SW ISSN 0345-0139
Reports from the Department of Psychology
Stockholm University
WHITE-COLLAR UNION MERGERS:
MOTIVES, BARRIERS AND EFFECTS
NON-RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 2002
Stephan Baraldi
Number 866
Magnus Sverke
June 2003
REPORTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY
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Personality- Social- and Developmental Psychology
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Work and Organizational Psychology
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Reports from the Department of Psychology,
Stockholm University, 2003, No. 866
WHITE-COLLAR UNION MERGERS:
MOTIVES, BARRIERS AND EFFECTS*
Non-response analysis of questionnaire data 2002
Stephan Baraldi & Magnus Sverke
A number of Swedish unions are involved in the planning, or
implementation, of major merger operations, in order to achieve
economies of scales and to adjust to the rapidly changing working life.
This provides a basis and opportunity for studying union mergers and
contributing to the understanding of what instigates them, how they
are implemented, and which possible effects resulting from them
might be identified. A project with these particular aims was initiated
in 2002, when the baseline measurement of a planned longitudinal
questionnaire study of union mergers was conducted. The focal
organizations of the project were four national unions, which, up until
December 2001, were planning to merge into one union. To examine
whether the samples used in the project’s baseline measurement were
representative, a non-response analysis was carried out, which also
constitutes the main purpose of this report. The samples were
compared with the respective union total populations in terms of basic
demographics. The samples were also compared with randomly
selected sub-samples of non-respondents who, in a short telephone
interview, responded to central items in the overall questionnaire. The
comparisons revealed strong similarities between the baseline
measurement samples and the respective union total populations, as
well as with the non-response sub-samples, regarding personal
backgrounds. An overall similarity was also found between baseline
measurement samples and non-response sub-samples regarding
different outcome variables. In general, these analyses indicate that the
baseline data are representative of the respective union populations.
Key words: Union mergers, representative samples, non-response
analysis
________________________________________________________________
∗
This research received financial support from the Swedish Council for Working Life
and Social Research (FAS). Corresponding author: Stephan Baraldi, Department of
Psychology, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. e-mail:
[email protected]
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Introduction
During the 1960s up until the beginning of the 1970s the Swedish union movement
was characterized by a surge of union mergers. This period saw a number of union
organizations, including both national unions and regional as well as local branches,
unite in common interests, resulting in the formation of a few big and powerful national
unions with a declining number of regional and local units (D’Agostino, 1987; Molin,
1991). As a result of this upsurge of mergers, close to three quarters of Swedish union
members felt that their post-merger level of union-related influence had declined
(Lewin, 1977). Another result probably related to the above-mentioned merger period
was a markedly decreased membership during the 1970s (Allvin & Sverke, 2000;
Kjellberg, 1997). These are believed to be the main reasons for a counter reaction
among Swedish unions during the following two decades when the majority of unions
seemingly shunned away from the earlier merger tradition.
Some of the problems believed to be related to the merger tradition from the 1960s
and early 1970s, one of the most relevant of these being decreased membership, are
persistently clinging on, incurring a palpable threat on the unions’ influential position
amongst the Swedish labor force (Kjellberg, 1997). As a result, during the past decade
the Swedish union movement seems to be heading toward a resurgence of the merger
tradition. Today we can see numerous examples of large unions planning some form of
merger within – and to some extent also across - union federations. It is believed that
mergers generate economies-of-scale advantages that, as a result, constitute possible
remedies for decreasing membership as well as for financial and administrative
difficulties (Chaison, 1996).
Union mergers
Studies of organizational mergers and their impact on different work related factors
abound in research on work and organizational psychology (e.g., Burke & Nelson,
1998). The fundamental structures of the main theories on organizational change can, to
a certain degree, also be said to apply to the field of union mergers. This stipulation
goes under the general assumption that unions are organizations and that, therefore, the
merger process of organizations is somewhat equivalent to the merger process of
unions. According to Chaison (1986), unions merge in two different ways, through
absorptions or through amalgamations. Absorptions always refer to mergers between
two unions where one large expanding union absorbs a smaller one. An absorption
renders the assimilation (or obliteration) of the smaller union’s identity into the larger
one’s. An amalgamation, on the other hand, refers to the merging of two or more unions
into a new union where the identities of the respective unions are evolved into a new
one. Some researchers (e.g., Janus 1978; McClendon, Kriesky & Eaton 1995; StrattonDevine 1990) have identified a third type of merger, affiliation. This type of merger
involves the affiliation of a smaller local union into a broader national one.
The type of merger believed to be associated with the highest risk of being
detrimental to membership-related attitudes, such as union commitment and
satisfaction, is amalgamation (Chaison, Sverke & Sjöberg, 2001). This is based on the
fact that an amalgamation results in a new union/organization with a new identity,
which represents new and unknown sets of beliefs and possibly a new organizational
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culture. Members can experience difficulties in defining and relating to the new union
with a lowered sense of union identification as a result. This problem is also relevant to
absorptions, although to a lower degree. The reason for this is that absorptions involve
one large union absorbing a small union. The large union’s general identity and culture
will be the prevailing one, and thus unaltered, through the change process. In contrast,
the absorbed union has to adapt to its absorber, which in turn may lead to negative
consequences for the members of the absorbed union. It follows, then, that the level of
change in absorptions is of a lesser proportion than in amalgamations, which result in a
change encompassing the whole organization. Affiliations are assumed to be less
sensitive to the above-mentioned problem as the smaller affiliated union often becomes
an independent division of the larger affiliating union, which keeps its identity intact
(Eriksson, Sverke & Hellgren, 2002).
Motives and barriers to mergers
One of the main reasons for merging unions is to steer the union organization away
from some kind of problem (Chaison, 1996). The problems most often identified as
triggers of union mergers are declining membership and financial difficulties (e.g.,
Aston, 1987; Chaison, 1986; Chitayat, 1979; Fortin, 1973; Waddington, 1995). Further
examples of motivational factors for union merger are economies-of-scale advantages,
increased bargaining power and adaptation to diversifying companies and organizations
(e.g., Chaison, 1986, 1996; DeCenzo, 1981; Streeck & Visser, 1997; Waddington,
1995).
Several obstructive factors regarding union mergers have been identified. These can
be divided into two categories, internal and external opposition (Chaison, 1996).
Internal opposition can be derived from either the union itself (e.g., officers opposing
merger on ideological grounds) or its members (e.g., members opposing merger in fear
of having their interests submerged in a larger union). External opposition is fairly
unusual although there have been occasions in the past when external factors have
blocked planned union mergers (e.g. Chaison, 1996).
Effects of mergers
Research on union mergers has suggested that the merger process may have
detrimental effects on members’ attitudes toward and participation in their unions (e.g.,
Chaison, 1986; Freeman & Brittain, 1977). Sverke and Sjöberg (1997) contradicted
these conclusions by showing in their study that organizational gains without a
declining membership commitment is indeed possible. This contradiction was further
extended by Chaison et al. (2001), who showed that members’ union participation was
unaltered after an amalgamation. The precarious equilibrium between union
enlargement via merger, on one hand, and its effects on different union-related attitudes
such as membership commitment, on the other, constitutes the core of the issue relevant
to this report and the project to which it pertains.
General aim of the project
The research project to which this report pertains was initiated in 2002 and its main
purpose is to contribute to the understanding of union mergers and their consequences
for the union organization itself as well as for its members. The primary initial focus of
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the project was on the planned merger (referred to as the “Trio-merger”) between four
national unions, namely the Swedish Social Insurance Employees’ Union, the Salaried
Employees’ Union, the Swedish Union of Local Government Offices and the Union of
Civil Servants (these unions will from here on be referred to as Social Insurance,
Salaried Employees, Local Government and Civil Servants, respectively). Salaried
Employees, Local Government and Civil Servants are confederates of the Swedish
Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO). Social Insurance pertained to the
Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) up until January 2002, when it changed its
affiliation to the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees.
The original merger plans were abandoned in December 2001, when Salaried
Employees voted against the merger and subsequently withdrew from the collaboration.
It then became necessary to alter the original purpose of the project (i.e., to study the
effects of the planned four-union merger) to studying the effects of an abandoned
merger plan. In addition, after the original merger plan was abandoned, two of the
unions (Social Insurance and Civil Servants) developed merger plans of their own.
These merger plans were realized in January 2003 when Civil Servants absorbed Social
Insurance. Hence, the project will also evaluate the effects of this merger, using the
other two unions (Salaried Employees and Local Government) as comparison unions.
The research project will debouch into a longitudinal study, of which the baseline
questionnaire data collection wave (Time 1) took place in 2002 (for further details about
the Time 1 questionnaire and its administration, see Eriksson et al., 2002). The project is
also based on relevant documentation and interviews.
The present study
Any conclusion that is generalized from a sample to a population rests upon a certain
required congruence between the two groups of individuals. When a sample is
congruent with the population from which it is drawn, it is said to be representative of
that population. This is relevant to the present project in that the groups of union
members selected for the baseline measurement (Eriksson et at., 2002) must be
representative of the populations of the respective unions.
In order to assess if the Time 1 samples are representative, a non-response analysis
was performed via a comparison between respondents and non-respondents at Time 1.
Comparisons between samples in this report were made on two different levels. First,
the Time 1 respondents were compared to the total union populations regarding mean
age, gender distribution and union office holding shares. Second, the Time 1
respondents were compared on background and outcome variables to a randomly
selected group of non-respondents. The main purpose of this report is to ascertain
whether the samples used in the baseline measurements (Time 1) can be regarded as
representative of the total union populations.
Table 1 shows sample sizes, dropouts and response rates for the samples used at
Time 1. As can be seen, the response rates are on the low side, ranging from 51.57
percent for Salaried Employees to 64.75 percent for Social Insurance, resulting in a total
mean response rate of 58.31 percent. We considered this level of response rate to justify
a carrying through of a non-response analysis.
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Table 1. Sample sizes, dropouts and response rates for Social Insurance, Salaried
Employees, Local Government and Civil Servants, in the baseline questionnaire data
collection wave.
Union
Social
Insurance
Salaried
Employees
1,000
1,000
1,000
999
3,999
7
13
9
17
46
Net sample
993
987
991
982
3,953
Number of answers
643
509
582
571
2,305
Response rate (%)
64.75
51.57
58.73
58.15
58.31
Gross sample
Not in population
Local
Civil
Government Servants
Total
Method
Sample and procedure
Due to the low response rate in the baseline measurements, it is difficult to say
whether those four samples are representative or not. In order to test for this, a nonresponse analysis was carried out. Out of the 3,999 individuals who were selected for
Time 1, a total of 2,305 individuals participated (this group shall hereafter be referred to
as “respondents”). A total of 46 individuals did not pertain to the population. It follows,
then, that out of the net sample of 3,953 individuals, 1,648 did not participate at Time 1.
Out of these 1,648, a total of 120 individuals (30 from each union) were randomly
selected for the non-response analysis (this group shall hereafter be referred to as “nonrespondents”).
Table 2 shows samples and response rates for the non-response analysis. Of the
initial 120 individuals, 9 were identified as not belonging to the population (either
retired or no longer a union member). 16 individuals refused to participate and another
10 individuals could not be reached. 12 individuals did not participate for other reasons.
The final number of respondents in the non-response analysis amounted to 73 (response
rate = 65.77%).
The individuals selected for the non-response analysis were interviewed via
telephone. The telephone interviews were administered by ARS Research AB. The
interviewee was informed about the purpose of the interview, about data security and
that participation was voluntary. The interviewer read each question verbatim to the
respondent and then ticked the respondent’s answer on 5-graded Likert scales ranging
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree), in the question template.
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Table 2. Sample sizes, dropouts and response rates for Social Insurance, Salaried
Employees, Local Government and Civil Servants in the non-response sample.
Social
Insurance
Salaried
Employees
Gross sample
30
30
30
30
120
Not in population
1
3
4
1
9
Net sample
29
27
26
29
111
Refused
5
2
4
5
16
Not reached
0
4
4
2
10
Other drop-out reason
4
5
1
2
12
Number of answers
20
16
17
20
73
Response rate (%)
68.97
59.26
65.39
68.97
65.77
Union
Local
Civil
Government Servants
Total
Measures
The telephone interviews with the non-respondents were fully structured, aided by a
question template consisting of background variables and strategically selected items
from the main questionnaire. Each of the selected index variables from the Time 1
questionnaire (for full details, see Eriksson et al., 2002) was represented by one single
item in the telephone interview (see Table 3). Out of the approximately 25 index
variables in the Time 1 questionnaire, 13 were selected for the non-response analysis.
For each of the index variables, one marker-item was selected to be used in the nonresponse analysis. The selection procedure involved identifying the item with the
highest loading in each of the index variables (in the factor analyses carried out to check
for internal consistency in the index variables in the main data). Below follows brief
descriptions of the respective variables and items used in the non-response analysis.
Demographic and background variables. Age (Bb01) measures the respondent’s age
in years. Gender (Bb02) measures the respondent’s sex (1=female, 2=male). Family
status (Bb04) measures whether the respondent is single (1) or married (2). Working
hours (Ab02) measures the respondent’s type of employment contract, i.e., whether the
respondent is working on full-time permanent contract (1), part-time permanent contract
(2) or temporary contract (3). Union tenure (Fb01) measures how many years the
respondent has been a member of his/her union. Organizational tenure (Ab04) measures
how many years the respondent has been employed by his/her present employer.
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Work-related attitudes. All work-related attitudes were assessed using a response
format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Organizational
commitment (Oc) reflects the respondent’s emotional attachment to the employing
organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Job satisfaction (Js) reflects the respondent’s
general satisfaction with his/her job (Hellgren, Sjöberg & Sverke, 1997; based on
Brayfield & Rothe, 1951). Turnover intention (It) reflects the respondent’s intention of
voluntarily resigning from his/her job (Sjöberg & Sverke, 2000; based on Lyons, 1971
and Camman et al., 1979).
Union-related experiences. All union-related experiences were assessed using a
response format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Union
centralization (Ce) reflects the degree of perceived centralization of decision-making in
the respondent’s union (Mellor & Mathieu, 1999). Union formalization (Fo) reflects the
extent to which decisions and procedures are guided by established rules and guidelines
within the respondent’s organization (Mellor & Mathieu, 1999). Union innovation (In)
reflects the extent to which the union is receptive of the members’ needs and priorities
(Mellor & Mathieu, 1999). Union support (Su) reflects the respondent's perceived
amount of support from the union (Goslinga, 1996; based on Shore et al., 1994). Union
justice (Uj) reflects the respondent’s degree of trust toward his/her union (Sverke et al.,
2001; based on Cummings & Bromiley’s (1996) Organizational Trust Inventory).
Union commitment. All union commitment items were assessed using a response
format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Ideological commitment
(Ucv) reflects the respondent’s emotional and value-related connections to his/her union
(Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995). Union instrumentality (Fs) reflects the degree to which the
union is perceived to achieve members’ individual objectives (Sverke & Kuruvilla,
1995). Union membership intention (Im) reflects the respondent’s intention of remaining
a member of his/her union (Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995). Union office holding (Fb02)
measures whether the respondent holds a union office (1=yes, 2=no).
Union merger-related attitudes. All union merger-related attitudes were assessed
using a response format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Attitude toward merger (Me) reflects the respondent’s general attitude toward union
mergers (Eriksson et al., 2002). Beliefs about merger (Tr) reflects the respondent’s
expectations of the initially planned Trio-merger (Eriksson et al., 2002).
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Table 3. Index variables and items used in the non-response analysis.
Index name (code)
Background variables
Age (Bb01)
Gender (Bb02)
Family status (Bb04)
Working hours (Ab02)
Union tenure (Fb01)
Organizational tenure (Ab04)
Work-related attitudes
Organizational commitment (Oc04)
Job satisfaction (Js02)
Turnover intention (It01)
Union-related experiences
Union centralization (Ce01)
Union formalization (Fo04)
Union innovation (In03)
Union support (Su04)
Item
“In what year were you born?”
“Gender?” *
“Household?” *
“What is you current employment
contract?” *
“How many years have you been a member
of your current union?”
“How many years have you worked for your
current employer?
“The decisions that are made within my
organization largely reflect my personal
values”
“I am contented with the job I have”
“I feel that I could leave this job”
“Members are encouraged to participate
when important decisions are made in my
union” (R)
“Rules and procedures which guide
administrative work within my union are
available to all members”
“My union is flexible and continually
adapting to new ideas”
“Should I have complaints, I know my
union would take them seriously”
“I completely trust my union”
Union justice (Uj05)
Union commitment and participation
Ideological commitment (Ucv06)
“My union is of great personal importance
for me”
Union instrumentality (Fs06)
“My union’s chances of bringing about an
improvement of my work situation are great”
Union membership intention (Im02)
“During the last year I have seriously thought
about leaving the union” (R)
Union office holding (Fb02)
“Do you currently hold a union office?” *
Merger-related attitudes
“I think mergers offer unions good
Attitude toward merger (Me03)
possibilities of strengthening their
positions”
Beliefs about merger (Tr05)
“Union members’ influence over unionrelated work would have increased after
the merger”
R = reversed-coded item. * For coding information see pp 6-7.
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Results and discussion
We begin this section by taking a look at how the Time 1 samples compared to the
respective union populations regarding three personal background variables, namely
mean age, gender distribution and union office holding shares. The two groups are not
tested for differences since standard deviations of the population data were not available
from the respective unions.
Table 4 shows comparisons between respondents and the respective union
populations as a whole regarding mean age, gender distribution and union office
holding shares. As can be seen, the Time 1 samples reveal similar figures for mean age
as the total union populations. Table 4 also shows that the gender distribution is similar
in the two groups. These results imply that the samples used in the data collection are
representative of the respective union populations regarding mean age and gender
distribution. When it comes to union office holding shares it can be seen in Table 4 that
a higher percentage of the Time 1 samples hold union offices compared to the total
union populations. This is to be expected, as members with union offices should be
more motivated to participate in an investigation concerning their own union than
would be the union population in general.
In sum, it can safely be said that the Time 1 samples are representative of the
respective union populations regarding gender distribution and mean age whereas union
office holding was somewhat over-represented in the Time 1 sample.
Table 4. Comparison between respondents and total unions regarding mean age, gender
distribution and union office holding.
Union
Social
Insurance
Salaried
Employees
Local
Government
Civil
Servants
Mean age
(in years)
Respondents
Total
union
Gender (female)
(%)
Respondents Total
union
Union office holding
(%)
Respondents
Total
union
52.14
52.00
85.80
84.92
12.90
6.55
44.55
41.33
64.60
62.93
9.50
6.96
48.80
47.38
78.20
74.15
16.90
10.49
48.91
54.00
69.20
63.92
22.70
17.57
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In the following section, we move on to comparing data from the non-response
samples with the samples that responded to the Time 1 questionnaire. First, results
regarding background variables are presented, followed by results regarding index
variables.
Background variables
Table 5 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
mean age, gender distribution and family status. As can be seen, no significant
differences between non-respondents and respondents were found. The two samples
were very similar indeed regarding age and family status, whereas there was a tendency
for females to be slightly over-represented among the respondents (however, this
tendency was not reflected in a statistically significant difference between respondents
and non-respondents).
Table 6 shows a comparison between non-respondents and respondents regarding
working hours. Here also, no significant differences were found, revealing strong
similarities between the non-respondents and the respondents regarding working hours.
Again, the slight differences between non-respondents and respondents were not
statistically significant.
Table 7 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
union and organizational tenure. No significant differences were found between the
non-respondents and the respondents on these two variables (t[2320] = 1.76, p = .08 and
(t[2219] = 0.84, p = .40 for the total sample respectively).
These results taken together are tantamount to the samples being representative of
their respective union populations regarding personal background variables.
Work-related attitudes
Table 8 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
work-related attitudes. The results show that the non-respondents were generally
significantly higher in organizational commitment than were the respondents. This was
consistently so for all the unions as well as for the total sample (t[2173] = 6.05, p < .001
for the total sample). Regarding job satisfaction, no significant differences were found
between the two groups. Furthermore, the only union where the non-respondents
differed from the respondents on turnover intention was Social Insurance, where the
non-respondents showed a significantly lower level of organizational turnover intention
than did the respondents (t[640] = -2.50, p < .05).
Taken together, the results show that the sample of respondents can be considered
fairly representative regarding work-related attitudes. Although organizational
commitment was higher among the non-respondents than among the respondents in all
samples, and although organizational turnover intention was lower among nonrespondents in Social Insurance, the work attitudes of respondents and non-respondents
were fairly similar.
Union-related experiences
Table 9 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
union-related experiences. It can be seen that when it comes to union centralization, the
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non-respondents experienced their unions to be less centralized than did the respondents
(t[2206] = 6.11, p < .001 for the total sample). The only exception to this was the Civil
Servants union, where the difference between non-respondents and respondents was
non-significant (t[546] = 1.89, p = .06). As can be noted in Table 9, the respondents
scored a mean of 2.94, which is very close to the scale mean of 3.00, which reflects an
uncertainty on behalf of the respondents whether their union was centralized or not.
Regarding union formalization, the non-respondents consistently experienced their
respective unions to be more formalized than did the respondents (t[2175] = 8.94, p < .001
for the total sample). This result, considered together with that of union centralization, is
somewhat noteworthy, in that they reflect the non-respondents’ and the respondents’
general perception of their unions as being decentralized and formalized at the same
time.
Regarding union innovation, there was a tendency for non-respondents to view their
unions as more innovative than did the respondents, with significant differences
between non-respondents and respondents only in Salaried Employees (t[468] = 5.26, p <
.001) and Local Government (t[542] = 3.21, p < .01) however. The observation of
uncertainty reflected in a mean score near the scale mean of 3.00 applies also here, since
the respondents’ total mean score was 2.95.
In terms of union support, the non-respondents found their union to be significantly
more supportive than did the respondents in Social Insurance (t[635] = 2.35, p < .05) and
Local Government (t[556] = 3.01, p < .01). However, for none of the unions was there a
significant difference between non-respondents and respondents regarding union justice.
Considering these results, the non-respondents can be regarded as approximately
similar to the respondents when it comes to three union-related experiences (union
innovation, union support, and union justice), whereas there were differences in two of
them (union centralization and formalization).
Union commitment and participation
Table 10 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
union commitment, union membership intention, and union office holding. As can be
seen, no general differences were found in ideological commitment nor union
instrumentality (t[2243] = 0.26, p = .80 and (t[2222] = 1.11, p = .27 for the total sample
respectively). The only union to show significant differences between non-respondents
and respondents when it came to intention to remain a union member was Salaried
Employees where the non-respondents showed a stronger intention to retain
membership than did the respondents (t[487] = -2.90, p < .01). Neither did the nonrespondents differ from the respondents regarding union office holding shares.
Therefore, the non-respondents and the respondents can be regarded as highly similar
when it comes to union commitment and participation. For office holding, the
percentages differed substantially even though these differences did not result in
statistically significant differences between non-respondents and respondents ( χ 2 =
2.97, p = .09 for the total sample).
Merger-related attitudes
Table 11 shows comparisons between non-respondents and respondents regarding
merger-related attitudes. As can be seen, the non-respondents were more positive toward
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union mergers in general (t[2204] = 3.89, p < .001 for the total sample). The nonrespondents were also significantly more convinced than the respondents that members’
union-related influence would have increased, had the planned merger been realized
(t[2226] = 5.87, p < .001). As noted, this variable revealed marked differences between
respondents and non-respondents. The reason for this is difficult to speculate about, but
one possible reason is that the non-respondents, keeping in mind that they responded via
telephone in the comfort of their home environment, maybe felt less inhibited to express
their views more freely. In other words, the non-respondents could have been less
affected by the social desirability bias. It might also be that the discussions about merger
among members became more extensive after the original four-way merger was
abandoned, and that members over time became more positive about the benefits of
merger.
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for age, gender and family status: Comparisons between
non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees, Local
Government and Civil Servants.
Variable name
(code)
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Age
(Bb01)
Mean (SD)
Gender (female)
(Bb02)
%
Family status (single)
(Bb04)
%
52.95
(6.47)
52.14
(5.84)
0.61
80.00
25.00
85.80
20.10
0.54
0.29
42.94
(8.13)
44.55
(10.53)
-0.61
56.30
18.80
64.60
24.40
0.48
0.27
47.29
(12.33)
48.80
(9.91)
-0.61
82.40
18.80
78.20
21.50
0.17
0.07
51.45
(8.80)
48.91
(9.60)
1.16
85.00
20.00
69.20
25.40
2.29
0.30
49.03
(9.69)
48.82
(9.42)
0.19
76.70
20.80
75.10
22.70
1.33
0.14
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
-14-
Table 6. Frequency distributions regarding type of employment contract: Comparisons
between non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees,
Local Government and Civil Servants.
Variable name
(code)
Working Hours
(Ab02)
(%)
Full-time
Part-time
permanent contract permanent contract
Temporary
contract
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
95.00
0.00
5.00
Respondents
91.70
6.70
1.60
Test for difference ( χ 2)
2.69
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
86.70
0.00
13.30
82.00
11.70
6.30
Test for difference ( χ )
2
2.89
Local Government
Non-respondents
88.20
11.80
0.00
Respondents
77.40
18.00
4.60
Test for difference ( χ 2)
1.39
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
85.00
15.00
0.00
89.60
5.10
5.30
Test for difference ( χ )
2
4.55
Total
Non-respondents
88.90
6.90
4.20
Respondents
85.50
10.30
4.20
Test for difference ( χ 2)
0.86
-15-
Table 7. Means (standard deviations) for union and organizational tenure: Comparisons
between non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees,
Local Government and Civil Servants.
Variable name
(code)
Union tenure
(Fb01)
Organizational tenure
(Ab04)
27.20
(6.11)
26.00
(8.88)
0.60
27.68
(5.43)
25.49
(9.19)
1.04
13.88
(9.98)
11.06
(9.41)
1.18
11.38
(9.77)
9.56
(9.46)
0.75
20.15
(9.24)
15.89
(10.74)
1.42
19.64
(11.19)
16.41
(11.55)
1.03
20.15
(10.09)
18.23
(11.73)
0.72
17.65
(11.19)
18.30
(12.23)
-0.24
20.74
(9.97)
18.26
(11.58)
1.76
19.36
(11.09)
18.13
(12.06)
0.84
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
-16-
Table 8. Means (standard deviations) for work-related attitudes: Comparisons between
non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees, Local
Government and Civil Servants.
Variable
name
(code)
Job
satisfaction
(Js02)
Turnover
intention
(It01)
3.65
(0.99)
2.99
(0.87)
3.31**
3.65
(1.35)
3.75
(0.98)
-0.43
1.30
(0.92)
1.99
(1.23)
-2.50*
3.56
(0.96)
3.00
(0.99)
2.25*
4.13
(0.72)
3.79
(1.12)
1.18
1.50
(1.10)
1.89
(1.22)
-1.27
3.82
(1.47)
3.02
(0.93)
3.43**
4.00
(1.37)
3.78
(1.04)
0.86
1.82
(1.47)
1.92
(1.20)
-0.34
3.60
(1.27)
2.92
(0.93)
3.14**
4.20
(1.06)
3.79
(1.00)
1.80
1.40
(0.99)
1.76
(1.06)
-1.50
3.66
(1.17)
2.98
(0.93)
6.05***
3.99
(1.16)
3.77
(1.03)
1.72
1.49
(1.12)
1.90
(1.18)
-2.88**
Organizational
commitment
(Oc04)
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Notes: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
-17-
Table 9. Means (standard deviations) for union-related experiences: Comparisons
between non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees,
Local Government and Civil Servants.
Variable name
(code)
Union
Union
centralization formalization
(Fo04)
(Ce01)
Union
innovation
(In03)
Union
support
(Su04)
Union
justice
(Uj05)
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
2.40
(1.43)
2.90
(0.90)
2.38*
4.45
(1.23)
3.69
(0.95)
3.47**
3.15
(1.14)
3.01
(0.95)
0.65
4.00
(1.26)
3.43
(1.06)
2.35*
3.50
(1.50)
3.30
(1.10)
0.78
1.94
(1.44)
2.88
(0.90)
4.00***
4.63
(1.15)
3.13
(0.95)
6.16***
4.06
(1.48)
2.90
(0.84)
5.26***
3.75
(1.18)
3.25
(1.02)
1.90
3.44
(1.15)
3.29
(1.10)
0.54
2.06
(1.43)
3.02
(0.92)
4.15***
4.94
(0.75)
3.25
(1.02)
6.74***
3.71
(1.69)
2.96
(0.90)
3.21**
4.06
(1.30)
3.25
(1.09)
3.01**
3.75
(1.00)
3.22
(1.08)
1.95
2.55
(1.36)
2.95
(0.92)
1.89
4.05
(1.15)
3.44
(1.08)
2.47*
3.25
(1.29)
2.92
(0.92)
1.52
3.05
(1.15)
3.46
(1.10)
-1.64
3.30
(1.22)
3.31
(1.13)
-0.04
2.26
(1.40)
2.94
(0.91)
6.11***
4.49
(1.12)
3.40
(1.03)
8.94***
3.51
(1.42)
2.95
(0.91)
5.00**
3.70
(1.27)
3.35
(1.07)
2.68**
3.49
(1.23)
3.28
(1.10)
1.56
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Notes: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
-18-
Table 10. Means (standard deviations) and frequency distributions for union
commitment: Comparisons between non-respondents and respondents in Social
Insurance, Salaried Employees, Local Government and Civil Servants.
Variable
name
(code)
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Ideological
commitment
(Ucv06)
Union
Union office
Union
membership
holding
instrumentality
intention
(Fb02)
(Fs06)
(Im02)
%
2.40
(1.19)
2.41
(1.15)
-0.02
2.80
(1.67)
2.46
(0.94)
1.53
4.05
(1.70)
3.95
(1.38)
-0.33
2.63
(1.45)
2.24
(1.09)
1.37
2.81
(1.28)
2.43
(1.02)
1.45
4.81
(0.54)
3.80
(1.39)
-2.90**
1.94
(1.20)
2.21
(0.99)
-1.08
2.18
(1.13)
2.49
(0.99)
-1.30
3.76
(1.60)
3.54
(1.47)
-0.62
2.40
(1.19)
2.36
(1.10)
0.14
2.70
(1.69)
2.60
(1.00)
0.44
3.75
(1.41)
3.75
(1.42)
0.01
2.34
(1.25)
2.31
(1.09)
0.26
2.63
(1.48)
2.50
(0.99)
1.11
4.07
(1.45)
3.76
(1.42)
-1.80
15.00
12.90
0.07
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
0.00
9.50
1.67
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
5.90
16.90
1.45
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
10.00
22.70
1.80
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t/ χ 2)
Notes: ** p < .01
8.20
15.60
2.97
-19-
Table 11. Means (standard deviations) for merger-related attitudes: Comparisons
between non-respondents and respondents in Social Insurance, Salaried Employees,
Local Government and Civil Servants.
Variable name
(code)
Attitude toward
merger
(Me03)
Beliefs
about merger
(Tr05)
Social Insurance
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
4.55
(1.00)
3.64
(1.00)
3.99***
3.60
(1.54)
2.94
(0.90)
3.14**
3.06
(1.65)
2.74
(1.07)
1.16
3.00
(1.55)
2.49
(0.96)
2.04*
2.94
(1.71)
2.85
(1.09)
0.33
3.29
(1.90)
2.44
(0.95)
3.51***
3.70
(1.30)
3.01
(1.09)
2.75**
3.25
(1.71)
2.53
(0.93)
3.27**
3.62
(1.53)
3.09
(1.12)
3.89***
3.30
(1.66)
2.61
(0.95)
5.87***
Salaried Employees
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Local Government
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Civil Servants
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Total
Non-respondents
Respondents
Test for difference (t)
Notes: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
-20-
Conclusions
The main purpose of this report was to test if the samples used in the baseline
measurements of the questionnaire study in the overall project, designed to evaluate
predictors and outcomes of union mergers, were representative. This was done through
comparisons on two different levels. The Time 1 samples were compared to the union
populations regarding mean age, gender distribution and union office holding shares,
and were shown to be representative on these specific personal background variables.
Randomly selected samples of non-respondents were then compared to respondents on
items considered central to the main questionnaire. These comparisons indicated that the
group of non-respondents, on the whole, was similar to the group of respondents.
The results did reveal some dissimilarities, though. In particular, the non-respondents
differed from the respondents on four specific areas. The non-respondents were overall
more committed to their respective employing organizations than were the respondents.
The non-respondents perceived their respective unions as less centralized and more
formalized than did the respondents and were also considerably more positive toward
union mergers than were the respondents. These dissimilarities taken together are not
easily interpreted, as the feelings of simultaneous decentralization and formalization
among the non-respondents are somewhat contradictory. This tendency is also evident
among the respondents, although not as strongly, and could be a reflection of a possible
non-response bias.
Apart from the dissimilarities mentioned above, the group of non-respondents can, in
our view, be generally considered representative of the group of respondents. There are
though, however, some statistical issues of relevance when it comes to the interpretation
of the results presented in this report. On the one hand, about 100 pair wise comparisons
were made analyzing the data, making the risk for mass significance apparent.
Considering the amount of separate comparisons, a few significant results appearing by
chance are to be expected, making it possible that the non-respondents are even more
similar to the respondents than they appear in the results presented here. On the other
hand, the small samples of non-respondents made it difficult to identify statistically
significant differences, which implies that there might be more differences between
non-respondents and respondents than is reflected in this report. When viewed together,
the argument could be made that these issues cancel each other out which, then, would
provide further support for the presented results.
In general, the comparisons presented here can be summarized in two parts. First, the
respondents who participated in the baseline measurements are highly similar to the
respective total union populations when it comes to central background variables such
as mean age, gender distribution, and union office holding shares. This is a strong
indication that the respondents at Time 1 are also generally representative of the total
union populations. Second, the results of the telephone interviews with a selection of the
non-respondents show that the non-respondents are similar to the respondents regarding
most of the respects central to the main questionnaire.
-21-
In sum, weighting the similarities against the differences and keeping the statistical
issues in mind, we find that the respondents participating in the baseline measurements
are to be considered representative of the total union populations from which they were
sampled.
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