Typhoon Isewan (Vera)
And Its Lessons
Cover photos (photo: Chunichi Shimbun)
Houses surrounded by driftwood
(Photograph taken on October 18, 1959)
People hurrying along the railway searching
for their families with rescued possessions
on their backs
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Towards C oll ab oration
bet ween Typho on Isewan (Vera )
and Hurricane K atrina
Hide a k i O da , Se c reta ry Ge n e r a l , Ja pa n Wat e r Forum
Hurricane Katrina landed on the coast of the Gulf
of Mexico early in the morning of August 29,
submerging the main part of New Orleans and causing
unprecedented damage. Even though preparations had
been made before its arrival, a significant number of
lives were lost. Despite warnings issued before Katrina
struck, many people were unable to evacuate, resulting
in disaster.
In 1959, Typhoon Isewan (Vera) hit central Japan
including Nagoya city and caused record damage to
the region due to high tides and floods. The region was
severely damaged and more than 5,000 lives were lost.
The disaster highlighted the importance of preparing
well for future attacks. One such preparation is to form
a comprehensive disaster management system and in
1961, two years later, the Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act was enacted. Typhoon Isewan (Vera) was
truly a turning point for disaster prevention systems
in Japan.
Unfortunately, however, the valuable lessons of
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) were not conveyed to the rest
of the world because of the language barrier. Therefore,
we decided to translate the important information of
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) into English.
People need to learn about what has happened
around the world in order to fully understand what
has happened in their own country. Without it, we
could not even recognize the fact itself. In this sense,
I hope that this booklet, which recounts the sad and
harsh experiences of Japanese people, may help restore
the areas affected by Katrina. In future, the precious
lessons being learned by American people will be told
worldwide, thus making the world a safer place against
water-related disasters.
Upon this occasion, I urge the international community
to consider the importance of the Hangen target:
“halving, by 2015, the number of lives lost to waterrelated disasters.” This is based on the concept that
almost all water-related disasters are predictable, and
so the loss of life can be minimized through adequate
warnings and evacuation.
To make the world a safer place against water-related
disasters, I hope international society will add the
Hangen target to the MDGs. This would be only one
step towards the final goal, but without passing the
first milestone, we cannot travel a million miles.
East and West,
With no distinction, big autumn storms
Attack us without pity.
Ei (Hideaki)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Contents
1. Typhoon Isewan (Vera) — the worst catastrophe in the history of Japan since WWII ..... 6
2. Reasons for the record storm surge disaster ....................................................................... 8
2-1 Landform prone to storm surge and path of the typhoon.................................................... 8
2-2 Weak coastal dyke structure and insufficient height ........................................................... 10
2-3 Sea-level zone spreading over a large area ............................................................................ 12
2-4 Nighttime disaster and lack of information transmission .................................................. 14
2-5 Many logs set drift from timber yards................................................................................... 16
3. Awareness of approaching typhoon .................................................................................. 18
4. Disaster response operation .............................................................................................. 19
4-1 All-out relief operations immediately following the disaster ............................................. 19
4-2 People fought hard to restore their life.................................................................................. 21
4-3 The first step towards restoration: closing the breaches in dykes ...................................... 23
5. Recovery process and restoration activities ...................................................................... 25
5-1 Reconstruction course............................................................................................................. 25
5-2 Reconstruction organization .................................................................................................. 25
5-3 Planned levee height ................................................................................................................ 25
5-4 Reconstruction activities......................................................................................................... 29
5-5 Central Japan Disaster Relief Department ........................................................................... 33
5-6 Restoration of orderly life ....................................................................................................... 34
5-7 Reestablishment of the road network, the arteries of restoration activities ..................... 36
6. Sinking land ....................................................................................................................... 38
6-1 Sinking land .............................................................................................................................. 38
6-2 Emergency bank rising for wave break construction .......................................................... 39
6-3 Full-scale levee construction .................................................................................................. 40
7. Japan after Typhoon Isewan .............................................................................................. 42
7-1 Changes in awareness of citizens in Japan after Typhoon Isewan (Vera) ......................... 42
7-2 Legal system for disaster prevention ..................................................................................... 43
7-3 Measures against storm surges in the three major bays ...................................................... 46
7-4 River dike Inspections ............................................................................................................. 50
8. Challenge to halve loss of human life ................................................................................ 52
8-1 Decrease of damage by water related disasters .................................................................... 52
8-2 Possibility of a Second Typhoon Isewan (Vera) ................................................................... 53
8-3 Preventing tragedy by water related disaster ........................................................................ 54
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
5
1. Typhoon Isewan (Vera) — the worst catastrophe in the history of Japan since WWII
Tremendous storm of Typhoon Isewan (Vera) struck the
Tokai Area on September 26, 1959.
Typhoon No. 15, which formed at sea to the east of the
Mariana Islands on September 21, developed very rapidly,
with central pressure falling by 91 hPa a day and its storm
zone expanding enormously. Even after passing its peak, the
typhoon remained strong, advanced north, and reached the
western part of Cape Shiono-Misaki, Wakayama Prefecture,
at 18:00 on September 26.
It crossed Honshu Island in about 6 hours, passed out
on to the Sea of Japan from the east of Toyama City, traveled
up the coast of the Hokuriku and Tohoku Areas, crossed the
northern part of the Tohoku Area, and then moved out to the
Pacific Ocean.
Since the typhoon was strong and had a large storm
area, strong winds rocked almost the whole of Japan. The
maximum wind speed recorded was 45.4 m/s (maximum
instantaneous wind speed: 55.3 m/s) in Irako (Atsumi-cho,
Aichi Prefecture), 37.0 m/s (maximum instantaneous wind
speed: 45.7 m/s) in Nagoya, and over 20 m/s (maximum
instantaneous wind speed: over 30 m/s) in almost every part
of Japan from Kyushu to Hokkaido.
An extraordinarily high surge of up to 3.45 m tore down
dykes along the coast and at river mouths. The flooding sea
water rushed inland, washing away many people who had
no time to escape. The inundated areas, which were at low
elevations, were difficult to drain and the delay led to poor
sanitary conditions, which caused victims of dysentery
infection.
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) caused the worst damage by
typhoon in the history of Japan, including 5,098 persons dead
or missing and 38,921 people injured.
Path of the typhoon
Typhoon Makurazaki.
Landfall on
September 17th, 1945
Path of Typhoon Isewan (Vera)
Typhoon Isewan features
Force at time of arrival on land
Air pressure at center: 929.5 mb (894 mb at peak )
Maximum wind speed: 50 m/s
Diameter: 250 km (wind speeds over 25 m)
Typhoon Muroto.
Landfall on
September 21st,
1934.
Typhoon Isewan.
Landfall on
September 26th, 1959.
Typhoon Number 13.
Landfall on
September 25th, 1953.
Typhoon courses
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Water, water everywhere...(Kanie Town, Ama District)
Damage caused by Isewan Typhoon
Prefecture
Casualties
(number)
Missing persons
(number)
Homes (number)
Injured persons
(number)
Washed away
Totally / partly destroyed
Submerged
Mie
1,233
48
5,688
1,339
23,172
62,655
Aichi
3,168
92
59,045
3,194
120,383
116,391
Gifu
86
18
1,709
118
16,086
11,089
Total
4,487
158
66,442
4,651
159,641
190,135
Source:
Mie:
Aichi:
Gifu:
Journal on the Ise Bay Typhoon Disaster, June, 1961
Ise Bay Typhoon Disaster Recovery Plan, March, 1960
Journal of Disaster Recovery for years 1959, 1960, 1961, 1965
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
7
2. Reasons for the record storm surge disaster
The area north of Ise Bay was traditionally engaged in
agriculture, and the land along the bay had been actively
reclaimed by drainage to increase the area of farmland during
the Edo Period. By the beginning of the Meiji Period, the
shore line seen today was formed, and the area has served as
the granary of the Chubu Area. The coastal industrial zones
in Nagoya and other cities were advantageous in terms of
harbors and abundant water resources, and showed one of
the fastest growth rates in Japan, powering the miraculous
economic recovery after WWII.
This was when Typhoon Isewan (Vera) struck the area.
There are several reasons why the typhoon caused the worst
disaster in Japanese history:
2-1 Landform prone to storm surges and path of the
typhoon
Storm surge is a phenomenon in which the sea level rises
abnormally. They occur when a fall in atmospheric pressure
causes the sea level to rise and strong winds drive the sea water
toward the coast. The degree of storm surge depends on the
topography of the land and sea bottom, as well as on the scale
and path of the typhoon. Typhoon Isewan (Vera) traveled
toward a bay that faced southward toward the typhoon, and
the bay, which extends south to north, is shallow for a long way.
Since the typhoon passed to the west of the bay, strong winds
from the south blew toward the inside of the bay, driving the
sea water toward the land and causing the abnormally high
storm surge.
Maximum instantaneous wind speed (m/s) during the period
Wind direction
Northwest
West
Northeast
Southwest
East
South
Nagoya City
North
Southeast
Wind blew in the
direction of the arrow
At least 45 m/s
30m/s - 44.9m/s
15m/s - 29.9m/s
Slower than 15 m/s
Kisogawa River
Maximum Tide Level 5.31m
(T.P.3.89)
Tide Level (m)
Atmospheric Pressure
Ise Bay
Atmospheric Pressure (mb)
Ibi – Nagaragawa River
Path o
f Typh
oo
n
Distribution of maximum wind speed
Measured Tide Level
Astronomical tide
Mean sea level of Tokyo Bay (T.P.)
Legend
Areas of muddy water
Breached levees and
embankments
8
Time (hours)
26th
27th
Map of bay area damage from the Typhoon Isewan
Tides at Nagoya Port and Changes in Atmospheric Pressure
(Journal of Ise Bay Typhoon Reconstruction
Volume 1: Ministry of Construction Central Japan
Construction Department. April, 1963. p. 206 )
As the typhoon approached, winds drove the water toward
the back of Ise Bay, which faces south, and the drop in
atmospheric pressure caused the water level to rise and
hence a record storm surge occurred.
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Photo: Chunichi Shimbun
Photo: Chunichi Shimbun
Inundation Due to Typhoon Isewan
Nanyo-cho, Minato Ward, Nagoya City,
became a part of the sea
(Photograph taken on the morning of September 27, 1959)
Residents of Kasugano, Nanyo-cho drying their clothes on the
roof while waiting for the water to recede
(Photograph taken on September 28, 1959)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
9
2-2 Weak coastal dyke structure and insufficient height
The coastal dykes at the time of the typhoon had been
constructed when the land was reclaimed in the Edo Period
and reinforced by lining the surface with rubble stones and
concrete. The dyke structure could not resist the wave pressure
of the tremendous storm surge as the height was insufficient
and the inland side, which was not lined, suffered scouring by
overtopping. Thus, the dykes were breached at many points.
In 1953, some 6 years before Typhoon Isewan (Vera), this
area, especially the southern part of Ise Bay, suffered serious
damage by Typhoon No. 13. Construction of a coastal dyke
was started to prevent damage by typhoons of a similar scale,
and almost 90% of the dyke was completed before Typhoon
Isewan (Vera). However, the dyke was not completed in the
northern area, which was seriously affected by Typhoon
Isewan (Vera).
Rubble stone
No lining
Coastal dyke before Typhoon Isewan (Vera)
Concrete block lining
Asphalt concrete
Asphalt concrete
Concrete block lining
Riprap
Concrete armor unit
Today’s coastal dyke
A breach in the dyke
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
A costal dyke washed away from its foundation
The masonry of a dyke pulled down
by the waves
A dyke destroyed
in the struggle with water
A house destroyed together with the dyke
Water flowing into residential areas through a breach in the dyke
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
11
2-3 Sea-level zone spreading over a large area
The area north of Ise Bay consisted mainly of land
reclaimed during the Edo Period and was no higher than sea
level. Thus, the lowlands were difficult to drain, and inundation
continued for more than 120 days in some districts. Analysis
Nagara River
after the typhoon revealed that the land had subsided since
WWII. The subsidence continued until the 1970s when the
use of underground water was regulated, and the dyke was
reinforced.
Nishikasugai District
Kiso River
Nakajima District
Kaizu-gun
Ibi River
Tsushima City
Nagoya
Nagoya City
Kintetsu
Nagoya
Line
Ama District
Saya Town
KansaiAtsuta Ward
honsen
National Highway
Line Nakagawa Ward
Route No. 1
Kuwana District
Inundation during
Typhoon Ise Bay
Aichi
District
Period of
inundation
Less than 1 day
Over 120 days
Flow line (sea
water)
Flow line (river
water)
Dyke break
Ise Bay
Yokkaichi City
Nagoya Harbor
Kuwana City
Shin River
Shonai River
31 to 120 days
Nikko River
1 to 30 days
Tokaido-honsen Line
Chita District
Ueno Town
Dykes broken during Typhoon Isewan and areas inundated
Kiso River
Anpachi District
Nikko River
Shin River
Shonai River
Nagoya Harbor
View of Ama District from the skies of Nagoya Harbor
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Inundation up to the eaves of houses in Nagashima Town
U.S. Air Force craft
transporting relief goods
(Sep. 29th 8 AM, Komaki airport)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
13
2-4 Nighttime disaster and lack of information transmission
The highest tidal level was recorded in Nagoya Harbor,
which was located at the innermost part of the bay, at 21:35
on September 26. Overtopping and dyke breakage started in
various districts at 20:00 to 21:00 in the evening. Since the
dyke started to give way at many points almost simultaneously,
the water rushed into the land and people had no time to
evacuate.
Residents taking refuge at night
At the time, telephone and TV were in only 20 to 30% of
houses, and the principal medium of conveying information
was the radio. However, winds packing a maximum
instantaneous wind speed of 60 m/s cut telephone and power
lines, and the power failure prevented typhoon information
and warnings from being broadcast.
Crossing the road in a boat
(Ueno Town, Chita District)
Minami Ward in Nagoya City paralysed by inundation
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Turbid stream of Nagara River in a sports ground
A Shinto shrine under 2m of water
Tagei Polder under water
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
15
2-5 Many logs set drift from timber yards
There were timber yards for storing imported timber at
Nagoya Harbor in the north of Ise Bay, and large quantities
of logs were washed away and caused serious damages to
buildings, etc.
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) caused not only a storm surge but
also heavy rainfall over the basins of the rivers that flow into
Ise Bay. Luckily, the flood from the rivers reached the peak at
the river mouths about 10 hours after the maximum storm
surge. Had they occurred simultaneously, the damage would
have been even more serious.
“Tragedy caused by driftwood —
Eastern part of Nagoya Port
Houses destroyed by logs
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Logs washed into a residential area
Logs washed into a residential area
Logs blocked at a dyke
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
17
3. Awareness of approaching typhoon
The arrival of Typhoon 15, which was named on
September 22, was broadcasted already in the morning of
September 24. The typhoon developed thereafter very rapidly,
and on September 25, it was at about 1,000 km south of the Kii
Peninsula traveling northwest at a speed of 28 km. However,
newspaper headlines on the day before landing and on the day
of landing were as unremarkable as “Typhoon will approach
tomorrow night” and “Tokai in the range of severe winds in
the afternoon”.
1) Article of Newspaper
Chubu Nihon Shinbun, morning edition of September 26
(Saturday)
“Typhoon No.15 approaching without weakening. Tokai in
the range of severe winds in the afternoon
A huge typhoon No. 15 is approaching Shikoku on 26. In the
afternoon and night of 26, the southern coastal area west of
Kanto will be in the range of severe winds.
Typhoon No. 15 was born in the Mariana Islands at 15:00
on September 21, developed into huge typhoon only in two
days.
It is as strong as Typhoon No. 12, which stroke Kyushu on
September 13, 1954, and is one of the largest typhoons after
WWII. Its radius is as large as 700 km, and will certainly affect
the majority of the Hoshu Island regardless of its course.”
Chubu Nihon Shinbun, evening edition of September 26
(Saturday)
“Typhoon No. 15 heading Tokai
Storm in the midnight
The largest this year
Typhoon No. 15 will likely to land on the Kii Peninsula at
8:00 on September 26 and travel northeast attacking the Tokai
Area. The Nagoya Meteorological Observatory announced at
14:20 that at 14:00 Typhoon No. 15 was on the sea about 200
km south of Cape Muroto traveling north and Kumanonada
is already in the range of strong winds and storm. Strong east
winds of over 20 m is blowing along the coast of the Tokai
Area. In mountain areas of Gifu and Mie Prefectures, it has
rained heavily since 25, recording a rainfall of 150 to 200 mm
up to present.”
2) “My experiences during Typhoon Ise Bay” by Susumu
Honda (working at the Nagoya Meteorological Observatory at
the time) (Cited from “Port and disaster prevention, No. 103,
Council of Port and Coastal Disaster Prevention in 1988”)
At 11:00 AM on September 26, the Nagoya Meteorological
Observatory issued warnings (warnings are issued when
serious disasters are predicted). The issuance was appropriate
and fast for an observatory at that time. If the warnings were
delayed, it would have received severe criticism since the
typhoon resulted in such a disaster. On other days, I as a
member of the observatory felt relieved.
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
In the evening of the day, people involved in disaster
prevention and the press gathered in the forecasting room
(where meteorological charts are prepared and forecast and
information are announced), and the atmosphere became
increasingly hurried.
As soon as an announcement was made, observatory staff
started to transmit the information through telephone in loud
voices, the press asked their questions and transmitted it to
their companies, and members of prefectural and municipal
governments in charge of flood fighting transmitted
information through the radio systems mounted on their
patrol cars (radio systems were not deployed as they are now).
Their voices mixed with the voices of observatory members
answering to inquiries by general people.
(Paragraphs omitted)
As night approached, winds and rain intensified, shuttering
and almost breaking windows. We tore up tatami mats from
sleeping rooms and nailed the mats to the windows using long
nails. People from the prefectural and municipal governments
helped us.
Then the roof of the forecasting room, which was galvanized
sheet iron, started to turn up (the forecasting room was on the
second floor of a two-storied building), and the rain started
to fall directly into the room. Meteorological charts, etc. were
quickly transferred to a first-floor room, where rain leaked
but the amount was yet small.
I don’t remember the hour, but some time in the night. The
majority of the roof turned up, and the building itself became
dangerous.
The director sent a telegram to the Tokyo Meteorological
Observatory and the Meteorological Agency, stating that the
building was dangerous, it was difficult to continue duties and
the staff would evacuate.
Somebody screamed “Hey, an evacuation order was
issued!”
When everyone evacuated, a telephone in the forecasting
room rang like an alarm. The telephone line was still alive. Hit
by intense rain near a window, Mr. Y answered the phone.
He shouted “It will go away soon. Don’t give up. Don’t give
up!”
However, the winds from typhoon had not changed
the direction yet (wind direction changes and becomes the
opposite when the center of typhoon passes), and even he did
not know how strong the typhoon would be.
The power was cut off and telephone was dead. Nagoya
City was paralyzed. It was when a record breaking high waves
attacked the coast near harbors, and huge logs from timber
yards were destroying the city. The meteorological observatory
could estimate serious disaster but it was much later that we
found how serious the disaster was.
4. Disaster response operation
4-1 All-out relief operations immediately following
the disaster
On September 27, having realised the magnitude of the disaster
from the status reports on the damage in the disaster-stricken
areas, local governments and related agencies promptly set up
disaster relief headquarters to organise various relief activities
in the afflicted areas.
On the same day, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked in the
southern Nagoya and all municipalities of Ama District. In
addition, a law concerning state aid for restoration of public
structures was applied to the five wards of Minami, Minato,
Atsuta, Nakagawa and Mizuho in the southern part of
Nagoya.
On September 27, various activities began. Refuge shelters
were opened at schools and other public facilities and helipads
were set up at various points including Meijo Park at the centre
of the town. Transportation and evacuation of victims began
using helicopters and boats of the Air Self Defense Force
(ASDF) and the U.S. Force in Japan, while food was rationed
to about 160,000 victims.
On September 28, the National Government joined local
governments and private participants in the relief and
restoration activities. Many citizens also took part in the
distribution of boiled rice and other relief items.
Members of Self Defence Forces evacuating residents
On September 29, the Self Defense Forces joined the relief
team and gave strong support in the evacuation of the
sufferers, transportation of relief goods and restoration of
damaged facilities.
As the magnitude of the disaster was reported to the rest of
the country, lorryloads of relief items were delivered from all
over, and convoys of lorries loaded with relief goods were very
much in the news.
In the inundated areas, however, there were no effective
means of restoration. No improvement took place before
the expiration of the six-day relief period under the Disaster
Relief Act, and the period was extended several times for
maintaining the relief activities. In the southern part of Ama
District the relief period was extended by about three months
until December 31, which was unprecedented in Japan.
Providing medical treatment (Yatomi Town, Ama District)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
19
Self Defence Forces transporting relief goods
Donated relief goods
at Nagoya National Hospital
Inundation in Nanyo-cho, Minami District, Nagoya City
High-school children sorting out relief materials
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T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
4-2 People fought hard to restore their life
Affected people did not only stay sad but fought hard to
restore their life.
1) Students of Daido Industrial High School
Daido Town was one of the most seriously affected areas.
Daido Industrial High School (present Daido High School)
was seriously affected including the death of 2 students, 26
members of students’ families, and 2 members of teachers’
families.
The school building, which was just completed, was
the tallest building in the district. Thus, over 2,500 people
evacuated to classrooms on the second to fourth floors.
Students and teachers of the high school fought as one
body to rescue people. On rafts marked with flags of “Daido
Industrial High School Students’ Troup”, they transported
rescue goods for refugees, injured people and the sick to
hospitals, and medical goods to patients, and rescued people
from the roof of inundated houses day and night. Over 200
students helped building and paddling rafts, transmitting
information, transporting foods, distributing goods, medical
activities, transporting patients, and other rescue activities.
The earnest activities of the students helped the town to be
restored gradually but steadily.
Even while engaged in restoration activities, both students
and teachers hoped to start classes again as soon as possible.
The school was closed only during 20 days from September
28 to October 20. When not all but some classes started again,
students and teachers were delighted. However, there were
still people sheltering on the fourth floor.
All classes restarted on November 15. The efforts of
students and teachers enabled classes to be restarted only in a
month and a half from such a serious disaster.
Transporting goods on boats and rafts
Transporting goods on boats and rafts
Front of Daido Industrial High School
Students restoring the school from damage
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
21
2) Local people
There are few records on the rescue and restoration activities by
local residents. Although experiences of such people are very
precious, opportunities to hear their experiences are decreasing
as the years go by.
People finding shelter at Minami Ward Office
3) Elementary school students
Elementary school students also had to live inconvenient days.
They wanted from the bottom of the heart to return to ordinary
life and go to school as soon as possible.
Students of Chidori Elementary School
helping restoration of the school
Students of Chidori Elementary School
cleaning the school after typhoon
22
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Emergency kitchen at Minami Ward Office
There were elementary school children who had to evacuate
their homes. Their essays on their experiences are available.
Students of Shiramizu Elementary School happy to see
their teachers again after a long lapse of time
Rafts had to be used to cross the field
of Meiji Elementary School
4-3 The first step towards restoration: closing the breaches in dykes
Sandbags being passed by hand to the breach
Temporary repair works
Temporary repair works near Karigaike
on the left bank Kiso River
Temporary repairs on Isojima
After the passage of the typhoon, which all took place in a single
night, hideous scars were left in various parts of the afflicted
area. Sea water mercilessly poured in through the breaches.
The disaster was expected to become worse and worse unless
effective measures were taken. And no one knew when the next
typhoon would strike. Local residents were troubled by a feeling
of impatience and fear.
First, the water must be stopped. Leaving their own inundated
houses as they were, people, led by members of the fire-fighting
team, started the restoration works on the dykes that had
collapsed.
The breaches, however, were so many and so large that in some
cases even the mass mobilization of people could be of little
effect.
On the day subsequent to the attack of the typhoon, 500 firemen
gathered to close a large breach 150m in length, through which
muddy water was still rushing in. At noon, they started to
throw sandbags into the water at the breach. Sandbags thrown
in, however, were carried away by the rushing water and did not
stay in place. Desperate efforts were made in spite of insecure
footing, but the efforts proved to be in vain and little was
achieved before nightfall.
On the next day, firemen resumed the work with the help from
100 members of the Self Defense Forces they had asked for.
The current nevertheless remained rapid and the water became
deeper and deeper. Deciding that increasing the number of
restoration team members could not improve the situation, they
requested the Ministry of Construction to send in bulldozers.
Towards the evening of October 1, five days after they started
to work on the dyke, the breach was at last completely closed.
5,000 men in all had participated in the work and about 32,000
jute sacks were used in making the sandbags.
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
23
Final stage of temporary repair works
Temporary repair works — pilling up sandbags
Drainage by temporary pumps
Completion of repair works
Breach at Karigaike on Kiso River
Engineers gathered to work out the best ways to effect temporary
closing of the dykes. The restoration project team in the end
adopted a combination of “fascine mattresses” and “sand-pump
dredgers” whose effectiveness had been proved by the Chubu
Regional Construction Bureau of the Ministry of Construction
in the restoration works after the Typhoon No.13 in 1953.
lattices 1m by 1m. A sheet of fascines is then sandwiched by two
latticed fascines, and tied together with steel wire. A number of
these latticed fascine units are connected with one another to
form a “fascine mattress”, 10 to 21 metres long, 6 to 10 metres
wide and 0.5 to 0.6 metre thick, the exact sizes depending on
the conditions of the breach to be closed.
Materials required for the project were gathered from all over
the country. The unprecedented quantity of materials used
were exemplified by the 340,000 fascines, 5,500 cubic metres of
rubble and 360,000 straw bags.
The fascine mattresses are carried to the breach in the dyke
and sunk into the water by placing rocks on top of them. Earth
dredged up by sand-pump dredgers are then poured on to the
fascine mattresses. The above procedure is repeated until the
top surface of the sunken mattresses become level with the
water surface. Earth plugged into the openings in the fascines
and earth stopped by the sunken fascine mattresses shut off the
stream and so a temporary dyke is created.
“Fascine Mattresses” and “Sand-Pump Dredgers”
First, “fascines” (15cm thick bundles of twigs bound with ropes
or steel wire) are prepared and these are woven together to form
24
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
5. Recovery process and restoration activities
5-1 Reconstruction course
1959 9.26 Typhoon Number 15 hits (Typhoon Isewan)
9.27 Disaster Reconstruction Department established at
the Ministry of Construction
9.28 ”Central Japan Disaster Relief Department”
established in Nagoya
10. 4 Temporary levee repairs started (5,360 m totally
destroyed. 132,000 m3 of soil. 55 day construction
period)
10.20 Construction started on National Highway 1 using
the drum can method.
11. 4 Drum can construction finished on National
Highway 1
11.16 Ise Bay High Water Relief Committee established
at the Deputy Director cabinet meeting
11.18 Temporary levee repairs under Ministry of
Construction management completed
12. 9 Central Japan Disaster Relief Department
disbanded
1960 1.27 Restoration work groundbreaking ceremony
2.18 Basic plan of action for high water relief determined
by the Ise Bay High Water Relief Committee.
1961. 9.30 All Ise Bay High Water Relief Committee
construction completed.
5-2 Reconstruction organization
(1) “Central Japan Disaster Relief Department”
Members;
Director.............Deputy Prime Minister
Deputy directorSecretary of State
Vice director .....Junior Cabinet Ministers or Administrative
Vice Ministers from various government agencies appointed
by the Director.
Staff....................Personnel from various government
agencies appointed by the Director.
The following committees were also established in the
Department and were responsible for collecting and analyzing
information to make emergency policy recommendations to
the related ministries, prefectures and municipalities.
a) “Temporary Levee-Repair and Drainage Committee”
b) “Residential Committee”
c) “Emergency Committee”
Source: “Typhoon Isewan Recovery Construction”
5-3 Planned levee height
Actual figures for the planned levee height were determined
by the Ise Bay High Water Relief Committee set up following
the Typhoon Isewan. The following summary is an excerpt
from “Lectures on Disaster Prevention Techniques by Mr.
Atsushi Iwama, Senior Deputy Director for the Ministry of
Construction Rivers Bureau Ise Bay High Water Relief Efforts.
May 1960.”
Weather and ocean conditions used in planning tide height
Planned tide level is determined by “using the average
tide level during typhoon season (July to October) as the
atmospheric tide level, with the tide level variation and
wave surging during typhoon season.” Planned tide level is
typically calculated not by looking at the previous maximum,
but alternatively by considering the frequency in which both
the previous maximum tide level variation can occur during
the average spring tide level. Using current examples from
Nagoya gives:
A) Previous maximum tide level
B) Average spring tide level
C) Previous maximum tide level variation
D) Typhoon average ride level
3.89 m
1.22 m
3.55 m
0.97 m
Planned sea level was calculated this time as 0.97 + 3.55
= 4.52 m, which is higher than the 3.89 m of A, and lower
than the 4.77 m of B + C. This is because B + C rarely occur
simultaneously.
During coastal reconstruction following Typhoon Number
13 in 1953, adding maximum sea level variation at the time
of 1.60 meters to the spring average sea level of 1.20 meters
resulted in a planned tide level of 2.8 meters.
Planned wave height was calculated using the Molitor
formula, and took into account records documenting the
disasters from Typhoon Number 13 in 1953, and the Ise Bay
Typhoon in 1959 (where wave height around Nagoya was
2.90 meters). While wave height calculations are merely
estimates that lack actual survey data, they are considered
to be reasonable figures. Table 7-5 contains calculations for
average tide level and wave heights in the Nagoya region.
*Source: Typhoon Isewan Disaster Reconstruction Report
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
25
List of mean high tide and wave height variation during typhoon season by district.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Mean high tide
during typhoon
season
Variation
Wave height
(1)+(2)+(3)
T.P 0.79
1.60
2.50
T.P 4.89≒5.00
Kushida Riv. - Shiroko
1.04
2.14
2.80
5.98 6.00
Shiroko - Suzuka Riv.
1.04
2.71
2.80
6.55 6.60
Suzuka Riv. - Mitaki Riv.
1.05
3.00
2.80
6.85 6.90
Mitaki Riv. - Asake Riv.
1.05
3.00
2.90
6.95 7.00
Asake Riv. – Nawa
0.97
3.55
2.90
7.42 7.50
Nawa - Oono
0.87
2.79
2.60
6.26 6.50
Oono - Noma
0.79
2.79
2.90
6.48 6.50
Noma - Morozaki
0.80
2.54
2.90
6.24 6.30
Morozaki – Kouwa
0.80
2.54
2.50
5.84 5.90
Kouwa – Handa
0.90
2.75
2.50
6.15 6.20
Handa – Okkawa
0.90
2.75
2.60
6.25 6.30
Okkawa - Kamezaki
0.90
2.75
2.00
5.65 5.70
Kamezaki – Takahama
0.90
2.75
1.30
4.95 5.00
Takahama – Isshiki
0.90
2.75
2.60
6.25 6.30
Isshiki - Jinno
0.82
2.65
2.30
5.77 5.80
Jinno - Jinnoshinden
0.82
2.65
2.40
5.87 5.90
Jinnoshinden - Oosu
0.82
2.47
2.00
5.29 5.30
Oosu - Magusa
0.82
2.20
2.00
5.02 5.10
Magusa – Irako
0.82
1.71
2.00
4.53 4.60
District
Toba - Kushida Riv.
The Nagoya coefficient (*) was used to calculate average tide levels for locations outside Nagoya during typhoon
season (July, August, September, October)
(*) (Mean high tide during typhoon season (0.97))/ (Mean Spring tide (1.22))=0.79
26
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Units: T.P.m
Nagoya City
Ise Bay
Pacific Ocean
Diagram of planned levee heights for Ise Bay high water reconstruction efforts
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
27
Planned levee height +7.50 meters
Planned tide height + 4.52 meters
Wave collision height + margin 2.98 meters
High tide during Ise Bay Typhoon +3.89 meters
Average high tide during typhoon season +0.97 meters
lev Shap
ee e
dis prio of
ast r to
er
Ise Bay Typhoon estimated tide +0.34 meters
High water levee height reference points
Average high tide during typhoon season
Maximum deviation during Ise Bay Typhoon
Planned tide level
Wave collision height
Wave collision level
Planned levee height
T.P + 0.97m
3.55m
4.52m (Average high tide during typhoon season + Maximum deviation during Ise Bay Typhoon )
2.90m
7.42m
7.50m (Planned tide level+ Wave collision height+ margin 0.08m)
JR Kansai railroad
Kiso River
Ibi, Nagara River
View of the Kisogawa river high water levee completed in 1962.
Table of high tide river districts
River name
Kiso
Ibi, Nagara
Total
Total length
Right bank
Outlet to JR railway bridge
L = 8391 meters
Outlet to JR railway bridge
L = 9530 meters
17,921 meters
32.991m
Left bank
1.8 k to JR railway bridge
L = 6,600 meters
Outlet to JR railway bridge
L = 8,470 meters
15,070 meters
• When looking from upstream to downstream, the right side is considered the right bank, and the left side is considered the left bank.
28
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
5-4 Reconstruction activities
Due to the unprecedented scale of the disaster, a full force
reconstruction initiative was launched by the government.
The first phase involved establishing a “Central Japan Disaster
Relief Headquarter” on September 29th, 1959, the third day of
the disaster. The department was based in Nagoya and chaired
by the then Deputy Prime Minister Shuji Masutani to extend
all possible means to the recovery project. On October 26, a
provisional 33rd session of parliament was convened where
disaster related legislations including a supplementary budget
were passed in rapid succession. The government immediately
started to implement those legislations with an extraordinary
amount of resolve in the reconstruction project.
During reconstruction, the Ministry of Construction Central
Japan Regional Construction Office that was in charge of
emergency reconstruction of river systems, and the Ministry
of Construction Kiso River Construction Office located
in Kuwana City, the center of the disaster area, maintained
a close cooperative relationship with the aforementioned
Central Japan Disaster Relief Headquarter in order to make a
full commitment to reconstruction.
Among a wide variety of different measures conducted at both
national and local level, this chapter provides a quick overview
of government efforts, and focuses on countermeasures
taken by the local authorities belonging to the Ministry of
Construction.
Given the hitherto unmatched scale of the disaster, the
government held a 33rd special session of parliament on
October 27th, 1959, where it established a comprehensive
range of long-lasting disaster prevention schemes based on
scientific assessment that focused on quick flood prevention
and soil restoration. These legislative efforts on the Ise Bay
Typhoon, along with severe rainstorms during the 1959 July
rainy season and water damage caused by Typhoon Number
7 in August in Gifu Prefecture’s Yoro City Neko district
(Makitagawa, tributary river to Ibigawa river), resulted in
the Diet passing the next draft of special disaster-related
legislation. 16)
• Ministry of Construction
1) Special measures law for water damage reconstruction of
public works facilities subjected to water damage in July
and August, or wind and flood damage in August and
September, 1959 (December 3rd 1959, Law Number 171.)
Description
i) Legislation increasing the government shares of
subsidy to promote disaster reconstruction projects
in restoring public works facilities, and preventing
future disasters in the specified areas affected by the
aforementioned disaster.
ii) Within budget, legislation allowing the national
government to assist with two thirds of the cost of
materials used for flood prevention by Prefectural
governments and flood fighting administration bodies
for specified items.
iii) Special measures law for storm serge countermeasure
plan in regions bordering Ise Bay damaged by
Typhoon Number 15 of 1959 (December 3rd, 1959.
Law Number 172)
Description
Special law establishes a high assistance rate from the
national treasury for projects (Ise Bay storm serge
countermeasures) related to new construction, renovation
and reconstruction of facilities in order to prevent damage
from storm serge, typhoon winds, flooding and other
abnormal natural phenomena in the specified areas
bordering Ise Bay with coast lines and river systems
significantly damaged by Typhoon Number 15.
2) Special measures law for the removal of sediment deposits
and fresh water from typhoon wind and rains in August
and September 1959 (December 3rd, 1959. Law Number
173).
Description
Special law allows subsidies of 90% on costs for regional
public agencies or other specified entities in regions
specified by government in order to remove those
sedimentary deposits and fresh water found to be at
levels determined by government that were caused by the
aforementioned typhoon winds and rains.
3) Special Public Housing Act Law related to water damage
in August and wind and flood damage in August and
September 1959 (December 3rd, 1959. Law Number 174).
Description
i) Legislation allows increases in the rate of national
subsidies in accordance with the Public Housing Act
for housing providers to supply Type-Two public
housing for lease to residents that occupied housing
destroyed by the aforementioned damage in regions
specified by government order.
ii) As an exception of the General Law on Industry
Worker Residence Fund Loans, the legislation allows
housing loan funds to extend the redemption period
by 3 years, in effect allowing a 3 year deferment,
regardless of the financial conditions stated in the
same law, when a housing provider meeting certain
conditions builds housing within 2 years for rent to
industrial workers that occupied housing destroyed
by wind and flood damage in August and September
in areas specified by government order.
• Office of the Prime Minister
1) Special
Loan
Flotation
Law
for
regional
public agencies subject to wind and flood
damage in July, August, and September 1959.
(December 4th, 1959. Law Number 175)
Description
Legislation allows specified regional public authorities
subject to the aforementioned water, wind and flood
damage to issue regional bonds to compensate insufficient
government revenue and use for disaster countermeasure
costs regardless of the provisions in Article 5 of the
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
29
Regional Finances Law, with the national government
supplementing both the principle and interest at set rates
for regional bonds issued to pay for recovery projects
related to light damage to public civil infrastructure,
public schools, and facilities used in agriculture, forestry
and fishery industries.
2) Special exemption law on the amount of disaster consolation
payments offered to members of Municipalities Officials
Mutual Aid Associations in areas subject to water damage
in July and August of 1959, or wind and flood damage in
August and September of 1959. (December 7th, 1959. Law
Number 179).
Description
Legistlation allows increases in the sum insured for
consolation payments to be up to 2 months pay for members
of Municipalities Officials Mutual Aid Associations that
suffered damage to their home or household property
in areas as specified by government order from the
aforementioned water, or wind and flood damage.
• Ministry of Finance
1) Special Measures Law related to the sale of state-owned
machinery to medium and small businesses that suffered
water damage in August 1959 or wind and flood damage
in August and September, 1959. (December 10th 1959.
Law Number 191).
Description
Special action is taken to provide medium and small
businesses subject to the aforementioned damage with
state-owned machinery and equipment at low cost sale
prices, low cost loans, or for replacement.
• Ministry of Education
1) Special Action related to disaster recovery of public school
buildings that suffers water damage in August 1959 or
wind and flood damage in August and September, 1959.
(December 5th, 1959. Law Number 176).
Description
i) Special exemption allows the national government to
subsidy three quarters of the cost of reconstruction
expenses for public school facilities subject to the
aforementioned damage (normal amount according
to the Law on National Burden of Public School
Facility Disaster Reconstruction is two thirds).
ii) Within budget, the national government subsidizes
two thirds of the reconstruction costs for public social
education facilities in damaged regions.
2) Special Action related to disaster recovery of private
school facilities that suffered wind and flood damage in
August and September, 1959 (December 5th, 1959. Law
Number 177).
30
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Description
i) Within budget, the national government subsidizes
one half of the reconstruction costs for private
school facilities in damaged regions that suffered the
aforementioned damage.
ii) In addition to ordinary administration, private
school foundations are allowed to offer loan services,
including to individually established schools,
limited for the reconstruction cost incurred by the
aforementioned damage.
• Ministry of Health and Welfare
1) Special measures law to maintain public sanitation in
areas subject to water damage in August 1959, or wind and
flood damage in August and September, 1959 (December
10th, 1959. Law Number 184).
Description
Legislation allows increases in the government share
in the costs necessary for prevention activities related
to the aforementioned damage in accordance with the
Infectious Disease Prevention Act for specified municipal
and prefectural governments, as well as allows the
national government to subsidize one half of disaster
reconstruction costs within budget for waterworks in
damaged municipalities, and two thirds for the cost of
sanitation facilities.
2) Special measures law for reconstruction of medical
facilities that suffered water damage in August 1959, or
wind and flood damage in August and September, 1959
(December 10th, 1959. Law Number 185).
Description
i) Legislation allows the national government to subsidize
one half of the reconstruction costs within budget for
public medical facilities (excludes medical practices
directly controlled by national health insurance) in
damaged areas specified by government order.
ii) Legislation allows specified financial institutions
to offer more favorable loan conditions for disaster
reconstruction for private medical operations in
damaged regions regardless of the regulations of other
laws.
3) Special measures law for disaster relief of prefectures that
suffers water damage in August 1959, or wind and flood
damage in August and September, 1959 (December 10th,
1959. Law Number 186).
Description
i) Legislation categorizes expenses disbursed for relief
projects of specified facilities in specified damaged
prefectures caused by the aforementioned damage to
be considered as relief costs in accordance with the
Disaster Relief Act and therefore eligible for subsidies
from the national treasury.
ii) For the year of 1959, for damaged prefectures, the
national treasury subsidizes the cost of general tax
for disaster relief projects when the cost exceeds one
quarter (usually one half) of yearly projected revenue
of the corresponding prefecture in the same year,
calculated at the normal rate of taxation.
4) Special measures law on disaster reconstruction of social
welfare facilities that suffered wind and flood damage in
August and September 1959. (December 10th, 1959. Law
Number 187).
Description
Special exception outlines share of contribution from
prefectural and national treasuries as set forth by the
Welfare Act and Child Welfare Act for disaster relief costs
of social and child welfare facilities in disaster regions
affected by the aforementioned damage, and allows public
funds to be used for assistance projects, including for
privately established child welfare facilities.
5) Special measures law on maternal and child welfare loans
for people subject to water damage in August 1959, or
wind and flood damage in August and September, 1959
(December 10th, 1959. Law Number 188).
Description
i) Legislation allows those affected from the
aforementioned damage that applied for maternal
and child welfare loans from after the damage until
the last day of September, 1960, a two-year deferment
extension of occupational loans and business
continuation loans, and a two year interest-free
deferment on housing repair loans.
ii) Legislation allows the national government to loan
three times (usually two times) of the amount that
is included in a special account as loan resources
to be used for maternal and child welfare funds for
those affected by the damage in specified prefectures
(including 5 large cities) for the years of 1959 and
1960.
6) Special measures law on assisting national health insurance
for areas subject to the Disaster Relief Act during water
damage in August 1959 or wind and flood damage in
August and September, 1959 (December 10th, 1959. Law
Number 189). .
Description
Limited to the year of 1959, the law allows the national
government to provide subsidies to those insured by
national health insurance (not including the national
health insurance society) in areas affected by the
aforementioned damage, and determines the conditions,
amount and calculation method of subsidies.
7) Special measures law on welfare pensions for those
affected by water damage in July and August of 1959, or
wind and flood damage in August and September of 1959.
(December 10th, 1959. Law Number 190).
Description
Legislation reinstates welfare pension payments for the
period from November 1959 to April 1960 for welfare
recipients, or the spouse or dependent thereof, that were
affected by the aforementioned damage when the payments
should have been cancelled based on that person’s income
level in 1958. Pension payments are reinstated on the
condition that person’s income in 1959 did not exceed
a certain limit (the standard income amount in which
welfare pension payments from May 1960 to April of 1961
are cancelled).
• Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
1) Special measures law for reconstruction projects of
agricultural, forestry and fishing industry facilities
affected by water damage in July and August of 1959, or
wind and flood damage in August and September of 1959.
(December 3rd, 1959. Law Number 169).
Description
Legislation allows to set forth a legal exception related to
provisional measures of the national treasury subsidy, and
permits the national government to offer high subsidy for
recovery of agricultural, forestry and fishery facilities affected
by the aforementioned damage, together with subsidy for
recovery of the settlement facilities in cleared land and
cultivation facilities for marine plants and animals.
2) Special measures law on the loan of funds for paying
insurance of optional life insurance due to wind and flood
damage in August and September 1959. (December 3rd,
1959. Law Number 170).
Description
Legislation allows funds to be loaned from the National
Agricultural Insurance Fund that are required by the joint
association of agricultural mutual relief associations for
paying optional life insurance funds for buildings affected
by wind and flood damage in August and September of
1959.
3) Special law on the sale of rice grain to damaged farms
affected by severe rain storms in July and August of 1959,
or hail storms in August and September 1959. (December
7th, 1959. Law Number 180).
Description
Legislation provides a means to sell rice grain at an
exclusive price in order for farmers in the scarcity of rice
grain for subsistence use due to the significant damage
by the aforementioned disaster to secure rice grain for
subsistence use.
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
31
4) Special measures law to subsidize desalting activities
for agricultural land damaged by salinization due to the
violent wind and rains in September of 1959. (December
7th, Law Number 171)
2) Special measures law on loans to middle and small
businesses that suffered water damage in August of 1959,
or wind and flood damage in August and September of
1959. (December 10th, 1959. Law Number 193).
Description
Legislation provides national subsidy for desalting
activities performed by local public agencies in order to
quickly remove salt from specified agricultural lands that
were inundated by sea water from the aforementioned
damage.
Description
Legislation lays out the means necessary to lower interest
rates of the Shoko Chukin Bank in order to facilitate
reconstruction loans to middle and small businesses
affected by the aforementioned damage. This law
establishes an exception to the Small Business Credit
Insurance Act and Small Business Loan Assistance Act
by raising the compensatory ratio of bond insurance for
reconstruction loans, and lowering insurance premiums.
5) Special measures law on the construction of collectively
used small fishing vessels subject to wind and flood
damage in September 1959. (December 7th 1959. Law
Number 182).
Description
Legislation provides national subsidy for the necessary
costs for fishery cooperative unions to construct
joint-ownership small fishing vessels that suffered the
aforementioned wind and flood damage.
6) Partial amendment to the Provisional Measures Act related
to loans for agriculture, forestry and fishing industries
damaged by natural disaster. (December 10th, 1959. Law
Number 192).
Description
Legislation provides loan assistance for those agriculturist recognized as having received the prescribed report
about damage to livestock to cover expenses necessary
for acquiring domestic livestock, domestic fowl or small
fishing vessels. In addition, the law raises business loan
limits and provides means to extend loan redemption
periods for damaged agricultural, forestry and fishery
operations in specified regions that suffered damage
from severe rainstorms in July and August of 1959, or
severe wind and rainstorms in the beginning and middle
of August, or in September of 1959.
• Ministry of International Trade and Industry
1) Partial amendment to the Middle and Small Business
Credit Insurance Corporation Act. (December 5th, 1959.
Law Number 178).
Description
Legislation increasing the amount of government
contributions to the Middle and Small Business Credit
Insurance Corporation in order to facilitate loans to
middle and small businesses subject to water damage in
August 1959, or wind and flood damage in August and
September 1959.
32
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
3) Special measures law for disaster reconstruction of
cooperative business association facilities subject to water
damage in August of 1959, or wind and flood damage in
August and September of 1959. (December 16th, 1959.
Law Number 197).
Description
Legislation allows government subsidy for the costs
required for disaster reconstruction of cooperative
business association facilities subject to the aforementioned
damage.
• Ministry of Labor
1) Special measures law for unemployment relief in areas
subject to water damage in July and August of 1959, or
wind and flood damage of August and September, 1959.
(December 9th, 1959. Law Number 183).
Description
Legislation provides special government subsidy for
necessary expenses for regional public agencies to provide
unemployment relief until the end of 1959 in regions
subject to the aforementioned damage.
2) Unemployment Insurance Exception Law related to water
damage in July and August, 1959, or wind and flood
damage in August and September, 1959. (December 14th,
1959. Law Number 195).
Description
Legislation establishes special measures required to
recognize those not working due to unavoidable loss of
work from the aforementioned damage as unemployed,
and allows unemployment insurance to those insured.
5-5 Central Japan Disaster Relief Department
The national government established the “Central Japan
Disaster Relief Department” in Nagoya on September 29th,
1959 to promote recovery activities in the Tokai region
damaged by the Typhoon Number 15. Deputy Prime
Minister Shuji Masutani was appointed as the Department
Director, Secretary of State Ishihara Kanshiro as the Deputy
Director, and the Director was responsible for appointing
junior cabinet ministers or administrative vice ministers from
related government administrations as Vice Directors and
administrative staff.
Based on this structural organization, the department
met twice daily in the morning and evening starting from
September 30th, then at least once every day from October
10th, then regularly every other month from November 7th.
Three committees, “Levee Repair and Drainage Committee,”
“Disaster Emergency Committee” and “Residential
Committee,” were set up to collect and analyze information on
exceptional measures and coordinate emergency actions by
the related ministries, prefectures and municipal governments
in the following areas: stopping levee failure, drainage work,
rescuing, relocation, provision of food, clothing and sleeping
materials for victims according to the Emergency Relief
Act, medical services, epidemic prevention, construction of
temporary and public housing, recovery of transportation
systems like roads, railways and ports and arrangement for
reconstruction materials, loans and finances.
of Defense; Coast Guard; Mie Prefecture, and the City of
Nagoya. The committee was responsible for facilitating
emergency relief activities; assisting group evacuations;
investigating emergency standards; supplying clothing and
sleeping materials; performing medical activities; supplying
water and helping with epidemic prevention.
Individual committee activities are as follows:
1) Levee Repair and Drainage Committee
The Levee Repair and Drainage Committee was set up on
October 5th, and formed with various government officials
representing the government ministries, construction,
agriculture, transportation and defense, as well as
representatives from Aichi, Mie and Gifu Prefectures; the
City of Nagoya and Nagoya port authority. The committee
promoted reconstruction projects and established an
emergency plan for repairing breached areas of coastal and
river levies, and draining fresh water areas.
2) Residential Committee
The Residential committee was set up on October 7th,
and formed with representatives from the Ministry of
Construction; Ministry of Health and Welfare; Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry; as well as representatives from
public housing corporations; the home loan administrations;
national loan administration; Prefectures of Aichi, Mie and
Gifu; and the City of Nagoya. The committee established an
emergency plan to promote construction and maintenance
of temporary emergency housing, disaster-reconstruction
housing, disaster public housing and settlement housing,
in addition to emergent securement, arrangement and
transportation of necessary materials to operate the plan.
3) Disaster Emergency Committee
The Disaster Emergency Committee was formed with
representatives from the Ministry of Health and Welfare;
Ministry of Education; Ministry of Finance; Department
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
33
5-6 Restoration of orderly life
A dyke gradually taking shape
Creating a dyke by piling up earth
Coastal dyke under construction
Temporary repair works begun in
Matsugashima Area
Placement of foundation concrete
An enormous amount of manpower was devoted to the
drainage of the large waterlogged area in the southern part of
Ama District. Local residents had a hard time during the long
period of the drainage works. With the aid of the Self Defense
Forces, people worked hard to close numerous breaches on
the dykes. It was only towards the end of November that the
drainage works began to take effect. Drainage works in the area
as a whole were completed on December 25.
In December, three months after the outbreak of the disaster,
the Japanese Government enacted certain laws including the
“Law for Special Measures to Promote Storm Surge Protection
Project.” These Laws were intended to implement measures, as
34
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Placenent of sheet piles for foundation
soon as possible, for protection of the land and people from
storm surges and other natural threats. As a part of this effort,
the “Council for Measures against Storm Surge in Ise Bay and
Other Areas” was organised by the Ministries of Construction,
Transportation, and Agriculture and Forestry, and other related
agencies, which gave guidelines for protection measures against
storm surges, including the design heights of embankments.
In accordance with the guidelines, permanent restoration works
following the temporary restoration works completed earlier
were initiated under a five-year program. Work progressed
faster than expected and were completed in 1962, a year before
schedule.
Repair works in progress at Isojima
Left bank of Nagara River after the storm
Left bank of Ibi River with a brand new concrete dyke
During this period, a total of two million people were engaged
in the works on the embankments of rivers and coasts alone.
Materials used in the works included about 270,000 eight-ton
lorry-loads of rubble. Cement bags required for the works
could be put side by side to cover the length of Japan’s main
island from Aomori to Shimonoseki.
timber port designed to prevent invasion by storm surges and
outflow of timber was constructed with the aim also of handling
the increased import of timber from abroad. (completed in
November 1968)
Around Nagoya Port, an 8.2km dyke was built between the
left bank at the estuary of Kiso River and the opposite coast
in Furumi district on Chita Peninsula. This dyke not only
protects the area form storm surges, but also has the function of
calming down the water in the bay, contributing to the efficient
functioning of Nagoya Port (completed in August 1964). A
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
35
5-7 Reestablishment of the road network, the arteries of restoration activities
National Highway No.1 today
National Highway No.1 almost reconnected after 35 days
Workers engaged in restoration works
The roads in the “zero-metre area” were either submerged under
water or had been destroyed by the enormous force of the flood.
Route 1 which was the main artery of the Chubu Region was no
exception and transportation in the region came to a standstill.
Lorries loaded with relief goods and materials for restoration
work had no access to the affected areas where the victims of
the disaster were in dire need of them.
Carried to the site, empty oil barrels were filled with earth and
sunk on both sides of the roads. Earth was then poured into the
space between the lines of earth-filled barrels and a new road
was made.
Restoration works began under difficult conditions of being
surrounded by water in order to restore the road network as
soon as possible. Much use was made in these works of oil
barrels. This method was used because the rapid flow of water
could not be stopped by merely piling up sandbags by the roads.
36
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
The restoration of a 4km stretch of road between Kanie and
Yatomi was carried our around-the-clock beginning on October
20 and the road was reopened on November 4.
Materials used in the restoration work included 10,000 oil
barrels, 110,000 cubic metres of earth and more than 100,000
sandbags.
Transporting oil barrels
Construction using oil barrels
Lorries carrying oil barrels
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
37
6. Sinking land
6-1 Sinking land
The Ise Bay Typhoon made people very aware of just how low
the elevation of the land around Ise Bay is. In fact, the land
continued to sink even further after the typhoon. 180 km2
of land were at sea level during the time of the Ise Typhoon,
but this figure increased to 274 km2 by 1988. A major factor
was the pumping up of underground water. Water used for
industrial and agricultural purposes came primarily from
high-quality, low cost underground water sources. Just as the
region was entering a time of comfortable living following a
prolonged period of high growth, the people could not ignore
the change that was occurring at their feet.
The land sunk an average of 10 centimeters in 1974, with
some areas sinking a maximum of 20 centimeters. After
pumping regulations were put into effect in the three Tokai
region prefectures however, the sinking rate slowed to around
1 to 2 centimeters per years after 1988. Today, the land is still
sinking, but appears to be proceeding slowly.
Ise Bay
0 meter elevation regions: 374km2
(Area below shows average level of spring tides)
Contour lines of cumulative sinking amounts since 1961 (units: cm)
(February 1961 to November 2004)
38
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
6-2 Emergency bank raising for wave break construction
Alluvial terrain at the southern outlet of the Kisomikawa river
has caused land to sink easily in an extensive amount of area.
Evident sinking in the ground layer exceeds 1 meter in most
places, with many places haven sank more than 2 meters, in
turn lowering the height of the levee system. As a result, the
Bank raised for wave break
levee system’s capacity to fend off high waters and waves was
significantly lower before restoration work began. High water
levee reinforcement construction commenced in 1969, but in
1975 work began to raise the bank to create an emergency
wave break in order to counter the accelerating rate that land
was sinking at. Construction was completed in 1988.
Planned levee height
Levee prior to
sinking
Planned tide level
Levee after sinking
Outlet of the Ibigawa River after wave break completed (Kuwana City Jonan)
Standard cross section of wave break
Completed wave break at Kisogawa river
(Nagashima-cho Yoshigasu)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
39
6-3 Full-scale levee construction
Bank raising construction to create an emergency wave break
was completed in 1988, but construction continued there
afterwards to complete a more robust high water levee system.
Bank raise for
emergency wave break
A wave suppression structure was built on the river side,
which provided a foundation to build a new levee and wave
break, thus finishing a robust levee system to shield against
high water and waves.
Wave break
Typhoon Isewan
reconstruction levee
Planned
tide level
Wave
suppressor
Levee during the Typhoon Isewan
• A wave suppressor is a structure placed before the levee to reduce the force and pressure of waves.
• A wave break is a structure designed to repel waves that hit back towards the water.
Aerial view of the Ibi — Nagara River system outlet (photo taken in March 1998).
40
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
High water level
measured during
Typhoon Isewan
High water
measured during
Ise Bay Typhoon
Concrete block
lining
Wave
suppressor
Large jagged
concrete blocks
Asphalt layer
Asphalt layer
Foot protection blocks
Mound layer
Standard cross section of levee reinforcements
Completed high water levee
Right bank of the Ibi River, Kuwana-shi Yoshinomaru
Right bank of the Ibi River, Kuwana-shi Yoshinomaru
Left bank of the Kiso River, Kisomisaki-cho Genroku
Right bank of the Kisogawa River
Kuwana-shi Nagashima-chou Shoin
Picture take April, 2005
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
41
7. Japan after Typhoon Isewan
7-1 Change in awareness of citizens in Japan after Typhoon
Isewan (Vera)
After Typhoon Isewan (Vera) and the serious damage
it caused, construction of comprehensive and systematic
disaster prevention systems started. In 1961, the Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted requiring the national
and regional governments and specified public organizations
to draw up and execute appropriate disaster prevention plans.
In 1962, the Central Disaster Management Council was
established, and the Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention of the
national government was drawn up.
Disaster prevention systems have been revised and reinforced
Winning poster of the Disaster
Prevention Minister’s Prize of the 2004
Disaster Prevention Poster Competition
after every serious natural disaster and accident. When the
Disaster Measures Basic Law was enacted, it was also decided to
designate September 1 of every year as disaster prevention day,
and various events concerning disaster prevention and drills
are held around September 1 in all parts of Japan.
The importance of public awareness of disaster prevention
and people’s evacuation behavior was recognized once again,
and measures are being taken to stimulate interest, such as
preparing and distributing posters, and assisting residents to
evacuate, such as preparing hazard maps for floods, tsunamis,
storm surges, and other natural disasters.
Overview of Tsunami and Strom Surge
Hazard Map Manual
Reference: Website of the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan
Memorial monuments are built at the sites to console the souls of the victims and remind of the lessons of Typhoon Isewan (Vera).
Memorial monument of Typhoon Isewan (Vera) (Shoe Mound)
While residents were evacuating to a nearby junior high school,
the dyke collapsed. When the water receded about a week later,
many shoes were found at the roots of reeds and in paddy fields.
The shoes were collected at this site where flowers and incense
were offered, and the place was called “Shoe Mound”. A memorial
monument to console the souls of the victims of Typhoon Isewan
(Vera) was built the following year.
42
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Statue of a mother and child
(Nagoya City)
The statue was built in 1962 to the right of the
former Minato Ward Office, hoping for the safety
and development of the ward. Two meters below
the pedestal is the inundation water level.
Reference: Website of Nagoya City
7-2 Legal system for disaster prevention
The Japanese legal system associated with disaster prevention
was basically established in the wake of Typhoon Ise Bay in
September, 1959, and the system was reviewed and modified
from time to time as other disasters were encountered in the
subsequent years.
Major laws for disaster prevention are described below.
1. Disaster Measures Basic Law
After the Typhoon Ise Bay (Ise-wan Typhoon) of September,
1959, the government agencies were having hard time coming
up with post-disaster stopgap measures. The conventional
government approach to disaster prevention met with
increasing criticism, and the growing public pressure for more
effective disaster-prevention administration resulted in the
enactment of the Disaster Measures Basic Law in November,
1961, based on the lessons learned from the typhoon:
(1) Human suffering and physical damage were tremendous.
(2) There was a lack of consideration to disaster prevention
necessary for urban development.
(3) The flood defense system was inadequate.
(4) Warnings and orders were communicated inadequately.
(5) There were aspects of a human-made disaster.
1) Purpose
Article 1 Purpose
The purpose of this law is to establish necessary disasterprevention systems involving the national government, local
public bodies and other public organizations, clarify where
the responsibility for disaster prevention lies and define basic
requirements for disaster prevention measures including
disaster prevention planning, disaster-prevention and
disaster-response measures and financial measures related to
post-disaster recovery and disaster prevention to realize and
promote comprehensive and systematic administrative efforts
for disaster prevention in order to protect the country of Japan
and the life, health and property of the people of Japan from
disasters and thereby contribute to the maintenance of social
order and public welfare.
1. The immediate purpose of this law is to protect the land
of Japan and the life, health and property of the people of
Japan, and the ultimate purpose of the law is to contribute
to the maintenance of social order and public welfare.
2. This article provides for the realization and promotion of
comprehensive and systematic administrative efforts for
disaster prevention in order to protect the country of Japan
and the life, health and property of Japan from disasters.
To achieve the purpose of realizing and promoting
comprehensive and systematic administrative efforts for
disaster prevention, this article stipulates the following
methods:
(a) Establishing necessary disaster-prevention systems
(b) Clarifying where the responsibility for disaster prevention
lies
(c) Defining basic requirements for disaster prevention
measures including disaster planning, disaster-prevention
and disaster-response measures and financial measures
related to post-disaster recovery and disaster prevention
3. This law stipulates the principles of not only the protection
of the life, health and property of the people of Japan but
also the country of Japan.
1 The term “the land of Japan” is construed as referring to the
territory of Japan consisting of its land, territorial waters
and territorial airspace. The land and territorial waters are
construed as including underground space and the water
under the surface of the sea.
2 The term “the people of Japan” refers to the people of
Japan under the Nationality Law (1950, Law No. 147). The
provisions regarding the rights and obligations of the people
of Japan stipulated in Chapter III of the Constitution of
Japan, excluding those that are inherently not applicable to
foreigners, are deemed applicable to foreigners. It may be
understood, therefore, that under this law, the life, health
and property of foreigners in Japan also must be protected
from disasters as in the case of Japanese people.
4. The term “public organizations” under this law refers
to (1) independent administrative corporations, (2) the
Bank of Japan, Japanese Red Cross Society, NHK (Japan
Broadcasting Corporation) and other public organizations,
(3) corporations operating as public utilities including
electric, gas, transportation and telecommunications
utilities and (4) port authorities, land improvement districts
and the managers of other public facilities (see Explanation
22 on Article 2).
5. To “establish necessary disaster-prevention systems”
means to establish organizational systems related
to disaster prevention such as the Central Disaster
Prevention Council, local disaster prevention councils,
disaster countermeasures headquarters and emergency
countermeasures headquarters.
6. To “clarify where the responsibility for disaster prevention
lies” means to clarify the responsibility of the national
government, local public bodies, designated public
organizations, local residents and so forth for disaster
prevention.
7. To “realize and promote comprehensive and systematic
administrative efforts for disaster prevention” means to
establish disaster-prevention-related organizations, clarify
where the responsibility lies and define requirements for
disaster prevention such as disaster prevention planning so
as to realize integrated and systematic disaster prevention
administration by stipulating the requirements for disaster
prevention such as disaster prevention planning because in
the past disaster-related administrative tasks were assigned
to a number of independently operating government
ministries and agencies and were performed in a nonintegrated way by those ministries and agencies.
(Quoted from Article-by-article Explanation of the Disaster
Measures Basic Law)
2) Responsibilities for disaster prevention
Article 3 Duties of national government
The national government, in view of its mission of protecting
the land of Japan and the life, health and property of the people
of Japan, shall be obligated to take every possible disasterprevention measure by making full use of its organizations and
functions.
2. In order to fulfill the duties stipulated in the preceding
paragraph, the national government shall draw up master
plans for disaster prevention, disaster response and postdisaster recovery, implement those plans in accordance with
the relevant laws and regulations, promote the execution
of office duties or tasks related to disaster prevention to
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
43
be performed by local public bodies, designated public
organizations, designated local public organizations or
other organizations, coordinate the execution of such
office duties and tasks in an integrated way, and ensure
appropriate expenditures for disaster prevention.
3. In performing their duties, all designated administrative
organizations and designated local administrative
organizations shall cooperate with one another so that the
duties of the national government stipulated in Paragraph
1 of this article can be fulfilled.
4. The heads of all designated administrative organizations
and designated local administrative organizations shall
give appropriate recommendations, guidance and advice
to the prefectural or municipal governments concerned
and take other appropriate measures so that regional
disaster prevention plans for the prefectural or municipal
governments concerned can be drawn up and implemented
smoothly.
Article 4 Duties of prefectural governments
All prefectural governments shall be obligated to draw up
disaster prevention plans for all areas in the prefectures,
implement those plans in accordance with the relevant
laws and regulations, help the municipal governments or
designated local public organizations in the prefectures
perform their duties and tasks related to disaster prevention,
and perform overall coordination of those duties and tasks in
cooperation with the organizations concerned and other local
public bodies in order to protect the areas in the prefectures
concerned and the life, health and property of the residents of
the prefectures.
2. In performing their duties, all prefectural organizations
shall cooperate with one another so that the duties of
the prefectural governments stipulated in the preceding
paragraph can be fulfilled.
Article 5 Duties of municipal governments
As local public bodies, all municipal governments shall be
obligated to draw up disaster prevention plans for the areas
in the municipalities concerned and implement such plans
in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations in
cooperation with the organizations concerned and other local
public bodies in order to protect the areas in the municipalities
concerned and the life, health and property of the residents of
the municipalities.
2. In order to fulfill the duties stipulated in the preceding
paragraph, the mayors of all municipalities shall seek to
improve fire-fighting organizations and flood-fighting
organizations, disaster-prevention-related organizations
such as local public bodies in the areas of the municipalities
concerned, and voluntary disaster-prevention organizations
formed by local residents in the spirit of neighborhood
cooperation (called “voluntary disaster prevention
organizations” in Paragraph 2 of Article 8) so that all
functions of the municipalities can be used to the full.
3. In performing their duties, all fire-fighting organizations,
flood-fighting organizations and other municipal
organizations shall cooperate with one another so that
the duties of the municipal governments stipulated in
Paragraph 1 of this article can be fulfilled.
44
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Article 5-2 Cooperation between local public bodies
If necessary to fulfill the duties stipulated in Paragraph 1 of
Article 4 or Paragraph 1 of the preceding article, all local public
bodies shall endeavor to cooperate with one another.
Article 6 Duties of designated public organizations and
designated local public organizations
All designated public organizations and designated local
public organizations shall be obligated to draw up disasterprevention-related plans related to the tasks to be performed
by those organizations, implement such plans in accordance
with relevant laws and regulations and cooperate with the
prefectural governments or municipal governments concerned
in connection with such tasks so that the disaster prevention
plans of the prefectural governments or municipal governments
concerned can be drawn up and implemented smoothly.
2. In view of the public and public-interest nature of their
tasks, all designated public organizations and designated
local public organizations shall contribute to disaster
prevention by performing their tasks.
Article 7 Duties of local residents
All public organizations in the administrative areas of local
public bodies, the managers of all facilities that are important
from the viewpoint of disaster prevention and any other entity
that is responsible for disaster prevention under relevant laws or
regulations shall perform their duties faithfully in accordance
with relevant laws or regulations or regional disaster plans.
2. Besides performing the duties stipulated in the preceding
paragraph, all residents of the administrative areas of
any local public body shall also take measures to prepare
themselves against disasters and endeavor to contribute to
disaster prevention by making preparedness-enhancing
efforts including, but not limited to, participating in
voluntary disaster prevention activities.
3) Evacuation recommendations and orders
Article 60 Evacuation recommendations and orders from
mayors
If deemed necessary to protect human life or health and
prevent the spread of disaster, the mayor of the municipality
concerned may issue an evacuation recommendation to
any resident, stayer or any other person in the area that is
considered to require evacuation, and if the situation at hand
is deemed urgent, the mayor may issue an evacuation order to
any of such persons.
2. If deemed necessary in the event of issuing an evacuation
recommendation or an evacuation order under the
provision of the preceding paragraph, the mayor may issue
an instruction as to a place to which to evacuate.
3. In the event of having issued an evacuation recommendation
or an evacuation order under the provision of Paragraph 1
of this article or in the event of having issued an instruction
as to a place to which to evacuate, the mayor shall promptly
report it to the governor of the prefecture concerned.
4. If it has become no longer necessary to evacuate, the mayor
shall announce it immediately. In this case, the provision of
the preceding paragraph shall apply mutatis mutandis.
5. In the event that a municipal government has become unable
to perform all or a major part of its office work because
of a disaster, the governor of the prefecture concerned
shall take all or some of the measures to be taken by the
mayor of the municipality concerned under the provisions
of Paragraph 1, Paragraph 2 and the first sentence of the
preceding paragraph on behalf of said mayor.
6. In the event of having begun to take or having taken
measures on behalf of a mayor under the provision of
the preceding paragraph, the prefectural governor shall
announce it.
7. Requirements for the implementation of measures by a
prefectural governor under the provision of Paragraph 5 of
this article shall be stipulated in cabinet orders.
Regarding delegation to fire-fighting personnel, refer to Article
153, Paragraph 1 of the Local Autonomy Law.
Regarding evacuation recommendations and orders under
other laws, refer to Article 22 of the Fire Fighting Act, Article
25 of the Landslide Prevention Act and Article 4, Paragraph
1 of the Law Concerning Execution of the Police Duties
Execution Law.
Article 61 Evacuation recommendations and orders from
police officers
In the case set forth in Paragraph 1 of the preceding article, if
it is considered not possible for the mayor to issue a number of
evacuation orders at a time or if requested by the mayor, police
officers or marine safety officers may issue evacuation orders
to any resident, stayer or any other person in the area that is
considered to require evacuation. In this case, the provision
of Paragraph 2 of the preceding article shall apply mutatis
mutandis.
2. In the event of having issued an evacuation order under
the provision of the preceding paragraph, the police officer
or marine safety officer concerned shall immediately notify
the mayor of said evacuation order.
3. The provisions of Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 4 of the
preceding article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
mayor who has been notified as set forth in the preceding
paragraph.
2. Law Concerning Special Financial Assistance in Case of
Severe Disaster
This law, which was enacted in September, 1962, provides for
special financial assistance of the national government to local
public bodies or special assistance to affected people to be
provided under the provisions of financial measures stipulated
in Chapter 7 of the Disaster Measures Basic Law.
3. Law Concerning National Treasury Share of Expenses for
Rehabilitation of Damage to Public Works Facilities
This law is applicable to disasters caused by storms, floods,
storm surges, earthquakes or other abnormal natural
phenomena, and this law is applied to rehabilitation projects
if the disaster involved is not of extreme severity. Enacted with
the aim of achieving early post-disaster recovery and thereby
ensuring public welfare, this law basically provides for “the
restoration of the original form.” Japan’s restoration system
for public works facilities dates back to 1881, when a national
subsidy for a post-disaster rehabilitation project was provided
in the form of a supplementary budget. Since then, the law has
been amended in view of the experience of many disasters.
4. Other restoration systems
Improving restoration projects
The Law Concerning National Treasury Share of Expenses for
Rehabilitation of Damage to Public Works Facilities basically
aims for the restoration of the original form. In the event of
a severe disaster, the effect of a project for the restoration
the original form alone is limited. An improving restoration
project, therefore, is adopted for a series of sections including
damaged areas in order to prevent the recurrence of a disaster
and ensure a higher level of safety.
Related information
Flood Fighting Act
Laws predating this law include the Irrigation Association Act
of 1908. A series of major typhoons—namely, Makurazaki
Typhoon in September, 1945, Akune Typhoon in October,
1945, Typhoon Kathleen in September, 1847, which inflicted
tremendous damage on the Tokyo metropolitan area, and
Typhoon Ione in September, 1948—provided increased
momentum for the enactment of a flood fighting law, and the
Flood Fighting Act was enacted in June, 1949.
Purpose of the law
Purpose
Article 1 Purpose
This law aims to prevent damage, provide protection and
mitigate damage due to floods or storm surges and thereby
ensure public safety.
Content
1. Responsibility of municipal governments for flood
protection
2. Compensation for disasters suffered in line of duty
3. Joint preparation of flood defense advisories by the
Meteorological Agency and other organizations
concerned
4. Issuance of flood defense advisories for important rivers
5. Stipulation of the obligation of beneficiary municipalities
to bear part of expenditure
6. Flood-fighting subsidies for rivers that are important from
the viewpoint of national economy
7. Stipulation of the obligation of flood defense managers
of designated flood defense management bodies such as
prefectural governors
In addition to the above provisions, the following provisions
were expanded or added in June, 2001, in view of urban flood
damage in recent years:
1. Increasing the number of flood forecasting rivers (flood
forecasting issued by prefectural governors)
2. Announcement of inundation-prone area maps
3. Measures to ensure smooth and timely evacuation
4. Reliable communication of flood forecasts to underground
spaces
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
45
7-3 Measures against storm surges in the three major bays
Measures against storm surge in the three major bays were
designed with external force equivalent to Typhoon Isewan.
Zero-meter zones
Total of the three major bays
Area: 577 km2
Population: 4.04 million
Tokyo Bay (Yokohama City to
Chiba City)
Area: 116 km2
Population 1.76 million
Ise Bay (Kawagoe Town to Tokai City)
Area: 336 km2
Population: 900 thousand
Osaka Bay (Ashiya City to Osaka City)
Area: 124 km2
Population 1.38 million
T.P. under + 0 m
Under the mean monthlyhighest water level
Under the design high water level
* Water areas, such as rivers
and lakes, are not included.
* Zero-meter zones denote
land lower than the mean
monthly-highest water
level.
Objectives of storm surge prevention plans and course settings
Plan
Tokyo Bay
Ise Bay
Osaka Bay
Design external force
Typhoon Isewan (September
1959)
Typhoon Isewan (September
1959)
Typhoon Isewan (September
1959)
Tidal level
Mean monthly-highest water
level in typhoon season (July
to October)
Mean monthly-highest water
level in typhoon season (July
to October)
Mean monthly-highest water
level in typhoon season (July
to October)
Course of the design
typhoon 23) The worst
course was determined
by comparing the courses
parallel to those of Typhoons
Ise Bay and Kitty.
The worst course was
determined by comparing
the courses parallel to those
of Typhoons Isewan and
Kitty.
The course of Typhoon
Isewan
The course of Typhoon
Muroto, which causes the
most serious damage, was
decided to be used after
comparing the courses of
Typhoons Muroto and Jane.
46
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
1) Tokyo
a. Capital Tokyo entailing constant danger of storm surge
and tsunami disasters
Storm surge is a phenomenon in which the sea level rises from
its ordinary level during typhoons, etc. Tsunami is big waves
caused by a submarine earthquake.
The inland of Tokyo Harbor is lowlands or so called zerometer zones (where the elevation is lower than the high water
level and the land inundates during ordinary high tides if
there are no banks). The area of the zero-meter zones is about
124 km2, accounting for about 20% of the total area of the
23 wards of Tokyo. About 255 km2, or about 41% of the total
area of the 23 wards, has elevations lower than the estimated
tidal level during a super-huge typhoon of the Typhoon Ise
Bay level.
Therefore, Tokyo needs measures for protecting the land
from storm surges on ordinary days as well as during typhoons
and earthquakes.
Adachi Ward
Kita Ward
Katsushika Ward
Arakawa Ward
Bunkyo Ward
Sumida Ward
Taito Ward
Chiyoda Ward
Edogawa Ward
Koto Ward
Minato Ward
Arakawa River
Chuo Ward
Sumida River
Old Edogawa River
Shinagawa Ward
Tokyo Harbor
Zero-meter zone (elevation lower
than the high water level)
Ota Ward
Low-elevation zones of elevations
not higher than 5 meters from the
low water level
Tama River
Low-elevation zones in Tokyo
Tatsumi Water Gate
b. Preventing storm surge damages
To prevent damages by storm surges, the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government has installed sea walls and water gates along the
waterfront extending from the Arakawa River to Haneda.
1. Sea walls (facility to protect the inland from storm surges
and tsunamis from the sea and rivers)
2. Revetment (facility inside sea walls and prevents inundation
during ordinary high water level)
3. Land locks and water gates (facilities installed where sea
walls cross canals and roads and protect the inland from
storm surges and tsunamis)
4. Pumping stations (facilities installed with strong pumps
to forcedly drain water from inland when the water level
inside closed water gates rises during rains)
River
Toyosu Water Gate
Inflow of storm water
and sewage
River water gate
Storm surge
Internal retaining
wall
Land lock
Riverside waters
Suna-machi
Pumping Station
Inland
River
Land lock
Shinsuna Water Gate
Tatsumi Water Gate
Water-side land
Akebono Water Gate
Shinonome Water Gate
Land lock
Forced drainage
Outer sea wall
16) Tatsumi Pumping Station 17) Forced drainage
Measures for preventing storm surges (in Koto Ward)
Outer sea wall
c. During Typhoon No. 13 in 2001
When Typhoon No. 13 in 2001, which caused serious damages
to various areas of Japan, passed Tokyo, the water level at
Tatsumi Water Gate was 3.1 m above the low water level and 1
m above the ordinary high water level, and there was a risk of
inundation by the storm surge. Thus, all of the 19 water gates
and 26 land locks were closed, and water was drained using
the pumps of the pumping stations to prevent damages.
Assumed typhoon of the Typhoon Ise Bay’s
scale (A.P. +5.10 m)
Typhoon No. 20 (A.P. +3.55 m, 1979)
Typhoon Kitty (A.P. +3.15 m, 1949)
Typhoon No. 15 (A.P. +3.13 m, 2001)
Mean high water level
A.P. denotes the reference water level of the Arakawa Project, and A.P. +
0m is almost the low water spring in Tokyo Bay.
Storm surge records in Tokyo Bay
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
47
d. Measures against large-scale earthquakes
Most of the facilities for preventing storm surge disasters were
intensively constructed in the 1960s and early 1970s after the
Typhoon Ise Bay in 1959. These facilities have deteriorated
and need to be repaired, and must be improved for seismic
resistance to resist larges-scale earthquakes as learned from
disasters during the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government is rapidly improving
existing facilities, such as water gates and pumping stations
especially in Koto Ward, which has large zero-meter zones,
for seismic resistance and deteriorated parts. The projects
are being executed with all our strength to ensure safety
during storm surges and earthquakes by giving thorough
consideration to the environment.
2) Osaka
The Osaka Prefectural Government is constructing various
facilities to protect the land from storm surges during largescale typhoons
Facilities for preventing storm surges have been constructed
in the western part of Osaka after Typhoon Jane in 1950 and
Typhoon Dai 2 Muroto in 1961.
Projects started in fiscal 1965 to ensure higher degree of
safety, and their goals are shown below.
In 1970, the three principal water gates were completed
forming the primary tide protection line. In 1981, Kema
Pumping Station was completed to drain water from the
inland.
Principal flood damages to Osaka during typhoons
Goal
Construct facilities to protect the land from storm surges
assuming that a typhoon of the scale of Typhoon Ise Bay
(September 1959) strikes Osaka Bay along the worst
course (course of Typhoon Muroto) during the high tide
Design high water level
O.P. + 5.20 m (= O.P. + 2.20 m + 3.00 m)
O.P. + 2.20 m: mean monthly-highest water level in
July to Oct ober (typhoon season)
3.00 m: storm tide (abnormal rises in tidal level due
to wind setups and drops in atmospheric pressure)
Three arch-shaped water gates were constructed along the
Aji, Shirinai, and Kitsu River, which are principal streams of
the old Yodo River. The arch shape, which was new in Japan,
does not hinder the passage of vessels and is strong against
severe conditions, such as strong winds and earthquakes.
(Completed in 1970)
When the gates are closed to protect the land from storm
surges, the water level of the river rises. Thus, a facility to
drain water from the inland while the gates are closed was
constructed (Kema Pumping Station).
Storm Surge Prevention Center
monitors water levels 24 hours a day
48
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Shin Yodo River
Kema Pumping Station
Dojima River
Old Yodo River
(Okawa River)
Neyagawa River
Ajigawa Tidal Lock
Tosabori River
Dai-ni Neyagawa
River
Hiranogawa River
Shirinaigawa Tidal Lock
Kitsugawa Tidal Lock
Design bank height outside water gates
O.P. + 6.60 m
(= O.P. + 5.20 m + 1.40 m)
The design high water level is put as O.P. + 5.20 m, and fluctuation
of 1.40 m is considered (height of runup and dam-up).
Schematic diagram of tidal lock methods
Drain water to large rivers
Design levee free board
outside the water gate
Tidal lock height
Fluctuation
Design high water level
Design free board inside the water gate
Free board
Design stored water level
Storm tide
Water level to close the water gate
Mean monthly-highest water
level in July to October
(typhoon season)
Design bank height inside water gates
O.P. + 4.30 m
(= O.P. + 3.50 m + 0.80 m)
The design stored water level when the gates are closed is put
as O.P. + 3.50 m, and a free board of 0.80 m is considered.
Ajigawa Tidal Lock (Close)
Ajigawa Tidal Lock (Open)
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
49
7-4 River Dike Inspections
Typhoon No. 17 in September 1976 caused dike breaks of along
the main and branch streams of the Nagara River, inflicting
enormous damage specifically to Anpachi-cho and Gifu City.
These d Dike breaks led to increased importance attention
toof the dike management, and the thorough examinations
of dikes, including studies on in terms of the history of dike
breaks and water leakage, and foundation conditions on the
part of , etc. was conducted by the River Bureau, of the former
Ministry of Construction. Inspections and studies continue to
be made and reviews are conducted as required.
1. Dike Break Cases in Japan
An examination of the pattern of dike breaks in Japan shows
that, oOf the total of 771 cases of damage patterns to river
dikes that occurred during the period from 1985 to 1990
in Japan, slope failure accounted for about 50% and water
leakage accounted for about 45%. A bit over 5% of the dike
breaks caused serious damage. Dike breaks causing serious
damage accounted for a bit over 5%. Damages from dike
breaks causing critical damage account for slightly over 5%.
Though overtopping and dike breaks along large rivers are
have become scarce with large rivers in these daysrecent years,
dike breaks itself cannotas such have not been eliminated.
Water leakage, 350 cases (45.4%)
Dike break, 41 cases (5.3%)
Slope failure, 380 cases (49.3%)
2. Dike Inspections (Established in 1979)
1) Dike inspection measures classification
Measures are classified in the order of importance of
inspections.
(1) Water leakage (I) With history : Traces of dike break or
old-river dikes with history of water leakage
(2) Water leakage (II) With history: Dikes other than (I)
above, which have history of the water leakage
(3) With history of slope failure: Dikes with the a history
of slope failure
(4) Water leakage (I) No history: Traces of dike breaks or
old-river dikes without water leakage history, but with
probable hazard equivalent to (1I) above
(5) Water leakage (I) No history: No history, but with
conditions similar to (2) above and probable water
leakage hazard
(6) Slope failure
No history: No history, but with
conditions similar to (3) above and probable slope
failure hazard
(7) Scouring: Location that is a water colliding front in
case of flooding and may possibly cause bank rip
(8) Slide: Location where slide may occur in case of
flooding
(9) Others: Locations other than above, that require
measures because of river characteristics
2) Inspection measures data book (example)
The history measures data book for (1)-(9) above has been
prepared.
Water leakage I and II history (leakage, no leakage) data book
Unit: ¥1 million
Form-4
Measures
or no
measures
against
water
leakage
Water
leakage I
50
Distance
mark
Name of
location
Name Overall
of work plan
Length
(m)
Project
cost
Up to Remaining
19813 project
Name of
river
Continued/completed
Continued
Name of river
Outline of overall plan
Completed
Right
bank 1.55
to 2.30
km
Right
bank 2.30
to 2.75
km
Right
bank
24.07 to
24.27 km
Low water revetment
Right
bank
25.60 to
26.40 km
Total
High water revetment
L=8.0m
High water revetment up to 1981, Ll
= 8.0 m. After construction, back
filling of +/-L = 200 m constructed in
19875. { } shows temporary work.
4 locations
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
0
0
3) Recent Inspections
Dike inspections is are made at the a time of the first weeding
and grass collection of the year along dikes weeding and grass
collection of the year concerned.
(1) Inspection method
Cross range for inspection and survey
Berm
Crown Berm Dike boundary
Visual inspections and surveys were made while walking
on the dike berms and slope while measuring and
photographing the general condition of abnormal locations.
Careful observation of the surrounding area was made and
the pertinent factors and evaluated damage (ranking of the
importance and urgency of the measures) were recorded.
Discussions among inspectors were held beforehand to
coordinate awareness in terms of the inspection method and
damage evaluation.
(2) Damage location evaluation criteria
- Special A rank
Damage locations that require immediate measures to prepare for floods in
the year concerned are treated as special, with damage condition reported
immediately to the river administrator.
- A rank
Damage locations that may exert considerable effects on the dike if the
damage is left proceeding.
- B rank
1) The cause of damage and event is difficult to determine, so that a
secondary survey (detailed survey other than a visual one) is considered
necessary. (Depending on the expected cause, the influences on the
dike are considered to be considerable.)
2) The damage scale is relatively large, so that careful observation of the
progress is considered necessary. (For “trampling,” by users of river a
depth of 50 cm or more is used as a basis of determination.)
3) Locations where the distribution state of holes by moles or field mouse
needs continuous observation.
- C rank
Damage location other than A and B above, whose progress requires
continuous observation.
(3) Damage types
Damage types
Judgment criteria
1) Depression
Damage with partial depression in the slope
2) Crack
Linear damage probably caused by slip, differential
settlement, etc.
3) Irregularity
Irregular damage due to uneven height of slope and
crown
4) Trampling
Ramp-like damage because river users go through
the same route
5) Gully
Damage scoured in the form of groove while
rainwater flows down the slope
6) Molehill
Molehill or hole that is possibly the passage route of
mole and field mouse
7) Break-away
Lost block lining
8) Bare land
Bare land without vegetation on the slope
9) Others
Damage other than (1) to (8) above
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
51
8. Challenge to halve loss of human life
8-1 Decrease of damage by water related disasters
Japan is prone to natural disasters, such as earthquakes,
typhoons, storms, and volcanic eruptions, due to its location,
topography, geology, meteorology and other natural
conditions. Every year, many people are killed and valuable
assets are lost during natural disasters.
Especially in the few years after the end of WWII, many
large typhoons and earthquakes struck Japan and caused
serious damage. Typhoon Makurazaki in 1945 and the Fukui
Earthquake in 1948 caused extensive damage with over 3,000
people dead or missing.
Serious natural disasters continued in the 1950s, causing
the deaths of over 1,000 people, capped by Typhoon Isewan
(Vera) in 1959 which resulted in over 5,000 people killed or
missing.
The number of people killed or missing during typhoons
dropped sharply after Typhoon Isewan (Vera), and is still
gradually decreasing. This is mainly attributable to the active
promotion of national land protection projects, such as soil
and water conservation and coastal projects, reinforcement of
disaster prevention systems by enacting the Disaster Measures
Basic Law and other laws, construction and improvement
of systems and facilities for meteorological observation,
advanced forecasting technologies, and development and
promotion of methods for transmitting disaster information.
����������������
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Changes in the number of people killed or missing during water-related disasters and the amount of damage (1951 to 2004)
����
Changes in the amount invested in water control in Japan (1951 to 2004)
52
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
8-2 Possibility of a Second Typhoon Isewan (Vera)
Coastal dykes in Japan have been constructed by
determining the design height based on measurements during
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) (maximum deviation of tidal level).
During the period of rapid economic growth, dykes subsided
in some districts due to land subsidence but have been repaired
so as to protect the land from storm surges.
No typhoons of the scale of Typhoon Isewan (Vera) have
struck Japan thereafter, except the Second Muroto Typhoon in
1961, just 2 years after Typhoon Isewan (Vera). Some typhoons
recorded a maximum wind speed or lowest atmospheric
pressure similar to those of Typhoon Isewan (Vera), but adverse
conditions did not occur simultaneously and the damage was
not so serious.
Number of typhoons in the northwestern
Pacific with lowest atmospheric pressure
below 900 hPa (1951 to 2004)
Year
Number
1951 to 1960
6
1961 to 1970
7
1971 to 1980
9
1981 to 1990
9
1991 to 2000
2
2001 to 2004
0
33
Reference: Website of the National
Institute of Informatics
However, in 2004, a record of 10 typhoons struck land in
Japan, and signs of abnormal weather are frequently observed.
Thus, there is a higher possibility of a typhoon as large as
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) and Hurricane Katrina striking Japan.
Hurricane Katrina
In August 2005, a hurricane having a maximum wind speed
of 78 m/s (280 km/h) and lowest atmospheric pressure of 902
hPa struck the US, causing serious damage estimated at 10 to 25
billion dollars (as of September 1) and killing 453 to 1,335 people
directly and another 335 indirectly (as of September 1).
Typhoons with low central atmospheric pressure
at the time they approached Japan (1951 to 2004)
Rank
Year
Typhoon
Central
atmospheric
pressure
1
1961
No. 18 (Second Muroto Typhoon)
925hPa
2
1959
No. 15 (Typhoon Isewan (Vera))
929hPa
3
1993
No. 13
930hPa
4
1951
No. 15
935hPa
1955
No. 22
940hPa
1965
No. 15
940hPa
1965
No. 23
940hPa
1971
No. 23
940hPa
1991
No. 19
940hPa
5
Notes (before statistics were taken)
Muroto Typhoon: 911.6 hPa (1934)
Makurazaki Typhoon: 916.3 hPa (1945)
Reference: Website of the Japan Meteorological Agency
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Numbers of typhoons landed, approached and formed (1951 to 2004)
Reference: Website of the Japan Meteorological Agency
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
53
8-3 Preventing tragedy by water related disaster
Preparations against disasters are indispensable for
sustainable development, but are frequently given a low
priority and forgotten by administrators and residents as time
passes after a disaster.
However, water-related disasters endanger people’s lives,
and the damage takes a long time to restore. Secondary damage
may also occur, such as worsening of sanitary conditions and
the resultant spread of contagious diseases.
Thus, disaster prevention must be regarded as a core
national policy, and must be preferentially promoted jointly
with residents.
Reduce by half loss of human life caused by water related disasters by 2015
The international community should establish a goal of halving the number of deaths by water
related disasters by 2015.
To attain the goal, the following policies should be given priority:
• Establish and enhance early warning systems,
• Establish and enhance both administrative and physical evacuation systems, and
• Enlighten and educate residents.
Changes in the number of victims in the world
Display of tsunami water level in the past
54
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Comparison between Typhoon Isewan and Hurricane Katrina
Item
Typhoon Isewan
Hurricane Katrina
Sept. 26, 1959
Aug. 25, 2005
Central pressure (when it came ashore) (hPa)
929
920
Wind velocity (when it came ashore) (m/sec)1)
45
62
Came ashore on
Killed or missing (number of people)
2)
4,977
Houses totally or partially collapsed or washed away
(number of houses)3)
144,955
Soaked houses (number of houses)4)
190,135
Inundated area (km2)
More than 1204
(as of Oct. 3)
Approximately 160,000
310
374
Notes:
1) Typhoon Isewan and Hurricane Katrina had a
similar wind velocity because wind velocities are
expressed as a mean in ten minutes in Japan and as
a mean in one minute (approximately 1.3 times the
mean in ten minutes) in the United States.
2) Numbers of people killed or missingby Typhoon
Isewan are national totals, and those killed or
missing by Hirricane Katrina are the totals in the
states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and
Florida.
3) Number of houses totally or partially collapsed or
washed away by Typhoon Isewan are national totals,
and those collapsed or washed away by Hurricane
Katrina are the totals in the states of Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.
Sources:
Nature and human relationship (in Japanese),
Lower Kiso River Work Office, September 1999.
Article on YOMIURI ONLINE of September 1,
2005 at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/
Article on asahi.com of September 14, 2005 at
http://www.asahi.com/
Digital Typhoon data collected by
National Institute of Informatics
2005 Hurricane/Tropical Data for Atlantic
collected by Unisys
Data collected by the National Climatic Data
Center
4) Number of soaked houses and inundated area are
totals in Mie, Aichi and Gifu prefectures for Japan,
and totals in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida for the United States.
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
55
Information sources
Typhoon Ise Bay — Lessons to be handed on —,
Executive Committee for Projects Marking 30th Anniversary
of Typhoon Ise Bay, August 1989
30 Years after Typhoon Isewan (Vera) (in Japanese), Yasuda,
Minoru and Akiyama, Ryoso, River, October 1989, Japan
River Association
Nature and human relationship (in Japanese),
Lower Kiso River Work Office, September 1999
Nikkei Construction: Century of water-related disasters —
What is going on in Japan (in Japanese)
Do you know Typhoon Isewan ? (in Japanese),
Minami Ward of Nagoya City, March 2002
Disaster Management in Japan, Cabinet Office, Government
of Japan
Disasters during Typhoon Isewan (Vera) (in Japanese),
Ministry of Construction, March 1962
Website of Nagoya City
http://www.city.nagoya.jp/
Typhoon Isewan (Vera) Restoration Project Records (in
Japanese) Chubu Regional Construction Bureau of the
Ministry of Construction, April 1963
Website of the Japan Meteorological Agency
http://www.data.kishou.go.jp/
Webpage of the Chunichi Shimbun: Special edition on
Typhoon Isewan (Vera)
(in Japanese) http://www.jwn.ne.jp/chunichi/saigai/
56
T YPHOON ISE WAN (VERA) AND ITS LESSONS
Website of the Tokyo District Meteorological Observatory
http://www.tokyo-jma.go.jp/
Website of the National Institute of Informatics
http://agora.ex.nii.ac.jp/
November 2005
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