FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN RELIGIONS: THE CASE OF JAPAN
(Draft – Not for Citation)
David Wessels
Sophia University
Tokyo, Japan
June 2009
(Author’s note: I have retained the original title of this paper for the
Santiago Congress of IPSA 2009. However, as I complete this draft, I would
suggest that the following revised title may be a better guide for the reader:
“Reconsidering Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, with Reference to
Modern Japan”.)
Introduction
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, globalization is a
framework for our understanding of both politics and religion (Wessels 2009),
and the interaction of religion and politics in a global space is newly
appreciated (Esposito and Watson 2000).
The globalizing trends that we
notice today have familiar antecedents in history, as well.
And yet, in
international relations, there have been and still are many polities and
many religions that interact as if they are “foreign” to each other. The
spread of religions outward from their places of origin has been going on
for centuries. After a time what may have been foreign to one locale takes
on indigenous characteristics and may in turn be passed on elsewhere in a
continuing process of foreign penetration and assimilation. As religions
and politics change, ideas and identities of people transform the nature
of international politics.
Migrant workers from the Philippines bring Saudi Arabia and its people
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 1
into close contact with non-Muslim people.
Migrants from their former
colonies into Britain and France have had interacting religious and political
implications for both polities and religious adherents.
The religious
affiliations of residents in Israel, Lebanon, Timor-Leste, Kashmir, the
Netherlands, and Turkey—to name just a few places—reverberate on the world
stage. Barack Obama deems it appropriate in his first visit to the Middle
East as American President to address himself not only to statesmen but to
Muslims more generally. The former British Prime Minister launches the Tony
Blair Faith Foundation soon after leaving office “to promote respect and
understanding about the world’s major religions and show how faith is a
powerful force for good in the modern world.” (Mission Statement of Tony
Blair Faith Foundation; found at http://www/tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/
about-us.mission-statement.html)
In this paper, I am not going to try to say everything that can or
needs to be said about society, politics, religions, and history. But I will
try to explore the transformation in international relations that has been
going on in the modern world from the perspective of foreign relations and
foreign religions, and use Japan’s modern history as a backdrop for this
exercise. Perhaps the focus of the paper could be explained more precisely
as an effort to situate the focus of traditional international relations
or political science on foreign relations in the context of a globalizing
world in which religions spread via diasporas and direct missionary activity.
Diverse religions come into close contact with each other, and encounters
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 2
with a mix of politics and religion are among the significant “foreign”
encounters of our time that require a more thorough analysis than they are
ordinarily given.
As a reference point, I will address the experience of modern Japan
in these encounters. I will take as a starting point the events in East Asia,
and especially in Japan, that took place from the middle of the nineteenth
century.
From the standpoint of international relations, the “western”
world barged its way into the region at that time to an unprecedented degree
as trends in politics (such as imperialism and human rights), economics (trade
and
industry),
religion
(missions
and
nationalisms),
and
technology
(transport and communication) converged in an expansion of international
society or the international system.(Bull and Watson 1984) (Veer and Lehmann
1999)
The states of Europe and the Americas were forging internal and
external political relations that included both sovereignty and overseas
territorial expansion among their basic institutions.(Philpott 2001) (Holsti
2004)
Foreign relations for Japan and other regions meant new religious
encounters, as well.
Modern Japan
Japan, of course, had already experienced a mixture of political,
economic, and religious penetration in the sixteenth century when Portuguese
and Spanish ships reached the archipelago. Beginning with Francis Xavier
in 1549, the Catholic faith spread over a period of several decades until
edicts of expulsion of the missionaries and suppression of the faith became
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 3
more severe from the 1590s into the 1630s. The ban on Christianity in Japan
was finally lifted only in 1873.
When foreign pressure to open East Asia to western economic influence
and trade increased in the mid-nineteenth century, the immediate diplomatic
issues that Japan faced were allowing foreign vessels to resupply in a limited
number of ports and the permanent stationing of consular officials. After
the Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) began this process of limited contacts, broader
issues in Japan’s relations with other countries were gradually incorporated
into official diplomatic documents. The Japanese-American Treaty of Amity
and Commerce (1858) included provisions that allowed Americans “complete
freedom to practice their religion and the right to build churches in Japan,
and the Japanese would not offer any insults to American religious practices.”
[(Matray 2002), Vol. 1, p. 218.]
Then, in 1868 the Meiji Restoration inaugurated a period of rapid
transformation in Japan.
In that same year the Department of Divinity
(jingikan 神祇官) was established as the highest organ of government. It was
responsible for conducting various rites of state and helped to promote the
ascendency of organized State Shinto over Buddhism within Japan.
However,
the administrators were divided on theological and policy matters, and the
Department was demoted to the status of a Ministry of Divinity (jingishō
神祇省) on 8 August 1871, then abolished and reconstituted in the Ministry
of Education (or Religion; kyōbushō
教部省) on 14 March 1872.
[(Hardacre
1989) pp. 29-31.]
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 4
The Iwakura Mission (1871-1873) was sent by the Japanese government
to survey western societies, and its recommendations and experiences had
a significant impact on Japan’s development over the next decades. One of
the messages that these Japanese brought back from their travels in the United
States and various European countries was the expectation that these
countries had for freedom of religion in Japan. This was regarded as a mark
of the modern polity that was expected of Japan and a condition for improvement
in Japan’s treaty relations with foreign countries. This added weight to
the call for religious freedom made by various foreign missionaries,
educators, and diplomats
in the early years of the Meiji Period (1868-1912).
Organized movements for freedom and people’s rights spread throughout the
country.
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution)
granted Japanese subjects freedom of religious belief (Article 28) in 1889.
These rapid developments in the domestic and foreign politics of Japan
certainly had effects on Japan’s commerce and industry, culture and thought,
military and politics and religion. Furthermore, the imperial ambitions of
this new player on the international stage led to wars and colonialism in
the following decades, which also had implications for religions. To put
the matter in trade terminology, Japan was both importing and exporting
religions as it encountered the international system during this period.
Actually, Japan first had to find a word to express religion, a process
that took some time and had reverberations in later events. [(Hardacre 1989),
pp. 63-65.] Characteristics of religion that Japanese noticed in Christianity
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 5
included its doctrinal and scriptural base, as well as a membership that,
on the one hand, was not coextensive with the population of any nation, and,
on the other hand, extended beyond the boundaries of a single nation. [(Baker
1997), p.157] The term shūkyō (宗教) became the accepted translation for
“religion,” with the same Chinese characters being adopted elsewhere in the
East Asian region.[(Hardacre 1989), pp. 63-65, and notes 14 and 15 on p.
177.] The native religious practices referred to as Shinto (神道) provided
a basis for mixed religious and political mobilization from this period.
By offering a transnational definition of religions, Meiji era
bureaucrats could argue that practices associated with Shinto that focused
on reverence for the ancestors of the nation and for the Emperor could be
favored for mobilization of the people during this period. What is usually
called State Shinto developed with traditional religious trappings but
without the status of State Religion because of the definition of religion
that had been adopted by the government. Of course, the matter was not so
simple.
As Japan developed its military power and economic prowess in the late
nineteenth century, the educational system was used to instill national
loyalty.
The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) was read to students,
and pictures of the Emperor were reverenced. School trips to the Ise Shrine
linked each new generation to the mythical origins of the nation.
The
Yasukuni Shrine in the new capital, Tokyo, apotheosized soldiers who had
died in the service of the emperor and the state. Politics and administration
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 6
continued as usual, buttressed by religious ritual. Harootunian sees the
historical process in terms of claiming a collective memory through mourning
and religious ritual. [(Harootunian 1999), p. 146]
Shinto Shrines were established in those parts of Asia that Japan
colonized or settled in (Taiwan, Korea, Manchukuo). These shrines served
as links to the Japanese polity as well as religious venues. Although they
were utilized mostly by Japanese settlers, they became sites through which
the Japanese rulers tried to mobilize a sense of attachment to the Japanese
emperor and nation among local inhabitants.
Japanese military forces
controlled the shrines; and resistance by residents to forced participation
in shrine rituals led to conflicts and repression, especially in Korea.
[(Hardacre 1989), pp. 95-96.]
The diplomatic confrontations that continue today when Japanese
government officials attend the Yasukuni Shrine are well publicized. I will
not try to examine these incidents in detail here, but I do want to situate
them in the context of my topic of foreign relations and foreign religions.
For the peoples of Asia who experienced Japanese aggression from the late
nineteenth into the twentieth century, the Yasukuni Shrine is particularly
sensitive because Class A war criminals convicted by the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War Crimes Trials) after World
War II are enshrined there. As a flash point for the historical memories
of Asian peoples, Yasukuni Shrine is both a reminder of the imposition of
Japanese religious rituals of an earlier period and a symbol of foreign
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 7
relations gone awry in the past and the present.
I will also include a few words about a “Yasukuni Incident” associated
with my own institution, Sophia University, which is significant as a case
of Japan’s confrontation with a foreign religion in wartime and as a part
of a larger religious and diplomatic event.
This will require a brief
excursus into the military and political history of the period. After the
Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, the Japanese army consolidated
its power in the region, leading to the proclamation of the puppet state
of Manchukuo on February 25, 1932. The ideological basis for the state was
Wang-tao (the Royal Way or Way of the King 王道), based on Confucianism rather
that Shinto. This doctrine was merged with the Japanese Way of the Emperor
(Kōdō 皇道) in later formulations, and thus was associated with Shinto themes.
The cultivation of Confucian rites in the new Manchukuo raised the
dormant issue of “Chinese Rites,” which had been a source of tension between
Chinese governments and the Vatican for hundreds of years since the Christian
missions in China from the seventeenth century.
As a study of foreign
relations and foreign religions, this controversy deserves a special mention
here. [For a detailed analysis of this issue see the work of Minamiki, on
which I rely here (Minamiki 1985).] It is especially notable for the way
in which the changed political and social circumstances of the twentieth
century rebounded on a religious practice.
On May 5, 1932, a Sophia University student refused on religious
grounds to reverence a picture of the Japanese Emperor at the shrine. This
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 8
resulted in a crisis that could have led to the closing of Sophia and various
penalties for Christian teachers and students. To make a long story short,
the resulting official exchanges on the matter between Church officials and
government officials led to affirmations by the government that making a
sign of reverence toward the Emperor’s picture in Yasukuni Shrine was a civic
rather than a religious act.
This led Church authorities to affirm that
Japanese Catholics could participate in such civic activities.
The
political
and
military
conditions
in
Manchukuo
and
Japanese-occupied China raised questions of religious observance there, just
as it had done in Japan, including this Yasukuni Incident. In this context,
the Vatican issued letters and instructions on the matter in 1935 and 1936
that modified traditional prohibitions against Catholics’ participation in
rituals of a civic nature that had been interpreted earlier as forbidden
religious rites. Pope Pius XII’s encyclical letter Summi pontificatus of
1939 solemnized the principles of universality in mission which the crisis
of the 1930s had brought to a head. In the turmoil of wartime, Catholic Church
teaching and practice changed regarding its own foreign relations vis-à-vis
places where it was viewed as a foreign religion.
Contemporary Japan
After the Second World War, Japan’s foreign relations changed
dramatically. Military defeat was followed by a lengthy Occupation period,
during which a new Constitution of Japan (日本国憲法), whose writing had been
guided by SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers), came into effect
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 9
in 1947. State Shinto was abolished, but the Yasukuni Shrine began to be
treated as a religious entity that could continue to operate under the
principle of freedom of religion.(Yasukuni: senryooka no shirarezaru kooboo
2005) The Constitution guaranteed non-discrimination on the basis of creed
(Article 14), freedom of thought and conscience (Article 19), and freedom
of religion (Article 20). Articles 20 and 89 also make separation of religion
and the state explicit.
There have been sporadic attempts since then by various political and
religious groups to change the status of Yasukuni Shrine to an institution
under the state on the grounds of its role as a memorial for fallen military.
The constitutionality of such a move is in doubt, and it has not been a
politically viable position.
There has also been some collusion between
government ministries and the shrine in supplying information and advice
about enshrining the war dead.
A political party (Kōmeitō) closely
associated with a religious group (Soka Gakkai) has had some electoral success,
but by 1970 it had to separate itself officially from the parent religious
organization for political recognition.
But these are primarily issues
internal to Japan, and so I will end this discussion of Japan and return
to the wider theme of foreign relations and foreign religions.
Religion and Politics in a Globalizing World
Use of the word “foreign” in the title of this paper invites a reaction:
if the world is undergoing a process of deep globalizing, can any politics
be simply categorized as foreign? Does not the process of interdependence
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 10
or mutual penetration among polities make traditional boundaries porous,
if not invisible, in the economy or society, in ecology and culture? And
yet our world is full of foreign ministries and diplomats engaged in
communications
processes
that
presume
foreign
relations
are
still
significant. I will not challenge that presumption head-on, but I will try
to modify it by identifying some religious themes that challenge the ordinary
perspective on these issues.
“Foreign” religions are, if anything, more problematic even than
foreign relations.
Certainly, many religions—including almost all major
ones—make claim to universal values and messages that may be indigenized
in various locales but remain universal in their core. If they are foreign
to a place or time, it is a circumstance of history rather than anything
essential in the religions themselves. Globalization or universality is an
aim, if not an achievement, for these religions.
But what happens when
religious encounters are less than harmonious? And how can religious
differences within or among polities affect the conduct of global politics?
One way to approach these conundrums is through an analysis of some
of the discourses that are used.
In foreign relations, processes of
linguistic and other symbolic communication are the medium of contact between
polities.
Sovereignty,
self-determination,
and
non-intervention
are
primary themes in inter-state discourses; these help to create boundaries
between the internal and the external, between domestic and foreign. On the
other hand it is not uncommon for statesmen and diplomats to cross those
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 11
boundaries. The powerful contemporary claims about human rights are vivid
examples of not recognizing others as “foreign.”
Similar rhetoric in
political discourse is noticeable when statesmen urge that disagreements
may exist with the governments of other states, but not with their people.
Advances in technology and developments in political thought have
contributed to this breakdown of the foreign element in the conduct of
international relations.
Even before a “CNN-effect” was noted in public
affairs, diplomacy was challenged to keep up with the changed meanings and
identities of peoples throughout the world. Nineteenth-century imperialism
is a thing of the past, but the independent states that spread across the
planet have certainly not led to the establishment of autarchic polities
with
closed
societies.
Democratization,
too,
has
had
a
diplomatic
side-effect of stimulating political emulation. Multinational corporations
and consumer tastes can be regarded as aspects of a globalizing consciousness
that relativizes the foreign in a fundamental way.
Even a brief reflection on the example used in this paper illustrates
how
different
our
twenty-first
century
world
is
from
the
mid-nineteenth-century world in which Japan encountered “foreign” powers.
At that time, race and civilization were markers of diversity and otherness
that created seemingly rigid barriers to equality of treatment in the conduct
of foreign affairs. Notions of progress and modernity were somewhat more
fluid, opening a space for Japan (and others) to “catch up” with the West.
Material factors like the military and industry seemed to be the important
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 12
elements in power ranking that appealed to nationalist fervor. Both the West
and Japan went through a long ordeal of suffering in their foreign relations
as they pursued such goals over the next century.
For its part, the mainstream of international relations developed
along a line of secularism as a spiritual foundation of foreign affairs.
(Hurd 2008) I will not develop that discussion here, but I do want to point
out some significant issues raised by that perspective. If secularism is
contrasted with religion, it is curious how Japan’s encounter with
nineteenth-century international politics forced it to come up with a new
vocabulary and conceptual framework for religions.
Japan’s religious
self-image was challenged as it elaborated a constitutional and legal
framework for domestic and international politics.
In our own times, the United Nations has tried to establish a norm
of tolerance of religion or belief. This is found in the “Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief,” General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981.
It was reiterated in the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, “Declaration
and Program of Action,” (no. 22 and following) adopted on 22 June 1993; and
in the declaration “Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance,”
General Assembly Resolution 48/128 of 14 February 1994. These are strong
statements about the internal character of states-members of the United
Nations. Participants in international relations today are encouraged to
adopt a framework of tolerance for dealing with religion. This presupposes
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 13
a familiarity with religions and beliefs that may differ from one another
but are not foreign in the way that they may have been experienced previously.
Secularism is not taken for granted, and neither is a notion of “foreign
religions.”
Religious
discourses
contemporary global trends.
have
also
changed
under
the
impact
of
Inter-religious dialogues and ecumenical
encounters among religions have increased; and religions notably address
the major political agenda of today’s world, including human rights, peace,
and economic justice. (Traer 1991; Küng and Kuschel 1993) In particular,
as noted above, human rights, by virtue of transcending political boundaries,
are a key to the universalizing or globalizing character of political and
religious conditions. Analysts see religion as playing a significant role
even in the traditional international issues of security (Seiple and Hoover
2004), and urge statesmen to take religion more seriously in the conduct
of foreign relations generally [Johnston 2003; Johnston, Sampson, and Center
for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.) 1994; Albright
and Woodward 2006].
What is the religious meaning of these trends? I would suggest that
in parallel with a breakdown of “foreign” relations in international
relations, there is a transformation in the “foreignness” of religions in
the world.
Religionists, statesmen, and analysts all converge on a new
appreciation of the reality of public religion and the shared space for the
sacred which (multiple) religions occupy.(Tsushiro 津城 2005) Religions are
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 14
not seen as “foreign” to each other or to particular polities in the way
that they were a century ago. Religion itself is seen as returned from its
“exile” from international relations (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003) and its
“resurgence” as the key to understanding the transformation in twenty-first
century international relations (Thomas 2005; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997)
Concluding Remarks
This brief paper has come full circuit from a brief overview of
religions and polities interacting on the world stage to a brief analysis
of how the foreignness of international relations and global religions is
breaking down. As a counterpoint, I have described briefly a contrasting
story of Japan’s encounter with foreign relations and foreign religions over
the last century-and-a-half, a period when foreign relations and foreign
religions shaped international interactions dramatically for Japan. Living
as we are in the midst of contemporary processes, we probably lack the distance
to appreciate all that is happening. I would suggest that we need far better
definitions of religion and international politics than the Japanese
statesmen used in the nineteenth century. And we need a deeper appreciation
of the boomerang or rebound effects that drive the encounters among religions
and among polities, and also those between religion and politics today.
Traditional discourses of diplomats and current dialogues among religionists
offer some keys to a clearer understanding of the direction of these
encounters.
END
Wessels, Foreign Relations and Foreign Religions, p. 15
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