinInternationalPolitical
Theory,"Millennium:JournalofInternationalStudies39,no.3(2011):853.
85
FionaWilliams,"TowardsaTransnationalAnalysisofthePoliticalEconomyofCare,"inFeministEthicsand
SocialPolicy:TowardsaNewGlobalPoliticalEconomyofCare,ed.RianneMahonandFionaRobinson
(Vancouver:UniversityofBritishColumbiaPress,2011),21.
86
G.K.D.Crozier,"CareWorkersintheGlobalMarket:AppraisingApplicationsofFeministCareEthics,"The
InternationalJournalofFeministApproachestoBioethics3,no.1(2010):131.
87
Hochschild,27.
88
Ibid.,21-2.
120
Thisuncriticalacceptanceofdependenceasabasisforarationaltheoryofobligationposes
problemsforEngster’scaringhumanrights.Allhumanrelationstakeplacewithinwebsof
dependence,anddependenceisconstantlyconstructedbysocialandpoliticalpatternsofpower.
Further,becausethesecaringhumanrightsarelargelyfocusedonhowanyparticularstateensures
thecaringneedsofitsowncitizens,itcannotexaminetherootcausesoftransnationalcaring,
effectivelyreinforcingharmfulpatternsofexclusionthatarealreadypresentintheworldtoday.
Thisisthesameproblemwithmainstreamhumanrightstheoriesasoutlinedinthepreviouschapter;
theycannot‘see’orevenchallengethestructuralharmsofglobalization.Onlythroughacritical
examinationofdependencedoesitbecomeclearthatcaredeficitsinonepartoftheworldcreatesa
demandtoimportcarersfromotherpartsoftheworld,whichinturncreatesanewcaredeficit.89
TheabilityforWesternnationstodemandcarefromotherpartsoftheworldisalsopartofalegacy
ofcolonialpowerrelations,perpetuatinginequalitythrough“thetranslationoftheunequalrelations
ofpersonalinterdependencyintotheunequalrelationsoftransnationalinterdependency.”90
ConsideragaintheexampleoftheFilipinananny.Thereareseverallayersofdependencethatcan
beanalysed.First,acriticalethicofcarecananalysethewayinwhichthenannyandthefamilyare
dependentuponeachother.TheFilipinanannyisdependentuponheremployersfornotonlyher
income,butforhercontinuedstaywithinCanada,andthepowerthatheremployershaveoverher
ispronetoabuse.Inturn,theCanadianfamilyisdependentontheFilipinanannytocareforthe
childrenandmaintainingthehouse.Thebalanceofdependencefallsmoreheavilyuponthenanny
thanthefamily,becausethefamilycanalwaysfindanotherFilipinawomanforthejob,whereasthe
nannymightnotbeabletofindanotheremployer/sponsorforhercontinuedstaywithinCanada.A
secondlevelofdependenceanalysisisattheinternationallevelifweexaminethediscrepancy
betweenCanadaandthePhilippinesininternationalpolitics.Canada,thoughitscitizensrelyon
cheapimportedlabour,hasagreaterbargainingpositionthanthePhilippines,whichisdesperateto
exportitsownwomentoexpiateitsnationaldebtthroughtheremittancesofthosewomen.91
Third,andlast,wecanexaminehownationalandinternationalpoliciesgeneratethe
possibilityofimportingcareworkersactuallyservestoperpetuategenderedandracializedformsof
power,andallowssomepersonstoshifttheircaringresponsibilitiestoothers.Thesepoliciescanbe
understoodas“cost-effectivewaysofsecuringfamilynormsandmeetingcareneeds(eventhough
thesenormsandneedshavenowchanged)”andcanilluminatehow“thesewomen’s[likethe
89
Williams,"MarketsandMigrantsintheCareEconomy,"28.
"TowardsaTransnationalAnalysisofthePoliticalEconomyofCare,"25.
91
EvelynNakanoGlenn,"Gender,RaceandtheOrganisationofReproductiveLabor,"inTheCriticalStudyof
Work:Labor,Technology,andGlobalProduction,ed.RickBaldoz,CharlesKoeber,andPhilipKraft(Philadelphia:
TempleUniversityPress,2009),79.
90
121
Filipinananny’s]socialrelationsandcitizenshiprightswereinscribedwithgenderedandracialised
inequalities.”92Thecaringpracticeofresponsibility,focusingonhowourresponsibilitiesare
structured,allowsustoseehowimportingcarerscanallowmanydifferentlayersofnormsand
normativestructuresofpowertoremainintact,andallowforsomepeopletocontinuetheir
‘privilegedirresponsibility.’Becausemostoftenmigrantcarersareracializedwomen,thiscanallow
normsaboutfamilystructuretoremainrelativelyintact,becausetheburdenofcareisshiftedto
anotherwoman,whoseracialorethnicdifferencealsoservestomarkheroutassomeonewhois
presumedtobe‘naturally’acarer,andbyoccupyingthatroleofcarer,herdifferencesare
reinforced.93Further,therelationsofpowerbetweennationscanremainintactaswell.Justas
importantasitistoinvestigatenormsaroundraceandgender,wecannotignoretherelationsof
powershapedbyhistoricalpatternsofcolonialization,andhistoricalmigrationpatterns.94AsI
arguedinChapterTwo,theparityofpowerbetweennationsisofvitalimportancewhenweanalyse
globalmoralcontexts,becausesuchrelationsareoftenshapedtobenefitthemorepowerfulparty,
whichatleastpartlygeneratedthemoralcontextinthefirstplace.
IfEngster’scaretheoryweretouseacriticalanalysisofdependence,inanefforttorefute
mycritique,hewouldhavetorethinkthepurchaseofhisrationaltheoryofobligationtocareand
hisstratificationofcaringobligations.Oncewecriticallyassessourdependencerelations,it
becomesdifficulttogroundatheoryofrationalobligationuponthoseveryrelationsinthefirstplace.
RecallthatthepointofarationaltheoryofobligationistosaythatifIdenythatothersneedcare,I
thendenythatIneedcare,whichisunintelligiblebecauseallpersonsneedcareinordertoatleast
survive.95However,oncedependencerelationsarecriticallyassessed,andthenatureofour
dependencerelationsischallenged,therationaltheoryofobligationitselfcanbequestioned.
Becausetheshapeofourdependencerelationsarestructuredbynormsaboutgender,race,and
class,itisproblematictousedependenceasagroundsforarationaltheoryofobligation,asthough
itwereaconceptwithoutnormativecontent.Forexample,oncewearecriticalofgenderrolesand
thenormativeimplicationsinherentinheterosexualmarriage,wecanquestionwhetherornota
wifeisrationallyobligatedtoprovidecertainkindsofcareandmaintenanceforherhusband.
Certainly,onehopesthatthecouplecaresforeachother,emotionallyandmaterially,butitis
unclear,ifEngsterweretoincorporateacriticalviewofdependence,whyawifeisobligatedtocare
forherhusband(orviceversa)iftheirdependenceitselfisstructuredbynormsandrelationsof
92
Williams,"TowardsaTransnationalAnalysisofthePoliticalEconomyofCare,"29.
SeeChapterTwo,Section3.1foramoredetaileddiscussionontheconstructionofdifferenceandits
possibleharms.
94
UmutErel,"Introduction:TransnationalCareinEurope-ChangingFormationsofCitizenship,Family,and
Generation,"SocialPolitics19,no.1(2012):9.
95
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,49.
93
122
power,andfurtherreinforcedbypublicpolicythatcontinuestoprivilegethehusbandworking
outsidethehomeandthewifecaringforthehomeandchildren.
Oncetherationaltheoryofobligationlosesitssecurefoundation,Engster’sstratificationof
caringresponsibilitiesdoesnotnecessarilymakesense,particularlywithregardtotheideathatwe
haveresidualresponsibilitiesforthecaringhumanrightsofdistantstrangers.Therationaltheoryof
obligationmadepossibletheideathatwecouldneatlystratifyourcaringresponsibilities,because
wearebestabletofulfilourobligationstothoseclosesttous.However,ifwedonothaveafirm
foundationforourobligationstocare,itisunclearwhatourresidualresponsibilitiesare.Becausea
criticalpictureofdependencemakesitpossibletoquestionourrationalobligationstocare,the
stratificationofourcaringobligationsbreaksdown.Thereisthennocleardistinctionbetweenthe
differenttiersofourobligations,andwhilewemightbeabletoacknowledgethatthecareclaimsof
distantstrangersarevalid,thatdoesnotmeantheirclaimsareabletofinddirectpurchasewithus.
Forexample,thecocoafarmerswhosupplytheworldwithchocolatecertainlyhaveclaimsofcare,
butifthestratificationofourcaringobligationsbreaksdown,itisnotclearanylongertowhomthey
maketheirclaimsofcare.Oncewelackaresidualresponsibilitytocarefordistantstrangers,itis
unclearwhyitremainsourresponsibilitytoseektofulfiltheircaringhumanrights.Thus,
incorporatingacriticalpictureofdependenceintoEngster’scaringhumanrightsisdeeply
problematicforhisprojectbecauseitreliesonanuncriticalacceptanceofdependenceinorderto
generatecaringhumanrightsclaimsinthefirstplace.
Section 2.2 – Second Critique: Minimally Feminist
Engsterclaimsthathisbrandofcaretheoryisminimallyfeminist,andthatthisisacceptablebecause
whileitdoessomethinglessthanpursueafullcommitmenttowomen’sequalityandrights,itgoes
“alongwaytowardsupportingmoresocialequalityforwomen,sincewomen’sinequalityisclosely
tiedtotheirtraditionalroleascaregiversandthelowvaluationthatcaringpracticeshavebeen
accordedbymosttheoriesofjusticeandmostsocieties.”96Iargue,onthecontrary,thattheethics
ofcareshouldbestronglyfeminist,andthatitshouldnotbackawayfromlargerclaimsabout
women’sequality.Byconstrainingthefeministaimsofcareethics,Engsterisunabletoinvestigate
thewaysinwhichwomen,onaverageandespeciallythosewomeninandfromtheGlobalSouth,
experiencetruncatedlifechoicesevenifalltheircaringhumanrightshavebeenmet,thusleaving
intactgenderbiaseslikemainstreamhumanrightstheories.WhileEngsterdoesnotnecessarilytout
minimalfeminismasaprimefeatureofhisbrandofcaretheory,Iarguethatweshouldatleastbe
96
Ibid.,14.
123
sceptical,andperhapsevenoppose,anykindofcaretheorythatdoesnothavestrongfeminist
commitments.97AlthoughEngsterclaimsthatthereisnothingpreventingusfromusingaliberal
rightstheorytosupportamorerobustnotionofwomen’sequality,98relyingonliberalhumanrights
toachievegoalsalreadycontainedwithinthefeministethicofcareindicatesthatEngsterhasmissed
avitalpoint.LikeEngster’suncriticalacceptanceofdependence,aminimallyfeministcaretheory
cannotinvestigatetherootcausesofglobalmoralproblems,inthiscasewomen’ssubjugationona
globalscale,particularlywithregardtotransnationalcaremigrationanditsdarkerside:humansex
trafficking.
Intheprevioussection,Iexaminedwhatitmeantforcareethicstobecritical,andhereI
mustexplainwhatitmeansforcareethicstobefeminist.Careethicsisfeministbecauseit,
“concentratesonthewaysinwhichdecisionsaboutcareareconstitutedparticularlybyrelationsof
gender,butalsoofglobalandlocalrelationsofethnicity,raceandclass.”99Thatmeans,unlike
Engster’sformulationofcaretheory,whichonlyhasminimalfeministcommitments,afeministethic
ofcareexpresslyexaminesthewaysinwhichourcaringrelationsareshapedbylocalandglobal
normsaboutgender,race,class,andethnicity.100Engster’sminimalfeministcommitmentsare
largely,Iargue,asetofstandardsthatwomenshouldnotbeexpectedtoshoulderthemajorityof
thecarework,orthatwomenshouldnotexperienceuniqueharmsduetotheirgender.However,
theseshouldnotsarebulwarksonly.Themerestandarddoesnotrequireengagementwiththewhy
andhowofwomen’ssubjugation,andtheespeciallyprecariouspositionoftransnationalcare
workers.AssuchEngster’stheoryisnotsubstantivelydifferentfrommainstreamhumanrights
discourses,becauseitcanleaveintactgenderbiasesandoverlookimportantlocationsofsocial
reproduction,i.e.thetransnationalcontextofcare.
Inpresentingsolutionstocombatthegendereddivisionofcare,Engsteralsoexaminesa
possiblecauseofthegendereddivisionoflabour,althoughasIshallarguebelowitisashallow
examinationthatdoesnotfullychallengethewayinwhichthepoliticalspheremattersforthe
gendereddivisionoflabour.HisexaminationfocusesinparticularontheworkofNancyChodorow.
Althoughheisawareofthecritiquesofherwork,hebaseshissolutionsonthenotunreasonable
understandingthattheperpetuationofthegendereddivisionofcarehasagreatdealtodowith
97
Infact,VirginiaHeldarguedthatacceptingtheideaofanon-feministethicofcarewouldbedisingenuousto
thehistoryofcareethics,anditsgrowthintoasubstantialmoralandpoliticaltheory.SeeHeld(2006)forthe
fullargument.
98
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,14.
99
Robinson,"TheImportanceofCareintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanSecurity,"171.
100
SeeChapterTwoforadiscussiononhowtheethicsofcareworkstoachievethisfeministaim.Also,Iam
awarethatthereareconcernsaboutthefeasibilityofcontextualjudgmentsbasedonauniversalstandpointof
care.InChapterSixofthisthesis,Iarguethatthesolutiontothisproblemis,inpart,toacceptthe
vulnerabilityofjudgment.SeeChapterSixforthefullargument.
124
unequalparentingarrangements(i.e.thegendereddivisionofparentalresponsibility),andassuch
girlsreceivemessagestoengageincarewhileboysaresocializednottoengageincare.101
Therefore,Engster’sprimarysolutionsaregearedtowardsequalisingparentingarrangements,
wheregovernmentsshouldfostersubstantialparentalleave,encouragementotakefamilyleave,
andprotectflexibleworkarrangementsforparentsofbothsexesallowingbothwomenandmento
beseenascaregivers.This,Engsterclaims,wouldaidinerodingthenormsaroundgenderand
care.102Additionally,Engsteralsoarguesthatthereshouldbegreaterincentivesformentoenter
traditionallyfemaledominatedprofessions,suchasearlychildhoodeducation,elementary
education,andnursing,muchlikehowwomenhavemorerecentlybeenencouragedand
empoweredtoentertraditionallymale-dominatedfieldssuchasmath,science,technology,and
engineering.Engsterclaimsthatthegovernmentcanplayaroleinchangingthegendereddivision
ofcareworkthroughaseriesofpolicyincentives,whichwillenableustoviewcaringasahuman
activity,thatmenandwomenbothshouldengagein,notonlyafeminineone.103
Engsteracknowledgesthatcarehasbeenhistoricallydevalued,andhesuggestsseveral
strategiesforinculcatingpeoplewiththevaluesofcare.However,becausehedoesnotaddressthe
underlyingpowerstructuresinvolved,particularlythegenderedstructuresofpower,histheoryof
caringhumanrightscannotinvestigate“thepatriarchalconditionsunderwhichvaluesandpractices
associatedwithcaringhavedevelopedinsocieties.”104Ifcareistobeapublic,politicalissue,andif
wearetoreallychallengetheentrenchedpublic/privatedividethatunderwritesthefeminisation
anddevaluationofcare,thenthosewhocare,thosewhohistoricallyhavebeenmostassociated
withcaringpractices,musthaveafullandequalpartofthepoliticalprocess.Evenifthecaring
humanrightsofwomenweremet,theywouldstillexperienceunnecessaryrestrictionsontheirlife
choices,particularlywithregardtobeingabletodirectlyaccesspoliticalpower.Engster’scaring
humanrights,therefore,cannotbeusedasawaytoensurethatwomenhaveequalvoiceinthe
politicalarena.Moreover,itcouldbethecasethatusingcaringhumanrightsasasetofstandards
couldlegitimizethecontinuedexileofwomenfromthepoliticalsphere.Althoughcareitselfmight
becomeapublicconcern,ifwomenarenotconsideredfullyequalwithmen,andthusnotableto
participateinpoliticaldiscourse,thentheyarestillgoingtoberelegatedtotheprivatesphereand
lackasubstantialvoiceinpoliciesandactionsthatdirectlyimpactupontheirlivesandthelivesof
thepeopletheycarefor.Wecanseethisplayoutinhowtransnationalfamilieshavetostruggleto
providecarefortheirchildren.
101
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,222.
Ibid.,223-5.
103
Ibid.,226.
104
Robinson,"TheImportanceofCareintheTheoryandPracticeofHumanSecurity,"171-2.
102
125
InastudyofChineseimmigrantfamiliesinCanada,YanqiuZhouexaminedhowCanadian
visarequirementsmadeitdifficultforthegrandparentsofimmigrantfamiliestohelpraisetheir
grandchildren,andthatthecaringlabourofthegrandparents(mostlygrandmothers)wasdeemed
necessarynotonlybytraditionalChinesekin-structures,butalsobecauseofthelackofcare
provisioninCanadaitself.105Becausethesetransnationalgrandmothersarenotheardbythe
Canadiangovernment,duetolanguagebarriersandthehighlevelsofbureaucracythatserveto
keepsomeelderlywomeninacycleofperpetualvisas,thelensofcarecanaidinexposingthe
“complexmultipleinequalitiesandexploitations(basedongender,ageandgeography)ofcareon
bothfamilialandtransnationallevels.”106Zhou’sstudypointstothefactthatalthoughitmightbe
temptingtoconstruealackofwomen’sfullpoliticalparticipationasalocal,culturalproblem,we
cannotignorehowtransnationalnormsaboutgenderbearuponwomen,orthatinternational
relationsofpowercanservetoisolatewomenfromlocalpolitics.107
Engster’sminimalfeminismalsorendershiscaringhumanrightsasdoublyproblematic
whenweattempttoinvestigatetherootcausesofandthesituationofthetransnationalmigration
ofcarers.ConsideringthatEngster’scaringhumanrightsareonlyminimallyfeminist,andthat
Engsterdoesnotincludesexualactivityinhisunderstandingofcare,thismeanshecannotfully
understandoneofthedarkestmarkets:humansextrafficking.CertainlyEngsterwouldsaythat
humansextraffickingisaviolationofhiscaringhumanrights,particularlythefirstone:“All
individualshavetherighttophysicalsecurity,”whichincludessexualassaultasharm.108Thisisa
goodstandardtohave.Iamnotarguingthatweshouldabandonthestandardsofhumanrights,
especiallyonesthatserveasbulwarksagainstgrossphysicalharms.However,standardsaloneare
notenough.Theycannotaccessthe‘why’ofhumantrafficking,thefactors—suchasthe
intersectionofnormsaboutviolenceandgender,economicconsiderations,andpoliticalinstability—
thatcontinuetomakehumansextraffickinga$150billion(US)peryearindustry.109Acriticalethics
ofcareisabletoaccessthe‘why’fortworeasons.First,becauseitisfeminist,itexpresslyusesthe
lensofgendertoexaminethe‘masculine’valuesthataresomeoftheunderlyingcausesofhuman
trafficking.Second,itisable,throughthepracticeofattentiveness,tobringtotheforethe
importanceoftryingtounderstandtheexperienceofsexworkers.
105
YanqiuRachelZhou,"TowardTransnationalCareInterdependence:RethinkingRelationshipsbetween
ImmigrationandSocialPolicy,"GlobalSocialPolicy13,no.3(2013):281.
106
Ibid.,291.
107
Zhoualsoincorporatesaninterestingdiscussiononhowweshouldnotbetotallyoccupiedbythepaid
dimensionofglobalcarechains,andthattransnationalkin-careisinfactalargepartofglobalcarechainsas
theyexisttoday.However,theyareoftenoverlookedbecauseitismoredifficulttoobtaindataandinteract
withthewomenwhorelocateoverseastohelptheirfemaleimmigrantrelatives.
108
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,169.
109
"TraffickinginPersonsReport",13.
126
Onthefirstpoint,althoughEngsterdoesclaimthatweshouldcriticallyinvestigatethe
causesofsuchmassiveharms,hedoesnotexpresslystipulatethecriticalmethodweshoulduse
whendoingso.110However,thecritical,feministlensofcareethicsisabletoexaminehow“cultures
ofhegemonicmasculinityareintegraltoboththediscursiveandmaterialconstitutionof
globalization.”111Thecurrentglobalpowerstructureispredicatedonparticularvalues,values
traditionallycodedasmasculinesuchasself-sufficiencyandakindof‘privilegedirresponsibility’with
regardtocare.Thismeansthatwecannotallowaninvestigationofgendertostopatthehomeor
eventhenationalleveltoaddressparticularproblematicconstructionsof‘maleness’thatare
embeddedwithinsocialstructuresandinstitutions.Wecanseethesemasculinitiesaspartofthe
currentharmfulpatternsofglobalization.Therefore,tocombatthesepatternsweneedtoaddress
theseconstructionsofmalenessthroughtheinstitutionsofglobaleconomicandsecurity
governance.112Theemphasisonthese‘male’valuesinglobalpoliticalandeconomicdiscourses
contributestotheharmfulprocessesofglobalizationthatallowcaretocontinuetobedevaluedand
commoditizedforconsumptionratherthanahumanpracticenecessaryforthecontinuanceoflife.
Oneofthecommoditiesis,unfortunately,sex.Importantly,itisnotenoughtosimplythinkofsex
traffickingasaresultofsupplyanddemand,becauseapurelyeconomiclensremovesthenormative
questionsfromview.113Rather,wemustinvestigatewhysomepersonsviewsextraffickingas
acceptableinthefirstplace.Certainly,mostpeoplewouldcondemnthepractice,butthefact
remainsthatsextraffickersearnahealthylivingontheiractivities,andthatpeople,mostoftenmen,
arewillingtopayforsex,eventhoughtheymightbeawareoftheplightofthepersonwhomthey
areabusing.Itis,ononelevel,alegitimizedformofmalepowerandvaluesthatunderwritesthe
continuedtradeinhumanbeingsforthepurposeofsex.Itisnotjustnormsaboutviolenceor
genderatplayhere,butratheranintersectionofthesenormsthatlinkmasculinediscoursesto
normsaboutviolencewhichcontinuetorenderwomeninsecureacrosstheworld.114
Second,thefeministlenscanalsobeusedtobetterengagewithandunderstandthosewho
haveexperiencedsextraffickingthemselvesbyfollowingthepracticeofattentiveness.Because
Engsterdoesnotincludesexualactivityinhisdefinitionofcare(thoughhedoeshaveaproscription
againstsexualassault),hisunderstandingofcarecouldservetofurthersingleoutandstigmatizesex
workers.Rather,wecannotnorshouldweseparateoutsexworkersformotherformsofcare
110
TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,190.
Robinson,"CareEthicsandtheTransnationalizationofCare:ReflectionsonAutonomy,Hegemonic
Masculinities,andGlobalization,"137.
112
Ibid.,138-9.
113
Ibid.,128.
114
SeeChapterTwo,Sections3.3and3.4foradiscussionabouthowhegemonicgendernorms(notnecessarily
individualmen),andnormsaboutviolenceoftenservetorenderwomeninsecure.
111
127
workers,butinsteadbeattentivetotheirlifeexperiences.Singlingoutsexworkersisoftendone
throughmoralprohibitionsagainstsexwork,whichobscurestheextenttowhichcurrentpatternsof
globalizationactuallygroundthesepractices,andfurtherstigmatizessexworkers.Wecannotignore
theimportanceoflisteningtothewomenwhohavesurvivedandbeenabletoleave(becausewe
willlikelyneverhearfromwomenwhocannotleavetheirsituation).Notonlyisitpartofacritical,
feministethicofcaretotakeseriouslytheexperiencesofothers,butthroughthepracticeof
attentivenesswealsolearnhowcentralcareistothelivesofwomentraffickedforsex:their
desperateneedtocareforothersinspiteofstructuralimpedimentsthatresultedinbeingtrafficking
thefirstplaceandtheirsubsequent“inabilitytocarewellintheirpresentcircumstances.”115The
testimonyofthesewomenservestohighlightthatnotonlywasthereadeficitofcareinthecountry
towhichtheyweretrafficked,butthattherearemanyfactorsthatpushwomenintotransnational
migrationinthefirstplace,suchastheirownneedtocarefortheirdependents.116
Theexperiencesoftraffickedwomenarealsoimportantbecausetheydemonstratethatthe
sameprocessesthatservetoimportdomesticcarersandlive-innanniesalsopertaintosex
traffickers.Becausethereisaglobaldemandfor‘women’swork’inaffluentstates,all“formsof
laborcanonlybemadesenseofwhenviewedthroughthelensofglobalgenderedrelationsof
power.”117Mostofthewomenwhoaretraffickedforsexualabuseassumetheywillbedomestic
carersorothertransnationalmigrantworkers,buthavetheilllucktobetraffickedfordarker
reasons.Revilingandcondemningthetraffickersisnotenough,anddoesnothelpusunderstand
theunderlyingcausesofhumantraffickingthefirstplace.118Thevariousfactorssuchasalackof
politicalstability,lackofsocialservices,troublingsocio-economicsituations,andtheincreasedrole
ofwomeninpoorercountriesasprovidersfortheirfamiliesinthecontextofhighunemployment,
oftenpushwomenintomigrantwork,whichoftenresultsinthembeingtrafficked.119
WereEngstertoreplytothiscritiquebyclaimingthathistheorycouldincorporatestronger
feministclaims,Idonotthinkitcoulddosowithoutundercuttinghisprudentialaims.Hisclaimthat
theminimalfeminismofhiscaretheorywillensurethatcareistakenseriouslyinthepoliticalsphere
whileatthesametimenotrequiringfull,equalpoliticalparticipationofhistory’straditionalcarers
(i.e.women)alsomeansthatitwouldbelikelytobeadoptedworld-wide.Whilehispracticalgoalis
115
OlenaHankivsky,"TheDarkSideofCare:ThePushFactorsofHumanTrafficking,"inFeministEthicsand
SocialPolicy:TowardsaNewGlobalPoliticalEconomyofCare,ed.RianneMahonandFionaRobinson
(Vancouver:UniversityofBritishColumbiaPress,2011),154.
116
Crozier,124.
117
Robinson,"CareEthicsandtheTransnationalizationofCare:ReflectionsonAutonomy,Hegemonic
Masculinities,andGlobalization,"141.
118
OlenaHankivsky,"TheDarkSideofCare:ThePushFactorsofHumanTrafficking,"ibid.,152-3.
119
Ibid.,153.
128
laudable,itistoodeeplyflawedtobeviable.WereEngstertoputforthamorestronglyfeminist
kindofcaretheory,hewouldhavetopushforamoresubstantiveunderstandingofthewayglobal
andlocalgenderedrelationsofpowerplayoutinaperson’slife.Suchastronglyfeminist
understandingwouldrequireEngstertoexpandhislistofcaringhumanrightstoincludemore
substantivecivicprotections,particularlyforwomenwhoarethetraditionalprovidersofcare.The
basicpointisthatincorporatingcriticalfeministaimswouldinvariablyalterEngster’scaretheory
andhiscaringhumanrights.Byeschewingthefeministlensandexercisingsexfromhisdefinitionof
care,Engsterisunabletodomorethanholdtoasetofstandards,which,asIhavearguedin
ChaptersTwoandThree,isnolongerenoughtocombattheharmsexperiencedintheworldtoday.
Wemustinvestigatetherootcausesofsextraffickingifwearetobetterunderstandthereasonsfor
itscontinuedsuccess,andultimatelydismantlethesystemthatallowssextraffickingtocontinue.
Theuniqueandpowerfulperspectiveofcriticalfeministcareethicsshouldnotbeeasilyset
aside.Rather,“acriticalfeministethicsofcaredoesnotunderstandethicsasasetofprinciples
waitingtobe‘applied’toaparticularissueinworldpolitics;rather,itviewsthetaskofnormativeor
moraltheoryasoneofcriticalmoralethnography,”120thatistosayhowmoralityisembeddedand
reproducedinsociety.Itisnotenoughtoproduceasetofstandards,ratheritisimperativeto
investigateandunderstandhowsocial,economic,andpoliticalarrangementsstructureourlives,and
theethicalimplicationsofthatstructuring,asguidedbythepracticesofcare.Mycritiqueof
Engster’stheory,however,doesnotaddresshisclaimthatthecritical,feministethicsofcareisnota
practicalguideforpublicpolicy.Therefore,nextinChapterFive,Iarguethatacriticalethicofcare
canguidepublicpolicywithouttheneedtorelyonanyhumanrightsframework.Thatbeingthe
case,itisunclearwhat‘caring’humanrightsoffersthatcannotbeaccomplishedbyacriticalfeminist
ethicofcare.
120
FionaRobinson,"CareEthicsandtheTransnationalizationofCare:ReflectionsonAutonomy,Hegemonic
Masculinities,andGlobalization,"ibid.,135.
129
130
Chapter 5: Care Ethics and Public Policy
AsdemonstratedinChapterFour,Engster’scaringhumanrightsanalysishasmajorflaws.Engster
developedhistheoryinresponsetotheworrythattheethicsofcare,asformulatedbythemajority
ofcaretheorists,cannotprovidesubstantivepolicyguidance.HeclaimsthatTronto’sdefinitionof
caringis“toobroadtoprovideclearguidanceonmoralandpoliticalissues”andthat“herpolitical
theoryofcareisalsovague.”1OfFionaRobinson’scritical,globaltheoryofcarehestates:“Framed
soabstractly,Robinson'stheoryprovideslittlepracticalguidanceforpolicymakers,activists,andthe
generalpublicinthinkingaboutwhatitmightmeantocareforothersabroad.”2
Inthischapter,Iargue,contrarytoEngster,thatcritical,feministcareethicscanbeaviable
sourceofethicalguidanceforpublicpolicyontwofronts.First,asexploredearlierinChaptersTwo
andThree,thelensofcarecanexposehowpolicybasedexclusivelyonhumanrightshascertain
‘blindspots.’Forexample,ahumanrightsapproachcannotalways‘see’howraceandgender
norms,dependence,andexclusioncontributetoandconstructpervasivepoliticalandmoral
problems.Secondly,criticalcareethicscanspuratransformationofthepolicyprocessitself.The
transformativepotentialofcareethicsprovidesanopportunitytoengageintherealworldprocess
ofpublicpolicy,asIarguedinChapterTwo.Althoughthereareothersites(e.g.public
administration,businesspractices,healthcarefields,andeducation)whereengagementwithcare
ethicswouldbetransformative,Ifocusonthepolicyprocessfortworeasons.First,itisimportantto
directlyanswerEngster’schargethatRobinson’scriticalethicofcareisnotasuitableethicforpolicy
guidance.Second,policyspeaksauthoritativelyaboutitsareaofconcern,beitgender,race,
sexuality,orsocio-economicconsiderations.Policydocumentsareasourceofauthorityinbotha
legalandanormativesense,andwhenpolicydocumentsmakeparticularassumptionsaboutcare
requiringprivate,notpublic,consideration,thiscanpushcareanditsconcernsoutofthepublic
sphere.ResearchdonebyFionaWilliamsillustratesthat,“[w]hatislackinginthecurrentpolicy
debateisarecognitionoftheseethicalapproaches,andoftheirimportanceinpeople’slives.The
emphasisonworkovershadowscare;interdependencyisthepoorrelationofeconomicselfsufficiency;andeducationalachievementframeschild-centredness.”3Bymakingastrongcasefor
caretobeincorporatedintopublicpolicy,careitselfcanmorefullybeunderstoodasanissueof
1
Engster,TheHeartofJustice:CareEthicsandPoliticalTheory,67.
Ibid.,162.
3
Williams,"AGoodEnoughLife:DevelopingaPoliticalEthicofCare,"27.
2
131
publicconcernandincorporatedintoourpublicdiscourse,whichwouldmoreaccuratelyreflect“the
waypeople[attempt]tobalancetheirownsenseofselfandtheneedsofothers.”4
Ibeginthischapterwithabriefexplanationofthepolicystagestheoryofpublicpolicy,
whichiswhatIusetoexplorethepolicyprocess.5Second,Iwillprovideabriefoverviewofhow
humanrightshavebeenincorporatedintothesestagesofpublicpolicyandelaborateonsomeof
theproblemsofpolicyviewedexclusivelythroughahumanrightslens.Throughoutthisdiscussion,I
willincorporatemyargumentforusingthelensofcaretocorrectforsomeoftheseproblems:that
critical,feministcareethicscanbeaguidefordeterminingpublicpolicy,andultimatelythatcritical
careethicscantransformthepolicyprocess.BytransformationoftheprocessImeanthewaysin
whichproblemsaredefinedandprioritized,whatkindsoftoolsareseenasavailabletoaddresssaid
problems,andhowdifferentevaluationmetricscanofferdifferentstandardsofpolicysuccessor
failure.Myclaimisnotthatweshouldabandonhumanrightsasabasisforpublicpolicy,butthat
humanrightsshouldnotbeoursolebasisformoralandpoliticalreasoning,especiallyinthepolicy
process.6
Section 1 – Policy Stages Theory
Therearemanywaystounderstandthepolicyprocess.Here,Iwillfocusononeofthemore‘classic’
methodstoassesspolicy,thatofpolicystagesandthepolicycycle.Policystagetheoriescategorize
thedifferentstagesofthepolicyprocess,determinewhotheactorsareateachstage,andexplore
thewaysinwhicheachstageaffectstheothers.7Althoughtheword‘stages’impliesthatthereisa
finishedproductthisisnotnecessarilythecase.Policystagetheoriesbringtolighthowthepolicy
processisnotalwaysalinearone,andcanbebetterunderstoodascyclical,repeatingoverandover
4
Ibid.,26.
Iacknowledgethatthereisavastarrayoftheoriesabouthowthepolicyprocessfunctions,butthereare
certainadvantagestousingthepolicystagestheory.Forone,itisheavilyused,andassuchisoften
incorporatedintohowethicalphilosophersthinkaboutpolicyingeneral.Anotheradvantageisthatit
simplifiesthepolicyprocessinsuchawayastoallowustoseehowdifferentethicaltheoriesshapedifferent
partsoftheprocessandgeneratedifferentoutcomes.
6
Asanaside,Itakeitasagiventhatethicalguidanceshouldbeincorporatedintothepublicpolicyprocess.If
onebelievesthatethicalreasoninghasnoplacewithinthepolicyprocess,thechoicebetweenhumanrightsor
careethicsbecomesmoot.Here,however,Ishallassumethatmoralconsiderationsareintegraltothepolicy
process.Formoreontheimportanceofethicsinthepublicpolicyprocess,see:TomL.BeauchampEthicsand
PublicPolicy(1975)onhowpublicpolicyisanexcellentmethodforapplyingethicaltheoriestomodernmoral
problems;RobertGoodinUtilitarianismasaPublicPhilosophy(1995)foradefenseofutilitarianethicsasa
guideforpublicpolicy;orJonathanWolffEthicsandPublicPolicy(2011),foranexplorationofareasofpublic
policy(issuesofcrime,health,animalwelfare,druguse,disability,andmore)fromaphilosophicalperspective
todemonstratehowphilosophy,ethicsinparticular,caninterveneinpolicydebatestoclarifytheissuesat
hand.Thesearenotexhaustive,butasmallsamplingofworksthatexplorethewaysinwhichmoral
philosophycaninformandbenefitthepublicpolicyprocess.
7
MichaelHowlettandM.Ramesh,StudyingPublicPolicy:PolicyCyclesandPolicySubsystems(Ontario:Oxford
UniversityPress,2003),11.
5
132
aspoliciesarerefinedandalteredthroughtime.8Inspiteofthisnon-linear,cyclicalviewofpolicy,it
isneverthelesshelpfultobreakdowntheprocessintostagesinordertocometogripswiththe
complexprocessthatispolicymaking,andbecausethispolicy-stagemodelcanbeusedatalllevels
fromlocalgovernmenttotheinternationalarena.9
Althoughitisimportanttorefrainfromthinkingofpolicyasalinearprocess,wemustbegin
ourassessmentandunderstandingofpolicyatsomepointalongthepolicycycle,andagendasetting
isagoodpointofentry.Agendasettingbeginswhenagovernment(orotherpolicymaking
institution)recognizesaproblemwithinsociety.10Asaninitialmatter,policiesaregenerallycreated
toaddresssocialproblems.Understandingthewaysinwhichsocialproblemsareidentifiedand
interpretedbypolicymakers,policyadvocates,andthegeneralpubliccanprovideinsightintothe
relationshipbetweenhowtheproblemisframedandwhatkindsofsolutionsarethenconsidered
possible.Second,agendasettingisalsoastagewherepolicymakerscandeclinetoact,thatis,they
candeterminethatasocialproblemisnotaproblematall,oratleastnotaproblemthatis
appropriateforaparticularinstitutiontoaddress.
Policyformulationisthestageofthepolicyprocesswhenpolicymakersandotherrelevant
policyactorsfirstdraftanddiscusspossiblecoursesofactiontorectifyorcounteradetermined
problem.11Thatdoesnotmeanthatthisisanorderlyprocess,oftenfarfromit.Therelevantactors
involvedareamixtureofpolicydecision-makers,expertsinspecializedfields,publicsocialgroups,or
specialinterestgroups.Inthecontextofgovernments,actorsareelectedofficialsandsometimes
invitedexperts.Inotherinstitutions,theymightbeselectworkersinabusiness,ortrained
developmentworkersinaNon-GovernmentalOrganization(NGO).Expertscanbescientists,
doctors,psychologists,sociologists,artists,orotherpersonswhoprovidespecializedinformation
andinsightaboutaparticularproblem.Socialgroupsincludeparentadvocacygroups,charity
groups,orasocialjusticeorganizationlikeAmnestyInternationalorGreenpeacethatoperateinthe
publiceyeandworkthroughpubliccampaignstoexertinfluenceovertheformulationprocess.
Lastly,specialinterestgroupscanbebusinesses,religiousorganizations,orsingle-issuegroupsthat
operateclosertotheseatofdecision-makingandtrytosteerpolicyformulationtowardanoutcome
thatbenefitstheminsomemanner.
8
Ibid.,13.
Ibid.,14.
10
Ibid.,121.
11
Ibid.,143.
9
133
Whiletheformulationstageproducedapoolofpossiblesolutions,inthethirdstage,
decision-making,asmallsetofactors—decision-makers12—makethefinalchoicesaboutwhatpolicy
solutiontopursue.Therearetwodifferentkindsofpoliciesthatcanresultfromthedecisionmakingprocess.Somepoliciescanbe‘positive,’alteringthestatusquo,ortheycanbe‘negative’by
upholdingthestatusquoinstead.13Further,“publicpolicydecision-makingisnotatechnical
exercisebutaninherentlypoliticalprocess.”14Therearewinnersandlosersinsofarassomepeople
getsomethingoutofthedecisionwhileothersdonot.Decision-makingisaprocessthathasdirectly
grownoutofthetwopreviousstages,andinvolvesagreatdealofbackandforthinwhichactors
oftentradepromisesinordertoreachanagreement.
Policyimplementationis“wherepolicydecisionsaretranslatedintoaction.”15Atthisstage
ofthepolicyprocess,thescopewidensonceagaintoencompassnotonlythepolicydecision-makers,
butalsothosewhowillbedirectlydeliveringthepolicyoutcomesandthosewhoarereceivingthe
policyoutcomes.Inagovernment,thismeansthatpoliticiansmightbethedecision-makers,but
thosewhoimplementthepolicyareoftencivilservants.16Thepolicysystemnowalsoexpandsto
includetargetgroups:“groupswhosebehaviourisintendedorexpectedtobealteredby
governmentaction.”17Thesearethemembersofthegeneralpublicwhoaretherecipientsofpolicy
implementation,orareacteduponbythepolicy-makinginstitution.
Lastly,policyevaluationis“thestageofthepolicyprocessatwhichitisdeterminedhowa
publicpolicyhasactuallyfaredinaction.”18Liketheotherstagesofthepolicyprocessthereare
built-inbiasespresent,whichcanleadtocolouringtheoutcomesofanyevaluation,especially
consideringthetermssuccessandfailurecanoftenbesubjective.19Therefore,manypolicy
evaluationsrelyonpolicy‘judges’thathaveinformationenoughtomake“reasonablyintelligent,
defensible,andreplicableassessments.”20Theactorsintheevaluationstagearenotalwayslocated
withinthegovernmentorotherpolicyinstitutionsthemselves,butcanbefromwidersocial
structures,suchasbusinesses,interestgroups,themedia,andthegeneralpublic.Fromthis
evaluationprocess,therearetwooutcomes:feedbackandtermination.Feedbackiswherethe
12
Inagovernmentdecision-makersareprimarilyelectedofficials,whileinbusinessesorNGOstheyaresenior
executivesorboardmembers.
13
Negativeandpositivearenotusedasstand-insfor‘bad’and‘good’outcomes,butmerelyawayto
categorizethetypeofactiontakenbydecision-makers.Sometimesupholdingthestatusquomightbethe
morebeneficialoutcome.
14
HowlettandRamesh,162.
15
Ibid.,185.
16
Ibid.,187.
17
Ibid.,188.
18
Ibid.,207.
19
Ibid.,208.
20
Ibid.,209.
134
policyloopsbacktoadifferentstageinthepolicycycletobereviewedandadaptedastimegoes
on.21Terminationoccurswhenthepolicyishaltedordisbanded.22
Admittedly,muchoftheinformationaboutthepolicyprocessinthisbriefexamination
focusesonthedomesticpolicyofnationstatesasabasisforanalysis.Yet,thekindsofpolicy
processesdiscussedherearenotnecessarilyuniquetonationsandthusdonotprecludethinking
abouthowNGOs,corporations,andotherinstitutionsdraftpoliciesoragendas.Second,
internationalinfluenceshavegainedgreaterpurchaseinpublicpolicyoverthelastseveraldecades
duetotheprocessesofglobalization.23Globalizationhasnotonlyincreasedinternational
connectedness,buttheinterconnectednessbetweendifferentkindsofpolicyaswell,suchthat
“[t]raditionalsocialpolicyareassuchassocialsecurityandhealthcarehavethusbecomeapartof
economicpolicymakingasaresult.”24Intermsofinternationalinstitutions,theirabilitytoaffect
policyisoftendeterminedbywhetherornotan“internationalregimefacilitatestheir
involvement.”25Aninternationalinstitutioncanhavemoreroomtoactifother,powerful
internationalactorspromotesaidinvolvement.Forexample,smaller,lesspowerfulnationsmight
beeagertoapplyformembershipininternationalinstitutionsiflarger,morepowerfulnations
promotejoiningtheinstitutiononthebasisofthesmallernationgainingeconomicandsocial
benefitsbydoingso.Theabilityofaninternationalinstitutiontoactwithinanyparticularnational
contextcanalsodependonthepoliticalstructureofthenationinquestion,aswellasitsdisposition
towardinternationalinvolvement.Thatsaid,weshouldnotdiscounttheabilityofNGOsasasiteof
policymaking,andtheabilityofNGOstoworkandexistinnationsthatarenotwelldisposedtoward
large-scaleinternationalintervention.NGO’s,duetotheirpeculiarnatureofexistingbetweenthe
publicandtheprivate,areoftenabletoimplementpolicywithoutthestigmaofbroadinternational
intervention.26
Section 2 – The Lens of Care and Issues in Public Policy
Inthissection,Iwillbeginbybrieflyexplaininghowhumanrightsstandardsareusedtoinformeach
policystage,andthenIwillusethelensofcaretohighlightthe‘blind-spots’—thecontextsof
difference,exclusion,gender,dependence,andcareitself—thatoccurbecauseofanexclusivefocus
onahumanrightsperspective.Iwillthenarguethatthecrucial,feministethicsofcare,andits
21
Ibid.,216.
Ibid.,218.
23
Ibid.,55.
24
Ibid.,59.
25
Ibid.
26
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,157-60.
22
135
correspondingpractices(thatofattentiveness,responsibility,andresponsivenessasoutlinedby
Robinson)canbeusedtoprovidenewkindsofinformationandnewwaysofactingateachstageof
thepolicyprocess.Althoughthepracticesofcarecanbeapartofeverypolicystage,Igenerally
singleoutonepracticethatIconsidertobevitalateachstageasanexampletohighlightthewaysin
whichcaretheoryandthepracticesofcarecaninformandtransformthepolicyprocess.Policy
shapesourlives,andhowweliveinrelationtoparticularothers.Consideringthatcritical,feminist
careethicsinvestigatesandprovidesguidanceforjudginghowinstitutionalpatternsofpowershape
theserelations,thismeansthatcareethicscanandshouldbeusedasanethicalguideforthepolicy
process.Iwillbreakthissectionintofivesub-sectionsfollowingthepolicystagesinordertoprovide
clearcomparisonsbetweenacareethicsandahumanrightsperspectiveonthepolicyprocess.
Policy,fromahumanrightsperspective,istheefforttoimplementhumanrightsstandards
throughgovernmentaction.Whilethismightseemtobethenormtoday,thiswasnotalwaysthe
case.Untilthe1990shumanrightsdiscoursewasnotnecessarilyexpresslyincorporatedinto
legislativeaction.Achangeoccurred,however,afterthecollapseofSovietUnion,andthe
subsequentendoftheColdWar,whenitseemedthattherewasapowerfulconnectionbetween
neoliberalcapitalism,representativegovernment,andhumanrightsstandards.Governmentsthen
begantousehumanrightsasawaytopresentorgroundtheirpoliticalplatforms,andasaguidefor
politicalandpublicaction.27However,thelanguageofrightshadtonegotiatewiththeconceptof
NewPublicManagement(NPM),whichis“concernedwithimprovingtheefficiencyofpublic
administration.”28Throughouttheendofthe20thcentury,therewastensionbetweenthedriveof
NPMtoprivatizepublicprograms29andahumanrightsstandpointthat“emphasizedthatthe
internationalobligationsthatthestatehasassumedshouldbeclearlyexpressedandimplemented
throughitspublicpolicy.”30Eventually,policymakersfoundaworkablesolutionbetweenhuman
rightsdiscoursesandNPM:humanrightsprovidedtheobjectivesofpublicpolicy,whilethe
proceduresandspecificexecutionofanypolicywereguidedbyNPM.31
Theethicsofcarehasyettobeincorporatedintostatepolicyprocesses.However,mygoal
hereistoarguethatwerecareethicsapartofpublicpolicy,itwouldserveasawaytoclarify
assumptionsaboutpublicgoods(suchascare),driveaninvestigationintohowpolicyimpactsreal
people,embeddedinrealrelationshipsandareaffectedbysocialnormsthatpolicyoftenservesto
27
DanielVazquezandDomitilleDelaplace,"PublicPoliciesfromaHumanRightsPerspective:ADeveloping
Field,"SUR-InternationalJournalonHumanRights8,no.14(2011):36.
28
Ibid.
29
NPM’sgoalofprivatizationworkedontheassumptionthatthiswouldproducebetterfinancialcost-benefit
solutions,albeitsometimestothedetrimentofthosepeoplethegovernmentshouldhavebeenhelping.
30
VazquezandDelaplace,37-8.
31
Ibid.,38.
136
reinforce,drawingparticularattentiontonormsarounddependence,exclusion,race,andgender.
Thecritiquethatcritical,feministcareethicscannotguideorinformpolicyisacritiquebasedupon
theassumptionthatbecausewehavenotusedcareethicsasaguideitisnotsuitable.Yet,simply
becauseithasnotbeendonebeforedoesnotmeanitisimplausible.Throughouttheremainderof
thischapter,Iwillarguethatusingcareethicsasaguideforpublicpolicyispossibleandsomething
thatweshoulddo.Careethicscanprovidenewinsights,motivations,andpathsofactionthat
wouldservetotransformourpolitical,social,andeconomiccontextsintoonesmoreconduciveto
peoplebeingabletoliveandbuildtheircaringrelationshipswithparticularothers,andinawaythat
doesnotconformtocurrentexploitativeandharmfulassumptionsaboutgender,race,dependency,
andexclusion.Intermsofglobalpublicpolicy,forexample,wecouldworktonotonlyeliminatethe
‘pull’factorsthatdrawtransnationalmigrantcarersintowealthynationsforwork,butalso
understandthepressing‘push’factorsthatthatunderwritemigrantsleavingtheirfamiliesbehind,
producinganevenlargercaredeficitintheirhomecountry.Inordertodothat,wewouldneedto
usetheethicsofcare,withitspracticesofattentiveness,responsiveness,andresponsibilitytofocus
onthewayinwhichmigrantworkersliveandoftenmakeimpossiblechoices.32
Section 2.1 – Agenda Setting
Becausehumanrightshavebeenusedtooutlinetheobjectivesforpublicpolicyandgovernment
action,humanrightscreate:“[A]logicofresponsibilitythroughaccountingmechanismsandlegally
bindingobligations.Seenthroughthislens,theobjectiveandtheessenceofpublicpolicyisnotto
solvespecificproblemsorrespondtounsatisfieddemandsbut,rather,tofulfilrights.”33Public
policyfromahumanrightsperspectivereinforcestheideathatthestatehasanobligationtoits
citizens,andspecificallythatobligationhastodowiththefulfilmentoftheirhumanrights.Although
humanrightscanstillbeusedtoidentifyproblems,thatactionissubsumedbythedrivetofulfilthe
humanrightsofallcitizens.Thatmeansintheagendasettingstagethegoalisto‘unpack’theright,
ortounderstandtheobligationsthattherightwillrequire,whichthenformsthebasiccontentof
publicpolicy.34Forexample,ahumanrighttoeducationwillfirstfocusontheobligationsthatright
generates:accesstoschools,availablematerialsandpersonnel,andacertainstandardofqualityin
teaching.Theseobligationsareonesthatthegovernment‘ought’tomeet.Therefore,when
draftingpolicy,althoughcostsarekeptinmind,theobjectiveofthepolicyistoensurethatcertain
32
Weir,"TheGlobalUniversalCaregiver:ImaginingWomen'sLiberationintheNewMillennium,"313-4.
VazquezandDelaplace,39.
34
Ibid.,41.
33
137
standardsaremetsuchthatthehumanrighttoeducationisfulfilled.Thisalsomeansthatthestate
mighthavetointervenewhennon-stateactorsdenychildrentherighttoeducation.
Thereare,however,twoparticularproblemsthatthehumanrightsperspectiveonpublic
policycannotaddressatthisstage.First,thebackgroundconditionsandassumptionsthatexist
withinanysocietygreatlyinfluencethekindsofproblemsthatcanbe‘seen’assuitableforpolicy
solutionsinthefirstplace.Ideasaboutwhatisnormal,whataredeviationsfromnormal,and
normativepoliticalidealsareallboundtogetherindefininganysocialproblem.AsIarguedin
ChapterThree,humanrightsdonotnecessarilyidentifysomesocialproblemsaspoliticallyrelevant
nordotheyinvestigatethebackgroundcausesofidentifiedsocialproblems.Thesecondproblem
forahumanrightsperspectiveisthattheagendasettingstagerequiresafairdegreeof‘active
citizenship.’This‘activecitizenship,’iswheretherighttoparticipationandconsultationinpublic
matters“impliestheactive,documentedparticipationofallpersonswhoareinterestedinthe
formulation,application,andmonitoringofpublicpolicies.”35Theproblemwith‘activecitizenship’
isthatthosewhodonothavethetimetoparticipateinthiswayareoftenleftout,excludedfrom
thepolicyprocesseventhoughtheirproblems,oftendeeponesaroundgenderanddependency,are
notbroughttothepolicytable.Suchpersonscanberenderedinvisibletothepoliticalprocess
becausetheycannotparticipatethroughtraditionalmeans.36
Critical,feministcareethicscanbeavitalassetatthisstageoftheprocessforthreereasons
thatdirectlyaddressthefailingofhumanrightsbasedapproachesnotedabove.One,becauseofits
criticalexaminationoftherootcausesofproblems,acaretheoryanalysisofanysocialproblemcan
providedifferentinformationthanhumanrightsthatthencanallowforagreaterunderstandingof
anyparticularproblem,asIarguedinChaptersTwoandFour.Thisgreaterunderstanding,inturn,
canleadtomoreeffectiveandlonger-termsolutionsthanmightotherwisebeconsidered.The
secondreasoncareethicscanbeimportantattheagendasettingstageisbecauseitcanwidenthe
scopeofwhatcountsasaproblem,suchthatconcernsaboutcareanddependencywouldcometo
beaddressedthroughsocialpolicy.Third,caretheory’spracticeofattentivenesscanbeusedto
underscoretheimportanceofpolicymakersbeingattentivetotheneedsandconcernsofthetarget
groupsofanypolicyandproactiveinseekingouttheaffectedparticipantstobepartoftheagenda
settingstage.
Toillustratethepoint,consideracasestudyfromYanqiuZhouandSheliaNeysmithon
transnationalgrandparenting,whereelderlyChinesegrandparentstraveltoCanadainordertoassist
35
Ibid.,43.
EvaFederKittay,"AFeministPublicEthicofCareMeetstheNewCommunitarianFamilyPolicy,"Ethics111,
no.3(2001):529.
36
138
theirchildrenbytakingonthelabourofcaringforthehomeandyoungchildren.37TheCanadian
governmentcertainlybenefitsfromthistransnationalgrandparenting,becauseitdoesnothaveto
investasheavilyinearlychildcare.However,thesearrangementsareoftenstressfulforeveryone
involved.Thegrandparentsaretrappedinacycleofexpensivevisaregulations,whichisoften
furtherproblematizedbyalanguagebarrier.38TheadultchildrenwholiveinCanadaareunder
pressureto‘startagain’andoftenfacetheproblemofdownwardmobility,andtheirchildrenface
thestressesofuncertaincaringarrangements.39TotheCanadiangovernment,thissituationisnota
policy‘problem’becauseitdoesnottakeintoaccountthewaysinwhichimmigrationpolicyshapes
theverylivesofimmigrantsfromChina.Thesetransnationalgrandparents“directlycontributeto
theirimmigrantchildren’sparticipationinthelabourforceandthewell-beingoftheirgrandchildren
as‘LittleCanadians.’”40ImmigrationandchildcarepoliciesinCanadashapetheimmigrantfamily,
oftenpenalizinggrandparentsfortryingtohelptheirchildrenfillachildcaregapthattheycannot
fulfilontheirown.Thisdemonstrateshowagendasettingmatters,becausetheCanadian
governmentdoesnotseetransnationalgrandparentingasasocialproblemtobeaddressedthrough
policy,regardlessofthefactthatcurrentpolicies—theintersectionofalackofchildcareand
immigrationpolicy—aretheverythingthatgeneratestheprobleminthefirstplace.Thepervasive
normsinthissituationmightbeonesthatprioritizefamilycareoverpaidcare,orevengovernment
providedcare,andnormsaround‘desirable’and‘undesirable’immigrantsasborneoutthrough
immigrationpolicy.
However,byusingthelensofcareintheagendasettingstage,insteadofpolicyreinforcing
socialnorms,onecaninvestigatethenormsandassumptionsthatunderlietheattitudesthatgave
risetothesocialprobleminthefirstplace.41Inparticular,thepracticeofattentivenesswouldentail
thatpolicymakersshouldlistentotheneedsoftheir‘productive’immigrantpopulation,which
wouldspeaktoaneedforincreasedchildcareprovision,andalsolistentothegrandparentsinthis
situationwhotakeupthelabourofcaretothebettermentoftheCanadianeconomy.Apossible
solution,ratherthanthemoreexpensiveexpansionofgovernmentcarewouldbetocreatespecial
provisionsforgrandparentswhotraveltoCanadainordertoprovidein-homechildcare,makingthe
visaprocesslesscomplicatedandlessexpensive.Thischangewouldsignaltheunderstandingthat
careisanimportantandnecessaryfeatureoflife,andonethatmakesproductiveworkpossiblein
37
Zhou,"Time,SpaceandCare:RethinkingTransnationalCarefromaTemporalPerspective,"163-4.
SheliaM.NeysmithandYanqiuRachelZhou,"MappingAnotherDimensionofaFeministEthicsofCare:
Family-BasedTransnationalCare,"InternationalJournalofFeministApproachestoBioethics6,no.2(2013):
147.
39
Zhou,"Time,SpaceandCare:RethinkingTransnationalCarefromaTemporalPerspective,"171.
40
NeysmithandZhou,155.
41
OlenaHankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare(Vancouver:UniversityofBritishColumbiaPress,2004),
59-60.
38
139
thefirstplace.Acareanalysisofsuchnormscandemonstratetheactualrootsoftheproblem,
whichoftenarethefailureofprevailingnormsandlawstoincorporateaperson’slivedexperience
intoalarger,institutionalframework.Throughthiscriticalanalysisofthecausesofsocialproblems,
theproblemwillnotnecessarilybeseenasthefaultofthepersonwhodoesnotfitintothe
institutionalframework,butafailureoftheframeworktoalteritsscopeinordertoaccommodatea
widervarietyofpersons.Thetensionbetweenincorporatingmorelivedexperiencesand
maintainingaworkableframeworkwillrequireconstantnegotiation,becauseitisentirelypossible
thataparticularlivedexperiencewillnotcompelaframeworktochange,butitisvitalthatsuch
negotiationsbecomeapartofourpolicyprocesses,especiallywhenfirstidentifyingsocialissues.
Anotherwaywemighttransformtheagendasettingprocessisbyusingthepracticeof
attentivenesstohelpguideaction.Careethicsbasedpolicywouldrequirepolicymakers,especially
attheagendasettingstage,topayattentionto“whatisactuallytheproblemasexperienced.”42
Policymakerswouldberequiredtolistentothosewhohaveaproblemanddotheirbestto
understandhowtheproblemaffectspeopleintheirdailylivesandwithregardtotheirrelationships
withothers.Thepracticeofattentivenessisimportantforpolicymakersbecausewecannotrely
uponallpersonsbeingabletotakepartintheaforementioned‘activecitizenship.’Forexample,
womenwhomustworkatapaidjobandthencareforfamilymembersathomeoftenlackthetime
tobecomeinvolvedinensuringthattheirconcernsarebroughtforwardforpolicyassessment.If
theydomaketheefforttobecomean‘activecitizen’theyinvariablysacrificeeithersomepaid
labourtimeor,morelikely,someofthetimenecessarytofulfiltheircaringresponsibilities.Care
ethic’spracticeofattentivenesswould,instead,provideguidanceforhowpolicymakerswouldneed
toengagewithcitizenswhoareoftennotheard.Theethosofthe‘activepolicymaker’would
supplementthatofthe‘activecitizen,’becausecareethicswouldhighlightthattheactual
responsibilityforcareintherelationshipbetweenthepolicymakerandthecitizen43liesmost
heavilyupontheinstitutionandtheindividualswhomakepolicy,notthecitizen.Thecitizenisoften
thetargetofpolicy,whichmeansthatwhilethecitizencertainlyhassomeresponsibilitytorespond
tothepolicyandtoprovidefeedbackiftheyareable,thepolicymakeristheonewhomustbe
attentivetotheneedsofthepolicyrecipient.Careethic’spracticeofattentivenessmeansthat
policymakerswouldhavetoexpendefforttryingtounderstandthelivesofsingleparents,domestic
workers,andotherswholackthetimeorfundstotakean‘active’roleinthepoliticalprocess.
42
SelmaSevenhuijsenetal.,"SouthAfricanSocialWelfarePolicy:AnAnalysisUsingtheEthicofCare,"Critical
SocialPolicy23,no.3(2003):315.
43
However,thepersonuponwhompolicyactsisnotnecessarilyacitizen,particularlyinthecaseof
immigrationpolicy.Iusecitizenasastand-in,admittedlyaflawedone,forallpersonswhoareaffectedbya
policy.
140
Perhapsthiscouldbeaccomplishedthroughnewsocialmedia,whichisintegratedintomany
people’slivesalready,orbyofferingmoreconvenientandmorefrequentopportunitiesforface-tofaceinteraction,andbyincludingserviceslikechild-mindingduringsuchmeetings.
Section 2.2 – Policy Formulation
Thesecondstep,onahumanrightsperspective,oncetherighthasbeen‘unpacked,’istothen
identifywhichstateinstitutionsareresponsibleforfulfillinganygivenobligation,orhowpolicyis
formulated.Thequestionsthathumanrightsstandardsaskofpolicymakersarewhatarethe
“structuralcausesofarightnotbeingexercised.”44However,nofinaldecisionismadeatthispoint,
becausethisismerelywherepossiblesolutionstoaddresstheproblemareconsidered;wherepolicy
actorsweightheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofoneparticulargovernmentofficetakingthelead
onaddressingaproblemandperhapscommissionstudiestofurtherunderstandtheproblemand
gatherdata.Thisalsomeansthathumanrightspublicpolicyisaholisticenterprise;45i.e.onethat
involvesmultiplegovernmentofficesworkingtogether.46Tofulfiltherighttoeducation,for
example,theremustbestandardsfortheeducationofchildrendirectly(thoughthesettingof
curricula),andalsofortheeducationofprospectiveteachers.Theremustalsobebuildingcodesfor
schoolstoensureasafelearningenvironment,andacampaigntoconvinceparentsofthe
importanceofeducatingtheirchildren.Nosinglegovernmentdepartmentisenoughtofulfilthe
right,whichmeansmultipledepartmentsmustworktogether.Everybarriertofulfillinghuman
rightsbecomesa‘publicproblem,’andthusmustbeaddressedthroughappropriatestateaction.47
Aproblemwithpublicpolicyinformedbycurrenthumanrightsdiscoursesisthatinmany
waysitstillreflectsamainstreamliberalideaofcitizenship,thatoftheautonomousindividualwho
isabletomeettheirbasicneedsontheirown.48Thisconceptionofthepersonallowsfor
dependenceintheprivatesphere,butassumesthatonceanindividualisinthepublicrealm,they
aremeantto“transcenddependency.”49Humanseparatenessisanecessaryfeatureofpublicpolicy
onahumanrightsperspective,anddependencemaystillbeassumedtobeafailureonthepartof
theindividual.Thisisacurrentfeatureoftraditional,mainstreamhumanrightsbasedpolicy,which
44
VazquezandDelaplace,48.
HolisticinthesensethatVazquezandDelaplacemeanhereisthatitrequiresmultiplegovernment
institutionstoworktogetherholisticallytoaddresstheproblem.Whilethisisveryimportantandnecessary
forgoodpolicy,Iarguethatpolicymustbemoreholisticinitstreatmentofpeople,understoodasembedded
withinrelationships.
46
MurliDesai,"SocialPolicyApproaches,HumanRights,andSocialDevelopmentinAsia,"SocialDevelopment
Issues35,no.2(2013):14.
47
VazquezandDelaplace,44.
48
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,5.
49
Ibid.
45
141
treatstheindividualasthelocusofprimaryconcernwithouttakingintoconsiderationtherolethe
largercommunityhastoplayinthelivesofindividuals.Anexampleofthispittingoftheindividual
againstthecommunityispresentinhealthcarepolicy,evenwhensuchpolicyexplicitlyseeksto
incorporatecommunity-orientedsolutions.SelmaSevenhuijsenusesahealthcarepolicydocument
bytheDutchgovernmentcalledChoicesinHealthCaretohighlightkeyproblemswithstandard
policypractices.50Shenotesthatalthoughthedocumentseekstodepartfromanovertfocusonthe
individualby“invokingcommunitariansolutionsorbyselectivelystatingthatneedsmightbesocially
constructed,”51theindividualremainstheprimarysubjectofconcern.Thepolicydocumentmakesit
clearthatitistheindividualwhoisresponsibleforassessingtheirneedsandexpressingthemas
claimswithinthehealthcaresystem.However,thisdocumentalsoassumesthattheindividualis
irresponsible,thattheyhave‘unlimited’needsthatmustbecurbedbyaresponsiblepolitical
communityinordertodiscussresponsiblehealthcarechoices.52Forexample,wecouldimaginean
individualwhoplacesunduestrainuponthehealthcaresystembygoingtothedoctorbasedupon
eachsymptomratherthanlookingforunderlyingcausesofthesymptoms.Throughacommunityorientedprocess,thevarioussymptomsmightresolveasasingleproblem,thusrenderingthe
demandsuponthesystemmuchlessoverall.Yet,thisseparationoftheindividualfromthelarger
communityandfromtheirrelationshipnetworksrendersthecommunityandtheindividualatodds
withoneanother.The‘irresponsibleindividual’canbeperceivedasathreattothewiderpolitical
community.Conversely,becausethepoliticalcommunityarguesaboutcare“withabstract,legal
normsasitsmainpointofreference,”53theindividualcanbeisolated,thesubjectofjudgmental
scrutiny,wherethemainconcernisnotsomuchtheirwell-beingasaperson,buthowtoensurethe
individualmeetsacertainsetofhealthstandardswithoutcausingunduestressuponthecommunity
asawhole.Pittingtheindividualandcommunityagainsteachotherisexactlywhatwedonotwant
inpublicpolicy.Whilecareethicsbasedpublicpolicymustbesensitivetotheproblemoflimited
resources,itwould,however,disallowtheperpetuationharmfulnotionsofdependencethatsetthe
individualandthecommunityatodds,especiallyifthereasonfordoingsoistobeperceivedas
conservingresources.
Inlightoftheaboveexample,oneofthemoststrikinginsightsthatcriticalfeministcare
ethicscanprovideatthepolicyformulationstage,thoughthepracticesofattentivenessand
responsiveness,ishowcareanddependencyareproblematicallystructured,bothpoliticallyand
50
Sevenhuijsen,122.
Ibid.,133.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
51
142
socially.54Bypayingattentiontothosewhodothebulkofthecaringlabour,byactuallylisteningto
suchpersons,andthenrespondingtotheirneeds,thiswouldopenupthefieldofpossiblesolutions
toincludeonesthattakeintoaccountthewayinwhichpolicycanhelporhinderthosewhodocare
work.Theassumptionsaroundcareanddependencyarethemselvesshapedbycurrentpolicy,
namelythetensionbetweenhowcurrentpolicyshapescaringpractices,andacontinuedinsistence
thatacriticalcareperspectiveisunnecessaryorunabletoguidepolicy,particularlypolicythat
impactscaringpractices.55AsSelmaSevenhuijsenargues,ifcareisgoingtobeadequatelydiscussed
inthepoliticalarena,this“presupposesthatwehandlewithcareanumberofkeyvaluesforgood
careprovisioninthepublicsphere,”which“impliesare-evaluationofcareinpoliticsor,rather,a
relocationofcarefromthemarginstothecentreofpoliticaljudgmentandcollectiveaction.”56
Usingcareethicsprovidesnewinsightsthatrequireanexaminationofnotonlycaringpractices,but
alsothenormsandassumptionsaroundcare,bringingcareintothecentreofourpoliticalprocess
andpolicy-making.
Publicpolicyfromahumanrightsperspectiveisaboutthefulfilmentofhumanrights,and
althoughsomepoliciesmightacknowledgetheneedtocorrectforpastorcurrentstructural
problems(suchasdiscriminationagainstwomen),thisdoesnotprotecttheindividualfrombeing
castasafailurewhentheyaredependentuponaid,orastheaboveexampleillustrated,athreatin
healthcarepolicywherethegoalistoreduceunduestrainuponthesystemfrom‘irresponsible
individuals’throughaself-policingcommunity.Thistensionbetweentheindividualandthe
community,andourproblematicconstructionofdependence,isfosteredbyhumanrightsbased
publicpolicy,whichoftenrestsuponhumanautonomyasitsfoundationalprinciple.These
problemsoccurbecausehumanrightsarenotgearedtowardchallengingnormativenotionsof
dependence;theyareoftensilentaboutsuchnorms.Instead,problematicnormsofdependence
areleftinplace.Usingthelensofcarecanbethefirststeptowardchanginghowwethinkof
dependence,andthushowwecraftpolicy.
Oncecareethicsisincorporatedintothemakingofpolicy,thearrayofpossiblesolutionswill
shift.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthearrayofsolutionswillnecessarilybecomelargerorsmaller,
merelythatthenatureandkindofsolutionswillnotnecessarilyresembleprevioussetsofpossible
solutions.AprimeexamplecanbefoundinacasestudybyOlenaHankivsky,whoexaminedthe
54
SeeChaptersOneandTwoformoreontheinherentproblemsinthecurrentwaysinwhichinstitutions,
norms,andthemarketplacestructurecare.
55
KirsteinRummeryandMichaelFine,"Care:ACriticalReviewofTheory,PolicyandPractice,"SocialPolicyand
Administration46,no.3(2012):333-4.
56
SelmaSevenhuijsen,"ThePlaceofCare:TheRelevanceoftheFeministEthicofCareforSocialPolicy,"
FeministTheory4(2003):183.
143
waysinwhichvictimsofabuseinresidentialschoolsinCanadahadtheirclaimsaddressedandthe
kindsofsolutionsofferedtomakerestitutiontothevictims,solutionsthatwereintendedtoprovide
closureorhealing.57Oneoftheprimarymeansofrestitutionwastoprovidemonetarypayments
oncesurvivorshadgonethroughaclaimsprocess,specificallyfor“therapeuticexpensesand
pecuniarylossarisingfrominjury,pain,andsuffering.”58Theproblemwiththesepayoutsisthat
puttingadollaramounttoaperson’ssufferingisdifficult,andwhileapayoutmightbeacceptable
forsomeindividuals,othersfeltinsultedorangry,becausethinkingofcompensationonlyin
monetarytermsmay“trivializethesurvivortraumaanddistractfrommoreimportanttherapeutic
options.”59Othersfeltconfusedwhentheyweregivenapaymentwithoutanyadviceorassistance
inhowtomanagethemoney.Byincorporatingcareethicsintothepolicyprocess,possiblesolutions
expandfromtheideaofmonetarycompensation,butdonotnecessarilyexcludeit.Forsome
survivorsmoneyandguidanceabouthowtobestinvestorutilizethefundswouldbemostbeneficial
toaidingthesurvivorsastheyworkedtorebuildtheirlives.60Forothers,simplythechanceto
explainandtelltheirstory,tobelistenedtoandhavetheirstoriesacknowledgedduringtheclaims
processwasenough.Othersurvivorsmightrequiresustainedtherapy,orassistancewithfindinga
jobsotheyreachtheirprofessionalandpersonalgoals,orevenacommitmentfromthegovernment
topreventfurtherinstancesofinstitutionalabuse.61
Careethicscangeneratepossiblesolutionswiththeunderstandingthatsometimesitis
necessarytobeflexibleandresponsivetotheneedsofthepolicy’stargetgroup,andthusthe
practiceofresponsivenessisofprimaryimportanceatthisstage.Theinsightsfromtheprevious
stagearefurtherexpandeduponaspolicymakersbegintoformulatepossiblesolutions.Whenwe
assesssituationsfromacareperspective,wecanseethattoaddresssomeproblemsmuchmore
thanmonetarypaymentsmightberequired.Thepossiblesetofsolutionsthusgeneratedcan
encompassthemanydifferentwaysinwhichpersonscanbeaffectedbypolicydecisions,providing
abetterpictureabouthowtoaddressanygivensocialproblem.Whileperhapsmoreexpensivein
termsofmoneyandtimeintheshortterm,inthelongtermthehumanbenefitandthewider
benefittosocietytohavehealthier,happier,andmoreproductivecitizenscouldverywelloutweigh
theupfrontcosts.IntheexamplefromHankivsky’swork,althoughitmightrequiremoremoneyand
timetofullyaddressthetraumacausedbytheresidentialschools,thenetresultwouldbemore
57
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,61.
Ibid.,65.
59
Ibid.,75.
60
Careethicswouldalsorequireadvisorstoguardagainstpaternalisticattitudeswhiledispensingadvice,
whichwouldrequirepublicadministratorstobeattentiveandresponsivetotheneedsofanyparticular
individual.
61
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,78-9.
58
144
stableadultsthatcanparticipatemorefullyinsocietybecausetheirtraumawasaddressedinaway
thatallowedthemtohealandregaintheirsenseofautonomy.
Section 2.3 – Decision-Making
Humanrightsperspectivesonpolicytendnottotouchmuchonthedecision-makingstage,largely
becausemosthumanrightsmodelstendtoviewthisstageastheonethatdetermines“whichofthe
possiblesolutionspresentsthegreatestdegreeoftechnicalcertaintybasedontheavailable
evidence.”62Whilethereisanallowanceforthefactthatthepoliticaloutcomesofelectionscan
greatlyimpactthisprocess,andthatsuchoutcomescanbeasimportantastechnicalevidence,the
humanrightsanalysisofthedecision-makingstagedoesnotinvestigatethewaysinwhichpolicy
decisionsareactuallymadeandhowdeeplydecision-makingisinfluencedbyanyparticulardecisionmaker’sunderstandingofgovernmentalresponsibility.Becausehumanrightsdiscoursesofferlittle
guidanceforpolicymakersotherthanexistingasasetofstandards,asdiscussedinChapterThree,I
directlyproceedtoadiscussionoftheadvantagesoftheethicofcareatthispolicystage.
Decision-makingisaprocessthathasdirectlygrownoutofthetwopreviousstages,and
involvesagreatdealofbackandforthinwhichactorsoftentradepromisesinordertoreachan
agreement.Perhapsbecausethisstageisthemostpoliticalintermsofdeal-makingamongthe
narrowestsetofactors,onemightbetemptedtoarguethatcriticalfeministcareethicswouldfindit
difficulttogainpurchaseatthisstage.However,thedecision-makingstagewouldbenolessaltered
bycareethicsthantheotherstagesofpublicpolicy.Thequestionofpolicydecision-makingcanbe
understoodasaquestionabouthowanygiveninstitutioncanbeheldresponsibleforaddressinga
particularsocialproblem.Thisquestionaboutinstitutionalresponsibilityinpoliticsisoftentiedup
withideologicalpoliticalideasabouttheroleofthestate,andwhatwemeanwhenwechargethat
aninstitutionsuchasagovernmentis‘responsiblefor’publicgoods.Thismeansthatthecaring
practiceofresponsibilityisanexcellentlensthroughwhichtoviewthedecisionmakingstage.For
example,careethicscanbeusedinthedecision-makingstagetohelpclarifythescopeof
governmentalresponsibility,andhowgovernmentalinstitutionsalreadydeeplyshapepeople’slives,
allowingfor‘privilegedirresponsibility,’63whichisaproblemcareethicscanbeusedtodirectly
confront.
62
VazquezandDelaplace,35.
Inbrief,‘privilegedirresponsibility’istheideathatsomepersons(aswellassomeinstitutionsinthiscase)
aregivena‘pass’fromdoingtheworkofcarebecausetheirpaidworkismoreimportant.Further,privileged
persons,becauseoftheirfinancialsecurity,areoftennotawareoftheamountofcareworkthattheyrely
upon.Formoreon‘privilegedirresponsibly’seeChapterOne.
63
145
Tounderstandmorefullyhowcareethicscanbehelpfulinthisstage,wemustconsiderthe
differenttheoriesthathavebeenusedtounderstandhowapublicpolicydecisionismade.First,
thereistherationalchoicemodel,whereactors(legislators,boardmembers,thosewhomakethe
choiceaboutwhatpolicytopursue)arethoughttomaximizebenefitsandminimizecostsonrational
groundswhendecidingonpolicy.64Second,thereistheincrementalmodel,where“decision-making
isapoliticalprocesscharacterizedbybargainingandcompromiseamongself-interesteddecisionmakers.”65Changestothestatusquoareseenasbeingincrementalinnature,achievedwithahigh
degreeofbargainingandcompromisenotnecessarilyrelatedtotherationalchoiceor‘bestsolution.’
Third,themixedscanningmodelcombinesboththerationalchoiceandincrementalmodels,taking
thebestaspectsofboth(therationalityandtheincrementaltypeofchange)whilediscardingthe
troublesomeones(thelimitedscopeofrationalunderstanding),butultimatelyisunsatisfactoryto
manypolicytheorists.66Thesefirstthreekindsofdecision-makingprocessesallmaintainafocuson
achievingthebest‘technicalsolution,’whichrunsparalleltothehumanrightsviewofdecisionmakingasnotedabove.Theproblemhereisthattheserepresentshallowunderstandingsofhow
anydecisionismadeinahighlypoliticalprocess.Fourth,andmosthelpful,thereisthe‘garbagecan’
model,whichembracestheirrationalityofthedecision-makingprocess:“…decisionmaking[is]a
highlyambiguousandunpredictableprocessonlydistantlyrelatedtosearchingformeanstoachieve
goals.”67Thegarbagecanmodelemphasized,andpavedthewayforothertheoriestoencompass,
theideathat“decision-makingoftentendstooccurinmultiplelocationsorvenues,eachwitha
distinctsetofactors,rulesofprocedure,andabilitytoinfluencetheoutcomeofadecisionprocess
inapreferreddirection.”68Thesevenuesarenotstatic,whichcreatesmanydifferentpointsof
contactfordecision-making.
Whatthe‘garbagecan’modelallowsustounderstandisthatdecision-makingishighly
political,andboundedbyrulesandprocedures.Inaddition,politicalactorsarenotmerelyrational
benefitmaximizers,buthumanbeingswhohaveideologicalassumptionsabouttheroleof
government.Inparticular,thereareassumptionsaboutwhatagovernmentcanandshouldbe
responsibleforwhenitcomestothelivesofthoseaffectedbyitspolicies.Caretheory’spracticeof
responsibilitycanbeusedtoclarifyinwhatwayinstitutions,particularlystateinstitutions,are
responsible,andtocombatsomeoftheharmfulideologicalnotionsaboutgovernancethatallows
thegovernmentitselftomakepolicyfromaplaceofprivilegedirresponsibility.Theproblemisthat
64
HowlettandRamesh,167.
Ibid.,170.
66
Ibid.,173.
67
Ibid.,175.
68
Ibid.,178.
65
146
governmentsmakepolicyaboutcareworkandthosewhoperformthelabourofcarewithoutusing
caretheorytofullyunderstandtheissuesathandorthestakesthatareinvolvedwithsuchdecisions,
whichoftenservetokeeptheconcernsofcareintheprivaterealm.
Onekindofresponsibility,whichadherestothestate,isonethatcompelsthestateto
addresssocialproblemsinanattentiveway.However,itisimportanttonotethatbecausesome
socialproblemsarenotdirectlyaboutthecitizensofastate(suchasforeignworkerswhoare
especiallyvulnerableandtargetsofpolicy,particularlyimmigrationpolicy),thisresponsibilitycannot
beexclusivelydirectedtowardcitizensofaparticularstate,orweruntheriskofperpetuating
harmfulpatternsofexclusion.Thiskindofresponsibilityisonethatcallsforanattentive,engaged
responsetoanyproblemthatarises.Thisresponsibilityisdemandingbecauseevenwhenthestate
attemptstodisengageitselffromthelivesofindividualsasmuchaspossible,thatverynoninvolvementcanservetoshapethelivesofindividualsintheirrelationshipswithparticularothers.
Forexample,ifitisstatepolicytonotbecomeinvolvedindomesticdisputes,thatverylackof
engagementwithabusers,victims,andwithsocialnormsaroundgenderandviolence,codifiesitasa
privateproblemwhereinthoseresponsibleforsolvingtheproblemareonlyprivateindividuals.
Usingthelensofcare,itbecomespossibletoseethewaysinwhichthestatestructuresandshapes
ourrelationshipswithparticularothers.Thus,thekindofresponsibilitythatbearsuponthestateto
addresssocialproblemsisonethatisborneoutoftheunderstandingthatthestatestructures
humanlivesregardlessofwhatitdoes.Policymakinginstitutionshavearesponsibilitytousetheir
authorityandwide-sweepingpowertocombatsocialproblemsinsteadofmaintainavantageof
whatis,essentially,privilegedirresponsibility.Governmentscanmaintainsuchapositionpredicated
onthenotionthattheimportanceandseriousnessof‘actual’governmentdemandsmoreattention
andconcernthansocialproblemslikedomesticviolence,thecrisisofcare,orevenwealthinequality,
disregardingthefactthatgovernmentinvolvement(ornon-involvement)isintegraltoshapingthe
worldwelivein,especiallywhetheritfostersorfightspatternsofinstitutionalprivileged
irresponsibility.69
Section 2.4 – Policy Implementation
Duringthedesignandimplementationstageiswhenthehumanrightsperspectiveisinmostconflict
withthedrivetobeascosteffectiveaspossible.Althoughthedesignprocesswillhavedifferent
outcomesforanygivenhumanright,oneoftheaidsinpolicydesignisaLogicalFrameworkMatrix
(LFM)whichmapsoutthepointsofnegotiationbetweentheobjectivesofthepolicy(ahumanright)
69
Sevenhuijsenetal.,316.
147
andthepracticalconsiderationsofpolicy.TheLFMhelpspolicymakersweightheactions,
components,purpose,andgoalsofpolicyasoutlinedbyahumanrightagainsttherisksofthepolicy
andhowapolicywillbeevaluated.70Theideaisthatsincetheendgoalofanypublicpolicyisthe
fulfilmentofahumanright,alltheotherfactorsinvolvedwilltakeonahumanrightsperspective,
whichwillenablehumanrightsindicatorstobeestablished.71Usingthehumanrighttoeducationas
anexample,becausetheendgoalisensuringtheeducationofcitizensmeetsacertainstandard,the
designprocesswillincorporatewaystomeasuretheeducationofstudents(suchasstandardized
testing),toevaluatetheeffectivenessofcertaineducationalpractices(suchasteacherperformance
evaluations),andtoanticipatesomeoftherisksassociatedwithpubliceducation(suchasoverly
investedparents).
However,becausethefocusonhumanrightsasenactedthroughgovernmentactionis
largelyconcernedwiththebenefitofitsowncitizens,thismeansthatoftennon-citizentarget
groups,especiallytransnationalmigratorycareworkers(i.e.thosewhoparticipateinthe‘globalcare
chain’72)areacteduponbypolicy,notactedwithinordertoaddresstherealconcernsandproblems
facedbythepeopleintheseprecarioussituations.Theyareexcludedfrommuchofthepolicy
processandassuchwhenpolicyimplementationoccurs,theyareatargetgroupofpolicywithout
anysayinhowthatpolicyaffectstheirlives.Further,becausecareworkersareoftenexcludedfrom
thepolicyprocess,thisservestoalsoexcludeideasaboutcareitselffromtheprocess.Theexclusion
ofcare(andthosewhoengageincare)fromlargerpublicdebatesisjuxtaposedwiththevitalcaring
needs,particularlyintheWesternworldwithitsagingpopulations,withwomenwhoaretorn
betweenthelabourmarketandcareworkathome,andnormsaboutmasculinitythatallowformen
toavoidfullandequalparticipationintheworkofcare.Inspiteoftheneedweallhaveforcare,
andthepolicydocumentsthatseektofindwaystoprovideitforcitizens,suchdocumentsdonot
acknowledgedeeplyimportantquestionsaboutcareitself.
Aspreviouslynoted,humanrightshavecometobeembodiedthroughpublicpolicyandare
nowmorethanbulwarksagainstillegitimategovernmentaction.Further,ideasaboutinclusionare
70
VazquezandDelaplace,50-1.
Ibid.,51.
72
GlobalcarechainsarediscussedmoredirectlyinChapterTwo.Inbrief,itreferstothewayinwhichcare
shortagesintheWesternworlddrawin(mostly)womenfromothernationstoperformcarework,as
professionalsorasinformalservants.Thesemigrantwomenoftenleavefamilybehind,whomustbecaredfor
byothers,eitherhiredbythemigrantworkerorbyotherextendedfamilymembers.Regardless,onceagainit
ismostlywomenwhocareforthefamilythathasbeenleftbehind.Thisiscalledthe‘globalcarechain’where
acaredemandinonepartoftheworldprecipitatescaredemandsinanotherpartoftheworld.Formoreon
globalcarechains,seeHochschild(2002).
71
148
often“graftedontoanotionofcitizenshipintermsofrights.”73Inconflatinghumanrightswith
citizenshiprights,governmentscreatecategoriesthatallownoncitizenstobeexcludedfromthe
rightsprovidedtocitizens.74Thismeansthosepersonsinliminalsituations,likethetransnational
migrantworker,areoftenexcludedfromhumanrightsfulfilmentbecausegovernmentsrestrict
thoserightstocitizens,andthuscanfindtheprotectionoftheirhumanrightsseverelycompromised.
Theexclusionoftransnationalcareworkers,throughpublicpolicy,canalsoservetoreinforcethe
invisibilityofcareanddeepeninequalitybetweenthepeoplewhoconsumecare(i.e.payforit)and
thosewhoprovidecare.Publicpolicybasedonhumanrightsisconcernedwiththehumanrightsof
thecitizensoftheparticularstatethatmakesthepolicy,andassuchoftenoverlookstheeffects
suchpoliciescanhaveonforeignnationalslivingwithstateborders,ordistantstrangerslivingin
otherstates.Assuch,thesepoliciesservetoreinforcetwoformsofinequality,thatof“the
devaluationandinvisibilityoftheprivatecare-domainanditssubserviencetothepublicworldof
work,and[…]thetranslationoftheunequalrelationsofpersonalinterdependencyintotheunequal
relationsoftransnationalinterdependency.”75Withoutwomenfromothernationswillingtoleave
theirhomesanddothevitalworkofcaring,Westernnationswouldbeinanevendeepercrisisof
carethantheycurrentlyare.Toallowsuchastateofaffairstoremainunexaminedand
unchallengedismorallyandpoliticallyproblematic.Additionally,theethicsofcarecanincorporate
theunderstandingthatitisnotjustgender,butalsothatgeopoliticalandradicalizeddifferences
contributetothecontinuedabilityofthewealthyandpowerfultoimportandconsumecaring
labour.Thisintersectionofgender,race,andnationalitymatterbecauseaccordingtoa2013report
bytheInternationalLabourOrganization,17percentofinternationaldomesticworkersaremen.76
Suchmenaremarkedbytheirdifferentracializationandgeopoliticalorigin,andassuchare
‘acceptable’domesticworkers.However,whenraceintersectswithgender,theethicsofcare
investigateswhy,inspiteofbeing‘acceptable’domesticworkers,maledomesticworkersareviewed
73
SelmaSevenhuijsen,"CaringintheThirdWay:TheRelationbetweenObligation,ResponsibilityandCarein
ThirdWayDiscourse,"CriticalSocialPolicy20,no.5(2000):21.
74
OnemightsuggestthatIamnotgivingdueconsiderationtothedifferencebetweenhumanrightsand
citizenrights.WhileIamawareofthevastamountofliteraturediscussingthedifferencesbetweenhuman
rightsandcitizenrights,thatisoutsidemyscopehere.Mypointisthateventhoughtransnationalworkersare
understoodtohavehumanrights,theirpositioncanbesoprecariousthathumanrightsalonearenotenough
tounderstandthewaysinwhichtheyaremadevulnerable.Theyareoftenexcludedfromformsofpubliclife,
andtheirdifferencefromcitizensisoftenconstructedasafailingthatallowsthemtobelegislatedupon
withoutdueconsiderationfortheirlivedexperienceandinlightofthecaringresponsibilitiestheyhave
towardsparticularothers,suchasfamilyintheirhomecountry.
75
Williams,"TowardsaTransnationalAnalysisofthePoliticalEconomyofCare,"25.
76
RachelH.Brown,"Re-ExaminingtheTransnationalNanny,"InternationalFeministJournalofPolitics18,no.2
(2015):213.
149
withsuspicionorfaceseriouschallengestofindingwork.77Suchattitudestowardmaledomestic
workershighlightthecontinuedproblematicassociationofwomen,femininity,andcare.Ifcarewas
notconsidered‘women’swork’maledomesticworkerswouldnotfacesuchstigmaordifficultyin
obtainingworkinthefirstplace,althoughtheywouldstillbeinscribedwithracialandnational
differencesthatlabelthemas‘care-providers’ratherthan‘care-consumers’.
Adeeperexplorationoftheproblemsfacedbytransnationalmigrantworkerswillserveto
drawoutmoreclearlyhowpolicycanfostertheexclusionofcareworkersandcareworkitself.
Transnationalmigrantworkers,especiallythosewhoworkincaringprofessionsorthosewhotake
updomesticwork,oftenwithinthehomeoftheiremployer,andundertightcontrolsfromthehost
government.Canada’sLive-inCarerProgramdemonstrateshowhostnationsinviteforeign
nationalstofulfiladesperatecaringneed,buttheydosowithoutprovidingthosevitalworkersthe
full,materialprotectionsofcitizenship.Suchpersonsaregiven‘partialcitizenship,’whichgrants
formalaccesstorightsbutduetothe‘pointsbased’two-yearpathtowardsfullcitizenship,makes
enforcingorfulfillingtheirhumanrightsproblematic.Thereisalackofoversight,especiallywith
regardtomonitoringforabusesandtheenforcementofcontracts.78Thispartialcitizenshipis
particularlyproblematicbecausethosewhoonlyhavepartialcitizenshiparenotfullyintegratedinto
theirhoststatenoraretheyfullyprotectedbytheirhomestate.Thisexclusionisbroughtaboutby
publicpolicydesignedtofulfilthehumanrightsofthecitizen,andpointstothefactthat“traditional
conceptsofrights,justiceandcitizenshipmaybeinadequatetoaddressthecontemporary
challengesofcareandwell-beingatthetransnationalscale.”79Additionally,immigrantsareoften
putinthepositionofbeingmadetodemonstratethattheydeservetobeincluded,notexcluded,
whenitcomestopolicyprotection.Thenotionofwho‘deserves’theprotectionofthestatecanput
anundueburdenonthosewhomightnotcompetentlyspeakthehostlanguageorunderstandthe
bureaucracyofthehoststate.80Thisquestionof‘deserving’canthenfurtherreinforcetheconcept
ofincludedandexcludedgroups.Notionsaroundwhyorwhynotanindividual‘deserves’the
protectionsofthehoststatecanbeparticularlyproblematicwhenthepolicyofthehostcountryisin
placetofulfilagapintheprovisionofcare,consideringthevitalrolecareplaysineveryone’slives.
77
AsterGeorgoHaileandKarinAstridSiegmann,"MasculinityatWork:IntersectionalityandIdentity
ConstructionsofMigrantDomesticWorkersintheNetherlands,"inMigration,GenderandSocialJustice:
PerspectivesonHumanInsecurity,ed.Thanh-DamTruong,etal.(NewYork:Springer,2013),115.
78
ChristinaGabriel,"MigrationandGlobalizedCareWork:TheCaseofInternationallyEducatedNursesin
Canada,"inFeministEthicsandSocialPolicy:TowardsaNewGlobalPoliticalEconomyofCare,ed.Rianne
MahonandFionaRobinson(Vancouver:UniversityofBritishColumbiaPress,2011),54-5.
79
RianneMahonandFionaRobinson,"Introduction,"ibid.,13.
80
JoanC.Tronto,"AFeministDemocraticEthicsofCareandGlobalCareWorkers:Citizenshipand
Responsibility,"ibid.,173.
150
Thisliminalspaceaffordedtocareproviders,then,caninturncontinuetofosterthe
exclusionofcareprovidersandcarereceiversfrombeingseenas‘fullparticipatingcitizens.’First,
thosewhoprovidecarearetreatedpoorly,excludedfromfullcitizenship,orassumedtobecarersin
virtueoftheirgenderstatus.Second,thosewhoreceivecareareoftenconstructedas‘dependent’
uponthesysteminordertohavetheirhumanrightsfulfilled.Thesetwoaspectscombineto
demonstratethathumanrightsbasedpublicpolicycanexcludecarersandcarereceiversfrombeing
‘fullparticipatingcitizens,’becausetheirpreoccupationwithcare(providingorreceiving)renders
themunabletofullyparticipateinthepublic,politicalsphere.81Whencareremainsaprivate
concernforLive-inCarers,orthefamily(andthusforwomen),questionsabouthowwecare,whom
wecarefor,whodoesthecaring,andalltheassumptionssuchquestionsentail,arelefttotheside,
unansweredandoverlookedinpublicdiscussions.
Thelensofcarecanofferparticularinsightsintothepolicyimplementationstage,
particularlyaroundrelationsofpowerbetweenthosewhoenactandimplementpolicyandthose
whoarethetargetsofpolicy.Inparticular,itcaninterrogatethereasonswhymorepowerfultarget
groupslikebusinessesmighthavemoreofasayinwhatpoliciesareimplementeduponthem,
wherebusinessesandpolicymakersmightactinconcert,comparedtothetargetgroupsthatoften
lackimmediatepowerandinfluenceinthepolicyprocess.Theethicsofcarecanalsoprovide
guidanceforhowtargetgroupsareapproachedandtreatedbypolicymakersandthosewho
implementthepolicy,becausethepolicyimplementationstageiswherethethreepracticesofcare
cometogethermoststronglyasaguideforactioninpublicadministration.
Critical,feministcareethics,becauseitisprimarilyconcernedwithrelationshipsandthe
structuresofpowerthatcanunderlieandshaperelationships,requiresattentiontobepaidtoall
thecomponentsoftherelationship.Thismeansthatthelensofcarewouldrequireananalysisof
policyimplementationtobemindfulofmechanismsofimplementationmorebroadly,atthelevelof
administratorsandmanagers,aswellasbeingawareofhowtheday-to-dayprocessesof
implementationoccuratthelevelofindividualpersons.Tobecertain,thecomponentofcareethics
thatisconcernedwithoutcomeswouldbegearedtowardunderstandinghowpolicyactuallyaffects
concreteindividualsinthecontextoftheirrelationships.82Forexample,doesanewfamilyleave
policymakeiteasierfornewparentstocarefortheirchildren,makeitmoredifficult,orserveonly
toreinforcegendernormsaboutcaregiving?Yet,thisdoesnotmeanthatthelensofcareethics
wouldbenarrowlyfocusedonthesmallscale.Theethicsofcareisaflexibletool,abletoscaleupor
downasneeded.Onthelevelofadministrationandmanagement,theethicsofcarewouldinquire
81
YukiTsuji,"ReimaginedIntimateRelations:ElderandChildCareinJapansincethe1990s,"ibid.,112.
Sevenhuijsenetal.,317.
82
151
aboutandguidewider-reachingdecisionsaboutimplementationsoastobeawareoftherelations
ofpowerbetweentheinstitutionandthetargetgroup.Institutions,andespeciallygovernments,
canandshouldbemindfuloftherelationsofpowerwithinwhichweallexist.Often,stateshavea
greatdealofpoweroverothers,particularlythosewhoaremostvulnerable,andthereforeshould
actwithgreaterlevelsofcautioninordertoavoidpaternalisticorexploitativeactions.Examining
thepowerrelationsatplaycan“contributetoexposingoppression,repressionandsystematicforms
ofdominanceandassistinwaysofreversingthese.”83Thequestionofwhoholdsthegreaterparity
ofpowerwhenimplementingpolicycanbemadeclearusingthelensofcareethics,andhowthat
powerisusedmustbecarefullyconsideredtofosteraresponsibleuseofpowerforthebetterment
ofpeopleandtherelationshipspeoplemaintain.
Policyimplementationisalsowherethethreepracticesofcarecometogethermoststrongly.
Attentiveness,responsibility,andresponsivenessareallpracticesthatwouldservetoaidcivil
servantsastheyperformtheworkofadministeringpolicytoatargetgroup,especiallythepractices
asarticulatedbyRobinson.Thesepracticeswouldneedtobecomeembeddedinthevarious
implementationstylesthatinstitutionsutilizeinordertoadministerpolicytotheirtargetgroups.
Thesedifferentmethodsresultfromthemanyconstrainingfactors,suchasthenumberofagencies
involved,targetgroupsize,andthesocial,economic,politicalandtechnologicalconditionsthatall
institutionsfacewhendoingpolicy.84Theseconstrainingfactorscanaffectpolicy,andarepartof
thesystemthatpolicy-makersandimplementersmustworkwithin.Differentimplementationstyles
canalsoplayaroleindeterminingwhatkindsofinstrumentsareusedtoimplementpolicy,which
canbeunderstoodasrangingfromregulations,tosubsidies,todirectprovisions,toinformation
dissemination,andfinallytoinstitutionalreorganization,suchasmovingtasksfromonedepartment
toanother.85Yet,regardlessofthepolicystyle,orregardlessoftheconstraintswithinwhichpolicy
implementationoperates,thepracticesofcarecanstillbeofgreatbenefittothosewhoarethe
targetsofpolicy,aswellasausefulguideforthosewhoimplementthepolicy.Returningto
Hankivsky’sexampleofthevictimsofinstitutionalabuseatresidentialschools,manyofthesurvivors
wereabletotelltheirstoriesandexpresshowtheirexperienceoftheabuseshapedtheirlivesand
continuestoshapetheirrelationshipswithfriendsandfamily,whichhelpedtoexpiatesomeofthe
traumaoftheirexperiences.86Theemphasisonlisteningtothesurvivorswasprioritizedbecause
theCanadiangovernmentworkedtoavoidpaternalisticattitudes,listenedtothosewhomthepolicy
wasintendedtohelp,assumedresponsibilityfortheircompensation,andwasresponsivetothe
83
Sevenhuijsen,CitizenshipandtheEthicsofCare:FeministConsiderationsonJustice,Morality,andPolitics,66.
HowlettandRamesh,191-3.
85
Ibid.,203-4.
86
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,70-1.
84
152
sufferingofthesurvivorswhenthepolicywasimplemented.Thiswasbynomeansaperfect
process.Policyisneveraperfectprocess,butthisparticularpolicywasvastlysuperiortoabare
acknowledgementoftheirsuffering.Byacknowledgingthatthetargetgroupofmostpoliciesare
actualhumanbeingswhoareembeddedwithinwebsofrelationships,caringpolicyimplementation
isamoreholistic,87albeitmorecomplicatedprocess.Althoughtheprocessmightbemore
complicated,itcouldalsoproducegreaterbenefitsforthosetargetgroups,becausesuchpersons
nowhavemorestabilityandaremoreproductive,theycandirectlyfosterwidersocialstabilityand
productivity.
Additionally,wemustbeawarethatindividualsarenottheonlyoneswhoarethetargetsof
policy.Oftenthefamilyorlocalcommunitiesarepolicytargets.However,businessesandother,
formalorganizationsareoftenregulatedorgivensubsidiesforvariouseconomicandpolitical
reasons.Careethicscouldprovidevaluableinsightsintowhycertaininterestsareprioritized,aswell
asprovidingguidanceforhowtoresisttheconsuminginterestsofmoneyandthepoweritbringsby
questioninghowpoliciesthatshapebusinesspracticesbenefitorharmconcretepersonswithintheir
websofrelations.Forexample,alawthatdisallowsworker’sunionsmightbearguedtobeofgreat
economicbenefit,ontheassumptionthatlessregulationcanspurgreatergrowth,andthusmore
wealth.Acareethicsanalysismayrevealsuchclaimsasspurious.Forexample,thewealthcreated
insuchamannerisoftennotevenlydistributed,sothegreaterwealthinquestionisnotbeneficial
toallpersons.Weakerunionsalsocorrelatetolessworkerprotection,higherinsecurity,anda
negativeimpactupontherelationshipstheworkerstrytomaintain.Alternately,environmental
protectionlawscanputagreaterstrainonbusinesses.Yet,suchlawscanbethecatalystfornew
technologyaswellasunderwritingtheimportanceofacleanenvironmentforthecontinuedhealth
ofhumanbeingsandotherlifeonthisplanet.Theseexampleshelptodemonstratethatpolicy,no
matteritstarget,hasadeepimpactonindividualswithinandoutsideofstateborders.Howwe
implementpolicy,allkindsofpolicy,canultimatelyhaveitseffectsfeltinallourlives,inhowwe
workandlivetogether.
Section 2.5 – Policy Evaluation
Onahumanrightsaccount,evaluatingthesuccessorfailureofanypolicycan,atabasiclevel,be
understoodasthefulfilmentornon-fulfilmentofahumanright.Thisbasicunderstandingcanbe
brokendownintocertainkindsofindicatorsofsuccess:structural,process,andresultbased.
Structuralindicatorsrefertolegalcodesandinstitutionsconformingtoorfacilitatingthefulfilment
87
Byholistic,Imeanthattheethicsofcaremaintainsafocusonpolicytreatingthepersonmoreholistically.
153
ofhumanrights.88Processindicators“seektomeasurethequalityandmagnitudeoftheState’s
efforttoimplementrights.”89Progressindicatorsmeasurethereachofthepolicyandwhetherit
encompassesallthenecessaryfunctionsinordertofulfiltheright.Resultsindicatorsreflectthe
actualimpactofthepolicyonrealpersons.90Forexample,therighttoeducationcouldbemeasured
bywhatlawsareinplacethatfacilitatechildrengaininganeducation(structure),howmucheffort
thestateexertsinprovidingtheeducation(process),andhowwelleducatedchildrenactuallyare
oncetheirschoolingiscompleted(results).Anotherinterestingpointisthatoneofthewaysin
whichsomemeasurehumanrightsfulfilmentisbythekindsofpoliciesthatgovernmentsenact.
Measuringaggregatehumanrightsthroughpolicyisanindirectmeasure,tobesure,butthe
statisticsgatheredbypolicyimplementationandevaluationcanbeusedasa“suitableproxy
[measure]tocapturethedegreetowhichstatesareimplementing[humanrights]obligations.”91
Thesekindsofaggregate,indirectmeasurescanbeusedtodemonstratethedegreetowhich
governments“arecommittedtoputtinginplacethekindsofresourcesneededtohavea‘rightsprotectiveregime’inplace.”92
However,howweunderstandthesuccessorfailureofanypolicybyhumanrightsstandards
doesnotnecessarilytakeintoaccountthefactthatitcanleaveproblematicsocialnormsintact,
particularlyaboutrace,gender,andcarework,whichinturnundercutsthebasicequalitywhich
humanrightsaremeanttoembody.Eventhemetricsthatareusedtomeasuredevelopmentcan
incorporateabiasagainstcareworkitself,consideringallin-home,family-consumedcareworktobe
unimportantwhenitcomestoeconomicreportingandaccounting.Thiscanservetorendercare
work,andtheworkersthemselves,invisibletopublicpolicymetrics.93Inlargepart,thisisbecause
humanrights,andthepublicpolicyitinspires,chargesthatallindividualsshouldbetreatedas‘the
same,’butthelingeringquestionremains:thesameaswhom?Whatmodelofindividualisour
‘standard’?AsOlenaHankivskyargues,feministcritiqueshavedemonstratedthatthestandardfor
equalitycomparisonshas“usuallybeenaveryspecific,historicallyprivilegedgroupinsociety–white,
able-bodied,middle-classmales.”94Becausewhitemenareoftenthe‘norm’againstwhichother
equalityclaimsareconsidered,publicpolicybasedonthisassumptioncannotencompasscertain
differences,whichoftenrequiredifferentneedstobefulfilled,aswellasallowingcertainsocial
88
VazquezandDelaplace,52.
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
91
ToddLandman,"MeasuringHumanRights:Principle,Practice,andPolicy,"HumanRightsQuarterly26,no.4
(2004):925.
92
Ibid.,926.
93
Waring,35-6.
94
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,45.
89
154
norms,particularlythoseofraceandgender,toremainunexaminedandintact.Whiletheremight
besomecasesandissueswhereauniversalstandardissufficienttoaddresspublicproblems:
[W]omenandmenarenotsimilarlysituatedforthepurposesoflegalequalityrights
interpretation.Becausewomenmaydifferfrommenintheircapacityforchildbearingand
intheirsocio-economicstatus,theremaybenobasisinthemalestandardtoprovethe
inequalitytheymaybeexperiencing.95
Thus,evenifsomeone’shumanrightsarebeingfulfilledbyapublicpolicy,theremightbeother
problemsthatexist,becauseahumanrightsperspectivecannotalways‘see’theproblem,suchas
howthetasksofsocialreproductionareunfairlyallocatedinfamilies,asIarguedinChapterThree.
Further,policybasedonhumanrightsseekstoovercomehistoricaldisadvantageswithoutengaging
withtherootcausesofthosedisadvantagesinthefirstplace.Itisstillthecasethatmostofthe
dependencywork(carework)thatisdone,isperformedbywomenandracializedwomen,whoare
oftentransnationalworkers.96Theunequaldivisionofcaringlabourpersistsinspiteofincreased
participationofwomenintheworkplaceandthepoliciesinplacethatfosterthatparticipation.This
isbecausehumanrightsbasedpublicpolicydoesnotchallengethedeeplyheldandhistorically
situatednormaboutcareworkasbeingtiedtofemininity,andthenormsaroundmenbeing
releasedfromperformingcareworkduetotheirroleasaworkerinthelabourmarket.97When
lookingatglobalcarechains,currenttransnationalmigrationofcareworkfollowshistoricalpatterns
ofexploitation,particularlycolonialization,andinternationalpatternsofracialorethnicdivision.98
Forexample,thehistoryofAfrican-AmericanwomencaringforwhitechildrenintheUnitedStates
reinforcestheperceived‘normality’ofnon-whitewomenemployedtocareforchildrennottheir
own,99whichhasbeenexpandedtoincludewomenfromLatinAmerica,drawingpoorerwomen
frompoorercountriesacrossborders.Thefocusonthebarefulfilmentofanindividual’shuman
rightsdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthehistoricalbackgroundwillceasetohaveanyimpactonour
livesaswelivethem.
Thiskindofoversightcanbeseenintwoexamples,wherethesuccessorfailureofpolicy
wasjudgedwithoutreferencetothecurrentproblematicstructuresofgenderorcare.Thefirst
revisitstheDutchpolicydocumentChoicesinHealthCare,andthesecondfocusesontheSouth
AfricanWhitePaperforSocialWelfare.InthedocumentChoicesinHealthCare,womenplayadual
role.Ontheonehand,women’shealthorganizationswereinvitedtoparticipateinthecampaign
95
Ibid.,46.
Ibid.,112.
97
Sevenhuijsen,"CaringintheThirdWay:TheRelationbetweenObligation,ResponsibilityandCareinThird
WayDiscourse,"23.
98
Erel,9.
99
LiseWiddingIsaksen,SambasivanUmaDevi,andArlieRussellHochschild,"GlobalCareCrisis:AProblemof
Capital,CareChain,orCommons?,"AmericanBehavioralScientist52,no.3(2008):407.
96
155
becausetheywereseenas“thevanguardsofautonomyandfreechoice[inhealthcareprovision],as
opposedtomedicalization.”100However,priortothatpoint,inthisdocumentwomenwere
addressedaspersonswhomanageandinfluencetheconsumptionofcarewithinthefamilyunit,so
whilewomen’shealthorganizationswereseenaspoliticalactors,womeningeneralwerecastin
theirtraditionalroleasfacilitatingorcaringfortheirfamilymembers.101Althoughthepolicy
documentisprimarilyconcernedwithhowtoensurethattheelderly’shumanrighttohealthcareis
fulfilled,itdoessobyacceptingtheroleofwomenascarers,drawingonthe“silentlogicofa
‘natural’provisionofcarewithinthefamilyandkinshipnetworks.”102Evenifthepolicywere
successfulonthegroundsthatitincreasedthequalityofeldercare,itwillhavedonesobyutilizing
theassumednaturalnessofpairingwomenandcarework.
ThesecondexamplecomesfromanexaminationoftheWhitePaperforSocialWelfare
(WPSW)fromSouthAfrica.Writtenin1996,thedocumentexpressesastrongcommitmentto
humanrights,andevenaprofessedcommitmenttotheethicsofcare(althoughthecommitment
wasnotcarriedoutinrelationtothewaysocialwelfarewasconceived).103Throughoutthe
document,therearediscussionsaboutcareprovisionandtheimportantrolecareplaysinthelives
ofcitizens.However,theWPWScontainscontradictorylanguageconcerningwomenandcare,
whichleadstotwoproblems.First,caregivingispresentedasagender-neutralactivity,which
ignoresthepervasivegendereddivisionswithinthefamilyunit.Second,itsinglesoutwomenasa
‘specialgroup’thathasparticulartiestocareworkandshouldbesupportedinthatendeavour.
Concerningthefirstproblem,theWPSWwasinformedbyafamilialunderstandingofcare,suchthat
caregivingwasthemainfocus,andthatcaregivingwaslargelycarriedoutwithintheprivatesphere
amongkin-groups.Additionally,inthechapterofthedocumentaboutcare“familylifeisdescribed
ingender-neutral,functionalistandmoralterms.”104Thesilenceregardingthefactthatwomenstill
dothemajorityofthecareworkisproblematic,obscuringpervasivegenderdivisionsinspiteofa
formalgender-neutrality.Itisonlyinalaterchapter,aboutwomeninparticular,thatthisgendered
divisionoflabourisaddressed.Yet,thereisnothinginthepolicyaboutrethinkingthedivisionof
carework,butinsteadthedocumentarguesthatwomen“shouldbesupportedintheircaringroles
withoutthegenderdivisionincarebeingquestionedinthelightofgenderjusticeorofpromoting
caregivingasanaspectofthequalityofmen’slives.”105Onceagain,thereisarealproblemwithin
100
Sevenhuijsen,CitizenshipandtheEthicsofCare:FeministConsiderationsonJustice,Morality,andPolitics,
127.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.,131.
103
Sevenhuijsenetal.,301-2.
104
Ibid.,306.
105
Ibid.,307.
156
thedocumentastohowitseekstoresolvetheconflictbetweentheunequaldivisionofcareanda
commitmenttothefulfilmentofhumanrights.Thesecondproblemcanbeseenthroughoutthe
document,becausewomenaredepictedasa‘specialgroup’withtheneedforspecialprotections
againstdomesticabuses,supportintheircaringroles,andasagroupvulnerabletoHIVtransmission.
However,thedocumentdoesnotdiscussmen’srolesandtheconstructionsofmasculinitythat
necessitatetheneedforsuchprotections.ThisinvisibilityofmenwithintheWPWSunderliesthe
problemwithhowpolicyconcernedwithhumanrightsfulfilmentdoessoonthegroundsof
protectingwomensothattheyareabletofunctionwithinsocietyonthemodeloftheself-reliant
andindependentcitizenthatmenalreadyareassumedtohold.106Thispolicycouldalsoachievea
successfulevaluationwhilestillperpetuatingthenormsaroundgenderandcarethatworktokeep
womenandcarefromfullpoliticalconsideration.
Conversely,critical,feministcareethicscanbeintegratedintopolicyevaluation,
transforminghowweunderstandthesuccessorfailureofanygivenpolicy.Thistransformation
wouldnoteraseimportantfeaturesofpolicyevaluation,butwouldaltercollectiveprioritiesabout
policyandcareitself.Theethicsofcarewouldaskofanypolicywhetheritaidedpeopletolive
withinparticularrelationsofcarewithoutreinforcingharmfulpatternsofpower,particularlythose
ofraceandgender.Policycanthenfailifitservestoentrenchharmfulrelationsofpower,or
underminesthecaringrelationsinwhichpeopleareembedded.Policy,throughtheunderstanding
ofcareethics,wouldbesuccessfulifitworkedtochallengeoroverturnharmfulsocialnormsor
oppressiverelationsofpower.Acareevaluationofpolicywould,aswiththeotherpolicystages,
investigateassumptionsaboutwhatmakesgoodpolicy,theroleofstateinvolvement,andthe
practicesweusetoimplementpolicy.Althoughtherearethreemainmethodsofpolicyevaluation
(judicial,politicalandadministrative),107Ishallfocusontheadministrativemethodofpolicy
evaluationbecausetheseevaluationsareaprimetargetforthelensofcareethics.Judicial
evaluation(i.e.judicialreview),thoughitcanbepowerfulandsweeping,israreandoften
contentious.Politicalevaluation(i.e.votinginelections)isoftenfleeting,anddoesnotnecessarily
accuratelyreflectthesuccessorfailureofpolicy.Administrativeevaluation,however,isadriving
forceofwhetherapolicyisterminatedorfedbackthroughthepolicycycleforfurtherrefinement.
Administrativeevaluationsaregenerallymoreconcernedwithexaminingthedeliveryofservices
and“…whetherornot‘valueformoney’isbeingachieved.”108Thesekindsofevaluationsare
typicallybaseduponafinancialcost-benefitmodelandconsiderwhatthepolicyactuallyproduced,
106
Ibid.,311-2.
HowlettandRamesh,214-5.
108
Ibid.,210.
107
157
ifthepolicymetthestatedgoals,howmucheffortthepolicyrequired,andanefficiencyevaluation
ofthepolicyadministrationprocesses.109
Whilecareethicsmustbesensitivetothefactthatthereisalimitedamountofresources,it
wouldbeabletoquestionandchallengetheideathatafinancialcost-benefitanalysisshouldhave
prideofplaceamongadministrativeconcerns.Forexample,whenlookingattheoutcomesofthe
deinstitutionalizationofhealthcareinCanada,policy-makersprioritizedcostsavingasametricof
evaluationforhowwellthepolicyworked.Unfortunately,familiesandcommunitieswere“neither
preparednorabletoprovidethecareandservicesneededtorespondtothisshift,”whichmeant
thatinmanyinstances“thispolicychangeisincreasingratesofmorbidityandmortalityamong
patientsaswellasamongtheircaregivers.”110Instead,careethicscanbeusedtoexpandthelistof
recognizedcostsandbenefits(thetangibleandintangible)tocreateamoreholisticbalancing
exercise.111Anevaluationthatincorporatedtheinformationprovidedbycareethics,andits
practices,wouldbesensitivetothefinancialneedsofthestate,butwouldresistsavingmoneyatthe
expenseofrealhumanlives,notonlyintermsoflossoflife,butlossofopportunityandtheabilityof
caregiverstomakelifechoiceswell.Also,careethicswouldrequireagreaterawarenessofthefact
thatcaregiversforin-homepatientswouldlikelybewomen,orhiredhelp(whowouldlikelybenonCaucasianpersonsorforeignnationals).Thispolicy,asitstands,servestoreinforcetheideathat
carecanandshouldbeaprivateconcern,andthatpolicyis,ingeneralunconcerned,withwho
shoulderstheburdenofcare,onceagainmarginalizingwomenandracializedpersons,aswellas
furtherobscuringthosewhoaredependentuponcare.Whencareisplacedintheprivatesphereit
isremovedfrompublicconsideration,andthosewhoneedandgivecareareoftenremovedfrom
publicconcernaswell:madeinvisibleoncemore.Theethicsofcarewouldnotdiscounteconomic
concerns,butacareevaluationwouldservetomakeclearthateconomicevaluations“fitintoa
widerdecision-makingframe,whereothervaluesandprioritieshaveequalorsometimesmore
importance.”112Careethicsisameansbywhichwecantransformhowweunderstandthesuccess
orfailureofanypolicy,movingbeyondafinancialcost-benefitanalysisastheprimaryconcern,and
focusinginsteadonhowpoliciesimpactpeopleintheircaringrelationships,takingintoaccounthow
variousformsofdifferencesuchasraceandnationaloriginconstitutedifferentconditionsunder
whichcareoccurs,andhowanypolicycanservetoreinforceorfightentrenchedproblematicsocial
norms.
109
Ibid.,211-2.
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,99.
111
Again,holisticforcareethicsmeaningtreatingthepersonmoreholistically.
112
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,100.
110
158
Ihavearguedthatthecritical,feministethicsofcarecanbeasubstantiveguideforthe
publicpolicyprocess,andthatithasthepotentialtotransformthepolicyprocessitself.The
transformativepotentialliesincareethic’sabilitytoexpandthescopeofpublicdiscourseaboutcare,
gender,race,sexualorientation,age,wealth,andcitizenshipstatus.Thisexpansionispossible
becauseofthelensthatcareethicsbringstotheintersectionofsocialnorms,politicalpatternsof
power,andthemarketplace,providingpolicymakerswithnewkindsofinformation.Withthatnew
information,andguidedbythepracticesofcare,policymakerscanusecareethicsinthecraftingof
publicpolicy.Throughtheexamplesusedinthischapter,wecanseehowhumanrightsbasedpolicy
canfailtoencompassorchallengethewaysocialnormsandinstitutionalpatternsofpowercan
servetoperpetuatecurrentpatternsofinequality,creatingafeedbackloopbetweenpolicy,norms,
andthewaypeoplelivetheirlives.Careethicscanbeaguideforhowtobringtheseproblemsinto
therealmofpublicdiscussion,andoffersuggestionsforhowtoshapeourpublicdiscourse.Our
resultantpolicywouldthenbetterenablepeopletoliveintheirwebsofrelations.Thesekindsof
insightsandsuggestionsforactionmightbemorecomplicated,andassuchmoredifficult,butthey
wouldbelongerlasting,deepersolutionsthataddresstherootcausesofsocialproblems.
Thereisafinalchallengethatcareethicsmustanswer.Theethicsofcareisaprofoundly
feministethic,rootedinarejectionof‘individualist’ethicsanddirectlyaimedatdeconstructingthe
normsandrelationsofpowerthatmakethelinkbetweenwomenandcareworkseem‘natural’.
Conversely,KimberlyHutchingscontendsthattheethicsofcareassumesauniversalstandpoint—
thatofcare—whichisinherentlyproblematicforafeministinternationalethicalproject.Her
critiqueinvolvestwoimportantclaims.First,astandpointcannotbeseparatedfromitscontextand
thusisultimatelyunabletobeprescriptive.Second,thestandpointofcaredoesnotattack
embeddednotionsofgendersufficientlyenoughtoconstituteafeministethic.However,inthenext
chapter,IwilldefendcareethicsfromHutchings’feministcritique,arguingthatifwetakeher
criticismseriously,thecritical,feministethicsofcarecanincorporateamorenuancedmethodof
ethicaljudgment.
159
Chapter 6: A Problematic Method?
Inthischapter,Iexamineatensionthatremainsattheheartoftheethicsofcare,andisbest
articulatedbyKimberlyHutchings.Hutchingsinvestigatestheresonancesbetweenthemethodology
ofcareethicsingeneral(the‘orthodox’andcritical,feministversions)andfeministstandpoint
theory,atheorythatarguesthatpreviouslyundervaluedviewpoints(typicallythoseofwomen)
containdifferentandequallyimportantknowledgeabouttheworld.Hercritiqueistwofold:1)that
neithertheorygoesfarenoughtowardeschewinguniversalistclaimstomoralfoundations,which
throwsintoquestiontheabilityofeithertheorytoenablemoraljudgmentsintheparticularand,2)
thatneithertheorysufficientlyaddressesthegenderedideasembeddedinmoralcontexts.This
critiqueisfocusedonthesimilarityofmethodthatcareethicsandstandpointtheoryutilizefortheir
criticalanalyses,andultimatelyconcludesthatthesetypesofmethodsdonothaveenoughforceto
justifymakingmoraljudgments.Toclarify,Iconsiderethicalmethodthewayinwhichwe
investigatemoralorpoliticalcontexts,thestepstakenorquestionsaskedasweanalyseorassess
anygivensituation,asopposedtothecontentortheguidingprinciplesofanethicaltheory.For
Hutchings,methodmatters,andsheseekstofindadifferentkindofethicalmethodthatcan
navigatebetweenallstandpoints,guideourmoraljudgments,andprovideamethodfor
internationalfeministethics.Hutchingsclaimssuchamethodispossibleifonefirsteschewsany
claimstoamoralstartingpoint,beitclaimsabouthumandignity,theexperiencesofwomen,orthe
standpointofcare.TheendgoalforHutchingsisthatethicsbetransformative.Transformativenot
inthesenseofcorrectingforpastmoralwrongs,butinthesensewherecertainkindsofmoral
wrongscannotevenbethoughtofaspossibleinthefirstplace.Hutchingsarguesthatcareethicsis
nottransformativeinthisway,whichshedeemsproblematicforcareethics,fortworeasons.First,
caretheoryprivilegestheuniversalstandpointofcare,andclaimsitisapplicabletoallcontexts.
Second,theethicsofcareinsomesensegiveslegitimacytobadpracticesandnormsbyitsvery
engagementwiththosepracticesandnorms.IfHutchingsiscorrect,thentheabilityofcareethicsto
guideinternationalpolicyisseriouslyhindered.However,intakingHutchings’critiqueseriously,I
arguethatwecanusetheethicsofcaretojudgeacrosscontexts,andthatitstransformative
potentialisnotanullprospectasHutchingsclaims.
Iwillfirstprovideabriefoverviewoffeministstandpointtheoryandelaborateonthe
relationshipbetweenstandpointtheoryandtheethicsofcare.Second,Iexploreanddevelop
Hutchings’critiqueofcareethicsandfeministstandpointtheory,drawingouthowstandpoint
theoryandtheethicsofcarehavesimilarmethodologies,whichallowsHutchings’critiquetohave
160
purchase.Thiscritiqueiscloselytiedtoherpositiveargumentforadifferentandnewkindofethical
methodthatavoidsthepitfallsofstandpointtheoryandthusisabettermethodforengagingin
feministinternationalethics.Myaim,inthischapter,israthernarrow.Insteadofprovidinga
critiqueofHutchings,Idemonstratethatcritical,feministcareethicscanadapttothecriticismthat
Hutchingslevelsagainstthetheory,muchliketheshiftfromthe‘orthodox’ethicsofcaretoacritical
ethicofcareasoutlinedinChapterOne.IfmyrejectionofHutchings’conclusionsaboutcritical,
feministcareethicsissuccessfulhere,thenmyargumentinthepreviouschapterstands,andcare
ethicsremainsaviablesubstantiveguideforpublicpolicy.First,IarguethatHutchings’
understandingoftransformationisadmittedlymoreradicalthanthatofcareethics,butthatdoes
notmeancareethicslacksatransformativecapacity.Careethics,instead,representsareformisttypetransformation,whichrestsoncontinualdiscursiveexchange.Second,thatthetension
betweentheuniversalstandpointofcareandmoraljudgmentsinanyparticularcontextisnot
impossibletoovercome.Itakeinspirationfromthewell-knownworkofSeylaBenhabibandargue
thatthistensiondoesnotnecessarilyprecludeusfrombeingabletomorallyjudgeinparticular
contexts,evenwhenourparticularcontextdoesnotmatchthecontextofanother.Hutchings’
critique,intheend,forcescareethicstoconfrontthetensionthatliesintheheartofthetheory,and
insodoing,pushescareethicstoholdamorenuancedpracticeofmoraljudgment.
Section 1 – Care Ethics and Standpoint Theory
Feministstandpointtheory(orstandpointepistemology)originatedintheearly1980sasawayof
developingadifferentpictureofhowweexperiencetheworldandwhatkindofknowledgewehave
abouttheworld.Standpointtheoryarguesthatthereisagenderedproductionofknowledge,
wherewomenhavespecialknowledgeabouttheworldthatmendonot.Thislineofargument
drawsfromaMarxistepistemology,whicharguesthatthosewhoarelessprivilegedinasociety
knowmoreaboutthatsocietythanprivilegedothers.Althoughstandpointtheoryisnotwithoutits
internaldifferencesandexternaldetractors,thosenuancesarenotthefocushere.Thefocushereis
firsttoprovideabriefoverviewofwhatstandpointtheoryisingeneral.Then,Iwilldiscusshowthe
ethicsofcare,boththe‘orthodox’andcritical,feministversions,arerelatedtostandpointtheory.I
willpresentRobinson’sargumentthatthetwotheoriesaretoodissimilarincontenttobecritiqued
onthesamegrounds,becauseeachtheoryhasadifferentgroundingprinciple.Careasanethical
foundation,theclaimis,isnotproblematicinthewaythatwomen’sexperiencesare.
161
Section 1.1 – Feminist Standpoint Theory
Themostbasicprincipleoffeministstandpointtheoryisthat“itiswomen’suniquestandpointin
societythatprovidesthejustificationforthetruthclaimsoffeminismwhilealsoprovidingitwitha
methodwithwhichtoanalysereality.”1Womenhavespecialepistemicstatuswithinsociety,and
thisstatusprovidesjustificationsforthelargergoalsoffeminism,andalsoprovideswomenwith
anothertooltocritiquetherealitytheylivewithinaccordingtotheirownstandards.Asstandpoint
theoryhasevolved,itscoursehasbeenshapedbytwocentralclaims:1)“knowledgeissituatedand
perspectival”2and2)“therearemultiplestandpointsfromwhichknowledgeisproduced.”3This
meansthatwhateveranyoneknowsabouttheworldisjustthat,whattheyknow.Theirknowledge
isembeddedwithandbracketedbytheirculture,theirplaceinsociety,andtherelationsofpower
thatsurroundthem(i.e.politics).However,everypersonhasdifferentknowledgeabouttheworld,
whichmeansthatstandpointtheoryhashadtocontendwithchargesofrelativismandhasstruggled
toincorporateintersectionalanalysis,i.e.thewayinwhichmultipleformsofdifference(genderand
race,forexample)combinetomakeanentirelyuniquelivedexperiencethatcannotbebrokendown
intodiscreteparts.
Standpointtheoryrequiresthatstandpointsbedevelopedthroughanawarenessof
oppressionandincooperationwithothers.Astandpoint,therefore,“requirespoliticalorganization
todothatwork[ofachievingastandpoint]becausetheperceivednaturalnessofthedominant
group’spowerdependsuponobscuringhowsocialrelationsactuallywork.”4Thesimplefactof
beingawomandoesnotprovidemewithastandpoint.Imightnotnoticemyoppression,norhave
givencriticalthoughttomypossiblefutureroleasawifeandmother.Myknowledgeclaimsabout
theworldareincompleteifIdonotthinkaboutmyrolewithinthelargerframeworkofmyculture
andsociety,orabouttherelationsofpowerthatarethreadedthroughmylife.Achievinga
standpoint,ontheotherhand,issomethingthatisaccomplishedthroughconcertedcollective
efforts.5Tocontinuetheaboveexample,insteadofnotnoticingmyoppression,Itakenoteofit.
ThenIbecomeinvolvedwithworkaimedatchallengingthedominantgroup’spowerordiscourse(in
thiscasethatgroupismen).Iworkwithothers—academics,socialadvocates,orcommunity
members—toundermineassumptionsaboutwomen,disruptingthesupposednaturalnessofthe
socialorder.Theprocess,formoststandpointtheorists,ismeanttobeacriticalandrigorousone,
requiringreflectivethoughtratherthanrelyingonanyassumptionsonehadbeforebeginningthis
process.Stillthen,perhapsIhavenotachievedastandpoint,butIhavehelpedtoachievea
1
SusanHekman,"TruthandMethod:FeministStandpointTheoryRevisited,"Signs22,no.2(1997):341.
Ibid.,342.
3
Ibid.
4
SandraHarding,"StandpointTheories:ProductivelyControversial,"Hypatia24,no.4(2009):195.
5
Hekman,346.
2
162
standpointthatisacollectiveunderstanding,uniquetowomen,abouttheworldthatweinhabit.A
standpointisabletobetterexplaintheworldasIliveitbystandardsthatmakesensetomeand
otherslikeme,notbythestandardsofthegroupinpower.
Instandpointtheory,oneclaimisthatthelessprivilegedstandpointhasa‘better’
understandingoftheworldasitactuallyis.Thefirstformulationsofstandpointtheorydrewheavily
ontheworkofMarxandtheideathattheproletariathadamorecompletepictureoftheworld
becausetheyknewboththeworldoftheworkerandtheworldofthebourgeoisie,whereasthe
latteronlyknewtheirownworld.6Thisassumptionabout‘lessprivileged’personshavinggreater
knowledgewasthenabstractedtothefeministviewpointthatwomen,then,haveabetter
understandingoftheworldbecausetheyknowboththeirownworldandtheworldthatmeninhabit.
Men,conversely,donotneedtounderstandtheworldofwomeninordertogetalonginlife,thus
mendonotnecessarilyknowwhatwomenknow.Theoppressedsectionofsociety,then,isdeemed
tohaveasortofepistemicprivilege.Althoughtheymightbelessprivilegedinmorematerialways,
anyoppressedgroupmustunderstandthedominantgroupinordertosurvive.Assuch,their
knowledgeabouttheworlddrawsfrommoresourcesthanthenon-oppressedgroup.Therefore,
anyclaimtheoppressedgroupmakesabouttheworldisclosertothetruththananyclaimthenonoppressedgroupmakesbecausethelatterhavelessinformationabouttheworld.
However,theideathatanyonestandpointhadany‘better’wayofunderstandingtheworld
createdtensionbetweenfeminists.Thedualclaimsthatallknowledgewassituatedandthatthere
weremultiplestandpointssatuneasilywiththeideathatthestandpointofallwomenwasprivileged.
Theproblemwasthatthestandpointofwomeningeneralobscuresthestandpointsofblackwomen,
Hispanicwomen,Asianwomen,andwomeninnon-Westernnations.7Yettherewastheoretical
resistancetobreakingdownthefemalestandpoint,inpartduetoafearofrelativism,whichhad
plaguedfeministtheoryforyears.Whatwas,andstillis,atstakefornon-white,andnon-Western
womenisthattheirstandpointsanduniqueexperiencesbecomesubsumedunderthatofwhite,
middle-class,heterosexual,Westernwomen,becausethestandpointofsuchwomenwastakento
amounttothestandpointof‘womeningeneral’.8Theproblemoccursmoststronglywhengenderis
theonlylensthroughwhichoneviewstheworld,becauseoppressionisnotperpetuatedthrough
onlyoneprocess,buttheintersectionofmanydifferentprocesses.9Forexample,althoughwhite
6
Ibid.,343.
Ibid.,356.
8
PatriciaHillCollins,BlackFeministThought:Knowledge,Consciousness,andthePoliticsofEmpowerment
(NewYork:Routledge,1991),116.
9
AnnaCarastathis,"TheConceptofIntersectionalityinFeministTheory,"PhilosophyCompass9,no.5(2014):
304.
7
163
andblackwomenmightbesubjecttosimilargendernorms,theblackwomanhastonegotiatenot
justgendernormsbuttheintersectionofgenderandracethatmakesherlivedexperienceandthus
theknowledgeshehasabouttheworlddifferentfromthatofawhitewoman’s.Thisintersection,or
intersectionality,ofraceandgenderisnecessarytounderstandingtheparticularoppressionablack
womanfaces.Intersectionalitymakesmanifesttheuniqueworldsandproblemsofthosewho
experiencemultipleformsofoppression,anditismorethanamatterofaddingtogetherthe
differentlayers,butunderstandinghowthedifferentpatternsofprivilegecombinetomakeeach
experienceofoppressionintheworldunique.Theintersectionalcritiqueofstandpointtheory
foregroundsHutchings’critiqueofcareethics,whichisfocusedonthetensionbetweenholdingany
universalstandpointwhileattemptingtojudgeacrosscontexts.
Section 1.2 – Care as a Standpoint?
Theethicsofcare,especiallythe‘orthodox’ethicsofcareofGilliganandRuddick,wasinformedand
assistedbythethennascentstandpointtheory.Robinson,however,distanceshercriticalethicsof
carefromthe‘orthodox’ethicsofcareandfromstandpointtheoryingeneral.Robinsonarguesthat
careethicsandstandpointtheoryarenotsynonymous,thatacriticalcareethicsdoesmorethan
offer“anepistemologicalargumentaboutwomen’sprivilegedstandpointbasedontheiruniversal
oppression.”10Iwillargue,however,thatinspiteofthetheoreticaldistancethatRobinsontriesto
establishaboutthecontentofboththeories,criticalcareethicssharesamethodologywith
standpointtheory.BecausemethodologyisthefocusforHutchings’critiqueofstandpointtheory,
herclaimshavepurchaseoncritical,feministcareethicsaswell.
Early,‘orthodox’careethicsistiedtostandpointtheory,particularlytheworkofGilliganand
Ruddick,whoarguedthatitwaswomen’ssituatedknowledgeabouttheworld(theirrelational
outlook)thatproducedthemoraljudgmentsthatwehavecometocallcareethics.11SaraRuddick,
inherbookMaternalThinking,arguedthattherewaspoliticalimportanceinthewaythatmothers
think.12Themother’sstandpointwasonewhich“illuminatesboththedestructivenessofwarand
therequirementsofpeace.”13Ruddickdrewonothertheoriststoassertthatthemother’s
standpointwasasuperioronethatwasopposedtothedominantmoralandpoliticaldiscourse.
Fromthis,wecanseehowearlycareethicswasverysimilartostandpointtheorywhenitcameto
how(i.e.themethodologyused)boththeoriesexaminedtheworld.Standpointtheoryalsooffersa
10
Robinson,"CareEthics,PoliticalTheory,andtheFutureofFeminism,"305.
Hutchings,115-6.
12
ForRuddick,‘mothers’couldbefemaleormale,as‘fathers’weresomethingdifferent.Shedidnot
necessarilylinkmotheringtogender,butdidnotethatoftenmotherswerewomen.
13
Ruddick,136.
11
164
waytoseeandresistthedominantgroup’sdistortionofpoliticaldiscourse.Theproductionof
knowledgeandtheabilitytousethatknowledgetoshapeadiscoursecangeneratepowerforthose
whohaveproducedtheknowledgeinthefirstplace.Thatpowercaninturnbeappliedtoother
groups,usingtheknowledgeproducedbythedominantgrouptooppressothers.Forexample,the
discoursethatcareisaprivatematter,nottobethesubjectofpublicdiscourse,is,inandofitself,an
applicationof‘knowledge’aboutthepracticesofcare.Thisknowledgeisnotonlygeneratedby
peopleinpower,withthekindsoflegislationtheyenact,focuson,anddismiss,butalsobyevery
individualwhomaintainsthathowandwhywecareforparticularothersissomehowanapolitical
areaoflife.Becausecare,then,isnotasuitablepublicconcern,thosewhoprovideandneedcare
areoftenexcludedandmarginalizedfrompoliticalparticipationanddevaluedbythewidersocioculturalcommunity,asarguedinChapterTwo.Theproductionofknowledgegeneratessocial
power,butstandpointtheoryalsoseeksan“engagementwiththeparticularwayssuch
knowledge/powerrelationsworkoutinthepublicagendaanddisciplinarycontexts,amongother
sites.”14Standpointtheoryandthe‘orthodox’ethicofcaredonotendwiththeassertionof
epistemicprivilege,butextendtoananalysisofhowtheproductionofknowledgecangenerate
socialpowerandhowthatpoweriscarriedoutthroughpoliticalpolicy.Thegoalofboththeoriesis
toputforwardtheknowledgeclaimsabouttheoppressedgroupinordertodisruptthedominant
discourse,eitherthatofwomenor‘caringmothers’asperRuddick’swork.Ifallknowledgeis
understoodassituatedanddiscursive,thenthereisnobasisonwhichtojudgeanyonesetof
knowledgeasmore‘true’thananyother.
Thisinabilitytodisruptthedominantdiscourseistiedtodualproblemsforstandpoint
theoryandthe‘orthodox’ethicsofcare’:theproblemsofreductionismandessentialism.Yet,the
experienceofmothering,likethestandpointofawoman,ishardlythesameforallwomen,i.e.
standpointsarenotreductive.Racialandsocio-economicdividesproducedifferentstandpoints,and
whatonesubsetofmothersknowsabouttheworldisnotwhatallmothersknowabouttheworld.
Additionally,CarolGilliganwasroundlycritiquedforherworkInaDifferentVoicebecauseher
interviewees,uponwhomshebasedtheethicofcare,werepredominantlywhite,middle-class
womenwithhigherlevelsofeducation.15AlthoughGilligandefendedherclaimsbyarguingthather
workwasdefinedbythemenotgender,thisraisedproblemsforextendingherformulationofcare
ethicsacrossracialandsocio-economicdivides.InspiteofGilligan’sdefence,hercriticsmaintained
thattheexperiencesofsomewomencouldnotcountfortheexperiencesofallwomenevenwhenit
cametohowwomenunderstandandpracticecare,becausedifferentlysituatedwomencarryout
14
Harding,196.
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,22.
15
165
caringlabourunderdifferentpressuresandinsideofdifferentsetsofnormativeassumptions.In
otherwords,earlycareethicswas,likestandpointtheory,chargedwithbeingreductive.Second,
boththeoriesappearedtomakeessentialistclaimsaboutgender.Forexample,Ruddickclaimed
thatthemother’sstandpointwasthebestplatformfromwhichonemightbegintoresistwarand
implementpeace.Thisimpliesthattheremightbesomethinginherentlypeacefulabouttheroleof
mothering,whichrequiresonetoadoptaparticularpointofview,privilegetheneedsofanother,
andbecomereceptivetoanotherwithwhomyoucannotalwayscommunicate.Ruddickgivesample
spaceinherbooktohowwomenarepossiblyasbloodthirstyasmen,butthisisonlybecausethese
womenareadoptingthemasculinevaluesaboutwar,duty,andhonour,insteadofinvestinginthe
morefemininevirtuesofpeaceandcompromise.16Gilligan’stheorywasalsocriticizedforproducing
anessentialistviewofgender.ForGilliganwomen’sdifferentexperiences—theirveryknowledge—
oftheworldproducesadifferentmoraloutlook.17Theconcernforotherfeministswasthatif
feminineknowledgeproducesadifferentmoraloutlook,itmight,infact,meanthatwomenare
moreconcernedaboutparticularothersandlessconcernedaboutabstractrulesthanmenare,
takenasawhole.ThecritiquelevelledatbothGilliganandRuddick,asexplainedinChapterOne,
wasthatbyelaboratingatheoryofcareormothering,theirworkreinforcedakindofgender
essentialism,thatwomenbyvirtueofbeingwomenwerecarers.Thesetwocritiques,ofthe
reductionismandessentialismpresentinearlycareethics,culminateinthecriticismthatlike
standpointtheory,earlycaretheorydoesnotactuallydisruptthedominantdiscourse.These
theoriesinsteadfocusovertlyonthe‘feminine’andnotonthe‘feminist.’
Bothstandpointtheoryandcriticalfeministcareethics,however,respondedtotheir
critiques.Thefirstcritiquewasthattheearlyincarnationsofboththeorieswereunabletodisrupt
thedominant(orhegemonic)discourse.Hegemonicdiscourseinsomesensecanbeviewedas
writinga“particularscriptforacertaincategoryofsubjects.”18Considerthescriptthatwefollow
forthemajorityofmodernpoliticaltheorywehavetoday,wherehumanrightshavebecomea
hegemonicinternationalpoliticaldiscourse.Itisgroundedinabsolute,universalprinciples,suchas
thedrivetowardcraftingasetofhumanrightsthatcouldbeappliedregardlessofgender,race,
sexualorientation,nationality,age,orculture.TherightsoutlinedintheUDHRareaone-size-fitsall
protectionagainstgovernmentaggressionthatareprofoundlyshapedbyaparticularhistorical
context.Yet,asnotedinChapterThree,overthelastsixtyyearshumanrightshasbecomea
16
SaraRuddick,"MaternalWorkandthePracticeofPeace,"JournalofEducation167,no.3(1985):100.
Gilligan,74.
18
Hekman,357.
17
166
hegemonicdiscourse,19onethatisusedbymanypeopleandgroupsaroundtheworldtolend
legitimacytotheircauses.Forexample,thereistheGulabiGanginIndiathatchallengesthenorms
arounddomesticviolenceandsexualviolenceagainstwomenonthebasisofhumanrights.20
IndigenousAustralianshavealsotakenupthelanguageofhumanrights,andhaveutilizedthe
UnitedNation’sDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,tounderwritetheiradvocacyand
goalsforrecognition,hopingtochangemainstreamwhiteAustralianattitudestowardIndigenous
people.21However,asalsonotedinChapterThree,oftenthediscoursecannotencompassthe
variedandcomplexsituationsthatariseinwildlydifferentcontextsaroundtheworld.Modern
humansrightsdiscoursecannotincorporatemoralcontextswherealthoughpeoplesuffer,their
humanrightshavebeenmet,suchasthecaseofthetransnationalmigrantcareworkerwhohasnot
beenabusedorexploited(aswemightunderstandittoday),buthasbeenputinthepositionof
makingtheimpossiblechoicebetweenprovidingbettermaterialsupporttoherchildrenandbeing
abletodirectlycareforherchildrenherself,tolovethemdirectlyandnothaveherloveimported
andexpendedonachildnotherown.22Thescriptprovidedtothetransnationalcareworkeristhat
sheshouldbegladoftheopportunitytoearnmoremoneyforherchildreninspiteofthefactto
earnthatmoneyshemustexportherloveandcaringlabour,spendingitonanother’schild.
Resistance,however,cancomefromusing“otherdiscursiveformationstoopposethatscript,”23
suchas,butnotlimitedto,careethics.Standpointtheoryoffersadifferentscriptaswell,although
thestandpointwouldbethatoftheworkerherself,byfocusingonherexperienceofherlifeasshe
haslivedit.Theethicsofcareandthestandpointofthetransnationalcareworkerprovidedifferent
startingpointstodifferentmoralandpoliticalscripts.
Inanswertothesecondproblem,thatbothstandpointtheoryand‘orthodox’careethics
werefemininetheoriesnotfeministones,thecriticalethicofcarewasstructuredasprofoundly
feminist,andaimedatchallengingembeddedrelationsofpowerthatcontributetooppressionand
suffering.RobinsondrawsonTrontotomakethedifferencebetweenfeminineandfeministclear,
andthisishowRobinson,inpart,strivestoputtheoreticaldistancebetweenstandpointtheoryand
criticalcareethics.Thefemininetheoryisonethatisconstructedinoppositiontothemasculine,
andtieswomentocarework,whichstandsinoppositiontothepoliticalandsocialactivitiesofmen.
Thefeministapproachinsteadworkstode-couplegenderandcarework,underminingpervasive
19
SamuelMoyn,"TheContinuingPerplexitiesofHumanRights,"QuiParle:CriticalHumanitiesandSocial
Sciences22,no.1(2013):110.
20
"GulabiGangOfficial,"http://www.gulabigang.in/.Accessed9November2015.
21
"NationalCongressofAustralia'sFirstPeoples,"http://nationalcongress.com.au/.Accessed9November
2015.
22
Hochschild,21-2.
23
Hekman,357.
167
harmfulnorms,andcollapsingthedichotomyofgenderratherthanreinforcingit.Thefeminine
theoryisproblematicforcareethicsbecausetheattentivenessaspectofcarecouldthen“beseenas
asurvivalmechanismforwomenwhoaredealingwithoppressiveconditions—awayofanticipating
thewishesofone’ssuperior.”24Afeminineapproachtocaretheorytosomedegreeaccepts
traditionalgenderrolesanddevaluestheactivitiesofwomenwhoareinthosecaringroles.Inthis
sense,caringisonly“acorrectivemorality”25thatdoesnotsuggestfundamentallynewkindsof
thinkingorareasofmoralconcern.
Feministcareethics,asarguedinChaptersOne,TwoandFour,insteadseekstoilluminate
andtransformcurrentnotionsofgenderaswellasexpandthescopeofmoralandpoliticalconcern.
Inreviewingthecritiqueslevelledagainststandpointtheory,Robinsonnotes:“‘Standpoint’feminists
arguethattheirperspectiveaccountsfortheachievementsoffeministtheorybecauseitisa
politicallyengagedapproachwhichstartsfromtheperspectiveofthesocialexperienceofthe
subjugatedsex/gender.”26However,toattempttodevelopapoliticsthataimstofreeallwomen
fromgenderhierarchy,basedonasingletypeofwoman’sexperience,producestheresultthat
standpointtheoryissimply“yetanotherfalselyuniversalizingproject.”27Robinsonarguesthat
standpointtheoriesarethemselvessuspect.Inaddition,shearguesthatcriticalcareethicsisnota
standpointtheorybecausethecriticalethicsofcareexpresslydoesnotgeneralizefromwomen’s
uniqueexperiencesasthetraditionalcaregivers.Robinson’sargumentispredicatedontheideathat
itisthecontentofeachtheorythatsetscriticalcareethicsandfeministstandpointtheoryapart.
Whilestandpointtheoryattemptstogeneralizefromtheperspectiveof‘women,’theethicsofcare
doesnotprivilegeanyonetypeofpersonbutinsteadatypeofactivitythatallhumanbeingsshould
engagein.However,inspiteofRobinson’sattempttodistancethecritical,feministethicsofcare
fromstandpointtheory,IacknowledgethatthesimilarityofmethodologyallowsforHutchings’
critiquetohavepurchase.
Section 2 – Feminist International Ethics
KimberlyHutchingscritiquesnotonlyRobinson’scriticalethicofcare,butalsostandpointtheoryin
general.Hercriticismdoesnotnecessarilytakeissuewiththeirgoals,butrathertheethicalmethod
thatboththeoriesemploy.Hutchingsarguesthatifwedonotusethecorrectethicalmethod,we
runtheriskofextendinglegitimacytotheveryproblematicmoralcontextswewishtotransform.
24
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,22.
Ibid.,23.
26
Ibid.,21.
27
Ibid.
25
168
Accordingtoher,thebetterethicalmethodtoemployisonethatisproperlytransformative,where
weavoidtheriskoflegitimizingbadpracticesandinsteadcreatepossiblenewworlds,worldswhere
morallyproblematicpracticesandmodesofthoughtarerenderedunthinkable.Hutchingsargues
thatthisispossiblewhenwestopprivilegingtheethicalcontentofparticulartheories,suchasthe
standpointofwomenorcare.Thissectionwillproceedinthreeparts.Thefirstpartwillprovidethe
backgroundforHutchings’critique,elaboratingsomeofthebasicconceptssheutilizes.Thesecond
partwillfocusspecificallyuponthecritiqueofthecriticalethicsofcare,andwhereIconcedethat
Hutchingsmakesasalientpointaboutapreviouslyunexploredtensionincritical,feministcareethics.
ThethirdandfinalpartwillexamineHutchings’argumentforhowtoengageininternational
feministethicswithoutastandpoint.
Section 2.1 – The Background
ForHutchings,ethicalmethod(thewayinwhichwedoethics),notjustitscontent,isinherently
political,whichmeansthatmoralityandethicaljudgmentareirrevocablyboundupinthepolitical.
Hutchingsdoesagreewithstandpointtheory(andcareethics)aboutonething,whichis“thatmoral
knowledgelikeotherknowledgeissituated.”28Becausemoralknowledgeisnotabstractor
objective,itispossibletounderstandthatourmoralknowledgeandethicalmethodareinmany
waysshapedbyourpoliticalcontexts.Politics,andbyextensionpower,produces“patternsand
hierarchiesofinclusionandexclusion,”29andtheseinturnshapewhatisgoodandwhatisbad,what
isrightandwhatiswrong.Ethicsisnotsomethingthatworkscountertoworldpolitics.Rather,
ethicsis“oneofthediscoursesthroughwhichworldpoliticsisactivelyproducedandre-produced.”30
Justaspoliticscanshapeone’smoralpictureoftheworld,one’smoralpicturecaninturnreinforce
(orperhapsalter)theproductionofpowerintheworld.Therelationshipbetweenethicsand
politicsisnotsimplyaone-waystreet,butratheraverycomplicatedcircleofinfluence,production,
andpossiblechangethatcannothaveitspartsseparatedoutandtheorizedaboutasthoughdistinct.
Thejobofthetheorist,specificallytheethicaltheorist,istoilluminateandpossiblybeginto
explaintherelationbetweenethicalstancesandrelationsofpower.31Thegoalofthefeminist
theorististhentobringfocusandattentiontothewaysinwhichgenderedunderstandingsofpower
playoutinmoralandpoliticalsystems.ForHutchings,“thekeyfeatureoffeministinternational
28
MargaretUrbanWalker,MoralUnderstandings:AFeministStudyinEthics(NewYork:Routledge,1998),6.
KimberlyHutchings,"FeministEthicsandPoliticalViolence,"InternationalPolitics44(2007):99.
30
Ibid.,103.
31
Ibid.,100.
29
169
ethicsisthatitnecessarilybringpoliticsbackintotheheartofmoraljudgmentandprescription.”32
Thissuggestsadifferentwayofdoingethics,specificallyinternationalethics,whichwouldhave
implicationsforthenormsinvolvedaroundsitesofpowerandgenderdiscrimination.Admittedly,
whilethegoalsmightbesimilartocritical,feministcareethics,themethodtoachievethosegoalsis
verydifferentfromcareethics,whichemploysastandpoint-likemethodofanalysingspecific
contextsfromauniversalperspective,thatofcare,inthiscase.AndforHutchings,methodmatters.
Sincemoralityandpoliticsarenotseparate,thismeansthatthetheoristcannolongerholdany
claimtobeingoutsidethepictureoftheirtheory;theytoomustbe‘seen.’This‘seeing’involves
understandingthatone’sownmoralfoundationiscontingent,asisthefoundationofothers.33
Therefore,one’sownmoralphenomenologyandgenealogymustbe‘seen’aswellastheother’s,
andunderstoodasapartofthesocialandpoliticalcontextwithinwhichtheywereformed.
Whenitcomestoaninternationalethic,moralphenomenologyworkstomakeone‘see’the
“rangeofvaluesandprinciplesinstitutionalizedwithindifferentaspectsoftheinternational
order,”34andhowtheyfunctioneitherinsupportoroppositiontoeachother.HowIexperiencethe
world,andhowIassesstheworldfromamoralpointofviewgreatlydependsuponwhereIsit
withintheinternationalorder.Myexperienceofthemoralgoodnessorbadnessofanythingis
heavilyinformedbymylivedlocation.Genealogy,understoodanddefinedwithrelationtomorality,
isthreethings:1)ahistoricalaccountofhowknowledgeclaimscometobe;2)thewaymoraltheory
emergesoutofthosepracticesthatproducedthoseknowledgeclaims;and3)thepoliticalandsocial
effectsofthishistoricalprocess.35Genealogyseekstomakeclearwhattheeffectsofpowerare.
Thus,wemustaswhatarethe“benefitsandinclusions,costsandexclusions[that]followfromany
particularnormativeprescriptionandonwhatgroundsaretheyidentifiedascostsand
exclusions?”36Thetheoristmustthenbehonestaboutplacingtheirideaswithinthecontextthat
gaverisetothem.Thisisanotherlevelof‘seeing’intermsofunderstandingone’sownsubjectivity.
AsHutchingsasserts,ourlivedethicalselvesandourhistoricalbackgroundinfluenceourmoral
methodology.Assuminganysortofobjectivityorclaimtouniversalizabilityisdishonestand
methodologicallysuspect,obscuringtheethicalpicturethatanyparticularphilosopherbuilds,which
accordingtoHutchingsistheprimefailingoftheethicsofcarebecauseitisnothonestaboutits
specificity.
32
"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"113.
Walker,MoralUnderstandings:AFeministStudyinEthics,100.
34
KimberlyHutchings,InternationalPoliticalTheory:RethinkingEthicsinaGlobalEra(London:Sage
Publications,1999),149.
35
Walker,MoralUnderstandings:AFeministStudyinEthics,30.
36
Hutchings,InternationalPoliticalTheory:RethinkingEthicsinaGlobalEra,150.
33
170
Section 2.2 – Critique of Robinson’s Global Care Ethic
Hutchings’critiqueofRobinson’scriticalethicofcareistwofold.First,sheclaimsthatRobinson’s
argumentdoesnothaveclearprescriptiveconsequences.37Thismightseemredundanttomystated
argumentinChapterFive,whichisthatcritical,feministcareethicscanofferpracticalpolicy
guidance;however,thepointhereisthatcareethicscannotprovideclearcross-contextualmoral
judgment.ThisisfoundedonHutching’ssecondcritique,whichisthat,likestandpointtheory,the
criticalethicsofcareutilizesaproblematicethicalmethodologythatresultsinanappealtothe
universalidealofcare,whileatthesametimeattemptingtoholdontosensitivitytocontextand
partialityofjudgment.Theresultisthatthecriticalethicsofcareisnottransformativeintheway
thatHutchings’claimsfeministethicsshouldbe.
AlthoughRobinsonarguesthatthecontentandthescopeofstandpointtheoryandthe
ethicsofcarearedifferent,thisdoesnotdirectlyaddressHutchings’critique,whichisfocusedon
thesimilarityofmethodoftheethicsofcareandstandpointtheory.Themethodsofstandpoint
theoryandcareethicssharethreemainfeatures.38Thefirstpointofsimilarityisthatlikestandpoint
theory,criticalcareethicshasauniversalizingaspectthatsitsuneasilywiththeassertionthatall
knowledge,andthusallethicalreasoning,iscontextual.Thisseemsatoddswiththefactthat
Robinsonarguesstrenuouslyagainstauniversalizingethicswithintheinternationalcontext.She
arguesthat,inorderforauniversalethicstohold,themoralprinciplesemployedmustbeonesthat
areacceptabletoallrationalpersons,oratleastonesthatcannotbereasonablyrejected.The
problem,however,isthe“pronounceddiversityofindividuals,cultures,societies,andindeed
moralitiesintheworldtoday.”39Ethicalprinciplesthataresoabstracttobeacceptabletoall
personshaveadualproblem.First,theyaretooabstracttobepracticable.Second,asarguedin
ChapterThree,abstractionoftentreatsallpersonsas‘thesame,’whichbegsthequestion‘thesame
aswhat?’,andalsoobscuresthewaysinwhichdifferencesmattermateriallytopeople’slivesas
theylivethem.Theproblemforcritical,feministcareethics,however,isthatcareitselfbecomesan
abstract,universalizedconcept.Theethicalandpoliticalprojectofcareethicsdoesnotholdthatwe
mustcareaboutallotherpersons.Thepointofcriticalcareethicsistoinsteadbegintoseewhat
hasbeenhidden:thedivisionoflabour,thegenderedaspectsofcare,thewaysinwhichpolitical
37
"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"119-20.
Hutchingsdoesnotexplicitlydrawoutthesethreesimilaritiesbetweenstandpointtheoryandthecritical
ethicsofcare,rathertheyoperateinthebackgroundofherargument.Ielaboratethemherebasedonmy
owninterpretationoftherelationbetweenstandpointtheoryandcareethics.
39
Robinson,GlobalizingCare:Ethics,FeministTheory,andInternationalRelations,70.
38
171
policyfailstosupportthecaringrelationshipspeopleneed.40AsIarguedinChapterTwo,these
once-hiddenfacetscanberevealedonaglobalscale,demonstratingthattherelationshipsbetween
nationscanbeassessedbythestandardsofthepracticesofcare,whichareassumedtobe
reasonabletoolsofuniversalethicalengagement.
Thetheorizedconceptofcare,then,istheconceptthatgroundsthecriticalassessment
aimedatdisruptingthedominantdiscourse.Itis,methodologically,astandpoint,andthisisthe
secondpointofsimilarity,thatboththeoriesuseastandpointofsomekind.Understandingwhatit
meanstocareandwhatthepracticesofcareentailoffersadifferentsortofknowledgeaboutthe
world.Themoralepistemologyofcare“includestakingexperiencesintoaccount,exercisingselfreflectionsandsensitivejudgmentswherecontextualdifferencesareattendedto.”41This
knowledgethengroundsthelargerphilosophicalprojectathand:globalizinganethicofcare.Since
thelensofcarecanassesseverylevelofhumaninteraction,andeveninstitutionalinteraction,on
thebasisthatthesearealldifferenttypesofrelationships,thencarecanbemobilizedtocritically
assessandsuggestpoliticalcoursesofaction.Standpointtheory,Hutchingsargues(andIconcede),
doesfunctionallythesamething.Whentheoppressedgroup’sstandpointbeginstoemerge,then
thestandpointcanbeusedasthebasistochallengethedominantdiscourseandchangethepolitical
landscape.Thelargerprojectforthecriticalethicsofcareandstandpointtheoryisnotmerelyto
critiquetheworld,buttochangeit.Insum,boththeoriesadvocatethattheworldshouldbe
broughtmoreintolinewiththeinformationtheformallyignoredstandpoint(ofwomenorcare)has
abouttheworld.
Third,theethicsofcare,evenasacriticaltool,isoneaimedatuniversalapplication.The
assumptionisthatthepracticesofcare(attentiveness,responsibility,andresponsivenessas
outlinedbyRobinson)aretoolsthatareabstractenoughtobeabletofitthevastlydifferentmoral
contextsaroundtheworld.AlthoughRobinsoneschewsthefeasibilityofanyuniversalizedethics
thatfocusesonabstractprinciplesthatcannotbereasonablyrejectedbyrationalactors,shedoes
argueforthepossibilityforthestandardsofcarebeingauniversalmoralbedrockthatcan
neverthelessbeappliedwithcontextualsensitivitytoparticularmoralcontextsinternationally,and
mostimportantlycross-culturally.Perhapsitispossiblethatthepractisesofcare,astheyare
practices,arenotasunyieldingastheabstractmoralrulesofthekindthatrights-theoristsmight
employ.Forexample,wereonetonolongerbeattentive,thenoneisnolongerupholdingakindof
ethicofcare.Whatattentivenessmightentailcouldbedifferentfordifferentpeopleandcultures,
40
Hankivsky,SocialPolicyandtheEthicofCare,2.
TovePettersen,"TheEthicsofCare:NormativeStructuresandEmpiricalImplications,"HealthCareAnalysis
19(2011):55.
41
172
butitmustremainasapracticetobecarriedoutandnotabandoned.Regardless,thiscouldvery
wellculminateintheproblemthatwhatcaremeanstosomepeopleisnotwhatcaremeansto
others.Justasearlystandpointtheorysoughttotheorizefromthestandpointofallwomen,other
philosopherssoonrealizedthattodosowastoobscureandmarginalizethestandpointsofblackor
queerwomen.Althoughcritical,feministcaretheoristsnolongermakeidentityclaims,the
methodologyofcriticalcareethicsissimilarenoughtostandpointtheorythatHutchings’critique
aboutthetensionbetweentheuniversalaspectofcareandthegoalofcontextualmoraljudgment
canbeapplied.
Hutchings’elaboratesthreequestionsthatanyfeministtheoryshouldhaveanswersto.The
pointofthesequestionsistoascertainwhatanyparticularfeministtheoryisactuallydoing,andthe
natureofitstheoreticalscope.Thequestionsare:
•
•
•
Fromafeministperspective,howarethenatureandconditionsofethicaljudgment
withintheinternationalarenatobeunderstood?
Fromafeministperspectivewhatisethicallysignificantwithintherealmof
internationalpolitics?
Whataretheprescriptiveconsequencesoftakingafeministturnininternational
ethics?42
Thethreeareasoffocusthenareethicaljudgment,ethicalsignificance,andtheprescriptive
consequencesofthetheory.Thesequestionsareimportantbecausetheynotonlyformthe
standardsofcritiqueforcareethics,butarethequestionsthatallfeministethicaltheoriesmustbe
abletoanswer.Hutchingsclaimsthatcareethicscannotadequatelyanswerthesequestionsandas
suchitisnotthefeministethicaltheorywerequireforatruetransformationofinternationalpolitics.
First,Hutchingscallsintoquestionwhatexactlythemorallyprescriptiveconsequencesof
thecriticalethicofcareare.Ifethicaljudgmentisalwaysrelationalandcontextual,invirtueofways
inwhichourresponsibilitiesareembeddedinrelationshipswithparticularothers,thentherecannot
bemorallyuniversallyapplicableprinciples.Yetcontextualjudgmentsarebothnecessaryand
difficult,andare“orientedinrelationtothemodeofresponsivenesstootherswhichisdefinedas
‘caring’.”43Ethicalandcontextualjudgmentaresupposedtobeabletogivealargerpictureand
provideaninjunctionagainstrushingintoprematurejudgmentandfocuson“payingattentionto
theactualsituationsfromwhichmoraldilemmasandquestionsemerge.”44Ethicaljudgmentin
critical,feministcareethicsiscaughtbetweenanabstractstandardofjudgmentandthe
acknowledgementoftheneedtojudgeinlightofparticularcontexts.Forexample,Iholda
42
Hutchings,"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"113.
Ibid.,118.
44
Ibid.
43
173
particularconceptofwhatitistocare,butitisnotnecessarilythecasethatIcanapplythat
standardofcaretoothersincontextsnotmyown.Therefore,Iamnotnecessarilyabletojudge
othersoutsidemyowncontextbecausewelackasharedethicalbackground,whichinformsour
differentconceptionsofcareinthefirstplace.
HutchingsnotesthatforRobinsonethicalsignificanceisfoundinthestructuresand
institutionsoftheinternationalsystem,andtherelationsofpowerbetweenthem.Intermsof
ethicaljudgment,careethicsgoesbeyondaprescriptionagainst,forexamplewar,butalsocritically
assessestheinstitutionsthatsupportthepossibilityofglobalviolenceandinequalityinthefirst
place.Thequestionisnotsomuchwhetherornotsomethingiswrong,butwhattherootcausesof
anysituationare.45YetRobinsondoesnotprovidean“explicitprescriptiveagendainrelationto
war”46itself.HutchingsclaimsthatRobinson’soverallprescriptiveagendaisnotclearlydefined.The
problemliesinthemismatchbetweenthepartialityofjudgmentandtheuniversalscopeforthe
significanceofthatjudgment.Thismeansthatforcareethics,becauseitsabilitytojudgeissuspect
andisjuxtaposedwiththeaimtojudgeinternationalrelationsofpower,itseemsasthoughany
prescriptiveagendaisinherentlyflawed.Ifjudgmentissuspectandcannotbeuniversallyapplied,
thenanyclaimstobeingabletojudgeinternationallyare‘non-starters,’sotospeak.Theyhaveno
purchasetobeginwith.
Thusweareledtothesecondpartofthecritique:thetensionbetweenthedriveto
understandethicaljudgmentassituatedontheonehandandtheidealizationofcareasa
standpointontheother.Thestatedpurposeofthecriticalethicofcareisnotonlytojudge,butalso
totransformthecurrentinternationalrealmintoonewherecaringisprotectedandsustained.This
universaldrivesitsuneasilynexttoRobinson’s“insistenceoftheimportanceofpowerrelations,
complexityandcontext.”47Thistensionisinandofitselfproblematic,andissomethingthat
Robinsonstrovetoavoidasevidencedbyhercritiqueofstandpointtheory.ButwhileRobinson
showsthatthecontentofcritical,feministcareethicsisverydifferent,themethodologyremainsthe
same.
Standpointtheoryandthecriticalethicofcareareboththeoriesthatworktoexplainthe
worldasitis,andtotransformitintoaworldwherethewrongsexperiencedinthenowbecome
unthinkable.Theverynormsthatpermitthemoralwrongsareonesthatwillbechallengedand
overturned.Yet,theproblemremainsthatifallethicaljudgmentissituated,thenapplyingthe
standardsandpracticesoftheethicofcarewoulddependupontheethicofcarehavingsomesort
45
Ibid.,119.
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
46
174
ofauthority.ThepointforHutchingsisthattheethicaltheoriesofonecontextdonotnecessarily
haveauthorityovermoralquestionsinanothercontext,andthatinsteadwemustunderstandethics
asembeddedwithinpoliticsandthusneverfreefrompowerdynamics.Ifcareethicsisneverfreeof
powerdynamics,wecanquestiontheabilityofcareethicstopassjudgmentonthoseverypower
relationsinthefirstplace.48Theconclusionremainsthatinorderapplyinternationalfeministethics
onemustrejectanystandpoint.HowHutchingsaccomplishesthis,iswhatIturntonext.
Section 2.3 – Hutchings’ Ethical Method
Hutchingsdoesnotseektodevelopanethicaltheorybasedonaparticularmorallyprivileged
foundation,suchasanappealtohumandignity,women’sexperiences,orcare.Instead,sheoutlines
anethicalmethodthateschewsanyfoundationalstandpoint.BecauseHutchings’ethicalmethod
eschewsamoralfoundation,shecannotofferanethicaltheorythathasuniversalrulesoreven
ethicalguidelines.Rather,sheoffersthreeexamplestoshowcasehowhermethodoperatesby
answeringthequestionsaboutethicaljudgment,significance,andprescription.Theexamplesare
abouthowperceptionsofwarandhumanrightshaveimpactedourethicalevaluationsofspecific
internationalmoralcontexts.Tounderwritehermethod,shemobilizestheunderstandingthat
ethicsandpoliticsareneverseparable.Further,thateveryindividual’smoralbedrockisshapedby
hisorhermoralphenomenology(i.e.theexperienceoflivinginaspecificmoralcommunity)and
genealogy(thehistoryofthemoralrulestheyliveby).Inacknowledgingthis,Hutchingsone
interdictionisthatfeministethicsshould“alwaysbescepticalofanykindofmoralessentialismor
claimstoethicalnecessity.”49Thisethicalmethodismeanttomakeclearwhatourethical
assumptionsarebyquestioningthosethingsthatarethoughtofas‘necessary,’suchasthenorm
thatdesignateswomenas‘natural’carers.Onceweareabletoseehownormsareconsidered
‘necessary’andthatthese‘necessary’understandingspermeatetheworld,wecanthenchallenge
moreaspectsoflifethathavethisembeddedethicalsignificance.Thisismeanttobeasharp
contrasttothemethodofcritical,feministcareethics(andstandpointtheory)becauseoncewegive
upanyclaimstoauniversalethicswemustthenacceptthevulnerabilityofourownethical
judgmentsconsideringthatthejudgmentofothersmightbejustasvalidasourown.Theethicsof
careandtraditionalethicaltheories,ontheotherhand,havemorallytroublingoutcomes,because
theydonotviewtheirownjudgmentsasvulnerable.Thisacceptanceofvulnerability,alongside
Hutchings’threeguidelinestoforprescriptivejudgment,ismeanttoenableherethicalmethodto
fulfilthepromiseofthetransformativepowerofethics.
48
Ibid.,121.
Ibid.,123.
49
175
ThefirstexampleHutchingsusesconcernstheethicssurroundingwarfare,justwartheory,
andourethicaljudgmentsaboutit.Thepointhereistodemonstratetheabilityofherethical
methodtomake‘seen’whatwaspreviously‘unseen,’specificallytheimplicitjudgmentthatwar,on
somelevel,isnecessary.Justwartheory,shenotes,typicallyfocusesonwarasanactionoflast
resort.Yetforanyfeministmethodofethics,violence,evenconstrainedviolence,isproblematic
whenthestartingpointforanalysisisthatviolencemaybenecessaryinsomecircumstances.If
Hutchingsiscorrecthere,thenitisproblematicthatsomefeministethicscanbeusedtoendorse
justwartheory,suchasliberalfeministethics.Further,asRobinsonandHeldhaveargued,critical,
feministcareethicsmustbeabletodealwithissuesofviolenceifitistoreducethepossiblyof
violenceinthefirstplace,whichIdiscussedinChaptersTwoandFour.ThepointforHutchingsis
thatthefeministtheoriesthatendorseanyuseofforcearenotgoingtobeproperlytransformative
becausetheywillonlyperpetuatetheacceptabilityofviolence,whichispartofourmoral
experienceoftheworldowingtothelonghistoryofviolencebeinganacceptablemethodtosolve
internationaldisputes.Hutchingsclaimsherethicalmethod“callsintoquestiontheassumed
boundariesbetweenviolenceandnon-violence,peaceandwar,securityandinsecurity.”50Suchan
ethicdoesnotoperateonthebaldoppositiontothenotionthatpoliticalviolenceisevernecessary,
butratheritquestions“thekindofethicallifewhichgeneratesthetragicdilemmaofweighingup
individuallivesagainsteachotheroragainstcollectiveinterestsorabstractnorms.”51Violenceitself
isnotforbiddenasapractice,butrathertheassumptionofnecessarypoliticalviolenceasanormis
strenuouslyquestionedandopposed.Theattempttojustifyviolenceissomethingthatispossibleto
question,butanyclaimto‘justifiedviolence’cannotberuledout“inadvancebyanappealtoa
necessarystandpointforjudgment.”52Hutchingsusestheexampleaboutjustwartheoryto
demonstratetheabilityofhermethodtoassesscontextsforpreviouslyunseenethicalproblemsin
additiontounderscoringherscepticismaboutthepossibilityofanyethicalstandpointtoreject
problematicclaimswithoutfirstengagingwiththem.
Thesecondexamplecentresonfemalecircumcisionanditsethicalsignificance.Hutchings
statesthatthefirstquestionshouldbetodetermine“how[apractice]isethicallymeaningfulwithin
thecontextofaparticularformofethicallife.”53Often,suchpracticesareconsideredanethical
necessitywithinthecommunityitself.However,onceagainHutchings’methodwouldfirstestablish
thatethicalnecessitiesarenotabsolutenecessities,butareinsteadtiedupinsociallyconstructed
50
Ibid.,124.
Ibid.
52
Ibid.,126.
53
Ibid.
51
176
understandingsofculture,politics,economicpractices,andinstitutions.54Humanrightsadvocates,
shenotes,oftencondemnthepractice,anddosoundertheguidelinesoftheUDHR.Theyignore,
unfortunately,thattheUDHRalsoinvestsethicalsignificanceinthefamilyandthecommunity.As
such,theserightsareintensionwiththerighttobeprotectedagainsttorture,whichmanyactivists
mobilizeinanefforttostopfemalecircumcision.55Thisistheproblemwithanyattemptto
universalizemoralstandpoints:theyoftenconflictwhenappliedtocontextsthatdidnotproduce
them.Hutchingssuggeststhat,insteadofkeepingthesamesetofrightsandsimplyextendingtheir
sphereofapplicability,itmightbecomenecessarytocreatenewrights,whichmightinturn
“revolutionizeorevendestroytheinstitutionstowhichtheUDHRrefers.”56Ethicalsignificancein
thecaseoffemalecircumcisionisnotarightagainsttorture,becauserightsthemselvesarenot
actually“ethicaltrumpcard[s],”57thatistheyarenotethicallynecessary.Rightsmustbe
understoodinrelationtohowtheyfunctioninthebroadersocialandpoliticalcontext.Failingto
understandrightsincontextresultsintheproblematictensionexploredhere.WhatHutchings’
feministethicalmethodcansayaboutfemalecircumcision,then,isthewhentheethicalsignificance
ofanypracticehasparticularburdensthatarealmostexclusivelybornebyaparticulargroup,
specificallyalonggenderedlines,thatiswherewecanbegintoquestionthenormsthatsurround
thepractice.Butinordertoquestion,onemustalsounderstand,whichenjoinsthetheoristandthe
activisttoengagewiththepeoplebywhomandonwhomfemalecircumcisionispracticed.This
meansthatthetheoristmustfirstunderstandtheirownmoralcontext(acombinationofmoral
phenomenologyandgenealogy)aswellastrytounderstandthemoralcontextofthosewho
practicefemalecircumcision.Oncethereishonestyaboutone’sownmoralcontexts,the
conversationcanprogresstoanethicaljudgmentmadethroughdialogue,andthenapossible
solutioncanbeachieved.
Hutchings’finalexampleishowtheorganizedandsystematicrapeintheBosnianWarwas
categorizedasacrimeagainsthumanity,andhowthecontentofourethicalprescriptionmatters.It
isimportantthatsuchaheinousactioniscondemned,butthereasonsbehinditwereultimately
veryproblematic.TherapesintheBosnianwarwerejustifiedascrimesagainsthumanityontwo
counts:1)itwasorganizedsystematically(‘weaponized’),and2)itwasanattemptatethnic
genocidebyenforcedpregnancy.58TherearetwostridentresponsestothiswithinHutchings’
feministethicalmethod.Thefirstisthatweaponizedrapeonlymakessensewithinaspecific
54
Ibid.
Ibid.,127.
56
Ibid.,127-8.
57
Ibid.,128.
58
Ibid.
55
177
contextof“patriarchalassumptionsaboutthemeaningofrapeasaninstrumentforhurtingand
undermining,notthevictimsthemselvesasindividuals,buttheirmalerelationsandcompatriots
whocomprisethe‘enemy.’”59Rapeasaweaponisconstructednotasanactiontakenagainstthe
womenperse,butratheragainsthusbands,brothers,andfatherswhowouldbedemoralizedwhen
findingouttheirfemalerelationorpartnerhadbeenraped.Thevictimsthemselvesareobscuredby
thefocusonthereactionofhermalerelationsandtheirreactionstotheviolencecommittedupon
herbodyandmind.60Thisfirstpointalsofocusesononlyfemalevictimsofrape.Themalevictims
ofrapearehiddenfromview,whichrenderstheirsufferingasnotworthyofbeingnotedasacrime
againsthumanityatall.Secondly,theviewofsystematicrapeasattemptedgenocidealsoobscures
women,viewingthemprimarilyas“vesselsforthepropagationoftherace.”61Thisunderstanding
continuestotiethevalueofwomenaspeopletotheirabilitytoproducechildren.Thereasons,then,
forcategorizingtherapesintheBosnianwarascrimesagainsthumanityonlyservetoreinforcethe
waysinwhichrapecanremainaweapon.ByengagingwiththedeplorableactsintheBosnianwar
inthetermsusedbytheperpetrators,thelegalprescriptionsonlyservetoreinforceaworldwhere
suchactsremainapossibility.Thiscasealsodemonstratesthedangerofassumingthatthetheorists’
positionisuniversalizable,becausethis“globalises[…]theprivilegedpositionofthetheorist.”62If
thereistobearealtransformationoftheworldwemustbeevervigilantagainstthereproductionof
ourstandpointsthroughourassumptionsthatourunderstandingoftheworldcancountforthatof
others,eventheassumptionthatcarecanbeuniversallyapplied.Unreflexiveoruncriticaljudgment
iswhatwillresultin“reproducingoldexclusionsorintroducingnewones.”63
ThisreturnsustowhatHutchingsclaimstobethefailureofcritical,feministcareethics:that
ethicsshould,butsofarhasfailedtobetransformative.Althoughthecriticalethicsofcareis
constructedtobeabletoassesstheworldasitisandsuggestpossiblenewworlds,accordingto
Hutchingsitdoessobytooreadilyengagingauniversalizingclaimaboutcareinordertojudge
whetherornotcertainrelationshipsfosterandsustaincare.Instead,whatisnecessaryistomove
beyondthedrivetojudgetheactionsofothersinlightofabstractprinciples,andbegintoassessand
deconstructthe“backgroundvalues,practicesandinstitutionswhichgivethoseactionsmeaning.”64
ThefirstorderwithinHutchingsethicalmethodmustbetounderstandthepossibleassumptions
behindthepractice,ratherthanjudgingfromastandpoint,eitherthatofwomenorthatofcare.
59
Ibid.,129.
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
"ThinkingEthicallyAbouttheGlobalin'GlobalEthics',"JournalofGlobalEthics10,no.1(2014):28.
Emphasisintheoriginal.
63
Ibid.,27.
64
"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"129.
60
178
However,thisrejectionofa‘bedrock’forjudgment,andacorrespondingfocusonhowcontext
coloursallaspectsofjudgment,leadstothequestionofwhethermoraljudgmentsarepossibleatall.
MargaretUrbanWalkernotesthatalthoughwecouldjudgewithinthesystem,wecannotjudge
outsidethesocialsystem,andwehavenoauthoritytodoso.65Thosewhodonothavethesame
moralbedrocksmightnotholdtoethicsthataremutuallyintelligible.Inordertocrossthatdivide,
onewouldhavetochangetheentiretyofsomeone’ssocio-culturallife,whichisimpossible,morally
wrong,ormorelikelyboth.66Ifwecannotjudgebecausewehavenoauthority,thereisnorational
justificationforanyinterventioninthelivesofothers.Themoralactionswetake,then,areones
thataregearedtowardensuringthatthatwhateverchangeswemaketoourwaysoflifedonot
negativelyimpactothers.67
Hutchings,however,rejectstheimpossibilityofjudgment.Ifethicsaretobetransformative
infact,notjustinvainhope,thenjudgmentsmustoccur.Feministethicsmustbeprimarilyfocused
ontheproblemsstemmingfromthenormsthatproducegenderedrelationsofpower,andthe
judgmentsinvolvedshouldbeaimedatchallengingthosenorms.Yet,thesejudgmentsarenot
meantobeuniversalones,becausealljudgmentisbuiltuponone’sownmoralandpoliticalbedrock.
Evenfeministconcernsarenotapolitical.Ratherthanstrivingforuniversallyapplicablejudgments,
Hutchingsacceptsthevulnerabilityandcontextualnatureofjudgmentsandsuggeststhree
guidelinesforthetheoristtofollowwhenjudging.First,thetheoristmust“recogniseand
acknowledgethemoralimaginarythatshetakesforgranted.”68Thisisarestatementoftheearlier
understandingthattheethicaltheoristmustbeawareoftheirownmoralbedrockfromwhichthey
theorize.Second,shemust“workonengagementwithothermoralimaginariesinmodesotherthan
thoseofprotection,educationorpunishment.”69Insteadofassumingthattheroleofthetheoristis
toengageinonlytheirnativemodeofthought,thetheoristinsteadseekstoexpandtheir
understandingofthedifferentmoralimaginariesintheworldbeforetakingotheraction.Thirdand
last,“toembracetheriskofjudgmentasoneinwhichworldsarealwayswageredandinwhichwins
andlossesarecrucialforeveryone,includingthemoraltheoristherselfaswellasthoseaboutwhom
shewrites.”70Theethicaltheoristacceptsthatwhenshejudges,shedoessoinveryrealtermsthat
canentailrealconsequences.Tojudgeanother’sworldistoinvitejudgmentaboutyourownworld,
andthatisaveryriskyproposition,intellectuallyandpersonally.
65
Walker,MoralUnderstandings:AFeministStudyinEthics,208.
Ibid.,209.
67
Ibid.,210.
68
KimberlyHutchings,"APlaceofGreaterSafety?SecuringJudgmentinInternationalEthics,"inThe
VulnerableSubject:BeyondRationalisminInternationalRelations,ed.AmandaRussellandShickBeattie,Kate
(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),37.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
66
179
Section 3 – Transformation and Judgment
ThecritiquethatHutchingslevelsattheethicsofcaresuggeststhatcritical,feministcareethicsis
vulnerabletotheproblemscreatedbythetensionbetweentheuniversalstandpointofcareandthe
particularityofmoraljudgments.Further,becausecareethicsengagestoocloselywithharmful
normsandpractices(genderedpowerrelationsbeingoneexample),itmightonlyreinforcethe
statusquo,makingitunabletosupportthekindoftransformationthatHutchingsdeemspreferable
forfeministethics.Yet,Iquestionthenotionthatthereisonlyoneacceptablemodeof
transformation,andwecanthinkofthetransformationthatHutchingsoffersasbeingmoreradical
whilethetransformationofcareethicsismorereformist.Iargue,contrarytoHutchings,thatthere
isnothingwrongwithwantingtoreforminternationalpolitics,tofixitstep-by-stepratherthanseek
radicaltransformation.Further,IarguethetensionthatHutchingsdrawsoutisonethatcareethics
mustpaycloseattentiontoifitistobetransformative,andthatitisatensionthatiscompatible
withthepossibilityofmoraljudgmentbasedonthepracticesofcareinthefirstplace.Becauseof
Hutchings’critique,theethicsofcarecanbefurtherrefinedandimproved,muchasthetheory
developedtoanswerthecritiquesof‘orthodox’careethicsasdiscussedinChapterOne.
Section 3.1 - Transformation
Consideringthatmygoalinthisthesisistodemonstratethepracticabilityofcritical,feministcare
ethicsasatoolofcriticalanalysisforglobalmoralandpoliticalcontexts,aswellasaguideforpublic
policy,itremainsmyconvictionthatcareethicsisanethicaltheorythatcangiveuspractical
guidancetoengagewiththeworldasitistoday.Iamdubiousoftheviabilityofanethicalmethod
that,onceitidentifiesbadmoralpracticesandnorms,attemptstotranscendtheminfavourofthe
creationofnewpracticesontheassumptionthatthisisthebestwaytodefypatternsofoppression.
EvenifIweretoconcedethatHutchingsoutlinesabettermethod,Ineednotconcedethatherkind
oftransformationistheonlykindoftransformationpossible.Thetransformativepotentialofcare
ethicsisreformistinnature.Itisnotaplatformfora‘carerevolution’inaradicalsense,“butonlya
slow,ploddingjourneywheretinyvictoriesareachievedeachtimeamomentisspentlistening
attentivelyandpatientlytotheneedsofanother,wherethatmomentspentcanberecognizedas
deeplymoralandofgreatpersonalandsocietalvaluewithoutcomingatgreatimmediateorlongtermcost,eithertoindividualsortosocietyasawhole.”71Thecriticalethicsofcareoffersamore
modest,andperhapsmorefraughtkindoftransformation,butitisthekindoftransformationwe
71
Robinson,"CareEthics,PoliticalTheory,andtheFutureofFeminism,"307.
180
canstartenactingrightnowinourlivesaswelivethembyusingthestandpointofcaretoassess
ourselves,thosearoundus,andthestateoftheworldtoday.Wecanchangetheworld,and
althoughitwillcomeinsmallsteps,inalongprocess,itisnotbeyondus.
Hutchingshastooreadilydismissedwhatitistoengagewithharmfulnormsandpractices.
Sheclaimsthatthebestwaytodefytheoppressionthatthesenormsandpracticesfosteristo
ensurethatwedonotperpetuatethem.72SheusestheexampleofthemassrapesintheBosnian
wartoillustratehowengagementcanbeproblematicfortransformation.Inspiteofthelegislation
passedtocategorise‘weaponisedrape’asacrimeagainsthumanity,thelegislationitselfobscures
thegenderedrelationsofpowerinherentinrape.Further,becauseitdefinesforcibleimpregnation
asgenocidal,thisreinforcesandtacitlyacceptstheideathat“therapistdeterminesthenationality,
ethnicity,raceorreligionofthechildandconfirmsboththepotentialeffectivenessofrapeasa
weaponandthejustifiabilityoftheshameexperiencedbyandattributedtothevictims.”73Inan
attempttoengagewiththehorrorsoftheBosnianwar,theUnitedNationsissuedlegislationthat
wasnotcriticalenoughoftheunderlyingassumptionsthatmademassrapespossibleinthefirst
place.Butalthoughthisisatellingpointagainsthumanrightsdiscourses,itisthesameproblem
thatthecarecritiqueholdsagainsthumanrights.AsIarguedinChapterThree,humanrightsdonot
always‘see’therootcausesofcomplicatedmoralandpoliticalcontexts.Thecarecritiqueofhuman
rightsspecificallytargetsthefactthathumanrightscannotalways‘see’theunderlyingnormative
assumptionsthatproducetheprobleminthefirstplace,suchastheideathatissuesofsocial
reproductionarenotproperpoliticalconcerns,whichhasfosteredthecrisisofcarewecurrently
faceaswellastheplightofthetransnationalmigrantcareworker.
Theethicsofcareisacriticaltoolthatismeanttoengagewith,understand,unpack,and
accesstherootcausesofwhytheseatrocitieshappeninthefirstplace.Engagementwithcurrent
practicesisnecessary,anditallowsustoengagewithandaltercurrentpracticesbybringingthem
moreinlinewiththecritical,feministethicsofcare.Thisisvastlyimportant,aschangingpractices
alsochangesthosewhoareimpactedbythosepractices.74Withoutengagement,wecannot
understand.Withoutunderstanding,wecannotalterwhatisintosomethingelse,thatis,wecannot
transformthemoralandpoliticallandscape.AsZhoupointsout,whenwedocument,map,and
tracehowourdenseinterdependentrelationsareshapedbypolicy,norms,andotherinstitutional
patternsofpower,this“providesanempiricalbasisfordevelopingsocialjusticetheories,andtheir
relatedpolicies,whereinthepursuitofequityincludesissuesthatgofarbeyondtheclassicwelfare
72
Hutchings,"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"129.
Ibid.,130.
74
Conradi,118-9.
73
181
statemodel…”butexpandstoinclude“…thesocialdivisionoflabourandstructuresofdecisionmakingpower.”75Theethicsofcareseekstotransformtheworld,butnotthroughasceptical
ethicalmethod.Rather,itworksthroughexistingrelationshipsandpatternsofpowertoquestion
thosepatternsofpower.76AsarguedinChapterTwo,thetransformativepotentialofcritical,
feministcareethicsliesinitsabilitytoenableandstimulateadifferentkindofactionthatcanserve
tocounteractmorallyproblematicpractices.Actionisnotjustindividualactionbuttakesplace
betweenpersons“inthewayindividualssimultaneouslyrelatetooneanotherincommon(and
collective)interaction,withinandwithregardtoinstitutions.”77Thelocationandmethodof
transformationthatcareethicsoffersisrelational,opposingoppressiverelationsofpowerthrougha
demonstrationofhowwecanactbetterasindividuals,andalsohowinstitutionscanenablerather
thanhinderourcaringrelations.NolessthanHutchings’methoddoestheethicsofcarestriveto
make‘seen’whatwaspreviouslyrenderedinvisiblebythecurrentstateofinternationalpolitics:the
relationsofpowerbetweennations,genderandracialnorms,andeconomicandpoliticalforcesthat
rendercertainpeoplevulnerabletooppression,marginalization,andexploitation.Theserelations
arethenreformed,reshapedandalteredsothattheypromoteworldsinwhichpeoplecanbetter
fulfiltheircaringresponsibilities.
Section 3.2 - Judgment
However,Hutchings’mainclaimisthatthecriticalethicofcareiscaughtbetweentheuniversalizing
standpointofcareandtheacknowledgementthatcross-contextualjudgmentisinherently
problematic.78Thesoundnessofourmoraljudgments,evenbasedonthestandpointofcare,is
problematicwhenwealwaysmakejudgmentsembeddedwithinparticularcontexts.Theclaimis
that,assuch,wecannotproperlyjudgethecontextofothers.However,thistensionisnot
impossibletoovercome.SeylaBenhabibarguesthatitispossibletomakejudgmentsinthe
particularfromauniversalabstraction.BenhabibfocusesonasimilartensionintheworkofHannah
Arendtinmakingthisclaim,andIadopthermethodinordertoreconcilethistensioninthecritical,
feministethicsofcare.GivenHutchings’emphasisonmethodratherthanfoundationalmoral
content,itisfittingthatIadoptthesamestrategyindefenceofherchargeagainsttheethicsofcare.
AlthoughbothArendtandBenhabibusethelanguageofdutiesandmaxims,Benhabib’saimisthe
sameasmyown:todemonstratehowwecanhavemoraljudgmentsaboutparticularcontextswhile
operatingfromauniversalistposition.UnlikeBenhabib,Ifocusoncare.Interestingly,sheclaims
75
NeysmithandZhou,154.
Conradi,119-20.
77
Ibid.,125.
78
Hutchings,"TowardsaFeministInternationalEthics,"120.
76
182
thatalthoughArendt’sattempttocombineAristotle’sconcernwithparticularswithauniversalist
Kantianstandpointwasconfusing,itneverthelesscontainedadeeplyimportantinsight.Theinsight
wasthat“byweakeningtheoppositionbetweencontextualjudgmentandauniversalistmorality,”
thiscan“helpusseethroughsomefalsefrontsincontemporarymoralandpoliticaltheory.”79For
example,oneofthefalsefrontsthatcritical,feministcareethicsallowsustoseethroughisthe
divisionbetweentheprivateandthepublicspheresoflife,asdiscussedinChapterOne.The
methodologicalresultisthatmoralandpoliticaljudgmentbecomepartofapoliticalethic,wherewe
mustincorporatehonestyabouthowourownparticularcontextsinfluenceourjudgmentsbasedon
theuniversalstandpointofcare.Inbeinghonestaboutourownmoralcontexts,weareableto
engageinatransformativeprojectwithothers—whoalsohavetheirownparticularcontexts—
becausewecanbothbeginfromthesharedstandpointthatcareisnecessarytothecontinuanceof
humanlife.Becauseeveryhumansocietyinvolvessomeformofcare,whetheritisemotional,
physical,orinstitutional,wecanstartfromthisfactanduseitasaflexibletooltochangetheworld.
Benhabibarguesthatmoraljudgmentisapervasiveandunavoidablepartofhumanlife;she
writes:“Moraljudgmentiswhatwe‘alwaysalready’exerciseinvirtueofbeingimmersedina
networkofhumanrelationshipsthatconstituteourlifetogether.”80Ifwewithdrawfrommoral
judgment,however,weceasetointeractwiththerestofthehumancommunity.81Ifweacceptthat
moraljudgmentisanintegralpartofhumanlife,thenthecritical,feministethicsofcaremustbe
abletoengageinjudgment.Refusingtojudge,evenacrosscontexts,wouldthenbetoremove
ourselvesfromthepatternsofrelationsthatconnectourworldtogether.Therearefewwhoareso
isolatedastobecompletelyuntouchedbythewebofglobalrelationsthataresustainedthrough
political,economic,andculturalexchange.Wemustbeabletohavethetoolsofmoraljudgmentif
wearetoengagewiththerestoftheworld.
Therearethreewaysinwhichmoraljudgmentcanbeunderstoodasaformofmoral
interactionwithothers.Theseare,ingeneralterms,theassessmentofone’sresponsibilities,one’s
actionsregardingthecarryingoutofresponsibilities,andtheethical‘bedrock’asexpressedor
revealedthroughone’sactions.82Withregardtoone’sresponsibilities,thereisatensionbetween
howweunderstandthemintheabstract,basedonthestandpointofcare,andwhatthepracticesof
carewoulddemandofusinanyparticularsituation.Ourcaringresponsibilitiesforothersareoften
extendedtowardfriendsandfamily,andhowweassessourresponsibilitiesdependsonthe
contextualsituationofthoserelations.Inotherwords,“Theexerciseofmoraljudgmentthatis
79
Benhabib,SituatingtheSelf:Gender,CommunityandPostmodernisminContemporaryEthics,124.
Ibid.,125.Emphasisintheoriginal.
81
Ibid.,126.
82
Ibid.,127.
80
183
concernedwiththeepistemicidentificationofhumansituationsandcircumstancesasmorally
relevantdoesnotproceedaccordingtothemodelofthesubsumptionofaparticularundera
universal.”83Forexample,Imighthavearesponsibilitytomyfriend,butthecircumstancesthat
surroundourrelationshipcanalterthecontentofthatresponsibility,suchasdistance.Similarly,
governmentshaveresponsibilitiestowardthosewhofallundertheirpower(understandingthat
governmentscanactonnon-citizensaswellascitizens),andthecontentofthoseresponsibilities
canchangeastherelationshipitselfchanges.Considerthatwhenchildrengrowintoadultsthe
governmentthenhasdifferentresponsibilitiesforthatpersongeneratedbytheirchangedstatus.
Thatwehavecaringresponsibilitiesisnotindispute,butthequestionishowwejudgewhatthe
contentofthoseresponsibilitiesshouldbeinlightofshiftingcontextualfactors.Judgmentis
possiblebecausethepracticesofcare,particularlyattentiveness,canbeusedasacriticaltoolto
investigatewhatourresponsibilitiesshouldbe.Inthecaseofmyfriend,Icanperhapsrelyon
intuition(thoughincaseswheremyintuitionfails,Icouldusethelensofcaretotrytouncoverwhat
myfriendmightneedfromme).Inthecaseofgovernments,asIarguedinChapterFive,theethics
ofcareandthecaringpracticeofresponsibilitycanbeusedtoclarifytheresponsibilitythe
governmenthastowardparticularpersonsunderitspower,suchastheresponsibilitythe
governmenthastodevelopapolicythatwilladdress,forexample,theneedsofthetransnational
careworker.Establishingtheresponsibilitiesofindividualsandinstitutions,andhowthat
responsibilityismademanifest,isthefirststeptowardbeingabletomakemoralandpolitical
judgments.
Secondly,wemustconsiderthathowweactonourresponsibilitiesisanothersourceof
moralinteraction.Benhabibclaimsthat:“Theidentityofamoralactionisnotonethatcanbe
construedinlightofageneralrulegoverningparticularinstancesbutentailstheexerciseofmoral
imaginationwhichactivatesourcapacityforthinkingofpossiblenarrativesandactdescriptionsin
lightofwhichouractionscanbeunderstoodbyothers.”84Forexample,althoughthepracticesof
caredemandthatcaringpolicesareresponsivetotheirtargetgroups,thedifferentrequirementsof
eachpersoninthetargetgroupofanypolicymightrequireslightlydifferentresponsesfromus(i.e.
actions)basedontheircontext.Judgmentisnotassimpleas‘responsiveornot’,asthoughitwerea
tick-boxonaform.Rather,judgmentwoulddependonhowwellthepolicyrespondedtothe
nuancedneedsofthetargetgroupboundedbythecontextsofthatpolicy,especiallythevarious
kindsofresourcesthatwereavailabletoenactthepolicyinthefirstplace.Perhapsthepolicycould
onlybeminimallyresponsivebecauseofalackofmoneyorpersonnel,orperhapstherewasenough
83
Ibid.,128.Emphasisintheoriginal.
Ibid.,128-9.Emphasisintheoriginal.
84
184
moneyandpeopletoimplementthepolicybutitwasnotdeemedworththeinvestmentofsuch
resources.Ourjudgmentinthiscaserestsonaslidingscale,changingaswetracktheconditionsin
whichanypolicyisenacted.Inthefirstinstancewemightmakethemoraljudgmentthatthe
governmentdoingsomethingimperfectlywasbetterthannotdoingitall,butthatinthesecond
instancetherewasadegreeoffailureinthegovernment’sresponsivenesstothetargetgroup
becauseitcouldhaveenactedamoreresponsivepolicy.
Third,andlast,wemustassesswhatourethicalfoundationsareastheyarerevealed
throughouractions.AsBenhabibnotes:“Theassessmentofthemaximofone’sintentions,asthese
embodymoralprinciples,requiresunderstandingthenarrativehistoryoftheselfwhoistheactor;
thisunderstandingdisclosesbothself-knowledgeandknowledgeofone’sselfasviewedbyothers.”85
Essentially,ifIamtobehonestaboutmyethicalfoundations,whichisanecessarypreconditionfor
engagementincross-contextualmoraljudgment,Imustunderstandhowmyselfisconstructed
throughthewebsofrelationsIinhabit,notjustfrominsidemyownmind,butinthemindsofothers
aswell.UnlessIcanseemyselfandunderstandthatothersmightseesomethingdifferent,we
cannotproperlyaccessourethical‘bedrock’andthuscannotbehonestaboutit.Consider,for
example,anattempttobuildpeacebetweentwopreviouslyhostilefactions.Bothsidessee
themselvesashavingvalid,evenheroicreasonsforacting,andoftencasttheotherasan
unreasoningbelligerent.Alternatively,theyascribemotivestotheopposingfactionthatareonly
internallyintelligible,makingreal,honestcommunicationunlikely.Rather,wemustcombinethe
internalandexternalviewsofourselvesifwearetoassessthewayinwhichtheuniversalstandpoint
ofcareisexpressedthroughourparticularcontexts.
Thisresults,then,inthecreationofarobustpoliticalethicthatisabletomediatebetweena
universalmoralstandpointofcareandthevaried,particularcontextsinwhichcareisexpressed,
enabled,orhindered.Further,Benhabibclaimsthatthepoliticalethiccangoastepfurtherand
involvethecultivationandencourageaparticularpublicethos.ForArendt,thatwouldbeanethos
ofdemocraticparticipation.86Whenbasedonthestandpointofcare,itisinsteadapublicethosof
carethatwouldbecultivatedandencouraged.Thisethoswouldfocusonbringingcarefirmlyinto
thepublicsphere,becausethepracticesofcarearenecessarytoalllife.AsarguedinChapterThree,
withouttheacknowledgementoftheimportanceofcareinourlives,wecanobscureimportant
moralconcernsaboutsocialreproductionandcontinuetodevaluecare,caregivers,andcare
recipients.
85
Ibid.,129.Emphasisintheoriginal.
Ibid.,139-40.
86
185
Itisthroughthisparticularmethodofresolvingtheuniversalandtheparticularthatwe
cometounderstandthat“articulationofdifferencesthroughcivicandpoliticalassociationsis
essentialforustocomprehendandtocometoappreciatetheperspectiveofothers.”87Ratherthan
closeoffthepossibilityofmoraljudgmentbetweencontexts,wemustbeopentoit,becauseonly
throughthismoralandpoliticalengagementareweabletoovercomethenotionthatour
differencesareasourceofinexorabledivision.Overcomingthisnotionwillalsochallenge
institutions,norms,andotherpracticesthatuseourdifferencesasasourceofoppression,exclusion,
andviolence.Wemustbeopentotheperspectivesofothers,becauseinsodoingweareableto
cultivateourmoralimaginations,allowingforourself-centredperceptionsofourselvestobe
“constantlychallengedbythemultiplicityanddiversityofperspectivesthatconstitutepubliclife.”88
Ourself-perspectives,andthusourethicalfoundations,canbeprofoundlychallengedonthe
internationallevel.Thiskindofchallengedemandsthehonestyoftheselfandourethical‘bedrock,’
whichinturnmeansthatalthoughweacceptthatourjudgmentsaremostintelligiblefromwithin
theperspectiveofourowncontexts,thisdoesnotprecludetheabilitytoextendthatjudgment
outwards.
Theethicsofcare,therefore,owesadebttoHutchings,forwithouthercritiqueofthe
methodologyofcareethicsandthechallengetoitscapacityforprescriptivejudgmentandits
transformativeaims,itmayhaveruntheriskofremainingunresponsivetoaninternaltension.Like
theresponsetothecritiquesoftheearly,‘orthodox’ethicsofcareasdiscussedinChapterOne,
whichpushedcarephilosopherstowardsapoliticalethicofcare,thisresponsetoHutchingsdoes
notdemonstratethatcareisimmunetocritique,butratherdemonstratestheabilityofcritical,
feministcareethicstoadapttoimportantcritiqueswithoutlosingitscorecommitments.Itis
throughcritiquesthattheethicsofcarehasgrown,developed,andbecomearobustmoraland
politicaltheory.Theethicsofcareremainscommittedtoarelationalunderstandingofpersons,to
demonstratinghowthelensofcarecanbeusedtoanalysethewaysinwhichnorms,institutions,
andpatternsofpowershapethoserelations,andtoidentifytherootcausesofglobalmoralcontexts.
Additionally,careethicsiscommittedtofurtheringpracticaloutcomes,andarguesthatthepractices
ofcarecanbeusedtoguidenotonlypersonalbutinstitutionalactionaswell,specificallythrough
publicpolicy.Althoughwemustacceptthesituatednatureofmoraljudgment,thisdoesnot
precludethepossibilityofjudgmentatall,becausethestandpointofcareprovidesuswitha
touchstoneforcross-contextualdialogueaswenegotiateourself-perceptionsinlightofawide
87
Ibid.,140.
Ibid.,141.
88
186
diversityofperspectives.Thepossibilityfortransformation,then,liesinourwillingnesstocontinue
toengagethatverydialogueandactuponourjudgments.
187
Conclusion
Themainconcernofthisthesisistoassertthatwhilehumanrightsdiscourseshavedonemuchto
groundtheeffortsthatinstitutionsandindividualshavemadetoreducetheprevalenceofglobal
povertyandincreasethesecurity,education,andeconomicwellbeingofwomenandgirlsaround
theworld,theseissuesareneverthelessongoing.Further,humanrightsdiscourseshavenotbeen
abletocurtailtherisinglevelsofinequalitywithinandbetweennations,andneitheraretheywell
suitedtoaddressingthecontextofthetransnationalcaremarket,themigrantcareworkerswhoare
inthatmarket,andthedarklogicofhumantraffickingthatoftenrunsalongsidethe‘legitimate’
migrantcaremarket.Theprimaryargumentofthisthesisisthattheethicsofcareisapowerfultool
thatcanbeusedtoaddressthesecontextsbyofferingnewinsights,redefiningproblems,expanding
thescopeofmoralandpoliticalconcern,whilealsobeingabletoprovidecross-contextual
judgments,newmotivationforaction,andspurringthetransformationofourglobalmoralpolitical
landscape.
However,inordertounderstandhowwecanjustifyusingcareethicsonaglobalscale,ithas
beennecessarytoexploretheconceptualhistoryoftheethicsofcare,demonstratinghowcritique
hasbeenimportanttothedevelopmentofcareethicssinceitsinceptionintheearly1980s.The
ethicsofcarebeganintheworkofGilligan,Noddings,andRuddick,allofwhomexpressprofound
dissatisfactionwithmainstreamethicaltheories,becausesuchtheoriesholda(perhapsunconscious)
malebias;thuscaretheoristsrejecttheprimacyofmainstreamtheoriessuchasKantianethicsor
utilitarianism.Theethicsofcare,Gilliganclaims,moreaccuratelyrepresentshowwomenandgirls
reasonmorally,becausetheyviewthemoralselfinamulti-directionalwebofrelationsratherthana
verticalhierarchyofrightsholdersanddutybearers.Predicatedonthisconceptionofselfas
embeddedwithinrelationswithothers,moralquestionsarelessabouttowhomoneowesduties,
butratherabouthowonebestbalancesthecompetingresponsibilitiesonehasinvirtueofthe
inexorablefactofourembeddednessinrelations.Noddings’andRuddick’sworkoncareethics
buildsonGilligan’swork,expandingbeyondherworkonpsychologicalmoraldevelopmentinorder
toproduceaphilosophicalaccountoftheethicsofcareasafully-fledgedmoraltheory.While
Ruddickarguesthatcarecouldbeunderstoodthroughthepracticeofmothering,hermainfocusis
howwomen’sexperiences,especiallythoseofcaregiving,wereabsentfromtraditionalmoral
philosophy,andtheclaimthatsuchexperiencescouldprovideabasisfordifferentanswerstomoral
problems.Noddingsarguesthatitisnotonlywomenwhohavebeenignoredinmoralphilosophy,
buttheentireprivatesphere.Thisisproblematicbecausetheprivatesphereiswherecaregiving
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andreceivingtakesplace,andhistoricallytheonlyonewomencouldoccupybecausetheywere
barredfrompublic,politicalparticipation.Noddingsalsodrawsouttheimportanceofemotional
attachmentinourethicalreasoning,arguingthatfeelingisanessentialpartofcaring,thoughnot
theonlypart.Importantly,Noddingsalsoacknowledgesthepossibilitythatcarecanbepaternalistic,
manipulative,orexploitative,andassuchshehighlightsanimportantdistinctionfortheearly,
‘orthodox’ethicsofcare:althoughweassessrelationsfromtheperspectiveofcare,thegoalisnot
tosay‘allcareisgood’,butrathertofindwaystomorallyevaluaterelationsofcare.
However,theearlyethicsofcarefacedsharpcriticismfromdifferentsources.Mainstream
ethicalphilosophersquestionedtheabilityofcareethicstobeapublicethic,thatis,tohavescope
outsideoftheprivatespherebecauseofitsfocusoninterpersonalrelationships.Whilecertainly
thereneededtobeaninvestigationintothemoralchoicesonemakesinandamongstone’s
relations,itwasnotclearhowtheethicsofcarecouldeverbeusedasanethicforpubliclife.Ifthe
ethicsofcarecouldnotbeappliedtopubliclife,thenitwouldalsobeunabletoanswermoral
questionsofjustice.Betweenthesetwocritiques,itseemedasthoughtheethicsofcarewould
remainaprivate,parochialethic.Ontheotherhand,feministphilosophersexpresseddeepconcern
andcritiquedtheethicsofcarebecausetheyclaimeditservedtoreinforcegenderroles,linking
womenandcarework,ratherthanchallengingthem,basedontheclaimthatwomen’sexperiences
ascarersgavethemuniqueinsightintothemoralcontextsaroundcarework.
Asbitingasthesecritiqueswere,Ihavearguedtheywereneverthelessavitalpartofthe
growthofcareethicsfromitsoriginsintoarobustpoliticalethicwithadeepcommitmenttocritical,
feministanalysis.TheworkofTronto,Held,andKittaydemonstratesashiftawayfromthefocuson
theindividualinrelationshipandthemoralchoicesonefacesthere,toaquestionabouthow
institutionssuchasgovernments,businesses,andsocialnormsshapetherelationsweinhabit.The
ethicsofcarebecameacriticaltheory,alensonthepoliticalthataskedquestionsguidedbythe
practicesofcare.ForTrontothepracticesofcareareattentiveness,responsibility,competence,and
responsiveness.Whenweaskquestionssuchas“whydowomenthebulkofthecareworkat
home?”and“whyistheprovisionofcarenotconsideredapublicgood?”webegintoseehowcare
work,carers,andcarereceivershaveoftenbeenpushedtothepoliticalmargins,sidelinedand
unabletogivepoliticalvoicetotheirinterests.Theethicsofcareismorethanaprivatemorality;it
isamoralitythatchallengesthepublic/privatedivide,andhighlightshowquestionsofjusticeand
carecannotbeneatlyseparatedfromoneanother.Whilethepublicsphere,onthegroundsof
justice,hasalreadyinfiltratedtheprivatesphere,particularlyinfamilylaw,thereversehasnotoften
beenthecase;careprovisionhasremainedanissueoftensidesteppedinpolitics,particularlyin
nationsliketheUnitedStates.Additionally,theincreasedprevalenceofausteritymeasuressince
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the2008GlobalFinancialCrisishasshrunkthecareprovisionsinformerlymoreexpansivenations,
whichhasprimarilyimpacted“women,children,minorities,migrants,andthepoor,”1i.e.thosewho
aremostoftenvulnerabletooppression,marginalization,andexploitation.Lastly,andmoststrongly,
caretheoristsarguethattheethicsofcaredoesnotnecessarilyreproducegendernorms,butcan
insteadcriticallyinvestigatesuchnormsasoneoftherootcausesofwomen’scontinued
marginalizationandoppression.Becausetheethicsofcarehasbecomeapoliticalethic,itispossible
toseehowpoliciessuchasfamilyleaveorwelfarecanpotentiallyservetoreinforcegendernorms.
Ratherthanreinforcingtheideathatwomenare‘naturally’carers,thecriticalethicsofcareargues
thatsocial,political,andeconomicpatternsofpowerserveto‘code’womenascarerstoothers.
Theresponsestothecritiquesconsideredheredemonstratetheabilityofcareethicsandcare
theoriststogobeyondtheearlyformulationofcareethics,improvingthetheorytobetterarticulate
theworldaroundusandprovidedifferentanswerstomoralandpoliticalquestions.
Althoughcareethicsisapoliticalethic,mygoalhasbeentoaddressglobalmoraland
politicalcontexts,andtodosoIexploredtheworkofFionaRobinson,whowasamongthefirstto
turnthecritical,feministlensofcareethicstothefieldofinternationalrelations.Thejustification
Robinsonsupplies,andIsupport,isthatifweacceptthattheinternationalsphereiscomposedof
setsofrelationships—bothinstitutionalandindividual—andthattheethicsofcareisaprime
methodtoassessrelationshipsingeneral,thentheethicsofcareisanexcellenttooltousetoassess
theseinternationalrelationships.Ihavearguedthatacriticalethicsofcareisaviabletoolto
addressspecificissuesofmoralconcernwithintheglobalcontextinadditiontoahumanrights
analysis.Thecentralclaimisthatacareethicsanalysis,guidedbythepracticesofcare,offers
deeperinsightintotherootcausesofmoralcontextssuchasdifferenceandexclusion,skewed
genderrelations,andviolenceandhumaninsecurity.Further,ituncoversthewaysinwhichnorms
aboutgender,race,andclassareembeddedininstitutions,whichinturncanshapetheconcrete
relationshipsthataresharedbypeopleintheireverydaylives.Subsequently,theinformation
revealedbythelensofcareallowsustoimagineandenactdifferentkindsofsolutionstothe
problemswefacetoday,problemssuchasanincreaseintransnationalmigrationandthe
exploitationofcaringlabour,thecontinueddifficultiesthatwomenandgirlsfaceinobtainingan
education,housingorevenbasicsecurity,andthepatternsofexclusionthatallowforthe
continuanceofseverepoverty.InmyanalysisIdrewontheworkofWeir,Hochschild,Wilcox,and
Jaggartounderscorethetheoreticalaspectofaglobalcareethicswithpracticalexamplesof
women’scontinuedoppressionandmarginalization,inparticularfocusingonthecaseofthe
1
"ReportonAusterityMeasuresandEconomicandSocialRights,"(UnitedNationsHumanRightsOfficeofthe
HighCommissioner,2013),7.
190
transnationalmigrantcareworker.Isoughttoshowhowthelensofcareisabletobringtothefore
moralcontextsthatwereoftenoverlookedbymainstreamhumanrightsdiscourses.
Additionally,becausecareethicsoffersthisdeeperanalysisanddemandscritical,reflective
engagementwiththemoralcontextsitinvestigates,italsocanbeusedtoidentifypossiblesitesof
transformation.Thesesitesareplaceswhereourunderstanding,andthenpossiblyouractions,can
bealteredtoensurethatoursubsequentactionsenable,ratherthanhinder,thepracticesofcare
thatarenecessaryforhumanlifetocontinueandflourish.Transformationinthisinstancemustalso
beunderstoodasarelationalpractice,onethathappensbetweenandwithothersandwithregard
toinstitutions.Thetransformativepotentialofcareethicsliesinitsdifferentperspectiveandinthe
practicesofcarethataremeanttoguideouractionsaswedevelopandimplementsolutions,such
asthroughtransformingthepolicyprocesstobringconsiderationsofcareintofocus.Robinson’s
practicesofcare(attentiveness,responsibility,andresponsiveness)remindusthatalthoughwe
mighthavethebestofintentions,itisentirelypossiblefor‘care’tobepaternalisticorpernicious,
suchasenactingpolicymeasuresthatunnecessarilycurtailordictatetheactivitiesofaportionof
thepopulation‘fortheirowngood.’Thepracticesofcare,iffollowedcorrectly,aremeanttohelp
guideouractionswithoutfallingintoprovidingbadformsofcare.Aglobalethicofcaredoesnot
mandatethatweshouldcareaboutallothers.Instead,itapproachesglobalmoralcontextsfromthe
viewthatcareisvitaltocontinuedhumansurvival,andthewaysinwhichinstitutionsandindividuals
devaluecarecontributetohumansuffering.Careethicsoffersadifferentwaytounderstandissues
ofinequalityandinjusticethatgoesbeyondanidentificationofaprobleminordertoask:what
causedtheprobleminthefirstplaceandhowmightthecausesofsuchproblemsbeaddressed?
Thefactthatthecritical,feministethicsofcarerejectstheadequacyofmainstreammoral
andpoliticalphilosophiesdoesnotmeanthatIargueforthewholesalerejectionofhumanrights
discourse.Iprovidedabriefoverviewofthenatureandtheusefulnessofhumanrightstoaddress
internationalmoralandpoliticalcontextsthroughtheworkofGriffin,Beitz,andPogge.Through
theirworkIarguethatinspiteofthedifferencesinhumanrightsdiscourse,humanrightscanbe
thoughtofingeneralasasetofstandardsthatfunctionasenforceableclaims.Whatthismeansis
thathumanrightsfunctionasaminimummoralandpoliticalstandardforwhatitmeanstolivean
autonomouslife,andthatthesestandardssometimesgeneratefar-reachingclaimsofdutyupon
institutionsandindividuals.Thebenefitsofusinghumanrightsarenottobeeasilysetaside,andI
agreethathumanrightshaveimportantadvantages.First,humanrightsarestrongclaimsofjustice,
suchthatthestandardsofhumanrightsarenotonesthatrequireotherstoperformactsof
extraordinarykindness,butratherjusticedemandsthatweensurepeopledonotfallbelowa
particularstandard.Secondly,humanrightsoftenmarkoutareasofinternationalconcern,andare
191
oftentakenupbydisadvantagedgroupsaroundtheworldtolendlegitimacytotheirconcerns.
Third,andlast,humanrightscanofferclearandwell-definedpolicyguidance.
Myargumenthasnotbeentorejecttheimportanceorusefulnessofhumanrights,but
rathertoquestionthecapacityofhumanrightstoaddressthecomplexityofmoralandpolitical
contextsintheinternationalsphere.Ihavearguedthatinspiteoftheadvantagesofhumanrights
discourses,itisnottheonlyethicaltoolavailablewhenassessingandattemptingtoaddress
complexglobalmoralconcerns.InthisthesisIhavecritiquedhumanrightsfromtheperspectiveof
careinordertoshowthathumanrightscanoverlooktheverycontextsthatthelensofcarebrings
intofocus.Ihavesoughttodemonstrate,firstly,thathumanrightsdiscoursesoftencannotaddress
thestructuralharmsofmodernglobalizationbecausetheycannot‘see’therootcausesofthemoral
contextsinthefirstplace.Proclaimingthatcertainpersonshaverightsdoesnotnecessarilytellus
whysomepeopleareunabletoaccessthoserightsinthefirstplace,becausethereasonsforalack
ofaccessmaybeduetheunderlyingstructureofthecurrentglobalorder.Further,humanrightscan
carrywiththemaculturalandgenderbias,andalthoughitwouldbewrongtoclaimthatother
culturescannotnegotiatetheirownrelationshiptohumanrightsdiscourses,itistruethatwomen
andotherhistoricallydisadvantagedpersonsoftenneedtobetreatedasrecipientsof‘special’rights,
particularlyinthecaseofreproductiverightsforwomen.Howeverbecausehaving‘special’rights
canundercuttheintendeduniversalnatureofhumanrights,wecanbegintounderstandhow
oppressionandmarginalizationcanoccurevenifsomeone’shumanrightshavebeenmet.Lastly,
humanrightsalsostruggletoincorporatetheconcernsofsocialreproduction,i.e.carework,
becauserightsdiscoursesdonotoften‘see’careworkasanareawhererightsareanissue.Because
humanrightsdiscoursesmostoftenfocusontheindividualtakensingly,thisobscuresthefactthat
weareembeddedwithinwebsofrelations.Somecrucialhumanrelationshipsarestructuredinsuch
awaythatwomenshoulderthemajorityofthecarework.Assuchcarework,caregivers,andthose
whoreceivecareareoftenrenderedlessimportantanddevaluedonahumanrightsaccount.When
theprimarygoalistoanswerquestionsofjustice—construedintermsofrightsandduties—
questionsaboutwhocaresandwhyareoftenpushedtotheside,eventhoughthecurrentwaysin
whichcareisallocatediscertainlyunfairandunjust.Thepoint,then,wastoshowthatwhilehuman
rightsareimportant,theyarenottheonlywaytoapproachmoralandpoliticalproblems;thereare
someareaswherehumanrightsarenotwellsuitedtoprovidepossiblesolutions.Instead,wecan
andshouldturntothecritical,feministethicsofcaretobeourmoralandpoliticalguide,insome
situationsinparticular,andmorebroadlyasawaytoexpandthescopeofourthoughtandgenerate
evenmorewaystoaddressglobalmoralcontextsofinjustice.
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Thisthesishasworkedtohighlighttheuniqueandpowerfulperspectiveofthecritical,
feministethicsofcarewhenitcomestoglobalmoralandpoliticalcontexts.Fortheethicsofcare,
oursituatedcontextsmatter,andwecancometounderstandhowthoseverycontextsandthe
relationsweholdareshapedbyinternationalpatternsofpolitical,economic,andsocialpower.In
linewithRobinson,Ihavearguedthattheinstitutionalrelationsattheinternationallevelareripefor
acareanalysis.Byusingthepracticesofcaretoguideourthoughtaboutsuchinstitutions,weare
abletoseemoralandpoliticalcontextsinadifferentlightandbringtothefore:theexperiencesof
thosewhohavefacedexclusionpredicatedonbeing‘different;’theimpactgenderandracehave
uponone’slivedmoralandpoliticallife;andhowviolencecanbeperpetuatedthroughour
normativeandinstitutionalcommitments.Thisisnottodenythepracticalusefulnessandthe
importanceofhumanrightsasapoliticalethic,butrathertoencourageanexpansionofour
theoreticaltoolkit.
However,onemightbetemptedtocombinecareethicsandhumanrightstocreateasingle,
powerfulpoliticalethic.DanielEngstermadeonesuchattempt.Heclaimsthatinspiteofthe
analysisthatacriticalcareethiccanprovide,itlackstheabilitytoprovidecogentactionguidance,
particularlyformakersofpublicpolicy.Itistheveryflexibilityofcritical,feministcareethicsthat,
whileusefulforprovidinganalysis,rendersitproblematicwhenonetriestotakespecificactionor
makepublicpolicy.Healsoarguesthatbuildingatheoryofhumanrightsbasedoncarewouldhave
twogeneralbenefits.First,theywouldensurethatconcernsaboutcareitselfbecomecentraltoour
conceptofwhathumanrightsaremeanttoprotect.Second,careasafoundationforhumanrights
wouldavoidhavingtomakecross-culturallycontroversialesotericappealstoautonomy,
personhood,orbasichumandignity.Ifcareisahumanuniversal,ascaretheoristsclaim,thenit
seemsobviousthatgroundingasetofhumanrightsoncaretheorywouldgeneratethecareclaims
wewanttomake,butinthepowerfullanguageofrights.
WhileIhaveexpressedsympathywithEngster’saims,andfindsomeofhispolicy
suggestionslaudable,Ihavearguedthathisconceptionofcaretheoryisdeeplyproblematic.First,
Engsterreliesonanuncriticalacceptanceofourrelationsofdependenceinordertogroundatheory
ofrationalobligationthatformsthebasisforthe‘caring’humanrightsclaimsofdistantstrangers.
Yet,asIhaveargued,relyingonanuncriticalacceptanceofourrelationsofdependenceservesto
perpetuatetheverymoralcontextsthatcareethicsismeanttoaddress:contextsofexclusionand
difference.ThesecondproblemisthatEngsterpresentshis‘caring’humanrightsasonlyminimally
feministinordertounderwritethepracticalaimofincreaseduptakeandbroadacceptanceacross
cultures.Thisisproblematic,Iargue,becausebynotsupportingwomen’sfullandequalpolitical
participation,hiscaretheorycouldallowforthecontinuedoftheexclusionofwomenfrompolitical
193
life,whichhaslongbeenapartofwomen’soppression,marginalization,andgreatervulnerability.
Engsterassumesthatsimplybringingcareintopublicdiscussionwouldbeenoughwithoutwomen—
history’straditionalcarers—beingapartofthatdiscussion.Therefore,Imaintainthatweshouldnot
utilizeacombinationofcareethicsandhumanrightsthatrequiresthatwealtercareethicssothatit
lackstheverycomponentsthatmakeitsuchapowerfultoolinthefirstplace.
MyrejectionofEngster,however,meantthatIwasleftwiththechallengeofwhetherthe
critical,feministethicsofcarecouldbeusedtoguideaction,specificallyintheformationofpublic
policy.Myargumentforusingcareethicsasaguideforpolicyisaculminationofmylarger
argumentthathumanrightsalonearenotenoughtoaddressthedeepmoralproblemspresentin
theworldtoday.Humanrights,forthepastfiftyyears,havebeenincreasinglyincorporatedintothe
businessofrealworldpolitics,andinparticulartheprocessesofpublicpolicy.Whilehumanrights
havespecificbenefits,theyalsotendtooverlookthedeep,structuralfactorsthatallowsuffering,
oppression,andviolencetocontinue.Themajorfocusofhumanrightssince1948hasbeenthe
fundamentalequalityofallpersons,oftenconstruedas‘sameness’,whichcannotencompassthe
waysinwhichdifferencematterstoourlivesaswelivethem.Thismeansthatthosewhoare
‘different’fromthehegemonicmodel(thehistoricallyprivilegedgroup),haveoftenhadtobe
considereda‘specialgroup’withspecialkindsofrights.Anypublicpolicythatspeaksaboutcare,
gender,andrace,andwhichdoessoinanauthoritativeway,codifiesthewaysinwhichwethink
aboutcare,orsexualandracialdifference.Whenwomenareconstructedasa‘specialgroup’,in
needofspecialprotectionstoensuretheycancontinuetocare,oriftheyareassumedtobethe
primarycarer,ortheonewhoinitiatestheconsumptionofcare,thisonlyservestoreinforcemorally
problematicgendernormswithinasocio-politicalcommunity.Publicpolicyinformedonlybya
humanrightsdiscourseisnotenoughtocombatthewaysinwhichthosewhoaredifferent(women,
racializedpersons,differentlyabledpersons,gender-queerpersons,andthoseoflowersocioeconomicstatus)areoftenmarginalizedandexcludedevenifalloftheirhumanrightshavebeen
met.
Inthisthesis,Ihavesoughttoshowthatthecritical,feministethicsofcarecanbea
substantiveguideforthepolicyprocess.Iusedthepolicystagestheoryasaguidetodemonstrate
thattheethicsofcarecanbeusedateverypointinthepolicyprocesstoofferafreshperspectiveon
socialproblemsandpublicgoods,generatedifferentsetsofsolutions,reimaginetheroleof
institutionsinourlives,guidepolicyimplementation,andsuggestadifferentmeasureofpolicy
success.IusedcasestudiesofferedbyHankivsky,Sevenhuijsen,Williams,andZhouinorderto
underwritemyclaimsaboutcareethicshavingpracticalapplications.Theircasestudies
demonstratethatwhilecareethicsiscertainlyarobustcriticaltheoryintermsofassessingthe
194
qualityofpublicpolicy,policiesneverthelesscouldbeimprovedbyrelyingonthepracticesofcareas
ameansofactionguidanceforpolicymakers.Theethicsofcarecouldtransformthepolicyprocess
itself,requiringpolicymakerstobemoreattentivetotheneedsofthosetheyaremeantto
represent,encourgingustorethinkthekindsofresponsilbitiesinstitutionshavetowardpeopleand
thewebsofrelationstheyinhabit.Careethicsalsodemandsamoreresponsivekindofpublic
administrationofpolicy,andcanprovideadifferentmetricforpolicyevaluation.Thepractical
applicationoftheethicsofcareispossibleandcanbeputintoactionrightnow.
Lastly,Iinvestigatedwhetherornotthecritical,feministethicsofcarewasvulnerabletothe
criticismdirectedathumanrightsdiscourses,namely,thatsuchdiscoursesoftenoverlookandare
notsensitivetopeople’slivedethicalandpoliticalexperiences.Hutchingsoffersastrongcritiqueof
theethicsofcarealongtheselines,claimingthatthetheorydoesnotprovidetherighttoolsfor
cross-contextualprescriptivejudgmentortheactualtransformationofourinternationalmoraland
politicallandscape.AsHutchingspointsout,theethicsofcareusesamethodthatappearstobe
similartofeministstandpointtheory,andassuchisvulnerabletothesamecriticisms.Hercriticism
isthatcareethicsvalorisesthestandpointofcare,whichmeansthatwhenweusecareethicsto
guideourmoralreasoning,weareactuallyprivilegingourownconceptionofcareandareunableto
engagewithotherswhodonotshareourculturalframework.Thus,wecannotproduceintelligible
judgmentsacrossculturaldivides.Inotherwords,careethicsisanotherfalselyuniversalizingproject.
Further,thetransformativepotentialofcareethicsissuspectbecauseittoocloselyengageswiththe
currentproblematicnormsandpracticesthatengenderharmfulsituationsinthefirstplace.Care
ethicscouldpossiblyresultinlendingfurtherlegitimacytothosenormsandpractices.Subsequently,
Hutchingsdevelopsherownfeministethicalmethodtodemonstratethatitisnotnecessarytohave
atheoryassuch,butrathertoinsistthatethicalreasoningisinandofitselfapractice,thatis,the
methodbywhichwecarryoutethicaljudgmentmatters.Judgment,forHutchings,isthenbasedon
anethicalmethodthateschewsauniversalstandpointandinsteadasksparticularquestions
designedtoshowhowsuchharmfulnormsandpracticesimpactrealpersons.Byunderstandingthe
normsandpracticesthatunderwritethesituationsthatwehavejudgedtobemorallysuspect,we
arethenmeanttobeabletotransformtheglobalmoralandpoliticallandscape.Ourjudgmentswill
notbefocused,exclusively,onhowtocorrectorcompensateforcertainharms,butratherspura
transformationofthenormsandpracticesinvolvedthatgeneratedtheharminthefirstplace.The
transformativegoalforHutchingsisthatweradicallyreimaginethenormsandpracticesthat
generatedharmfuloutcomessuchthattheywillnolongerbeabletoproducethoseharmful
outcomesatall.
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WhileIconcedethatcareethicsandfeministstandpointtheorysharecertain
methodologicalsimilarities,IhaverejectedHutchings’claimthatthecritical,feministethicsofcare
lacksthecapacityformoraljudgmentortospursocio-politicaltransformation.Careethicshasits
foundationsinthedialoguebetweenthenormativeandtheempirical,andassuchitmusttakeinto
accounttheinteractionofcontextandvalue.IclaimtheethicsofcareowesadebttoHutchingsfor
theelaborationofapreviouslyunexploredtensionattheheartofcareethics.However,theethics
ofcareisaflexibletoolandisabletorespondtohercritique.BytakingHutchingscritiqueseriously,
careethicscanmaintaintheunderstandingthatpeoplemakesituatedjudgments,whilestillholding
totheusefulandpowerfulstandpointofcareasamoralfoundation.Idrewonthewell-knownwork
andinsightofBenhabibtosupportmyargumentthatanegotiationbetweenauniversalstandpoint
andspecificmoralcontextsispossible.Becausecareethicsexpandsthedomainsofmoral
considerationfromtheprivatetothegloballevel,thetasksofthemoralphilosopherarethen:to
investigateandexplainothermoralcommunities;tobeginadialogueaboutproblemsandpossible
solutions;toprovidewell-reasonedjustifications;andtodrawoutpossibleinconsistenciesand
outcomesofactingoncertainmoralcommitments.Thepointisthatthroughanhonestinteraction
withthevaluesandcontextsofothers,andacceptingthatourownvaluesandnormsaresubjectto
similartypesofchallengesthatweposetoothers,weareabletonegotiatedifferentcontextswhile
maintainingtheuniversalstandpointofcare.TheawkwardnessthatHutchingsidentifieswithincare
ethics—thatitissituatedbetweentheuniversalstandpointofcareontheonehand,andthe
acknowledgementofthepartialityofjudgmentontheother—sitsuneasilyonlywhenwefailtobe
honestaboutourowncontextsandperspectives.Judgmentfortheethicsofcareisnotasimple
yes/noproposition,butaconstantdialoguewithothers,negotiatingjudgmentinaback-and-forth
efforttoreachgreaterunderstandinginordertoaimforacooperativetransformationofourshared
world.
Further,IrejectHutchingsclaimthatthekindoftransformationthatshesuggests,thatof
renderingcertainharmsunthinkable,istheonlyorbestkindoftransformationpossible.Thekindof
transformationthatthecritical,feministethicsofcareoffersisaslowprocess,butonethatis
neverthelessworthworkingtowards.Itisonethatwillrequireconcertedeffort,butaneffortthat
couldservetoimprovethelivesofbillionsofpeople.Itisatransformationthatreordersour
priorities,predicatedontheunderstandingthatweareinexorablyconnectedtoeachotherthrough
internationalrelationsofpowerthathavebecomepartofourdailylives.Further,onlyoncewe
acknowledgethattheserelationsofpowershapeourlivescanwechallengetheembeddednorms
andassumptionswithinthemandthenreshapethemtoenablebettercaringrelationsinsteadof
allowingthemtoperpetuateharmfulones.Theethicsofcaredemandschange,butdoessothrough
196
thepracticesofcareandprioritizescontextualsensitivity,withthestandpointofcareasthestarting
pointformoralandpoliticaldialoguewithothers.Theethicsofcarerequiresustoacceptthe
vulnerabilityofourjudgment,understandingthatonlyoncewearehonestaboutourown
contextualbiasescanwemakeprogress.
Theethicsofcareisafeministethicalandpoliticaltheorythatcanbeusedtoday,canbe
appliedtotheworldasitisinordertobeginaprocessthatcouldonedaychangetheworld,where
careisfinallyunderstoodasanecessaryconditionforhumanlifeandgivensubsequentrespectas
such.Withoutcare,noneofuswouldsurvive.Withoutgoodcare,noneofuswouldbeableto
thrive.Byexpandingthecritical,feministethicsofcaretohaveglobalscope,webegintheprocess
ofcreatingadifferentkindofworld:aworldwherewomenandgirlsinparticularwouldfacefewer
structuralbarrierstotheirhealth,happiness,andsecurity;aworldwherethereislessinequality;a
worldwherethereislessdivision,exclusion,andviolence.Webegintocreateamorecaringworld.
197
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