Distributing death: Justification and constraints
When, if ever, is it permissible to kill some to save others? According to an influential strand of moral
philosophy, the same moral principles govern the use of defensive harm both in individual selfdefense and war. This course will examine this claim and explore the permissibility of defensive
harm (lethal and non-lethal) in both private and political contexts. An overarching theoretical
question will be this: Is defensive harm best justified by principles of comparative, distributive justice
(i.e. it is less bad that a threatener suffers defensive harm than her victim), principles of retributive
justice (i.e. it is only permissible to kill or harm a threatener insofar as she deserves to be killed or
harmed) or some combination of both?
In the first part of the course, we investigate the role that moral responsibility, desert and causal
responsibility has for the permissible resort to defensive force in individual cases. This part of the
course will focus on what an agent has to intend or do in order to become a permissible target of
defensive harm and will focus specifically on the following questions:
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Is it permissible to kill a morally innocent threatener (child soldiers, psychotic or innocently
mistaken threateners) in individual self - or other-defense?
Is it ever permissible to harm a non-threatening person in order to prevent oneself or
someone else from being harmed by a separate threat (e.g. human shields or innocent
obstacles)?
In the latter part of the course, we will focus on the ethics of killing in war. In this part, we bring
insights from the first part of the course and ask whether principles governing defensive harm in
interpersonal context can justify the use of large scale violence in war. If it cannot, should we
embrace pacifism or should we look for a different moral framework governing collective use of force?
More specifically, this part of the course will focus on the following questions
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What constitutes a just cause for war?
By what criteria do we identify morally legitimate targets in war? How do we distinguish
between combatants and non-combatant and why is it morally relevant?
Do combatants have a moral right to kill enemy combatants, and if so, do combatants on
both sides have this right?
How do we define terrorism, and can it ever be morally permissible? Why is intentionally
attacking a civilian morally worse than harming the same civilian collaterally?
What does it mean to say that defensive harm in war must be proportionate to be morally
permissible? Should all human suffering count for the same, morally speaking, or should the
suffering of civilians count for more in the proportionality calculation?
Tentative course overview – (subject to change)
1st week Moral responsibility in distributive and retributive justice
Alexander, Larry. 2015. Distributive Justice and Retributive Justice. In Oxford Handbook of
Distributive Justice, ed. S. Olsaretti: Oxford University Press.
Matravers, Matt. 2011. Mad, Bad, or Faulty? Desert in Distributive and Retributive Justice.
Responsibility and distributive justice: 136-151.
2nd week: Rights and responsibility based accounts of self defense
McMahan, Jeff. 2005. The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):
386–405.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1991. Self-Defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4): 283-310.
3rd week. Culpability based accounts of self defense
Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler. 2012. Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing.
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming.
Gardner, John, and François Tanguay-Renaud. 2011. Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense. Ethics
122 (1): 111-134.
th
4 week: Innocent threats
Otsuka, Michael. 1994. Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1): 74–
94.
Frowe, Helen. 2008. Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):
277-290.
5th week : Killing innocent bystanders
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1985. The Trolley Problem. Yale Law Journal 94 (6): 1395-1415.
FitzPatrick, William J. 2003. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Permissibility: In Defence of the Doctrine of
Double Effect. Analysis 63 (280): 317-321.
Otsuka, Michael. 1994. Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1): 74–
94.
6th week: Killing culpable bystanders
Benbaji, Yitzhak. 2005. Culpable Bystanders, Innocent Threats and the Ethics of Self-Defense.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (4): 585 - 622.
Øverland, Gerhard. 2011. Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability.
Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2): 122-136.
Optional Bazargan, Saba. 2013. Complicitous Liability in War. Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 177-195.
7th week : Just causes for war. Revolution, Humanitarian Intervention and Self Defense
Hurka, Thomas 2007. Liability and Just Cause. Ethics and International Affairs 21 (2): 199–218.
8th week. Proportionality in war
Hurka, Thomas. 2005. Proportionality in the Morality of War. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (1): 34–
66.
McMahan, Jeff. “Proportionate Defense.” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 23 (2014): 1–36
9th week. Open.
9th week: Killing in war.
Lazar, Seth. 2011. The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay. Ethics 122 (1): 8-9.
McMahan, Jeff. 2011. Who Is Morally Liable to Be Killed in War. Analysis 71 (3): 544-559.
Kutz, Christopher. 2005. The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War.
Philosophy & public affairs 33 (2): 148-180.
TBD
10th week killing civilians
Frowe, Helen. 2014. Non-Combatant Liability in War In How We Fight: Ethics in War, eds. H. Frowe
and G. Lang, 172-189: OUP.
Øverland, Gerhard. 2005. Contractual Killing. Ethics 115 (4): 692-720.
Tadros, Victor. 2014. Orwell's Battle with Brittain: Vicarious Liability for Unjust Aggression.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1): 42-77.
12th week. Proportionality in humanitarian interventions
McMahan, Jeff 2010. The Just Distribution of Harm between Combatants and Noncombatants.
Philosophy and Public Affairs
13th Terrorism
Scheffler, Samuel. 2006. Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive? Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1): 1-17.
Tadros, Victor. 2015. Wrongful Intentions without Closeness. Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (1): 52-74.
14th week Drones and autonomous weapon systems.
Strawser, Bradley Jay. 2013. Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military: Oup Usa.
Reading list (incomplete)
Alexander, Larry. 2015. Distributive Justice and Retributive Justice. In Oxford Handbook of
Distributive Justice, ed. S. Olsaretti: Oxford University Press.
Bazargan, Saba. 2013. Complicitous Liability in War. Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 177-195.
Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler. 2012. Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing.
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming.
FitzPatrick, William J. 2003. Acts, Intentions, and Moral Permissibility: In Defence of the Doctrine of
Double Effect. Analysis 63 (280): 317-321.
Frowe, Helen. 2014. Non-Combatant Liability in War In How We Fight: Ethics in War, eds. H. Frowe
and G. Lang, 172-189: OUP.
Frowe, Helen. 2008. Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):
277-290.
Gardner, John, and François Tanguay-Renaud. 2011. Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense. Ethics
122 (1): 111-134.
Hurka, Thomas. 2005. Proportionality in the Morality of War. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (1): 34–
66.
———. 2007. Liability and Just Cause. Ethics and International Affairs 21 (2): 199–218.
Kutz, Christopher. 2005. The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War.
Philosophy & public affairs 33 (2): 148-180.
Lazar, Seth. 2011. The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay. Ethics 122 (1): 8-9.
Matravers, Matt. 2011. Mad, Bad, or Faulty? Desert in Distributive and Retributive Justice.
Responsibility and distributive justice: 136-151.
McMahan, Jeff. 2005. The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):
386–405.
———. 2010. The Just Distribution of Harm between Combatants and Noncombatants. Philosophy
and Public Affairs 38 (4): 342-379.
———. 2011. Who Is Morally Liable to Be Killed in War. Analysis 71 (3): 544-559.
Moore, Michael S. 2007. Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability. University of
Pennsylvania Law Review: 395-452.
Otsuka, Michael. 1994. Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1): 74–
94.
———. 2008. Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping
Cases. Utilitas 20 (01): 92-110.
Rocheleau, Jordy. 2011. Liability, Just Cause, and Limits on the Multiplication of Purposes in War.
unpublished manuscript, available at http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME11/Rocheleau-ISME2011.pdf
Scheffler, Samuel. 2006. Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive? Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1): 1-17.
Strawser, Bradley Jay. 2013. Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military: Oup Usa.
Tadros, Victor. 2014. Orwell's Battle with Brittain: Vicarious Liability for Unjust Aggression.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1): 42-77.
———. 2015. Wrongful Intentions without Closeness. Philosophy & Public Affairs 43 (1): 52-74.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1985. Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle
in Looping Cases. Yale Law Journal 94 (6): 1395-1415.
———. 1991. Self-Defense. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4): 283-310.
Øverland, Gerhard. 2005. Contractual Killing. Ethics 115 (4): 692-720.
———. 2005. Killing Civilians. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3): 345-363.
Øverland, Gerhard. 2011. Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability.
Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2): 122-136.