Do Governors Matter? Budgeting Rules and the Politics of State Policymaking
Author(s): Charles Barrilleaux and Michael Berkman
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, (Dec., 2003), pp. 409-417
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Do Governors Matter? Budgeting Rules
and the Politics of State Policymaking
CHARLESBARRILLEAUX,FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
STATE
MICHAEL BERKMAN, PENNSYLVANIA
STATEUNIVERSITY
Whetherand how governorsinfluencepublic policies in the U.S. is open to question.This researchtests a
model of gubernatorialinfluenceon public policymakingin which gubernatorialpower is conceivedof the
governor'spower over the budgetaryprocessrelativeto that of the statelegislature.We arguethat governors
with greatercontrolover the budgetprocesswill use those powersto delivera higherproportionof policies
that confer benefits to statewide versus more localized constituencies.As governors'electoral security
increases,their willingnessto support legislativelydesired localized spending increases.Empiricalresults
derivedfrompooled cross-sectionalmodelslargelysupportthe modelstested.
merican state governments vary in the extent to
which governors or legislatorsdominate the budgetary process and state policymaking, but overall
state governorsare strongerthan ever before (Gosling 1994;
Beyle 1996; Hedge 1998). Bureaucraciesare more centralized, formalpowers have been enhanced, governorsenjoy a
largerrole in setting state priorities(Rosenthal1998; Hedge
1998; Clynch and Lauth 1991), and domestic policy devolution offersthem and their policy innovationsnationalvisibility. Further,the quality of the individuals who become
governorshas improved (Sabato 1978: 57) and contemporary governors are celebrated for their "pragmatism"and
skill (Stanfield1996). The National Governors'Association
is increasingly prominent and influential, and governors
regularlymake major party presidentialand vice-presidential short-lists.
Yet, we know little about the consequences of all this
institutionbuilding. Models of Americanstate policymaking
tend to focus on legislaturesat the expense of executives.lIn
some cases, such as when measuringgovernmentalcapability (Brace1993), informationon the two is even combined
into a single indicator.Althoughgovernorsmay appearto be
central players in American politics, political scientists'
models of state policymakingprovide only limited tests of
their roles. Whethergovernorsinfluencestate policymaking
is importantfor at least three reasons. First, for students of
democraticpolitics, the variationsin the design of executive
and legislative institutions that exist among the American
statesprovidea unique opportunityto assess the distributive
For example Erikson,Wright,and Mclver (1993) exclude the executive
from their models. Where both institutionsare considered,it is often in
light of whether their partisan control is divided (e.g., Alt and Lowry
1994; Fiorina 1994) ratherthan on the powers of either institution.
NOTE: We are gratefulto Tom Carsey,Neal Beck, MichaelD. McDonald,
the editors, and the anonymous refereesfor comments on earlier
versions of this article. We are responsible for any errors that
remain.
PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 56, No. 4 (December2003): pp. 409-417
409
consequences of differing governmental designs. Institutional designs do not occur by happenstancebut more often
are put in place to achieve some political, managerial,or
policy goal (Knott and Miller 1987). Second, researchon
American state politics portrays governors as either
extremelyinfluential(e.g., Beyle2001) or as inconsequential
(e.g., Erikson,Wright,and Mclver 1993). Given that governors are among the most visible officeholdersin any state, a
clearerunderstandingof whether,how, and under what circumstancesthey affectpublic policy is justified.
Third, at least one prominent scholar, Paul Peterson
(1995), arguesthat the states,because of the parochialismof
legislatures, are particularly bad vehicles for achieving
statewide policy goals. This is of particularconcern in the
present era, where policy responsibilityfor welfare, health
care, and other policies are commonly referredto the states
by the nationalgovernment.If, as we shall arguebelow, governors have incentives to produce public policies whose
benefits have statewide, ratherthan district, incidence, the
argument against states as vehicles for redistributionmay
not be as clear cut as Petersonsuggests.
Governors and legislators bring to state policymaking
distinct preferencesshaped by the composition of their constituencies.While legislatorsare "pulledby local geographic
constituencies"governors must consider the interests of a
"largerand more diverse group" (Crain and Miller 1990:
1030). We arguethat governorsseek higher levels of spending for redistributiveprogramsthat benefit their geographically diffuse constituencies in ways similar to legislators'
pursuit of geographicallyconcentrateddistributivebenefits.
Thus, our core assumption is that governorshave distinct,
identifiable,institutionallybased preferences.The budgetary process shapes the extent to which governors are able
and strategicallymotivated to pursue these spending priorities. The rules that govern the budgetaryprocess are contested and biased, and the governorhas greaterpower over
the process in some states than others (Gosling 1994).
These powers can be used to direct resourcestoward their
desired type of policy while limiting legislators'pursuit of
their spending priorities. To see this we develop a new
410
410
QUARTERLY
POLITiCAL
RESEARCH
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
measure of governor's budgetary power and show that
budgetary tendencies reflect the distribution of power
between the branchesover the budget process.
Of course, governors pursue more than just these
embedded institutionalinterests.They are also part of, and
even leaders of, a team-their political party-and their
interests and preferencesthereforeextend to those of the
team as well. We arguethat their willingness to act as leader
by promoting the interests of the legislativeteam members
is conditioned by the electoralenvironmentfaced by legislators and the governor.Many state-levelstudies treatboth
branches as though they are facing the same competitive
threat (e.g., Dye 1984) or competitive milieu (e.g., Ranney
1971). Drawing upon Schlesinger's(1994) "RevisedParty
Theory"we argue that cooperation is based upon the distinct competitive threat faced by each. Governors can be
expected to cooperate with legislators' policy priorities
when legislativeelections in a state are close and the governor is secure politically.Absent this security,governorswill
pursue their policy interests at the expense of legislators
within their same party.
Our analysisuses highly aggregatedstate spending data
in the 1990s to identify general spending tendencies. Following Peterson(1995) and others (Baumgartnerand Jones
1993) we divide state spending into two types: developmental spending where benefits are concentratedin specific
geographicsections of the states, and redistributivespending where benefitsarespreadaroundthe entirethe state. We
offer hypotheses about the ratio of one type of spending to
the other. The results stronglysupport our core hypotheses
that budgeting rules and competitive threatshape the ability of each branchto pursue their institutionalinterests.The
policymakingmodels we develop allow us to fully incorporate both the legislatureand governor, and offer a way to
capture the tension between the branchesinherent in state
and the federalconstitutions.
IN THE STATES
GOVERNORSAND POLICYMAKING
Systematictests of executive effects on state policymaking take two approaches.The first casts the governoras the
leader of a party team whose success is a function of the
governor's leadership and political skills. The second
focuses on the institutional powers of the governor, suggesting that the ability to lead depends upon the resources
and design of the governorship.2
Governorsas TeamLeaders
As a member of a partyteam,a governor'ssuccess or failure is viewed as a function of his ability to lead that team
(Morehouse 1998). The strengthand'cohesion of the party
organizationis a crucial tool at a governor'sdisposal, but
individual ability to use those resourceslargely establishes
whether a governorwill succeed or fail. Relatedto this view,
governorsare cast as the "legislatorin chief' and their effectiveness a reflectionof their individual ability to work with
the legislature (Bernick and Wiggins 1981). This view is
supported by evidence from studies of redistributivepolicies that find that Democratic governors, like Democratic
legislators,promotemore redistribution(Dye 1984; Winters
1976). The team-leaderapproach,in generalterms, leads to
a focus on the party of the governor,and tends to see the
governor'sconstituencyin termsvery similarto that as a legislator from the same party
Clearlythe governor'sleadership of her legislativeparty
is important.But it also the case that within any party each
individualoffice has its own constituencyand organization;
Schlesinger (1985, 1994) refers to these as party nuclei.
Because governors draw upon distinct constituencies we
expect that the governor'snucleus differs systematically
from that of the average legislator. These constituencies,
along with other characteristicsof the nuclei, may push differentofficeholdersfromthe common preferencessuggested
by a party focus. Party organizationsdevote considerable
effort to trying to "link the nuclei together"(Schlesinger
1985: 1153) to get them to cooperatewith one another.The
extent to which this linking occurs "isnot a fixed or stable
quantity" (ibid.) but depends upon political conditions.
This means that not only may differentofficeholderswithin
the same party have differentpolicy interests,but also that
the notion of a team is variableand conditional.We suggest
below it is possible to identify when governors have the
incentives to act independentlyor otherwise.
Governors'Powers
A second approachemphasizesthe governor'sformaland
informal powers (Mueller 1985; Beyle 1996; Schlesinger
1971) conditionedby political circumstances.For example,
powerful governors are more successful when they enjoy
strong electoralmarginsand legislativemajorities(Sigelman
and Dometrius 1988) and the same party controls both
branches (Clarke 1998). But commonly used measures of
gubernatorialpower are not designed to discriminatewhen
particularpowersmatterbecausethey mix budgetarypowers
with others (such as appointmentpowers; see for example
Schlesinger 1971 and Beyle 1996). Therefore, they can
obscurethe issue of influenceand fail to measurepower over
the legislaturein the stage at which the legislatureis most
involved-the formulationof budget totals and priorities.
To estimate gubernatorialinfluence properlywe need to
isolate governors' power over the specific stages of the
budgetaryprocess relativeto the power of the legislature.3
This is emphasized in some congressional work on the
3 Gross (1989)
2
Another important approach less applicable to our study of aggregate
spending differences across states concerns the budgetary requests of
executive agencies (e.g., Sharkansky1968; Clarke1998).
argues that most measuresof legislativeand gubernatorial
strengthcovarypositively and that gubernatorialpower should be measured relative to that of the legislature. See also Dometrius (1987) and
Mueller(1985).
411
BUDGETING RULES AND THE POLITICS OF STATE POLICYMAKING
budgetaryprocess (Thurber1997) as well as in the comparative cases studies of some states done by Clynch and Lauth
(1991). But only a handful of studies look at how a small
number of these rules affect governors'abilities to achieve
their preferences (Crain and Miller 1990; Poterba 1997).
Not only are these studies limited in the kinds of rules they
consider, they also conceptualize gubernatorialinterest as
simply reducing legislative spending, rather than the pursuit of particulartypes of spending objectivesrooted in their
distinctiveconstituencies.
ELECTORALINCENTIVESAND POLICYPREFERENCES
Our model borrows from both of these approaches.But
we put in the forefrontgubernatorialpreferencesembedded
within the institution. To derive these we draw upon legislative studies, which offer a theoreticallyrigorousanalysis
of institutionallyderived preferencesthat are advancedand
mediated by institutional capacity Influential studies of
Congress recognize that legislators' electoral incentives
cannot be explainedsolely in termsof the demography,partisanship,and the ideologicalprofile of their constituencies.
Legislators,irrespectiveof party,are parochialin their preferences (Mayhew 1974) eager to deliverparticularizedbenefits to their constituencies (Tullock1962; Weingast,Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). While our understandingof how
distributivepolitics operateswould not be possible without
an appreciationof how legislators'preferencesare rooted in
geographically defined constituencies, this approach has
had more limited influence on state-levelstudies.4
Governor'spreferences, too, should be rooted in their
geographic constituencies. Governors cannot spread the
costs of particularized programs for their constituents
among others' constituents, the way legislators can; their
so their "benefit-cost
constituencyis statewide, or "at-large"
calculus for appraising government programs"is not the
same (Crain and Miller 1990: 1030). Therefore,they may
seek to lower legislativespending, which may reduce overall spending totals (Crain and Miller 1990). Yet governors
may have constituencydriven preferencesof their own that
go beyond their desire to suppress spending by the legislature and their own budget-maximizingagencies. Thus, in
contrastto legislators'interestin policies "withdistrict-specific benefits"(Crain1999: 678), governorsshould preferto
fund policies with statewidebenefits.
Peterson,who characterizespolicies as "redistributiveor
developmental"based upon their geographic impact, has
advanced this argument. Developmental programs, (frequently called distributive) provide "physical and social
infrastructure"
(1995: 17) and "aregenerallyperceivedto be
a concentratedbenefit"(Peterson 1995: 41). Redistributive
programs"reallocatesocietalresourcesfromthe 'haves'to the
'have-nots"'(Peterson 1995: 17), are structured by class
4 Examplesinclude Wong (1989), Crainand Miller(1990), Crain(1999),
and Peterson(1995).
rather than geography (Wong 1989), and have costs and
benefits that are "geographicallydiffuse" (Peterson 1995:
43).5 Providingstatewide benefits best rewardsgovernors,
who must appeal to statewide constituencies (Schlesinger
1994). If governorsare politicallyambitious(as many seem
to be), their focus should be on the U.S. Senate-a statewide
office-or othernationaloffice, so they are againbest served
by providingbenefits to a broad constituency But evidence
for this is scarce.MarkPeterson(1990) finds that presidents
introducemore redistributiveproposalsthan any otherkind,
and Winters(1976) finds that governorspush for redistributive measures. But we find no direct tests of hypotheses
based upon the assumption that governors and legislators
are motivated to support differenttypes of policies. These
hypotheses are developed in the next section.
HYPOTHESES
Following Peterson (1995), we distinguish between
redistributiveand developmentalpolicies because links
between these types of policies and differentconstituencies
are most easily drawn. Redistributiveand developmental
spending decisions may often be dependent on choices in
the other area-in other words, spending for one category
of programforcesa governmentto make a tradeoff.We conceive of this tradeoffas a simple ratio of developmentalto
redistributivespending. In other words, our interest is in
explaining the extent to which one categoryof spending is
rewardedrelativeto the other.
InstitutionalCharacteristics
BudgetingRules:There is "considerablediversity"among
the states (Gosling 1994) in the extent to which the governor or legislature has greater power over the budgetary
process, which may be critical to budgetary outcomes
(Poterba1996; Clarke1998). From Gosling (1994) and the
detailed case-studies of twelve states in Clynch and Lauth
(1991) we identify how budgetaryrules can reasonablybe
expected to distributepower. We code these into a budget
powers index discussed below.
Hi: The morepower the governorhas over the budgetary
to redisprocessthe smaller the ratioof developmental
tributivespending.
We expect professionallegislaLegislativeProfessionalism:
torsto havea "vestedinterestin the expansionof government"
5
Peterson'spolicy typology is similar to Lowi's(1979), but it ignores the
means by which policy is carriedout, is applied only to spending programs,and does not emphasizethe conflict generatedby policy types. It
is also similar to the classificationscheme offeredby Baumgartnerand
Jones (1993), who differentiateinvestmentfrom consumptionpolicies
because the formerpromoteeconomic growthand the latterdetractfrom
the growth process. In practical terms their classification also brings
together policies that target investment in particulargeographic areas
and those that spreadbenefits statewide.
412
(Peterson 1995: 101) and thereforeto favor higher spending of all types (Carmines1974; Hedge 1998). But between
the two types of policies, we expect that legislatorspromote
developmental over redistributivepolicies. As legislatures
become increasingly professionalized, the value of a seat
increasesand membershave strongerincentives to produce
benefits that are apparent to the voters at home than do
members in a less professionalized body (Fiorina 1994;
Peterson 1995).
H2: The moreprofessionalthe membershipthe greater the
ratioof developmental
to redistributive
spending.
PoliticalBehavior
Parties:Democratssupport largergovernmentand more
spending than Republicans(Alt and Lowry 1994). But, as
Peterson (1995) notes, developmental spending with its
emphasis on subsidizing economic growth, and redistributive spending, with its emphasis on shifting resourcesfrom
haves to have-nots, each favor different constituencies.
Democratic legislators, therefore, should support higher
levels of spending on everything, but when there is an
explicit tradeoff,they should favorredistribution.
H3: Thepresenceof a Democratic
governorwillbe associated
with a lower ratio of developmentalto redistributive
spending.
H4: Higherpercentagesof Democratsin the legislaturewill
be associatedwith a lower ratio of developmentalto
redistributive
spending.
ElectoralCompetition:Greater electoral competition is
generallythought to lead legislatorsto enact more generous
redistributivepolicies (Plotnick and Winters 1985). Redistributivepolicies confer benefits to a broaderbloc of voters
than developmentalpolicies, and competitive elections are
expected to have the aggregateeffect of leading politicians
and parties to seek to provide benefits that appeal to more
voters, including those who might not normallyparticipate
in politics. Following that logic, we expect greatercompetition to produce more redistributivespending as legislators
are forced to seek to provide rewardsfor a broader set of
constituents.6
H5: Increasedcompetitionforlegislativeseats shouldlower
the ratioof developmental
to redistributive
spending.
With regard to competitiveness of gubernatorialraces,
we conceive of votes won as political capitalgovernorsmay
use to accomplish their policy and political goals. The
greaterthe electoral margin the more political capital at a
6
This does not imply that competition will reduce the amount of developmental spending but that, in competitive situations, redistributive
spending will be relativelyhigher than it would absentcompetition. Our
hypothesis implies nothing about the level or change in developmental
spending that occurs under competitiveraces.
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
PoLITIcAL
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
governor'sdisposal (Berryand Berry 1992). The incentive
may exist under certainconditions to use this capitalfor the
benefit of the governor'slegislativeparty.We expect governors and legislaturesto cooperateunder conditions of electoralthreat.We expect the governorto use her politicalcapital to assist threatenedmembers of her party.Although we
are unable to observe this directlyusing aggregatedata, we
expect it to show up as help for the legislaturein general,
which means higher developmental spending relative to
redistribution.We expect that this spending is distributed
unevenly across districts to favor those of the governor's
party,but cannot observe this.
H6: Increasesin governors'winningmarginsyield lower
values on the ratio of developmentalto redistributive
policy.
H7: In stateswith competitivelegislativeelections,the value
to redistributive
spending
of the ratio of developmental
will be greater as the size of the governor'swinning
marginin thepreviouselectionincreases.
Social,Economic,Spatial,and TemporalControls
In addition to the measures noted above, we introduce
controls for a number of additional factorslinked to variations in state governmentpolicymakingin existing research.
We controlfor state politicalideology,statepopulation,state
government tax capacity,and include dummy variablesto
control for the effectsof southernregionalvariationsand for
the effect of Alaska, which has enormous developmental
demands given its size, and years.
MEASURESAND ESTIMATION
We test these hypotheses with budget data over two year
intervalsfor all states in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. We
use Prais-Wintenregressionanalysis using a pooled crosssectional panel design in which estimates are correctedfor
known biases in standarderrorsand heteroskedasticitythat
arise in pooled models (Green 1993; Beck and Katz 1995).
The Prais-Winstenestimates correct for autocorrelationin
the models and produce results that are interpreted as
normal regressioncoefficients.7We estimate models using
the Prais-Winstenroutine contained in Stata7.
DependentVariable
Our dependent variableis the ratio of developmentalto
redistributivespending for each state in 1990, 1992, 1994
and 1996. To constructour measurewe coded state budget
outlaysas constitutingeitherredistributiveor developmental
7 As one reviewer notes, a suitable correction for autocorrelationis to
include a lagged value of the dependent variable in the models. That
comes at a cost, however, as the lagged value "overpowers"other variables in the model, leading to inaccurateconclusions (Achen 2000). The
Prais-Winstenestimator removes autocorrelationfrom the model and
produces unbiased estimates.
413
BUDGETINGRULESAND THEPOLITICSOF STATEPOLICYMAKING
TABLE1
PER CAPITADEVELOPMENTAL
AND REDISTRIBUTIVE
SPENDINGIN THEAMERICANSTATES,1990-1996.
ALL ENTRIESIN CONSTANT
(1986) DOLLARS
Ratio Developmental/
Developmental
Std. Dev.
Mean
1990
1992
1994
1996
$866.1
908.8
896.7
910.0
409.9
428.6
410.5
345.7
Redistributive
Redistributivea
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
$312.0
368.6
368.0
390.9
128.4
141.8
138.4
143.9
3.06
2.69
2.69
2.50
1.19
1.05
1.19
0.79
aTheratio is not based on per capita data and reflectsaverageannualvalues of the dependent variableto be used in the analysis.
expenditures.Our classificationfollows that establishedby
Paul Peterson (1995). Redistributivepolicies are not confined to spending for programstypicallyviewed as welfare
but rather those that provide statewide benefits. These
include general expenditures for welfare, pensions, unemployment, health and hospitals, housing, and education
(scholarshipsand subsidies only). The key is that redistributive policies, following Peterson's construction, have
statewide benefits. Developmentalpolicies include general
expenditures on transportation,education, police, corrections, and naturalresources.We use total spending (in constant 1986 dollars) on each function minusthe amount of
money provided for each function by the national government. Thus, again following Peterson (1995) we restrict
ourselvesto resourcesexpended by the states only.8
We see in Table 1 that most states spend more per capita
on developmental programsthan redistributiveones, and
that spending on each was higher in 1996 than it was in
1990.9 Alaskahas enormous developmentalspending, and
the Kolmogorov-Smirnovtest for normality indicates that
the data are not distributed normally when Alaska is
included. When Alaskais removedfromthe calculation,the
test indicates a normal distribution.To account for this, we
insert a dummy variable for Alaska in the ensuing multivariateanalyses.
Variables
Independent
BudgetPowers:The budget powers index is composed of
seven items. Details of the items are included in the Appendix. Higher values indicate that the governor has greater
control over the budgetaryprocess. We evaluatedthe validity of each of the index'scomponentsby including each separatelyin the model, i.e., in place of the index. In every case
the result of the estimation is consistent with our model:
powers that accrueto the executiveresultin greaterempha-
8 Data are from StateGovernment
Financefiles: www.census.gov.
9 Redistributiveand developmentalspending are moderatelycorrelated(r
= .47) indicating that states that spend relativelymore on development
also spend relativelymore on redistribution.
sis on redistributivespending and powers that are given to
the legislatureresult in greaterdistributivespending.10
Our hypothesis about profesLegislativeProfessionalism:
sionalism emphasizes specific behavior on the part of professional members rather than effects from institutional
characteristics(partlyaccounted for in our budgetarymeasure) or measured through a composite index (e.g., Squire
1992) or resourcemeasure(e.g., Brace1993). Therefore,we
follow Fiorina(1994) and Carey,Niemi, and Powell (2000)
who demonstratethat salarypicks up importantcharacteristics of the membershipand use annuallegislativesalaryas
a measureof professionalism.
Partisanshipof the
Partisanshipand ElectoralCompetition:
governoris indicated with a simple dummy variablecoded
1 where the incumbent is a Democratand otherwise coded
0. Legislativepartisanshipis the percentageof the combined
lower and upper chambers Democrats (except in unicameral Nebraska,which is droppedfromthe dataset).Electoral
competitionis calculatedfollowingHolbrookand VanDunk
(1993), and indicates the average difficulty of getting
elected to the lower house in a given state. This measureof
average competitiveness of elections between 1972 and
1986 contains cross-sectionalbut no longitudinalinformation. Our hypotheses address the competitiveness of elections rather than the competition between parties, which
have been demonstrated to be distinct conceptually and
empiricallyand to have independent influences on public
policy in the states (Barrilleaux1997).
ControlVariables:Our longitudinal measure of citizen
ideology is taken from Berryet al. (1998).11Tax capacity,a
measure of available resources, is drawn from Berry and
Fording (1997).12 Sources and scales of remaining independent variablesare contained in the Appendix.
10 These results,
along with a comparisonof our measurewith the Clynch
and Lauth(1991) classificationof budgeting for twelve states, are available from the authors.
1 We used
updated Berryet al. data, availableelectronicallyat the ICPSR
publication-relatedarchives(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu),study 1208.
12 The data are available from the ICPSRpublication-relatedarchives,
study 1124, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
414
414
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
TABLE
2
PRAIS-WINSTEN
OFTHERATIO
TOREDISTRIBUTIVE
REGRESSION
ESTIMATES
OFSTATE
GOVERNMENT
DEVELOPMENTAL
SPENDING,
1990,
1992, 1994, AND1996 (N = 188b)
Unstandardized
RegressionCoefficient
Standard
Error
InstitutionalCharacteristics
BudgetPowers Index
LegislativeSalary
-.13
.07
.04
.03
-3.44/.001
2.54/.01
BehavioralCharacteristics
Citizen Ideology
ElectoralCompetition
% DemocraticLegislators
DemocraticGovernor
Governor'sVote Margin
Competition X Gov.Vote
-.01
-.04
-.00
.01
-.03
.0007
.01
.02
.01
.07
.01
.000
-2.95/.007
-2.18/.029
-.78/.43
.10/.92
-2.13/.033
2.98/.003
.000
.005
.15
.55
.05
.01
.04
1.21
-6.85/.000
2.69/.007
.19/.848
4.47/.000
11.97/.000
4.13/.000
2.84/.004
5.81/.000
IndependentVariable
Demographic,Economic, Spatial,and TemporalControls
Population
Tax Capacity
South
Alaska
1990
1992
1994
Intercept
Adj. R2
Wald chi2/prob.>chi2
-.000
-.01
.03
2.45
.55
.19
.11
7.01
.66
15471163.4/ .0000
t/probabilityt
(two-tailed)
bLouisiana,Nebraska,and Virginiaare dropped from the analysisbecause their institutions or election laws do not conform to the rest of the states'.
RESULTS
Results are reported in Table 2. The model explains
about 66 percent of the variationin the ratio of developmental to redistributivespending in the states during the
years 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996 and is statisticallysignificant. Increasinga governorsbudgetarypowers by one unit
results in a reduction of about one-eighth of a unit of the
ratioof developmentalto redistributivespending (b = -.13).
Moreprofessionallegislatures,on the otherhand, areable to
use that enhanced capability to provide more benefits for
their districts:a one-unit increasein legislativesalaryresults
in a .07 increase in the dependent variable. So, consistent
with our expectations, governors use their institutional
advantagesto producepolicies that benefit their constituencies and institutionallystrongerlegislaturesproducepolicies
that benefit theirs.
The politicalpartiesof governorsand legislatorsshow no
meaningful effects in the model. Contraryto our expectations in hypothesis 3, Democraticgovernorsdo not perform
differentlythan non-Democratsvis-a-vis the ratio of developmental to redistributivespending. The percentageof legislative seats held by Democrats, likewise, has not significant effect on the dependent variable,leading us to reject
hypothesis 4.
The remainingthree of our seven hypotheses have to do
with the effects of electoralcompetition and the governor's
use of politicalcapital.Hypothesis5 is confirmed:Increased
electoralcompetitionhas the expected negativeeffecton the
ratio of developmental to redistributivespending, but the
effect is very small (-.002).13 Hypothesis 6 is also supported. Greaterwinning percentagesfor governors significantly lessen the ratio of developmental to redistributive
spending, although the coefficientis small (.0002) at mean
levels of electoralcompetition.Resultsof the test of hypothesis seven, in which we contend that governorsuse political
capital to assist legislators of their party where legislators
face competitive elections, suggest they do the opposite.
Here, we expected the interactionto yield an increasein the
value of the dependent variableat higher values of electoral
competition. The effect is negative, suggesting more redistribution, but the effect is larger where competition is
higher, indicatingmovement in a directionopposite to that
13 The effect for
hypothesis 5 is calculatedgiven a mean value of gubernatorialmargin,which is necessarybecause of the presence of the multiplicativeterm. The calculationis -.04 (.001 X 56.04)= -.002, p =.03.
The test for hypothesis 6 is calculated with a mean value of electoral
competition and is .007 (.001 X 41.23) = .0002, p = .03. SeeJaccardet
al. 1990 for a discussion of the analysisof the interactionterms.
415
BUDGETINGRULESAND THEPOLITICSOF STATEPOLICYMAKING
we expected.Where competitionfor legislativeseats is high,
defined here as one standarddeviation above the mean, a
one percentageincreasein the governor'svotes won leads to
a modest reduction in the value of the dependent variable
(-.07 + (.001 X 52.66) = -.004). Low competition, defined
as one standard deviation below the mean, accordingly
reduces the ratio of developmentalto redistributivespending by one-halfas much (b = -.002). Thus governorsappear
to mediatetheir policy positions in response to the extent of
electoral competition, possibly taking legislative competition into consideration,but they do it by providing more
redistributivepolicy ratherthan more developmentalpolicy
CONCLUSION
Our findingsconfirmthatthe institutionaldesign of executive and legislativepowers in state budgeting have meaningful effectson public policy Governorsaffectstate policymakingin a systematicand theoreticallypredictableway.We
introduceda model of state policymakingdesigned to capture any effectsof differingpowers of governorsversuslegislatures in the formal budgetary process. The model we
devisedis explicitlyintegrativein thatit drawselementsfrom
two prevailing, and seemingly disparate, traditions in
research on American governors: that which focuses on
formal institutionalpowers and that which focuses on the
governor'spartisanrole. Our researchshows each of these
views to have merit. At times, it is the institutionaleffects
that matterbut at others governorsmediate their individual
interestsin response to the competitionfor legislativeseats.
Governorsappearto tempertheir preferencesfor redistribution when competitionfor legislativeseats is high, but their
bias remainstowardredistribution.It may also be the case,
althoughwe areunwillingto make normativecalls here, that
governorsmay use their powers to enact what they believe
sincerelyto be optimalpublic policies.
Of course, both governorsand legislaturesinfluence policymaking in the states, as is intended in systems with
powers shared across institutions. Governorswith greater
control of the budgetary process are rewarded with an
increasedemphasison spending that confersstatewidebenefits, which we expect to aid governors'political ambitions.
The partisanshipof the governor does not appear to affect
the extent to which states pursue developmental versus
redistributivepolicies, and neither does that of the legislature. We do not take this as sign that partiesdo not matter,
but as sign that legislaturesand governorshave strong preferences for policies with specific incidences of benefits
regardlessof their partisanship.
The professionalism of state legislatures also directly
influences states' emphasis on developmentalversus redistributive spending. And, the competitiveness of legislative
elections produced a boost in redistributivespending. The
relationshipsamong competitivenessof elections, legislative
professionalism,and partisanshipare likely quite complex.
Professionallegislaturesare likely to have more Democrats
than unprofessionallegislatures (Fiorina 1994) and to be
competitive. They also more likely to have progressively
ambitiousmemberswhose policy preferencesare consistent
with their ambitions (Maestas 2000). These relationships
bear additionalinvestigation.
Paul Peterson's(1995) work may be read as a brief in
favorof the nationalizationof redistribution.The crux of the
argumentlies in his observation,based upon the assumption that legislatorshave no incentive to redistribute,that
state governments are poor vehicles for redistributive
policy Our results suggest that strong state institutionsthat
function within competitive electoralsystems will focus on
redistribution.Put otherwise,state legislatorsand governors
can be given tools that will lead them beyond district-level
parochialism to consider statewide needs. Whether their
perceptionof equitableand appropriatelevels of servicewill
comportwith what might flow froma nationalizedsystem is
unknown, but our evidence suggests that they will at least
focus on redistribution.
APPENDIX
MEASUREMENTAND DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS
This appendix contains a descriptionof the construction
of the budget power and a table containing descriptivestatistics for the continuous independent variablesused in the
analysis.Data sources are describedin the text and notes.
TheBudgetPowersIndex
The budget powers index is composed of seven items
summed to createa scale rangingin value from0 to 7, where
higher scores indicate greater gubernatorialpower. Each
item is coded so that highervalues indicategreatergubernatorialpower. The index is stable over time and well distributed: in 1996, for example, two states took on the highest
value of seven, five statestook on the lowest value of two, the
mean was 4.35, the median 4.25 and the modal value was
four.14 The followingitems are included in the index:
Share-From the Bookof theStates(BOS).Summaryindicator of whether the governorsharesbudgetaryresponsibility (0) or has full responsibility(1).
Agency Requests-From Budget Processesin the States
(BPS).Agency requests go directly to the legislature(0) or
through the governoror his budget office (1).
DocumentReview-(BOS). Executivebudget document is
the working copy for legislation (1), or legislaturehas the
opportunityto introducebudget bills of its own aftercommittee review (= 0). If the legislatureor executiveintroduces
anotherdocument aftersome point (.5).
RevenueEstimates-(BOS). Revenue estimates are made
by the governoror budget agency (1) or by an independent
commission, legislature, or independent revenue agency
14 From 1990 to 1996 thirty-onestates did not change in their values on
the final index; eight moved up or down one point (out of seven); ten
moved up or down .5 points and one state moved 1.5 points.
416
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
QUARTERLY
TABLE
1
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
FORINDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
USED IN THEANALYSIS
(N = 188)
Variable
Legislative professionalism
Budget index
% Democratic Legislators
Citizen Ideology
Governor's Vote Margin
Electoral Competition
Competition X Governor's Vote Margin
Population (000)
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard
Deviation
100
2
20
21
33.1
15.49
786.89
454
72,000
7
90.79
89.57
90.6
58.19
4857.97
31878.23
17,320.56
4.38
57.80
49.16
56.04
41.23
2308.41
5121.17
14,460.25
1.32
15.88
12.99
8.70
11.43
726.39
5596.80
(0). If the governor makes estimates along with a commission or revenue agency (.5).
Revenue Revisions-(BPS). Legislature, revenue agency or
commission can revise original estimates (0); governor or
his budget agency alone can do this (1). If shared responsibility (.5); If missing, same value as Revenue Estimates.
Line-Item Veto-Governor has the line item veto (1).
Override-Legislature can override with a simple majority
(0); More than a majority is required (1).15
DescriptiveStatisticsforthe independentVariables-Appendix
Table 1 displays measures of central tendency and dispersion
for the continuous dependent variables used in the analysis.
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