Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind

Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Tyler Peterson
Leiden University Centre for Linguistics
June 18, 2012
The Nature of Evidentiality
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 1
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks if you’d like the halibut or the veal
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 1
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks if you’d like the halibut or the veal
I
What is you’re reaction?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 1
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks if you’d like the halibut or the veal
I
What is you’re reaction?
I
You order the halibut
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 2
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks you if you’d like to sing along with him
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 2
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks you if you’d like to sing along with him
I
What is you’re reaction?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 2
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks you if you’d like to sing along with him
I
What is you’re reaction?
I
Most likely surprise
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 2
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks you if you’d like to sing along with him
I
What is you’re reaction?
I
Most likely surprise
I
This event does not ‘fit’ with what we know about how restaurants
normally work: the role of a waiter is to take meal orders and serve
food
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Restaurant Context 2
You’re sitting in a restaurant. The waiter arrives at the table and
asks you if you’d like to sing along with him
I
What is you’re reaction?
I
Most likely surprise
I
This event does not ‘fit’ with what we know about how restaurants
normally work: the role of a waiter is to take meal orders and serve
food
I
You are mentally unprepared for the waiter’s deviation from this
role
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 1
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. After an hour you look
outside and see Alvin’s truck in the driveway
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 1
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. After an hour you look
outside and see Alvin’s truck in the driveway
I
What is you’re reaction?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 1
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. After an hour you look
outside and see Alvin’s truck in the driveway
I
What is you’re reaction?
I
To say to Gwen and the others ‘Looks like Alvin’s home (let’s hide)’
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 2
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
your preparations, Alvin walks through the door
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 2
I
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
your preparations, Alvin walks through the door
What is you’re reaction?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 2
I
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
your preparations, Alvin walks through the door
What is you’re reaction?
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
‘Alvin!’
‘I’m surprised you’re home so early!’
‘What are you doing here?!’
And a variety of other expressions, sentence types, or information
structure marking that we interpret as surprise
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 2
I
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
your preparations, Alvin walks through the door
What is you’re reaction?
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
‘Alvin!’
‘I’m surprised you’re home so early!’
‘What are you doing here?!’
And a variety of other expressions, sentence types, or information
structure marking that we interpret as surprise
I
This event does not ‘fit’ with our expectations of the current
situation
I
You are mentally unprepared for Alvin’s arrival
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 1
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. After an hour you look
outside and see Alvin’s truck in the driveway
(1)
Gitksan
’
nakw
=hl witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
evidential translation: ‘Looks like Alvin is here.’
I
Gwen does not actually see Alvin arrive, but that she inferred that
he is here because she has indirect sensory evidence for his presence
(his truck in the driveway)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Alvin’s birthday party: Context 2
You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect him home for another hour. However, in the middle of
your preparations, Alvin walks through the door
(2)
Gitksan
’
nakw
=hl witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
Mirative translation: ‘Looks like Alvin is here!’
I
I
’
The indirect evidential meaning of nakw
is ‘short-circuited’ in this
context: Gwen actually sees that it is the case that Alvin is here
’
’
This ‘misuse’ of nakw
does not lead to infelicity, instead, nakw
can
have a mirative translation in addition to its evidential one
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
A cross-linguistic phenomenon
I
The use of an evidential to register the surprise of a speaker –
mirativity – is a cross-linguistically robust phenomenon:
(3)
Turkish (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 159)
Kemal gel-miş
Kemal came-evid
‘Kemal came.’
(4)
Hare (DeLancey 2001: 376)
heee, gúhde daweda!
ch’ifi dachı́da lõ
hey, up.there sg.sit.3sg.imperf. guy sitting evid
“Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!”
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
A cross-linguistic phenomenon
(5)
Tsafiki (Dickenson 2000: 411)
moto
jo-nu-e
motorcycle be-evid-decl
‘It’s a motorcycle!’
(6)
Qiang (LaPolla 2003)
dýy de-ýge-ji-k
door or-open-csm-infer
“The door is open!”
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Surprise
F Surprise is both a psychological-cognitive universal and a linguistic
universal:
I
I
It is fundamentally the same for all individuals, regardless of ethnic
or cultural differences.
Every language have some means to express surprise (mirativity)
I
There is an enormous amount of experimental research on surprise in
psychology, the cognitive sciences, and even artificial intelligence
I
Cognitive science: surprise is an emotion that is elicited from the
processing of new information
I
Very little of this research says anything about the language of
surprise
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Mirativity
I
Surprise is the most prominent and salient feature of mirativity when
it used as a linguistic label
I
There are many examples of mirativity in the descriptive literature,
and many characterizations of what mirativity is supposed to be, but
its definition remains ad hoc
I
Currently, there is no link between these two research streams
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Questions
I
Taking mirativity as a linguistic category at face value:
I
I
I
I
I
What are the ingredients that define mirativity?
How can these ingredients be drawn together?
What are the factors, contextual or otherwise, that license the
mirative use of an evidential?
Why are evidentials especially suited to expressing mirativity?
Only by answering these can we ask the question: Is mirativity in
fact a linguistic category?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Goals
I
To draw a more coherent, restrictive, and consistent picture of
mirativity
1. Account for the various surprise-like definitions of the category of
mirativity
2. Focus on what licenses the mirative use of evidentials, and why
they’re use for this purpose
3. Connect these two research streams
I
To look at how pragmatic properties of evidentials may shine a light
on their static meanings
I
Underlying strategy: take a parsimonious approach, accounting for
the baseline cases
I
A starting point: surprised meaning is not entailed by and evidential,
so a non-semantic analysis is needed
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
The main claims
I
Mirativity is the linguistic reflex of the common cognitive process of
processing new (environmental) information
I
Mirative evidentials are the functionally marked use of an
evidential, as licensed by the witnessing heuristic
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
The main claims
I
I
Mirativity is the linguistic reflex of the common cognitive process of
processing new (environmental) information
The mirative use of an evidential has two possible explanations:
I
I
I
A rhetorical device
A gestural deictic device
Mirative evidentials are the functionally marked use of an
evidential, as licensed by the witnessing heuristic
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Outline
Outline
Intro
Surprise!
The issues
The goals and claims
Deconstructing Mirativity
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Conclusion
In sum
Future directions
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
The characterizations of mirativity
I
If a speaker has indirect knowledge of Kemal’s arrival then the
speaker uses a sentence is marked with the inferential evidential -miş.
(7)
Turkish (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 159)
Kemal gel-miş
Kemal came-evid
‘Kemal came.’
I
If a speaker has direct knowledge of Kemal’s arrival, -miş can be
still be used, but it expresses another meaning: it is an experience
for which the speaker lacks ‘premonitory awareness’
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
The characterizations of mirativity
I
DeLancey (1997; 2001) later picked up on these observations and
connected them to similar phenomena he observed in two unrelated
languages: Lhasa Tibetan and Hare:
[Mirativity] marks both statements based on inference and
statements based on direct experience for which the speaker
had no psychological preparation... What these apparently
disparate data sources have in common ... is that the
proposition is one which is new to the speaker, not yet
integrated into his overall picture of the world (DeLancey
1997: 35-36).
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
The characterizations of mirativity
I
Linguistic mirativity as a label is defined by a constellation of
descriptors:
I
I
I
I
‘Non-expected’ information (Egerod 1974)
‘Surprise at unexpected new information based on immediate
observation’ (Friedman 2003: 197, 200)
‘New knowledge’, and (DeLancey 2001: 369)
‘Immediate meaning’ (Nichols 1986)
I
The médiatif in French linguistics tradition (Lazard 1999), and the
admirative is used in the Balkan linguistics tradition (cf. Friedman
a.o.)
I
These descriptors seem related, and they all share surprise as a
common characteristic
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Two construals of mirativity
I
In a mirative system, events and states that cannot be easily
assimilated are coded differently than those that easily fall in with
the speaker’s expectations (Dickinson 2000: 379)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Two construals of mirativity
I
In a mirative system, events and states that cannot be easily
assimilated are coded differently than those that easily fall in with
the speaker’s expectations (Dickinson 2000: 379)
1. The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and his general
knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from knowledge about
purely physical interactions to assumptions based on cultural and
social norms
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Two construals of mirativity
I
In a mirative system, events and states that cannot be easily
assimilated are coded differently than those that easily fall in with
the speaker’s expectations (Dickinson 2000: 379)
1. The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and his general
knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from knowledge about
purely physical interactions to assumptions based on cultural and
social norms
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Two construals of mirativity
I
In a mirative system, events and states that cannot be easily
assimilated are coded differently than those that easily fall in with
the speaker’s expectations (Dickinson 2000: 379)
1. The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and his general
knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from knowledge about
purely physical interactions to assumptions based on cultural and
social norms
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
I
If the immediate situation does not correlate well with either 1. or 2.
the proposition coding the event or state receives special marking
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Two construals of mirativity
I
In a mirative system, events and states that cannot be easily
assimilated are coded differently than those that easily fall in with
the speaker’s expectations (Dickinson 2000: 379)
1. The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and his general
knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from knowledge about
purely physical interactions to assumptions based on cultural and
social norms
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
I
If the immediate situation does not correlate well with either 1. or 2.
the proposition coding the event or state receives special marking
F That ‘special marking’ is the functionally marked use of an evidential
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
A speaker uses a non-evidential sentence to talk about things they
know are true (i.e. a declarative/assertion)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
A speaker uses a non-evidential sentence to talk about things they
know are true (i.e. a declarative/assertion)
I
A speaker uses an indirect evidential to talk about states, events, or
actions they did not personally witness: the speaker does not
know whether the state, event, or action embedded under an
evidential is true or not*
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
(8)
p = Alvin arrived.
a. Non-evidential:
witxw=t Alvin
arrive=pd Alvin
‘Alvin arrived.’
Belx (p) = x knows or believes p in c
b. Evidential:
’
nakw
=hl witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
Belx (p) ∨ Belx (¬p) = x does not know or believe p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
(9)
’
nakw
=hl witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
p = Alvin arrived.
a. Non-mirative (unmarked):
(S)c = (9)
Belx (p) ∨ Belx (¬p) = x does not know or believe p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
b. Mirative (functionally marked):
(S)c = (9)
Belx (p) = x knows or believes p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
Functionally marked evidentials (miratives) are identical to
declaratives wrt the speaker’s belief:
(10)
a. Declarative (non-evidential):
witxw=t Alvin
arrive=pd Alvin
‘Alvin arrived.’
Belx (p) = x knows or believes p in c
b. Mirative (functionally marked evidential):
’
nakw
=hl witxw=s Alvin
evid=cd arrive=pd Alvin
‘Looks like Alvin arrived.’
Belx (p) = x knows or believes p in c
evid(p) = The speaker has sensory evidence for p in c
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
What causes the change from Belx (p) ∨ Belx (¬p) to Belx (p)?
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
What causes the change from Belx (p) ∨ Belx (¬p) to Belx (p)?
I
The speaker (x) sees that p is true in c
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
Tsafiki (Barbacoan): the indirect evidential suffix -nu encodes
‘information inferred from physical evidence’ (Dickinson 2000: 407)
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses
the event of the motorcycle’s arrival, (11) expresses the speaker’s
surprise
(11)
‘[The] speaker heard what he thought was a car approaching.
But when he saw it, he realized it was a motorcycle’
moto
jo-nu-e
motorcycle be-evid-decl
‘It’s a motorcycle!’ (2000: 411)
I
The speaker knows the proposition (it’s a motorcycle)
embedded under the evidential is true
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
The evidential suffix -k in Qiang (LaPolla 2003): an inference may
be based on evidence obtained visually or by some other sense
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses the
door in the state of being open, (12) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(12)
‘The speaker sees that the door is open, but doesn’t know who
opened it’
dýy de-ýge-ji-k
door or-open-csm-infer
“The door is open!”
I
The speaker knows the proposition (the door is open)
embedded under the evidential is true
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
The indirect evidential particle lõ in Hare (Athabascan) (DeLancey
1997: 38-40, 2001: 375-378)
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses
the guy sitting in the tree, (13) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(13) heee, gúhde daweda!
ch’ifi dachı́da lõ
hey, up.there sg.sit.3sg.imperf. guy sitting evid
“Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy is sitting up there!”
(DeLancey 2001: 376)
I
The speaker knows the proposition (he’s sitting up there)
embedded under the evidential is true
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
Evidentials and knowledge
I
Full circle: Turkish -miş
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses
Hakan’s, (14) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(14) Hakan gel-miş
Hakan came-evid
‘Hakan came!’
I
The speaker knows the proposition (Hakan came) embedded
under the evidential is true
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
The witnessing heuristic
I
If a speaker uses an indirect evidential in a direct evidence context,
then the evidential expresses surprise
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
A history
A functional definition
Evidentials and the ‘witnessing heuristic’
An analysis in two parts
1. A model for processing surprising information
2. Evidentials as rhetorical devices and gestural deixis
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
I
one of the core human emotions, along with happiness, sadness,
anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (Ekman 1980; Ekman 1984;
Izard:1987).
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
I
I
one of the core human emotions, along with happiness, sadness,
anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (Ekman 1980; Ekman 1984;
Izard:1987).
central to sensory processing, adaptation and learning, attention, and
decision making
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
I
I
I
one of the core human emotions, along with happiness, sadness,
anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (Ekman 1980; Ekman 1984;
Izard:1987).
central to sensory processing, adaptation and learning, attention, and
decision making
universal, both linguistically and as a property of human cognition
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
one of the core human emotions, along with happiness, sadness,
anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (Ekman 1980; Ekman 1984;
Izard:1987).
I central to sensory processing, adaptation and learning, attention, and
decision making
I universal, both linguistically and as a property of human cognition
F the defining qualitative characteristic of mirativity
(Peterson 2012)
I
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The psychology of surprise
I
Surprise is
one of the core human emotions, along with happiness, sadness,
anger, disgust, contempt, and fear (Ekman 1980; Ekman 1984;
Izard:1987).
I central to sensory processing, adaptation and learning, attention, and
decision making
I universal, both linguistically and as a property of human cognition
F the defining qualitative characteristic of mirativity
(Peterson 2012)
I
I
The cognition of surprise: The properties of the emotion of
surprise have been effectively charted through the use of schema
theory
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Schema Theory
I
Schemata: organized knowledge structures representing concepts
such as situations, objects, events, and actions at various levels of
abstractness (Mandler 1984; Rumelhart 1984)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Schema Theory
I
Schemata: organized knowledge structures representing concepts
such as situations, objects, events, and actions at various levels of
abstractness (Mandler 1984; Rumelhart 1984)
I
Categorical rules or scripts that we use to interpret the world
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Schema Theory
I
Schemata: organized knowledge structures representing concepts
such as situations, objects, events, and actions at various levels of
abstractness (Mandler 1984; Rumelhart 1984)
I
Categorical rules or scripts that we use to interpret the world
I
Information is processed according to how it fits into these schema,
which are used to interpret our environment and to predict outcomes
of events or situations occurring in our immediate environment
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Schema Theory
I
Schemata: organized knowledge structures representing concepts
such as situations, objects, events, and actions at various levels of
abstractness (Mandler 1984; Rumelhart 1984)
I
Categorical rules or scripts that we use to interpret the world
I
Information is processed according to how it fits into these schema,
which are used to interpret our environment and to predict outcomes
of events or situations occurring in our immediate environment
I
Activated cognitive schema: schemata that are immediately relevant
and currently activated in the mind of the speaker
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
I
Activated cognitive schema: The role of a waiter in a restaurant
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
I
Activated cognitive schema: The role of a waiter in a restaurant
F Unexpected events involve a deviation to some degree from an
activated cognitive schema: schema discrepancy
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
I
Activated cognitive schema: The role of a waiter in a restaurant
F Unexpected events involve a deviation to some degree from an
activated cognitive schema: schema discrepancy
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
I
Activated cognitive schema: The role of a waiter in a restaurant
F Unexpected events involve a deviation to some degree from an
activated cognitive schema: schema discrepancy
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
I
Schema discrepancy check → revision: The waiter asking you to
sing along with him → (Oh, this must be that opera-themed
restaurant where the waiters sing O sole mio...)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Two construals of mirativity (cf. Dickenson 2000)
1. Schema: The speaker’s past experiences of similar situations and
his general knowledge. This set of assumptions can range from
knowledge about purely physical interactions to assumptions based
on cultural and social norms
I
Activated cognitive schema: The role of a waiter in a restaurant
F Unexpected events involve a deviation to some degree from an
activated cognitive schema: schema discrepancy
2. The speaker’s immediate experience of an event or state
I
Schema discrepancy check → revision: The waiter asking you to
sing along with him → (Oh, this must be that opera-themed
restaurant where the waiters sing O sole mio...)
F ‘Surprise’ is simply a label for schema discrepancy
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Schema Theory
Figure: A Cognitive Model of the Mental Processes Elicited by Surprising
Events (Reisenzein 2000: 265)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The linguistic reflex of schema discrepancy
(15) The syndrome of surprise (Reisenzein et al 1996; Meyer 1997;
Schutzwohl 1998; Reisenzein 2000)
1. The physiological level: different cortical response
wave patterns; changes in heart and respiration rates;
increased neural activation; etc.
2. The behavioural level: subsequent
curiosity/exploratory behaviour; specific facial expression;
interruption of ongoing activities; etc.
3. The subjective level: the subjective feeling of surprise;
verbal exclamation of surprise.
I
The subjective level involves the volitional linguistic responses
to a surprising event (schema discrepancy)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
The linguistic reflex of schema discrepancy
Context: You and Gwen are preparing a surprise birthday party for Alvin. You
don’t expect home for another hour. However, in the middle of your
preparations, Alvin walks through the door
I
Schema: surprise birthday parties are only surprising if the birthday boy
or girl doesn’t know you’re planning it
I
Active cognitive schema: the party is for Alvin, the birthday boy; the
party preparations are underway while Alvin is not there
I
Schema discrepancy: Alvin is there
(16)
You made it!
(Surprised intonation marked by ‘!’)
I don’t believe you made it!
(Referencing the schema-discrepency)
Looks like you made it! (Evidential verb, with/without ‘!’ intonation)
Wow, you’re here!
(Surprise vocalization, plus ‘!’ intonation)
I’m amazed you made it!
(Verb of surprise)
What a surprise (you’re here)!
(Wh-exclamative, verb of surprise)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise
I
corresponds directly to Dickenson’s construals of mirativity
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise
I
I
corresponds directly to Dickenson’s construals of mirativity
provides a theoretical point of contact between surprise as a
cognitive process, and the linguistic reflex of this process: mirativity
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise
I
I
I
corresponds directly to Dickenson’s construals of mirativity
provides a theoretical point of contact between surprise as a
cognitive process, and the linguistic reflex of this process: mirativity
shows that the many different possible intra- and cross-linguistic
expressions are derived in a single mental event: schema discrepancy
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise
I
I
I
I
corresponds directly to Dickenson’s construals of mirativity
provides a theoretical point of contact between surprise as a
cognitive process, and the linguistic reflex of this process: mirativity
shows that the many different possible intra- and cross-linguistic
expressions are derived in a single mental event: schema discrepancy
shows that the many related characterizations of mirativity (surprise,
unpreparedness, countered expectations, unexpectedness etc) also
reduce to schema discrepancy
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise
I
I
I
I
I
corresponds directly to Dickenson’s construals of mirativity
provides a theoretical point of contact between surprise as a
cognitive process, and the linguistic reflex of this process: mirativity
shows that the many different possible intra- and cross-linguistic
expressions are derived in a single mental event: schema discrepancy
shows that the many related characterizations of mirativity (surprise,
unpreparedness, countered expectations, unexpectedness etc) also
reduce to schema discrepancy
these characterizations may reflect the diversity found in the finer
meanings of mirativity in a particular language (Peterson 2012)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Outcomes
I
A schema-theoretic analysis of surprise explains the fact that
speaker’s of miratively-marked sentences are surprised at new
information, and not the proposition denoted by a
miratively-marked sentence
(17)
I
You made it!
(Surprised intonation marked by ‘!’)
I don’t believe you made it!
(Referencing the schema-discrepency)
Looks like you made it! (Evidential verb, with/without ‘!’ intonation)
Wow, you’re here!
(Surprise vocalization, plus ‘!’ intonation)
I’m amazed you made it!
(Verb of surprise)
What a surprise (you’re here)!
(Wh-exclamative, verb of surprise)
All of these expressions of mirativity are derived from a single mental
event (schema discrepancy): Alvin’s arrival
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Back to evidentials
F But why do many languages with indirect evidentials use them
as a linguistic reflex of surprise?
I
Broadly, evidentials are about the evaluation of new information and
communicating this information
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
An Analogy: Rhetorical Questions
I
Questions are requests for information – they help move discourse forward
I
Rhetorical questions differ in that the answer is known to the speaker and
the addressee, rather, they implicate another meaning (example adapted
from Caponigro 2007)
(18)
a.
‘John looks like an interesting syntactician.’
Ordinary question: ‘What does he know about semantics?’
[Possible answers: He knows a lot about semantics; He doesn’t
know a lot about semantics; etc.]
b.
‘I don’t think we should have John on our short list.’
Rhetorical question: ‘(After all,) what does he know about
semantics?’
[Implicates he knows nothing about semantics.]
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
An Analogy: Rhetorical Questions
I
Plain evidential statements help move the discourse forward
(19)
A:
’
nakw
=hl se-hon-(t)=s
Bob
evid=cd caus-fish-3=cd Bob
“Bob must be smoking fish” (non-mirative)
B: ixsta=hl hoxs
jab-i=s
Bob k’yoots
tasty=cd smoked.fish make-tr=pd Bob yesterday
“The fish Bob made yesterday was tasty.” (Let’s get some
more now.)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
An Analogy: Rhetorical Questions
I
If we adjust the context such that the speaker actually witnesses the
activity of Bob smoking fish, (20) expresses the speaker’s surprise.
(20)
Alvin and his friend drive by Bob’s place; they can smell and see
smoke coming out of the smokehouse. They walk up to get a
closer look and see Bob is indeed smoking fish
’
nakw
=hl se-hon-(t)=s
Bob
evid=cd caus-fish-3=cd Bob
“Bob’s smoking fish!”
I
But (20) does not really contribute anything to the conversation –
other than to implicate the speaker’s surprise (Peterson
2010a,b)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
Schema theory and schema discrepancy
The Linguistic Correlates of Schema Discrepancy
Why evidentials are suited to signaling schema discrepancy
Mirative evidentials as deixis
I
Evidentials, like other indexical expressions such as pronouns or
demonstratives, have a semantic meaning that is fixed (at least of
the lexical type, such as indirect, sensory, reported, etc)
I
Yet their meaning varies depending on time, place, the particular
evidence in that context, and the person who uses the evidential
(21) Look! A shooting star!’
‘I see a shooting star!’
I
Mirative evidentials take on a gestural deictic meaning, pointing out
or drawing the addressee’s attention to a shooting star
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
In sum
Future directions
In sum
I
Mirativity can be viewed as the linguistic reflex of a general
cognitive process: schema discrepancy
I
Mirative evidentials implicate surprise, or point to a surprising event
I
Many (if not all) of the various characterizations given by linguists
of the mirative are entailed by using surprise as the central feature of
mirativity (i.e. surprise entails new information)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
In sum
Future directions
Future directions
I
Extend this analysis to other ‘kinds’ of mirativity (congruent and
noncongruent marking, non-lexical evdentials)
I
Why is the reportative used??
I
A tighter explanation of why mirative evidentials have a short ‘shelf
life’: how long can surprising information be surprising?
I
Discourse Situation vs. Evaluation Situation (Speas; Schnenner);
New Environmental Information (Peterson 2012)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind
Intro
Deconstructing Mirativity
Schema Theory and Surprise as a cognitive process
Conclusion
In sum
Future directions
Thank you!
I
Nature of Evidentiality Project at the LUCL (Leiden University).
I
The Endangered Languages Documentation Programme (SOAS)
Tyler Peterson
Evidentiality and the Unprepared Mind