Critique: A worldwide journal of politics
Caught Between Venus and Mars:
Canadian Earthlings
in the Transatlantic Relationship after Iraq 1
Benjamin Zyla
Royal Military College of Canada
During the Cold War, the American-European relationship was referred to as the
“West.” It was, for example, institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the first formal transatlantic military alliance ever. 2 While
the Cold War was proceeding and the threat of Russian forces marching into
Western Europe was still imminent, the West used NATO’s military structures and
capabilities to contain the Russians. Some people argued “there was no more
durable symbol of the West than the transatlantic relationship” (Asmus, 2003: 2031). In this sense, the NATO alliance marked the institutionalization of the
transatlantic relationship and helped managing the balance of power in Europe. In
fact, there has never been such a sturdy relationship in world power over the past
half century as the transatlantic alliance constructed by the United States.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, changed the
meaning of the symbol “West” as well as the nature of international affairs. No one
was able to imagine the size of its impact. It transformed discussions about the
transatlantic relationship from one of the intellectual backwaters into an issue of
transatlantic survival. One dimension of the new style of the conduct of
transatlantic relations was the changing tone in meetings and briefings between
European and American government officials. There is no doubt that the most
recent transatlantic crisis was the most serious in the history of the alliance. It was
exacerbated by comments of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who
argued that the divergence in the transatlantic relationship was caused by the
conflict between “new” and “old” Europe. In a larger view, Rumsfeld’s comments
This paper was originally presented at the Annual CDAI- CDFAI Graduate
Student Symposium at the Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, Ontario,
Oct. 29-30, 2004. A slightly different version was also presented at the 3rd annual
Graduate Student Conference on Security hosted by The Security Studies Program
and Center for Peace and Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University March 18, 2005. The author would like to
thank the discussants at both conferences for their constructive comments.
1
Transatlantic relations always involved an analysis of US policies as well as
European policies for the simple reason that during the Cold War the European
continent was the strategic theatre of a balance of power struggle with the Soviet
Union and communism as an ideology.
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were the expression of a Bush administration that was tired of Europe’s way of
doing business. The EU was perceived as acting too slow, with too many actors,
and largely too time consuming. Instead, the administration proposed to replace
the institutionalized relationship with a coalition of the willing, an ad hoc group of
nations supporting U.S. policies. This, from an American standpoint, seemed to be
the better choice for “getting things done” (Kagan 2004: 3). Other analysts argued
that “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common
view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world” (Kagan 2004: 3).
Because of their fundamental differences, Robert Kagan says, Americans are from
Mars and Europeans are from Venus (Kagan 2004). They no longer share a
common “strategic culture.” Parts of this strategic shift originate from the new U.S.
National Security Strategy that the administration launched in 2002, which outlined
strategies and tactics on how to best meet the threats facing the United States.
However, the current administration is split on the question of how to achieve this
goal –by using U.S. military power unilaterally or multilaterally in concert with
other states. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld gave out the marching order for American
coalition warfare by saying that if no nation was willing to join America’s ad hoc
coalitions, the United States was determined to deploy its forces unilaterally. This, it
was believed in Washington, was the price the international community had to pay
for American security guarantees. The Bush doctrine is novel in the sense that he
believes that “today Washington faces new threats of such dire nature that it must
escape the constraints of multilateral structures it helped to build after World War
II” (Nye 2003: 64). In his view unilateralism is the way to make the United States a
safer place. September 11 made it very clear that globalization is not only an
economic phenomenon where borders are dissolved; it is also a political occurrence
beyond traditional state boundaries. “The information revolution and technological
change have elevated the importance of transnational issues and have empowered
non-state actors to play a larger role in world politics” (Nye 2003: 62).
Europeans, on the other hand, were offended by the analogy made by the
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of ‘old’ Europe fighting against ‘new’
Europe. “Rumsfeld’s remarks prompted outraged responses in both Paris and
Berlin and the colorful appellatives hurled across the Atlantic soon came to attract
almost as much attention as the issue underlying them” (Croci 2003: 471). They
saw it as an affront to their political sovereignty and caused an internal division
amongst the member states (Croci 2003: 470). The media, however, loved the
image of a historical divide between the allies and the question of how to deal best
with the phenomenon of global terrorism. If it is true, however, as Robert Kagan
argued, that the “reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development,
and likely to endure” (Kagan 2004: 4), the question occurs what does this mean for
Canada as the second North American ally of NATO?
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The argument of this paper is that Canadians have played the ‘earthlings’
in the transatlantic relationship since the birth of NATO. Canadian defense policy
was always intertwined with U.S. and European foreign policy. First, the paper
analyzes the evolution of America’s hegemonic position from a historical
perspective. This hegemonic position is also reflected in its role in the transatlantic
alliance. NATO is largely dominated by American policies, doctrines, and military
standards. The paper then turns to an analysis of European foreign and defense
policy. Assuming that there is a phenomenon of a ‘transatlantic gap,’ the third
section of the paper examines Canada’s role in between, to use Kagan’s
terminology, ‘Mars’ and ‘Venus.’
‘Mars’ and the Origins of the Transatlantic Relationship in the
Cold War
To understand the nature of the transatlantic relationship, one needs to revisit the
origins of the NATO alliance, which served at least three purposes: (1) the
requirement to contain Russian expansionist ambitions after WWII, (2) the creation
of a forum where major powers were able to reconcile their political, military, and
economic differences; (3) the assurance that the U.S. remains committed to
ensuring security in Europe (Cox 2002: 261-76). NATO was uniquely situated to
bind these objectives together. It was a win-win situation for Europe and the
United States and allowed for a comforting level of security and prosperity on both
continents.
NATO was a creation of the Cold War. It was formed as an alliance to
deter the threat of the Russian Empire. Shortly after WWII, the Soviet Union
extended its influence to the states of Eastern Europe including Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. NATO was a military as well as a
political response to the expansionist Communist ideology. It became a key
institution in an evolving distinct Western sub-system of international relations that
is based upon the transatlantic relationship between Western Europe, Canada, and
the United States. The alliance became a crucial structural element in the post 1945
international order with the objective of preventing another major war through its
article 5 collective defense mechanism.
After the victory of the allies in World War II, the European continent
was dependent on the security provided by the United States. It was not only that
the economies in Europe were significantly damaged, but also militarily, the United
States was dominant and more capable than anyone else. As a result, Europe fell
into an immediate “state of strategic dependence on the United States” (Kagan
2004: 18). America’s commitment to Europe was a continuous investment into
their expeditionary force capabilities in order to act and project power globally. Put
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differently, early on the U.S. military foresaw the strategic importance of rapidly
deployable forces that are able to act globally. Europe’s strategic role, on the other
hand, was entirely different. European armies were built for territorial defense and
had almost no expeditionary capabilities. 3 Large armies, numerous divisions of
tanks and thousands of troops were trained for D-day during the Cold War to stop
Russian territorial acquisitions. Because of this threat assessment, there was no
necessity for highly mobile and flexible troops that would allow European
countries to project military might outside of Europe. In short, panzers were
required, not response forces. Hence, the Europeans only most recently obtained
EU rapid reaction capabilities. 4
The United States sustained its military capabilities and doctrine
throughout and after the end of the Cold War. Its doctrines demanded an army
that is capable of fighting and winning two wars in two different regions of the
world. President Clinton’s administration introduced this doctrine. It was revised
most recently by the George W. Bush administration. The current administration in
Washington went beyond the traditional two war dogma and implemented a 4-2-1
principle – that is deter the enemy in four places, counterattack in two, and if
necessary occupy the enemy in one of the two (Posen 2003; Rumsfeld 2002: 24).
The relevance of this for the transatlantic relationship is that there were
many tensions between Europe and the United States before George W. Bush
entered the Oval Office (Walt 1998-99: 3-11). As Cox pointed out, none of the key
political figures in Washington or Brussels had thought about mentioning these
evolving strategic differences, because at the time, the transatlantic community was
growing economically. In short, as Kagan argues, “when it comes to setting
national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and
implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have
parted away” (Kagan 2004: 4).
The debate about weak military capabilities in Europe goes back to the
birth of NATO. Ever since the United States became actively involved in
European security issues, any administration holding office in Washington pressed
the Europeans to boost their defense spending. This controversy of defense
budgets had always caused tensions in the transatlantic alliance throughout the
3 It needs to be said that Britain and France possessed expeditionary capabilities
and continue to do so. However, their capability and size is much smaller than
those of the United States.
This became known as the European Rapid Reaction Force that was deemed to
be deployable by 2004 with 60,000 troops and equipment able to sustain in theatre
for one year.
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Cold War. It found reflection in the notion of ‘burden-sharing.’ Even when the
European economies recovered from the war, European governments were not
willing to build up sufficient military capabilities for self-defense. Hence, as some
analysts argued, Europe became comfortably situated in the transatlantic alliance by
being dependent on the United States for its territorial defense. “This psychology
of dependence was also an unavoidable reality of the Cold War and the nuclear
age” (Kagan 2004: 19).
‘Mars’ Since the End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the ‘win-win’ situation of the
transatlantic relationship. European and American policymakers were taken by
surprise of the events in Eastern Europe in 1989. Moreover, they called into
“question one of the most fundamental premises of the transatlantic relationship
itself: the requirement of maintaining the balance of power in Europe” (Kagan
2004: 19). Consequently, as some realist analysts argued, since the Soviet threat had
disappeared, NATO’s purpose of existence was in doubt as well (Mearsheimer
1994-95: 5-49). Nonetheless, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a
superpower left the United States as the “only remaining superpower” (Ikenberry
2002). There was no country that could balance against the United States.
America’s military today – be it the army, navy, or air force – enjoys supremacy in
all regards. Likewise, the American share of world economic product rose from 25
percent to around 30 percent (Cox 2002, 261-76). The United States appeared
invincible and invulnerable. This led John Ikenberry to call the U.S. a ‘hyperpower’
(Ikenberry 2002). As a result, the U.S. administration perceives it as their
prerogative that “the United States will refuse to play by the same rules as other
states: this is the price that the world must pay for the unipolar provision of
security” (LaFeber 1994: 303). Primacy was America’s grand strategy. 5 Today,
Generally speaking, a U.S. grand strategy is a relatively discrete and coherent
collection of arguments that try to define the role of the United States in the world.
A grand strategy incorporates economic strategies, political as well as military
strategies. The overall aim of a grand strategy is to lie out a national strategy on
how a state can best bring about security of itself in an anarchic world. The focus
of the grand strategy of primacy lies on great power relations in an anarchic world.
It is a classical realist theory. The primary objective of this grand strategy is that a
state wants to keep its supremacy over other competitive states that want to reach a
great power status. Second, a strategy of primacy is motivated by both power and
peace. It tries to ensure peace in the world, and it is its view that only a
preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace and stability in the world. “Peace is the
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nobody doubts that the United States enjoys enormous power politically, militarily,
and economically. Washington benefits from the capability of using its influence so
that other countries are willing to change their behavior to the way the United
States desires it to be. The ‘new’ conventional wisdom is that the United States is
on top. The American military budget is equal to the budgets of the next eight
countries combined; the American economy is equal to the size of the next three
countries combined; American culture in the form of television, Hollywood, and
internet plays a dominant role overseas.
This status of power, however, raised concerns in Europe. Governments
in Europe had doubts about the moral use of American power. Their concerns are
much deeper: Europeans do not believe in the current power system of
international relations with the United States as the global hegemony. Furthermore,
Europeans disagree with the United States about where to best project power. 6 The
Bush administration favors using America’s power overseas whenever and
wherever it deems necessary. The Europeans, on the other hand, are turning their
back on using power and are very reluctant to deploy its forces overseas. 7 It does
so only under specific circumstances. The new European Security Strategy of 2003
is a useful indicator for this case. Therein, the heads of European states and
governments manifested their belief that the use of force can only be the last resort
in solving conflicts. First, all channels of diplomacy and negotiation must be
exhausted before troops are sent on the ground. The purpose of European forces
is to prevent rather than to start wars. In other words, conflict prevention is one of
the cornerstones of Europe’s common foreign and defense policy. In addition, the
rule of international law and transnational cooperation are superior to using hard
result of an imbalance of power in which U.S. capabilities are sufficient, operating
on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners”
See for example Posen, Barry R., and Andrew Ross. Winter 1996/97. Competing
Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy. International Security 21 (3). This strategic view
clearly demands a unipolar environment; multipolarity is not permitted and not
desired.
Chris Patten’s comments, the European Commissioner for External Relations, in
‘Jaw-jaw, not war-war’, Financial Times, February 15, 2002; also David Ignatius in
The International Herald Tribune, February 16, 2002.
6
This is a rather interesting constellation, because not such a long time ago,
European empires used their power to influence the world whereas the United
States, at that time a non-influential country on Britain’s side, was hesitant to make
use of its power.
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military power. “The common perception…is that Europeans prefer to operate
patiently through multilateral institutions in order to construct a rule-based
international system” (Croci 2003: 472). This strategic orientation of military
capabilities is inconsistent with current U.S. grand strategy, which highlights the
utility of the military in times of fighting global terrorism. “Americans …are
deemed to be less inclined to put up with the slow pace of multilateral institutions
in order to construct a rule-based international system” (Croci 2003: 472).
However, what many observers did not notice was Europe’s detachment
from American ideology after 1990. Even though President Clinton was admired in
European capitals for his internationalism, American grand strategy continued to
emphasize U.S. military power. At the same time, Europe went through a process
of change and innovation. Their leaders began an integration process that was not
necessarily consistent with American interests. Beyond national policies, the
European Union as an institution managed to build a European Security and
Defense Identity into the official European treaty of Maastricht, and later revised
and extended those policies in the Amsterdam Treaty (Croci 2003: 485). In other
words, these steps can be seen as Brussels’ ambition for more independence. The
war in the Balkans was the agent to reforms in Europe’s militaries. It underlined
the ideological drift of the two continents – North America and Europe. Early on
in the conflict, the United States assumed that Europeans themselves would be able
to solve the conflict in former Yugoslavia, especially since it is just outside their
doorstep. Their emphasis lied on exhausting diplomatic tools rather than using
military hard power. However, when Europe did not intervene in the civil war, it
revealed their unwillingness and inability to foster and secure their own security.
Again, Europe relied on the United States for military support. Later on, when the
United States finally got involved in the war against Slobodan Milosevic, Europe’s
strategic goals and targets exasperated America’s military. American strategic
planning had to consult closely coordinated with its European allies. This was a
time-consuming process and slowed down the decision-making processes. In the
end, the war was an embarrassment for Europe’s foreign and defense policy and
their inability to contribute militarily to solving conflicts (Bertram 2000).
In short, the fractures in the transatlantic relationship are not new today.
They were apparent already in the 1990s; however, nobody paid attention to them.
While the Europeans were occupied with fostering their project of European
integration, the United States remained militarily strong and committed.
The Nature and Roots of American Unilateralism
September 11 reinforced the President’s view of the world as a dangerous place. It
was the day that changed U.S. foreign policy. More than ever, America’s national
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security policy was entrenched with a realist worldview. In the President’s mind,
states are the main actors in international affairs. They act in an anarchic
environment and struggle for national survival. Commentators in the media
accused the Bush administration of being isolationist, and irresponsibly driven by a
“cowboy diplomacy.” Realist theorists see military strength as the foremost
resource of American power to enforce peace and stability in the world. Alliances
and other international institutions are only seen desirable if they enhance
America’s national interests. Therefore, threats to national security must be dealt
with through pre-emptive strikes against potential aggressors that attempt to
challenge America’s hegemonic position or kill innocent American citizens. It was
President Clinton’s failure, Bush argued, to deploy American forces abroad into
regions where America had no national interest to be involved. 8 He referred to
missions in Somalia or Haiti - both of them were tangential to U.S. interests.
Instead, the U.S. military should only be deployed, so goes Bush’s credo, where
these interests are at stake or being challenged. In addition, American troops
should receive clear objectives for the mission prior to their deployment.
The unipolar nature of the international system is much preferred by this
school of U.S. foreign policy, because it sees an increased likelihood of conflicts
among great powers in the event of a multipolar system. In a multipolar world,
great powers are more inclined to challenge the status of superpowers militarily and
thus increase the risks of global instability. The greatest dangers of multipolarity are
uncertainty, misperceptions, and misinterpretations of other nations and the
behavior of their leaders.
The Bush administration perceives terrorists as products of rogue states
that are unable or unwilling to adhere to the principles of the rule of law,
democracy, and free markets as the fundamental principles of democratic
governance. This worldview, however, is rooted in the Jacksonian school of U.S.
foreign policy. Jacksonians have no confidence in any bureaucracy, be it a national
or an international one. Instead, they are very much in favor of state autonomy. In
their view, federal departments, agencies, and the political elites in office cannot be
trusted (Mead 2001, 225). The powers of governance should rest in the hands of
the local governments. Similarly, Jacksonians disgrace the international community
and the system of the United Nations. They are skeptical about such supranational
bodies and their elites. In questions of security and defense, Jacksonians rely on the
principle of self-defense (Mead 2001, 231), a principle that is based upon the belief
that Americans are able to take care of themselves. This is the individualistic
moment of Jacksonians, the right to “think and live as one pleases” (Mead 2001:
Governor George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences, “The Citadel, South
Carolina, September 23, 1999, http://www.citadel.edu/pao/adresses/pres_bush.
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233). This belief system, however, is consistent with the objectives of the “war on
terrorism.” The United States was confident enough to possess all military
capabilities necessary to eliminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The United
States did not ask Pakistan or other allies in the Middle East for their support and
endorsement. Nonetheless, if partners showed interest of joining the coalition
against international terrorism, Washington welcomed them. Others who did not
join the coalition were confronted with a clear choice: “Either you are with us or
against us.” Long-term alliances and partnerships were disregarded. Instead,
“coalitions of the willing” were formed that gave Washington the maximum
flexibility for the fight against international terrorism. One official in the Bush
administration called this new approach “à la carte multilateralism” (Cameron 2002,
68). Other analysts have argued that “against the background of these new threats,
the old system of collective security underpinning the NATO alliance has been
increasingly supplanted by temporary coalitions of opportunity focused on specific
issues” (Graham 2003: 425).
The move towards unilateralism was new in the post World War II history
of American foreign policy. 9 This new geopolitical remoteness after 9/11 can be
found in Donald Rumsfeld’s dictum that the “mission determines the coalition”
and not vice versa. “When it comes to our security we really don’t need anybody’s
permission” (Ikenberry 2004: 8), he said. As such, NATO was perceived as a player
on the periphery and its contributions, it was suggested, were rather symbolic.
NATO dispatched its AWAC’s planes to help control North American Airspace
and provided the U.S. with over-flight rights during the air campaign in
Afghanistan. It became evident what was already in the air years before: NATO is
no longer a tool of first resort to the United States, unless the Europeans and
Canadians increased their defense spending. The gap between European and
American military capability is significant. The Pentagon budget for 2004 was $400
billion plus an additional $87 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan
(Forbes 2004: 141). In addition, the U.S. military is structured more flexibly and is
much slimmer in terms of manpower. Currently, more than two million people
wear military uniforms in Europe, twice as much as in the United States (Forbes
2004).
However, the concept of unilateralism is almost as old as the history of
American foreign policy itself. President Washington preached already in the
eighteenth century: “Put not your trust in allies, especially those who are stronger
After the Second World War most European countries were left destroyed. Their
source of power, economic statecraft, military capabilities and human resources
were exhausted. Nevertheless, the war took place on European soil and left the
United States with a powerful economy and a less exhausted military.
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than you” (Quoted in: Cameron 2002: 69). The essence of unilateralism at that
time was to make American foreign policy independent from its European heritage,
especially Britain. Washington’s doctrine was to stay out of European wars and to
avoid permanent, entangling alliances. Later, President Woodrow Wilson pursued
the same policies in World War I, when he issued a public statement that urged
Americans to be “neutral in fact as well as in name” (McDougall 1997). Therefore,
it is quite surprising that recent editorials accuse the United States of being
unilateralist. The reality is that the United States was never isolationist and locked
away from all foreign involvements; it was always entangled with other countries.
Complete isolationism was and still is impossible, because the dependency of the
U.S. on foreign trade. Today’s administration appears to be consistent with
Washington’s credo: trust yourself.
Venus: Europe and the question of power
Conflicts in the NATO alliance are not a new phenomenon. As a result, the most
recent conflict over the Iraq crisis should be seen in such light. During the Cold
War, disagreement over military doctrines, defense, and foreign policy were no
rarity. It is also no novelty to the United States that the EU has ambitions for more
autonomy in foreign policy matters. “European would like to play the role of equal
partners, dislike what they see as American unilateralist temptations, and are
outspoken about it” (Croci 2003, 471). Europeans vehemently disagreed, for
example, with America’s foreign policy of containment. Germany’s Ostpolitik, based
on policies of detente, as well as French Gaullism can be interpreted as incidents
that call for greater European independence. They also revealed Europe’s
conviction that America’s policies were “too confrontational, too militaristic, and
too dangerous” (Kagan 2004, 28). Instead, Europeans supported conflict
prevention mechanisms such as engaging the ‘enemy’ politically, economically,
culturally, and addressed the root cause of terrorism (Croci 2003, 469).
Conflict prevention was also the dominant theme in Europe’s (first)
security strategy, which was adopted by the EU Council in December 2003. In this
document the EU describes how it intends to face the new external threats of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The Union portrays itself as a global
actor in world politics and highlights the importance of civilian crisis management
capabilities such as police, the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration,
negotiation, and consultation. The use of force is rather seen as the last resort to
cope with external conflicts. 10 Further, a European capability action plan was
10 See 2385th European Council meeting, General Affairs, 19-20. XI. 2001, Brussels,
19-20 November 2001.
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developed at the Council’s meeting in Laeken in 2003 in order to boost the
development of European crisis management capabilities. It called for 1000 police
officers to be ready for deployment within less than 30 days, 200 experts in the rule
of law, and experts for civilian administration to be posted on short notice. The
Ministerial Crisis Management Capability Conference, held on 19 November 2002,
confirmed the commitments of the member states. In addition, the European
Council in Helsinki in 1999 authorized a European Rapid Reaction Forces
(EUNRRF). This force was envisioned to consist of 50-60,000 that are to carry out
humanitarian and rescue missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, and
peacemaking tasks (Petersburg Tasks) ((Väyrynen February 2000). These forces
should have their own military command, control, and intelligence capabilities as
well as combat support and logistics. In Helsinki, the heads of states and
governments also decided to create unique EU capabilities in the field of command
and control, intelligence, and strategic air transport. They also called for better
coordination in monitoring and early warning, to prepare the establishment of a
European air transport command, to enhance strategic sea lift capabilities, and to
increase the number of rapidly deployable troops. The EU member states have
announced they will allocate a pool of more than 100,000 troops, 400 combat
aircraft, and 100 vessels to meet the military needs of crisis management. 11 These
military elements would be used primarily to carry out search and rescue missions,
defense against missiles, precision weapons, logistic support, and simulation tools.
The understanding reached at Helsinki was that until the European Union has
acquired its own planning and support capabilities, it will have to borrow those
from NATO.
Council of the European Union, “EU Military Structures” at
http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm, accessed on January 30, 2004. The
four major European countries, Germany, France, Britain, and Italy have made the
most significant contributions. The Germans were among the first to announce
their support for the ERRF. Germany is ready to provide up to 18.000 troops, six
squadrons of combat aircraft, 345 transport aircraft, and ground based air defense
systems. The German navy will contribute with 15 vessels.
Britain is able to contribute up to 12.500 troops, 16 Air assault brigade, short-range
air defense, attack helicopter, and logistic support. The British navy could send up
to 18 vessels, including an aircraft carrier, two nuclear attack submarines, four
destroyers or frigates and support ships. The British air force is able to contribute
72 combat aircrafts. The French committed 12.000 troops, 75 combat aircraft, 12
warships, and one aircraft carrier. France will also make available its strategic,
operational, and tactical headquarters. Italy will send four army brigades as well as
19 warships and navy Special Forces.
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Yet, there appeared to be significant shortfalls in allocating the required
troops, which required the EU to postpone the full deployment of the EURRF
until 2007. Nonetheless, the RRF concept was temporarily replaced with a EU
battle group concept in which 1.500 troops are available on short notice for rapid
deployment for up to 30 days. Also, the United States opposed some parts of the
Helsinki agreement and argued that militarily the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Europe (SHAPE) should retain the planning authority for EU-led missions.
The European Union is new to the business of peace support operations
(Missiroli 2003: 493). The European Council Meeting in Cologne in 1999 laid the
foundations for European civilian and military crisis management capabilities. This
gave the EU the tools to engage in a full range of conflict prevention missions
around the world. The tasks were defined in the treaty of the European Union as
the “Petersberg Tasks” 12 – evacuation, humanitarian and rescue missions including
humanitarian aid, separation of warring factions, and conflict prevention. With
these tasks at hand, the European Union has developed an autonomous capacity
for military actions. In short, the EU developed four areas of civilian crisis
management: the rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, and police. In
the area of the rule of law, it is the aim of the Council to provide 200 agents ready
for deployment to assist in establishing the rule of law in crisis situations. The
objective of judges, prosecutors, and correctional officers is to develop institutional
support for the process of transformation to democratic governance and the rule
of law. 13 This could include reforming the institutions of public administration, the
judicial system, the police, and reform the electoral process. The area of civil
administration is the least developed of Europe’s four pillars in civilian crisis
management. Civil protection, the third pillar, involves European internal
protection mechanisms for crisis management.
This is not to say, however, that the European Union possesses its own
military capabilities. These originate from the member states themselves. To be
better prepared for carrying out the “Petersberg Tasks,” the member states decided
to develop more effective military capabilities, which should not be mistaken as the
creation of a European army 14 but as a form of strengthening the European
12 The negotiations were held on a hotel on the Petersberg near Bonn/Germany.
The Petersberg Tasks were literally taken from the Western European Union’s
toolbox.
13
European Security Review, No. 10, January 200, 1.
14 As mentioned earlier, the EU does not have a military army and does not intend
to have one. Every single soldier is attached to a battalion, regiment etc. in a
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP). In 1997, the NATO Madrid
Declaration provided the EU with a military arm by merging the Western
European Union in to the EU. At the same time, there was a mutual understanding
between the EU and NATO in which the former would only act if the latter denies
actions. This would alleviate pressures of NATO forces and allow for greater
European autonomy. The implications for the transatlantic relationship were also
significant. The new understanding between the two security institutions in Europe
meant that NATO’s North American countries, the United States and Canada,
would only be drawn into mission in which NATO takes the lead. The idea of a
greater European autonomy goes back to a British-French proposal the two
countries developed at a bilateral summit meeting in St. Malo in December 1998.
There, they endorsed an independent deployment of European forces detached
from NATO. This caused serious considerations in the United States. Washington
supported increased European defense capabilities and included it into NATO’s
revised strategic concept. 15
The EU has also strengthened its own institutions of governance. A
permanent European command structure was created with the treaty of Nice in
2003. A political committee provides political guidance and control as well as
strategic direction of EU-led operations. The committee reports back to the
European Council. The Military Committee, composed of the national Chiefs of
Defense Staff, is in charge of all EU-military operations authorized by the Council
and the political committee. Its main objective is to evaluate strategic military
options for political decision makers by using situation & risk assessments, and
threat analysis in preparation for developing military options in crisis situations.
The Nice summit has also provided the opportunity for the involvement of ‘third
countries’ involvement for EU led operations. It allows non-EU countries, such as
Canada and the US and other partners, to deploy their troops under EU command.
For the European Union it is quite important to keep this third party involvement
active. A loss of third-country participation would result in a loss of valuable
expertise and political legitimacy (Baumgartner 2002). In addition, third countries
could make a significant contribution to policing capabilities, which are
underdeveloped at this stage.
member state. It is therefore more catalogue of military capabilities. The ERRF
should not be confused with the Eurocorp.
15 The revised NATO strategic concept was announced at the 50th anniversary
Summit of NATO in Washington in April 1999.
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The importance of EU enlargement
for the question of security
With the most recent enlargement, ten countries of Central and Eastern
Europe members joined the European Union. In 2004, the EU underwent a
historic enlargement by inviting the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia into the Union. It was a
unique, historic enlargement that signified the re-unification of Europe after
decades of division by an Iron Curtain. Prior to that, in 1999, NATO had invited
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the alliance. Besides economic
interests the latest EU enlargement process entailed great political benefits for the
transatlantic alliance. Overall it reinforced Europe as a pole of peace and stability.
While integrating the young democracies of the former Warsaw Pact countries, it
can be expected that the institutions of the European Union with their vast
resources and economic subsidiaries will provide assistance and guidance in the
transition period to democracy. “Europeans rely on the progressive integration of
Central and Eastern countries into the EU, which is supposed to project liberaldemocratic values and hence assure political and economic stability in the region”
(Croci 2003: 473). Hence, it can be argued that the process of European
enlargement will be the most significant contribution the United States and the
European Union ever undertook; the EU plans to spend as much as $60 billion in
Central and Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2006 (FDCH Government Account
Reports 2001, 8). Agricultural subsidiaries, for example, will help East European
farmers to make their products more competitive in international markets. The
single European market, on the other hand, allows the countries to the European
free trade zone where no surcharges such as customs or tariffs are levied. On May
1, 2004 the EU granted Central European countries full access to European
markets. However, access to Europe’s internal market is restricted to the free flow
of goods and services only. A transitional period will ensure that “old” European
labor markets are ready to accept additional, cheaper labor forces into their
markets. In sum, new markets, a stabilized democracy, and peace overall will most
likely permanently stabilize and enrich the entire European continent. Therefore,
the recent enlargement process will manifest peace, democracy, and free markets
on a continent that was shaped by war, destruction, hostility, poverty, and neglect
for a long time.
Canadian Earthlings in between ‘Mars’ and ‘Venus’
The security assessment Canada undertook by the end of the Second World War
was characterized by the understanding that the situation in Europe would directly
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affect Canada’s own security interests. This belief was rarely contested in the
Canadian public in the 1940s and early 1950s (Buteaux 1995: 154). “Nonetheless,
that Canada should play an active part in supporting the security of Western
Europe was based on a substantial popular consensus” (Buteaux 1995: 154) among
both French Canadians and English Canadians. This was the lesson the Canadian
government learned from both World Wars, where Canadian forces fought with
great losses for the liberation of Central Europe. In 1945, Canadians, as well as the
government itself, were determined to prevent another world war. Two major wars
fought in only forty years were lesson enough. Politically and economically, Canada
had a vital interest in the fast recovery of Europe and its industries. Canada’s
trading and financial interests required a stable and secure political environment
where investments would be safe and secure. In Canada, the political order was
seen as a “necessary precondition of economic reconstruction.” This economic
reconstruction of the large European market was a growing prospect for Canadian
exports, and still is today. After World War II, Canada was able to sign the
Washington Treaty as a form of political reassurance that another major war on
European soil would be impossible. Europe has always been a major industrial
market in the world, which grew in importance through its high density of
population, a large agricultural market, and an industry that produced one third of
the world’s output. Therefore, today the European Union as a trade block cannot
be neglected for Canadian interests. It became even more important when the EU
enlarged most recently from 15 to 25 member states and opened a market of more
than 450 million people. This opens great trade and investment opportunities for
Canada. Canadian companies not only have access to the markets of the previous
15 members but now to 25 national markets that account for 11.5 trillion dollars in
total. In theory, Canadian goods shipped to Estonia could freely flow inside the EU
without restrictions. In numbers, Canada exports more to the European Union of
15 members than to Mexico, China, and Japan combined. 16 The European Union
is Canada’s second largest trading partner after the United States.
Nonetheless, Canada came out of the World War II as an economically
healthy country with a foreign policy objective of internationalism and
alliancemanship. Functionalism became nice for Canadian foreign elite around
Lester B. Pearson, John Holmes, Escott Reid, and Hume Wrong. They dedicated
their pubic service to creating permanent military and political institutions that
would guarantee peace and security in the world. It was also the time when
Canadians enjoyed a healthy bilateral relationship with the United States. Canadian
diplomats in Washington successfully lobbied the administration to become a
16 See Press Release of the Delegation of the European Union to Canada,
‘Declaration on Canada-EU relations, March 18, 2004.
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founding member of NATO. Canada herself joined NATO for two major reasons:
(1) it institutionalized her influence and commitment in European security, and (2)
made Canada’s commitment to NATO an official policy at home in 1949 (Bland
1997: 4). The transatlantic alliance also gave Ottawa an institutionalized mechanism
to balance off powerful American interests – they saw NATO as a transatlantic
community of common values and interests.
North American geography, however, only permits one conclusion for
defense policy during the Cold War: it is simply impossible to defend Canada with
the size of its population in relation to the landmass. As a result, Canadian
territorial defense was taken care of by United States. “For as far ahead as one can
possible foresee, this will be the central fact of Canadian strategy and the basis of
Canada’s external policy” (Sutherland 1962: 202). In turn, however, if this
assumption is to be seen as true, Canadian defense policy can never ignore the
requests of American security. In other words, if the United States feels that her
security is compromised in any way, Washington is prepared to use military force
for its own protection. This paradigm, in turn, has implications for Canadian
foreign and defense policy in the sense that policy makers in Ottawa have to ensure
that Canada does not become a liability to the U.S. Nonetheless, Canada and the
United States have a long history of a bilateral defense relationship. The North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), based in Norfolk, Virginia,
was the institution that provided the structural body for this relationship (Sokolsky
2004). NORAD was also complemented by maritime co-operation in the Atlantic
and Pacific. In this sense, Canada “was obliged to maintain a proper place”
(Sokolsky 2004: 2) in North American as well as European security.
Canada’s link to Europe is based on historical developments such as
demographics as well as cultural and language ties. The first settlers came from
Europe. Canadians were connected psychologically towards Europe (Frankel 1970:
76-84) in the sense that events in Europe had implications at home in Canada.
Europe was part of Canada’s political space. Canada’s commitment to Europe
predates the formation of NATO. Canadians fought in two world wars and helped
re-build the societies and economies of Europe (Sokolsky and Middlemiss 1989:
157). After 1945, Canada made her sea, air, and land forces available to the NATO
alliance by permanently stationing her military forces in Germany (Sokolsky and
Middlemiss 1989: 158). This “Eurocentric view” in Canadian foreign and defense
policy lasted for the next fifty years.
Nonetheless, because of Canada’s difficult strategic position in North
America of sharing a continent with a more powerful partner and enjoying a
transatlantic link through NATO, often times Canada found itself ‘caught’ in
between American and European ambitions. During the Cold War, Canada shared
the American view that containment was the right policy of deterring the Soviet
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Union. Canada’s military standards, training, procurement, defense planning, and
management were acquired based on NATO standards, which were largely
dominated and influenced by the United States (Sokolsky 2004: 1). Canada found
herself in a triangular relationship, in which both Canada and Europe were
dependent on the U.S. for their security. Therefore, it can be argued, since the birth
of NATO the transatlantic alliance provided both security and forms of
independence for Canada (Sokolsky 2004: 2).
However, Canada and Europe share a similar interest. The NATO
institution provides the structural framework in which both are able consult with
their American counterparts on a regular basis. NATO is not only a political forum
of exchange and discussion that Canada intends to preserve, but also an
opportunity to balance and soften American interests. According to Pouliot, this is
one of the major functions of a healthy security community, namely a
“systematically peaceful resolution of transatlantic disputes” (Pouliot 2006: 125). By
definition, a security community is not free from political and social conflicts.
Whenever Washington works out plans on where to send its military next, NATO
is the place where the Europeans and Canadians are able to lobby the
administration to soften its approach by considering other forms of diplomacy.
“This is exactly the kind of contentious but peaceful political dynamics that have
been prevailing inside the transatlantic security community for the last few years”
(Pouliot 2006: 120). In addition, it allowed Canada to largely disregard homeland
security issues that are of direct threat to the United States.
Needless to say, today’s security threats are fundamentally different form
those during the Cold War. They are mostly of an asymmetric character. The EU
perceives climate change, resource depletion, and migration from economic and
ecological disaster zones as the new security threats, which require international
cooperation and not hard power. Europe’s threat assessment is consistent with
Canada’s foreign policy doctrine of conflict prevention through diplomacy and
economic support. Nonetheless, the U.S. has made it clear to Canadians after 9/11
that it expects Canada to increase her share in the defense of North America. The
‘smart-border’ initiative launched by the Canadian government immediately after
the terrorist attacks on 11 September was one response to the call. Canada is also
expected to play and pay a greater share in securing Canada’s border through
increased customs inspections, container scanning, and databases about incoming
flight passengers. September 11 distorted the global security environment and
created new roles for the defense alliance in general. The terrorist attacks
underlined the changing nature of warfare as well as the importance of North
America in a NATO alliance. Before 9/11, North America was a “geostrategic
backwater” (Sokolsky 2004: 6) for NATO. The defensive frontline of the ‘West’
was always on European soil. Since Washington placed a heightened emphasis on
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‘homeland security,’ Canada’s foreign and defense objectives re-shifted back to
issues of continental defense and away from NATO concerns. The reorganization
of the U.S. command structure underlines this trend (Sokolsky 2004, 6).
Nonetheless, Europe and Canada can be characterized as like-minded
partners internationally by developing similar instruments and capabilities for civil
based interventions. They also share a high degree of consensus on other issues
such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Landmines Treaty, the International Criminal
Court, the peace process in the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the use
of force in general. The EU provides 55 percent of global humanitarian aid and 66
percent of the world’s developmental aid. All these efforts make clear that it is
more appealing for European countries to advance its beliefs in multilateralism and
international law. It becomes clear that “Europeans today are not ambitious for
power, and certainly not for military power. Europeans over the past half century
have developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in
international relations […]” (Kagan 2004: 55). These are all policy issues Ottawa
would not hesitate to sign. In fact, the relationship between Canada and Europe in
the last two decades could be characterized by a high degree of consensus and
understanding. “There endures a bedrock of shared values and interests. Europe
and North America continue to share the commitment to democracy and human
rights that NATO was created to protect” (Graham 2003: 426). It was the Chrétien
Government in Ottawa, for example, that lobbied the United States to reconsider
its position for going to war with Iraq. Ottawa felt it would be a mistake to
overthrow the old concept of multilateralism and envisaged entangling alliances as
the best form of solving international conflicts and crisis.
Conclusion
It is apparent that the transatlantic rift between the United States and Europe,
primarily Germany and France, is not a theoretical construct, but a reality. The
relationship and bond that held this alliance together has disappeared. After World
War II, the glue that held the transatlantic alliance together and alive was the threat
of communism and a Russian military marching into Western Europe. The military
threat united the two different continents based on a clear vision of how to
construct the world, how to govern it, and who to engage and consult when
conflicts occurred. There was a customary belief to consult with partners first
before any actions were taken. NATO provided this forum of exchange. This bond
continued to exist after the end of the Cold War. During Gulf War I, President
Bush and his Secretary of State traveled around the globe and spent hours on the
phone convincing NATO and other heads of state of the necessity of such a
coalition. Again, it was the bond of an external threat, and the dictatorship of
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Saddam Hussein that united the coalition together. It was a common vision shared
by the U.S. and the EU that Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was not only a
threat to the security in the Middle East but also for Europe and the United States.
Deeper was the belief that international relations are ultimately based on the rule of
international law that prohibits invasions of foreign countries. It was a silent
common understanding in Paris, London, and Berlin that American primacy is
deemed to be preserved. In other words, European capitals acknowledged the
nature of the balance of power.
However, when President George W. Bush became the 43rd President, the
transatlantic understanding of how to govern in international relations vanished.
The White House showed a different understanding of how to deal with hostile
states. The crisis in Iraq revealed that the transatlantic relationship is in crisis. It
demonstrated that the common ground of understanding has disappeared; it was as
if Europe and the U.S. spoke two different languages that neither understood.
This paper has shown the growing divergence between North America
and Europe. It demonstrated Europe’s role as a junior partner in the transatlantic
alliance that was held together by a common threat perception during the Cold
War. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 changed this dimension. Since
1990 the United States is the only remaining superpower in international affairs. At
the same time, the EU fostered its project of integration while declining its military
spendings. The treaty of Maastricht marked the official start for a more
independent EU foreign and defense policy. In short, the European continent grew
closer together, economically and politically. With Maastricht, the EU incorporated
a legally binding foreign and security policy (CFSP) which was transformed with
the treaty of Amsterdam into the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
Most recently, the EU defined its military role and responsibility in the first
European Security Strategy. Therein, the member countries place special
importance on civilian crisis management capabilities. This underlines Europe’s
commitments to conflict resolution and the importance of international laws.
Canada is in a delicate situation. It shares the North American continent
with the United States but also enjoys a great European heritage. Historically, after
World War II and during the Cold War, Canada as well as Europe relied on the
United States for security protection. Without America’s help European soil would
not have been as defended as it was. However, 9/11 changed this equation and
demonstrated an even greater divergence of European and American threat
perceptions. Canada, again, is in a delicate situation, because it shares a long and
undefended border with the United States.
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