J a n u a r y 12, 1957
THE
great deal of discontent, c y n i c i s m
a n d lack of f a i t h w h i c h is corrodi n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
a t every
stage
and
undermining
public
morale.
This is because.
among
other reasons,
the a u t h o r of the
manifesto is a supreme
literary
a r t i s t , but. he has no g r i p over the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of w h i c h lie is the
a r c h i t e c t nor has he
a thorough
grasp of the processes
of change
t h r o u g h w h i c h the
c o u n t r y must
pass for his magnificent dreams to
become a r e a l i t y .
The manifesto traces the development of Congress aims by
stages f r o m the b e t t e r m e n t of the
masses and the under-privileged to
the objective of establishing a social i s t p a t t e r n o f society. I n the m a n i festo some of the objectives in the
Second P l a n have been filled in a n d
a more concrete a n d complete picture of the socialist p a t t e r n as the
Congress sees it has been clearly
d r a w n . E a r l i e r promises have been
made more
specific—a
national
m i n i m u m f o r everyone
has been
accepted as a firm objective, p r o gressive p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f l a b o u r i n
the conduct of i n d u s t r y
has been
defined as the a i m
of i n d u s t r i a l
democracy a n d accepted as the
other objective;
agricultural
cooperatives a n d co-operative v i l l a g e
management have been defined a n d
accepted as the c o u n t e r p a r t of indust r i a l democracy.
A l l this is to be attained, it has
been reiterated at every step, o n l y
t h r o u g h democratic methods. T h a t
is to say, peoples' w i l l i n g acceptance
of the aims a n d ready co-operation
in their realisation have been l a i d
down as the
criterion, f o r policy
decisions
a n d actual
execution.
There is the i m p l i e d assurance t h a t
coercion w i l l not be resorted to in
either case. W h a t is the value of
such promises w h e n the Congress
has not succeeded
in e v o l v i n g a
w o r k a b l e m e t h o d o f popular p a r t i cipation in any of the m a j o r fields
o f n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , either i n a r r i v i n g a t the correct
decisions a n d
policy m a k i n g o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
ECONOMIC
W E E K L Y
a n d execution?
A f t e r a n exhaustive e l a b o r a t i o n
of the aims a n d ideals—in fairness
i t m u s t also b e a d m i t t e d , g i v i n g t h e m
more concrete expression t h a n in the
past -the manifesto has t h i s s m a l l
p a r a g r a p h on the m e t h o d of execution:
"The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
machinery
should be adapted to suit the purposes of the P l a n . Cumbrous procedures a n d red
tape should be
avoided a n d it should be so o r g a n i sed t h a t r a p i d decisions are t a k e n
a n d given effect to. I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
i t should n o t isolate i t s e l f f r o m the
people b u t f u n c t i o n i n co-operation
w i t h them."
. T h i s is too amorphous a base a n d
too insecure, on w h i c h to raise such
a magnificent
edifice. Profession
of democracy is u n a v a i l i n g in the
face o f g r o w i n g a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m
a n d c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ; a n y day a better
c h i t to the Congress w o u l d be greater evidence of its responsiveness to
the peoples' t h o u g h t s a n d feelings.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
IF
the T r u m a n Doctrine stretched
America's frontiers t o A n k a r a ,
the Eisenhower Doctrine is an announcement by President Eisenhower
t h a t , subject to the
approval of
Congress, it is W a s h i n g t o n ' s policy
to extend the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries
of the U n i t e d States to the en stern
most p a r t of west A s i a . B o t h doctrines mean a n d i m p l y expansion of
A m e r i c a ' s spheres of influence over
t e r r i t o r i e s w h i c h are f a r beyond
America's
sovereign j u r i s d i c t i o n .
E v e n as the T r u m a n D o c t r i n e was
the o r i g i n of the "cold w a r " in Europe t the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e is widely deplored as an a t t e m p t to s t a r t the
"cold w a r " i n west Asia I n its a i m ,
neither the T r u m a n D o c t r i n e nor the
Eisenhower Doctrine is vague. B o t h
doctrines have the c o m m o n declared
objective o f c o n t a i n i n g C o m m u n i s m .
B o t h doctrines i m p l y , and rely on,
the Dulles policy of "deterrence".
Even so, the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e
m a y not, necessarily, intensify the
"cold w a r " i n west A s i a . I f i t does
n o t provoke this undesirable sequence i t w i l l be because the present
conditions in west A s i a are different
f r o m those p r e v a i l i n g in Europe at
the time of the enunciation of the
T r u m a n Doctrine. This interpretat i o n of the Eisenhower Doctrine is
based on the assumption t h a t President Eisenhower's Secretary of State
will
not. distort the Eisenhower
D o c t r i n e in pursuance of his policy
of "deterrence".
As the avowed a i m of the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e is to c o n t a i n C o m m u n i s m i n west A s i a , can i t , the
question n a t u r a l l y arises, a v o i d an
intensification of the "cold w a r " in
t h a t region? T h a t essentially depends
upon the diplomacy and statesmanship of the politicians and r u l i n g
parties i n west A s i a . E v e n t h o u g h
the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e is basically
a projection of W a s h i n g t o n ' s N o r t h
A t l a n t i c policy t o west Asia, i t m a y
r e m a i n perpetually
a burden a n d
responsibility
for
America and
A m e r i c a alone. M a r s h a l l A i d a n d
the T r u m a n D o c t r i n e created N A T O .
Economic a n d m i l i t a r y a i d offered
to west A s i a under the Eisenhower
D o c t r i n e m a y n o t succeed in creating MEDO.
Turkey,
Iran
and
P a k i s t a n are not west A s i a n countries. W i t h the sole exception of
I r a q , no west A s i a n c o u n t r y is a
member of the B a g h d a d Pact.
A l m o s t a l l west A s i a n countries
resisted M E D O , when i t was o r i g i n a l l y mooted as an adjunct of N A T O .
Events since then w o u l d seem to lend
w e i g h t t o the assumption t h a t west
A s i a n powers w i l l be more vehement
n o w i n t h e i r opposition t o r e v i v e d
American attempts
to establish
M E D O . West Asian
powers m a y
34
receive b o t h economic a n d m i l i t a r y
a i d f r o m A m e r i c a w i t h o u t abandoni n g their policy o f n e u t r a l i t y . W i t h
vision
a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n , west
A s i a n powers can enjoy the m a t e rial and military
benefits o f the
Eisenhower D o c t r i n e w i t h o u t sufferi n g f r o m its i n v o l v e d undesirable
consequences a n d c o m m i t m e n t s .
A t t h i s stage o f the argument, i t
m a y n o t be i r r e l e v a n t to revert to
the theory, discussed in this j o u r n a l
more t h a n once in
recent weeks.
Despite the Eisenhower Doctrine's
over-emphasis o n c o n t a i n i n g C o m m u n i s m , i t i s n o b a r t o j o i n t econom i c e x p l o i t a t i o n o f west A s i a w i t h
the Soviet U n i o n . I t w o u l d , i n retrospect be n o t w r o n g to presume t h a t
the contours of the Eisenhower
D o c t r i n e were sketched as C o m m u n i s t m i l i t a r y equipment began to be
supplied t o E g y p t and,
then, t o
S y r i a . T h e r e w o u l d seem to be n o t
the least shadow of a n y doubt t h a t
the Russian t h r e a t t o B r i t a i n a n d
F r a n c e t h a t she w o u l d intervene w i t h
volunteers a n d
"rockets"
i f the
Anglo-French
aggression a g a i n s t
Egypt did
n o t end, p r o v o k e d
W a s h i n g t o n t o p l a n out the details
o f the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e . A s I t
became evident t h a t the h a s t y A n g l o F r e n c h aggression w o u l d lead to a
p e r m a n e n t loss of prestige a n d aut h o r i t y o f B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e I n west
A s i a , the final touches w e r e added
THE
ECONOMIC
J a n u a r y 12, 1957
W E E K L Y
to the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e as a
device t o fill the
r e s u l t a n t power
v a c u u m . W i t h President
Eisenhower's t r i u m p h a n t r e t u r n t o W a s h i n g t o n , the
Eisenhower D o c t r i n e
has n o w been
announced.
These
are the " c o l d w a r " aspects of the
Doctrine.
B u t recent reports about A m e r i c a ' s
gestures of economic help to E g y p t
a n d the
Eisenhower's
Doctrine's
m a j o r emphasis on economic cooperation a n d assistance (the studied
avoidance of the a i d aspect of economic help is n o t w i t h o u t s i g n i f i cance) reflect W a s h i n g t o n ' s belated
reaction t o Moscow's policy t o A s i a
since the Geneva S u m m i t Conference.
E v e n t h o u g h economic assistance to
west A s i a n countries is offered f o r
"the maintenance o f n a t i o n a l i n dependence", a n d n o t e x p l i c i t l y f o r
economic i m p r o v e m e n t , the gesture
is more open a n d w i t h o u t a n y strings.
M i l i t a r y a i d i s offered o n l y t o those
west A s i a n countries w h o seek such
assistance. There is a s i m i l a r rider
to the proposed use of A m e r i c a n
a r m e d forces i n this region. T h i s
l a s t proposal has a f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n
t h a t the A m e r i c a n a r m e d forces can
b e employed i n west A s i a o n l y
"against overt
armed
aggression
f r o m a n y n a t i o n controlled b y i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n i s m " . President
Eisenhower expresses the hope t h a t
n o occasion w i l l ever arise t o undert a k e t h i s last a c t i o n to enforce the
Eisenhower D o c t r i n e f o r security i n
west A s i a . President Eisenhower's
hopes are n o t l i k e l y to be falsified by
events. N o " o v e r t
a r m e d aggress i o n " is l i k e l y by a n y n a t i o n "controlled by
international Commun i s m " . S y r i a i s u n l i k e l y t o a t t a c k her
p o w e r f u l neighbours l i k e T u r k e y ,
I r a q a n d I s r a e l , t h o u g h there are
m o r e chances o f I r a q o r I s r a e l comm i t t i n g acts o f aggression against
S y r i a or J o r d a n . T h e r e is a l w a y s the
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o m b i n e d aggression by
A r a b s a g a i n s t Jews, or by I s r a e l
a g a i n s t A r a b States
But Washington's offer, under the Eisenhower
D o c t r i n e , t o supply m i l i t a r y equipm e n t to countries in t h i s region is a
p a r t i a l assurance
t h a t any future
aggression i n t h i s region w i l l n o t
necessarily be aided a n d abetted by
International Communism.
T h a t , the Eisenhower
Doctrine
m a y perpetuate the " c o l d w a r " i n
west A s i a , i s n o t its m a j o r f l a w . I t s
basic defect is, as President Eisenhower confesses himself, t h a t i t w i l l
not, a n d is n o t expected to, solve the
problems t h a t plague t h i s region.
"There are the problems of Palestine
a n d r e l a t i o n s between I s r a e l a n d
A r a b States, a n d t h e future o f the
A r a b refugees. There is the p r o b l e m
of the f u t u r e status of the Suez
C a n a l . . . . I t i s n o t the purpose o f
the legislation, I propose" President
Eisenhower confesses, " t o deal d i r ectly w i t h these
problems". These
difficult issues, President Eisenhower
concedes, w o u l d exist quite a p a r t
f r o m the t h r e a t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l
C o m m u n i s m . There are, perhaps,
n o t m a n y instances i n h i s t o r y where
a sponsor of a n y policy has so
eloquently damnified it as President
Eisenhower has himself condemned
the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e . There is'
another phrase in President Eisenhower's address
before
Congress
w h i c h is no less objectionable. In
his appeal to Congress
to endorse
his policy, he elaborates the strategic
a n d economic
importance of west
A s i a . His" a r g u m e n t is t h a t , w i t h o u t
the Eisenhower Doctrine, " W e s t e r n
Europe w o u l d be endangered j u s t as
t h o u g h there h a d been no M a r s h a l l
Plan,
no N o r t h Atlantic
Treaty
O r g a n i s a t i o n " . T h i s is an open admission t h a t the Eisenhower D o c t r i n e
Is expected t o fill the political vacu u m created
b y the ignominous
r e t r e a t o f B r i t a i n a n d France f r o m
west A s i a . I n rejecting the Eisenhower Doctrine, west A s i a n countries w i l l echo P a n d i t Nehru's w a r n i n g , some years ago
to the P a r i s
session of the General
Assembly,
t h a t A s i a n problems could no longer
be solved in the context of Europe
alone.