Topic: African Americans’ Battle for Civil Rights within the U.S. Army
Intro Paragraph:
As World War II ended, American soldiers fighting across Europe and Asia longed to
return to the Land of the Free. Thousands of African-American veterans shared this dream,
but their homecomings proved disappointing. Instead of returning to liberty, blacks found an
unchanged racist atmosphere in America and discovered that the same evils they risked their
lives to end persisted in their homeland. One African-American soldier described the
situation in 1944 saying, “The Negro soldier is called upon to fight and on occasion die for a
democracy he is not fully allowed to enjoy.”1 Yet on July 27, 1948, President Truman took a
significant step in the American civil rights movement with Executive Order 9981,
mandating racial equality in the Armed Forces. Ironically, the commander-in-chief faced
massive resistance to this order in the Army, purported protector of American principles and
symbol of unquestioning loyalty. Army Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley boldly
stated in response that, “The Army is not out to make any social reforms. … It will change
that policy when the nation as a whole changes.”2 The Army fought integration because its
leaders’ strong racist views led them to conclude that the Army had already sufficiently dealt
with its racial issues, desegregation should be tested elsewhere first, and integration would, in
fact, harm the Army’s ability to wage war. However, African-Americans could not let this
policy stand and remain silent. An arsenal consisting of the President’s mandate, the
African-American community, the media, and the demands of the Korean War overpowered
the Army’s racist views and moved blacks one step closer to true racial equality.
1
2
“Unhappy Solider,” Time, 10 July 1944, 65-68.
“Army Segregation to Go, Says Truman,” New York Times, 30 July 1948. sec. A.
2
Body Paragraph:
World War II brought the racial tensions that had plagued the Army for most of its
history to the foreground. Ever since the Revolution, African-Americans had fought for their
country under deplorable conditions.3 However, more than in any previous war, AfricanAmericans came to believe during World War II that they deserved equal treatment to their
white counterparts. America’s aims in the war—defeating fascism and the German belief in
a master race—further exacerbated black unrest. How then could America claim that her
black citizens were inferior to whites? In 1944, one of the few black officers in the Army,
Captain Lemuel R. Curtis, declared, “Negroes in far-flung corners of the earth are getting a
new slant on things. When they come home they expect to get some of the things they’ve
been hearing about and fighting for.”4 The Pittsburgh Courier, an African-American
newspaper, coined the term “Double V” to express this sentiment. 5 On February 14, the
paper named the “Double V” its official slogan of the war and announced a campaign to help
realize this dream. “We have adopted the Double ‘V’ war cry—victory over our enemies at
home and victory over our enemies on the battlefields abroad,” it proclaimed. “In our fight
for freedom we wage a two-pronged attack against our enslavers at home and those abroad
who would enslave us. WE HAVE A STAKE IN THIS FIGHT … WE ARE AMERICANS
TOO!” 6
3
Richard O. Hope, Racial Strife in the US Military (New York: Praeger, 1979), 10-19.
“Unhappy Solider,” Time, 10 July 1944, 65-68.
5
Lawrence P. Scott and William M. Womack, Double V: The Civil Rights Struggle of the Tuskegee
Airmen (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 1-2.
6
“The Courier’s Double ‘V’ for a Double Victory Campaign Gets Country-Wide Support,”
Pittsburgh Courier, 14 February 1942.
4
3
I. INTRODUCTION AND THESIS
Introductory Paragraph
• Hook à after WWII, Af-Ams shared dream of returning to the Home of the Free, but
their homecomings proved disappointing
o returned to racist atmosphere, despite having fought for freedom themselves
o Quotation à “The Negro soldier is called upon to fight and on occasion die
for a democracy he is not fully allowed to enjoy.” [E6, “Unhappy Soldier,”
Time 1944/6/10]
• Context à
o July 27, 1948, HST issued Exec. Order 9981 (racial equality in Armed Forces)
o however, Army resisted – racist views of leaders made leaders thing that had
solved problems, desegregation should be tested elsewhere, integration would
hurt ability to fight
o Quotation à Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, “The Army is not out to
make any social reforms. … It will change that policy when the nation as a
whole changes.” [J2, “Army Segregation,” NYT 1948/7/30]
• Thesis à
o However, African-Americans could not let this policy stand and remain silent.
An arsenal consisting of the President’s mandate, the African-American
community, the media, and the demands of the Korean War overpowered the
Army’s racist views and moved blacks one step closer to true racial equality.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
African-American Discontent
• WWII brought racial tensions, which had been there since Revolution, to the
foreground
o Cite: [D3, Hope, Racial Strife, 10-19]
• WWII made Af-Ams feel that deserved equal treatment …
o especially because of War Aims: defeating fascism, defeating German beliefs
in master race
o thus questioned racism at home
§ Quotation à Lemuel Curtis (Af-Am Army captain) “Negroes in farflung corners of the earth are getting a new slant on things. When they
come home they expect to get some of the things they’ve been hearing
about and fighting for.” [E2, “Unhappy Soldier,” Time, 1944/7/10]
• Double V Campaign the result
o coined by Pittsburgh Courier
o Quotation (shorten?) à “We, as colored Americans, are determined to protect
our country, our form of government and the freedoms which we cherish for
ourselves and for the rest of the world, therefore we have adopted the Double
“V” war cry – victory over our enemies at home and victory over our enemies
on the battlefields abroad. Thus in our fight for freedom we wage a twopronged attack against our enslavers at home and those abroad who would
4
enslave us. WE HAVE A STAKE IN THIS FIGHT...WE ARE
AMERICANS, TOO!” [H1, “Courier’s Double V” PittCour, 1942/2/14]
Army’s Non-Response
• Despite Double V campaign, Army made no significant adjustments in racial policy
during war
o Cite à [Source B, Nalty, Strength for Fight, 183]
• Basis of Army policy = the assumption that blacks were inferior soldiers and that
race-mixing would upset white soldiers
• Method of Army policy = keep Af-Ams in own units, away from combat, no Af-Am
officers
o Segregation Quotation (shorten?) à War Department memo to President “The
policy of the War Department is not to intermingle colored and white enlisted
personnel in the same regimental organizations. This policy has been proven
satisfactory over a long period of years and to make changes would produce
situations destructive to moral and detrimental to the preparations for national
defense.” [K12, SecWar Patterson in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in
Military, 107-8]
o Away from Combat Quotation à Advisory Committee on Negro Troops
comment on “low fitness” of black soldiers [K10, Advisory Committee
Minutes in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in Military, 123]
o Minimize Black Officers Quotation à MajGen Henry H. Arnold “Negro
officers serving over white enlisted men would create an impossible social
problem.” [K4, Arnold to Marshall, 1940/5/31, in MacGregor and Nalty,
Blacks in Military, 41]
• Af-Ams, naturally, resented all three policies
o Cite à [Source C, MacGregor, Integration of Armed Forces, 56-57]
Army’s Slow Recognition of Problem (and “response”)
• Initial response (1940) when confronted by Civil Rights protestors = cannot address
racial issues
o Quotation à General George Marshall “The army cannot accomplish such a
solution [to racial problems] and should not be charged with such an
undertaking. The settlement of vexing racial problems cannot be permitted to
complicate the War Department and thereby jeopardize the discipline and
morale.” [F3, Marshall Memo to Stimson, 1940/12/1, in “Integration of
Armed Forces” at www.whistlestop]
o held this opinion for next decade
• Slow Recognition (1945) – SecWar Robert Patterson orders study of “Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy” by Gillem Board
o Cite à [Source B, Nalty, Strength, 214-15]
• Gillem Board’s statement was radical … made four recommendations:
o 1. “Negro personnel and units [should] be trained on the same basis and
standards as white personnel.”
5
•
o 2. “Negroes [should] be utilized and assigned to jobs and units consistent with
their qualification.”
o 3. “there are not sufficient qualified Negro officers” and should be more
trained.
o 4. “Negroes in the army as a whole [should] be prorated in proportion to their
respective sizes in the population at large and in no case shall the number of
Negroes exceed 10 percent.”
§ Quotation Source à [K3, War Department Circular No. 124,
1946/4/27, in MacGregor and Burns, Blacks in the Military, 209-210]
Problem à last recommendation would limit the number of Af-Ams in the Army and
led to Af-Ams feeling unwanted and protesting
o Cite à [C, MacGregor, Integration, 159-160]
Af-Am Hopes … and Disappointment as Army doesn’t implement
• Af-Am belief that Gillem Board findings marked end of segregated Army
o Quotation à NJG “The Gillem Report just released by the Army abolishes
the overall policy of segregation...Jim Crow is dead.” [M1, “Gillem Report,”
NJG 1946/3/9]
• Army refusal to accept findings
o Cite à [Hope, Racial Strife, 29]
o Quotation à Gen. Joseph McNarney “The Negro is a failure as a soldier. It
will be 100 years before he can develop to a point where he will be on parity
with white Americans.” [N1, “An Army General on Negroes,” Newsweek
1946/9/30, 63]
• Army decreases numbers of Af-Ams in Army – ignored three positive suggestions,
accepted one negative one
o Cite à [Hope, Racial Strife, 29]
• Af-Ams (PittsburghCourier) condemn Army’s lack of response
o Quotation à “This new Army directive indicates that the Army command has
undergone no real change of heart.” [H4, “The Army, An Evaluation,”
PittsCour, 1946/5/11
III. THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE (PROVING THESIS)
A. TRUMAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981
Truman’s Early Reluctance
• had not considered integrating military until summer 1948
o Cite à [MacGregor, Integration, 293]
• however, a shift pushes to the top of his priority list – show the influence and growing
political power of black leaders
o 1. Truman’s Civil Rights Committee issues report, To Secure These Rights, on
October 30, 1947
6
§
•
driven by growing violence in the South and increasing Af-Am vote,
HST had appointed committee in 1946 to study race relations
§ Committee’s report advocates desegregation of military
• Cite à [P, To Secure These Rights, p?]
o 2. Pressure from black leaders
§ Philip Randolph, founder of Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
§ APR conducts lengthy correspondence with HST and threatened to use
considerable influence with blacks to protest
§ Quotation (shorten) à “To openly counsel, aid, and abet youth, both
white and Negro, to quarantine any Jim Crow conscription system,
whether it bear the label of universal military training or Selective
Service…From coast to coast in my travels I shall call upon all Negro
veterans to join this civil disobedience movement and recruit their
younger brothers in an organized refusal to register and be drafted…I
shall appeal to the Negro parents to lend their moral support to their
sons, to stand behind them as they march with heads held high to
Federal prisons as a telling demonstration to the world that Negroes
have reached the limit of human endurance, that we will be buried in
our graves before we will be slaves [D8, Senate Committee on Armed
Forces, A. Philip Randolph Hearing, 1948, in Stillman, Integration of
Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, 37]
HST couldn’t afford the negative publicity
o Cite [D9, Stillman, Integration, 40]
Truman Issues Executive Order 9981
etc.
7