Crime, Law & Social Change 37: 311–355, 2002.
© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Anticipating organized and transnational crime
PHIL WILLIAMS & ROY GODSON
University of Pittsburgh, The Matthew B. Ridway Center for International Security Studies,
4G23 Forbes Quadrangle, PA 15260, Pittsburgh, U.S.A.
Abstract. This paper seeks to identify ways in which governments and law enforcement
agencies might enhance the effectiveness of their efforts to anticipate organized crime. It
starts by defining what is meant by anticipation, and differentiating it from the much more
difficult task of prediction. The analysis then identifies some of the methods and models
that are generally accepted as part of the existing knowledge base on organized crime and
highlights how these can be used to anticipate future developments and to develop warnings
about how criminal organizations might evolve and behave in the future. The knowledge
base includes political, economic, sociological, strategic, and composite models and shows
how they provide a foundation for anticipating future developments in organized crime. The
models are either models about the kind of environment in which organized crime flourishes or
models about the ways in which organized crime behaves. What we do, in effect, is to identify
and elucidate ‘models’ in ways that provide propositions about the kinds of developments,
innovations or changes we might see in organized crime (both domestic and transnational)
in the future. Underlying indicators provide warning about future manifestations of organized
crime. Anticipating these manifestations provides a basis for appropriate preventive, defensive
or mitigating strategies. Finally, the article provides some examples of specific techniques of
information collection and intelligence analysis that might assist in this task of anticipation.
Introduction
Organized crime has reached levels in the post-Cold War world that have
surprised even close observers. Many criminal organizations have not only
become transnational in scope but also exhibit a degree of flexibility and
adaptability in methods and modes that poses considerable challenges for
intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and society at large. Unfortunately,
there is no quick and simple methodology for anticipating the major activities
of criminal organizations, operational methods for moving various forms of
contraband, innovations in money laundering, the development of new markets, or the measures taken by criminal organizations to counter law enforcement. Many criminal organizations are adept at concealment and disguise, at
presenting a moving and evasive target for both law enforcement agencies
and rivals in the criminal world. This is hardly surprising; if they fail in these
areas then they often go out of business. What this means, however, is that
the task of anticipating organized crime is particularly difficult.
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It is in this area that social science and academic analysis can provide
assistance to governments and the private sector, especially at the intelligence
and strategic planning levels but also at the operational level. There is a tendency particularly among government officials to regard the term academic
as a synonym (or euphemism) for “theoretical,” “abstract,” “irrelevant,” or
“impractical.” The argument, here, however, is that social science theories,
concepts and models, if used judiciously and with an awareness of their limitations, have significant utility. They can help to inform policy making and
facilitate the development of strategies that are also more pro-active than is
often the case in law enforcement. In effect, the earlier the warning the less the
policy and law enforcement response has to be a scramble to catch up, and the
greater the prospect that effective and coherent strategies can be developed.
Among the developments it is important to anticipate are the following:
• The overall level and scope of organized crime within countries, within
particular regions, and at the global level. As a subset of this, it is necessary to be concerned with possible redistribution of criminal activity
from one region to another, perhaps because the opportunities are greater
and the risks are lower.
• A continued increase in the level of transnational organized crime, i.e.
crimes that involve the crossing of border by the criminals themselves,
the products that they are supplying, or the proceeds of their activities.
• The relationships between criminal organizations and government officials which can be instigated by either party but are established and
maintained for the benefit of both. Symbiotic relations of this kind –
sometimes termed the political-criminal nexus – have been important in
the rise of organized crime in a number of countries and are also one of
the biggest obstacles to effective action against organized crime.
• Changes in the pattern of criminal activities, both domestic and transnational, including the development of new illicit market niches or the
supply of new products and services.
• Strategies that transnational criminal organizations use in their efforts to
counter law enforcement and to manage the risks they face as a result of
law enforcement activities. These include efforts by organized crime to
infiltrate government and law enforcement both directly and through the
creation and cultivation of corruption networks.
• Efforts by organized crime to infiltrate businesses and financial institutions. Which businesses are particularly vulnerable and what are the
characteristics that make them so? What are the critical entry points into
business that need to be protected?1
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• Cooperative relationships among local, regional, and global criminal organizations that provide multiplier effects for criminals and make the
task of law enforcement even more formidable.
• The rise and fall of criminal organizations. There is a constant dynamic
to the criminal world with some groups in decline and others emerging. This can have important implications for the kind of expertise that
law enforcement needs in terms of languages, cultural understanding,
diversity of recruits etc.
• The results of success. What might be the unintended results of successful counter strategies? Are there ways in which we might be worse off
as a result of our successes, keeping in mind the “pillow” or “balloon
effect” increasingly familiar in the drug trafficking business?
This is not intended as an exhaustive list; it serves merely to identify some
of the dynamics of organized crime, operating both domestically and at a
transnational level, that require greater illumination and, where possible, anticipation.
This paper starts by defining what is meant by anticipation, and differentiating it from the more difficult task of prediction. The paper then identifies
some of the methods and “models” that are generally accepted as part of
the existing knowledge base on organized crime and highlights how these
can be used to anticipate future developments and to develop warnings about
how criminal organizations might evolve and behave in the future. The knowledge base includes political, economic, sociological, strategic, and composite models and shows how they provide a foundation for anticipating future
developments in organized crime. The paper identifies and elucidates underlying conditions that provide propositions about developments, innovations,
or changes in organized crime, and future manifestations of organized crime.
Anticipating these manifestations provides a basis for appropriate preventive,
defensive or mitigating strategies. Finally, the paper provides some examples
of specific techniques of collecting information and intelligence that might
assist in this task of anticipation.
What is meant by anticipation
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb anticipate as: to seize or take
possession of beforehand; to use in advance; to spend (money) before it is at
one’s disposal; to take up or deal with (a thing) or perform (an action) before
another person or agent has had time to act, so as to gain an advantage; to
deal with beforehand, forestall (an action); to be before (another) in acting, to
forestall; to observe or practise in advance of the due date; to cause to happen
earlier, accelerate; to occur earlier, to advance in time; to take into consideration before the appropriate or due time; to realize beforehand (a certain
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future event). Anticipation is, of course, related to these various meanings of
anticipate, but is also defined as intuitive preconception, a priori knowledge,
precognition, and presentiment.
The notion of anticipation that we are emphasizing here involves developing information and analysis that enables governments and non-state agencies
to be prepared for new directions in organized crime, and in so doing to have
an enhanced capacity to take precautionary or defensive measures in order to
gain an advantage and in some cases to forestall or pre-empt these new directions or initiatives. Effective anticipation requires an effective knowledge
base, makes good use of underlying warning indicators, and requires intelligence that is both timely and actionable. While this might seem obvious, what
is striking about strategy to counter organized crime in the past is that it has
rarely succeeded in moving beyond the reactive. Usually, it has been running
to catch up with the criminals. There are good reasons for this – including the
reluctance in law to take action until a crime is committed and the difficulty
of justifying action against future challenges when there are already many
existing problems, challenges and cases to deal with. Nevertheless, there
are also some less positive reasons, including the focus on individual cases
rather than the overall phenomenon under investigation, a clear disdain for
strategy in some government circles, and a reluctance to blur or cross the
traditional distinctions between social science research, intelligence, and law
enforcement.
Difficulties of anticipating organized crime
Anticipation, whether of nature, or man-made initiatives is inherently problematic. When trying to anticipate organized crime and transnational organized crime, the problems are compounded by the capacity of criminal organizations to conceal their activities within a variety of licit transactions, to act
rapidly in order to exploit new opportunities, and to reconfigure and reconstitute organizational structures in response to law enforcement successes.
Consequently, our propositions about future behavior are conditional or contingent rather than scientific laws. We are not offering a crystal ball that can be
used for predicting new criminal organizations, new modalities of organized
crime, or new strategies implemented by criminal enterprises. Nor is there
any suggestion that we can develop absolute predictions based on the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular development to
occur. Social phenomena are often too complex for social science to emulate
the natural sciences. However, careful use of models and extrapolations from
past experiences enable us to contend that if certain conditions are present
then there is a serious probability that particular kinds of developments will
occur. By taking existing knowledge about organized and transnational crime
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
315
– much of which is encapsulated in so-called models – and using this as a
framework for thinking systematically and imaginatively about the future it
is possible to make contingent propositions about the further evolution of
organized crime.
Models and their implications
In recent years there have been critical failures in anticipating the expansion
of organized criminal activities in many places such as Mexico, Russia, and
China. Yet such failures encourage the development of both more knowledge
and more refined models that, if used with care and judiciousness, can provide
a significant starting point for extrapolation and successful anticipation of
future developments. Accordingly, this section identifies models of organized
crime and then extrapolates from them contingent propositions about future
behavior. There are various ways of classifying the existing models or frameworks at the national and transnational levels. Here they are organized under
five major headings: political, economic, social, strategic, and composite or
hybrid models. Variants of each model also are discussed. The models are
of two kinds: models of conditions – political, economic, and social, – that
are conducive to the expansion of organized crime, and models about how
organized crime operates. In effect, they cover both the attributes of the environment and the attributes of the actors. Some are well-established; others
more recent. We have chosen them, however, on the basis of their utility in
helping us anticipate future developments in organized crime.2 In each case,
we provide a succinct summary of the central ideas and hypotheses embedded in particular models or approaches and a series of propositions regarding
future directions and activities of criminal organizations that stem from these
models.
Political models
Weak states
Political models revolve around the nature of the state and political institutions. Critical dimensions appear to be the strength or weakness of the state,
the extent to which its government is authoritarian or democratic, and the
degree of its institutionalization of the rule of law.3 Strength and legitimacy
of the state are among the most important determinants in the work of several
authors. These include Francisco Thoumi who argues that Colombia became
corporate headquarters of the cocaine trade because the weaknesses of the
state gave Colombian drug traffickers an important competitive advantage
over their counterparts in Peru and Bolivia.4 Colombia had an extremely
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polarized political system that was characterized by a high level of violence. The low level of effectiveness and legitimacy of the state meant that
drug trafficking organizations could operate with a high level of impunity.
During the 1990s, in particular, the lack of financial support for election
campaigns provided a perfect way for drug trafficking and organized crime
groups to obtain access to the political elite and to develop and perpetuate
political-criminal symbiotic relationships.
Another perspective on the weakness theme was provided in the analysis
by Diego Gambetta to explain the rise of the Mafia in Sicily.5 He suggests that
mafias come into existence in order to provide private protection and contract
enforcement. They arise where the state itself is incapable of providing such
protection and, in this sense, are a necessary evil. The Mafia in Sicily, in
his view, came to monopolize the business of providing private protection
and contract enforcement, filling the vacuum and offering services that in
most other countries were provided by the state. Organized crime evolved
from there, and in the period after the Second World War developed a symbiotic relationship with the Christian Democratic party that was based in part
on Mafia help in mobilizing votes during elections. The political-criminal
nexus in Italy was a major factor in allowing the Mafia not only to remain a
deeply entrenched part of Italian social, economic and political life but also
to operate with a high degree of impunity – at least until the 1980s.
Strong regimes becoming weak
While weak states have long been associated with the rise of organized crime,
there kas been a more recent recognition that strong authoritarian regimes can
also act as incubators for organized crime. These regimes are generally characterized by one-party rule, a lack of oversight of the ruling elite, an absence
of checks and balances and civil society, and the prevalence of patron-client
relations. The conditions for corruption – described by one analyst as “monopoly plus discretion minus accountability” – are almost always present in
authoritarian states and exploited by officials who often extend their corrupt
activities into links with criminal organizations.6 In effect, this kind of state
encourages the development of organized crime – but within limits that are
established, defined, and maintained by state authorities. Criminals tend to be
at the service of the political establishment rather than a threat to it. Traditionally, Mexico and the former Soviet Union approximated this situation.7
Both had organized crime, but it was muted rather than overt, its realm of operations circumscribed by the power and authority of states with strong social
control mechanisms. There were collusive relationships between criminals
and state or party officials – but they were under the control of the officials
rather than the criminals.
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With the transition from authoritarian to more democratic forms of government in the 1990s, however, not only was the existing pattern fundamentally altered but also this controlled equilibrium was destroyed. The trigger to
the upsurge of organized crime was a weakening of state structures that seems
to be an inevitable accompaniment to the transition process. In the Russian
case, the collapse of the Soviet state with its well-established mechanisms
for social and political control, and the moves towards democratic structures
and procedures, changed the power relationship between officials and the
criminals. Without a strong enforcement apparatus to ensure the criminals
were kept within existing boundaries, organized crime was able to expand the
scope of its activities in ways that were unprecedented. Symbiotic or collusive
relationships remained, but the establishment was no longer the dominant
partner. The change was reflected in patterns of corruption – which were
no longer intended primarily to enrich the nomenklatura but to ensure the
criminals were able to act with impunity. The result, of course, was a major
expansion of organized crime in Russia and other Newly Independent States.
The process was accelerated by hyper-inflation, unemployment and a general decline in economic conditions which provided both incentives and pressures for criminal activity as a means of survival and advancement in a new
economic environment. Indeed, the distinctive feature of the post-Soviet states
was their “dual transition” – from authoritarianism to democracy and from a
centrally-controlled economy to freer markets. With political change accompanied by economic reform the absence of legal and regulatory frameworks
for new businesses provided major opportunities for organized crime to expand the domain of its activities. The result – and this is where there is an
interesting parallel with the Sicilian experience – is that criminal organizations in Russia and elsewhere in the Newly Independent States helped fill
the regulatory vacuum. The need for protection, debt collection, and contract enforcement for business provided a whole new set of opportunities and
functions for Russian criminal organizations. With the state failing to provide
what was needed, organized crime came to play a significant role in the Russian economy. At the same time, the lack of safeguards in the privatization
process ensured that criminals and officials were the major beneficiaries.
There are variations on this theme in Mexico. Political corruption and the
system of bribery and corruption have been present at least since Spanish rule.
These conditions continued in the 20th Century, during most of which the PRI
had a virtual monopoly of power. Politics and society during this period were
based on patron-client relations and the relationship between government and
organized crime accorded with this general pattern. Leaders of the government and ruling party used organized crime for personal enrichment and to
provide funding for the social control apparatus. In turn, they allowed organ-
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ized crime to operate with a high degree of immunity. Lupsha and Pimentel
have termed this the Elite-Exploitative model – a term that could be applied
equally well to authoritarian regimes.8 However, in Mexico and elsewhere
this situation has broken down. As the PRI dominance of both political and
economic sectors eroded, so did its control over organized crime. As a result,
organized crime in Mexico – helped also by links with Colombian drug traffickers and proximity to United States markets – expanded. In an interesting
contrast with the Russian (and Italian) case, local extortion in Mexico has
been far less pervasive. Organized crime in Mexico has taken the form predominantly of trafficking in drugs, people, motor vehicles and various other
forms of contraband. This is not entirely surprising. The proximity of the US
market as well as a long tradition of smuggling across the common border
meant that organized crime focused its activities predominantly in this area.
Such variations notwithstanding, both cases are examples of the weakening of
authoritarian states, with far-reaching implications for the level of organized
crime.
Even some parts of pluralistic democratic systems can be so strong that
they encourage or facilitate criminal activities. In New York, for example, the
effective licensing and regulatory practices, in effect, very strong state mechanisms with little real accountability, transparency, or rule of law, apparently
had some of the characteristics and incentives to criminality seen in a number
of authoritarian systems. The US Cosa Nostra was able to benefit from these
arrangements for many decades, dominating a variety of industrial sectors
and the construction industry in particular. In the 1990s, however, changes in
accountability and the development of more effective rule of law mechanisms
at the state, federal, as well as New York City levels, apparently led to the
diminution of Mafia control.9
Weak states characterized by ethnic conflict or terrorist activity
Fertile soil for the growth of organized crime is also found in states that, in
effect, implode or disintegrate. The low level of legitimacy of some states can
take the form either of ethnic secession movements or an attempt to obtain
control of the state apparatus by force and exclude competing factions. Where
this results in the disintegration of the state, as in the former Yugoslavia, there
is likely to be an increase in criminal activities for several reasons.
• The collapse of central authority is likely to be accompanied by a collapse of the criminal justice system and the removal of constraints on
behavior. War crimes and organized crimes sometimes have the same
perpetrators.
• Competing factions or separatists often resort to criminal behavior to
fund their political struggle. This was evident, for example, with the
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Kosovo Liberation Army which reportedly used profits accrued through
the involvement of Kosovo Albanians in heroin trafficking in several
countries in Western Europe.10 During the last several years of the 1990s,
the number of Kosovo Albanians arrested in Europe for drug trafficking
has increased significantly. The US and many Latin American governments also claim similar developments occurred in Peru in the 1980s
(e.g., Sendero Luminoso), and with the Colombian FARC, ELN, and
“paramilitaries” in the 1990s.
• Conditions of chaos provide a fertile ground for criminal entrepreneurship and a lucrative payoff for the supply of even legal goods that are
in high demand but low supply. Those who can supply goods that are
not readily available reap large rewards. Ironically, the opportunities for
criminal profiteering in regions of ethnic conflict are increased significantly by the imposition of international embargoes which create illegal
markets such as those in the Balkans. During the war in Bosnia, for example, the Serb paramilitary leader Arkan (formerly a contract killer for
the Yugoslav Communist party, and wanted for armed robberies in the
Netherlands and Sweden) gained control of gasoline and other products
and, according to the UN War Crimes Tribunal, became wealthy as a
result.11
• The cessation of conflict can also lead to an upsurge of organized crime
as former combatants use their expertise in violence in furtherance of
criminal activities. The end of the war in Bosnia, for example, was associated with the spread of organized crime from the Balkans into Central
and Western Europe. Criminal groups from the Balkans have not only
become active in Austria and elsewhere, but are also extremely violent.
A major study of organized crime in the Netherlands noted that “outside the circles of Dutch criminal groups, it is mainly former Yugoslav
gangs that repeatedly exhibit a willingness to use violence against police
officers.”12 This is hardly surprising given the number of specialists in
violence who had graduated from military to criminal activities.
None of this is to claim that all domestic conflicts, whether based on ethnic
hatred, ideological differences, or religious intolerance, have an organized
crime spin-off. There are cases in which this has not occurred. Nevertheless,
these should not obscure the fact that in an era when conflicts over identity
and political power have become ubiquitous – and funding from other states
has become far more tenuous than during the Cold War – one of the most
important means of obtaining the funding for political and military struggle
is through criminal activities, a development that typically results in “fightersturned-felons.”13
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Similar dynamics are evident in countries in which unsatisfied demands
for self-government among a significant minority of the population have generated terrorist campaigns. In some of these terrorist groups engage in criminal activity to fund their political activities. The Basque ETA, for example,
has a subordinate organization called KAS that typically committed crime
for profit on its behalf, collected “revolutionary taxes,” and had control over
Jarrai, a youth group which is heavily involved in street violence and provides
an important source of recruitment.14 Similarly during the 1980s surprising
numbers of Tamils were arrested in Europe for drug trafficking. Even the
IRA, which obtained much of its financing from voluntary contributions,
helped to finance its armed struggle through a variety of criminal activities
ranging from video piracy and Eurofraud to bank robberies, extortion of small
businesses and the theft and sale of construction equipment from Britain.15
One possibility for the future – and this is speculative – is that some
terrorist groups will transform themselves into criminal organizations primarily focusing their activities on illegal profit-making activities. For example,
where a political settlement removes the political rationale for continued violence or where some members of terrorist organizations are so hooked on
the lifestyle and so attracted by the profits, they are tempted to continue the
illegal profit-making – for mercenary rather than political reasons. In Northern Ireland, for example, some terrorists, instead of reverting to law-abiding
citizens, have become full-time criminal entrepreneurs. There are precedents
for this. Perhaps the most notable of which is the transformation of Chinese
Triads from political to criminal organizations. Initially established in the
17th Century to oppose the Qing dynasty, the many Triads were bereft of
their cause by the collapse of the Qing and the establishment of the Republic
of China in 1912. While some members entered politics, “those who were
not absorbed by the political machine returned to the well-established Triad
organizations for power and status. However, without a patriotic cause to pursue, the secretive and anti-establishment nature of the organizations helped
transform them into criminal groups.”16 This kind of transformation from
political activism or terrorism to organized crime is not pre-ordained, but is a
distinct possibility that needs to be considered.
Democratic states with high legitimacy as crime resistant states
Identifying the conditions under which organized crime can flourish is also
suggestive of conditions which it finds inhospitable. Well-functioning democracies with a high level of political legitimacy, a strong and deeply entrenched culture of legality, rule of law, structures for accountability and
oversight, and high levels of transparency inhibit the emergence of organized
crime. If these characteristics are present, it is more difficult for organized
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crime to develop a symbiotic relationship with the political and administrative
elites and to come into the mainstream of political life in the country.
Resulting propositions about the political environment and organized crime
From all this it is possible to formulate several propositions about the sets
of conditions under which criminal organizations develop and flourish – and
conversely do not develop – in particular states:
• States that are weak provide a congenial home base for criminal organizations. Operating from this home base criminal groups can extend their
operations elsewhere, especially if they have products (whether drugs,
women, or arms) which are in demand elsewhere.
• Strong states act as incubators for criminal organizations but generally
succeed in circumscribing and containing these activities. The weakening of these states, either gradually or suddenly, as part of a transition
from one form of political and/or economic system to another, facilitates the expansion of criminal activities well beyond the previous limits.
Although the political-criminal nexus that developed in the previous regime will tend to survive the change, the power relationship within the
nexus is likely to move in favor of the criminals. Similarly, corruption
which in the old system was used to benefit the political elites now
becomes a major instrument used by organized crime to protect itself.
These developments tend to perpetuate the weakness of the state and
hinder the prospects for a successful transformation to the rule of law
and to a functioning and vibrant democracy.
• States in which there is not only a political transition but also transition
from a command economy to a free market will experience not only a
significant increase in the level of organized crime but also more pervasive forms of organized crime. In such economic transformations, organized crime is likely to go well beyond the supply of illicit goods and
services to become deeply entrenched in the economy. Criminal groups
will exert control over many business enterprises, especially those in
the export sector, will have a significant influence on financial institutions such as banks, and will also demand protection money from large
and small businesses alike. Extortion will become one of the staples
of organized crime in transition economies as criminal groups develop
parasitical relationships with new enterprises. The converse is that in
states in which the transition is only political, organized crime will not
develop in these directions to anything like the same extent.
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• States in which there are ethnic conflicts or terrorist movements are also
likely to see an increase in organized criminal activity, as are neighboring states, especially in weak or ungovemable regions.
• Peace agreements in ethnic conflicts, civil wars, or states in which terrorist groups have been active sometimes generate an increase in organized
crime if former members of military or para-military organizations turn
their attention to crime for mercenary or personal, rather than political,
reasons.
Although the proposition about the transformation from a command economy
to the free market suggests that it might be possible to anticipate, in broad
terms, the form that criminal activities will take in certain kinds of transition,
for the most part the political models help us to understand the scale of organized crime and the conditions that lead to its increase. The various models
are encapsulated in Table 1:
Other models provide opportunities to anticipate in more detail the activities and strategies of criminal organizations at both the domestic and transnational levels.
Economic models
There are two closely related economic models that provide a basis for anticipating future trends in organized crime. The first is about market demand
and the nature of criminal markets; the second is about the way criminal
enterprises behave in criminal markets. Both models emphasize the profit
motive and economic considerations as opposed to political conditions. Both
also provide insights into the kinds of organized crime behavior that it might
be possible to anticipate.
The market model
The first model focuses on the dynamics of supply and demand in illegal
markets whether local or global. An illegal market has been defined as “a
place or situation in which there is a constant exchange of goods and services, whose production, marketing and consumption are legally forbidden
or severely restricted by the majority of states. Moreover, the activities of
that illegal market are socially and institutionally condemned as an inherent
threat to human dignity and the public good. Typical markets of this kind . . .
include hard drugs, illicit arms sales, trade in economic and sexual slavery,
capital originating from criminal activity, and deals involving secret information and intelligence.”17 At least four different kinds of products are the focus
of criminal markets: prohibited goods such as drugs; regulated goods such as
fauna and flora or antiquities; stolen (and counterfeit) goods such as cars; and
products that are differentially taxed in different jurisdictions and are often
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Table 1.
Political conditions
Implications
Result to anticipate
Weak state
Opportunities for organized
crime to develop with little
interference;
Organized crime can flourish
and use the state as a home
base
Role of organized crime as
substitute for protective and
regulatory functions of the
state
Strong state becoming
weak
Initial incubation then
expansion of power of
organized crime as state loses
power
States in transition particularly
vulnerable to organized crime
inhibiting progress toward
democracy, rule of law, and
the free market
States characterized by
Factions use criminal activities
ethnic conflict, insurgency to fund their political struggle;
or terrorism
and use embargoes as
opportunity for trafficking and
profiteering
Increase in organized crime,
including violence, within the
state and its neighbors.
End of conflict may lead to
transformation of terrorist
organizations into primarily
criminal organizations
Strong democratie states Constant struggle between
with high levels of
organized crime and law
legitimacy, transparency, enforcement
rule of law
Organized crime provides
illicit goods and seeks
vulnerable economic sectors
but largely on the defensive
smuggled from the low tax jurisdiction to the one with higher taxes. Research
and analysis of illicit markets suggests that they are often disorganized, rather
than highly organized, with multiple participants who cooperate and compete
in complex and unpredictable ways.18 Indeed, one proponent of this approach
is highly skeptical about the role of hierarchical criminal organizations in
illicit entrepreneurship, contending instead that organization is merely a form
of govemance in, or regulation and enforcement, in the criminal world.19 The
argument is that it is individuals or small groups of members of a criminal
organization rather than the organization per se who meet the demand for
illicit products.
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The critical dimension in this view is not criminal organizations, but the
dynamics of illegal markets. Prohibition regimes (which simply reduce supply but not demand and therefore push up price) generally encourage an influx
of suppliers, varying greatly in size and power. These markets are rarely
dominated by a small number of large syndicates. A good example is the
trafficking of women for commercial sex – an area of activity that is generally
regarded as being controlled by organized crime. In fact, although criminal
organizations are the single most important kind of player in this market, there
is a wide range of participants in the trade, including: brokers and agencies
who recruit the women, often using false promises of employment; corrupt
officials who assist in provision of passports, visas, work permits, and any
other documentation; brothel owners and criminal groups who pay the suppliers and put the women to work; and corrupt policemen and politicians
who take payoffs – in money or in kind – for turning a blind eye to prostitution in their jurisdiction. Moreover, although some criminal organizations
are directly engaged in the trafficking, others simply facilitate the process and
protect, or “tax” the agencies and entrepreneurs involved. The implication of
all this is that the much touted monopoly control over markets is much more
elusive (except perhaps at the local level) than many traditional accounts of
organized crime imply.
The enterprise model
The second economic model starts from the notion that organized crime
groups are essentially enterprises with the emphasis on the business dimension rather than the criminal.20 There is a continuum of business enterprises
from licit firms which engage solely in licit businesses, through licit firms
which sometimes act in illicit ways, to illicit firms which operate in illegal
markets and provide prohibited or highly regulated goods and services. This
is not to ignore the characteristics of criminal enterprises that differentiate
them from their licit counterparts – the need to conceal their activities, the
importance of security precautions, the use of violence and the use of corruption. Important as these differences are, though, they should not obscure the
commonalities, the most important of which is the desire for profit. Indeed,
wherever enterprises fall on the licit-illicit continuum they behave in essentially similar ways: they typically scan their environment for opportunities,
seek to make rational judgments about opportunities and dangers, and seek to
maximize their profits where this does not involve unacceptably high levels
of risk. Not all criminal organizations engage in a formal planning process;
nevertheless their thinking, intuitively or deliberately, will reflect standard
business needs and take into account such factors as new product opportunit-
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
325
ies, product dominance, profit margin, market needs and opportunities, degree
of competition, risk management, retirement strategy, and the like.
Resulting propositions
Although there are differences among these two economic models, they both
place considerable emphasis on the market and the opportunities it provides.
They see criminals as rational actors constantly seeking new opportunities
to maximize their profits. Furthermore, even if one accepts the argument
that criminal entrepreneurs are usually a few individuals or small groups
and that criminal markets are not dominated by large-scale hierarchical organizations, the implication is not to reject parallels with licit business. In
both the licit business world and the world of criminal enterprises, there
are enormous variations in size and structure of the “firms.” Acknowledging
that much criminal enterprise is run by small businesses rather than large
conglomerates simply reflects this diversity. Consequently, these two models
can, in effect, be lumped together to suggest the following propositions about
criminal operations and the kinds of developments that can be anticipated:
• Criminal organizations will constantly seek new geographic markets and
if these markets are lucrative will not usually be deterred unless met by
overwhelming countervailing power or cultural resistance. This helps
to explain why a growing number of criminal organizations have increasingly become transnational in their operations. Globalization has
offered new opportunities and provided new imperatives for licit businesses seeking to be competitive. It has had the same effect in the criminal world, encouraging criminal organizations to meet (or create) market demand well beyond their home state. In effect, criminal organizations go where the rewards are greatest, exploiting disparities in price,
as well as differential laws and regulations and culture. The implication
of this is that even states that have well-established criminal justice systems that in some ways are resistant to organized crime find themselves
attracting criminal organizations that see them as a lucrative venue for
business. Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States has become a
host or target state for transnational criminal organizations with home
bases in other states. The search for new markets also explains why,
since the end of apartheid, South Africa, with its open borders, weak
criminal justice system, well-developed infrastructure and – by African
standards at least – high level of wealth – has become a major target for
African criminal organizations as well as those from elsewhere. Nigerian
criminals have transformed the South African drug market through largescale imports of cocaine, while Chinese, Russian Moroccan, and Italian
criminals are also active in the country.21 In a similar vein, Colombian
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drug trafficking organizations, through the 1990s, developed major new
markets in Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is evident
in the increasingly large seizures of cocaine in the Newly Independent
States.
• In terms of products, the enterprise model suggests that some criminal
organizations will increasingly diversify their activities into a range of
illicit products. Among the illicit markets that have taken on new dimensions in recent years are commercial sex and the trafficking of women
and children, CFCs, automobile theft, and illegal trafficking in fauna
and flora. Furthermore, we should expect to see both product specialization and the rise of poly-commodity trafficking organizations. There is
evidence of the latter in the Florida-Puerto Rico, California-Baja channels which are used for bringing drugs and people to the United States
from Central and South America and for taking motor vehicles from
the United States to Central and South America. Among the criminal
enterprises that are operating simultaneously in a variety of illegal markets are Mexican, US, Chinese, Nigerian, and Turkish groups. Chinese
criminal enterprises engage in a wide variety of activities ranging from
the smuggling of illegal aliens to large-scale intellectual property theft
and counterfeiting; Turkish entrepreneurs traffic in heroin, people, antiquities, and, in some cases, nuclear materials; while Nigerian groups
in a section of Johannesburg operate both drugs and prostitution. This
pattern of diversification is likely to be replicated elsewhere.
• Just like licit enterprises seeking to minimize their tax burdens, criminal enterprises seek to protect their profits. They often use offshore
financial centers and bank secrecy jurisdictions to protect their money.
It would not be surprising if, in the future, they also make increasing
use of smart cards and e-money to break the audit or investigative trail.
In order to keep ahead of efforts to clamp down on money laundering
through more stringent regulation of the banking sector even in offshore
financial centers, they have an incentive to use other mechanisms such as
trusts, international business corporations, and new financial instruments
such as options and derivatives that protect the identity of the beneficial
owner. As new offshore financial centers open up, so criminal entrepreneurs use them, tentatively at first, and more fully as they become more
confident of the protection they provide.
• Just as licit enterprises engage in cooperative as well as competitive behavior, criminal organizations are likely to collaborate with one another
against common adversaries, particularly law enforcement. The collaboration may take diverse forms ranging from strategic alliances and joint
ventures at the most ambitious level through tactical alliances, contract
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
327
relationships, supplier customer relations, to spot sales at the most basic
level. Cooperation will be particularly attractive when well-established
criminal enterprises have saturated the existing market but are facing
obstacles in their efforts to break into new markets. A local partner can
greatly facilitate such an entry and by exploiting existing distribution
channels and corruption networks can ensure the rapid development of
the market.22
• Where cooperation has resulted in the development of major competitors with a large market share, criminal enterprises will seek to develop
alternative allies, to re-establish their market position and to diversify
into new markets. This suggests that not only will some Colombian drug
trafficking organizations seek alternative partners to Mexican trafficking
organizations (as they seem to have done with the Dominicans) but they
will use routes that do not go through Mexico and develop new markets
where Mexican organizations are not major players.
• To operate effectively in markets that are diffused or “disorganized”
and contain multiple players, criminal enterprises will seek to develop
patterns of cooperation with participants in the licit world who play a
critical role in supplying the commodity (parents of villagers who sell
their daughters; officials at chemical manufacturing plants willing to divert precursors), in moving the commodity (customs and immigration
officials who have to be bribed) or in selling the commodity (art and
auction houses who sell antiques that do not have proven provenance).
In short, any criminal enterprise seeking to develop an effective market
niche will develop significantly collusive linkages with the licit world.
• Criminal enterprises will seek to penetrate legitimate business to protect
their funds, to provide apparent legitimacy for wealth, and, in a few cases
to provide an option for a transition to licit business or retirement from
criminal activities. Licit business enterprises also can be excellent covers
for various kinds of trafficking activities. In order to diversify and protect
their profits, criminal enterprises will move into the licit business world,
exploiting vulnerable points of entry into particular firms or industries.
This was done in the garbage disposal and construction industries in
the United States, hazardous waste disposal in ltaly, and, more recently,
the commodities, aluminum, banking, and export industries in Russia.
Criminal organizations will not only use these licit enterprises as a cover
for illicit activities, and possibly as a further source of profit, but also,
over the medium and long term, as a means of legitimization.
Whereas the political models were useful primarily for anticipating changes
in the magnitude and type of organized crime, the enterprise and market
models provide more insight into the business opportunities and incentives
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Table 2.
Economic model
Implications
Result to anticipate
Market dynamics
Organized crime responds to
market dynamics and exploits
demand for its goods and
services especially where there
are prohibition regimes
Criminal organizations will
become major participants in a
variety of criminal markets,
but will not have monopoly
control over these markets
Enterprise model
Criminal organizations will
act in ways similar to licit
enterprises and will seek out
new business opportunities,
structures, and strategies to
maximize profits
Criminal enterprises will seek
to diversify markets and
products, to protect profits (for
example, by using offshore
financial centers), and will
cooperate with other criminal
organizations and will collude
with various individuals,
institutions and agencies in the
licit world
that are available and the kinds of strategies that particular groups are likely
to adopt to maximize their profits. Understanding the dynamics of illegal
markets and the business strategies pursued by criminal enterprises to should
enable governments and private enterprises to anticipate new departures in
criminal activity. This is summarized in Table 2.
Anticipation of criminal initiatives, however, requires that analysts understand the specific perspectives and perceptions of the criminal organizations
and understand their logic, their assessment of risks and opportunities and the
considerations that will determine their ultimate policy choices. This theme
is discussed further below.
Social models
Although the political and economic models of organized crime are among
the most compelling, they are certainly not the only significant models. Social
models emphasize such factors as the cultural basis for organized crime, the
idea of criminal networks as a social system, and the importance of trust and
bonding mechanisms as the basis for criminal organization. Whereas political
models focus on the opportunities available in particular kinds of governmental arrangements and enterprise models focus on the market opportunities
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
329
and how they might be exploited, social models focus on the grass-roots level,
the cultural conditions that encourage and facilitate criminality, as well as the
way in which crime is actually organized.
The cultural model
Organized crime is facilitated by particular cultural and subcultural factors
such as patron-client relations, ties of family and kinship, suspicion of outsiders, and informal exchange networks.23 Communities where social organization has these characteristics generally are characterized by the absence
of an effective rule of law system and the expectation of a culture of lawlessness. Often they also are characterized by the emergence of secret societies engaged in criminal activities. In Sicily, for example, where there was a
powerful tradition of clientelism in which success was believed to depend on
connections with those with power, the Mafia structure itself is territorial and
“family” based. Loyalty to the local crime “family” (cosu) was reinforced by
oaths and rituals designed to encourage omerta “silence before the law.”24
Indeed, the creation and maintenance of loyalty and allegiance, achieved
through rituals and oaths and backed up by penalties for defections, was
simultaneously a sub-cultural norm and a fundamental defense mechanism
against the power of the ruling class and its repressive legal techniques.
Traditional Chinese organized crime had similar cultural underpinnings.
As one observer has noted, “In the development of Chinese crime groups,
the values and norms of the Triad subculture have been paramount.”25 Initially, the Triads were politically motivated secret societies and although they
degenerated into criminal organizations, their character and many of their
functions continued to be influenced by their origin. The criminal Triads,
for example, continued to use oaths and rituals to induct new members. In
many respects, these resembled the oaths and rituals of the Sicilian Mafia and
were similarly intended to instill a high sense of loyalty and an enormous
fear of disloyalty. Indeed, the Triad emphasis on loyalty, “brotherhood” and
secrecy although not “intrinsically criminal” provided an important basis for
criminal activities.26 Yet, there has also been some dilution of this component of Chinese organized crime and the formal Triad structure and Triad
norms have become less important. As the groups “replaced their patriotic
or benevolent causes with criminal activities,” other changes also occurred.27
“Membership was granted to almost anybody who wanted to join, and leaders
lost track of and control over their followers. Members became interested in
enhancing their individual gains. Nowadays, the Triad values of patriotism,
brotherhood, righteousness, and loyalty remain only in proclamations.”28 For
some observers, however, there is still an important cultural underpinning for
Chinese organized crime. This is the notion of guanxi or reciprocal obligation
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which treats family obligation as an imperative even if its spans generations
and continents. Although guanxi relationships are not as tightly enmeshed as
those of traditional Triad ties, some observers believe they provide a basis for
the global activities of Chinese criminals. Guanxi provides a basis for trust
and therefore facilitates a great deal of criminal activity in the same way that
it facilitates much licit business.29
It is also arguable that cultures in which the culture of lawlessness and
corruption is endemic provide an important incubator for the development
of indigenous organized crime and an attractive target for transnational organized crime looking for new opportunities. In Nigeria, for example, the
political system is based largely on what has been termed “prebendalism,”
that is “a pattern of political behavior in which individuals compete for public
offices in order to use them for the personal benefit of the office-holder and
his faction.”30 Closely related to this are patronage and clientelism, patterns of
behavior that place much more emphasis on contacts and favors as a means
of getting ahead and accumulating wealth than on norms, standards of behavior, or the rule of law. Such a cultural climate easily condones criminal
activities so long as they are successful in the acquisition of resources. When
coupled with authoritarian military rule that characterized Nigerian politics
for several decades, this cultural factor helps to explain the rise of Nigerian
organized crime. High levels of education, mobility, and well-established
trading patterns, as well as the link to Britain, all help to explain why Nigerian
crime has become ubiquitous at the global level. Indeed, the cultural model is
sometimes incorporated – implicitly or explicitly – into the next model which
focuses on ethnic networks.
The ethnic network model
Ethnic and diaspora networks have been significant, particularly in the development of transnational organized crime. As one component of the broader
process of globalization, transnational ethnic networks transcend national
borders and often facilitate transnational criminal activities. Even though most
immigrants are law-abiding citizens who are more likely to be the victims
rather than the perpetrators of crimes, the Sicilian diaspora helped to bring
Mafia-like organized crime to the United States in the late nineteenth and
first half of the twentieth century. In the second half of the twentieth century
this process was extended to, among other places, Australia and Venezuela.
Similarly, the Chinese diaspora brought the Chinese variant to many parts of
the Pacific and other regions, such as the United States, Western Europe, and
even Russia. For its part, the Nigerian diaspora has allowed Nigerian criminal
groups to pose problems for law enforcement in countries as diverse as Britain, South Africa, the United States, Russia, Italy, and Brazil. Colombians
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331
in the United States, Turks in Western Europe, and Russians in Israel have
greatly facilitated the creation of network structures for criminal activities.
Indeed, ethnic communities can be an important resource for transnational
criminal enterprises, providing recruitment opportunities, cover and support.
Recruitment based on ethnic loyalties is facilitated when immigrant groups
are alienated rather than integrated into their adopted society. As one analyst
observed: “Many immigrant groups have been totally marginalized in Europe,
some live in cultural ghettos. They readily provide some of the personnel for
international organized crime.”31 Low status and poor conditions mean that
the rewards offered for assistance in smuggling or other illegal activities are
relatively attractive in spite of the risks. Even casual participation or involvement on the margins can yield greater rewards than can be obtained through
the licit economy. Furthermore, ethnically-based criminal networks are also
difficult to penetrate since they have inbuilt defense mechanisms provided by
their language and culture. These barriers are often strengthened by ties of
kinship, and inherent suspicion of authority. A further consideration is the
vulnerability of their relatives at home to punishment should the migrants
decide to collaborate with law enforcement in their new home country. Just as
transnational corporations have their local subsidiaries, transnational criminal
organizations often have their ethnically based criminal groups and networks
within immigrant communities.
The social network model
A third social model of organized crime is sufficiently broad to encompass
both the cultural and ethnic network models while also extending beyond
them. This can be termed the social network model. Part of the impetus for
this came from dissatisfaction with descriptions of the Mafia in the United
States as simple hierarchies. Joseph Albini’s work, for example, revealed that
even Italian organized crime in the United States could best be understood
through patron-client relations rather than formal hierarchies.32 A similar
conclusion emerged from a historical study of organized crime in New York,
in which Alan Block concluded that not only was organized crime more
fragmented and chaotic than believed, but also it involved “webs of influence” linking criminals with those in positions of power in the political and
economic world. These patterns of affiliation and influence were far more
important than any formal structure and allowed criminals to maximize opportunities. In a similar vein, Francis Ianni highlighted the importance of
networks in African-American and Puerto Rican criminal activities in New
York.33 In some quarters, however, there is still a tendency to regard traditional hierarchical models such as the Cosa Nostra in the United States, as
“real” organized crime, to equate hierarchy with organization, and to dismiss
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networks as disorganized crime. Such assumptions are misleading and mask
significant anticipated organized crime behavior.
This is even more apparent from the recognition given to networks as an
effective organizational form for innovation whether in business or in politics.
Society has developed through various stages, each characterized by various
organizational or institutional patterns. It has evolved through tribes, institutions, and markets, with networks, it is argued, now becoming a dominant
organizational form.34 At each stage a new organizational pattern does not
replace old ones, but surpasses them in efficiency and effectiveness for at
least some tasks. In the business context, the search for affiliates, allies, and
partners, and the formation of transnational business networks has become
critical in enabling firms to compete effectively on the global level. In effect,
there has been widespread adoption of the keiretsu model that was long seen
as a critical ingredient in the competitiveness and efficiency of many Japanese
companies. The internal counterpart of this has been the tendency in some
firms to seek skillful management, innovation, and enhanced productivity
through largely horizontal network based structures rather than the traditional
pyramids or hierarchies.
The same tendency is visible in organized crime. Gary Potter, for example,
has suggested that organized crime in the United States can best be understood in network terms, while Finckenauer and Waring, in a study on Russian
emigre criminals in the United States concluded that they operate largely
through network structures.35 Nor is reliance on networks confined to the
United States. As one data-rich report on organized crime in the Netherlands
noted in reference to the Dutch drug trade: “There is no evidence of one big
organic identity at the command of one leader with various echelons functioning quasi-automatically within it. The world of the Dutch wholesale trading
drugs can better be described as an extensive network where thousands of
individuals, often in cliques and groups, are linked by formal or informal
relations, or where these relations are easy to establish through ‘friends of
friends’ if business so requires. Intersections can be discemed in the network,
and individuals and groups with more power than others.”36 The authors also
emphasize the dynamic quality of these networks: they contend that although
many of the relationships are not particularly stable, clashes among them are
generally followed by the creation of new action sets to implement specific
criminal activities or more long-term coalitions.37
This is not surprising: networks are sophisticated organizational structures
that are well suited for criminal activities. Among the major characteristics
of criminal networks are the following:
• They are flexible and adaptable, able to respond quickly to market opportunities and to the efforts of law enforcement to disrupt their activities.
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
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• They are highly resistant to disruption and even when they have been
degraded have a significant capacity for reconstitution.
• They are capable of considerable expansion through recruitment of new
members, whether individuals or organizations.
• They have a capacity to extend across national borders either through
ethnic linkages or through simple business linkages that enable them to
exploit new opportunities.
• They can extend in ways that allow them to cross boundaries of demarcation such as that between the licit and illicit sectors of the economy and
society.
• Networks seek to defend themselves through expansion into the “upperworld” and recruitment of politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and law enforcement agents who are susceptible to coercion or bribery.
• Criminal networks develop safeguards against infiltration and damage.
In particular, they develop mechanisms to insulate the central figures
who are responsible for organizing the core of the network and directing
the networks activities. In addition, they will develop a high degree of
redundancy and duplication, something that in licit business is regarded
as wasteful and unnecessary. For criminal networks, in contrast, such
redundancy is essential. It makes them highly resilient to disruption and
provides a significant capacity for reconstitution in the event that they
are damaged by law enforcement.
In view of these characteristics, networks are an ideal vehicle for executing transnational criminal activities such as drug trafficking and other forms
of smuggling.38 Understanding their characteristics therefore, should enable
analysts to anticipate certain kinds of criminal behavior. Indeed, each of these
social models yields certain insights that can be used to anticipate some of the
activities of criminal organizations.
Resulting propositions
These various social models yield propositions about the evolution of organized crime that have implications for prevention and enforcement efforts and
their likely degree of success:
• Where patron-client relations are a key component of a national culture,
criminals will seek high level patronage and protection from the political
establishment. In return, they will provide either monetary or political
favors, or some mixture of both. This overlaps with one of the political
models but whereas that model emphasizes the opportunities that come
from weak oversight and transparency, the emphasis here is on the cultural conditions that transform patronage, clientelism, and culture into
criminal-political relationships.39
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• Since defections are a fundamental challenge to criminal organizations
rooted in sub-cultural norms, cooperation with the authorities will invariably result in attempted retribution against the defectors and their families. This can be understood partly in terms of simple revenge. Yet, such
killings also represent an effort by criminal organizations to re-establish
and re-impose norms that are not only essential to their operations but
that are critical to their sense of identity. In other words, traditional
criminal organizations will seek to maintain or restore their sub-cultural
traditions and norms even if this requires extensive violence.
• Diaspora communities can become a base from which certain criminal
organizations operate. As a country’s population becomes more diverse
so will its criminal organizations. Moreover, different criminal organizations tend to develop different styles of operation. Nigerian groups for
example, typically exploit targets of convenience whether the social welfare system in Britain, or credit cards in the United States and Canada, or
the demand for heroin in any number of countries. Consequently, where
immigrant communities are growing, law enforcement should expect
manifestations of organized crime to emerge from within them and to
spread well beyond them. Once again this points to the need for a greater
understanding of the diverse forms that organized crime can take.
• Criminal networks will seek to expand and co-opt a whole set of support players who provide entry points to the licit worlds of government,
finance and business. Organized crime-corruption networks will become
increasingly pervasive and make use of the “upperworld” – professionals
such as lawyers and accountants for services such as money laundering,
of government officials for network protection and support, and law
enforcement officers for counterintelligence.
• Once established, criminal networks will not be easily defeated. Unless
the nodes and connections that are identified and eliminated are critical
to the functioning of the network, criminal networks will simply use
alternative nodes and connections. The redundancies they create as defense mechanisms mean that it is difficult to degrade them. Moreover,
even if they are seriously impaired they will often display a remarkable
capacity to reconstitute and regenerate themselves in a short time period.
Indeed, the remnants of one criminal network can continue to function
even in truncated form. In Colombia, for example, the destruction of
the Cali cartel meant that Colombian organizations became part of a
less-concentrated trafficking network which has continued to supply the
United States and other drug markets. The possibility for regeneration is
something that crime prevention and law enforcement practitioners can
monitor in order to minimize the prospect of being taken by surprise.
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Table 3.
Social models
Implications
Result to anticipate
Cultural and sub-cultural
model based on patron-client
relations, ties of family and
kinship or on patterns of
corruption
Loyalty is not to state but to
family, kin or ethnic group.
Personal exchange
relationships are more
important than the rule of law.
Criminal organizations will
not only flourish but will
penetrate government, creating
crime-corruption networks
that are difficult to eradicate.
Ethnic network model based Transnational ethnic networks
on ethnic ties in immigrant and immigrant communities
communities
that are marginalized provide
cover and recruitment for
criminal organizations and are
difficult for law enforcement
to penetrate
In many cases diasporas will
be followed by the growth of
organized criminality. For host
societies this means that
organized crime will become
more diverse.
Social network model based
on the notion that networks
are not “disorganized” but
are highly sophisticated
organizational forms
Network organizations will
extend into the licit political
and economic world and will
also extend across national
borders. Networks will prove
highly resistant to traditional
law enforcement attacks.
Organized crime can best be
understood in terms of
network structures that are
characterized by high levels of
flexibility, redundancy, and
resilience as well as a capacity
to cross boundaries.
If the political models help us to understand the level of organized crime and
the enterprise and market models to understand their business strategy, the social models highlight yet other dimensions. Recognizing the cultural origins
of particular groups, the importance of ethnic networks as a facilitator for
forms of organized crime that are novel to the host countries, the propensity
of criminal networks to expand across borders and into the licit world, and the
capacity of these networks to defend and even regenerate themselves provides
opportunities to anticipate developments. These models are encapsulated in
Table 3.
The strategic or risk management model
Another model that has not been fully developed in the organized crime literature, but that recognizes that criminal organizations are in an adversarial
relationship with government and law enforcement agencies, as well as each
other, is what can be termed the strategic or risk management model. This
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model is based partly on the proposition that criminal organizations seek not
only to maintain their survival and maximize profits, but also to minimize the
“law enforcement risk.”40 It is also based on the recognition that in adversarial
relationships each side tries to anticipate the behavior of the other and act
accordingly.
While analogies such as American football or chess are over-simplistic
since they depend heavily on rules, the essence of the competitive structure
is similar in that criminal organizations and government agencies are intent
on outwitting each other, anticipating each other’s initiatives, and taking appropriate countermeasures. In some respects, of course, this overlaps with the
model of organized crime as criminal enterprise, which also recognizes that
criminal organizations face risks from government and rival groups. It explicitly acknowledges that criminal organizations have to operate not only in a
competitive environment, in which force becomes the arbiter of competition,
but also an environment in which governments and law enforcement agencies
are, in effect, trying to put them out of business. Consequently, criminal enterprises face a distinct form of risk which has implications for their structure
and behavior. Hence, criminal enterprises are risk management entities par
excellence.41 Their risk management strategies can range from simple efforts
to separate the organization (or its leaders) and the crime, or they can be much
more elaborate and extensive.
Indeed, it is possible to identify three kinds of measures that are or can be
generally incorporated into risk management strategies:
• Initiatives designed for risk prevention whether through passive avoidance or more proactive measures designed to shape the environment in
which criminal organizations operate. Criminal groups function most
effectively when focused on entrepreneurial initiatives rather than countering law enforcement. Consequently, they seek to ensure the safety of
the leaders, the continued viability of the organizations and the immunity
of their proceeds from seizure through the creation of a low-risk environment and the exploitation of safe havens. The proceeds of crime in
the face of aggressive law enforcement will typically be sent to offshore
financial centers and bank secrecy havens where they are relatively safe
from forfeiture and seizure laws.
• Defensive measures and tactics that attempt to control the risks that have
to be incurred even in a relatively benign environment. Even though
Cali drug trafficking organizations had tried to co-opt major parts of
the Colombian government, its leaders developed extensive counter-intelligence methods and acquired state of the art-technology to obtain adequate warning of law enforcement and intelligence initiatives directed
against them.42
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337
• Measures designed to mitigate damage and ensure that the organization
exhibits a high degree of resilience even in a hostile environment in
which defensive measures have proved inadequate.
Although there is some overlap among the three strategies, they are complementary. The optimum strategy is to reduce risk through creating a congenial
environment for the leadership and its activities; as in other forms of business,
however, it is impossible to avoid risk altogether. Consequently, the second
component of risk management consists of measures taken to defend against
or control risks. Although this can go a long way to avoiding the imposition
of costs by law enforcement or rivals, almost invariably some costs will be inflicted on the organization. It is essential, therefore, for criminal organizations
to make preparations to mitigate the damage (including, as suggested above,
a reliance on network structures that can be reconstituted). Some risks can be
anticipated and costs avoided; other risks and costs can be limited, contained
or controlled; but some simply have to be accepted as part of the price of
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. The crucial thing therefore is to
ensure that inescapable risks and costs do not become overwhelming.
Risk management strategies developed by criminal leaders are multi-dimensional and multi-purpose. This is not surprising. The risks they confront
are both varied and pervasive: they include risks that their illegal products will
be seized, that the proceeds of their crimes will be forfeited, that their personnel will be killed, arrested or defect to law enforcement, that the integrity of
the criminal network will be compromised by infiltration, and that the enterprise will be disrupted or destroyed. Consequently, considerable energy, time,
and resources are devoted to managing these risks. The strategies that result
are designed to protect a variety of things including the leadership, organizational integrity, financial assets (most of which represent the accrued profits
from criminal activities), operational personnel, and the products of the criminal organization. Not all these things have the same importance, however,
and both products and operational personnel will generally be regarded as
less important and more dispensable than leaders and profits.
Resulting propositions
The strategic and risk management model has significant implications for
much of the behavior of criminal enterprises. Among the kinds of strategies
and tactics that can be anticipated are the following:
• Criminal leaders will be intent on creating or maintaining a safe haven,
sanctuary, or retirement strategy. One way is to take steps to ensure that
their home base, at least, remains a congenial environment or sanctuary
from which they can operate with relative impunity. One of the most important ways to do this is through the use of systemic or institutionalized
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corruption whereby the criminal enterprise obtains allies and protectors
at high levels in the state apparatus and the community at large. The proposition is that this strategy is likely to become even more widespread
and that regions in which organized crime develops will face a real
problem from systemic corruption that will prove enormously difficult
to reverse and eradicate.
• As part of their defensive strategy, criminal organizations will operate
secretly, denying information to outsiders, and try to learn the secrets of
rival organizations and law enforcement agencies. They will also seek to
penetrate or infiltrate governments, law enforcement bodies, and private
sector security, thereby obtaining not only intimate knowledge of their
tactics and techniques, but also advance notice of any operations. There
are many cases of this, including some in Chicago where members of
some of the larger and more powerful street gangs became policemen.43
In other cases, drug trafficking organizations, for example in Colombia, used their lawyers to learn about the methods the government was
adopting against them. In yet others, groups such as the Hell’s Angels have used bribery to corrupt policemen and thereby obtain critical
counter-intelligence that enabled them to undermine investigations.44
The proposition here is that such activities, far from being aberrations,
are increasingly likely to be the norm as organized crime, both domestic
and transnational, becomes the subject of increasing pressure from law
enforcement.
• Criminal organizations concerned to protect themselves will make increasing use of proxies and contractors at the operational level, allowing
the proxies to incur the risks of detection and apprehension. Nigerian
criminal organizations have become particularly adept at this, using a
range of couriers – from US military personnel to middle aged white women – who do not fit the profile of typical drug traffickers developed by
customs organizations worldwide. This has a dual pay-off: it increases
the chances that the drugs will reach the market and it minimizes the
risks to the Nigerian criminals who have, in effect, graduated from a
service role to a managerial position.
• Criminal organizations will become increasingly adept at disguise and
concealment of their products and will use technology, the capacity to
embed illicit products in licit, and the availability of multiple trafficking
routes in an effort to circumvent the efforts of law enforcement. Often
criminals will choose the route of least resistance, a calculation which
explains why radioactive material trafficking had shifted from Austria
and Germany in the mid-1990s to the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia
in the late 1990s.45
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
339
• Criminal organizations will increasingly exploit technological developments, including information technologies as a means to enhance and
improve their risk management efforts. The most obvious case in point
is encryption which has been appearing increasingly in criminal cases
and offers opportunities to neutralize electronic surveillance which, in
the last few decades, has been one of the most potent law enforcement
weapons against organized crime. Encryption of communications and
computer systems will make it difficult for law enforcement to obtain
advanced warning of criminal activities, to disrupt criminal operations,
and to provide evidence of criminal activities that can be used in court
cases.
If some of the earlier models help us to anticipate the extent of organized
crime or the kinds of business strategies pursued by criminal organizations,
the strategy and risk management model has very obvious practical implications. Anticipating risk management strategies and the way they are implemented should enable law enforcement to exploit the vulnerabilities of the
criminal organizations and to impose substantial costs upon them. An assessment of the risk management strategies adopted by a criminal enterprise, for
example, can reveal the priorities for protection and, by implication, the major
vulnerabilities of the enterprise. This, in turn, could enable law enforcement
to deploy its own efforts and resources more effectively in pursuit of high
value targets. Furthermore, identifying the kinds of precautionary actions that
a criminal organization is taking (such as contracting out for money laundering) provides opportunities to exploit these actions (through the creation of
money laundering fronts) and thereby damage and dislocate the organization.
The risk management model is summarized in Table 4.
Table 4.
Risk management model
Implications
Result to anticipate
Risk management model is
based on the idea that
criminal organizations are in
adversarial relationships in
which strategy is critical
Criminal organizations will
develop a comprehensive
range of measures aimed at
the prevention, control, and
mitigation of the risks they
face from law enforcement
and rivals
Organized crime will seek safe
havens from which to operate
and will look to neutralize
governments and law
enforcement agencies through
corruption, counterintelligence and security
practices, including making
greater use of information
technologies.
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PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
Hybrid or composite models
A fifth set of approaches to anticipating organized crime lacks the analytical
purity of other models. It is useful nonetheless, not least because it emphasizes the dynamic nature of organized crime. Such approaches can be
described as composite models. They combine, political, economic, social
and strategy factors at both the domestic and international levels. The first
example of a composite model might be termed the transnational model. It
seeks to understand the rise of transnational criminal organizations in terms
of a particular confluence of opportunities, motivations (both incentives and
pressures), and resources that help to determine which groups will be successful and which will not.46 These three categories – opportunities, motivations, and resources – are explored at the global and national levels. The
framework incorporates, to one degree or another, some aspects of the other
models discussed above. The idea of weak states, for example, can be understood as offering opportunities, while the economic pressures from transitions
provide incentives and pressures for entry into the criminal economy as the
opportunities in the licit economy are, for the vast majority of people, very
limited. Ethnic networks are an important resource that have made it much
easier for some criminal organizations to operate on a transnational basis with
considerable success.
Opportunities at the global level, of course, stem from long term secular
trends in global politics and economics that have encouraged the development of a myriad of transnational organizations. The emergence of a “global
village” has fundamentally altered the environment in which both legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate. The global financial system, the free
trade system, and the emphasis on open borders, global communications and
information systems have opened up unprecedented opportunities for transnational crime. At the national level, criminal organizations with the capacity
for cross border activities have flourished where the state has been weak,
acquiescent, corrupt or collusive.
If global motivations for the rise of transnational criminal organizations
are diverse, the most important is the demand for a variety of illicit products
that transnational criminal organizations are able and willing to supply –
at considerable profit. For example, just as people migrate from the licit
economy to the licit, they also try to migrate to countries where economic
opportunities are greater. Immigration restrictions in some of these countries
do not stem the flow of immigrants; they just push them into the hands of
those, such as Chinese snakeheads, who are able to circumvent the restrictions and move illegal migrants to their destination. The people-smuggling
business has become extremely lucrative and involves not only Chinese and
Mexican groups but also Turkish and Albanian criminal organizations.
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341
Similarly, in terms of pressures, continued global inequalities among nations and the biases of the international trade system against developing states
make drug production in many developing countries a more attractive option
than the cultivation of other agricultural products. At the national level, economic collapse or dislocation is an important underlying cause of the rise of
criminal organizations. Economic depression in licit industries can lead to
those involved moving into illicit industries – and bringing with them all the
skills of the traditional entrepreneur. It can also provide the trigger that takes
an organization into a new phase of activity. Moreover, economic disruption
almost certainly adds to the recruitment pool for criminal organizations, and
provides conditions in which these organizations can very easily appear as a
positive rather than negative force.
Seizing opportunities and responding to pressures and incentives, however, is only possible if those involved possess and are able to exploit some
critical resources. Resources can be understood in terms of skills or capabilities that have been built up over time. At the international level, ethnic
networks – as suggested in the section on social models – can be understood as a vitally important resource for criminal organizations. It is possible,
for example, that the Yakuza has become less transnational in scope than
other criminal organizations, because Japanese migrant networks overseas
are far smaller and less well-entrenched than are Italian, Chinese or Nigerian
networks.
At the domestic level resources include an entrepreneurial culture and
tradition, cultural norms that encourage upward mobility by whatever means
are available and impose no social stigma for activities that are outside the
law, a high tolerance for the use of violence, experience in smuggling and a
familiarity with corruption.
The three factors – opportunities, pressures and incentives, and resources
– provide a “package” that helps to explain the rise of transnational criminal
organizations, especially when combined with some kind of trigger mechanisms – that is, abrupt developments that bring about a change in the opportunity structure, the pressures and incentives, or the availability of resources
and that result in a shift in the level, status, pattern of activity, or strategy
of organized crime. These triggers can be political (a change in the nature
of the state – for example, from strong to weak), economic, (disruption and
the sudden constriction of opportunities in the licit economy) or social (for
example, the dislocation and breakdown of social norms or the flaring up of
ethnic tensions). They can operate at the global or the national level. The
crucial point about triggers, however, is that they are often very sudden, involve considerable dislocation, and catalyze underlying conditions in ways
that profoundly change the situation. A good example is provided by the
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upsurge of Nigerian organized crime and drug trafficking. Nigerians grew
up in an atmosphere – stemming from its days as a British colony – fostering
trade and international travel and communications. The oil boom of the 1970s
expanded Nigeria’s reach into countries throughout the world. With the collapse of oil prices a portion of Nigeria’s young, aggressive and experienced
entrepreneurs and traders shifted to criminal activities. Much of the energy
and resourcefulness that had been dedicated to licit business activities was
transferred to fraudulent business activities and other activities such as heroin
and cocaine smuggling.
A second example of this composite approach could be termed the transshipment model. Developed by Shona Morrison, an Australian criminal intelligence analyst, it seeks to explain why particular states become transit points
for drug trafficking orgamzations.47 Building on Richard Friman’s analysis
which argues that states become transshipment points if they provide access
to the target or destination state for trafficking organizations and are open
to easy and relatively safe transit, Morrison distinguishes between vulnerable
states and sensitive states.48 She suggests that both types of state are generally
coastal and the source of a large volume of imports to the target country.
Vulnerable states are also characterized by corruption or instability or some
combination of the two. Sensitive states lack this quality but are characterized
by a “one-product economy” or a “transitional economy” or a “clean reputation” (which, of course, has the advantage that incoming commodities are
unlikely to be carefully scrutinized). An increase in corruption or a decline in
stability would, of course, move sensitive states into the vulnerable category.
Morrison uses these combinations of characteristics for a country by country analysis of potential transit points to Australia, but her approach could
equally well be useful to other states concerned about becoming either a final
destination or a transshipment point for drugs and other illicit commodities.
Resulting propositions
The composite model suggests a number of important propositions:
• As a result of globalization and both the opportunities and pressures
that accompany it, there will be a growing tendency for organized crime
to become transnational in scope. Although purely domestic criminal
organizations can be both successful and wealthy, the power and success
of criminal enterprises could depend increasingly on their capacity to act
transnationally. This will certainly be the case if the impulse to exploit
globalization is as compelling in the world of criminal enterprise as it is
for legal businesses. The corollary is that existing criminal organizations
which are already transnational in scope will expand their operations
in the search for new markets. This has certainly been the case with
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
343
Colombian drug trafficking organizations which have increasingly supplied markets in Western Europe, the former Soviet Union, and South
Africa.
• Transnational criminal organizations will increasingly exploit licit transnational business to disguise their illicit activities. Specific cases of this
will continue to include manipulation of import and export prices to
provide a cover for money laundering and the use of containers for drug
trafficking and other contraband smuggling, including – often with tragic
consequences – the trafficking of illegal aliens.
• Using the transshipment model, it is possible to look at existing and
emerging markets for drugs and other illicit products and then to identify
specific countries that are likely to be used for transshipment – especially
as governments try to inhibit or contain existing transshipment efforts.
In this connection, Brazil is likely to become particularly important for
transshipment as increased efforts are made to combat drug trafficking to
the United States through Mexico and the Caribbean. In addition, Brazil,
which scores high in terms of opportunities, motivations and resources
could emerge as an increasingly important player in the transnational
crime world with a role going well beyond drug transshipment.49 Among
the factors that suggest this are: a capacity for drug cultivation; a weak
central state which not only lacks control over large portions of the
country outside the major cities but also tolerates no-go areas in some
of these cities; a clientelist political system with well-established patterns of corruption; a sophisticated infrastructure that is already used
to facilitate transportation of illicit products and to launder proceeds of
crime; extensive trade patterns that could be used as cover for various
products, and existing criminal organizations which, although largely
localized, are well entrenched and, given the highly cosmopolitan nature
of Brazilian society, are likely to develop links with criminal groups
from elsewhere. The mix is suggestive of a state that at the very least
needs to be watched carefully.
• We will see the emergence of several other countries as home states for
major transnational criminal organizations. Even if there is some level
of organized crime associated with these states at the moment, there
are likely to be far-reaching shifts in the power, wealth and level of
activity of existing groups as well as the development of new criminal
organizations. A prime candidate for this is China, which has extensive
corruption networks, large disparities in wealth, a central government
that finds it difficult to exert control over rural provinces, the development of people-smuggling enterprises and counterfeiting in its southern
coastal regions, large ethnic networks overseas held together in large
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part by the concept of guanxi, and the potential for a transition from a
communist political system to something else. Hong Kong potentially
provides an important outlet for illicit as well as licit commercial activities. The triads that traditionally operated from Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan still exist and are forging cooperative relationships with groups
from the mainland. Among the possible triggers that would help to generate a significant increase in the power and reach of Chinese organized
crime are a change in the system to explicit rather than tacit capitalism,
a loosening of political controls (which at the moment, are imperfectly
applied but still impose some degree of restraint on criminal groups),
some kind of economic crisis that halts or reverses the rapid economic
growth that has been achieved in recent years and precipitates large-scale
migration from the licit economy to the illicit, and the expected massive
movement of peoples from rural to urban areas.
• In the same vein, Cuba will become both home and host state for criminal organizations. Cuba has in place extensive corruption networks and
the substantial informal economy or black market that almost invariably accompanies a political and economic system that is notoriously
inefficient. There are also high levels of poverty and limited economic
opportunities in the licit economy. The transnational linkages between
Cubans in Cuba and Cubans in the United States provides an important
resource that could very easily be exploited by Cuban criminal organizations. The main trigger would be the collapse of the communist state
and the resulting transition. As Cuba follows other communist states
and rejects the principles and precepts of the past four decades in favor
of capitalism, this is likely to have several implications for organized
crime. A Cuba in transition would have the ingredients for becoming
a home state for criminal organizations: weak central authority, at least
for a few years, as the post-communist government establishes itself; the
removal of social safety nets coupled with limited opportunities in the
licit economy; traditions of smuggling and contraband; and links with
a very substantial Cuban emigre community that could provide both
recruitment and cover for Cuban criminal activities in the United States.
Even more important, it would appear that Cuba is likely to become both
a host state for organized crime – as it was for the American Mafia during
the Batista years – and a transshipment state for drug trafficking. The
opening up of Cuba once again would make it very attractive for transnational criminal organizations operating in Central or South America and
the United States. Similarly, as former Soviet officials built up contacts
with criminal elements during the dual transition in the 1980s and 1990s,
Cuban and Russian officials will be able to build on the Russian-Cuban
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
345
contacts established during the Cold War. As far as its potential role
in transshipment is concerned, this could be enormous, dwarfing any
involvement in drug trafficking to the United States during the Castro
era. With trade between Cuba and the United States restored, it would be
much easier for drug traffickers to embed drugs within licit exports coming to the United States. Given Cuba’s location close to Florida, it could
also become an important transshipment state for alien trafficking to the
United States. An additional incentive for organized crime involvement
is the commercial sex trade. The market for commercial sex in Castro’s
Cuba is currently driven by imperatives of subsistence rather than the
enrichment of criminal enterprises. Nevertheless, the existence of such
a market makes Cuba very attractive for criminal organizations desiring
to reap the benefits of what is already a very lucrative trade and one
that will become even more profitable when Cuba is once again a tourist
destination for United States citizens. The resurgence of prostitution in
Cuba during the 1990s is a potential magnet for organized crime which
will seek to control the market for commercial sex as it did prior to
the Castro era. Another attraction is the large tourist industry which has
many cash businesses that are perfect for laundering money. A related
possibility is that Cuba will become an offshore financial center and
bank secrecy haven, something for which there are already many successful models in the Caribbean. In order to be competitive in a world of
deregulation, Cuba is likely to adopt a permissive approach to offshore
finance, especially in the early years as it tries to establish itself as a
viable alternative to Antigua, the Cayman Islands and other jurisdictions.
For organized crime this will offer a major opportunity to infiltrate an
offshore financial center from the bottom up – an attractive option for
any criminal enterprise looking for avenues for money laundering. In
short, the post-Communist transition in Cuba has the capacity to create some real opportunities and advantages for transnational organized
crime groups including Russian, Sicilian, Mexican, Colombian and US
groups.
• Another very real possibility for the future is that at least some African
nations will become much more heavily involved in transnational organized crime, following what could, in effect, be described as the Nigerian
model. Indeed, one component of this is likely to be an increase in levels
of criminal activity by Nigerian groups themselves. Nigeria could well
face an increasingly inhospitable economic environment as continued
population growth requires an ever increasing percentage of Nigerian
oil supplies to be used for domestic consumption rather than available
for export earnings. At some point this is likely to result in economic
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shocks that, in turn, create far-reaching social and economic dislocation. In these circumstances, the pressure to emulate those – that is
criminals – who remain relatively shielded from economic downturns
could become even more widespread. New criminals can build on the
expertise that already exists, on the Nigerian diaspora, and on the highlevel corruption and collusion that, at least until the end of the Abacha
regime, made Nigeria a very congenial home base. If a further increase
in Nigerian criminal activities is one aspect of growing African involvement in transnational crime, others include a growing number of states
becoming home to groups that try to emulate Nigerian organizations.
Indeed, the phenomenon of Nigerian organized crime has already broaderied into a West African phenomenon and it is only a matter of time
before it spreads further. Many African governments have very weak
states with inadequate criminal justice systems, limited opportunities
in the licit economy and traditions of corruption. Border controls in
many countries in Africa are weak or non-existent and provide ideal
opportunities for smuggling a wide variety of illicit products. Much of
the contraband trade will increasingly go into and through South Africa
which has excellent transportation and financial systems, important trade
and travel links with the rest of the world, and highly porous borders. For
its part, South Africa could well provide a case study that accords almost
completely with the Morrison model of transshipment states. lt clearly
meets the prerequisites of ease of transit, and access to a variety of target
states and markets.50 Should there also be an increase in corruption or
instability – and there is certainly evidence of a growth in corruption in
South Africa – then it would move from a state sensitive to transshipment to fit very neatly into Morrison’s category of states that are highly
vulnerable to becoming transshipment states.51
The broad propositions enshrined in the two composite models are summarized in Table 5, while Table 6 encapsulates the arguments about specific countries that are likely to witness a major increase in organized crime activity and
power.
Indeed, the conditions likely to generate a major increase in organized
crime in certain countries are summarized in Table 6 which identifies underlying conditions, possible triggers, and likely results.
All five sets of models of organized crime provide insights that are useful
in anticipating levels of organized crime, the emergence of particular countries as home bases of major criminal organizations, the patterns of activities
of transnational criminal organizations and the strategies these organizations
adopt. In using them, however, it is important to acknowledge that they are
dynamic rather than static, reflecting the learning capacity of organized crime
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
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Table 5.
Composite models
Implications
Result to anticipate
Transnational organized Transnational criminal
crime model
organizations will operate
from a safe home base
characterized by weak
government, economic
dislocation, social upheaval
and integration into the global
economy
Transnational criminal
organizations will not only
take control of much of the
domestic economy of certain
states but will operate in a
variety of host states where
there are lucrative markets and
ethnic networks
Transshipment model
Coastal states which not only
have a large volume of exports
to consumer countries but are
also characterized by
corruption or instability will
be major targets for
transshipment of drugs and
other illicit goods
Organized crime will identify
and exploit states where there
is ease of transit and access to
the final destination for the
transshipment of illicit goods
groups as well as their opportunistic nature, and their adversarial relationship
with law enforcement. They also need to be combined with some specific
techniques of information and intelligence gathering that will enhance the
capacity for anticipation.
Specific research and data collection techniques
The problems of anticipation remain formidable. If governments and civil
society are to respond effectively to criminal organizations and criminal markets, however, it is essential that more systematic efforts be made in this
direction. In this connection there are several techniques or methods that have
proven useful in efforts to anticipate more traditional national security threats
and that could profitably be used to enhance the prospects for anticipation in
the area of organized crime:
The “red team” approach. This typically involves putting oneself in the
place of the adversary and looking at the world from his perspective and
where possible, with his value system. Following the business logic of organized crime which presumes that criminal enterprises constantly scan their
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Table 6.
Country Underlying
conditions
Possible triggers
Likely results
Brazil
Patron-client
relations; weak
government; “no-go”
areas in cities;
extensive rural areas
where state is weak;
existing use for
transshipment;
extensive trade
patterns; absence of
culture of lawfulness
Economic crisis
Pressure on Mexico
Increased importance
as a transshipment
state and possible
emergence of
indigenous Brazilian
organizations as major
players in drug
trafficking and other
organized
crime
China
Existing corruption
networks; lack of
control over rural
provinces; peoplesmuggling enterprises,
large ethnic networks
overseas; concept of
guanxi, integration of
Hong Kong, Macau
and special enterprise
zones; absence of
culture of lawfulness
Transition from a
communist political
system to a more
uncertain rule of law
and reformist
government which
removes or eases
some social controls.
Cooperation between
indigenous Chinese
criminal organizations
and Hong Kong and
Macau based triads as
well as increase in
Chinese organized
crime in those
countries where there
is a large Chinese
immigrant community
Cuba
Patterns of corruption;
poverty; international
isolation encourage
smuggling of various
kinds; networks with
Cubans in United
States; absence of
culture of lawfulness
Collapse of
Communist regime
perhaps on death of
Castro
Develop some
indigenous organized
crime but become a
major host to Russian
and Sicilian criminal
organizations,
traditional organized
crime groups in the
United States, and
Mexican and
Colombian drug
traffickers. Also
become an offshore
financial center
attracting dirt money.
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
349
Table 6. Continued
Country
Underlying
Some African Weak government;
states
patterns of corruption;
economic pressures;
large informal
economies; weak
border controls;
Nigerian model;
absence of culture of
lawfulne
Possible triggers
Democratization
process offers new
opportunities for
diffusion of
corruption and entry
of transnational
criminal organizations
which could provide
financial support for
elections
Likely results
See increase in
indigenous and foreign
organized crime in
many African states as
Nigeria becomes
model to emulate and
organized crime in
South Africa becomes
deeply entrenched.
environment for new opportunities which are then exploited, it is possible to
use a red team approach to understand the logic of criminal enterprises, the
assessment of risks and opportunities, and the kinds of considerations that
will determine ultimate policy choices. For example, criminal organizations
often seek to infiltrate licit businesses targets that are not only lucrative but
also highly vulnerable. If some industries are protected and others are not,
then those that are not will tend to become the next victims. Consequently,
by engaging in red team analysis and examining the opportunities, obstacles
and constraints from the perspective of the criminal organizations themselves,
it might be possible more effectively to anticipate both methods and targets.
This could easily result in some false positives, but this would be a price worth
paying if it also encouraged protective measures that would make the licit
business world as a whole much more resistant to penetration by organized
crime.
More extensive use of intelligente sources. Increased use can be made of
intelligence, i.e., the combination of information from open and clandestine
sources. Much broader data collection and analysis than has traditionally
been undertaken by law enforcement and intelligence agencies is facilitated
by the ready availability of open sources through on-line databases and new
journals. Other fruitful sources that have been underutilized are convicted
prisoners, collaborating witnesses and defectors, (including professionals –
lawyers, accountants and bankers – who are hired by criminal organizations
to launder and manage the proceeds of crime). Current information that is obtained from interviews with defectors or prisoners often provided the basis for
government offensives against criminal organizations. Once the immediate
offensives have been completed, more extensive, systematic interviewing can
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be undertaken and the results disseminated, thereby enabling other agencies
in other countries to benefit from the knowledge that has been obtained.
Traffic and travel analysis. Another technique that can be brought from
the intelligence world is traffic analysis. This focuses not on the content of
information flows among criminals but on the volume and direction of messages exchanged, i.e., the “traffic.” This might help for example, in identifying
potential new ventures by criminal organizations, their spread into different
localities or even different nations. In this area, it should be possible to build
on telephone toll analysis, and seek not just to establish specific connections among individuals but to look at changing patterns of activity by and
among criminal organizations. In other words, toll analysis can be used for
strategic as well as tactical purposes. In addition, it should be possible to
extend these techniques to look at travel patterns of criminals, something
that is increasingly important as criminal organizations from different countries increasingly establish cooperative links that provide major new market
opportunities and generally enhance their power and reach.
Vulnerability assessments. Efforts can be made to examine particular industries, businesses or government agencies to identify why they might appear
attractive to organized crime and how criminal organizations might try to infiltrate them, the points of vulnerability, points of entry, and the methods that
might be used. This has been done, for example, by Hong Kong’s Independent
Commission against Corruption (ICAC). The natural concomitant is strategic
analyses of protective measures that might be initiated to reduce these vulnerabilities. Even more ambitious, but along the same lines are vulnerability
assessments of particular countries looking at political, economic and social
trends and conditions and attempting to tease out how these might impact on
the prospects for organized crime. National indicators would help to reveal
if particular states are becoming weaker or more corrupt and, in some cases,
will highlight the need to look at patterns of interaction between criminal
organizations and politicians.
Anomalies and early warning. It is important to have some capacity for
going beyond a particular industry, national, or regional focus. Governments
could usefully include small groups which are set up to look for anomalies
(i.e. events and activities that do not fit established patterns or models) and to
identify new trends as has been done by sophisticated intelligence analysts.
They can obtain information from a wide range of sources and should not
be bound by existing models or frameworks. This is not intended as a substitute for the other methods of anticipation outlined above, but simply as a
complementary effort.52
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351
Knowledge fusion. The availability of information does not in itself guarantee good analysis. Perhaps even more important in anticipating new trends
and developments in organized crime is the combination of novel forms of expertise – specialists on organized crime and business and industry specialists
or regional or national specialists. While all source data fusion is a familiar
buzz phrase in intelligence matters, what we are referring to here could be
described more appropriately as knowledge fusion. Fusion of this kind is
essential if we are to have any real success in anticipating new trends and
developments in organized crime. In effect, it requires matching information
with the models, seeing where it fits and where it does not, and if necessary
refining the models.
These techniques used in conjunction with the models and projections outlined above could enhance the capacity to anticipate developments in organized crime. They are neither foolproof nor are they a panacea. Nevertheless,
they provide a stronger basis than currently exists for both intelligence-led
law enforcement and for the development of far more effective long-term
strategies against organized crime than currently exist.
Concluding observations
In 1997 an important study on warning and response in international relations
noted that “early warning indicators typically do not speak for themselves;
they require analysis and interpretation. But the kinds of knowledge and
theories needed for this purpose may be in short supply.”53 The discussion
here is an attempt to increase this supply in relation to organized crime and
at least identify developments and trends that could prove significant. At the
same time, there is a clear recognition here that there is no “silver bullet” in
anticipating organized crime, whether domestic or transnational. Understanding the cultures and sub-cultures that facilitate organized crime can provide
an important basis for planning. So too can an enhanced awareness of the
political and economic incubators for criminal enterprises. Similarly, anticipating the risk management strategies of criminal enterprises can facilitate the
development of appropriate precautions or counter-measures by law enforcement agencies. If successful anticipation can be a powerful tool, however, it
does not follow that it will always lead to successful policies or strategies.
Warning is contingent and cannot always be turned into effective response.
This is as true in the area of combating organized crime as it is in other policy
areas such as military security.
There are several reasons for this gap between adequate warning and appropriate response. If trends are caught early, before they have fully matured,
for example, they might not be compelling enough to demand decisive ac-
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tion, especially if this requires difficult or unpalatable decisions or a significant allocation of scarce resources.54 This is particularly true in government
and even private security agencies, where there is a natural and inevitable
preoccupation with existing cases and problems. Law enforcement is predominantly and inherently reactive. Moving to a pro-active stance requires
a fundamental change in deeply embedded attitudes and a willingness to
recognize that combating organized crime requires efforts to reduce the same
political, social and economic vulnerabilities that criminal organizations seek
to exploit. Anticipation allows societies to do this. When done with care
and effort it can significantly reduce the opportunities for organized crime
to develop to a point where the criminals can not only develop new markets
but also coopt political and economic elites, neutralize government and law
enforcement initiatives and generally act with impunity.
Unfortunately, even if anticipation is successful and there is a deliberate
and unequivocal response this might not be commensurate with the developing challenge. Alternatively, even adequate warning and a response that
is entirely appropriate in terms of both its focus and the level of resources
involved, are still no guarantee of success in preventing untoward developments. Organized crime is not only deeply rooted in conditions that are
enormously difficult to change but also exploits secular trends that in most
other respects are very positive in their impact. The implication is that if
maximum benefit is to be derived from successful anticipation this has to
be followed by the formulation and implementation of broadly based policies
and strategies which not only attack the criminal organizations but also attempt to make the environment in which they operate far less congenial. Just
as law enforcement agencies cannot deal exclusively with organized crime
through its traditional focus on cases, governments cannot deal with organized crime through an exclusive focus on law enforcement. Anticipating the
activities of criminal organizations, whether operating domestically or across
borders, requires not only law enforcement and regulatory efforts. It also
requires education, cultural change, and public-private partnerships. Seen in
this way, it is clear that effective anticipation is not the last word in combating
organized crime but merely an essential first step.
Notes
1. For a discussion of this issue see Jay Albanese, “Where Organized and White Collar
Crime Meet: Predicting the Infiltration of Legitimate Business,” in Jay Albanese (ed.),
Contemporary Issues in Organized Crime (Monsey, New York: Willow Tree Press, 1995)
pp. 35–60.
2. The question could still be asked, of course, about why we have chosen these five sets
of models rather than any other. The answer concerns their utility in anticipating both
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
353
future developments likely to impinge on organized crime, and the future behavior of
criminal organizations. An alternative and useful conceptualization of organized crime
that also categorizes models can be found in Boronia Halstead, “The Use of Models in
the Analysis of Organized Crime and Development of Policy,” Transnational Organized
Crime Spring 1998 (4:1), 1–24.
This reflects work done on the Political-Criminal Nexus by Roy Godson and the National
Strategy Information Center. See, for example, Trends in Organized Crime Spring 1999
(4:3) and Fall 2000 (5:1).
Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder: Lynne
Reinner, 1995).
Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
This formula was developed by Robert Klitgaard. See, for example, his “International
Cooperation Against Corruption,” Finance & Development March 1998 (35:1), 3–7.
See Stanley Pimentel, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico,” and
Louise Shelley, “The Political-Criminal Nexus: Russian-Ukrainian Case Studies,” in Trends
in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Spring 1999 (4:3).
Stanley Pimentel, “The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics: Mexico,” Trends in Organized Crime Spring 1999 (4:3).
See Robert Kelly, “The Political-Criminal Nexus in the United States,” in Trends in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Fall 2000 (5:1). Also, James J. Jacobs
et al., Gotham Unbound: How New York was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime
(New York: New York University Press, 1999).
Buckovic, “Heroin for Kalashnikovs,” Belgrade Borba in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 1998 p.
6. The involvement of the Kosovo Albanians in drug trafficking became a much more
frequent item in press reports during the Kosovo crisis in March and April 1999.
CNN/Time Impact: Interview Transcript “Cherif Bassiouni on Arkan and ethnic cleansing,” <http://cgi.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/impact>.
Cyrille Fijnaut, Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Bruinsma, and Henk van de Bunt, Organized
Crime in the Netherlands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 194.
Charles Hanley, “Increasingly, Guerrillas Financed by Drugs,” Toronto Star December 29,
1994, p. A19. R. Thomas Naylor, “The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of
Guerilla Organizations,” Crime, Law and Social Change 1993 (20), 13–51.
Soledad Alameda, “Floren Aoiz,” El Pais Dec 13, 1992 (95), 14–27. We are grateful for
this reference to Magdalena Hindie and have drawn on her unpublished paper, “Terror
in Spain” Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
(January 1998).
Paul K. Clare, Racketeering in Northern Ireland – A New Version of the Patriot Game
(Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago,
1989).
Ko-lin Chin, Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 9.
Pino Arlacchi, “Large Scale Crime and World Illegal Markets,” in Organized Crime:
International Strategies Report of the International Seminar on Policies and Strategies
to Combat Organized Crime held under the auspices of the United Nations and the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico (December 8–11, 1987) pp. 47–61 at
p. 49.
See Peter Reuter, The Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis (Washington DC.: National Institute of Justice, 1985) and R. Thomas Naylor, “From Cold War to
354
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
Crime War: The Search for a New National Security Threat,” Transnational Organized
Crime 1995 (1:4), 37–56.
See Naylor, Ibid. This theme is also developed in the same author’s “Mafias, Myths and
Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime” in Transnational Organized
Crime 1997 (3:3), 1–45.
This view of organized crime is most clearly associated with Dwight C. Smith. See, for
example, his “Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: a Spectrum Based Theory of Enterprise,”
in Crime and Delinquency July 1982 (26), 358–386. The analysis here also draws on
remarks by Ambassador David Miller at an NSIC workshop on transnational organized
crime held Nov 17–18 1994.
Peter Gastrow, Organized Crime in South Africa (Johannesburg: Institute for Security
Studies, 1998).
It is also worth noting that the converse of this can also occur with criminal organizations
providing information to law enforcement regarding their competitors. Members of the
Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations routinely did this as part of their struggle
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
One of the best statements and illustrations of this argument is Letizia Paoli, The Pledge to
Secrecy: Culture, Structure and Action of Mafia Associations, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
European University Institute Firenze, June 1997.
Jane Schneider, Trends in Organized Crime Winter 1998 (4:1).
Ko-lin Chin, Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 9.
Ibid. p. 19.
Ibid. p. 11.
Ibid.
For the criteria and rituals of traditional Triad membership see W.P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1960), which was used in Hong
Kong courts to identify Triad members. For a discussion of guanxi see M. Cordell Hart,
“ ‘Guanxi’: an Important Concept for the Law Enforcement Officer,” Trends in Organized
Crime 1996 (2:2). Some believe the concept is too broad to serve as an effective indicator
of criminal association.
R. Sandbrook, Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 28 quoted in Rachel Flanary, “The State in Africa: Implications for
Democratic Reform,” Crime, Law and Social Change 1998 (29:2–3), 179–196 in endnote
4 at p. 193.
Frank Bovenkerk, “Crime and the Multi-ethnic Society: a View from Europe,” Crime,
Law and Social Change 1993 (19), 271–280 at p. 279.
See Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York: Appleton,
Crofts, 1971) and Francis J. Ianni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
Alan Block, East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York 1939–1959 (Swansea
UK.: Christopher Davis, 1979).
See David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: a Framework about Societal
Evolution (Santa Monica: RAND P-7967, 1996).
Gary Potter, Criminal Organizations: Vice Racketeering and Politics in an American
City (Prospect Heights Ill.: Waveland Press, 1993) and James O. Finckenauer and Elin
J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998).
Fijnaut et al., Organized Crime in the Netherlands p. 74.
Ibid.
ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
355
38. For a fuller analysis see Phil Williams, “The Nature of Drug Trafficking Networks,”
Current History April 1998, 154–159.
39. The most documented case is that of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. On the relationship between
organized crime and politics in Mexico, see John Bailey and Roy Godson (eds.), Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S. Mexican Borderlands
(Pittsburgh Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).
40. See Ernesto U. Savona, Harmonising Policies for Reducing The Transnational Organised
Crime Risk Transcrime (University of Trento) Working Paper No. 2 (June 1995).
41. The following analysis is based on a chapter by Phil Williams entitled “Risk Management by Transnational Criminal Organizations: Threat or Opportunity for Law Enforcement?,” in Gina Pattagulan (ed.), Transnational Organized Crime in the Asia-Pacific Region (forthcoming).
42. The most extensive and detailed published discussion of the strategic interaction between
the Cali and Medellin cartels, and the US and Colombian governments, can be found in
Robert J. Nieves, Colombian Cocaine Cartels: Lessons from the Front US Working Group
on Organized Crime (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, April 1997).
43. Lawrence B. Sulc, Law Enforcement Counter Intelligence (Kansas City: Varro Press,
1996) pp. 65–67.
44. Yves Lavigne, Hell’s Angels (Toronto: Carol Publishing Group, 1996) pp. 133–143.
45. This emerges clearly from the chronology of nuclear material smuggling incidents developed by Paul N. Woessner at the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies,
University of Pittsburgh. An earlier version was published as “Chronology of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials Smuggling Incidents July 1991–June 1997,” Transnational
Organized Crime Spring 1997 (3:1), 114–209.
46. Phil Williams and Carl Florez, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and Drug Trafficking,” Bulletin of Narcotics 1994 (46:2), 9–24.
47. Shona Morrison, “The Dynamics of Illicit Drugs Shipments and Potential Transit Points
for Australia,” Transnational Organized Crime Spring 1997 (3:1), 1–22.
48. Richard Friman, “Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment,” Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:1), 65–83.
49. Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado, “Brazil: The Emerging Drug Superpower,”
Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:2), 239–260.
50. Richard Friman, “Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment,” Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:1), 65–83.
51. Shona Morrison, “The Dynamics of Illicit Drugs Shipments and Potential Transit Points
for Australia,” Transnational Organized Crime 1997 (3:1), 1–22.
52. See Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction, 2000) pp. 196–
198.
53. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problems and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation, May 1997) p. 11. The following paragraphs adapt several of the arguments put forward by George and Holl to the subject being
considered here.
54. Ibid. p. 5.
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