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BicameralismandtheBalanceofPowerinEULegislativePolitics1
-AmieKreppel,UniversityofFlorida
ThetransformationoftheEuropeanParliament(EP)fromaconsultativeassemblyto
legislativedecisionmakerhasbeenwelldocumented(Rittberger,2003,2008;Kreppel,
2002;Priestly,2008).Theimpactofsuccessivetreatyrevisionsonitsabsoluteandrelative
powersisalsowellestablished(Hix,2002;Tsebelis,1994).Whathasbeenlessthoroughly
explored,however,isthebroadereffectoftheinstitutionalevolutionoftheEP,andin
particulartheimpactontheotherkeyactorsintheEUpolicyprocess.Thisresearch
analyzestheinfluenceofthedevelopingbicameralstructureoftheEUonthecharacterof
inter-institutionalrelationshipsandlegislativesuccessoftheEP,CouncilandCommission.
Inparticular,theroleofinter-institutionalpolicypreferencecongruenceandcoalition
formationonthepolicyprocessisexaminedtogainnewinsightsintotheEUpolicy
process.
AlthoughtheEuropeanParliamenthasbeentheinstitutionmostoftenandmostdirectly
impactedbypasttreatyreforms,thechangestotheinstitutionalbalanceofpowerintheEU
havenotaffecteditalone.Indeed,changestothelegislativeprocessesoftheEUare
generallyunderstoodtohaveforcedincreasedcollaborationbetweentheEPandthe
Council(CostelloandThomson,2013;Kreppel,2011;FarrellandHéritier,2004)andto
havereducedtheagendasettingpowersandlegislativeinfluenceoftheCommission
(KreppelandOztas,2016;GarrettandTsebelis,Garrett,1995).However,theextentto
whichsharedpreferencesandpolicycoalitionsbetweenthesethreeinstitutionsimpact
theirlikelysuccessinobtainingtheirpreferredpolicyoutcomesremainslargely
unexplored.2Thisresearchaimstofillthislacunabydirectlyexaminingtheimpactof
policypreference(in)congruencebetweentheCommission,EPandCouncilonlegislative
success.
ToplacethisanalysisiscontextIfirstprovideashortreviewoftheevolutionoftheEPand
thehistoryofitstransformationfrom‘talkingshop’tolegislativechamber.Thisisfollowed
byasurveyofexistingresearchonthistransformationanditsimplicationsfortheroleof
theEPandtheEU’sdecision-makingprocessmoregenerally.Thisisfollowedbya
theoreticalinterpretationoftheresultsoftheEP’sinstitutionalevolution,includingthe
developmentofseveralhypothesesregardingthechangingcharacterofinter-institutional
relationships.Thehypothesesarethentestedempiricallyintheempiricalanalysissection
afterthedataandmethodsemployedarepresented.Thefinalsectionconcludes.
TheEmergenceofBicameralismintheEU
WhentheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)wascreatedin1957itlargelyborrowed
theinstitutionalstructuresofitspredecessor,theEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity,
1Paperpreparedforthe15thBiennialConferenceoftheEuropeanUnionStudiesAssociation,May4-6,2017,
Miami,Florida
2Mostanalysesfocusontherelativeincrease/decreaseinlegislativeinfluenceofoneortheotherinstitution,
ratherthantheimpactofcollaborationorcoalitionsbetweenthethreeinstitutions.
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albeitwithsomenotableadjustments.3ThismeantthattheAssemblyoftheECSCwas
adaptedtoserveasthenew‘CommonAssembly’–recognizingthatthissingleinstitution
wouldserveastheconsultativeassemblyfortheECSCaswellasthenewEECandEuratom.
TherewereafewsignificantchangestotheAssembly,however.Foremostamongthemwas
thedecisiontoincludeaprovisioninthenewtreatyrequiringthedirectelectionofits
members(Art.138(3)).4Thoughitultimatelytookmorethan20yearstofullyimplement
thistreatyrequirement,itsimportanceinthetransformationoftheEPfromconsultative
assemblytolegislativechambercannotbeoverstated.5Since1979theEuropean
ParliamenthasbeentheonlydirectlyelectedinstitutionoftheEuropeanUnion,providing
itwithauniqueclaimtodemocraticlegitimacyandinmanyoccasionsresultinginpressure
ontheotherinstitutionsandthememberstatestoincreaseitsrelativepowers.
AstheEuropeanEconomicCommunityevolvedtobecometheEuropeanCommunities
(SingleEuropeanAct)andeventuallytheEuropeanUnion(MaastrichtTreaty)thebreadth
anddepthofthepolicydomainsbeingintegratedattheEuropeanlevelincreased
substantially.Thisledtoincreasingconcernsregardingwhathascometobeknownasthe
EU’s‘democraticdeficit’(Neunreither,1994;Katz,2001;AndersonandEliassen,1996,
Lodge,1994).Whilethetrueextentofthedemocraticdeficitandindeedevenitsactual
existencehavebeendebated(Majone,1998;Moravcsik,2002;Cromez,2003;Coultrap,
1999),concernsregardingthedemocraticcharacteroftheEUhavehadasignificantimpact
ondecisionsregardingtheevolutionoftheEP.TheParliament’suniqueclaimtoadirect
linkwithvotershasledtoalinkagebetweenitslegislativeempowermentandareduction
inthedemocraticdeficit.
ThefirstclearexampleoftheimportanceofEPelectionscamein1980whentheEuropean
CourtofJusticeruledinsupportoftheEP’srightofconsultationholdingthatwhen
consultationwascalledforbythetreaties(Art.173EEC;nowArt.263TFEU)theCouncil
hadtowaitfortheEP’sopinionpriortotakingadecision(RoquetteFrèresvCouncil,Case
138/79).ThisdecisioncamejustafterthefistdirectEPelectionsandunderscoredthenew
legitimacyoftheEP.6Theso-calledIsoglucosedecisioneffectivelygrantedtheEPan
3Inparticular,theEECtransformedthe‘HighAuthority’oftheECSCintothelessgrandiose‘Commission’of
theEECandtoday’sEU.Italsomodifiedtheprevious‘SpecialCouncil’intothemoremundane,though
ultimatelymorepowerful‘CouncilofMinisters.’
4Previously,undertheECSCTreatymemberstatescouldopttohavetheirmemberstotheAssemblydirectly
electedratherthanappointedbythenationalparliaments(Art.21),butnostateeverchosetoimplementthat
option.
5DespitethefactthattheRomeTreatycalledforthedirectelectionofthenewAssembly,andrepeated
effortsbytheEPtopushfortheirimplementation,ittookthememberstatesuntil1976toadoptaprocedure
toimplementthisrequirement(OJL278,8.10.1976).Electionswereultimatelydelayeduntil1979toallow
forfullratificationandimplementationofthenewprocedurebyallmemberstates.
6ThetextofthejudgmentincludesthestatementthattheconsultationprovidedforinArticle173“isthe
meanswhichallowstheParliamenttoplayanactualpartinthelegislativeprocessoftheCommunity.Such
powerrepresentsanessentialfactorintheinstitutionalbalanceintendedbytheTreaty.Althoughlimited,it
reflectsatCommunitylevelthefundamentaldemocraticprinciplethatthepeoplesshouldtakepartinthe
exerciseofpowerthroughtheintermediaryofarepresentativeassembly.”(RoquetteFrèresvCouncil,Case
138/79)ascitedinTeasdale,2012,ThePenguinCompaniontoEuropeanUnion(2012).
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indirectpoweroflegislativedelayincertainpolicyareas(Kreppel,2002).Althoughonlya
negativepower,thissignaledthebeginningoftheEP’sdirectlegislativeauthority.
ThenextincreaseinthelegislativeroleoftheEPcamewiththeintroductionofthe
CooperationProcedureintheSingleEuropeanAct(1987).Thoughinitiallyapplicableonly
tosinglemarketinitiatives,andrelativelyshortlivedasacorelegislativeprocedure,the
CooperationProcedurewasacriticalinnovationinthatitgavetheEPtheabilitytodirectly
offeramendmentstolegislativeproposals.7ThepolicydomainoftheCooperation
procedurewasexpandedbytheMaastrichtTreaty(1993),butmoreimportantly,this
treatyintroducedtheCodecisionProcedure.Asthenameimplies,theCodecisionProcedure
increasedthedecision-makingauthorityoftheEPgrantingitvetopoweroverpolicyby
grantingittheabilitytorejectproposalsdefinitively(requiringthattheCommissionreinitiate)andcreatingaconciliationcommitteetomanagedifferencesbetweentheEPand
theCouncil.Thoughthereweresomequestionsregardingtherelativeeffectivepolicy
influencegrantedbythetwolegislativeproceduresinitially(Tsebelis,1994,1996;Moser,
1996;TsebelisandGarrett,1997;Scully,1997),intheendthecodecisionprocedure
becamedominant,eventuallybeingtransformedintothe‘OrdinaryProcedure’inthe
LisbonTreaty.8
Whiletheexpansionofthecooperationprocedureanditseventualreplacementbythe
Codecision(nowOrdinary)Procedureundoubtedlyhaddirectpositiveeffectsonthe
relativelegislativepoweroftheEP,intheend,itmaytheinclusionofthe‘conciliation’
stageundertheCodecisionprocedurethattrulyalteredthecharacteroftheEUlegislative
branch.Untilitsintroduction,uptoandincludingundertheCooperationProcedure,theEP
wasgenerallyrequiredtodealwiththeCouncilindirectlythroughcollaborationwiththe
Commissioninitsroleas‘honestbroker.’TheCommission’sintermediaryrolegrantedita
mechanismfordirectengagementinthelegislativedecisionmakingprocessafter
initiation,despitethefactthatitlacksanyformaldecisionmakingpowers.9The
introductionofaformalconciliationprocessduringwhichtheEPandCouncilengage
directlyhelpedtofacilitategreaterinteractionbetweenthetwochambersofan
increasinglysymmetricalbicamerallegislativebody.DirectengagementbetweentheEP
7Itshouldbenoted,however,thatEPamendmentswereonlydifficultfortheCounciltoignoreifthe
Commissiontookthemup,thusrequiringunanimityintheCounciltochangethem.
8EnroutetothistransformationtheCodecisionprocedurewasmodifiedbytheAmsterdamTreatytocreate
whatisknownasCodecisionII.Theprimarydifferencebetweenthetwoversionsoftheprocedurewasthe
removaloftheabilityoftheCounciltosimplyreconfirmitsprevious‘commonposition’duringthe
conciliationprocess.SeeHix,2002foradditionaldetailsregardingtheevolutionofthecodecisionprocedure.
9TheCommissiondoeshavethenegativepowerofwithdrawal,asupheldintherecent(2015)decisionofthe
EuropeanCourtofJustice(CaseC‑409/13).ThisallowstheCommissiontowithdrawabillfromconsideration
beforetheCouncilhasacteduponit(Art.293(2)TFEU).Ingeneral,theexpectationisthattheCommission
willdothisonlywhenthereisnofeasiblewinningcoalitionfortheproposal,butrecenteventssuggestthat
theCommissionmayalsotrythispathwhenitfeelstheCouncilandEParestrayingtoofarfromthegoals
originallyintendedinitsproposal.Thepotentialimpactofearlyagreements(discussedbelow)remains
unclear.Inparticular,whetherornotanearlyagreement‘counts’asCouncilaction.
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andtheCouncilwasfurtherencouragedbytheinclusionofthepossibilityofdefinitively
adoptinglegislationafterthefirstreadingiftheCouncilfullysupportedtheEP’sposition.10
Thepossibilityoffirst-readingadoptionoflegislationopenedthedoortowhathavecome
tobeknownas‘earlyagreement’decisions.Earlyagreementsareachievedwheninformal
triloguesbetweenrepresentativesfromtheEPandtheCouncil(withrepresentationfrom
theCommissionpresentaswell)negotiateafinalagreementonthedetailsofaproposal
priortotheformalfirstreadingintheEP.ThisallowstheEPtointroducetheagreed
compromiseduringitsfirstreadingandtheCounciltoadoptitwithoutamendment,
resultinginthebillbeingadoptedatfirstreading.Overtimerecoursetoearlyagreements
hasincreasedsubstantially,withrecentanalysessuggestingthatnearly85%ofall
decisionsundertheordinaryprocedureareachievedthroughtheearlyagreementprocess
(Bressenelli,KoopandReh,2015:92).Whilethereareanumberofdifferent
interpretationsoftheimpactofthecurrentuse(abuse)oftheearlyagreementprocedure
intermsofitsimpactontransparencyandthedemocraticlegitimacyoftheEUlegislative
process(Reh,2014;Costa,DehousseandTrakalova,2011;Rasmussen,2011;Reh,Héritier,
Bressanelli,2013),thereislittledebateregardingitseffectoninter-institutionalrelations.
ThedevelopmentofstronginstitutionalandpersonallinksbetweentheCouncilandtheEP,
inconjunctionwiththeformalchangestothelegislativeprocedure,haveresultedina
EuropeanParliamentthatismuchlessdependentontheCommissionfortheachievement
ofitspolicygoals.Thebulkoflegislativebargainingnowformallyandinformallyoccurs
directlybetweentheCouncilandtheEP.Thequestioniswhetherornotthishashadany
effectonpolicypreferencecongruenceandcoalitionstrategiesbetweenthethree
legislativeinstitutions.
UnderstandingInter-institutionalRelationsintheEU
Analysesofinter-institutionalrelationswithintheEUhavehistoricallyfocusedonthe
ideologicalcharacteroftheinstitutionsratherthenrelativepowerdynamics.Theimplicit
assumptionintheliteraturehasgenerallybeenthattheEPandtheCommissionform
coalitionsbecauseoftheirsharedsupranationalcharacterandsubsequentpro-integration
policypreferences,whiletheCouncil,andlatertheEuropeanCouncil,representthe
interestsofthememberstates,andare,therefore,moreskepticalofinitiativestoincrease
integration.Thus,alliancesformonthebasisofthesupranationalandintergovernmental
characteroftheinstitutionsthemselves.Thisassumptionisevidentinmostspatial
models/representationsofEUdecision-making,whichexplicitlyplacetheCommission
betweentheCouncilandtheEPalonganaxisofmoreorlessintegration(Tsebelis1994,
1997;Kreppel,1999;2000;Thomson,2009,2011).11
10Thedevelopmentofamechanismtoallowearlyagreementswasintroducedbyaresolutionwithinthe
EuropeanParliamentin1995andeventuallyincludedintheAmsterdamTreatyin1999(nowArt.294TFEU).
Recoursetofirstreadingorearlyagreementsdidnotreallybegintogrowuntilafter2004however.
11Therehavebeensomeeffortstoexaminedecisionmakingfromamorepartisanperspectivebasedonthe
standardleft-rightideologicalaxis,however,mostoftheselookatbehaviorwithininstitutions,ratherthan
betweenthenthem.SeeforexampleHixetal,2007ontheEPandHagemanandHoyland,2008onthe
Council.
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Thisinterpretation,however,hasbothimplicitlyandexplicitlybeenbasedatleastinpart
onthemediatingroleoftheCommissioninthelegislativeprocess.Asthe‘guardianofthe
treaties’andan‘honestbroker’betweenbothmemberstatesandEUinstitutions,The
Commissionhashistoricallyhadalegislativerolethatextendedwellbeyondthetechnical
introductionofpolicyinitiatives,despitetheabsenceofanyformalroleinthedecisionmakingaspectsofthepolicyprocess.Thedecliningimportanceofthehonestbrokerrole
andreductionindirectengagementafteraproposalhasbeeninitiatedhasfundamentally
underminedtheseinterpretationsofinter-institutionalcoalitionbehavior(Kreppeland
Oztas,2016;CostelloandThompson,2013;TsebelisandGarrett,2000).
Asaresult,thecharacterofinter-institutionalrelationships,withinandbeyondthe
legislativeprocess,hasbecomethefocusofaspateofnewresearch.Forthemostpart
theseanalysestendtofocusonthevariouspossibledyadicrelations(e.g.EP-Commission,
EP-Council)ratherthanexaminingthenexusofrelationsbetweenallthreelegislative
institutions.ThosethatreflectonthechangingcharacterofEP-Commissionrelationstend
tofocusonthechangingpowerdynamicbetweenthetwo,andinparticulartherelative
increaseinthepoweroftheEP(FarrellandHeritier,2007;Moury,2007;Stacey,2003).
Others,however,underscorethenaturalaffinitybetweenthepolicyinterestsoftheEPand
Commission(Rosén,2016;Ebeberg,GornitkaandTrondal,2014).Theseanalysesreflect
earlyinterpretationsthatfocusonthesupranationalcharacterofthetwoinstitutionsand
theirgeneralsupportformore,ratherthanlessintegration.Whatdistinguishesthese
analyses,however,isthattheyinterprettheempowermentoftheEPasapossiblenet
benefitfortheCommission.Thus,theCommissionisunderstoodtohaveanincentiveto
encourageEPempowermentwithinspecificissueareasinwhichtheEPislikelytosupport
CommissioninitiativesduringnegotiationswiththeCouncil(Stacey,2003),particularlyif
doingsowillservetoincreasetheperceivedlegitimacyofEUdecisions(Rosén,2016).
Fromthisperspective,theformalempowermentoftheEP,evenpotentiallyattheexpense
ofCommissionpower,isintheinterestsoftheCommissionifthetwoinstitutionsshare
policypreferencesandiftheEPcanserveasavaluableallyvis-à-vistheCouncil.
AnalysesofthechangingrelationshipbetweentheCouncilandtheEParefewer,andtend
tofocusonthedevelopmentofincreasedformalandinformallinkagesbetweenthetwo
institutions.Inmostcasestheunderlyingquestioniswhymemberstateshavedecided
(repeatedly)toincreasetheEP’slegislativepowers,despitethelikelypreference
divergencebetweentheEPandtheCouncil.Theanswersrangefromdiscussionsof‘logic
ofappropriateness’argumentsfocusedonreducingthedemocraticdeficitandengaging
withsocialnormsregardingdemocraticgovernancetoanalysesof‘incompletecontracts’
andunintendedconsequences(Pogge,1997;Hix,2002;Katz,2001,Crum,2005)
RegardlessoftheexplanationsprovidedforwhytheEPhasbeengrantedincreased
legislativeinfluence,theconclusionisthatitsempowermenthasresultedinanecessary
increaseindirectformalandinformalcollaborationandcooperationbetweenitandthe
Council.
Themostvisiblereflectionthisistheemergenceofearlyagreementsasthedefactonorm
oftheEUlegislativeprocess(FarrellandHéritier,2004;DeRuiterandNeuhold,2012;Reh
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etal,2013;Bressanellietal,2015).12Effortstoexplainthehighlevelofapparent
consensusbetweentheCouncilandtheEP(asevidencedbythedramaticincreaseinthe
useofearlyagreements)arelargelyinstitutionalistincharacter(MühlböckandRittberger,
2015).ThesegenerallyfocusonthepragmaticneedofbothinstitutionsfordecisionmakingefficiencyandthecostsoffailurefortheindividualinstitutionsandtheEUasa
whole.Bothlegislativechambersbenefitfromsuccessfulpolicyinitiativesandareharmed
bypublicfailurestoagreeonmechanismsforpursuingthebestinterestsoftheEU.Thus,
despitethelonghistoryofinter-institutionalcontestationandtheirdiverse
representationalintereststheCouncilandtheEPhaveincentivestoworkcooperativelyto
achievethosepolicyoutcomesthatarefeasibleasefficientlyaspossible.
ThelonghistoryofformalandinformalincreasestothelegislativepowersoftheEPleads
naturallytothegeneralexpectationsthattheEPwillbebothmoreinvolvedandmore
influentialinthepolicymakingprocessoftheEU.TheimpactofthisexpansionofEPpower
ontheotherlegislativeinstitutionsislessobvious,particularlyintermsoftherelations
betweenallthree,asopposedtoaspecificdyad.Despitethegeneral,thoughnotuniversal,
interpretationthatincreasedEPpowershaveledtoadecreaseinCommissioninfluence,it
isnotallclearwhatthisresultmightmeanintermsofinter-institutionalcoalition
dynamicsbetweentheEPandtheCommission.13IftheEPandtheCommissioncontinueto
sharepolicypreferencesasaresultoftheirgeneralsupranationalcharacteristicsthenit
maynotmatterwheretherelativebalanceofpowerlies,aslongastheyworktogether
cooperatively.Ontheotherhand,iftheabilityoftheEPtomakethemostofitsincreased
legislativepowersrequiresthatitworktofindagreementswiththeCouncil,attheexpense
ofsomepolicyprioritiessharedwiththeCommission,thentheempowermentoftheEP,
combinedwiththeconcomitantmarginalizationoftheCommissioninthedecisionmaking
stageofpolicymaking,clearlyreducesthepolicymakingroleoftheCommission.
TheramificationsoftheEP’sincreasedlegislativepowersontheCouncilareevenlesswell
understood.Thoughitisclearthatthereisanincreasinglyhighlevelofcollaboration
betweentheCouncilandtheEPaswitnessedbythedominanceofearlyagreements,the
impactontherelativedecisionmakingpowersofthetwoinstitutionsislessclear.Under
the(revised)codecisionprocedure(nowtheordinaryprocedure)theEPandtheCouncil
areformallyequalsinthelegislativeprocess.Thiswouldsuggestthattheyareequallyable
toextractcompromisesandconcessionsfromeachotherduringthelegislativeprocess.14
However,thereiscurrentlylittleempiricalresearchtotestthisargument.15
12Thereare,however,otheranalysesthatexaminethedevelopmentofpotentialpartisanlinkagesbetween
thetwoinstitutions(vianationalparties)andthepotentialimplicationsforEP-CouncilrelationsandEU
policy-making(Mühlböck,2013;Kreppel,2013).
13Thepowerdynamicmaynotneedtobeinterpretedaszero-sumifabroaderinterpretationofthepolicymakingprocessisemployed.Forexample,iftheCommissionrequiredEPengagementtoimprovethe
legitimacyofitspolicyinitiativesthenboththeEPandtheCommissionbenefitfromtheincreaseinEP
decisionmakingauthority(Rosén,2016)
14ThereissomeanalysisthatsuggeststhatchangestotherulesoftheEPthatprovidegreatertransparency
regardingEPpositionsduringtheinformaltrilogiesthatproceedearlyagreementshasactuallyledto
informationasymmetriesthateffectivelyreducethebargainingpoweroftheEP(HéritierandReh,2012).
15Becauseoftheinformalcharacterofearlyagreementsitisactuallyincreasinglydifficulttoattemptto
evaluatewhois‘winning’duringthenegotiationprocess.Itmaybethatinthefuture,becauseoftheEP’s
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TogaingreaterinsightintotheimplicationsoftheempowermentoftheEPontheinfluence
oftheCommission,CouncilandEPonthepolicyoutcomesoftheEUandthepatternsof
policypreferencecongruenceandinstitutionalcoalitionformationbetweenthemI
introduceaseriesofhypothesesderivedfromtheliterature.Thesefocusonthechanging
powerdynamicsbetweenthecorelegislativeinstitutionsandtheirlikelyimplications.The
hypothesesarethentestedempiricallyutilizingseveralexistingdatasetstoevaluatethe
extenttowhichincreasedEPpowerhasalteredthecharacterofinter-institutionalcoalition
buildingintheEUpolicyprocess.
ChangingPatternsofInter-institutionalCoalitionBuilding
Themostobviousconclusionfromacrosstheliteratureisthatthedirectlegislative
authorityoftheEPhasincreasedsubstantiallyoverthelastthreedecades.Asaresultofthe
introductionofaninformalpowerofdelayfoundedinitsowninterpretationofthe
Isoglucoseruling,throughthegradualexpansionofitsformallegislativepowers,and
becausetheconcomitantshiftintheperceptionoftheEP,ithasbeentransformedfroman
externalobserverofthelegislativeprocessdependentuponCommissionsupportforits
positionstoanautonomouspolicyentrepreneurco-equalwiththeCouncilinmostpolicy
realms.Thus,theEPisnolongera‘conditional’actorinthepolicyprocessandnolonger
reliantonthegoodwilloftheCommissiontofurtheritspolicypreferences.
H1–ThedirectlegislativepoweroftheEPhasincreasedresultingingreater
independentpolicyinfluenceandautonomyfromtheCommission.Asaresult,theEPis
lessreliantoncoalitionsbasedonpolicypreferencecongruencewiththeCommission
foritssuccessinachievingitspreferredlegislativeoutcomes.
DespitethegeneralshiftinthestandingoftheEPthroughoutitsinter-institutional
relationswiththeCommissionandtheCouncil,formalpowersdomatter.Asaresult,itis
anticipatedthattheincreaseintheEP’sautonomouspolicyinfluencewillbegreaterunder
thoselegislativeproceduresinwhichithasformaldecision-makingauthority(Codecision
andtheOrdinaryProcedure).
H1a–ThepolicyinfluenceoftheEPishigherunderthecodecision/ordinaryprocedure
leadingtoahigherprobabilityofachievingitspolicyobjectivesunderthisprocedure.
IncontrasttotherisingindependenceoftheEP,theCommissionhasfounditselfinan
increasinglycontingentpositioninthelegislativeprocess.Thoughitmaintainsitsunique
statusastheformalinitiatorofallEUlegislation(includingdecisions,directivesand
regulations),itabilitytocontrolthecharacterandcontentoftheeventualoutcomeof
policymakinghasdiminished.TheCommissionislessabletoshapeEPpolicycontributions
sincetheEPcansimplyofferitsamendmentsdirectlywithoutthemediatingroleofthe
Commission.Inaddition,thepreviouscentralityofthe‘honestbroker’roleofthe
Commissionhasbeenprofoundlydiminishedbytheincreasingrecoursetoinformal
negotiationsandearlyagreementsbetweenCouncilandEP.Asaresult,theautonomous
internalrulesregardingformallyapprovedEPnegotiatingpositionsthatitwillmorefeasibletoevaluate
negotiatingpositionswithfinaloutcomestoassesrelativesuccess,atleastfortheEP.
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influenceoftheCommission,beyondtheinitialactofinitiation,hasbeenreducedleading
toagreaterrelianceonsharedpolicypreferencesfortheachievementofitspolicygoals.
H2–ThepoweroftheCommissiontoobtainitspolicyobjectivesisindirectandrelies
onitsabilitytoformcoalitionswiththelegislativedecisionmakers(theEPandthe
Council)asaresultofpolicypreferencecongruence.
ThisreductioninCommissioninfluenceisespeciallyapparentwhenpoliciesaredecidedby
earlyagreementsbetweentheCouncilandtheEP.Despitethenormofholdinginformal
triloguesthatincludetheCommissionduringnegotiationsbetweentheCouncilandtheEP
priortotheadoptionofearlyagreements,thereducedroleoftheCommissionduringthis
processisevidentbytheneartotalabsenceofanydiscussionoftheroleoftheCommission
inthespateofrecentanalysesofearlyagreements(Rehetal,2013;Bressanellietal,2015;
seealsothediscussioninKreppelandOztas,2016).
H2a–EarlyagreementsdiminishthelegislativeinfluenceoftheCommissionresulting
inreducedabilitytoachieveitspolicygoals.
InadditiontofundamentallyrestructuringtherelationshipbetweentheEPandthe
Commission,thechangingcharacteroftheEPanditsrelativelegislativepowershas
resultedinashiftintheinter-institutionalrelationsbetweentheEPandtheCouncil.
Despitethemonikerof‘parliament,’thelimiteddecisionmakingpowersoftheEP,
combinedwiththesomewhathybridcharacteroftheCouncillongdelayedageneral
understandingoftheEUinstitutionalstructure.DespitethebroadacceptanceoftheEU’s
legislativebranchasbicameral,andlargelysymmetrictoday(Konigetal,2007;
Rasmussen,2011;Kreppel,2011;CostelloandThomson,2011),itwasnotuntilthelate
1990sthatthetermbicameralismwasevenappliedtotheEU(TsebelisandMoney,1997).
Thebroaderinstitutionaleffectsofsymmetricbicameralismarewellunderstood
(DiermeierandMyerson,1997;TsebelisandMoney,1997;Heller,2007).Mostimportant
amongthem,ofcourse,istheneedforbothlegislativechamberstoagreetoadoptpolicy
initiatives.Undertheordinarylegislativeprocedure(andthepreviousrevisedCodecision
Procedure)neitherchambercanformallydominatetheother,meaningtheymustagreeor
beabletofindacompromiseornopolicycanbeadopted(andthestatusquoremains).
H3–TheEUisbicameralincharacterthus;theboththeEPandtheCouncilwillbe
morelikelytoachievetheirlegislativeobjectiveswhentheirpolicypreferences
converge.
DespitethedramaticincreasesinlegislativepowerobtainedbytheEPsincethelate1980s,
itremainsinsomeregardsthejuniorpartnerinthelegislativegame.Partiallythisisthe
resultofsomepolicyareasfallingoutsideoftherequirementforfullyequaldecisionmakingbetweentheEPandtheCouncil.16GiventhattheEPisgenerallymoreinfavorof
16Themostobviousarenaisofcourseforeignpolicyissuespreviouslyhousedintheso-calledsecondpillar.
Butevenoutsideofthislimitation,therearespecificpolicyareasnotfullygovernedbythe‘ordinary’
procedureasoutlinedinArticle294TFEU.Thesearedecidedunder‘specialprocedures’(Article289TFEU)
andincludedecisionsregardinginternalmarketexemptionsandcompetitionlaw,aswellassomeaspectsof
intellectualpropertyamongothers.
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integrationthantheCouncilthiscanresultinabargainingadvantagefortheCouncilsince
theEPwillgenerallybewillingtoacceptsome(evenmarginal)integrationoverno
integration(frequentlythedefaultstatusquoposition).Thus,therelativeproximityofthe
Counciltothestatusquocreatesapowerimbalanceinspiteoftheformaldecision-making
rules.However,boththeperceiveddemocraticlegitimacyoftheEPandtheabilityofthe
CommissiontouseitsformalpowerofinitiationstrategicallysuggestthattheCouncilwill
finditmoredifficulttoobtainitsgoalswhenthetwosupranationalactorssharepolicy
preferences.
H4–TheCouncilretainsahighlevelofautonomyinlegislativedecision-making,but
canbenegativelyimpactedbyEP-Commissioncoalitions.TheabilityoftheCouncilto
achieveitspolicyobjectiveswillbereducedwhentheCommissionandEPsharepolicy
preferencesthatdifferfromthoseoftheCouncil.
Aspoliciesbecomeincreasinglysalient,thewillingnessofeitherofthetwolegislative
chamberstoconcedetheirpositionswilldecrease.Asaresultpolicypreference
congruencebetweentheEPandtheCouncilwillbeincreasinglyimportantintermsofthe
likelihoodofthetwolegislativechambersultimatelyachievingaanagreementonpolicy
outcomes.
H4a–HighpolicysaliencywillincreasetheimportanceoftheEP-Councilcoalitionin
determiningpolicyoutcomes.
WhilepreviousanalysesofEUdecision-makinghavetendedtoassumeanatural
supranationalcoalitionbetweentheEPandtheCommission,thisresearchlooksinsteadat
thelikelyimpactofthefundamentalchangeinthecharacteroftheEPonitsinterinstitutionalcoalitionpatternsandtheimpactofpolicypreferencecongruence.Ratherthan
assumingthattheEPandCommissionsharepolicypreferences,andthatthispolicy
preferencecongruenceshapestheEUlegislativeprocess,thisanalysisexaminespreference
congruencebetweenthethreecorelegislativeactorsandtheimpactofdifferentcoalition
patternsthatresult.Inparticular,thisresearchinvestigatesthepotentialimpactofthe
needforincreasedEP-Councilcollaborationasaresultoftheincreasinglysymmetrical
characteroftheEU’sbicamerallegislativebranch.Totestthehypothesesoutlinedabove
threeexistingdatasetsondecisionmakingontheEUarepartiallymergedandemployedin
evaluatingthepatternsofinter-institutionalcoalitionformationandtheirimpactonthe
policyprocess.
DataonDecisionMakingintheEU
Oneofthelargestdifficultiesinmeasuringtherelativeinfluenceofpoliticalactorsonthe
policyprocessisevaluatingtheirpreferencesoveroutcomes.Formalpowersand
ideologicalpositions(howevermeasured)provideonlyalimitedabilitytoimpute
preferencesandevaluateinfluence.17Oneoftherareexceptionstothisconundrumisthe
17Awidevarietyofmeasuresincludingelitesurveys(Bakkeretal,2012)andpartymanifestodata(Merzet
al,2016)areavailabletoinferpartypositionsacrossaspectrumofpolicyissues.
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Decision-makingintheEuropeanUnion(DEUII)datasetdevelopedbyThomsonetal.
(2012).Thisuniquedatasetprovidesinformationonatotalof331controversialissues
includedwithin125differentlegislativeproposalsthatwereintroducedbetween1996and
2008.Foreachspecificpolicyissuethedatasetidentifiestheoutcome(ona0-100point
scale)preferredbyeachofthekeylegislativeactors(e.g.theCommission;theEPandthe
memberstates'intheCouncilofMinisters).18Thus,theDEUIIdatasetprovides
informationonthepolicypreferencesoftheinstitutionalactorsaswellasfinaloutcomes
alongaunifiedscaleallowingforcomparisonsbetweenboththepreferencesofvarious
institutionalactorsandbetweentheinitialpreferencesofeachactorandeventual
outcomes.19
AsusefulandwidelyutilizedastheDEUIIdatasetis,thereareanumberofpotential
weaknessesandcritiques.Themostobviousweaknessfromtheperspectiveofthis
researchisthatthedatasetdoesnotincludeanydataafter2008,whichmeansthereisno
informationregardingthepotentialimpactoftheLisbonTreatyandtheadoptionofthe
‘ordinaryprocedure’withitsconcomitantexpansionofEPinfluenceacrossawideareaof
newpolicyareas.Asaresulttheconclusionsofthisresearchmustbeinterpretedas
preliminary,reflectingthecharacterofinter-institutionalrelationshipsandpolicyinfluence
beforethechangeswroughtbytheLisbonTreatywentintoeffect.Giventhesubstantial
expansionofEPinfluenceundertheLisbonTreaty,theresultsdiscussedhereshouldbe
seenasindicativeoffuturetrendsratherthananassessmentofthecurrentsituation.
Additionalconcernsaretiedtothecharacterofthedatasetitself.Theseincludethe
selectionanddispersionofelitesinterviewed(veryfewarefromtheCouncilstaffandoften
preferencesofactorsareimputedbyothersratherthanprovideddirectly).Inaddition,the
0-100pointscaleislooselyassumedtomeasuredegreeofintegrationbasedonthedegree
ofchangefromthecurrentstatusquoposition(0beinglestand100beingmost
change/integrationist),howevernotallissueareasareeasilyplacedonthisaxisandthe
significanceofthedifferencesinpositionbetweenissuesmaynotbeconsistent.Sincezero
alwaysrepresentstheleastintegrationist(leastchange)positionand100themost
integrationist/changedpolicypositiontherelativevalueofactorpositionsareintrinsically
tiedtothedynamicsofeachspecificpolicyarearatherthansomeabsolutemeasureofpro
orantiintegration/changeposition.Thismakesaggregateanalysismorechallengingasthe
relativevalueofpositiondistancesarenotconsistentacrosspolicyareas.20Asthisanalysis
doesnotfocusonthecharacterofthepolicypreferencesofthevariousactorsintermsof
relativesupportforintegration/change,butrathertheextentandcharacterofinter
18Thisdatawascollectedthroughalaboriousprocessthatincludednearly350semi-structuredinterviews
withkeyactorswithintheEUlegislativeprocessfromacrossthethreerelevantinstitutionsoveraperiodof
severalyears.
19TheDEUIIdatasetincludesinformationfortheEPandtheCommissionasunitaryactorsandinformation
onthepreferencesofthemajorpartygroupswithintheEP(thoughthelatterhasahigherlevelofmissing
data).InadditionitprovidesinformationonthepreferencesofeachofthememberstateswithintheCouncil
ratherthanaunifiedpositionfortheCouncilasawhole(Thomsonetal,2012).Inthisanalysis,following
fromKreppelandOztas,2016,weuseasinglemeasurefortheCouncilderivedfromthemeanoftheir
individualpreferences.
20Foramorein-depthanalysisoftheseandotherconcernsregardingtheDEUIIdatasetseeSlapin,2014.
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institutionalpreferencecongruence,coalitionsanddistancesbetweenpreferencesandthe
eventualpolicyoutcome,thisislessofaconcernhere.21
Inadditiontotheinformationregardingthepreferencesofthevariousactorsprovidedby
theDEUIIdataset,thisanalysisincorporatesadditionalinformationregardingthe
characterofthepoliciesanalyzedandthepotentialroleofpartisanideologicalproximity.
WhiletheDEUIIprovidesinformationonthelegislativeprocedureemployedandthe
saliencyoftheissueforthevariousactors,itdoesnotprovideadditionalinformationon
thecharacterofspecificissuesorlegislativeproposals.Asanadditionalmeasureofthe
changingcharacterofinter-institutionaldecision-makingseveraladditionalvariableshave
beenaddedtothebaseDEUIIdataset.Inallcasestheadditionalinformationisavailable
onlyforpoliciesadoptedunderthecodecisionprocedure,asaresultanalysesthatinclude
thesevariableshaveasmallerN(theexactnumberdependsonthespecificvariables
included(seebelow).
Giventheincreasingimportanceofearlyagreementsandtheexpectationthattheselimit
theinfluenceoftheCommissionadummyvariableisaddedforallcodecisionprocedure
policiesindicatingiftherewasanearlyagreement(ora3rdreadingdecision)betweenthe
CouncilandtheEP.22Toexaminethepossibleimpactofideologicalproximityoncoalition
buildingbetweentheEPandtheCouncilavariablemeasuringtheideologicaldistance
betweentheEPrapporteurfortheproposalandthemedianpositionoftheCouncildevised
byMahrandRinge(2016)intheiranalysisofEPlegislativeinfluencewasincluded.The
saliencydataintheoriginalDEUIIdataisspecifictoeachinstitutionratherthanageneral
measureandincludesalargenumberofmissingdatapointsmakingitdifficulttoincludein
thisanalysis.Instead,analternativemeasureofsaliencybasedonnumberofrecitals
devisedbyWøienHansen(2014)aspartofananalysisfocusedonexplainingtheabsence
ofearlyagreementswasutilized.23
TheImpactofPolicyPreferenceCongruence
Theinformationonactorpolicypreferencesacrossarelativelylargenumberofissues
areasandspecificpoliciesprovidedbytheDEUIIdatasetoffersarareopportunityto
examinetheimpactofpreferencecongruenceonlegislativeinfluence.Inparticular,this
typeofinformationallowsforanassessmentoftheindependentdecision-makinginfluence
ofthevariousactors.Apoliticalhegemonwouldbeabletoachievetheirpreferredpolicy
outcomesregardlessofthepreferencesoftheotheractorsortheirrelativeproximity.In
contrast,anactorwithonlylimitedautonomouspolicyinfluenceordecision-making
authoritywouldbereliantuponpreferencecongruencewithothermorepowerfulactors
21SeebelowforadescriptionofhowtheDEUIIdatasetisutilizedinthisanalysisthroughthecreationof
categoriesratherthannominaldistances.
22ThisinformationwascollectedfromtheEuropeanParliament’swebsiteonlegislativeactivity(availableat
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/).EachpieceoflegislationadoptedbycodecisionintheDEUII
datasetwaslookeduptodetermineifadecisionwasreachedatfirstreading.Ifsoitwascodedasanearly
decision.
23Therespectiveauthorsgraciouslyprovidedthesedatasetsforuseinthisresearch.
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fortheachievementoftheirpreferredoutcomes.Byprovidinginformationaboutthepolicy
preferenceofthecorelegislativeactors,aswellastheeventualoutcometheDEUIIdata
allowsforananalysisoftherelativedependenceoftheCommission,EPandCouncilon
eachotherinthepursuitoftheirpolicygoals.
Asusefulasthisdatasetis,however,itisnotwithoutweakness–asnotedabove.Of
particularconcernistherelianceona100-pointscaleforthemeasurementoftherelative
positionsofallactors.Whilethisapproachworkedwellfortheoriginallyintendedanalysis
ofrelativebargainingpowerunderdifferentdecision-makingrulesonanissue-by-issue
basis,itdoesnoteasilyallowforreliablegeneralizationsacrossthe331issuesinthe
dataset.Theabsolutevalueofa20ptdistance,forexample,mayvarysignificantlyfromone
policyareatothenext,makingitproblematictointerpretresultsbasedonabsolute
distancesformidealpreferences.Toavoidthispotentialpitfall,thisanalysisinstead
developsasetofdichotomousvariablestomeasurelegislativesuccessandinterinstitutionalpreferenceproximity.
Thedependentvariableacrosstheanalysespresentedhereis‘legislativesuccess.’Thisis
measuredintermsofrelativeproximitytothefinaloutcome.Inotherwords,the‘winner’
ofthelegislativegameistheactorwhosepolicypreferenceisclosesttotheeventual
outcome.Ifmultipleactorshavethesamepreference,andthisistheclosesttotheeventual
outcometheyareallconsideredwinners,thustherecanbemorethanonewinnerper
policydecisionifthereisagreementbetweentwoormoreactors.Toavoidcreating
artificialdifferentiationsbetween‘winners’and‘losers’anyactorwhosepreferenceis
within±5pointsofthe‘winner’onthe100-pointDEUIIscaleisalsoconsideredtobea
winner.24Notethatutilizingthiscriterionforwinningmeansthatthedesignated‘winners’
didnotnecessarilyobtaintheiridealoutcome;theymerelygotcloserthantheotheractors.
Todeterminewhetherthevariousactorsare‘winning’thepolicymakinggameasaresult
oftheirownindependentlegislativeinfluenceorsimplyasaresultofsharingpolicy
preferenceswiththosewhohavesuchpower(luck)Iincludesetofdichotomousvariables
indicatingpolicypreferencecongruencebetweenactors.Foreachpolicyincludedinthe
DEUIIdataset,therelativepreferredpositionsoftheactorswerecompared.Actorswere
deemedtohavecongruentpreferences(apolicycoalition)iftheywerewithin±10pointsof
eachotherontheDEUII100pointscale.25Despitethefactthathepolicyareasselectedfor
theDEUIIdatasetaresupposedtobehighlycontentiousand/orsalient,therearea
numberofcasesinwhichthereisahighlevelofagreementacrossallthreeactors,a
dummyvariableforconsensuscontrolsforthiswhenallactorpreferencesarewithin±10
pointsofeachother.
24Alloftheanalysesdiscussedbelowwerealsorunwitha10-pointmarginwithessentiallysimilarresults.
TheuseofamarginforvictoryisparticularlyimportantbecausewhiletheEPandCommissionhaveunitary
scores,theCouncilscoreisanaggregatederivedfromthepositionsofthevariousindividualmemberstates,
resultinginagreaterdiversityofinstitutionalpreferencescores.
25A±5pointscalewasalsocreatedandtestedwithlargelysimilarresults.Intheend,however,thedecision
toutilizethe10-pointscalewasmadebecauseitresultedinfeweromittedcases.
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Additionalindependentvariablesareincludedtocontrolfortheimpactofthelegislative
procedure(Codecision),earlyagreementsand3rdreadingdecisions.Thesecontrolsalsotie
indirectlytoseveralofthehypothesesdescribedaboveastheyspeakspecificallytothe
anticipatedrelativeinfluenceofthevariousactors.TheEPhasgreaterformalpowerunder
theCodecisionProcedure,whiletheCommissionislargelyexcludedfromdecisionsmade
throughearlyagreements.Policyoutcomesdecidedat3rdreadingarelikelytobehighly
contentiousandcertainlyrepresentcaseswherethereislittlepolicycongruencebetween
theEPandtheCouncil.Thismayservetoincreasethenegotiatinginfluenceofthe
CommissionandordemonstratethedominanceoftheCouncil.Finally,twoadditional
variablesareincludedmeasuringthesaliencyofthelegislation(WøienHansen,2014)and
ideologicaldistance(left-right)betweentheEPrapporteurandtheCouncilmedian(MahrRinge,2016)datasets.26Thesevariablesprovideadditionalinsightintothepotentialroleof
saliencyontherelativeimpactofthevariousactorsandthepotentialimpactofideological
distancesbetweenthetwolegislativechambers.
Becausethedependentvariablesusedinallcasesaredichotomous(winning/notwinning)
logisticanalysisisemployedinallanalyses.27Foreachinstitutionaseriesoffivemodels
aretestedtoexaminetheimpactofjustpolicycongruence(Model1),policycongruence
andsimplecontrolsforprocedureandoutcome(Model2),impactofthestageatwhicha
decisionwasmade(Model3)andtwoindividualmodelsaddingtheadditionalmeasures
forsaliency(Model4)andideologicaldistancebetweenEPandCouncil(Model5).These
lastwererunindividuallybecause;despitesimilarclaimsofcomprehensivecoverage,each
wasmissinganumberofthecodecisioncasesincludedintheDEUIIdataset.Notethat
models3-5includeonlydecisionsmadeundertheCodecisionProcedureeitherbecausethe
analysisisexaminingtheimpactofearlyagreementsand3rdreadings(Model3)orbecause
theseweretheonlycasesincludedinthedatasetfortherelevantindependentvariable
(Model4andModel5).TheresultsofthestatisticalanalysesarepresentedinTable1
(EuropeanParliament),Table2(Commission)andTable3(CounciloftheEuropean
Union).Eachinstitutionwillbediscussedseparatelyandthensomeofthepatternsthat
emergeacrossinstitutionswillbeanalyzedwithreferencetoHypotheses1-4discussed
above.28
Whilethisanalysiscannoteffectivelymeasurechangeacrosstimegiventhelimitationsof
theunderlyingDEUIIdata,wecancontrolfortheinfluenceofavarietyofdifferent
variablesonthelikelihoodthattheeventualpolicyoutcomewillbeclosesttothe
26Notethatthedataprovidedinbothcasesisforthelegislativeproposalasawholeratherthanthespecific
policyissuesprovidedintheDEUIIdataset.
27Withdependentvariablesthatarediscrete(inthiscasedichotomous)andmeasureonlymembershipina
grouporcategorystandardOLSmethodsareinappropriateastheycanlead,amongotherthings,topredicted
valuesofgreaterthanoneand/orlessthanzeroandsuchvaluesaretheoreticallyinadmissiblewitha
dichotomous(0,1)variable.
28Thenumberofcasesineachmodelacrossthethreeinstitutionsvariesbasedontheinclusion(ornot)of
non-codecisiondata(Models1and2)andthelevelofmissingdatapointsforactorpreferencesintheDEUII
dataset.Notethatbecauseofthecomparativelyhighlevelofmissingdataforthe“StatusQuo”variablefor
codecisionpolicies,thisisonlyincludedinModel2.Thedummyvariableforthecodecisionprocedureisof
courseomittedfromModels3-5,whichonlyincludecodecisionlegislation.
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preferencesoftheinstitutioninquestion.BeginningwiththeEuropeanParliament(Table
1),thebasemodel(Model1)demonstratesthepositiveeffectofpolicycongruencewith
boththeCommissionandtheCouncil,evenwhencontrollingforgenerallyconsensual
policyissues.Moreover,thesignificanceofpreferencecongruencewiththeCommission
andCouncilistrueacrossallmodels.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthepositiveimpact
ofpolicycongruenceismuchstrongerfortheCouncil(EP-CEU)thantheCommission
(COM-EP).InthemostbasicmodeltheEPis1.6timesaslikelyto‘win’thepolicybattle
whenitspreferenceiswithin10pointsoftheCommission’s,butitisoverfourtimesas
likelytowhenthereisasimilarproximitytotheCouncil’spreferredoutcome.Thegreater
impactofpreferenceproximitywiththeCouncilisalsoconsistentacrossallfivemodels-
peakinginModel4(discussedfurtherbelow).
TheseinitialresultsdemonstratethattheEPisstillmoresuccessfulwhenitsharespolicy
preferenceswiththeotherinstitutions,but,asanticipatedbyHypothesis1,itspreviously
theorizedrelianceontheCommissionisnolongerascritical.Instead,asshouldbe
anticipated,itispreferencecongruencebetweenthetwolegislativebrancheswithdirect
poweroverdecision-makingthatismoresignificant,atleastfortheEuropeanParliament–
aspredictedbyHypothesis3.Thereishowever,nosupportforHypothesis1a.Indeed,the
magnitudeofpreferencecongruencewiththeCouncilactuallydecreaseswhenwecontrol
fordecisionsreachedundertheCodecisionProcedure(thus,lesssignificantfornonCodecisionbills)andthedummyforCodecisionisnotsignificant.Instead,thereisa
negativerelationshipbetweenEPsuccessandanoutcomethatapproximatestheprevious
statusquo.IndeedtheEPislessthanhalfaslikelyto‘win’thepolicygamewhentheresult
isthemaintenanceofthestatusquo(Model2).Thisislikelyreflectiveofthelongstanding
interpretationthattheEP,asasupranationalinstitution,isusuallysupportiveofpolicy
changegiventhatintheEUcontextsuchchangeisgenerallyindicativeofincreased
integration.FurtherindicationthatHypothesis1aisnotcorrectcanbeseeninModel3.
AlthoughearlyagreementshaveapositiveimpactonthelikelihoodofEPsuccess,itfalls
justshortofsignificance.Moreover,thereisanegativeimpactfor3rdreadingdecisions.
Suchdecisionsareincreasinglyrareandtheyoccuronlywhennoagreementhasbeen
possiblebetweentheEPandtheCouncilintheearlierstagesofthelegislativeprocess.The
resultsofModel3suggestthatwhensuchstrongdifferencesbetweentheCouncilandthe
EPoccur,evenundercodecision,whentheEPhasmaximalpower,theEPlosesthebattle,
withsuccess65%lesslikelythandecisionsreachedbeforethe3rdreading.
Interestingly,thesaliencyofapolicydoesnotappeartobethecauseofsuchcontention
betweentheEPandCouncilastheEPismorelikelytobesuccessfulwhensaliencyis
higher(Model4).ThesaliencyvariableisborrowedfromWøien(2014)andreflectsthe
numberofrecitalsintheoriginalCommissionproposal.29Inthesampleanalyzedherethis
rangesfrom5to49.Foreachadditionalrecitalincludedinthelegislation,thelikelihoodof
theoutcomemostcloselyreflectingthepreferencesoftheEPincreasesbyapproximately
3.7%.Itisalsonoteworthythatcontrollingforthesaliencyofanissueincreasesthe
29Therelativeimportanceofapieceoflegislationisassumedtobecorrelatedwiththespacededicatedto
justifyingitgenerallythecorefunctionoftherecitalswithinalegislativeproposal(Häge,2007;Hägeand
Naurin,2013).
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magnitudeoftheimpactofEP-Councilpolicycongruencesignificantly,withtheEPmore
than14timesaslikelytoobtainanoutcomeclosesttoitspolicypreferenceswhenthese
alignwiththeCouncil’s(Model4).Thiswouldseemtocontradicttheexpectationsof
Hypothesis4a.30Incontrast,theimpactofideologicalproximitybetweentheEP
rapporteurandthemedianCouncilmemberisnotsignificantanditsinclusionhaslittle
impactontheothervariablesincludedinthemodel(Model5).
TheresultsoftheanalysisaresimilartoacertaindegreefortheCommission(Table2).As
withtheEP,theCommissionismorelikelytobesuccessfulwhenitspreferencesalignwith
thoseoftheotherlegislativeactors.Theeffectsare,however,moresignificantinthecaseof
theCommission.WhilethelikelihoodofEPsuccessincreased1.6timeswhenits
preferencesalignedwiththeCommission,fortheCommissionpreferencecongruencewith
theEPresultsinanearlyfourtimesgreaterlikelihoodofsuccess(andnearlyeighttimes
higherwhenithaspolicypreferencecongruencewiththeCouncil(Model1).Thishighlevel
ofpolicycongruenceinfluenceisconsistentacrossallfivemodels(Table2),underscoring
thehighdegreeofCommissionrelianceonthe‘luck’ofpolicycongruencewiththeother
legislativeactorsinlinewithHypothesis2.
TheimpactoftheCodecisionProcedureandresultingincreasedcollaborationbetweenthe
CouncilandtheEPislessclear,althoughthereissomesupportforHypothesis2ainModel
4andModel3suggeststhat3rdreadingagreementsalsoresultinadecreaseininfluence
fortheCommission.TheCommissionisonlyabout36%aslikelytohavepolicyoutcomes
reflectitspreferenceswhen3rdreadingdecisionsarenecessary(Model3),thusboththeEP
andtheCommissionarelesssuccessfulwhen3rdreadingsarerequired.31Interesting,once
thesaliencyoftheproposal(asmeasuredthroughnumberofrecitals)isincludedinthe
analysis3rdreadingsfailtobesignificantandinsteadearlyagreementshavethenegative
relationshipanticipatedbyHypothesis2a.Thus,inModel4theCommissionis57%less
likelyto‘win’thelegislativeprocesswhentheCouncilandtheEPreachanearly
agreement.32
Finally,Model5presentstheinterestingresultthatincreasesintheideologicaldistance
betweentheEPrapporteurandtheCouncilmedianhaveanegativeeffectonthesuccessof
theCommission.ThissuggeststhatheCommissionnotonlyreliesonpolicycongruence
withtheothertwoinstitutionsindividually,butalsosufferswhentheyareideologically
distancefromeachother(Model5).Thisissomewhatsurprisingasitmightbeexpected
30MostlikelyIneedtointroduceaninteractivetermtolookatcongruencewhensalienceishigh.Thiswillbe
testedduringrevisions.
31Althoughthedeclineis3rdreadingagreementsisusuallyattributedtothetimecostsassociatedwiththe
drawnoutnatureofthelegislativeprocess,itmaywellbethattheEPandtheCommissiontrytoavoid3rd
readingsbecausetheytendtodolesswellwhentheprocessreachesthisstage.Alternatively,itcouldbethat
whentheEP(andCommission)knowtheyarelikelytofailtoobtaintheirpolicypreferences,theydrawout
theprocessforaslongaspossibleinhopesofsomechangeinoutcome.
32Both3rdreadingandearlyagreementvariablesaresignificantonlyatthe90%thresholdandareclearlynot
robusttochangesinthemodelspecifications.Thus,theseresultsshouldbecautiouslyinterpreted.
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thattheCommissioncouldusedifferencesbetweentheEPandtheCounciltoitsadvantage
topushitsownpolicyagenda.33
IncontrasttotheEPandtheCommission,themostnotablethingabouttheCouncilisits
relativelackofrelianceonpreferencecongruencewiththeothertwoactors(Table3).In
thebasemodel(Model1),noneofthevariablesmeasuringpreferencecongruenceare
significant.IndeedacrossallfivemodelsthereisonlyapositiveeffectinModel5whenthe
CouncilandtheEPhavecongruentpreferences(discussedbelow).Thus,despitetheEPand
Commission’srelianceonthehappycircumstanceofsharingpolicypreferenceswiththe
Council,thepolicyinfluenceoftheCouncilislargelyunaffected.34Interesting,however,the
Councilisnegativelyimpactedinsomecases(Models2and5)bypreferencecongruence
betweentheEPandtheCommission.Thus,innonCodecisioncases(Model2)andwhen
controllingfortheideologicaldistancebetweentheEPrapporteurandtheCouncilmedian
(Model5)coalitionsbetweentheEPandCouncilcanhampertheabilityoftheCouncilto
achieveitspolicygoals,lendingsomesupporttoHypothesis4.
TheseresultssuggestthatHypothesis3isonlypartiallytrue.WhiletheEPismore
successfulwhenitspreferencesaresimilartothoseoftheCouncil(Table1),such
preferencecongruencehasrelativelylittleimpactonCouncilsuccess–suggestingit
remainsamuchmoreautonomousinstitutioninthepolicyprocess.35Positivepreference
congruencebetweentheCouncilandtheEPonlyhasapositiveeffectonCouncilsuccess
whenideologicaldistancebetweenEPrapporteurandCouncilmedianisincludedinthe
analysis(Model5).
Finally,asindicatedbythediscussionoftheEPandtheCommission,theCouncilisnearly
threetimesmorelikelytobesuccessfulatobtaininganoutcomeclosesttoitspolicy
preferenceswhenthelegislationisdecidedat3rdreading(Model3).36Noothervariables
testedaresignificantforthelikelihoodofCouncilsuccess.Thisunderscorestheextentto
whichtherelativeinfluenceoftheCounciloverpolicyoutcomesremainslargely
independentofthepolicypreferencesoftheotheractorsorthesalienceoftheproposal.
Conclusions
Theanalysispresentedhereprovidesanumberofinsightsintotheemergingcharacterof
inter-institutionaldecision-makingandtheimpactofpolicypreferencecongruenceon
actor’sabilitytoachievetheirpreferredpolicyoutcomes.Asanticipated,therelative
balanceofpowerbetweentheCommissionandtheEPappearstohaveshiftedfromearlier
models.PriortotheCodecisionProcedureitwasassumedthatthepolicyinfluenceofthe
EPwas‘conditional’-effectivelyreliantuponsupportfromtheCommission(Tsebelis,
33ThisresultismademoreconfusingbythefactthatthevariableisnotsignificantforeithertheEPorthe
Councilthemselves(Table1andTable3).
34Therelationshipispositive,butfailstomeetsignificancecriteriainallcases.
35Though,ofcourse,theCouncilcanbenegativelyimpactedbycoalitionsagainstitasnotedabove.
36ThisvariablefallsjustshortofstatisticalsignificanceinModels4and5-likelyasaresultofthereduced
numberofcases.
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1994).Theanalysispresentedheresuggeststhatthispatternisshiftinganditisnowthe
CommissionthatismorereliantonpolicypreferencecongruencewiththeEPforlegislative
successbasedonthemagnitudeoftheoddsratiosreportedinTables1and2.Coalitions
betweenthetwoinstitutionsarestillimportant,however,anditappearsthatonlywhen
theypresentaunitedfrontagainstthepreferencesoftheCouncilaretheyableto
effectivelyconstraintheabilityoftheCounciltowinthepolicygame(Table3).
Thoughmorepowerfulthaninthepast,theformaladditionofpolicy‘codecision’withthe
Councildoesnotappeartohavebeensufficient(atleastthrough2008)tocreatetrulycoequalbranchesintermsofrelativepolicyinfluence.ItmaybethattheEPbetterableto
shiftpolicyoutcomestowardsitspreferencessincetheintroductionoftheCooperationand
Codecisionprocedures,butitisclearlynotabletoensureoutcomesthatareclosertoits
preferencesthanthepreferencesoftheCouncil.37ThisanalysisdemonstratesthatEP
successremainsheavilycontingentonpreferencecongruence,howevertheprimary
institutionalinterlocutorhasshiftedfromtheCommissiontotheCouncil.Theemerging
relationshipappearstobeoneofinformalbicameralasymmetry.Despiteincreasingly
equaldecisionmakingpowerswithintheformallegislativeprocedures,theEPisstillthe
juniorpartnerinthelegislativegame.GiventhestrongnegativeassociationbetweenEP
successandthestatusquo,asanoutcomeitmaywellbethatthepowerimbalancereflects
thecharacterofactorpreferences.SincetheEPpreferssomeintegrationtonone,itis
willingtoacceptanoutcomethatisclosertoCouncilpreferencesifitnonethelessincreases
EUintegration.
ThedominanceoftheCouncil,anditsrelativeindependencefromthepreferencesofthe
otherinstitutionalactorsisinlinewithhistoricalinterpretationsoftheCouncilasthe
dominantpolicyactorintheEU(Table3).Despitebeingnegativelyimpactedbyaunified
coalitionagainstinsomecases,theCouncilappearslargelyunaffectedbytheexistenceof
preferencecongruenceintermsofthebroadresultsanalyzedhere(winningornotwinning
thelegislativegame).Moreover,thecleardominanceoftheCouncilin3rdreading
agreementsprovidessomeexplanationforwhytheCommissionandtheEPmightwork
hardtoavoidthem(providinganalternativeexplanationfortheriseofearlyagreements).
Overall,thisanalysissuggestsashifttowardsbicameraldecision-makingbetweentheEP
andtheCouncil,withtheCouncilcontinuingasthedominantactorandtheCommissionan
increasinglyperipheralactor.Thetrendshighlightedhere,however,shouldbetakenonly
asindicativeofthecurrentsituationastheydonotincludeanydatafromthepostLisbon
period.Giventheuncertainresultsofthecodecisionprocedureinthisanalysisitisnot
cleariftheindependentinfluenceoftheEPislikelytohaveincreasedsincethe
implementationofthesignificantlyexpanded‘OrdinaryProcedure,”Thoughan
increasinglycontingentrolefortheCommissionseemslikely.
37BecauseofthedifficultyininterpretingabsolutedistancesintheDEUIIdatasetitisnotpossibletoprovide
areliablemeasureofEPbargainingimpactbasedonthedistancebetweenpreferencesandoutcomes.
AnalysesutilizingabsolutedistancesdosuggestthattheEPisabletopulltheCounciltowardsitsown
preferences,evenwhentheEPdoesnotultimatelywin.
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Table1:DeterminantsofEuropeanParliamentLegislativeSuccess
Model1
Model2
Model3
COM-EP(10)
COM-CEU(10)
EP-CEU(10)
Logit
Coefficient
0.497*
(0.285)
1.644*
(0.468)
Logit
Coefficient
0.778**
(0.358)
Odds
Ratio
Logit
Coefficient
Model4
Odds
Ratio
Logit
Coefficient
Model5
Odds
Ratio
Logit
Coefficient
Odds
Ratio
2.178**
(0.780)
0.757**
(0.370)
2.131**
(0.789)
0.835*
(0.445)
2.306*
(1.025)
1.069**
(0.447)
2.913**
(1.302)
-0.643
(0.545)
0.526
(0.286)
-0.466
(0.622)
0.628
(0.390)
-0.224
(0.642)
0.799
(0.513)
0.154
(0.778)
1.167
(0.908)
-0.304
(0.741)
0.738
(0.547)
1.412***
(0.405)
4.106***
(1.663)
1.193**
(0.471)
3.297**
(1.553)
1.933***
(0.631)
6.912***
(4.362)
2.642***
(0.845)
14.05***
(11.87)
2.066**
(0.875)
7.896**
(6.906)
1.147
(0.962)
3.150
(3.029)
1.562
(1.386)
4.768
(6.607)
0.585
(1.486)
1.794
(2.667)
-0.140
(1.944)
0.869
(1.689)
0.377
(1.628)
1.458
(2.373)
Codecision
-0.187
(0.322)
0.829
(0.267)
SQwin
-0.780*
(0.432)
0.459*
(0.198)
EarlyAgree
0.259
(0.372)
1.296
(0.482)
0.501
(0.438)
1.650
(0.723)
-0.159
(0.447)
0.853
(0.382)
3rdReading
-1.051*
(0.565)
0.350*
(0.198)
0.212
(0.817)
1.236
(1.010)
-0.260
(0.860)
0.771
(0.664)
Saliency(WH)
0.0367*
(0.0190)
1.037*
(0.0197)
Rapp-CEUMed.(MR)
-0.0336
(0.317)
0.967
(0.306)
-0.580***
(0.194)
274
0.560***
(0.109)
274
0.585*
(0.181)
195
-0.699**
(0.279)
165
0.497**
(0.139)
165
-1.902***
(0.631)
118
0.149***
(0.0941)
118
-0.577
(0.569)
113
0.562
(0.320)
113
Consensus(10)
Constant
Observations
Standarderrorsinparentheses
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
Odds
Ratio
-0.535*
(0.309)
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Table2:DeterminantsofCommissionLegislativeSuccess
COM-EP(10)
COM-CEU(10)
EP-CEU(10)
Consensus(10)
Model1
Model2
Model3
Model4
Model5
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Coefficient Ratio Coefficient Ratio
Coefficient
Ratio
Coefficient Ratio
Coefficient
Ratio
1.342*** 3.827*** 1.491*** 4.442*** 1.613*** 5.017*** 1.979*** 7.237*** 2.039*** 7.682***
(0.270)
(1.034)
(0.335)
(1.486)
(0.388)
(1.945)
(0.493)
(3.571)
(0.493)
(3.788)
2.064***
(0.495)
7.880***
(3.901)
2.291***
(0.586)
9.881***
(5.791)
1.934***
(0.609)
6.919***
(4.217)
1.803**
(0.769)
6.068**
(4.667)
1.674**
(0.712)
5.333**
(3.798)
-0.165
(0.407)
0.848
(0.345)
0.187
(0.459)
1.206
(0.553)
-1.174
(0.856)
0.309
(0.265)
-1.457
(1.184)
0.233
(0.276)
-0.473
(1.042)
0.623
(0.649)
-0.265
(0.686)
0.767
(0.526)
-0.795
(0.824)
0.451
(0.372)
0.126
(1.145)
1.134
(1.298)
0.653
(1.532)
1.922
(2.943)
-0.236
(1.332)
0.790
(1.052)
Codecision
-0.234
(0.317)
0.791
(0.251)
SQwin
-0.366
(0.401)
0.694
(0.278)
EarlyAgree
-0.621
(0.417)
0.537
(0.224)
-0.857*
(0.501)
0.425*
(0.213)
-0.666
(0.514)
0.514
(0.264)
3rdReading
-1.027*
(0.555)
0.358*
(0.199)
-0.806
(0.910)
0.446
(0.406)
0.125
(0.988)
1.134
(1.120)
Saliency(WH)
Rapp-CEUMed.(MR)
-0.795**
(0.363)
0.452**
(0.164)
Constant
Observations
-1.302*** 0.272*** -1.210*** 0.298***
(0.189) (0.0513) (0.282) (0.0840)
317
317
229
229
-0.00423
0.996
(0.0205) (0.0205)
-1.143***
(0.295)
173
0.319***
(0.0940)
173
-1.098*
(0.633)
122
0.334*
(0.211)
122
-0.226
(0.629)
117
0.798
(0.502)
117
Standarderrorsinparentheses
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
19
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Table3:DeterminantsofCounciloftheEuropeanUnionLegislativeSuccess
COM-EP(10)
COM-CEU(10)
EP-CEU(10)
Model1
Model2
Model3
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Logit
Odds
Coefficient Ratio Coefficient
Ratio
Coefficient
Ratio
-0.403
0.668 -0.828*** 0.437***
-0.221
0.802
(0.251)
(0.168)
(0.313)
(0.137)
(0.352)
(0.282)
Model4
Logit
Odds
Coefficient
Ratio
-0.438
0.645
(0.433)
(0.279)
Model5
Logit
Odds
Coefficient
Ratio
-0.743*
0.476*
(0.437)
(0.208)
0.570
(0.504)
1.768
(0.892)
0.116
(0.573)
1.123
(0.643)
0.371
(0.599)
1.449
(0.868)
0.339
(0.763)
1.403
(1.070)
0.147
(0.691)
1.158
(0.800)
-0.213
(0.336)
0.808
(0.272)
-0.459
(0.399)
0.632
(0.252)
0.734
(0.577)
2.083
(1.202)
0.341
(0.675)
1.406
(0.949)
2.124*
(1.182)
8.367*
(9.887)
0.0583
(0.687)
1.060
(0.728)
0.516
(0.822)
1.676
(1.378)
1.160
(1.274)
3.189
(4.063)
-
-
-
-
0.480
(1.438)
1.616
(2.324)
Codecision
0.431
(0.286)
1.539
(0.441)
SQwin
0.226
(0.356)
1.253
(0.446)
EarlyAgree
0.136
(0.357)
1.146
(0.409)
0.0226
(0.404)
1.023
(0.413)
0.294
(0.438)
1.342
(0.588)
3rdReading
1.072**
(0.514)
2.921**
(1.502)
0.483
(0.759)
1.621
(1.230)
0.655
(0.823)
1.926
(1.586)
Saliency(WH)
-0.0210
(0.0173)
0.979
(0.0170)
Rapp-CEUMed.(MR)
-0.0340
(0.303)
0.967
(0.292)
Consensus(10)
Constant
Observations
0.411***
(0.159)
318
1.509***
(0.240)
318
0.425*
(0.248)
230
1.529*
(0.380)
230
0.105
(0.254)
174
1.110
(0.282)
174
0.817
(0.548)
118
2.264
(1.240)
118
0.353
(0.557)
118
1.423
(0.792)
118
Standarderrorsinparentheses
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
20
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