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CHAPTER 6
STRATEGIC EFFECT OF AIR POWER
People have preferred to feel rather than to know about Strategic Bombing.
Dr Noble Frankland
The concept of ‘Centres of Gravity’, first espoused by Clausewitz as a way of describing
how to compel an opponent in conflict or war to bend to your will, has stood the test of
time. In Clausewitz’s day, he believed the enemy’s army to be the “hub of all power”;
now an opponent’s centre of gravity may take many forms and often different degrees
of accessibility. What is clear, however, is that far from being limited to the physical
destruction of targets with high explosives, we now seek to achieve strategic effect on
target sets.
The ability of air power to reach, disrupt or, possibly, destroy an opponent’s strategic or
operational centre of gravity suggests that air power is inherently capable of military
action with strategic effect. That effect may be created through independent, distinct
action or through joint or multinational activity operating in cadence with other forces.
Throughout the history of air power, air platforms and their associated weapon systems
have been able to carry the fight to the enemy. The aim of this chapter is to offer a brief
overview of the history of the strategic use of air power to place strategic effect into
context. The context of joint force employment will be developed to offer planning
considerations for the employment of air power for strategic effect.
Air Operations for Strategic Effect
Air operations for strategic effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the defined
strategic centre of gravity of an opponent. The effect sought by air power
could be destructive, non-destructive or a combination of both, against target
sets which undermine the opponent’s ability, will and means to continue his
aggression. Air operations for strategic effect are not limited to bombing or
solely the domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon
systems are capable of action for strategic effect.
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Historical Survey of Strategic Bombing
The evolution of air power doctrine is covered in Part Three of this volume. Within that
doctrine, however, the employment of air power for strategic effect is closely associated
with the development of theories of strategic bombing. The early promises of the
military potential of air power were made before air power had reached a sufficiently
mature technological stage to deliver those promises. Such theories underpinned the
teaching of both the RAF and the USAAF Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) throughout
the 1930s. The culmination of such theories was the notion expressed by British Prime
Minister, Stanley Baldwin, that ‘the bomber will always get through.’1
As a result, in both the pre-war theories for the employment of air power and the
historiography of the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War, there have
been claims and counter-claims for the efficiency of strategic bombing. There is no
incontrovertible evidence that strategic bombardment has been decisive in breaking the
determination or shattering the will to continue of an enemy.2 There is, however, more
evidence to suggest that the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War had
a profound impact upon the outcome of the war.3
Strategic bombing campaigns associated with the Korean War, Vietnam War, Falklands
Conflict, Gulf War and the Balkans continue to excite similar interest amongst historians
and commentators. In these limited wars, strategic bombardment from the air was
attempted with mixed results.4 At the conceptual level, however, modern air power
theory has kept up with changing technology. In an influential work published in 1989,
The Air Campaign,5 John Warden argues that air power strategic bombardment attacks
against the leadership of a government or group can lead to strategic paralysis, thereby
obviating the need for attacks against fielded forces. Warden’s theory undoubtedly
influenced US air campaign planning during the Gulf War and, even if Warden’s theories
cannot be proven, there is no doubt that air power can be employed for strategic effect
in support of the desired strategic end-state.
The notion that the strategic employment of air power is inextricably linked to
bombing and bombardment is derived from historical experience. The purpose of the
strategic employment of air power is to create strategic effect on the identified target
set. This effect will be in support of the defined strategic aim, but may not be part of
a theatre campaign.
Speaking in debate on Air Estimates, 1935, Hansard.
Air Vice Marshal R A Mason, Air Power, a Centennial Appraisal, Brassey’s, 1994, p.272-273.
See R Overy, Why the Allies Won, Pimlico, 1995 and R Pape, Bombing To Win, Cornell, 1996 for up to date
surveys of the Strategic Bombing Campaign of World War Two.
4
See Chapter 14 for details of works on strategic bombing. The most recent comprehensive work is R A Pape,
Bombing to Win, Cornell, 1996. Another recent survey is by Lt Col M Bucknam, Chapter 11 of
S W Peach (Ed), Perspectives on Air Power, TSO, 1998.
5
J Warden, The Air Campaign, Brassey’s 1990.
1
2
3
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Operation El Dorado Canyon 1986
In April 1986, exasperated by terrorist actions supposedly backed by the Libyan
President, Colonel Qaddafi, the Reagan administration authorised a retaliatory
night air attack. For Operation El Dorado Canyon, a joint USN and USAF force
was mounted against terrorist and airfield targets in Libya. Of the US allies in
Europe, only the UK offered assistance; France’s refusal to grant permission to
overfly meant that the twenty-one F-111s were committed to a 2700 mile flight
round the Bay of Biscay and through the Straits of Gibraltar. This route to the
target from their base in the England was far longer than the direct flight across
France. The indigenous Libyan air defences were significant.
The Libyans boasted an air force of 500 aircraft and a formidable ground
environment bristling with integrated SAM sites, armed mainly with Soviet
missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft guns. The system was operated under
the direction of 3000 Soviet technicians. At 2.00 am local time on 15 April, the
coordinated raids of the USN and USAF swept into Libya to hit their targets.
The attack lasted for thirteen minutes, and cost the Americans the loss of one
F-111 crew, but caused considerable damage to the Libyans. The five selected
targets were all severely damaged, while collateral casualties and damage were
not extensive. Although some civilians were killed or injured, generating
predictably adverse publicity, the raid did mark a major success for the United
States, and was described as ‘probably the most controversial discrete foreign
policy action taken by the Regan administration’.6
Historical Lessons from the Employment of Air Power for Strategic Effect
There are four lessons which can be deduced from the use of strategic bombardment:
●
Air Power as Shock Action. First, the shock of aerial bombardment can induce
panic and destroy the morale of those targeted. Over time, however, historical data
suggest that target populations become inured to the effects of air attack.
Nevertheless, the psychological impact of air power - when employed together with
other forms of coercive activity such as Information Operations - can be profound.7
●
Effect on Target Population. The second lesson is that a comprehensive bombing
strategy can have profound effect on civilian morale and divert the opponent’s
military effort away from offensive operations to home defence.
6
7
Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq, p.105.
See A Lambert, Air Power and Coercion, in S W Peach (Ed), Perspectives on Air Power, TSO, London, 1998.
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The Effect of Allied Bombing of Germany in World War II
Bombing in World War II was both strategic and tactical in purpose, pursuing an
independent campaign to pave the way for a combined-arms invasion of Hitler’s
Europe. Central to the achievements of the Combined Bombing Offensive was
the defeat of German air power, and the result in the spring and summer of 1944
was catastrophic for the German war effort. Direct attacks on German aircraft
production, airfields and aircraft in transit, together with the use of long-range
fighters to contest German airspace, crippled the Luftwaffe. Allied bombing of
cities also forced German industry to adopt a policy of dispersal or decentralisation. In some cases large resources were tied up in building new
factories in bomb-safe areas in a situation where building labour and materials
were in desperately short supply. The impact on German morale was equally
debilitating. Bombing did not produce the overthrow of the Hitler regime but
the effect on those regularly subjected to bombing in the major industrial centres
was nonetheless intensely demoralising. Furthermore, Germans interviewed
after the war were almost unanimous in their view that bombing was the hardest
thing for civilians to bear. Bombing also distorted German strategy and forced
the massive diversion of resources - men and weapons - to fight the bomber
threat. The establishment of an extensive German air defence system shifted
valuable resources away from the main battlefronts. This had a further
unforeseen effect on military performance as German armies during 1943 found
themselves slowly starved of air support at just the point that their enemies’
production of aircraft began to rise steeply. Bombing not only diverted German
military effort to home defence on a large scale, but also encouraged desperate
solutions from Hitler that further undermined economic capacity and postponed
the introduction of military technologies that might have had a decisive effect.8
●
Leadership Reaction. The third lesson from the study of air bombardment is that, if
the opposing government or group is inherently authoritarian, it is likely that the
leadership will take little notice of public opinion. Consequently, air bombardment of
the populace is unlikely to have any effect on the commitment of the leadership to their
strategic objectives or war aims.
Vietnam - Population Forcibly Redeployed
During Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965, the physical pattern of targets
indicated no intention to kill large numbers of civilians. The great majority of
destroyed targets were isolated from population centres. Nevertheless,
evacuation programmes were initiated in all major cities and villages in North
Vietnam. US intelligence estimated that the population of Hanoi fell from
475,000 to 235,000 in 1967 and that of Haipong declined from 220,000 to 55,000
during the same period 9.
8
9
See R Overy, Bomber Command 1939 - 45, HarperCollins, 1997.
See Pape, R A, Bombing to Win, Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell, New York, 1996.
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Lancaster aircraft over Cologne 1945
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Importance of Targeting. The fourth lesson of strategic bombardment is that targets
for strategic effect must be carefully defined. One of the essential lessons of the
history of strategic bombardment is the paramount importance of targeting. As air
power assets become more versatile and multi-role, the same platforms could well be
used for missions with strategic effect as for air interdiction (AI) or even close air
support (CAS). Weapon systems will vary according to target sets, but it is highly
likely that delivery platforms will be in short supply. Therefore, in a joint or
multinational environment, strategic missions may need to be justified alongside other
priorities within a theatre of operations. The key for commanders and planners alike
is the selection of the correct strategic centre of gravity via campaign planning tools
and the estimate process described in JWP 0-10. According to current doctrine and
practice, targeting priorities at theatre level are decided by the joint target coordination board (JTCB).
Campaign Planning Tools for Strategic Effect
Within the estimate process, a defined strategic centre of gravity for an opponent is
selected. This process may, in itself, be complex and involve the interaction of many
commanders and staff officers. Once the centre of gravity for each level is selected,10 in
consultation with their staffs and higher level commanders, component commanders
will determine decisive points and lines of operations either by activity or component.
These features may not be solely military lines of operations, nor are decisive points
solely military objectives. Objectives can include diplomatic, political and economic
objectives. However, all must lead to the strategic centre of gravity which should be the
key to achieving the strategic aim or the end-state. Timing is another vital criterion in
campaign planning and, once decisive points and lines of operation have been
determined, phases of operations over time are identified. Full details of campaign
planning tools are contained in JWP 0-10.
The essential feature of air operations for strategic effect is that the activity - which could
also include similar action by maritime or land forces11 - although aimed at the strategic
centre of gravity in support of the overall aim, may be mounted distinct from the joint
campaign or from outside the theatre boundary. It is this distinction which sets air
operations for strategic effect apart from other roles and missions. This planning
process and desired outcome is displayed graphically in Figure 6.1.
The UK recognises only one centre of gravity for each defined level of warfare - operational and strategic. The
UK does not usually define a centre of gravity for tactical operations. This doctrine may be at variance with that
of allies, for example, US doctrine recognizes there may be more than one centre of gravity for each level. In
multinational and coalition air operations, it is vital that doctrinal coherence is sought in the early stages of
campaign planning.
11
See British Maritime Doctrine and British Military Doctrine for details of distinct maritime and land operations.
10
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Phases of the Operation
Figure 6.1 Campaign Planning Tools for Air Operations with Strategic Effect
The Objective of Strategic Effect
The objective of strategic effect missions is similar to that of manoeuvre warfare itself: to
shatter the enemy’s cohesion and will, rather than simply to destroy his manpower and
materiel as in the Cold War attrition-based model. This objective is achieved by applying
strength against identified weakness through the application of firepower, manoeuvre
and surprise throughout the enemy’s operating area, with operations timed
simultaneously at all levels of warfare.12 Target sets identified by campaign planning
tools may include the machinery of government, military forces, infrastructure and
research and production facilities. All will have been approved and scrutinised by
commanders and planners with regard to the strategic aim and, equally importantly,
with regard for extant Rules Of Engagement (ROE), the laws of armed conflict (LOAC)
and associated targeting concepts such as distinction and proportionality.13
JWP 0-10.
See British Defence Doctrine and JWP 0-10 for further details of the legal framework for military operations.
Detailed advice to commanders will be provided by a qualified legal adviser. An excellent short reader on the
subject is C Greenwood. Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict, SCSI 4, Camberley, 1994.
12
13
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Target Selection
Selection of the correct target sets to achieve coercive effect or to deny an opponent vital
information or materiel may well be the key to success. JWP 0-10 outlines the criteria
and, although specialist advice is available, commanders need to exercise military
judgement in the timely completion of this process. Furthermore, as was made clear in
Chapter 1, the targeting of air power is part of a political as well as military process in
conflicts short of general war. It is axiomatic that there will be deep political interest in
the target selection process.
Target Selection
The ever increasing accuracy of air delivered weapons, coupled with media
presence and probably a more questioning public, has forced political leaders
to undertake careful appraisal of target selection in post World War II
confrontations. A political perception existed that a minor error committed by
a junior officer in the field could touch off a nuclear war; in at least one crisis,
this led to Washington dictating ‘rudder orders’ to the Sixth fleet. During the
first phase of Operation Rolling Thunder, the US President, Lyndon Johnson,
maintained day-to-day approval of all targets, even prescribing the strike dates
and times. Later in the war in Vietnam, his successor, President Richard Nixon,
allowed the military to make target decisions after general guidelines and rules
had been established. There has since been a gradual reduction in the political
micro-management of the military commander in theatre. In 1981, after the
engagement in which USN F-14s destroyed Libyan aircraft, President Ronald
Reagan declared quite publicly that he did not mind being informed of the
incident after it had happened. President George Bush, himself a former
military pilot, despite having nearly the same information available as General
Schwarzkopf, took the fundamental decision that it would be the perspective
of the man of the spot that mattered. President Bush may also have
acknowledged that the British success in the Falklands War of 1982 may have
been in part because of the autonomy afforded to the theatre commanders.
This does not mean politicians abrogated their responsibilities, but they
accepted that even the most modern technology cannot enable them to make
warfighting decisions remotely14.
14
Desert Victory, Norman Friedman, p.145.
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Political Constraints
Although military doctrine seeks militarily solutions, political, legal and humanitarian
constraints, either externally or internally imposed, are factors of modern warfare and
need to be taken into account in campaign planning.
During the Gulf War, UK aircraft did not attack targets near to religious sites.
Similarly, in Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 over Bosnia, the Air
Commander personally approved all targets.
As outlined earlier in this chapter, historical experience suggests that trying to attack
national will directly with air operations appears to have limited effect. In inter-state
warfare, national will has been taken to be synonymous with the enemy state’s military
capability. Military capability consists of everything within the state which can contribute
to the ability to carry on the confrontation. In traditional or ‘industrial’ states, these
physical aspects of power are present in the control of land, in the population, money,
natural resources, finance, industry, government machinery, armed forces,
transportation and communications networks and all the other components of state
infrastructure. Once these have been destroyed, theoretically there may be no capability
left to continue with an aggressive military campaign and national will is lost or becomes
militarily unimportant.
Targeting military capability as a whole is also difficult. However, through problem
solving techniques such as nodal analysis, the critical aspects of systems can be
identified, the targets located, destroyed or damaged and, as a consequence, a path can
be opened through to the core of national or group will. The selection of critical aspects
of military capability is relevant at the strategic level but also at both the operational and
the tactical level. The successful prosecution of a tactical target could well have an effect
at the operational or even the strategic level of war.
In non-industrial states, or when the machinery of government has imploded into
anarchy, identification of target sets is much more difficult. The apparatus of leadership
may be virtually non-existent or mobile. Fielded forces may be small, isolated pockets
or groups, communications may be by word of mouth in impenetrable local dialect, and
so on.15 In such scenarios, air power remains highly relevant, but air operations for
strategic effect may cascade to other platforms such as attack helicopters or support
helicopters used to deploy special forces.
15
In Somalia, US forces dominated the electro-magnetic spectrum. The warlords did not use it.
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Levels of Air Operations for Strategic Effect
Air power would rarely be used in isolation during a joint or a multinational campaign.
The use of aerospace assets would always be directed towards the political end-state
which the campaign was designed to achieve. However, in the course of that campaign,
air power could be used in three different ways:
●
Concurrent Operations. Parallel operations conducted by air power at different
levels of warfare at the same time.
●
Simultaneous Operations. Operations coordinated with the manoeuvre of surface
forces involved with joint or multinational operations.
●
Autonomous Operations. Operations purely dependent on aerospace assets. Air
operations may be distinct from theatre level operations but in support of the strategic
aim or end-state.
Whatever air operations take to achieve strategic effect, the mission type is more
pervasive than air bombardment using conventional bombs. Air assets in the form of air
transport, support helicopters, or maritime reconnaissance and attack (MRA) aircraft,
could well be used for missions with strategic effect. Nevertheless, recent experience
and current trends suggest that for conventional attack missions for strategic effect, it is
likely that precision guided munitions (PGMs) or stand-off missiles will be employed.
If unguided bombs are employed, strict guidelines may be applied to ensure accurate
delivery and avoid collateral damage.
Precision
The Precision Concept
The employment of PGMs for strategic effect requires a much greater degree of
understanding on the part of those involved in tasking than simply acquiring the
weapons and traditional weapon-to-target matching. The effective employment of
PGMs requires an understanding of precision as a total concept: precision in doctrine,
tactics, C2 and logistic support; a systemic approach is required. Once that degree of
convergence is achieved, PGMs can add significantly to the credibility and effectiveness
of air operations as targets can be struck more accurately and reliably with far fewer
aircraft with less risk of collateral damage than in the past. PGMs are not infallible; as
with any weapon system, they have reliability and serviceability factors which
commanders should take into account in their risk assessment. Nevertheless, PGMs give
commanders the opportunity to concentrate force in space and time with an accuracy
that can prove decisive. See the RAF Air Operations manual for further details.
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PGMs in Deliberate Force
Although initiated following the bombardment of the market place in Sarajevo
by the Bosnian Serb Army on 28 August 1995, which left 38 dead, Operation
Deliberate Force was the culmination of events and related planning over a
long period. The warring factions in Bosnia had disregarded UN mandates
concerning designated Safe Areas and heavy weapon exclusion zones.
Planned as an air attack to reduce military capability to threaten or attack safe
areas and UN forces, the Operation’s targets included heavy weapons,
command and control centres and military support facilities. Over 700 PGMs,
a mixture of laser-guided bombs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Stand-off Land
Attack Missiles (SLAM) and anti-radiation missiles (ARM) were used together
with more conventionally aimed munitions. The US Deputy Defence Secretary
John White stated “our accuracy has been phenomenal”, and that strikes were
so precise that crews had gone beyond looking at targets and were looking at
aiming points within targets. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that bombing
in the Operation had been much more accurate than in the Gulf War. This
increased accuracy, as well as ensuring that air attacks were economical and
highly effective, also reduced collateral damage to such an extent that the
Americans were able to claim that although they had searched closely for
civilian casualties following air attacks they had found none. After two weeks,
on 14 September, offensive operations were suspended when the warring
factions agreed to the conditions of the UN-brokered framework agreement.
UN/NATO agreed that the objectives of the Operation had been met, mission
accomplished and end-states achieved. The factions had been given a signal
demonstration of the economical but devastating force of NATO air power, and
in particular their ability to attack targets with precision. The commanders were
able to declare ‘the resumption of air strikes is not currently necessary’16.
The Psychology of Precision
If the fear of air power and the uncertainty created by the unexpected can enhance the
ability of air power to be exploited for strategic effect, the very accuracy of PGMs may
work against military utility. The fact that Western nations are sensitive to loss of life on
both sides of a conflict and that forces will be required to limit collateral damage, could
reduce the coercive value of PGMs.
Despite the political and psychological factors, PGMs offer military commanders the
opportunity of using decisive military force close to an area inhabited by noncombatants in the enemy homeland, or close to own forces without resorting to the area
bombing now consigned to history. Strategically, when carefully planned in cadence
with other means, this can mean that coercive pressure could be brought to bear on an
16
See Craig Covault, ‘Precision Missiles Bolster NATO Strikes’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 Sept 95, and
‘Bombing that hits its mark’, Navy Times, 2 Oct 95.
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OPERATION DESERT FOX 1998 - Tornado GR1 at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait
enemy more rapidly and with longer impact.17 PGMs also offer commanders an element
of responsive control which might be absent with cruise and tactical ballistic missiles.
In certain scenarios, possibly in a politically-charged conflict or missions for coercive
effect, it may be essential to have a man-in-the-loop to ensure positive control and target
identification until weapon release, with very tight ROE. PGMs offer that capability.
During Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, NATO crews were voice authorised for each
target before weapon release.
Stand-off Weapons
Trends in technological development are making stand-off weapons a reality.
The ability of the launch aircraft to stay out of harm’s way whilst releasing a stand-off
weapon to fly deep into an opponent’s territory and disrupt or destroy a target with
strategic effect will remain a key mission for air power. That said, air launched or sea
launched cruise missiles are not a panacea for the use of military force. Cruise missiles
may be scarce resources and may be counter-productive in coercive operations.
The key to understanding air operations for strategic effect is that the target sets must be
of strategic value to the opponent. If current trends continue, as stand-off ranges
increase and cruise missiles become more accurate, the next step may well be the
development of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) which are capable of extreme
manoeuvrability through the ability to withstand very high ‘g’ loading.
17
See A P N Lambert on Coercion, Chapter 10 in Perspectives on Air Power, ibid.
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