MILANMUN 2015 SECURITY COUNCIL STUDENT OFFICER: Edoardo Rundeddu ISSUE: Establishing an atmosphere of détente in the China Sea area Table of Contents I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. Introduction Definition of Key Terms a. The 9-Dash Line b. UNCLOS General Overview a. Spratly Islands b. Paracel Islands c. Pratas Islands d. Scarborough Shoal e. Macclesfield Bank f. Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands g. James Shoal h. Natural resources Major Parties Involved and their Views a. The People’s Republic of China b. Japan c. The Philippines d. Taiwan (Republic of China) e. Viet Nam f. Malaysia g. Brunei h. ASEAN i. United States of America j. United Nations Past Treaties and Agreements a. Potsdam Declaration, 1945 b. Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 c. Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 1971 d. Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951 e. Join Statement China and Philippines, 1995 f. ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002 Possible Solutions Bibliography 1 I. Introduction The China Sea, one of the most important trade routes in the world, has always been, since the 19 century, a scenario of territorial disputes between China, Taiwan, Japan, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Experts on the issue say that the tensions between these nations tend to escalate and will possibly converge into an armed conflict if their overlapping claims over several uninhabited islands rich of natural resources are not unraveled. Another source of interests in these islands, especially those in the South China Sea is their strategic position, that would guarantee the construction of military bases and the control over the trade routes, as a quarter of global shipping, estimated to be $5.3 trillion, passes through this sea. The disputes, however, are not only concerning land, but they also extend to the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), that set the rights to sea resources and energy exploitation and production of each of the countries involved. th As said by Le Luong Minh, secretary general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the issue in the China Sea “is not just about competing claims; it’s about peace and stability in the region”. The stake is high, and it is not likely that these countries will withdraw their claims. In addition, it is very hard to say what island belongs to each nation, as they all have valid justification for their requests. However, an effective solution aiming at establishing an atmosphere of détente in this area for what concerns the territorial disputes might be the key to begin a process of pacification between the nations involved, that, in the course of history, have usually fought on opposite sides. II. Definition of Key Terms a. The 9-Dash Line The 9-Dash Line is a controversial traditional territorial claim put forth by the People’s Republic of China according to which the sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoal, the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, belongs to the Chinese Government. As the last two islands groups are the two most important objects of the South China Sea dispute, the Line is contested by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Viet Nam. On the other hand, Beijing is determined not to reduce the territorial and marine claims as proclaimed in the 9-Dash Line. Indeed, in 2009 China submitted a historical map to the United Nations that included the Line, and the same map was printed in the new Chinese passports issued in 2012. Image from http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/09/11/1367888/china-bares-first-book-9-dash-line 2 b. UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The UNCLOS was first signed in 1982, but came into force only in 1994, as it required 60 signatures. One of the most important points of this agreement concerns the extent of national sovereignty over maritime regions, dividing the coastal areas of every country into six categories: Internal Waters, included on the landward side of the baseline (the mean low water mark), over which a nation has exclusive sovereignty; Territorial Waters, that range up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, over which a nation has exclusive sovereignty. Every other nation usually has the right of innocent passage through it; Contiguous Zone, that ranges up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline. In this area, a nation has the right to exercise the influence necessary to the prevention of the infringement of its customs or law. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), that ranges up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within it, a nation can exploit the natural resources, regulate fishing, create artificial islands and conduct scientific researches. The EEZ only surrounds inhabitable land. Continental Shelf, ranging up to the geographical continental slope. As, in many cases, the EEZ does not reach the continental slope, countries can ask, with certain restrictions, an extension of 150 nautical miles of their rights granted by the EEZ. In this case, however, these rights would only be valid for the Shelf and not for the water over it. High Seas, that include all waters beyond a nation’s EEZ. No nation is allowed to claim areas of the high seas. The UNCLOS is critical to the situation in the China Sea, because it is used as a counter argument against the historical 9 Dash-Line. Beijing, indeed, considers the areas enclosed by the Line as Territorial Waters and EEZ, clearly going against the distances proposed in the agreement. Since Taiwan claims mirror the ones put forth by Beijing, the 9-Dash Line is also taken into consideration by the government of Taipei. However, while China’s claims have not been specified and seem to include all the South China Sea within the Line, Taiwan’s territorial requests are limited to the islands they control such as Taiping and to the 12/200 nautical miles area (whether the island is uninhabitable or not) around them defined as Territorial Waters, thus referring to the UNCLOS. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm link to UNCLOS Image from http://www.unclosuk.org/group.html 3 III. Overview There are several territorial and marine disputes in the China Sea. In this document, only the major ones are reported. a. Spratly Islands Image from http://www.surftrip.com/destinations/islands/pacific/spratly_islands.html The archipelago of the Spratly Islands is situated next to the coast of the Philippines in the South China Sea. Its hundreds of small uninhabited islands are critical in defining international borders, and are valuable because they are next to rich fishing areas and because guano, an effective fertilizer, can be found there. Potentially, they may also contain oil and natural gas. Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Viet Nam are currently claiming the sovereignty over the islands, and all of them except for Brunei have militarily occupied them. According to ancient Chinese maps dating back to the 12th and 13th centuries, the Spratlys have always been part of China, as they were occupied during the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) for fishing purposes. Also in the following dynasties, the Yuan, the Ming and the Qing, the archipelago was considered included in China’s borders, and it was referenced in several maps drawn between the 18th and 19th centuries. In this same time period, also Vietnamese maps included the Spratly Islands, but due to poor communication, neither China nor Viet Nam were aware of each other’s overlapping claims. At the end of the 19th century, with the exponential growth of geographical explorations, European powers reached the Spratlys. Particularly, in 1887 France claimed the archipelago as part of its colonies in Indochina and occupied some of the islands, finding Chinese fishermen working 4 there. The French occupation ended de facto after World War II, but officially only when the independence of Viet Nam and the rest of the occupied Indochina was proclaimed. During World War II, the islands were occupied by Japan for military purposes. In 1946, after its defeat, the Republic of China, which included China, Mongolia and the island of Taiwan, occupied the former Japanese territories, encompassing the largest island in the Spratlys: Taiping. An important turning point occurred in 1949 with the division of the territories that made up the Republic. The newly formed victorious People’s Republic of China occupied most of the Chinese Spratlys, while Taiwan abandoned the island of Taiping in 1950. The island was, however, reoccupied in 1956, fearing that Filipino explorer Tomas Cloma, who in the same year had declared the Free Territory of Freedomland encompassing part of the archipelago, could also claim Taiping, that had already been requested by Beijing after the secession. Taiping is now still administered by Taiwan. The historical rival of China for the Spratly Islands, Viet Nam, began to strive for the possession of the archipelago in the 1970s, when it was confirmed that reserves of oil and natural gas could be found next to the Spratlys. As a result, the diplomatic relations between these two countries worsened, also due to other conflicts that occurred after the unification of North and South Viet Nam. In 1988, an actual naval battle took place and 70 Vietnamese were killed. Although later on an agreement addressing the exploiting of natural resources and fisheries was signed by China and Viet Nam, in 2003 the Chinese Government began prohibiting fishing in the South China Sea. Tensions arose again in 2011 when attacks against Vietnamese exploration ships were carried on by China next to the Spratly Islands. Moreover, the year later Viet Nam officially declared the archipelago (and also the Parcel islands as explained in the next sub-section) part of Vietnamese borders. The Philippines have lately claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys. In 1976 they occupied Pagasa Island and built an airstrip. In 1999, with the aid of a navy ship, Filipino troops were deployed next to the Second Thomas Shoal, and since that moment have never left the island. Tensions escalated, and in 2011, the President of the Philippines reported the possibility of the beginning of an arms race. In 2013 the Philippines requested the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) for clarifications on the legitimate EEZ in the area. A final decision still has to be taken (today January 6, 2015). However, China has affirmed that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the dispute. Moreover, Beijing didn’t accept the process that took place in the Philippines that fined nine Chinese fishermen for poaching endangered sea turtles in the sea area next to the Philippine coast. The other nations involved in the Spratlys are Malaysia and Brunei. Malaysia claims all the islands within their EEZ and has currently occupied only three of them. Also Brunei’s claims are justified by their EEZ, but unlike all the other nations they haven’t occupied part of the archipelago yet. Another significant problem in the Spratly Islands is that most of the involved nations are building or have built military structures on the disputed islands. Taiwan, Malaysia, Viet Nam and the Philippines have already constructed airports and other buildings, such as the Filipino cellular phone base station launched in 2005 and the 1,150 meter long Taiwanese airstrip on Taiping. Also China is very active is this ambit, and it is currently building an artificial island 3,000 meters long to be used as an airstrip, despite the request the United States had made asking all nations to stop establishing immobile structures on the islands. 5 b. Paracel Islands Image from http://www.surftrip.com/destinations/islands/pacific/paracel_islands.html The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea, equidistant from the coasts of Viet Nam and of the People’s Republic of China. The 30 small islands and reefs that make up the archipelago are divided into two groups: the Amphitrite northeastern group and the Crescent southwestern group. Like the Spratlys, these islands are adjacent to rich fishing areas and potential oilfields and natural gas reserves. Although there are no native inhabitants, about 1,000 Chinese soldiers and construction workers reside in the archipelago. The Paracels are currently administered by the Chinese province of Hainan, but are claimed by Taiwan, recognizing itself the true heir to the territories that belonged to the Republic of China before the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and by Viet Nam. Although before historical records existed there is the possibility that Vietnamese fishermen reached the Parcels, the oldest proofs are in favor of China. Indeed, leftovers from the Tang and Song dynasties, dating back to the 10th century, were found in some islands, that could have also been inhabited at that time. Like the Spratly Islands, the Paracels were included in Chinese maps of the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. However, as Viet Nam and China were not aware of each other’s claims, in the 15th century Le Thanh Tong, emperor of Viet Nam, founded commercial activities in the area of the Paracels mainly focused on fishing, but also on salvage operations. About two hundred years later, the Vietnamese encyclopedia of trade routes Thiên Nam tứ chí lộ đồ was compiled, which also consisted of maps describing the archipelago. Another document, the Phủ biên tạp lục published in 1776, reports the Vietnamese exploitation of the Paracels and the Spratlys since 1702. The Vietnamese government kept claiming control over the Paracels until the end of the 19th century, when Indochina became a French colony. At first China reinforced its control over the archipelago, placing Chinese flags on the islands in response to a German survey in the area and nominating Chinese merchants administrators of the Paracels. However, in the 1920s – 1930s France, representing the position of its colony, sent troops to occupy islands in the South China Sea. Consequently, in 1932, French Indochina officially annexed most of the Paracel Islands, despite the protests of Beijing, and built a weather station on Prattle Island, the largest in the Crescent group. 6 During World War II, Japan occupied some of the islands in the northeastern group, but after the peace treaties it withdrew its claims. As Japan left the archipelago, China occupied Japanese former islands, and thus gained control over the Amphitrite group. The sovereignty over the Crescent group was passed to Viet Nam when part of the French colony of Indochina was dissolved in 1945, turning into the Free State of Viet Nam. However, after the First Indochina War that ended in 1954 with the division of the territory into North and South Viet Nam at the 17th Parallel, the southwestern Paracels were occupied by South Viet Nam as their location is below the line set as border. After the discovery of potential oil and natural gas deposits next to the Spratlys and Paracels, South Viet Nam stipulated agreements with foreign oil companies. Also, for purposes linked to the Viet Nam War, the South Vietnamese government announced its will to build an airbase on the Paracels. The People’s Republic of China interpreted these actions as an attack to their sovereign rights as described by the 9-Dash Line, and in 1974 it seized Viet Nam’s territories in the archipelago in the Battle of the Paracel Islands. Since then, China controlled the whole archipelago. After the conflict, South Viet Nam protested and asked for the intervention of the United Nations, but due to the veto power China has in the Security Council, nothing was done. As a result, diplomatic relationship between South Viet Nam and Beijing worsened, and nothing changed with the reunification that led to the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Also, in the last years, China has been very harsh with the Vietnamese fishermen that were found next to the Paracels by Chinese authorities, and severe attacks against Vietnamese fishing ships took place. To reinforce the territorial claim, the Chinese government has encouraged the growth of its small population in the island known as Yongxing by building a hospital, a library, an airport and by providing mobile telephone coverage to the people settled there, establishing a primitive form of city. Now Beijing is planning to construct a school, that will be attended by approximately forty children. c. Pratas Islands Image from http://www.iks.tw/bq9p/qth.htm 7 Also known as Dongsha Islands, the Pratas Islands are three uninhabited islets organized in an atoll in the South China Sea. Only the largest one, Pratas Island is always above the sea level. The islands are situated next to China’s coast, being approximately 340 km from Hong Kong. Despite the Chinese claims, the Pratas are currently administered by Taiwan (Republic of China). The main natural resources that can be found are minerals, salt, guano, but the atoll is also important for its rich fishing grounds and for its strategic military position. The islands were included within China’s borders in 1730 during the Qing dynasty. In 1909, a stone marker was placed by the governor of Guangdong (China) on Tungsha Island, the largest in the atoll, to restate Chinese control over the Pratas. The atoll was occupied by Japan in 1939, while the second Sino-Japanese War was taking place, and they began to be administered by Taiwan, that between the end of the first Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the end of World War II (1945) was a Japanese territory. After that, the control passed to the Guangdong province in the Republic of China. Although after the Chinese Civil War, the only territory controlled by the Republic of China was Taiwan, while the People’s Republic of China had sovereignty over all Mainland China, including the province of Guangdong, the jurisdiction over the Pratas was given to Taiwan. After receiving sovereignty over the atoll, Taiwan began to construct on it. After building a national monument in 1989 to symbolize Taiwanese control over the atoll, a hospital, a power station, a library and a fishermen service station that provides them with emergency shelter were built on Pratas Island. The most important building is, however, the 1,500 meter long Pratas Island Airport, used for military purposes. d. Scarborough Shoal Image from http://chinadailymail.com/2012/05/18/philippine-president-stopped-veterans-protest-tour-toscarborough-shoal/ Scarborough Shoal is located in the South China Sea, 124 nautical miles to the coast of the Philippines (falling in Filipino EEZ), the nearest landmass, and 472 nautical miles from the Chinese coast. It is currently under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, but it is also claimed by Taiwan (Republic of China) and by the Philippines. The main natural resources of the islands are guano and rich fishing grounds. It is estimated that 80 percent of the petroleum Japan imports from the Middle East passes next to Scarborough Shoal. 8 Both China’s and Taiwan’s claims are supported by historical records, according to which the shoal was explored by Chinese sailors in late 10th century. The Philippines, instead, demand sovereignty over the area due to evidence coming from 60 ancient maps dating back to 1136, which show the position of the shoal with respect to Philippine borders and due to the distances proposed by the UNCLOS. The first nation to prove its interest was the Philippines, that in 1965 constructed an iron tower next to the shoal, and since then, it began gaining control over the area. Between 1996 and 2012, Filipino Navy ships have spotted and arrested several Chinese fishermen and poachers found in Scarborough Shoal, accused to have infringed international sea law. In 2012 tensions arose, also due to the fact that China was deploying vessels in the disputed area. A 2 months standoff occurred when a Filipino Navy ship found illegally collected coral, clams and sharks inside eight Chinese vessels next to Scarborough Shoal, but could not arrest the Chinese fishermen because Beijing sent there two surveillance ships. The Filipino ship withdrew when a third Chinese ship reached the shoal. Since then, the Philippines has lost control over the disputed area. e. Macclesfield Bank Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macclesfield_Bank Macclesfield Bank is one of the largest atolls in the world, composed by underwater reefs situated in the China Sea, between the Paracels, the Pratas, the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal. It is controlled by the People’s Republic of China, but it is also claimed by Taiwan (Republic of China). It is not clear whether the Philippines are also claiming the Bank, which lies just outside Filipino EEZ, but they have protested Chinese claim because, according to the UNCLOS, a fully submerged territory is not subject to sovereign claims. Like in the other disputed islands, fishing grounds can be found around Macclesfield Bank. 9 f. Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Image from http://japanfocus.org/site/view/3877 This group of five uninhabited islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese and as Diaoyu in Chinese, is situated in East China Sea, within the EEZ of China, Taiwan and Japan. They are currently administered by Japan and claimed by the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (Republic of China). The islands are rich in fishing grounds and, potentially, in oil and natural gas. The island group, under the name Diaoyu, was first mentioned in Chinese books dating back to the 15th and 16th centuries, during the Ming Dynasty. In 1895, after the first Sino-Japanese War lost by China, Japan won sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and all of its islands, including the Senkaku group. The islands were then leased to a Japanese entrepreneur, Tatsushiro Koga. Later on, in 1932, four of them were sold to Koga’s son Zenji, who abandoned the business in 1940, However, after the defeat in World War II, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which came to force in 1952, it was decided that Japan had to leave all the Chinese territories it had invaded, including minor islands. The treaty, however, did not mention the Senkaku group. Between the end of World War II and 1972, the USA controlled the disputed islands. Before leaving the territories in 1972, the United States signed an agreement, the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, according to which they would have returned the Ryukyu islands to Japan. Although the agreement was unclear about transferring the sovereignty over the Senkaku islands to Japan, the government of Tokyo de facto began administering the islands when the Americans withdrew. The Senkaku returned to Koga, who sold them to the Kurihara family. After staying silent for more than a century, Taiwanese and Chinese claims became only concrete after 1969, year in which the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific discovers potential oil and natural gas reserves in the South and East China Sea. In 1972, both governments declared the right to own the Senkaku islands, and in 1978, 100 Chinese fishing boats were found next to the island group. In response to this, in the same year a Japanese nationalist group built a lighthouse on one of the islands and it also built another lighthouse in 1996. Between 2002 and 2012, several accidents took place due to protests organized by Chinese activists and due to Chinese fishing boats entering the area. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku islands from the Kurihara family for 2.05 billion yens. 10 g. James Shoal Image from http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1200564/pla-navy-amphibious-task-force-reachesjames-shoal-near-malaysia. James Shoal is an underwater uninhabited bank in the South China Sea, situated south of the Spratly Islands 50 miles from Malaysia and 1100 miles from Chinese coast. It is claimed by Malaysia, and, despite the distance, by the People’s Republic of China and by Taiwan, as it lies in the southernmost area of the 9-Dashed Line. The bank is not controlled by a specific country, although China has sent several times military ships to James Shoal with the intent of asserting Chinese sovereignty over the disputed area. Malaysia is, however, also conducting activities near the bank: the Royal Malaysian Navy regularly patrols the areas claimed, and the country has developed economic activities in them, most importantly the exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits located in maritime regions around James Shoal. h. Natural resources The main reason why the nations involved in the China Sea dispute are trying to obtain sovereignty over the island groups is because they are all rich in three natural resources: Guano: bird excrement that is an effective fertilizer and that is also employed in the production of soap. Fishing grounds: the China Sea holds areas that are among the most prosperous fisheries in the world. This natural resource plays a very critical role in this issue, especially because the nations involved are the top fish-consumers in the world, and they are therefore pushed to find new fishing grounds to respond to the demands of their increasing populations. The parties involved, particularly China, the Philippines and Viet Nam, continue using the seas around the disputed islands for fishing. Several times it happened that a country imprisoned fishermen coming from another country, guilty of fishing in their “territorial waters”, despite the fact the islands are, in theory only, under the jurisdiction of no one, as they have the status of disputed territory. A similar problem arises from nations building on these islands: how can they build something in a territory that has never been assigned to them? Oil and natural gas resources 11 Image from http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10651. In 1969, the United Nations Committee for Coordination of Join Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) released a report according to which hydrocarbon deposits may be present in the China Sea area. After this event, all nations reinforced their territorial claims, and the small and uninhabited islands disputed reacquired importance. According to American studies in the region, 11 billion barrels of oil are estimated to be in the South China Sea, and 200 million in the East China Sea. 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are estimated to be in the South China Sea, and between 1 and 2 in the East China Sea. However, it is hard to rely on these numbers as they are only estimates. Moreover, the estimates are significantly different depending on the country that has studied the reserves. An example can be that according to Chinese estimates, there are up to 250 trillion cubic feet in the East China Sea only. Many nations have already built oil rigs in the disputed areas, which led to an escalation of tensions. Among all, China is the most active in this ambit. Its population is growing at an incredible pace, and so is growing their needs for what concerns energy, as projected by the US Energy Information Administration in the following image. Indeed, from May to July 2014, a standoff took place between China and Viet Nam, as China established an oil rig in disputed waters. Consequently, in December 2014, Viet Nam, like the Philippines, asked the PCA to judge the case. Conflicts like this are becoming very common in the area. As a result, the nations involved are increasing their expenditure in military, to keep up with the 175% increase in Chinese military spending since 2003. 12 Images from http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs. 13 IV. Major Parties Involved and their Views a. The People’s Republic of China Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China. Claims: not specified; the entire area encompassed by the 9-Dashed Line and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. The claims over the China Sea it put forth refer back to the territories that used to be part of the ancient Chinese empire, and does not coincide with the agreements of the UNCLOS, which was also signed by the People’s Republic of China. Chinese determined attitude, which does not leave so much space for mediation, is also interpreted as a means used by the Communist Party to acquire the consent of the population, showing that China is a nation able to defend its interests. “The dotted line of the South China Sea indicates the sovereignty of china over the islands in the South China Sea since ancient times and demonstrates the long-standing claims and jurisdiction practice over the waters of the South China Sea”, Zheng Zhenhua, Chinese diplomat. With regards to the situation in the East China Sea, relations between China and Japan have worsened after the Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku islands, which is not recognized by the People’s Republic. “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and adjacent islets which have been China’s inalienable territory since ancient times.” China’s foreign minister, 2009. b. Japan Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan. 14 Claims: Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Japanese official said “we did not give in to the Chinese demand of acknowledging the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkakus.” Japan, indeed, claims the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands due to both historical reasons and to the agreements of the UNCLOS. However, its position on the issue is very firm: the nation does not accept the idea a territorial dispute is going on for the control over the archipelago as it sees the Senkaku Islands completely as part of Japan, and that were stolen by China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. As said in a document released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “the Senkaku Islands are indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan […] Japan will act firmly and calmly to maintain its territorial integrity.” c. The Philippines In light green members of ASEAN. Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines. Claims: Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal as part of Philippine EEZ. The Philippines are strongly claiming the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal as they lie just few miles away from their coast. Its major enemy in the dispute is the People’s Republic of China, and it has started an arbitration case at the PCA. As said by Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario “With firm conviction, the ultimate purpose of the Memorial is our national interest. It is about defending what is legitimately ours. It is about securing our children’s future. It is about guaranteeing freedom of navigation for all nations. It is about helping to preserve regional peace, security and stability. And finally, it is about seeking not just any kind of resolution but a just and durable solution grounded on International Law”. The Philippines can count on the support of the United States, their ally, as it has been demonstrated in several agreements between the two parties concerning the China Sea disputes. 15 d. Taiwan (Republic of China) Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan. Claims: the islands within the 9-Dashed Line they are already controlling, such as Taiping in the Sptratlys, and their 200 nautical miles EEZ, that would de facto make Taiwanese claim be over all the islands also requested by the People’s Republic of China. To understand the claims of Taiwan, it is important to understand its history. Until 1949, the territories that now form the People’s Republic of China were united into the Republic of China. In that year, the Chinese Civil War took place, which was fought between the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. The lattest turn to be the winner, and the nationalists evacuated to the island of Taiwan. Taipei became the temporary capital of the Republic of China. The communists, who had conquered all of mainland China, claimed control over Taiwan as well, declaring the end of the Republic of China. Although some reconciliation measures have lately taken place between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, the second one still suffers from political isolation. China does not recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and thus has made pressures on other countries not to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Moreover, while the People’s Republic of China is represented at the United Nations (being a P5 member nation), the Republic of China is not anymore, after having been expelled in 1971 with the UN recognition of the Communist Chinese government. Therefore, this is the reason why Chinese and Taiwanese claims start from the same basis, as they both claim to be the true heir of the pre Civil War China. The main island controlled by Taiwan is Taiping, and the government is determined in affirming Taiwanese control over it. An airstrip has been built already, and another one has been projected. The island is very important for the government of Taipei because it has fresh water supplies, and so it can be considered inhabitable. This, in turn, would give Taiping an EEZ of 200 nautical miles like any other ordinary inhabitable land. However, the Republic of China is beginning to fell threatened by the militarization of Viet Nam in the neraby Spratly Islands, as the following sentences show: “Viet Nam may plan to deploy these portable missiles to reef islets closer to Taiping Island or mights carry them on patrol boats to within striking range. In such a scenario, our military transport aircraft heading to Taiping Island would be directly threatened.” (The Taipei Times). This, in turn, is leading to a militarizion of Taiwan. Indeed, as said by Johnny Chiang, legislator of the Chinese Nationalist Party ruling the Republic of China, “we must flex our firepower muscle there to deter such threats. Therefore, I request the military to station one or two Tuo Jiang corvettes at the Taiping base on a long-term basis.” 16 e. Viet Nam In light green members of ASEAN. Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam. Claims: Spratly Islands and Paracel islands due to both historical reasons and UNCLOS agreements. Viet Nam’s major enemy in the South China Sea is the People’s Republic of China, and thus it has allied itself with the Philippines, to defeat this common enemy. Indeed, Viet Name has submitted a position paper to the PCA after that China has refused to participate in the case filed by the Philippines, as it claimed that the Court could not arbitrate a Chinese territory. The SinoJapanese relations have lately worsened, particularly after that Vietnamese protests took place following the placing of a Chinese oil rig near the Paracel Islands within Vietnamese EEZ. f. Malaysia In light green members of ASEAN. Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia. Claims: James Shoal and Malaysian EEZ with a proper continental shelf extension. Malaysian claims over the South China Sea are in contrast with the requests of the People’s Republic of China. However, unlike the other members of ASEAN, Malaysia has not shown opposition to Chinese ships patrolling the disputed waters. Malaysian defense minister Hishammuddin Hussein has indeed declared in an ASEAN meeting that “just because you have enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies” referring to China, and that Beijing “can patrol every day, but if their intention is not to go to war”. Together with Brunei, Malaysia is a nation that tends to deescalate tensions in the area rather than considering the territorial dispute an issue of national concern. 17 g. Brunei In light green members of ASEAN. Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brunei. Claims: their 200 nautical miles EEZ and two submerged reefs in the Spratly Islands that lie within it. In 1984, Brunei released several maps in order to describe its claims in the South China Sea. In these maps, a rectangular EEZ also encompassing a small portion of the Spratlys was drawn. However, according to the UNCLOS, the claim over the two features requested by the sultanate, Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, becomes problematic, because they are both fully submerged during high tide. Despite this strong interest, Brunei has never formalized its demands. Brunei has had conflictual relations with Malaysia, which started in 2003 due to Malaysia’s claim on the two reefs and to its will to exploit natural resources in Brunei’s EEZ. In 2009, a secret agreement between the two parties was signed. It is believed, due to subsequent declarations, that it described Malaysian acceptance of Brunei’s EEZ and claim over Louisa Reef and Rifleman’s bank in exchange of the mutual right to exploit the hydrocarbons that Malaysia had claimed in 2003. Unlike the other nations involved, Brunei has silently supported China, as it has not opposed its 9-Dash Line claim except for the areas also claimed by the sultanate, and it has supported a quiet approach to the issue, asking for peace and mediation. h. ASEAN Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_Southeast_Asian_Nations. Regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes, the ASEAN has assumed the role of a mediator to promote peace and stability in the region, as shown in its Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Through this association, the countries involved can unite their forces to counter Chinese strong claims over all the region. 18 i. United States of America Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States. The United States of America play a fundamental role in the disputes in the China Sea area. Indeed, it is very likely that, in case of an escalation of tensions leading to an armed conflict, the United States will participate. The most likely scenario for American intervention is if their ally, the Philippines are attacked by China, which would automatically enforce the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 between the two allies. However, the United States also have direct interests in this issue: Ensuring freedom of navigation and observance of international law: American military and commercial ships are daily navigating in the South China Sea area, despite the fact Beijing had always contested this American presence. The main controversy lies in the interpretation of the UNCLOS, which was, however, not signed by the United States. While China claims a nation cannot conduct military operations within another country’s 200 nautical miles EEZ, according to the United States and to most nations this is possible. Economic interests: the United States are wishing to establish an atmosphere of détente in the China Sea due to economic reasons. Out of $5.3 trillion of maritime trade, $1.2 trillion is controlled by Washington. It is clear that, in case of a conflict, these numbers will drop, and this would mean a major economic loss for the United States. Protecting Sino-American diplomatic relations: the United States’ will is to avoid a conflict, especially if they stand on the opposite side of China. Instead, they want to preserve dialogue because they don’t want to become Beijing’s enemies, as cooperation between the two parties is fundamental in finding agreements concerning several other issues. “All claimants have a responsibility to clarify and align their claims with international law. They can engage in arbitration and other means of peaceful negotiations.” (John Carry, US Secretary of State) “Any nation with a claim has the right to assert it, but they do not have the right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion.” (Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State). 19 j. United Nations Image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations. The UN has not assumed a clear position on the issue of the China Sea area yet. However, it obviously support the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and thus tends to reject historicallybased claims. V. Past Treaties and agreements a. Potsdam Declaration, 1945 Link to full text http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. The Potsdam Declaration, issued by the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and Republic of China on July 26, 1945, is the result of the Potsdam Conference and gave an ultimatum to Japan concerning its surrender in World War II. As pointed out by Chinese Premier Li Kequiang, the document states that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”, which meant giving up all the other occupied territories to China. However, the fact that the Declaration does not mention at all the Senkaku Islands is a major issue. On one hand Japan believes it has the right to control the archipelago because it was not mentioned in the Potsdam agreements, and, in any case, it could have been part of “the minor islands”. On the other hand, China claims that, since the Senkaku Islands were not addressed, they fall in the group of features that Japan had to return to Beijing. b. Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 Link to full text http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm. The Treaty of San Francisco was a peace treaty between Japan and the Allies, signed in 1951. Its purpose was to officially end the Empire of Japan, as Tokyo gave up most of its oversea territories. Japan abandoned its rights to the islands and territories occupied pre and during World War II, such as Taiwan, the Spratly Islands and the Pescadores. Other islands, such as the Ryukyu islands, became US trusteeship. Again, like the Potsdam Declaration, the Treaty of San Francisco did 20 not address the question of the Senkaku Islands. Japan argues that the archipelago was included in another island group that also obtained the status of US trusteeship, as said in Article III. China disagrees and claims that the treaty did not give the United States control over the Senkaku Islands. c. Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 1971 The purpose of Okinawa Reversion Treaty, signed on June 17, 1971 by the United States and Japan was to return the territories mentioned in the Article III of the Treaty of San Francisco (which were controlled by the Americans) to the government of Tokyo, in exchange for military access to Okinawa. It is therefore critical to understand whether or not the Senkaku Islands were implied in Article III of the Treaty of San Francisco. If yes, then Japan can be considered the legal owner of the archipelago. d. Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951 Link to full text http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm. The Mutual Defense Treaty was an agreement signed on August 30, 1951 between the United States and the Philippines. According to the agreement, if one of the two parties is attacked, the other needs to give him its support. The Mutual Defense Treaty plays an important role in the China Sea Dispute, because the People’s Republic of China knows that, in case an armed SinoPhilippine conflict occurs, it will possibly fight a war against the United States. e. Joint Statement China and Philippines, 1995 Link to full text http://en.people.cn/english/200005/16/eng20000516_40943.html. A Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines was signed in Manila in 1995, outlining possible cooperation for the 21st century. The agreement was an attempt aiming at the de-escalation of tensions in the South China Sea area, and its major points are: The ongoing disputes should not harm the Sino-Philippine relations, and should be addressed peacefully and taking into consideration equality. An atmosphere of peace should be established in the China Sea area, asking both parties to reject the use of force in territorial and maritime disputes. Parties should aim at negotiations to resolve disputes. f. ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002 Link to full text http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2002%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Conduct%20of%20Parties%20in %20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf. 21 The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed in 2002 by the 10 ASEAN nations and by the People’s Republic of China. The aim of the declaration was to ease tensions, asking all the involved nations to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means” refraining from using force. The declaration asked for the establishment of a code of conduct to “further promote peace and stability in the region”, which was, however, never written. The main weakness of the agreement was the fact that it was non-binding, and therefore in the last years many of the countries involved in the China Sea dispute have resorted to military aid. VI. Possible Solutions In order to establish détente in the China Sea area, it is critical to end the disputes. This task is, however, hard to accomplish due to the organization of the Security Council, in which China has veto power. It is true that the People’s Republic is likely to refuse resolutions that do not guarantee Chinese sovereignty over all the territories within the 9-Dashed Line, but it is also true that the primary focus of all nations is to de-escalate the tensions created in the last years, and therefore, through negotiations, all the parties involved will be able to come to an agreement. The islands of the China Sea can be divided between the disputers in many different ways, but the most important thing is to decide whether historically-based claims or international treaties are more valid in determining a country’s sovereignty over a territory. If you are representing a nation that trusts in international agreements and laws, then it is important that you plan to elaborate a new treaty similar to the UNCLOS but specific to the situation in the South China Sea. Indeed, although the UNCLOS has been a very successful agreement in demarcating a country’s waters, it has not helped resolving disputes over maritime regions and islands. Additionally, it is also important that nations come to an agreement for what concerns a binding Code of Conduct, advocated in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties but never achieved, for all nations involved in the China Sea dispute. Organizing a meeting between all the parties involved would be a great attempt to begin a process of negotiation, especially because most of the nations have not formally declared their claims in the China Sea yet, which could lead to misunderstandings and possible tensions. However, while the process of determining each disputers’ territories may take a lot, it is vital that two things immediately occur: a significant demilitarization, if not complete, of all the disputed regions, and the ratification of an agreement concerning the exploitation of the natural resources found in the China Sea. Especially in the case of the possible natural gas and oil deposits, it is very important that the countries next to the sea collaborate for the development of this potential source of wealth, that can bring huge benefits to the region. 22 VII. Bibliography “1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement.” Wikipedia. June 2, 2014. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1971_Okinawa_Reversion_Agreement. “2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” National University of Singapore. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2002%20Declaration%20on%20the%20Conduct%20of%20Parties%20in% 20the%20South%20China%20Sea-pdf.pdf. Avendaño, Christine O. “China rejects arbitration anew.” Inquirer. December 8, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/115232/china-rejects-arbitration-anew/. Bader, Jeffery A. “The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity.” Brookings. February 6, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-chinanine-dash-line-bader. Cahoon, Ben. “Paracel Islands – Spratly Islands.” World Statesmen. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Paracel_Spratly.html. Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Obama’s Dangerous South China Sea Strategy.” The National Interest. October 21, 2013. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-dangerous-southchina-sea-strategy-9265. Chen, Sharon. “Malaysia Splits With Asean Claimants on China Sea Threat.” Bloomberg. August 29, 2013. Accessed January 13, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-28/malaysia-splits-with other-asean-claimants-over-china-sea-threat.html. “China and the United Nations.” Wikipedia. January 2, 2015. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_and_the_United_Nations. “China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict.” CNN. June 28, 2011. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/27/china.vietnam.timeline/. “China’s Maritime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/. “China, Philippines Sign Joint Statement.” People’s Daily. May 17, 2000. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.people.cn/english/200005/16/eng20000516_40943.html. “China to build school in contested Paracel Islands.” BBC. June 15, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27856082. “China.” Wikipedia. January 9, 2015. Accessed January 11, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China. Collinson, Gary and Christopher B. Roberts. “The role of ASEAN.” Australian National University. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief-7.pdf. Del Callar, Michaela. “PHL map exhibit debunks China’s claim over Panatag Shoal.” GMA News. September 12, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/378760/news/nation/phl-map-exhibit-debunks-china-sclaim-over-panatag-shoal. Drifte, Reinhard. “The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – Between ‘shelving’ 23 and ‘dispute escalation’.” Global Research. July 28, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-japan-china-confrontation-over-the-senkakudiaoyu-islandsbetween-shelving-and-dispute-escalation/5393760. Dunnigan, James. “China Tries to Avoid Another War.” Strategy Page. September 16, 2011. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/China-Tries-To-Avoid-Another-War-9-162011.asp. E., Albert. “Pratas Islands.” Military Analysis. March 27, 2013. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://militaryanalysis.blogspot.it/2013/03/pratas-islands.html. “East China Sea.” Eia. Accessed January 11, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs. “Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/fact_sheet.html. “Geography: South China Sea.” The Republic of China Yearbook. 2002. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.poklad-jazyka.cz/Zeme(2/mapa/Asie/Vy(1chodni(1_Asie/Taiwan/Yearbook2002/chpt015.htm. Glaser, Bonnie S. “Armed Clash in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 2012. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883. Gold, Michael. “Taiwan considers permanent armed ships for disputed South China Sea island.” Reuters. October 16, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/16/ustaiwan-soutchinasea-idUSKCN0I509I20141016. Hamzah, B. A. “China’s James Shoal Claim: Malaysia the Undisputed Owner.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. July 1, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsispublication/rsis/chinas-james-shoal-claim-malaysia-the-undisputed-owner/#.VLQuctLF-So. Hollis, Daniel. “United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982.” The Encyclopedia of Earth. February 26, 2013. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/156775/. “How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties.” BBC. November 10, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139. Hung, Joe. “Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.” The China Post. June 22, 2009. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joehung/2009/06/22/213223/Sovereignty-over.htm. “James Shoal.” Wikipedia. September 3, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Shoal. “Japan to deploy ships after China detected drilling in disputed waters – report.” RT. July 18, 2013. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://rt.com/news/japan-china-disputed-islands-271/. Keck, Zachary. “Japan Has Not Recognized Senkaku Island Dispute.” The Diplomat. November 11, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/japan-has-not-recognized-senkakuisland-dispute/. Kivimaki, Timo. War Or Peace in the South China Sea? NIAS Press, 2002. https://books.google.it/books?id=CNVf9R_L5FAC&dq=guano+south+china+sea&source=gbs_navlinks _s. Lee, Ivy and Fang Ming. “Deconstructing Japan’s Claim of Sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.” 24 Asia-Pacific Journal. December 31, 2012. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://japanfocus.org/site/view/3877. “Macclesfield Bank.” Wikipedia. October 19, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macclesfield_Bank. Markwith, Taylor. “Scarborough Shoal between China and the Philippines: Climate Change’s Role” American University Washington DC. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/scarborough.html. “Mutual Defense Treaty Between RP & USA” Chan Robles Virtual Law Library. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm. “Mutual Defense Treaty (US – Philippines)” Wikipedia. August 21, 2014. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Defense_Treaty_(U.S.%E2%80%93Philippines). Nguyen, Hong Thao. “Vietnam’s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels & the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims.” Accessed January 6, 2015. http://southeastasiansea.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/vietnams-position-on-the-sovereignty-overthe-paracels-the-spratlys-its-maritime-claim.pdf. O’Reilly, Brendan. “Li Makes his Potsdam Declaration.” Asia Times. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-280513.html. “Paracel Islands.” Encyclopedia Britannica. July 21, 2013. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/442423/Paracel-Islands. “Paracel Islands.” Wikipedia. December 21, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands. Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Vietnam a Growing Threat to Taiwan’s South China Claims: Report.” The Diplomat. December 31, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/vietnam-agrowing-threat-to-taiwans-south-china-sea-claims-report/. “Potsdam Declaration.” National Diet Library. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. “Potsdam Declaration.” Wikipedia. December 23, 2014. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potsdam_Declaration. “Pratas Islands.” Wikipedia. October 23, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratas_Islands. “Q&A: South China Sea dispute.” BBC. May 8, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. Ren, Xiao. “Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes – a view from China. East Asia Forum. November 4, 2013. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/11/04/diaoyusenkaku-disputes-a-view-from-china/. Santos, Matikas. “UNCLOS explained: Why China’s claims in South China Sea are invalid.” Inquirer. February 28, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/99689/unclosexplained-why-chinas-claims-in-south-china-sea-are-invalid/. “Scarborough Shoal standoff: A timeline.” Inquirer. May 9, 2012. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline/. 25 Schwarck, Edward. “China vs. America: The ‘Freedom of Navigation’ Debate.” The National Interest. August 21, 2014. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-vs-america-thefreedom-navigation-debate-11116. Scoville, Ryan. “Japan: ‘No Dispute’ Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu.” The Diplomat. December 24, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/japan-no-dispute-on-the-senkakudiaoyu/. “Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands – Chronology.” Global Security. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku-chronology.htm. Smith, Jennifer. “Why is China building an artificial island large enough for an airfield in disputed South China sea waters?” Daily Mail. November 25, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2846176/China-building-island-large-airfield-disputedsouth-sea-waters-satellite-images-workers-expanding-archipelago-military-bases.html. “Spratly Islands: China denounces Vietnam, Philippines over volleyball and soccer games, claims Vietnamese ramming ships.” News. June 12, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-09/chinese-ships-rammed-1400-times-by-vietnamesevessels/5510802. “Spratly Islands.” CIA. May 28, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.html. “Spratly Islands dispute.” American University Washington DC. May, 1997. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/spratly.htm. “Spratly Islands dispute.” Wikipedia. December 19, 2014. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands_dispute. “Spratly Islands.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/561209/Spratly-Islands. “Spratly Islands.” Wikipedia. December 30, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands. Storey, Ian. “Testing Brunei’s resolve over China.” ISEAS. December 10, 2012. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/is10dec12.pdf. “Summary of UNCLOS and the South China Sea event.” Washington Foreign Law Society. June 5, 2013. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://wfls.org/news/summary-of-unclos-and-the-south-china-sea-event/. “Taiwan profile.” BBC News. November 24, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia16164639. “Taiwan.” Wikipedia. January 12, 2015. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan. “Territorial Disputes: Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.” Easy Timeline. Accessed January 6, 2015. https://sites.google.com/site/easytimeline/territorial-disputes-diao-yu-senkaku-islands. Thai, Michael. “Who Owns the Paracel Islands?” The Hypermodern. July 23, 2009. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.thehypermodern.com/2009/07/23/who-owns-the-paracel-islands/. Thayer, Carl. “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick: What is Malaysia Playing At?” The Diplomat. February 28, 2014. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/speak-softly-and-carry-a-bigstick-what-is-malaysia-playing-at/. 26 “The Senkaku Islands.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed January 12, 2015. http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000018519.pdf. Tiezzi, Shannon. “Taiwan Will Not Cooperate With China in South China Sea.” The Diplomat. May 15, 2014. Accessed January 11, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/taiwan-will-not-cooperate-with-chinain-south-china-sea/. Tiezzi, Shannon. “The Philippines’ UNCLOS Claim and the PR Battle Against China.” The Diplomat. April 1, 2014. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-philippines-unclos-claim-and-thepr-battle-against-china/. “Timeline: China Japan island dispute.” News. August 19, 2012. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-19/an-japan-china-timeline/4208770. Tordesillas, Ellen T. “Justice Carpio: China’s 9-dashed line – grand theft of Global Commons.” Yahoo News. September 9, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. https://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/theinbox/justice-carpio-chinas-9-dashed-line-grand-theft-of-100032136.html. “Treaty of Peace with Japan.” Taiwan Documents Project. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm. “Treaty of San Francisco.” Wikipedia. January 3, 2015. Accessed January 16, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_San_Francisco. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” IMO. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Legal/Pages/UnitedNationsConventionOnTheLawOfTheSea.aspx. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” United Nations. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Van Loi, Luu. “The Historical and Juridical Title of Vietnam – Period After 1884.” Paracel and Spratly Islands Forum. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://paracelspratlyislands.blogspot.it/2008/01/historicaland-juridical-title-of-vn_18.html. “Vietnam repeatedly established sovereignty over the Paracels, Spratlys during French colonial rule (part 2).” Thanh Nien News. July 12, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-repeatedly-established-sovereignty-over-theparacels-spratlys-during-french-colonial-rule-part-2-28386.html. Viray, Patricia Lourdes. “China bares first book on 9-dash line.” Philstar. September 11, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/09/11/1367888/china-bares-first-book-9dash-line. Wu, Shincun and Keyuan Zou. Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation. Ashgate Publishing, 2013. https://books.google.it/books?id=LrHqtmweI6oC&dq=fishing+grounds+china+sea&source=gbs_navlin ks_s. Xu, Beina. “South China Sea Tensions.” Council on Foreign Relations. May 14, 2014. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790. Yee, Chan Kai. “Philippine president stopped veterans’ protest tour to Scarborough Shoal.” China Daily Mail. May 18, 2012. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://chinadailymail.com/2012/05/18/philippinepresident-stopped-veterans-protest-tour-to-scarborough-shoal/. “Z28X – Pratas Island.” FSXDB. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://fsxdb.com/Airports/Details/Z28X. 27
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz