MSUMUN XVI
March 18th-March 20th
Iranian Revolution Committee
Chair: Bryant Hepp
Gabriela Arias, Rachel Goldman, Matthew Rappe
Michigan State University Model United Nations XVI
Delegates,
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Iranian Revolution Specialized Committee here at
MSUMUN XVI. 1979 was a pivotal year for Iran as well as the international community, altering
the course of history not only for the Middle East but for the entire world. You are tasked with
representing a political leader of the Iranian Revolution during the Revolutionary Council’s
mandate to draft a new constitution. Although these 50 actors may never have met in a room
for three days to hash out their differences using parliamentary procedure, every one of them
was a real and historic persona, and each represents a viewpoint essential to the Islamic
Republic’s creation.
It is an unfortunate and ironic twist of fate that--although I am your chairperson--you will see
very little of me over the weekend of the conference. This is because I will be studying in
Azerbaijan, which is about as close as a U.S. Citizen can get to Iran with the assurance of also
leaving. Instead, I leave you in the more-than-capable hands of my three assistant chairs: Gabby,
Rachel, and Matt.
All this is not to say I will be taking a passive role during the weekend of the conference. In fact,
I will be your fifty-first delegate: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. I will review everything you pass
and offer my amendments, which will be revealed at the end of the weekend. At that time, you
will be faced with two choices (just as the historic committee was after drafting their
constitution): accept my edits unconditionally and send the constitution to referendum, or seek
arbitration from an as-of-yet undetermined “Assembly of Experts,” who will have final say over
the draft submitted to and indubitably approved by the public.
By immersing yourself in a persona which is likely altogether foreign to you, delegates will leave
this conference with a new perspective on one of the most significant political revolutions in
recent history. The ability to understand and respect others--even when we have profound and
fundamental differences--is a critical skill on both the personal and professional levels. I fully
expect that this weekend will give you a chance to practice that skill and reflect on the slight
changes in circumstance which set events in motion, even on an international scale. But if these
goals are too ambitious for a weekend, I hope you simply enjoy MSU’s campus, make new
friends, and each speak at least once in committee.
Sincerely,
Bryant Hepp
Iranian Revolution Specialized Committee
Chair
[email protected]
About Us
Bryant Hepp is a senior majoring in International Relations with minors in Muslim and Jewish
Studies. He enjoys running, biking, and swimming--but only while outside exploring Michigan’s
natural beauty. Bryant’s hobbies include watching Seinfeld and drinking loose-leaf tea, as well
as lots of other, less pretentious things.
Gabrielle Arias is a senior from Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic majoring in International
Relations and Women and Gender Studies. This past summer she had the opportunity to intern
for the Dominican Permanent Mission to the United Nations. She enjoys learning new
languages, French films, and salsa dancing. Gabby is passionate about acting and recently
portrayed the eponymous character in a community theatre performance of Shakespeare’s
Richard III.
Rachel Goldman is a junior with majors in both Arts and Humanities and Political Science. She is
President of RCAH council and would be more than happy to talk to you if you’re considering
MSU in your future plans. Her favorite TV show is Friends, and she is still going through a
Twilight phase.
Matthew Rappe is a freshman in the James Madison College and has an interest in the Middle
East and Islam. He is from Chicago’s inner city and is thoroughly enjoying the wide open spaces
of MSU. Matthew holds Irish citizenship and has two cousins in Ecuador. He is also a lifelong
pescatarian.
MSUMUN XVI
3
Introduction
The date is 12 Farvardin, 1358 (April 1, 1979, according to the Western calendar). After 98% of
the public voted in favor of instituting an Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has
declared today "the first day of God's government." You are a member of the Revolutionary
Council, a secret body assigned to guide the revolution and to draft the new regime's
constitution. Debate rages between the committees communist, nationalist, and Islamist blocs,
as well as between delegates of the ethnic minorities who threaten to splinter the country.
Although a consensus has been reached on the majority of issues, some points of contention
remain:
Economic System
The recently deposed Shah has squandered the country's vast bounty, sowing the seeds of
discontent across the nation's countryside and engineering the mechanisms of rebellion within
her cities. As a member of the Revolutionary Council, it is your duty to update the constitution
with a modern, successful economic system which conforms to the values of the Islamic
Republic. You must decide whether to nationalize Iran's financial institutions and oil companies,
or to privatize in hopes of attracting revenue.
Islamism
Although the Islamic Republic has been confirmed through referendum, the nature of
governance in the Islamic Republic is open to interpretation. On one hand, traditional Shia
scholars espouse the long-held separation of church and state as an important cultural principle.
On the other, many revolutionary leaders advocate greater involvement of religious views in
politics. Ayatollah Khomeini has been careful not to broach the topic himself in the past few
months, but his supporters have been active in calling for incorporation of the principle velayate faqih, or “guardianship of the jurist” into the new constitution. This concept is hotly debated
even among clerics, but some say Shia religious principles authorize a representative of God to
serve as the nation's supreme leader. As a delegate, you must decide if and how the policy is
implemented--and the extent to which it forms a reality of the new regime.
Finally, when the Revolutionary Council has reached a consensus on the above issues, they
shall submit a final draft to Ayatollah Khomeini for his approval. Upon return of the amended
constitution, delegates will choose whether to accept the Ayatollah's "corrected" version in
whole, or to refer the issue to an Assembly of Experts who will have final say over the version
presented in a referendum later this year.
MSUMUN XVI
4
Topic 1: Structure of Military
The Basij
It is thanks to the protestors and the youth especially that this revolution has been
brought about. Now, Ayatollah Khomeini has given structure to the revolutionary vanguard
by calling for the founding of a people’s militia. The Basij is a loosely associated corps of
civilian volunteers committed to perpetuating the Islamic Revolution on the home front.
Should this group be viewed as a legitimate part of a future national government, or is it
too close to Ayatollah Khomeini to represent the diverse viewpoints represented in the
new regime?
The purpose of the Basij is still undefined for post-revolutionary Iran. It is a civilian
group for civic engagement on a grassroots level, yet it has potential to be a lot more. This
group could serve as an intelligence apparatus for the government, a secret police force, or
as auxilaries for the military in foreign wars.. The Basij could serve to enforce Islamic
standards of behavior, dress codes, male-female separation, abstention from forbidden
substances. While liberals would doubtlessly frown upon this, conservatives and
traditionalists may welcome the implementation of religious values throughout everyday
life in contrast with the Shah’s secular debauchery.
Pasdaran
The Pasdaran or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Revolutionary Guard for short)
serves a parallel and separate role from the traditional military. While the military is
responsible for countering foreign aggression, securing territorial integrity, and fighting
conventional warfare, the Pasdaran and its subordinate organizations are responsible for
protecting and promoting the revolutionary ideals throughout Iran. The Pasdaran is
particularly crucial in the defense of revolutionary leaders against foreign operatives, and
serving as guards against CIA interference in the region.
The Revolutionary Guard is responsible for perpetuating the spirit of the revolution, and
primarily the Islamic values professed by Ayatollah Khomeini. It has given much legitimacy
to the movement because it draws from a different base of support than the state military
once controlled by the Shah. The Pasdaran will act to expose and destroy
counterrevolutionary elements relentlessly, so what constitutional limits, if any, should be
placed on this group?
The Pasdaran has subordinate organisations, one of which is the Basij, there is a
potential in this new constitution to create additional groups. One possibility is the creation
of a smaller elite special forces group for the purpose of exporting the Islamic
Revolution. This group may engage in clandestine activities not entirely known to the
public and not entirely palatable to international law. It is up to this committee whether
this is in line with the values of the revolution.
Artesh
The Artesh is the conventional military of Iran. During the revolution the military
experienced mass desertion, soldiers joining the mobilization on the streets. In light of
MSUMUN XVI
5
mass desertions by young men the military declared neutrality and refused to fight on
behalf of the Shah any longer. This significantly aided the cause of the revolutionaries, but
this does not mean the military commanders are completely on the side of the
revolutionaries. These high level officers of the armed forces of Iran are still left over from
the Pahlavi dynasty and have divided alliances. It remains to be seen if you can teach the
Old Guard new tricks.
It would be politically expedient to remove members of the former regime; they may
collaborate with foreign agents against the new government and ignite a civil war. But to
remove these military leaders would cost the nation military expertise and experience.
Obliterating the long established-chain of command would leave Iran vulnerable to
potential attack by neighbors. There is no telling what dastardly forces may act to take
advantage of the newly-independent Islamic Republic of Iran.
Political Role of the Military
The newly-formed Islamic Republic has yet to determine the criteria for holding office in
the to-be-elected government. There is already much debate over which offices may be
held by clerics, but equally important is what roles military officers may fill. In neighboring
Baathist regimes such as Iraq the military plays a crucial political role in supporting the
regime. As such, some right-wing nationalists in Iran may be in favor of leaving a special
constitutional role for the military. Is the military the protector of the constitution with a
responsibility to use force when that document is threatened?
Those revolutionaries on the other side of the political spectrum will be skeptical of
concentrating too much power in the hands of the military. Mixing military and politics can
create a system that benefits from waging war where there is no battle to be won.
Conversely, a military coup would end all hopes of a new free Iran. For these skeptical
delegates it would be best to ban active duty officers from holding political office.
Topic 2: Economic System
The origins of the Iranian Revolution are as economic in nature as they are religious or political.
The economy is the lifeblood of a country and the challenges Iran faced under the Shah will not
miraculously disappear when a new regime takes power. Delegates will address the economic
issues plaguing the newly-formed Islamic republic, seeking to find innovative yet historically
plausible solutions. While all actors may not be invested in every aspect of the economy, each
delegate stands to gain (or lose) from the reordering of the status quo inherent in any
economic restructuring. The economy of the new Islamic Republic will stand as a testament to
the greatness of the Iranian people and the purity of their values.
Land Reform
Reza Shah Pahlavi began his meddling in the economy in 1963 through the monarchy’s socalled “White Revolution.” The series of five year plans fell short of being a revolution and were
really just top down measures to further subjugate the country to Western Imperialists who
backed the shah. One key aspect of the White Revolution was land reform. In theory, it was a
measure to distribute land evenly to break up the holdings of feudal lord and quell the desires
MSUMUN XVI
6
of the peasants for political concessions. Land reforms were encouraged and funded by the
Kennedy administration in several vassal states of the American Imperialists.
Mechanized farms, inevitably owned by the richest landholders, were excluded from the
reform and left intact. Absentee landlords kept half of their vast holdings. Religious holdings
were divided up. Peasant laborers without former employment agreements with the farms they
were working on were ignored by the government and lost their jobs when they no longer had
vast lands to work on nor new lands of their own. Generals and government officials skimmed
off the top and were able to hold and expand their land holdings in land reform. The policy was
mishandled and led to less productive farmland and more migration to large cities and
industrial centers.
The results of land reform and the origins of the revolution are best illustrated by the statistics.
By 1975 the top 1% held 20% of the land, not a staggering figure, but the bottom 65% only held
a combined 15% of the land. Mechanization was not encouraged on small farms, the Shah
preferred to fund the industrial sector and as a result Iran became a net food importer by the
70s. Highly expensive food imports (from Western countries pleased to supply) were subsidized
by the government, compounding its losses.
Industrialization
The White Revolution heavily relied on revenue from oil exports rather than tax revenue. As a
reflection of the budget, 33% of the first five year plan was funded by oil, 62% of the third five
year plan was funded by oil revenue, and by the fifth five year plan over 80% was funded by oil
revenue. These funds were used to expand government operations in large scale modern
industry (which was entirely state owned). This oil boom of the 70s was the source of inflation
in Iran.
In 1973 the Shah set aside these five year plans (when oil revenue was at its peak) and invested
in industries, mines, oil, gas, and petrochemicals. These inspired high industrial growth rates
comparable to Japan at the time. Industrial growth between 1965 and 1975 was 15.2% annually.
From 1968 to 1976 refrigerator production jumped 363%, automobile and jeep production
jumped 504%, truck and van production jumped 2,944%.
However, despite rapid industrialization, the government was the largest industrialist. It was
the primary investor and those close to the royal family benefitted greatly. Industrialization was
encouraged through direct investment and also tariffs as high as 200-300% on industrial goods
while traditional and agricultural goods were left unprotected by the regime. Low interest loans
and tax holidays encouraged multinational corporations (mostly American) to set up shop and
accumulate capital in Iran.
High tariffs and government stimulus created monopolistic conditions for Iranian industries. In
1972 goods produced in Iran were 25-35% more expensive than the average world prices.
Monopolistic companies engaged in high profiteering and employed inept management
MSUMUN XVI
7
dominated by the government. The results of this was reflected in 1976 export statistics. Oil
exports made up 97% of exports and even then was followed by agricultural and traditional
products like carpets, cotton and fruit. Inferior industrial manufactured products were sold
mainly within the country.
The industrial upper class grew friendly to the state in this time, no one could enter the market
without including the Pahlavi family in some way. This class of owners and managers joined
with the bureaucrats in their loyalty to the Shah. By 1976 150 families owned 67% of all
industry and finance. The Pahlavi family itself owned 137 of the top 500 largest corporations
and financial institutions.
Civil Society
Another facet of the Shah’s policies was to combat inflation being felt in the country. However,
he did not focus on the profiteering government monopolies or the inefficient government
owned businesses in finance, industry, transportation, communication, power, and mineral
resources. The Shah instead focused on the bazaars of the cities. The bazaar had long been a
largely-independent market of artisans and small merchants using traditional methods of
manufacturing, which still accounted for most non-oil government exports. They had
historically resisted the growing power of the Shah and protested against the removal of Prime
Minister Mosaddegh in 1953.
The Shah’s economic policy relied heavily on price controls not tied to inflation, which lowered
the bazaari profit margins to the point where they could barely maintain their livelihoods.
Limits were placed on the small lending operations within bazaars, leading to many
bankruptcies among merchants. All means of political organization had been outlawed except
for the pro-government Rastakhiz party so the bazaaris had only civil disobedience to voice
their opposition. The Society of Merchants, Guilds, Artisans of the Tehran Bazaar (SMGATB) was
formed as a civic organization to replace those previously outlawed by the regime. Most of the
Bazaari leaders were also associated with the National Front, a secular political group skeptical
of the clergy, but not unwilling to work alongside it. The SMGATB soon became an enemy of
the regime and a target of SAVAK (secret police) agents.
Ignoring the rights of the bazaaris for free association, freedom in trade the government
targeted bazaaris with fines, imprisonment, and violent intimidation. In response, the leaders of
the Tehran bazaar used the SMGATB for mobilization. They held strikes and defied government
orders to reopen the bazaar, during these times they were encouraged by Ayatollah Khomeini
living in exile, one of the few clerics to advocate revolution early on. The bazaaris showed their
support for Khomeini by striking shortly after the death of his eldest son, Mostafa.
Labour Movements
Factory workers and blue-collar employees were also key groups that were disillusioned with
the monarchy. When economic recession struck in the 50s these groups were drawn to the
MSUMUN XVI
8
Tudeh Party (a communist group) and The National Front (a liberal group). These groups backed
Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953 even when the clerics opposed him. That same
year the Shah outlawed labor organizations and replaced them with docile governmentsponsored unions. The state’s accumulation policies during the White Revolution alienated blue
collar workers and industrial laborers because the Shah exclusively favored the upper class
landlords, generals, and bureaucrats.
During the high inflation of the 1970s cost of living rose for workers who only had the
government to blame. Their alliance with highly educated low level bureaucrats and teachers
gave them the clout to hold strikes in the late 1970s. Their demands went from expulsion of
managers and dissolution of government unions to more political demands. They wanted the
release of imprisoned labor leaders, greater freedom of association, and dissolution of Savak
that was used violently against demonstrators. Soon these groups, as well as the Bazaaris
acknowledged the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, leading to the Islamic Revolutionary
Council.
Islamic Finance
Islamic finance is also a question for this committee. Profiteering on capital is considered
forbidden in sharia law. This immoral exacting of usury can be held responsible for the great
gaps in wealth in Iranian society under the Shah. It becomes very easy for the richest to
maintain and expand their wealth when they can charge others for borrowing their wealth with
no regard for the success of the business they are loaning the money to. While it is agreed that
usury, or riba in terms of sharia, is unlawful, there is debate among scholars as to what exactly
constitutes forbidden forms of interest. In order to carry out finance in a moral and Islamic way,
financiers must enter into joint partnership with whom they invest so that they truly have a
stake in the success of the business they loan out to. Additionally, Islamists argue that unIslamic industries such as pork, alcohol, debauchery, and moral depravity should not receive
funding from the state.
Bloc Positions
Marxists will be interested in increasing the rights of the workers of Iran and nationalizing the
means of production. Many of the industries were already owned by the state prior to the
revolution but corruption and greed led these industries to be mismanaged. Marxists should
also try to shrink the gaps between rich and poor that developed under the monarchy. Land
reform could be used to go further than the half measures of the White Revolution. Full
employment, an extensive social safety net, factories owned by the workers, rights to form
unions and strike are all goals of the Marxists. Marxists may also be opposed to capitalist
banking system and foreign investment from the West, these were viewed as methods of
worker exploitation.
MSUMUN XVI
9
Liberals will be interested in giving greater economic freedoms to Iranians and also breaking up
government held industries. Price controls that were implemented during the Shah’s reign were
especially egregious to groups like the National Front. As a solution to mismanagement by the
regime of the Shah they suggest a free market economy to achieve equilibrium between supply
and demand. This would mean breaking up the government monopolies and selling them off to
private investors. Liberals and Bazaari merchants also benefited from small scale loans and
would be opposed to implementation of Islamic finance.
Islamists will be concerned with the moral authority of the new government. They see the main
failures of the monarchy as caused by a departure from God’s will laid out in the Quran.
Islamists would like to see un-Islamic activities banned including: interest rates on loans, pork
sale, alcohol sale, gambling, and immodest behaviors. Their primary concern is having an
Islamic Republic of Iran that cares for the poorest among them. There is a history of Islamic
socialism but this will largely depend on the specific historical figure.
Questions to Consider
What are the entitlements of the citizens of Iran and who qualifies?
What are the rights of workers? What are the rights of business owners?
What businesses should be given to the state? Shared in cooperatives? Left to the private
sector?
Can usury (i.e., financial interest) be allowed in the Islamic Republic?
Topic 3: Islamism
Velayat-e Faqih
One of the main reasons for this committee’s convocation is a dispute over the nature of the
state’s relationship with Islam. Although the people of Iran voted overwhelmingly in support of
establishing an Islamic Republic, questions remain as to the validity of the polls. Although the
creation of an Islamic republic held support of over 97% of voters, it was the only option on the
ballot opposed to retention of the monarchy. As such, it is unclear to what extent the mandate
for theocratic governance is a product of manipulation by the pollers.
The Islamic Republic that is the basis of the Iranian government revolves around a strict
framework, based on Allah’s ability to govern; He is essentially the most supreme legislator,
with exclusive sovereignty. The goal of the Islamic Republic is to follow Allah’s bidding, as His
instruction is the ultimate source of justice and creation. Therefore, all judicial and legislative
decisions, as well as financial, economic, military, and administrative decisions must be based
on the Islamic criteria. The Qu’ran must be the basic framework of this government. In order to
achieve the Islamic Republic, legislators must work toward this by creating an economic system
as well as a legislative one that encompasses this. In addition, part of the goal of the Islamic
Republic is to spread religion, which also must be factored into the constitution, particularly in
MSUMUN XVI
10
terms of international relations. However, other religions (though not many) are free to exist,
though they will be in the minority. Shi’ism must still be the national religion of Iran, and must
be involved in all aspects of government.
When working on the new constitution, Ayatollah Khomeini was vehement about his desire to
implement velayat-e faqih, a system in which there was no real distinction between religion
and government, and secularism was no part of this. In this governmental system, the Imams
are responsible for interpreting and explaining Islamic law to citizens. In addition, this
government would be led by one member of the clergy, who would be known as the faqih, or a
group of members of the clergy, known as foqaha. All candidates for any of these positions
must have a strong working knowledge of Islamic law.
One of the most important things to consider when trying to write a new Iranian constitution is
the Constitution that was written in 1906; in order to write a better constitution, it is important
to analyze the flaws in the original document and recognize how these flaws contributed to the
uproar in the 1970s. The two major issues in the debate about the Constitution are if and how a
secular government can play a significant role in an Islamic government, and to what extent
citizens if Iran should be allowed to be involved with government.
Political Debate
Mirza Muhammad-Hossein Gharavi-Na’ini, an Iranian moderate, believed that a constitutional
system would be extremely compatible with Islam, based on the fact that the principles of Islam
essentially already are a constitution, and the transition from simply a religious doctrine into a
governmental constitution would be a fairly easy transition.
On the other side of this debate, there is Ayatollah Fazlollah Nuri, an Iranian conservative, who
very strongly believed that a constitution would contrast with Islam, as national sovereignty
must remain in the hands of Allah. Given the fact that he adamantly believed that since God
holds all the power to make laws, he felt very strongly that because of this, there was no room
for citizens to be involved in government, particularly not in any democratic sense.
Questions to Consider:
Is there any way that parts of the Original Constitution can be salvaged?
How can religion be the basis of a governmental system?
Is the Qu’ran itself already a constitution? If so, how, and if not, why not?
Ruhollah Khomeini: Ayatollah Khomeini is an enigmatic figure, motivated by an unquenchable
thirst for power yet ingeniously pragmatic. His supporters compare him to the Mahdi; his
detractors, to the devil. Although he has final authority over the work of this committee, political
opponents should not despair: the Ayatollah is exceedingly cautious and will only attempt to take
the power he knows he can get away with.
MSUMUN XVI
11
Mehdi Bazargan: Bazargan occupies a powerful yet precarious position as the prime minister of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Provisional Revolutionary Government. A universally respected
intellectual and scholar of Islamic thought, Bazargan’s support for democracy has brought him
increasingly into conflict with Khomeini and the hardline Islamists seeking to institute a
theocracy.
Sayyed Abolhassan Banisadr: As minister of foreign affairs, Banisadr is tasked with
representing the national interests abroad during the Islamic Republic’s transition period--and
preventing foreign influence from unseating the fragile current government. A renowned
economist who literally wrote the book on Islamic finance, an avowed leftist, Banisadr remains
diplomatic and cooperative with all revolutionary parties, from the nationalists to Islamists.
Hussein-Ali Montazeri: A respected Islamist leader, Ayatollah Montazeri is Khomeini’s
second-in-command as well as a member of the Revolutionary Council. While Montazeri
supports the implementation of theocratic governance and the principle of Velayat-e Faqih as
articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, he is also a strong supporter of human rights and a leader of
the reformist movement within the Islamist bloc.
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh: A former member of the Freedom Movement, Ghotbzadeh left the
nationalist-democratic bloc to join Ayatollah Khomeini’s personal staff in Paris, serving as a
translator and spokesperson after his return to Iran. Ghotbzadeh is also in charge of Iran’s
national television, attempting to cleanse it ideologically to conform to Islamist standards.
Mohammad Shariatmadari: A devout pacifist and scholar of Islam, Ayatollah Shariatmadari
represents the religious opposition to Ayatollah Khomeini’s attempt to institute theocratic
governance. Shariatmadari is a firm believer in the classic shi’ite principle of separation between
religious and political leadership. Although Shariatmadari once saved Khomeini’s life by
interceding with the Shah to prevent his execution, he now stands as one of the fiercest
opponents of the latter’s Velayat-e Faqih principle.
Mahmoud Taleghani: Although occupying the position of Ayatollah, Mahmoud Taleghani is an
avowed leftist who helped found the nation’s democratic opposition to the Shah. During his
extensive time in prison, Taleghani was profoundly shaped by Marxist economic thought, and
strongly advocates collective property rights as a principle of Islam. Taleghani enjoys wide
support among the Kurds and is a protector of minority rights in the newly-founded republic.
Yadollah Sahabi: A close friend of Bazargan and the late Mosaddegh, Sahabi is a cofounder of
the Freedom Movement of Iran. A democrat, Sahabi is also in favor of nationalizing the
country’s oil industry.
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: A close follower of Ayatollah Khomeini, Rafsanjani is a
pragmatic and skillful politician capable of using any means to achieve his goals. A staunch
proponent of privatization, Rafsanjani supports liberal economic policy.
MSUMUN XVI
12
Ebrahim Yazdi: An early supporter of the nationalist movement, naturalized U.S. Citizen, and
staunch democrat, Yazdi serves as Bazargan’s deputy prime minister in the Provisional
Revolutionary Government. He is an important member of the Freedom Movement.
Mostafa Chamran: A member of Khomeini’s inner circle as well as a radical member of the
Freedom Movement, Chamran recieved military training in Cuba and now serves as the regime’s
first minister of defense. He is active in foreign policy and has strong ties with the Syrian
government.
Mohammad-Javad Bahonar: A founding member of the Islamic Republican Party, Bahonar is
an avid supporter of Khomeini and a strong Islamist. His position as education minister on the
Revolutionary Council allows him to influence the socialization of the nation’s youth.
Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili: Ardebili is a friend and supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini, as
well as a co-founder of the Islamic Republican Party. Although he supports the institution of
theocratic principles, he is a centrist in regards to most political issues.
Massoud Rajavi: A communist who has served extensive time behind bars, Massoud Rajavi is
the leader of the Mujahadeen-e Khalk, a leftist political party and guerilla force. He is widely
supported by Kurds and other ethnic minorities within Iran.
Kazem Rajavi: A human rights lawyer and brother of Massoud Rajavi, Kazem Rajavi holds six
doctoral degrees in the fields of social sciences. He currently serves as Iran’s ambassador to the
United Nations.
Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi Kani: A staunch Islamist, Kani is head of the Central Provisional
Komiteh for the Islamic Revolution, and is charged with arbitrating trials for the former
members of the Shah’s regime. He is also a cofounder of the Combatant Clergy Association, an
Islamist-pragmatic group.
Morteza Motahhari: A founder of both the Revolutionary Council and the Combatant Clergy
Association, Motahhari wields immense power in post-revolutionary Iran. Motahhari is a devout
Islamist philosopher and politician, and views communist ideology as inconsistent with the
ideals of an Islamic Republic.
Mir-Hossein Mousavi: A former Islamic socialist, Mousavi evolved ideologically to favor
Khomeini’s uniquely theocratic ideology. Mousavi is an elite member of the Islamic Republican
Party and the editor-in-chief of the party newspaper.
Habibollah Asgaroladi: A conservative Islamist, Asgaroladi is charged with distributing the
nation’s economic wealth through social welfare programs under the new regime.
Habibollah Peyman: An Islamic socialist, Peyman is aligned with the leftmost wing of the
Islamist bloc of post-revolutionary politics.
MSUMUN XVI
13
Ali Akbar Velayati: From a young age, Ali Akbar Velayati was involved in democratic antiShah politics, and was arrested by SAVAK when he was only 17. A secular democrat, Velayati
is a leading member of the National Front.
Reza Davari Ardakani: An Iranian philosopher strongly influenced by Martin Heidegger,
Ardakani is a professor at Tehran University with close ties to the military. Although he is highly
populist, he does not favor democratization like many other nationalist figures.
Ahmad Fardid: a Tehran University professor and intellectual, Fardid’s nationalist and antiWestern rhetoric has helped to define the Islamic Revolution. Fardid is secular and nationalistic,
but his philosophy has been criticized for authoritarian tendencies.
Seyyed Mahmoud Kashani: The son of a prominent cleric, Seyyed Kashani is a distinguished
lawyer and well-respected Islamist. He cofounded the Islamic Republican Party favored by
Ayatollah Khomeini, Kashani currently serves as its secretary-general.
Mahdi Iraqi: As founder of Fadayan-e Islam, Iraqi is a fundimentalist Islamist who has no
qualms engaging in terrorist tactics to reach his political goals. He currently runs Qasr Prison,
where many former regime officials are jailed.
Hassan Ayat: A theologian and politician, Ayat serves as deputy leader of the Islamic
Republican party. A calculating politician, Ayat has forged a reputation for being tough to work
with and holding grudges.
Karim Sanjabi: A Kurdish Iranian who helped to lead the national-Leftist and anti-Soviet Iran
Party during the 1950s, Sanjabi served as Mohammad Mossadegh’s minister of education until
the coup and return of the Pahlavi Dynasty. A secular democrat, Sanjabi is currently secretarygeneral of the National Front.
Bahram Afzali: A captain in the Shah’s navy, Afzali is currently a rising star in the Iranian
military. With close ties to Ali Rafsanjani and Abolhassan Banisadr, Afzalis political
connections may allow him to not only survive regime change, but to increase his power as a
leader of Iran’s armed forces.
Ehsan Tabari: Fluent in eight languages, Tabari is a reknowned intellectual and poet. As a
communist, Tabari is a founding member of the Tudeh Party and supporter of increased ties with
the Soviets.
Noureddin Kianouri: a member of the Tudeh central committee and the party’s secretarygeneral, Dr. Kianouri is a strongly-committed communist. Having spent much of his postMossadegh years in exile, Kianouri’s return to Iran in 1979 helped to signify a new era of
communist involvement in the political process.
Iraj Eskandari: An important member of the Tudeh Party, Eskandari served as secretary of the
party for many years before the return of his colleague Noureddin Kianouri.
MSUMUN XVI
14
Ali Ardalan: A wealthy landowner and member of the political elite, Ardalan was economic
minister in the previous government. Post-regime, his priorities are preventing nationalization
and avoiding execution.
Mohammed Ali Mowlavi: As a former bureaucrat in the Shah’s government, Mowlavi is in a
precarious position post-revolution, As current head of the central bank, however, his skillset has
protected him from political enemies. He is against nationalization and the prosecution of
members of the previous regime.
M. Khalatbari: Once a bureaucrat in the Shah’s government, Khalatbari currently serves as
finance minister for the Islamic Republic. His connections with foreign countries and economic
expertise make him a valuable asset for the post-revolutionary government. He is against
nationalization and the prosecution of former regime members.
A. Moinfar: Previously a low-ranking minister in the government pre-revolution, Khalatbari has
become minister of oil for the new regime. Although his political connections to the Shah make
him unpopular among the revolutionary leaders, his expertise and connections make him
indispensable. He is invested heavily in the status quo and seeks to maintain what little
economic and political order remains in Iran.
A. Izadi: A wealthy landowner, Izadi is also the minister of agriculture post-revolution. He
strongly opposes changes to the economic status quo, especially in regard to land reform and
nationalization.
Abbas Amir Entezam: A member of Bazargan’s interim government, Entezam serves as deputy
prime minister and spokesperson for the group of leaders. Entezam has been outspoken in his
opposition to theocratic governance and supports the forced resignation of all of the shah’s
military leadership. He is a democrat and member of the National Front.
R. Maraqii: A wealthy industrialist and former governor of Azerbaijan, Maraqii supports
minority rights and regional autonomy in the Islamic Republic. He is a democrat but opposes the
redistribution of land.
Mohsen Rafighdoost: The son of a bazaari, Rafighdoost is currently the head of Ayatollah
Khomeini’s security detail. He is one of the few people the Ayatollah trusts for security and is
well-suited to advise on the nation’s future military situation.
Ahmad Khomeini: The youngest son of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ahmad serves as his father’s
chief of staff. He helps to coordinate the Ayatollah’s daily schedule and serves a an advisor on
military issues.
Sadegh Khalkhali: Recently appointed Chief Justice of the Islamic Revolutionary Court,
Khalkhali is a hardline cleric who has been tasked with trying and sentencing members of the
previous regime. He takes great pleasure in his work and seeks to dispense justice to all members
of the former regime, from governmental ministers to police and military officers.
MSUMUN XVI
15
Hassan Dehqani-Tafti: An Anglican bishop and convert to Christianity in a nation which has
recently undergone an Islamic Revolution, Dehqani-Tafti is concerned foremost with the rights
of religious and ethnic minorities in the new regime. He is the first ethnic Persian to be Bishop of
Iran in modern times.
Ashraf Dehghani: A feminist communist Azeri revolutionary, Dehghani’s pre-revolutionary
activities have made her famous. She supports nationalization, rights of ethnic minorities, and
support for women in the new constitution.
Ali Hosseini al-Sistani: A leader of the Iraqi Shiite community, Sistani is nonetheless heavily
involved in Iranian politics. Al-Sistani supports the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and
advocates a hawkish Iranian foreign policy to protect Shiites in the region; he is ambivalent on
issues of theocratic rule.
Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei: An Iranian expatriate and Grand Ayatollah living in Iraq, al-Khoei
continues to be heavily involved in his home country’s politics. Al-Khoei strongly opposes
theocratic rule, but advocates for Islamist involvement in foreign as well as domestic Iranian
politics.
Ali Akbar Meshkhani: A respected and prominant Ayatollah, Meshkhani opposes the principles
of theocratic rule as outlined by Khomeini in his treatises on velayat-e faqih.
Mohammad-Ali Rajai: A secular democrat and member of the Freedom Movement, Rajai is
above all a power-seeking politician who will align himself with whatever party provides the
most advantageous prospects for future advancement.
Ezzedin Hosseini: A prominant Kurdish leader, Sheikh Hosseini is one of the principle
negotiators for increased minority rights and regional autonomy with the new regime’s leaders.
Masoud Barzani: Leader of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party, Barzani has close ties with the
Kurdish minority in Iran and is an advocate for interventionist foreign policy. He is in favor of
increased minority rights as well as an expanded and strengthened military to combat external
threats to the revolution.
Ahmad Madani: A former officer in the Shah’s military who was dismissed for his political
views, Madani has recently been reinstated as commander of the Iranian navy. He is a democrat
who supports the National Front.
Nasser Farbod: Serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces in
Bazargan’s transitional government, Farbod is a supporter of the National Front of Iran.
MSUMUN XVI
16
Works Cited
Parsa, Misagh. Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1989.
Print.
Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution. http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iraninfo/government/constitution-4.html
MSUMUN XVI
17