INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
E
IMO
TECHNICAL GROUP OF THE MEPC ON
OPRC-HNS
3rd session
Agenda item 3
MEPC/OPRC-HNS/TG 3/3/3
10 June 2005
ENGLISH ONLY
MANNUALS AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
Progress report of informal Consultation Group on the development of a guidance
document on contingency planning and response to HNS incidents
Submitted by the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association (IPIECA)
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document presents a progress report on development of a draft
guidance document on contingency planning and response to marine
spills resulting from the bulk transport of chemicals. It is suggested
that this manual, once finalized, be published as a joint publication
between the oil and chemical industries and the IMO.
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 10
Related documents:
MEPC 51/WP.3, MEPC 49/7/72, MEPC 48/6/1,
MEPC-OPRC/OPRC-HNS/TG 2/2/1
Background
1
The oil and shipping industries, through their respective organizations, have contributed
largely to the work of IMO on issues related to implementation of the OPRC Convention and of
the OPRC-HNS Protocol, initially through the OPRC Working Group and now through the
OPRC-HNS Technical Group. Contributions have included the preparation and finalization of
manuals, guidelines, guidance documents and model training course materials.
2
To facilitate the implementation of the OPRC Convention, IMO and the oil and chemical
industries have co-operated through the Global Initiative programme by conducting joint
activities such as training, workshops and seminars on contingency planning and pollution
response, with the aim of promoting government and industry co-operation.
3
Although much useful technical information on chemical spills is contained within the
IMO Manual on Chemical Pollution, there is a need for additional manuals and guidance
documents related to contingency planning, hazard identification and assessment, impact
assessment, evacuation schemes, and response options for HNS.
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
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MEPC/OPRC-HNS/TG 3/3/3
-2-
4
In this connection, the European Chemical Industry (represented by CEFIC) and the Oil
industry (represented by IPIECA) presented a proposal to the first meeting of the OPRC-HNS
Technical Group to prepare, jointly with IMO, a guidance document on contingency planning
and response to marine spills resulting from the bulk transport of chemicals
(MEPC 51/WP.3, paragraphs 7.9 and 7.10).
5
At the first meeting of the OPRC-HNS Technical Group, an informal consultation group
was established to further develop the proposal and a draft manual was submitted to the second
session of the OPRC-HNS Technical Group in September 2004 for its consideration and
comment.
6
The informal correspondence group includes representatives from the following Member
States and Observing Bodies:
•
•
•
•
IPIECA (Co-ordinator)
CEFIC
ITOPF
Italy
Current status
7
Further to the comments received at the second meeting of the Technical Group, the
informal consultation group has continued to work intersessionally on the development of the
manual. Comments were also received from ITOPF and the United States following the last
Technical Group meeting and were taken into consideration in developing the current draft.
8
Following revisions, a draft of the guidelines is now substantively complete, as set out in
the annex. The figures and tables that will eventually be included in the finalized draft are still to
be prepared. In the interim, boxes and titles have been included to demarcate the eventual
placement of these figures and tables, once finalized.
Timeframe for further development of the Manual
9
It is envisioned that a final round of comment and revision will be required and that a full
draft text of the complete manual will be available for consideration by the next meeting of the
Technical Group in March 2006.
Action requested of the Technical Group
10
The Technical Group is invited to:
.1
take note of the information provided on the work progress of the informal
correspondence group tasked to develop a guidance document on contingency
planning and response to HNS incidents;
.2
note the draft manual annexed to this report; and
.3
note that a final draft document will be completed for submission to the next
session of Technical Group in March 2006.
***
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MEPC/OPRC-HNS/TG 3/3/3
ANNEX
Planning and Response to Chemical
Spills on Water
June 2005
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
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Preface
This report has been commissioned by the International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association (IPIECA) and has been developed in collaboration with the
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC).
In preparing this report, IPIECA has been guided by a set of principles which it would
encourage every organisation associated with the transportation of chemicals at sea to
consider when managing any operations relating to the transportation, handling and storage of
chemicals and petrochemicals:
•
•
•
•
it is of paramount importance to concentrate on preventing spills;
despite the best efforts of individual organisations, spills will continue to occur and
will affect the local environment;
response to spills should seek to:
o minimise the risk to human safety and health
o minimise the severity of environmental damage by considering all appropriate
response options;
o hasten the recovery of any damaged ecosystems;
the response should always seek to complement and make use of natural forces to the
fullest extent possible.
Following a spill, it is important to measure the effectiveness of the response and to document
lessons learnt for future responders. These needs should be addressed at the planning stage.
Many countries and organisations already have well-developed systems and plans for
responding to oil spills and many of these arrangements will be directly applicable to
chemicals spills. Certainly, the need for effective organisational structures, reporting and
notification, logistics support, planning and training are shared by both oil and chemical spill
response. This document should, therefore, be read alongside documents such as “A Guide
To Contingency Planning For Oil Spills On Water”, Volume 2 in the IPIECA report series.
However, chemical spills do differ from oil spills in many important respects, especially with
regard to the type and range of hazards posed and the consequent requirements for appropriate
protection of responders and the general public; and also with regard to the wide-range of
physical properties and the consequent implications for environmental fate and the potential
to contain and mitigate spills.
The purpose of this document is to identify the key issues that must be addressed when
planning for or responding to chemical spills on water and to identify resources that can be
used to ensure a safe and effective response.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Contents
1
Introduction
4
1.1
1.2
1.3
4
5
5
BULK TRANSPORT OF CHEMICALS
CHARACTERISTICS OF BULK CHEMICAL CARRIERS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
2
Requirements For Chemical Spill Preparedness and Response
7
3
Safety – Understanding Chemical Hazards
8
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4
5
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
CLASSES OF DANGEROUS GOODS
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSE OPERATIONS
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
9
12
12
13
Fate and Impact of Chemicals in the Marine Environment
14
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
14
17
17
18
19
THE EUROPEAN CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
TRAJECTORY AND DISPERSION
MODELLING SYSTEMS
MARINE IMPACTS
SENSITIVITY MAPPING
Response Options
21
5.1
5.2
5.3
21
21
22
RESPONSE OBJECTIVES
MONITORING
RESPONSE TECHNIQUES
6
Equipment
24
7
Management, Training and Exercises
26
7.1
7.2
7.3
26
26
26
8
MANAGEMENT
TRAINING
EXERCISES
Case Studies
APPENDIX 1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SOURCES
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27
Introduction
As the international transport of chemicals increases, there is a growing awareness of the need
to be able to respond safely and effectively to marine spills of chemicals. The primary focus
of governments and industry is on the prevention of chemical spills, but inevitably some spills
will occur and plans and procedures must be in place to ensure a safe and effective response
operation.
It is important to recognise that many of the chemicals transported by sea present only a low
risk to human safety or to the environment. However, some chemicals do present a serious
risk not only to the ship’s crew, response personnel and the environment but also to local
population centres near the spill site.
The wide range of potential impacts means that organisations and regulatory authorities need
to have in place an effective and tested emergency management capability. A structured risk
assessment process is a key component of that capability.
This document highlights the issues that must be addressed when planning for or responding
to spills arising from the bulk transport of chemicals on water. Many of these issues also arise
when dealing with incidents involving packaged goods, with spillages of chemicals on land or
with marine oil spills. A number of detailed guidance documents have been prepared on these
other topics and additional reference material is listed in the appendix.
Bulk Transport of Chemicals
In 2000, approximately 120 million tonnes of chemicals (including petrochemicals were
transported in bulk at sea. The volumes and types of chemicals and transport routes are
highly variable, reflecting market pressures, however an indication of the general global
patterns may be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1. [Source: IPTA based on data for 2000 provided
by CEFIC].
Table 1
Main chemicals transported in bulk at sea (M tonnes/yr)
Aromatics
Xylene
Benzene
Toluene
Ethyl Dichloride
Styrene
MTBE
Figure 1
6
2
2
3
4
6
Acids/Bases
Caustic
Phosphoric
Sulphuric
Methanol
Ethylene glycol
5
4
4
10
3
World map showing principal transport routes for bulk chemicals
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
characteristics of Bulk Chemical Carriers
Bulk chemical cargoes are those loaded directly into holds or tanks of ships – either as liquid,
gas or solid.
Bulk Liquid Carriers
Specialised chemical tankers vary from 400 – 100,000 m3 capacity with tank sizes ranging
from 70-3,000 m3 for specialised products.
Gas carriers transport liquefied gases using temperature and/or pressure control. The size of
vessels varies up to 135,000 m3 capacity. The largest ships are used for Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG). Other key products carried in this way include propane, butane, ammonia and
vinyl chloride.
Bulk Solid Carriers
Carriage of bulk solid cargoes poses additional risks relating to the physical form of the cargo,
such as instability due to cargo shifting or liquefying. The production of toxic or explosive
gases may also be a risk even from apparently non-hazardous cargoes – for example, when
the Fenes ran aground in 1996 carrying a cargo of wheat, salvers faced hazards from
hydrogen sulphide produced by the fermentation of the wheat.
Figure 1.2
Schematics of bulk liquid, gas and solid carriers
Regulatory Framework
The carriage of chemicals in bulk at sea is governed by two main international conventions:
• the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 194, as amended;
and
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•
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) and Annex II noxious liquid
substances carried in bulk.
In addition, the design, construction, equipment and operation of ships carrying chemicals in
bulk are set out in a number of international codes and industry guidelines:
For liquid cargoes:
• IMO Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous
Chemicals in Bulk (BCH Code)
• IMO International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code)
• International Chamber of Shipping - Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals)
For liquefied gas cargoes:
• IMO International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code)
• International Chamber of Shipping - Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas)
For solid bulk cargoes
• IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code)
The codes also contain information relevant to emergency response – such as chemical
hazards and pollution categories.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Requirements For Chemical Spill Preparedness and Response
Intergovernmental
Requirements
and
Conventions
In many countries, the laws and procedures
for preparing for and responding to oil spills
are well-developed, as required under the
IMO International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (OPRC). In March 2000,
States already Party to the OPRC
Convention adopted the Protocol on
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to
Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and
Noxious Substances, 2000 (HNS Protocol).
The HNS Protocol will enter into force
twelve months after ratification by at least
fifteen States.
The HNS Protocol defines hazardous and
noxious substances as
“any substance other than oil which, if
introduced into the marine environment is
likely to create hazards to human health, to
harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea”.
Like the OPRC Convention, the HNS
Protocol aims to provide a global
framework for international co-operation in
combating major incidents or threats of
marine pollution.
Parties to the HNS
Protocol will be required to establish
measures for dealing with pollution
incidents, both nationally and in cooperation with other countries. Ships will be
required to carry a shipboard pollution
emergency plan and there will be a
requirement for ports to develop plans to
deal specifically with incidents involving
HNS.
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Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to
Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000
(HNS Protocol)
Article 3
Emergency plans and reporting
1. Each Party shall require that ships entitled to fly its flag have
on board a pollution incident emergency plan and shall
require masters or other persons having charge of such ships
to follow reporting procedures to the extent required….
2. Each Party shall require that authorities or operators in
charge of seaports and hazardous and noxious substances
handling facilities under its jurisdiction as it deems
appropriate have pollution incident emergency plans or
similar arrangements for hazardous and noxious substances
that it deems appropriate which are co-ordinated with the
national system established in accordance with article 4 and
approved in accordance with procedures established by the
competent national authority.
Article 4
National and regional systems for preparedness and response
1.
Each Party shall establish a national system for
responding promptly and effectively to pollution incidents.
This system shall include as a minimum:
a. the designation of:
i) the competent national authority or authorities with
responsibility for preparedness for and response to
pollution incidents;
ii) the national operational contact point or points; and
iii) an authority which is entitled to act on behalf of
the State to request assistance or to decide to render
the assistance requested;
b. a national contingency plan for preparedness and response
which includes the organisational relationship of the
various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking
into account guidelines developed by the Organisation.
2. In addition, each Party within its capabilities either
individually or through bilateral or multilateral co-operation
and, as appropriate, in co-operation with the shipping
industries and industries dealing with hazardous and noxious
substances, port authorities and other relevant entities, shall
establish:
a. a minimum level of pre-positioned equipment for
responding to pollution incidents commensurate with the
risk involved, and programmes for its use;
b. a programme of exercises for pollution incident
response organisations and training of relevant
personnel;
c. detailed plans and communication capabilities for
responding to a pollution incident. Such capabilities
should be continuously available; and
d. a mechanism or arrangement to co-ordinate the response
to a pollution incident with, if appropriate. The
capabilities to mobilise the necessary resources.
Contingency Planning and Management Systems
As referred to above, many countries have national requirements for chemical spill
preparedness and response. Whether these requirements are established independently or
through ratification of the various conventions, at an early stage detailed consideration needs
to be given to the establishment of a contingency planning programme. The principles and
processes used in chemical spill response contingency planning are similar to those used for
crude oil and common petroleum products (e.g. those outlined in IPIECA Volume 2:Contingency Planning and IMO/IPIECA Volume 2:- Exercise Planning) however there is
necessarily an increased focus on the nature and properties of the spilled substance.
Key aspects that need to be addressed at the contingency planning stage are:
1. Scenario – identifying the range of potential hazards based on transport patterns,
identifying the specific chemicals transported, their properties and the potential
threats;
2. Response capability – identifying the response capabilities needed for the plan, the
potentially affected resources and the organisational or equipment needs;
3. Operational – identifying the checklists, models and tools that can be operational
during a response.
Several computerised models, databases, and management systems have been developed for
this purpose, including the GESAMP profile system (see section 4.4:- Marine Impacts) which
details a hazard evaluation procedure, and models which can predict the fate and dispersion of
a chemical spill (see section 4.3:- Modelling Systems).
In addition to understanding the in-water toxicity and effects, it is important to have an overall
framework to manage the actions of both first and longer-term responders, and where
appropriate, to protect local communities and other affected parties. The ‘Awareness and
Planning at the Local Level’ (APELL) programme from the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) is a modular, flexible methodological tool for preventing accidents and,
failing this, to minimise their impacts. APELL provides a framework to help decision-makers
and technical personnel increase community awareness and to prepare co-ordinated response
plans involving industry, government, and the local community.
To assist front-line chemical emergency planners and responders, APELL uses a system
known as ‘CAMEO’ (Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations) developed by
the Environmental Protection Agency Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention
Office and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the United States.
CAMEO can be used to access, store, and evaluate information critical for developing
emergency plans. Over the last 15 years, CAMEO has been introduced in over 50 countries
through the APELL programme.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Safety – Understanding Chemical Hazards
As with all marine incidents, the highest priority in the response operation must be given to
human safety. However, the hazards posed by some chemicals may endanger the lives of
responders being sent to rescue the crew of a vessel.
This means that no response action, other than isolating the incident, can be taken until the
initial risk assessment is carried out.
The hazards posed by the spills of chemicals range from:
• No hazard posed to crew or the environment, with the chemical rapidly being
diluted at sea or evaporating;
through;
• Local hazard to ship’s crew and response personnel, but limited and local impact
on the environment due to rapid dilution or evaporation;
to;
• Major hazard to ship’s crew, response personnel, local population and the
environment.
Ensuring access to the initial risk assessment capability 24-hours a day, 365 days a year
should be a central element of the contingency planning to deal with chemical spills on water.
As a parallel in responding to chemical spills on land, the chemical industry in Europe (coordinated through CEFIC) has a voluntary programme that, as part of the Responsible Care
initiative, initial information on the chemical hazards posed by a spill should be available
soon after a request for information.
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
Chemical spills may pose any one or combination of the following hazards:
•
•
•
•
•
Flammability
Explosivity
Toxicity
Corrosivity
Reactivity
Flammability describes how easily a material will ignite either spontaneously from exposure
to a high temperature or from exposure to a spark or open flame. Important physical
properties that indicate the flammability of a substance are:
• flashpoint – the lowest temperature at which a substance gives off sufficient vapours
to ignite and burn when exposed to an ignition source. Substances with low flash
points present the greatest risk.
• Lower and upper explosive limits (LEL/UEL) – the range of concentration of
gas/vapour in air between which the mixture can be made to explode by heating or
ignition. If the concentration of vapour is above the UEL, the mixture is “too rich” to
burn, and if below the LEL the mixture is “too lean” to burn.
• Auto-ignition temperature – the lowest temperature at which spontaneous combustion
can occur in the absence of a spark or flame.
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The dangers posed by flammable substances include explosion, burning, inhalation of smoke
and inhalation of toxic gases.
Explosivity is the ability of a substance to react rapidly to produce high local temperatures
and to generate large volumes of gases. Explosions may involve either a rapid chemical
reaction or the sudden release of contained thermal or mechanical energy.
Toxicity is the inherent ability of a substance to damage living tissue, impair the central
nervous system, cause severe illness or death when inhaled, ingested, injected or absorbed by
the skin.
Toxic effects may be acute i.e. those that occur soon after exposure (minutes to days) and
chronic i.e. those which persist for a long period of time (months to years) whether or not
they occur immediately on exposure or after a delay. Toxic effects may also be considered to
be local effects i.e. they occur at the primary site of contact, or systemic i.e. the chemical is
absorbed and circulated through the body to another site.
Many governments and regulatory authorities publish guidance on exposure limits for
airborne concentrations of chemicals. These limits include a range of measures such as Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) - intended to describe the risk to humans resulting from
once in a lifetime, or rare, exposure to airborne chemicals; and Immediately Dangerous to
Life and Health (IDLH) – indicating the level at which any toxic, corrosive or asphyxiant
substance poses an immediate threat to life or would cause irreversible or delayed adverse
health effects or would interfere with the individual’s ability to escape from a dangerous
atmosphere). Different operational levels are used in different countries and many limits
apply to healthy workers rather than to the general public. In the latter case, the Emergency
Response Planning Guidelines (EPRG) provide estimates of concentrations of substances
where adverse effects on population may be observed. An important part of the contingency
planning process is to establish appropriate levels for use during an incident.
Corrosivity is the ability of a substance to chemically attack metals or alloys or destroy body
tissues i.e. acids and bases. Spills of corrosive cargoes may cause chemical burns to crew and
responders; may corrode response equipment and may release gases such as hydrogen which
can form explosive gas-air mixtures. Corrosivity is indicated by particularly high or low pH
levels.
Reactivity is the ability of a substance to react chemically. This may occur spontaneously
when exposed to a source of energy, such as heat, or when in contact with another substance.
Particularly important reactions for chemicals transported in bulk at sea are:
• reactions on contact with air and water;
• reactions with other chemicals
• polymerisation or decomposition reactions.
Guidance on the reactivity of chemical cargoes may be found in cargo compatibility charts
produced, for example, by the US Coastguard (www.chrismanual.com), shown in Figure 3.1
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Figure 3.1
Cargo compatibility chart
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Classes of Dangerous Goods
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, as amended sets
out classes of packaged dangerous goods in Chapter VII.
Class
Description
1
Explosives
7
Gases
Flammable gases
Non-flammable , non-poisonous gases
Toxic gases
Flammable liquids
Low flashpoint
Medium flashpoint
High flashpoint
Flammable solids (including self-reactive solids and liquids),
substances liable to spontaneous combustion and those which, in
contact with water, emit flammable gases
Flammable solids
Substances liable to spontaneous combustion
Substances which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases
Oxidising substances and organic peroxides
Oxidising substances
Organic peroxides
Toxic and infectious substances
Toxic substances
Infectious substances
Radioactive materials
8
Corrosive substances
9
Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
5
5.1
5.2
6
6.1
6.2
Examples
Further sources of information on the properties and hazards of chemicals are contained in the
Appendix.
Implications for Response Operations
Understanding the chemical hazards is necessary to inform immediate operational decisions,
such as:
•
•
•
•
Is it safe for responders to approach the vessel?
What PPE should be worn?
Should crew/general public be evacuated or instructed to remain indoors?
Should the vessel be isolated or towed offshore?
As the response operation progresses, understanding the nature of the environmental fate of
the substance and the hazards to the environment also informs longer-term operational
decisions:
•
Is it possible to contain any released cargo?
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
•
•
Is it possible to mitigate the effects of any released cargo?
Is it better to recover sunk cargo or to undertake a controlled, monitored release to the
environment?
Assessing the risks from a specific spill requires information not only on the nature of the
chemical or chemicals involved, but also on the local environmental conditions, the volume
spilled, the sensitivity of environmental resources, and the proximity and density of the local
population.
Personal Protective Equipment
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is designed to prevent exposure to the chemical through
inhalation or ingestion and through skin/eye contact. The type of PPE used depends on the
nature and severity of the hazard posed by the chemical.
Level A provides the highest level of protection for
respiratory, skin, eye and mucous membranes. The PPE
consists of a fully encapsulating chemical protective suit
in which a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is
worn beneath the suit. The restrictions in movement and
the potential for heat exhaustion must be taken into
account when assigning tasks to response personnel.
Fig Level A
Fig Level B
Level B protection consists of a chemically resistant suit
with a SCBA worn outside the suit. This type of PPE
provides maximum respiratory protection and lower level
splash protection.
Level C protection is used in situations when a sufficiently
low concentration of a known substance permits the use of a
full-face mask air-purifying respirator.
The body is
protected with chemical resistant clothing, such as a onepiece coverall, and gloves and boots.
Fig Level C
Level D is the lowest level of protection and consists of
basic work clothing such as coveralls, gloves and safety
shoes/boots. This should not be used in any situations
where respiratory or skin hazards exist.
If the hazards of a particular situation are uncertain, a higher level of PPE should be used.
Exit routes from the contaminated area and decontamination facilities must be set up before
personnel are sent into contaminated areas.
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Fate and Impact of Chemicals in the Marine Environment
Chemicals spilled into the sea behave in different ways depending on:
• their physical properties – particularly solubility, density, vapour pressure
• the prevailing environmental conditions e.g. sea temperature, sea state, wind speed,
current, rain
In simple terms, chemicals can behave in a combination of four ways:
•
•
•
•
evaporate,
float,
dissolve, or
sink.
Fig 4.1 Schematic of processes acting on a spill
In reality, the behaviour of a spilt chemical is more complex than indicated by four simple
categories and substances may behave as a combination of these modes. For example, a
chemical that would commonly be classified as “an evaporator” may have a low but finite
solubility that means that it will be important to consider any possible effects on the marine
environment or water intakes. A chemical typically classified as “a dissolver” may have a
low but finite vapour pressure, which means that although the chemical will initially dissolve
it will be lost to the atmosphere by evaporation over the period of hours.
It is important to consider the behaviour of the chemical at sea and not to rely on hazard
databases that are designed for spills of chemical on land where there are not the same
dilution and dispersion processes acting on the chemical.
The European Classification Scheme
The European Classification Scheme has developed 12 categories of chemicals (Property
Groups) which show similar behaviour in water and which could therefore be responded to in
a similar way. The Classification Scheme is based on 3 physical properties (solubility,
density and vapour pressure) and also uses viscosity to determine the likelihood of formation
of a surface slick. A schematic of the flow chart used to define the Property groups is shown
in Figure 4.2 and examples of the classification are shown in Table 4.1.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Figure 4.2
Flow chart used to assign Property groups in the European Classification
system [www.bonnagreement.org]
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Table 4.1
Property Groups from the European Classification Scheme
Property Group
G
gas
Properties
evaporate immediately
GD
E
gas/dissolver
evaporator
evaporate immediately
float, evaporate rapidly
ED
evaporator/dissolver
evaporate rapidly, dissolve
FE
floater/evaporator
float, evaporate
FED floater/evaporator/dissolver
float, evaporate, dissolve
F
floater
float
FD
floater/dissolver
float, dissolve
DE
dissolver/evaporator
dissolve rapidly, evaporate
D
dissolver
dissolve rapidly
SD
sinker/dissolver
sink, dissolve
S
sinker
sink
Examples
propane
butane
ammonia
benzene
hexane
cyclohexane
methyl-t-butyl ether
vinyl acetate
heptane
turpentine
toluene
xylene
butyl acetate
isobutanol
ethyl acrylate
phthalates
vegetable oils
animal oils
dipentene
isodecanol
butanol
butyl acrylate
acetone
monoethyl amine
propylene oxide
some acids and bases
some alcohols
glycols
some amines
methyl ethyl ketone
dichloromethane
1,2-dichloroethane
butyl benzyl phthalate
chlorobenzene creosote
coal tar
tetra ethyl lead
tetra methyl lead
Since solubility, density and vapour pressure are themselves temperature dependent, a
substance may be assigned to different Property Groups at different temperatures.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Trajectory and dispersion
For those spills which remain on the sea surface, the trajectory i.e. the path followed is
influenced by surface currents and winds. The resultant movement is shown in Figure 4.3 and
may be calculated as the vector addition of the surface current and 3% of the wind speed.
With the exception of chemicals in Group F, the surface slick is depleted by evaporation and
or dissolution and is likely to persist for only a few hours.
Figure 4.3
Schematic of current & wind trajectory
For those spills that dissolve, a plume or cloud will form, gradually growing and diluting as
the substance dissolves and moves downstream. A rough approximation of the concentration
may be obtained in the case of a slow and steady current [HELCOM]. The method is not
applicable to stagnant or highly turbulent water nor to the situation when the density of the
substance differs significantly from the density of the water.
Table 4.2
Distance in metres to reach two concentration levels for different
quantities released [Source: HELCOM Manual Vol 2]
Quantity released (tonnes)
1
10
100
1,000
Concentration 1 g/m3
500
1,000
2,000
4,000
Concentration 1 mg/m3
5,000
10,000
20,000
40,000
Modelling Systems
Computer-based models are also available to predict the downwind dispersion of gaseous
releases or of the evaporated vapour cloud that can result from releases of liquid or solid
cargoes. Examples of these models are provided in the Appendix.
Computer-based modelling systems are also available that combine the physical partitioning
of the chemical spill with the trajectory of the slick. Such models have been successfully used
to predict atmospheric and marine hazards during response operations such as the Ievoli Sun
and Ascania incidents.
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Whilst field validation of some models has been carried out, it is important to note that the
accuracy of the models is highly dependent on the quality of the input data. Modelling is a
predictive tool that can aid planning and response – it does not replace the need for
monitoring of the spill during an actual incident.
Figure 4.4
ChemSIS prediction of styrene concentrations during the Ievoli Sun incident
Marine Impacts
Assessing the impact of substances in the marine environment needs to take account not only
of the toxicity to marine life, but also the persistence of the substance, the potential for it to
bioaccumulate and the potential to disrupt marine activities – for example, through tainting of
fish or closure of beaches.
MARPOL – Annex II of MARPOL provides information on the dangers presented by bulk
liquids transported at sea. Noxious liquid substances carried in bulk are classified into four
categories according to the hazard they present to marine resources, human health or
amenities.
Category A - substances are liable to produce a hazard to aquatic life or human
health, or are highly toxic to aquatic life. (14%)
Category B - substances are liable to produce tainting of seafood, or are moderately
toxic to aquatic life. (22%)
Category C - substances are slightly toxic to aquatic life. (34%)
Category D - substances are practically non-toxic to aquatic life. (30%)
The MARPOL classification scheme is based on hazard profiles for chemicals transported in
bulk at sea. The methodology for these hazard profiles has been defined by GESAMP.
GESAMP – the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental
Protection is an advisory body consisting of experts nominated by the sponsoring agencies
(IMO, FAO, UNESCO-IOC, WHO, IAEA, UN, UNEP). At the request of IMO, the Group
has developed a hazard evaluation procedure for evaluating the hazards of chemical
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
substances that may enter the marine environment. This procedure was recently revised and
is shown in Figure 4.5. Over 2,200 products have been assessed by the GESAMP working
group.
Sensitivity Mapping
Different types of environmental and commercial resources will be affected in varying ways
by chemical spills and therefore require different response strategies. Attention must be given
to resources in the water column, on land and on the seabed. Detailed coastal maps are
desirable for all areas covered by contingency plans. In addition, environmental data must be
available, preferably presented as sensitivity maps for all areas judged to be at risk from
chemical spill pollution. This entails recording the areas of special commercial, ecological or
recreational value, and the type of shoreline, so that the priorities for protection and the most
appropriate response strategy can be defined.
In many places, sensitivity maps have already been developed for oil spill contingency
planning. Most of the information is of direct relevance to chemical spill contingency
planning – for example, the location of seawater intakes or fishery nursery areas. In general,
as the persistence of surface chemical slicks is significantly less than that of similarly sized oil
slicks, the areas potentially affected by a spill and hence the requirements for sensitivity
mapping are typically smaller for chemical spill contingency planning compared to oil spill
contingency planning.
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Figure 4.5
Revised GESAMP hazard evaluation procedure
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Response Options
Response Objectives
In many cases, particularly if the spill involves a chemical that evaporates or dissolves
rapidly, it will not be possible to physically contain or recover the spilled product from the
sea. In these cases, the response options may be limited to monitoring and measures designed
to mitigate the potential hazards, for example communication to advise local residents to
remain indoors or prohibition of fishing.
There are a limited number of response techniques that can be used to tackle spills of
chemicals at sea. It is important to rapidly establish which response techniques are feasible in
order to reduce or if possible eliminate the impacts of the hazardous substance on humans and
the environment. Communication of information both internal and external to the response
activities has been shown repeatedly to be the critical element that can go wrong in a response
operation. In most chemical incidents the rapid communication of relevant information is
likely to be the most important action that response agencies carry out.
Monitoring
Many chemical spills will be difficult or impossible to observe with the naked eye and it is
essential that an appropriate monitoring strategy is put in place to ensure the safety of
responders and to confirm predictions of the spread and dispersion of the slick.
The type of monitoring implemented will depend on the specific properties and hazards posed
by the substance involved.
Monitoring Gases in Air
It is essential to systematically monitor the concentrations of chemicals in air throughout any
incident involving gases or vapours. Key aspects of monitoring include:
•
•
•
Oxygen concentrations – any atmosphere having <19.5% oxygen i.e. an oxygendeficient atmosphere, should be entered only by personnel wearing self-contained
breathing apparatus (see Section 6). Monitoring is carried out using oxygen cells.
Combustible or explosive gas levels – to identify areas where flammable air/fuel
mixtures exist. A value below 10% of the Lower Explosive Limit may be considered
safe. Typical instruments are combustible gas detectors and explosimeters.
Toxic substances – to identify areas where toxic substances are present and to
establish safe outer limits where it is reasonably safe for unprotected personnel.
Instruments must be capable of measuring at ppm level and include gas detection
tubes, flame ionisation detectors, photo-ionisation devices, IR trace gas detection
(these instruments typically provide only approximate levels) and portable gas
chromatographs and portable mass spectrometers (these instruments typically require
specialist personnel to operate them properly).
Monitoring the Water Column
Monitoring the concentration of chemicals in the water column typically involves two main
techniques:
• Collecting water samples – these are then transferred for analysis at fixed or mobile
laboratories;
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•
Use of towed probes – a number of monitoring devices can be towed through the
water column to establish the extent of a slick and to provide real-time data. Typical
measurements include: pH, light absorption, electrical conductivity
Monitoring Surface Slicks
Thin films on the sea surface can damp capillary waves. A number of techniques have been
developed that make use of the altered properties of the sea surface:
•
•
•
Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) makes use of the reduced intensity of the
backscatter and the surface slick appears as a darker area on the SLAR image;
UV scanners can identify changes in the UV reflectivity of the sea surface;
IR scanners and Forward-Looking Infrared Imagers (FLIR) identify changes in the
radiation temperature of the sea surface.
The effectiveness of these techniques differs depending on the properties of the chemical
involved and the environmental conditions. Understanding the available resources and their
applicability is a key part of the contingency planning process.
Monitoring Sunken Spills
When a pool of liquid chemical collects on the seabed, there will be a phase boundary
between the chemical and the sea water. It may be possible to use echo sounders to locate this
phase boundary and hence to identify the area affected by the spill. Monitoring of the
concentration of the spilt substance at different depths may also be useful to delineate the area
affected.
Response Techniques
Response to Gases and Evaporators
Plume modelling, air monitoring and defensive strategies such as water sprays are commonly
used to respond to gas leaks. When applied as a fine droplet i.e. as a mist and in calm
conditions, they can:
•
•
•
knock down water soluble gases;
stop, steer or disperse sparingly soluble or insoluble gas clouds;
reduce the risk of fire and explosion in flammable clouds of gases, by cooling hot
surfaces, putting out sparks and suppressing flame formation.
Response to Floating Chemicals
A chemical that floats on the water surface will spread and form a large contact surface with
the air. Depending on its vapour pressure, it may evaporate and give rise to a vapour cloud
above the slick. Monitoring of air concentrations is important in these situations to assess fire
and explosion risks and health risks.
It is possible to attempt to contain and recover spills of floaters, but only of those substances
that evaporate or dissolve slowly i.e. category F substances. Typical techniques involve:
•
Covering the slick with foam – this reduces evaporation and hence reduces possible
fire and explosion risks. It also restricts spread over the water surface and hence can
increase the effectiveness of containment and recovery operations. In this case,
consideration must be given to the toxicity of the foam.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
•
•
•
Application of sorbents either loose, as mats or in “sausages”. As many low viscosity
chemical spills rapidly spread to cover a large surface area, these techniques are most
applicable if the spread of the chemical can be confined.
Bubble curtains created by releasing compressed air through a perforated hose may be
used to contain floating slicks in shallow, slow-flowing waters.
Conventional oil spill response booms and skimmers may be used to contain and
recover spills of floating chemicals. The effectiveness of these techniques depends on
the physical properties of the substance involved, as the equipment may not be able to
deal with the thin films and low viscosity of some floating chemicals. Compatibility
of the equipment with the chemical must also be considered (see section 6).
Response to Dissolved Chemicals
The potential to contain and recover spills of chemicals that dissolve is extremely limited.
Response techniques are generally restricted to forecasting their spread, monitoring and
mitigation of their effects.
In the case of spills in shallow or confined waters, treating agents can include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Neutralising agents
Flocculation agents
Oxidising agents
Reducing agents
Gelling agents
Activated carbon
Ion exchangers
In practice though, the use of these treating agents is often ineffective as the dosage is difficult
to estimate and recovery of the substance may be difficult. Curtain barriers may also be used
to contain dissolved chemical spills in shallow and almost stagnant waters.
Response to Sunken Chemicals
Response to sunken chemicals must consider not only the recovery of the chemical itself, but
the removal and treatment of contaminated sediments. The principal technique is that of
dredging. Airlift pneumatic dredges have proven the most successful type of dredge as the
turbulence generated by other types, such as mechanical and hydraulic, can tend to scatter the
chemical.
Disposal
Before commencing any techniques that may lead to the recovery of spilled chemical, it is
essential that an appropriate and legal disposal route has been identified. Even temporary
storage must take proper account of the physical properties of the chemical and its potential to
evaporate or leak.
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Equipment
During the contingency planning process it is important to establish what equipment is
available for responding to chemical spills. A typical stockpile should include:
PPE
Monitoring equipment
Pumps and hoses
Decontamination
Booms and skimmers
sufficient individual chemical protection suits of various types
together with properly fitting associated breathing apparatus.
oxygen monitors; simple readily-available devices such as photoionisation devices, flame ionisation detectors, electrochemical
cells, colour tubes and more sophisticated equipment such as
portable mass spectrometers. The latter may be difficult to operate
and maintain in the field.
chemically resistant pumps and hoses for cargo transfer.
washing and decontamination equipment together with capacity to
store contaminated water
existing booms and skimmers for oil spill response may be suitable.
Understanding the materials and compatibility with chemicals is
essential.
No single piece of equipment will be suitable for all types of chemical spill and care must be
taken to understand the compatibility of materials and chemicals. An example of a
plastics/chemical compatibility chart is shown in Figure 6.1. More detailed information can
usually be obtained from the equipment manufacturer.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Table 6.1
Material / chemical compatibility chart. Note: this table provides only a
general guideline of recommendations and not guarantees of performance.
Types of Chemicals
Polypropylene
Polyethylene
Polystyrene
Aliphatic Hydrocarbon
Aromatic Hydrocarbons
Fully
Halogenated
Hydrocarbons
Partially
Halogenated
Hydrocarbons
Alcohols
Phenols
Ketones
Esters
Ethers
Inorganic Acids – Concentrated
Inorganic acids - Dilute
Bases –Concentrated
Bases – Diluted
Salts – Acid
Neutral
Basic
Organic Acids – Concentrated
Organic Acids - Dilute
Oxidising
Agents
–
Concentrated
Oxidising Agents – Dilute
Fair
Fair
Poor
Fair
Fair
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Acrylic
(Polymethyl
methacrylate)
Good
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Good
Poor
Good
Good
Fair
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Good
Excellent
Poor
Fair
Excellent
Good
Good
Good
Good
Excellent
Good
Good
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Poor
Good
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Fair
Good
Fair
Excellent
Good
Excellent
Good
Poor
Fair
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Poor
Fair
Good
Fair
Fair
Good
Good
Good
Poor
Poor
Poor
Good
Good
Fair
Poor
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Management, Training and Exercises
In order to react quickly to a chemical spill, response staff should be assigned specific roles
and responsibilities, properly trained and regularly rehearsed and available for 24-hour callout. Many of the aspects discussed in this section are identical to those that must be
considered for oil spills. A key difference is the need for highly-specialised staff in certain
potentially hazardous roles and an increased requirement for effective internal and external
communications.
Management
There are four fundamental elements that make up effective management of a chemical spill
or any other spillage:
1. A response organisation: typically with functional teams to address command,
planning, operations, logistics, legal/finance. The key aim of the organisation will be
to obtain timely assessments to allow the response effort to proceed in a manner that
minimises the hazards to human safety and the environment.
2. clear roles and responsibilities: amounting to a “job description” for each of the
identified roles.
3. Effective communications: information flow within the organisation and to the
outside world is a serious challenge and requires both modern technology and
disciplined personnel
4. Suitable resources: the availability of appropriate equipment and staff.
Training
It is vital that staff with an identified role in the response organisation are given effective
training. The training should include the appropriate level of tuition in hazardous materials,
risk assessment, PPE and chemical fate, depending on their role. Familiarisation with
relevant contingency plans and procedures will also form part of the training package.
Exercises
Spill simulations are an excellent way to exercise and train personnel in their emergency roles
and to test contingency plans and procedures. Valuable lessons can be learned from such
exercises and these can be used to improve plans. Chemical spills invariably require a high
degree of inter-agency co-operation and these linkages are strengthened through regular
exercises.
The low frequency of chemical spills means that exercises are a vital part of preparing for an
effective response.
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Planning and Response to
Chemical Spills on water
Case Studies
Multi-tank Ascania
1999,
Pentland Firth, UK
A fire broke out in the boiler room of a chemical tanker, the Multitank Ascania, which was drifting in rough seas around 5 miles off the north coast of Scotland.
1700 tonnes vinyl acetate monomer
Highly flammable
Due to the risk of explosion, 14 crew were airlifted off the vessel, leaving only
Can form explosive mixtures with air
the master on board. A tug tried, unsuccessfully, to tow the vessel further
Vapour heavier than air
offshore. An exclusion zone of 5 km radius was set up around the vessel,
Polymerisable
involving the evacuation of 600 local residents. The master was able to pump
Irritant
water into empty cargo tanks between the engine room and the vinyl acetate
MARPOL Cat. C (slightly toxic)
cargo, isolating the heat source from the cargo and preventing explosion.
Fate: dissolver/evaporator
Thermal cameras were used to assess the fire before salvage crews boarded
the vessel. The cargo was eventually transferred to another vessel.
Ievoli Sun
2000
English Channel
A leak in the bow section was reported. To prevent pollution damage on the coastline, the ship was being towed to shelter when it sank 12 n.m. from the island of
Alderney. The location of the vessel necessitated the involvement of both the French and UK authorities, under the bilateral Mancheplan Agreement
If a major release of styrene had taken place there was the potential for
4000 tonnes styrene
Flammable liquid
flammable levels of vapour above the wreck. An exclusion area was set up
MARPOL Cat. B (moderately toxic)
and environmental monitoring carried out until more information could be
Fate: floater/evaporator
obtained on possible leakage rates.
The styrene cargo and heavy fuel oil were recovered from the wreck.
1027 tonnes methyl ethyl ketone
No pollution hazard
Following modelling and assessments, it was decided that the MEK and IPA
Flammable liquid
should be released slowly into the marine environment – the risks of this
Fate: evaporator
being less significant than the hazards to salvers in recovering the products.
996 tonnes isopropanol
No pollution hazard
Flammable liquid
Fate: evaporator
Alessandro Primo
1991
Italy
The vessel sank in 110 m in the Adriatic Sea, 16 miles off the coast of Italy.
An exclusion zone of 10 miles radius was set up around the wreck and
550 tonnes acrylonitrile
Highly flammable liquid
environmental monitoring was carried out. Water samples and an ROV
Can form explosive mixture with air
investigation showed evidence of a leak of acrylonitrile. Recovery of the ship
Human carcinogen
was determined to be impossible. Initial attempts were made to seal the leak
MARPOL Cat. B (moderately toxic)
and a cargo recovery operation was undertaken 2 months later.
Fate: dissolver/evaporator
3000 tonnes ethylene dichloride
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Flammable liquid
Practically non-toxic (GESAMP)
Fate: sinker/dissolver
Anna Broere
1988
Holland
The vessel collided with a Swedish container ship Atlantic Compass, was severely damaged and sank in shallow water.
Highly flammable liquid
An exclusion zone of radius 10km and height 300m was set up around the
547 tonnnes acrylonitrile
wreck. Due to the hazards posed by the acrylonitrile, it was decided to
Can form explosive mixture with air
recover the cargo. The wreck was cut in half so that the stern could be lifted
Human carcinogen
MARPOL Cat. B (moderately toxic)
separately from the leaking cargo tanks. Salvage workers were equipped with
Fate: dissolver/evaporator
PPE including self-contained breathing apparatus, the lifting crane was fitted
with an automatic gas alarm and continuous monitoring of air and water was
500 tonnes dodecyl benzene
Fate: floater
carried out during the operation, which lasted 73 days. Approximately half
the cargo was recovered.
Bahams
1998
Brazil
A mistake during an unloading operation was compounded when acid was placed in mild steel tanks. The acid corroded through the tanks.
2,0000 tonnes sulphuric acid (95%)
Corrosive
The following aspects were considered when deciding on the optimum
Risk of explosion due to formation of response to this situation:
hydrogen when reacting with ship’s
• the high risk of explosion
structure
• no facilities onshore and no vessels available to contain the 60%
MARPOL Cat. C (slightly toxic)
acid/water mixture
Fate dissolver/evaporator
• corrosion of the ship’s structure could lead to leaching of heavy
metals into the harbour
• further corrosion of the ship’s structure could lead to an uncontrolled
spill in the harbour
• neutralisation was not a practical solution due to the large volumes of
acid involved.
The solution adopted was to release the cargo slowly from the vessel during
ebb tides. Monitoring of pH at particularly important sites was carried out
during the release operation. After 11 days this operation was halted. When
operations resumed, the cargo was transferred to another vessel for release
further out to sea.
Brigitta Montanari
1984
Adriatic
A gas tanker sank on 82m, a distance of 15 miles offshore. The wreck lay in a semi-enclosed area, surrounded by small islands on the outer edge of a nature reserve.
1300 tonnes vinyl chloride monomer
Forms explosive/flammable mixtures in A response operation was mounted to recover the cargo by lifting the wreck to
air
30m and then pumping the VCM into another vessel. Monitoring for VCM in
Highly volatile
air and water was carried out throughout the operation. Due to weather and
Carcinogenic
safety considerations, the recovery operation lasted almost 9 months. Several
Fate: gas
hundred tonnes of cargo were recovered.
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Appendix:
Additional Information Sources
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), London
Manual on Chemical Pollution: Section 1 Problem assessment and response arrangements (1999
edition)
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), London
International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous
Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code)
The carriage of dangerous chemicals in bulk at sea is governed by the IBC Code. The code
identifies the MARPOL pollution category of chemical products and identifies whether the
product presents a safety hazards (in terms of fire, reactivity and toxicity) and/or a pollution
hazard (in terms of water, air and marine pollution).
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), London
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code(IMDG Code)
Although developed for the carriage of packaged goods, the IMDG code contains information on
chemical hazards and the potential for marine pollution.
HELCOM Manual on Co-operation in response to Marine Pollution within the framework of the
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki
Convention), Vol. 2.
A practical response manual containing information on the behaviour of chemical spills and
response techniques.
CHRIS - The Chemical Hazards Response Information System
CHRIS is a free on-line information source developed and maintained by the US Coast Guard
(www.chrismanual.com). The system is designed to provide information needed for decisionmaking during emergencies that occur during the water transport of hazardous chemicals.
CHRIS contains information for approximately 1,000 chemical products:
Transport Oriented Database on Chemical Substances (TROCS)
The TROCS database was developed to assist in taking decisions related to marine pollution
emergencies caused hazardous and noxious substances (HNS) and by certain crude and refined
oils. The database contains a number of useful case histories and can be downloaded from the
web-site of the Regional Marine Emergency Pollution Centre for the Mediterranean Sea
(www.rempec.org).
NOAA Reactivity Worksheet
A database of reactivity information for more than 6,000 common hazardous chemicals,
produced by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The worksheet can be
downloaded from www.response.restoration.noaa.gov
The Emergency Response Guidebook
The Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG2004) was developed jointly by the US Department of
Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation
of Mexico (SCT). The guide provides generic advice for identifying materials involved in
incidents and protection. The guide is aimed at firefighters, police, and other emergency
services personnel who may be the first to arrive at the scene of a transportation incident. Free
downloads are available from hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/gydebook.htm.
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CAMEO ®
CAMEO ® is a system of software applications to plan for and respond to chemical emergencies.
The system is developed by the US EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention
Office and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and
Restoration (NOAA). CAMEO consists of 3 parts: a chemical database of over 6,000 hazardous
chemicals, 80,000 synonyms, and product trade names; mapping software to visualise data e.g.
roads, facilities, schools, response assets); an atmospheric dispersion model (ALOHA) for
evaluating the downwind dispersion of hazardous chemical vapours.
www.epa.gov/ceppo/cameo/index.htm
___________________________
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