ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
Title: Entanglements of Major-power States in the Global South: an Indication for a 21st
Century Styled Cold War? The Case of Ukraine.
Tags: Cold War, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy
Abstract:
Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East may be used as proxies in place of
direct confrontations between superpower states, namely the United States, Russia and China.
In this paper, we argue that this pattern resembles the former Cold War whilst explaining how
and why the new Cold War will be fought differently. Existing studies examine separate
geopolitical disputes between global hegemons but fail to draw connections of multiple
conflicts in the globe. This study aims to fulfill this gap by discovering the connections of
geopolitical disputes where the three superpowers interfere; and the pattern of the 21st
century-styled Cold War, which will not be fought according to the traditional format, given
today’s interdependent world. Understanding this pattern can lead to more accurate
predictions for the 21st century world, enabling the Global South to be better prepared for the
consequences of superpowers’ clashes. In the case of Eastern Europe, Ukraine and the former
Soviet satellite states particularly will bear the ramifications of the superpowers’
entanglements. The Global South solutions and regionalism are crucial to resolve conflicts.
This study on the Ukrainian crisis is one part of a research series. Similar model will be
applied to the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
Entanglements of the U.S., Russia and China in Foreign Affairs: Theoretical Analysis
The foreign policy of the U.S., Russia and China has involved entanglements in other states
in order to pursue their own strategic interests which at various historical points have led to
clashes among them or with the states they entangle. The terms ‘entanglement’,
‘intervention’, ‘engagement’, and ‘meddling’ have been used interchangeably depending on
the author’s intended connotation and sometimes the severity or the motive of the actions. No
existing literature has provided a clear distinction criterion when one term should be used in
certain contexts over the other. Tipchanta (2012) provides a detailed definition of the term
‘intervention’ including economic, political and military actions of one state in another, using
both direct and indirect means. Regardless of whether the host states agree or disagree to
these actions, they are considered foreign intervention. In this paper, we choose to use the
term ‘entanglement’ which is the same term that the founder, Thomas Jefferson, used.
For the U.S., it has strayed from the founders’ intent with regards to foreign policy. Thomas
Jefferson was among the first to define the strategy of the United States by warning that it
should pursue “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations -- entangling
alliances with none.” In fact, the U.S. was born out of a deep entanglement in international
affairs by exploiting the tensions between Britain and France in order to gain independence.
The economic self-sufficiency was a dream of the founders but this could never be achieved
because of the U.S.’ geographical location (Friedman, 2014).
George Washington later urged the U.S. to avoid foreign adventures in his farewell address in
1796. It is worth extracting some parts of his speech:
1 | P a g e ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
“Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which
are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to
implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities…Our detached
and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course…Taking care
always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive
posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.”
This however could not have been realised because the U. S. was economically entangled
with Europe from the start. Its distant geography forced it into trade which had to be
protected against pirates and potentates, rather than preventing it to avoid excessive
involvement in the outside world as hoped. It made the U.S. weak and vulnerable to Britain
and France and even the Ottomans. As a result, the U.S. was fighting in the Middle East as
early as the 19th century. They wished for a time of peace and isolation. However, when
conflicts proved necessary, they did not hesitate to take action. Today, the U.S. is much more
powerful. Its gross domestic product constitutes more than 20 percent of that in the world.
The thirst to satisfy rapid economic growth causes it to intrude everywhere and this has led to
challenges and inevitable crashes with other major power states such as Russia and China
whose strategic interests intersect in the states or regions in question (Ibid.).
However, the American public is getting ‘entanglement fatigue’ just like during the Vietnam
War. Both left and right wanted to retreat to first address domestic economic needs. The
current U.S. President Barack Obama responded to this call to limit the U.S. entanglement by
announcing the decrease in U.S. entanglements in the world. However, the speedy expansion
of Chinese economic and political stretch and the increasing aggression of Russia globally
are threatening the U.S.’ strategic interests. Despite having reduced its military spending in
Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2012 due to Obama’s commitment to pull out troops, recent
crisis in the globe such as Arab springs, Ukrainian crisis, the East Asian and South Asian
crisis mean the U.S. still needs to maintain a massive military strength.
For China, its five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence argue for non-intervention whereas in
reality it does exercise power and intervention in the globe. Due to the century of humiliation,
China sees itself as a victim of bullying, intervention and imperialism by Western powers and
Japan since 1839. In the aftermath of WW II, Mao Zedong declared the end of the “century
of humiliation”, announced the four principles of Modernisation, which aimed at
reestablishing its power and influence in the region. This created China’s exponential
economic growth, nearly surpassing the U.S. as the world’s largest economy. Since then,
China has increased its military spending and activity. It has also taken a new policy
approach-- dogmatic assertion to gentle persuasion; joining and integrating in International
Organisations; improving relationships with its neighbors and former Western foes; and a
shift to multilateral diplomacy. These demonstrate China’s zest to expand and engage in the
global political arena as opposed to its pronounced Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Russia will intervene to keep control of its satellites too. Putin in particular is anti-Western
and is aiming to resurrect Russia’s power in the globe. At the end of the Cold War, Mikhail
Gorbachev started ‘Perestroika’ which turned Russia to the West. This continued until the
start of Putin’s presidency but later there was a shift in position. Putin’s foreign policy
decisions combine realpolitik with international economic integration. This policy would
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
help integrate Russia into the world community and economy. However, because of the
perception that Russia is not treated as an equal partner and that it is encroached by the
EU/NATO enlargement, Putin started to disregard the cooperation with the West (Sakwa,
2008). We see that although the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviet ideology remains
important for the post-Soviet leaders and policymakers in that the Soviet-Western rivalry
rhetoric is still exploited to enhance one’s political power stance. This Soviet ideology,
despite of major changes, therefore will continue to influence future Russia’s political
directions. And Russia will potentially remain its animosity with the West and extend its
power in the satellite states (Lynch, 1992).
Essentially, the driving factor behind the major power states’ foreign entanglement is their
image projection and prestige. Chinese and Russian are concerned with the image in the
region whereas the U.S. is concerned with the image in NATO and the United Nations.
Liberalists may push for the positive-sum free trade solution and suggests the avoidance of
zero-sum conflicts. However, a state cannot be economically entangled in the world without
also being politically and militarily entangled.
All types of realism are useful for the analysis of foreign entanglement. Gegout (2005)
divides realism into four main schools of thought including core, economic, normative and
ethical realism. Core realism explains foreign entanglement on the purpose to maintain state
security (Roberts,1993). Economic realism explains those actions that are carried out in order
to maximize economic wealth. Normative realism is relevant when used to explain foreign
entanglement which is driven by prestige for state leaders and the states. Machiavelli (2003),
Aron (2003), Morgenthau (1985), and Posen and Ross (1996-97) provide a thorough analysis
of how prestige matters for leaders. Additionally, ethical realism can provide a useful
explanation to foreign policy decisions which are resulted by ethical interests. Contrary to the
idea found on international relations theoretical understanding that realists do not think moral
policies are possible, Morgenthau (1985), Donnelly (2000) and Sagan (2004) do expect states
to sometimes act in an ethical way.
Constructivism is also used here as it analyses how norms are created, and how they
influence decisions. Unlike most constructivist literature, which focuses on the impact of
positive norms on foreign policy-making, our study shows that the negative norm of racist
prejudice in the case of Russia in former Communist states, China in Asia, and the United
States in the NATO member states, along with the neglected norm of legality, needs to be
included in the explanation of their involvement in the region they could exert power upon.
This article disagrees with those realists who postulate that foreign entanglements occurs only
for security reasons and economic gains; and with liberalists and constructivists who suggest
that states entangle first and foremost in order to respect the principle of the ‘responsibility to
protect’. Instead, it argues that the drivers for the major power states’ struggles to exert
influence in the world must also consider two additional explanations: the wish to acquire
prestige in their neighbour states and the international community and the weight of the past.
Gegout (2005) defines the wish for prestige as operating on three levels: individual, state and
international.
For Putin’s Russia, this is particularly true. The motivating factor for their entanglement is to
reclaim their former glory, to acquire prestige in their neighbour states and the international
community. For China, normative realism also provides a valid explanation because the
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
weight of the past, namely the century of humiliation which the nation identifies with, has
been the driver for its foreign policy choices and decisions to entangle in states and regions
China believes it has been humiliated. China, an important economic partner of Africa today,
is motivated in its engagement in Africa by the protection of the Chinese economy, and the
intention to project an image as a responsible power (Ibid.). The wish to acquire prestige and
international community as explained by normative realism can also explain the United
States’ struggle, policy choices and foreign entanglements with intent to maintain its global
influence and battle with the decline of American empire today. Based on these theoretical assumptions, we therefore argue that when the U.S., Russia and
China do decide to entangle in other states and regions, it is primarily for the sake of prestige,
and only where intervention does not harm the security and economic interests. This is true in
the case of the U.S. where the U.S. has no direct interests in the Ukraine. Indeed, security and
economy are inevitably undermined particularly if areas of entanglements intersect and
threaten the other state’s interests as we currently see in the case Russia and the West’s
clashes in Central Europe. Again, leaders would not go beyond the extent that it would risk
their prestige and popularity at home. Putin has seen a rise of popularity following his tighter
grip on Russia’s neighborhood. Obama’s sanction responses to Russia are related to a wish to
maintain its influence in NATO and European allies. This could be explained by normative
realism. However, Obama’s actions reach only to an extent that do not harm American
security and economy as reflected in his reluctance to take a stronger stance toward Russia’s
annexation of Crimea. Generally, when a crisis occurs in foreign countries, the reaction of the
U.S. is generally inaction. This can be explained by absence of strategic and economic
interests in the state in question; unwillingness to be involved in distant conflicts when its
prestige is not threatened; and sometimes by the racist assumption that conflict in the global
South is a normal event which does not require any reactions. The latter was the case in
Rwanda, Darfur, Crimea and Diaoyu and Senkaku Island. The U.S. entangle in foreign states
if the public supports it, the economic condition permits and its ally will join. They primarily
want UN support, but this is not essential. The desire of Russian, Chinese and American
leaders to create a positive image of themselves for their own citizens is a crucial factor in
entanglement.
The article is written to inform and challenge academics and students of international
relations, history, and the North-South politics, and the makers of national and international
policy. It also aims to interest and inform the wider general readership.
Defining Cold War
Thinking in historical and political context is crucial to understanding the motives for the
U.S., China, and Russia entanglement. In the past, the U.S. and Russia were engaged in the
Cold War battles around the globe for strategic and economic motives. The Cold War ended
in 1991 when the world saw the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen states. Russia had
since looked west in order to revive its troubled economy. By transforming the energy sector,
Putin has made Russia today an energy super-state and with this a renewed encroachment
upon the former Soviet states. The economic rise of China also has led China to stretch its
wings in the Global South and the areas it believes to have been humiliated in the past such as
in Asia, Africa, Asia and Latin America. This has recently led to clashes of interests and
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
rising tensions between the U.S., Russia and China. Despite this, the U.S. still is not
discussing issues of conflict management with these states. The U.S. rather seek to encamp
with the Northern states to resolve issues whereas Russia and China now are increasingly
cooperating with each other and sometimes bandwagon with Southern states and what
Northern leaders consider pariah states in the international community in order to balance the
hegemony of the U.S. and its allies. They are using proxies such as Ukraine and the Spratly
Islands instead of directly confronting with each other in wars. We argue that this is a
recurring pattern of the former Cold War.
To indicate whether today’s clashes between the U.S., Russia, and China are indeed a
resemblance of the Cold War, we need to first revisit the former Cold War and define what it
was about.
It is no doubt that the former Cold War was primarily about the balance of power which may
be maintained at a single point as a seesaw. Considerable pressure may be brought from
various sides in order to preserve the balance. The means used to create the balance included
political-economic and political-military means with raw military force to back up (Lynch,
1992).
Throughout the Cold War, states maintained excessive military spending. However, this was
reduced among the U.S. allies in Europe and Asia toward the end because of the lowered
perception of global threats. The only state that retained their military expenditure was the
U.S. Many suggest this was because the U.S. wanted to reinforce their global super power
status and that this was strongly influenced by the web of big military corporations.
What Lynch describes as the American and Soviet attempt to preserve the balance of power
during the Cold War years is now being repeated. Political-economic and political-military
diplomacy is being used together with the backup of raw military force. Russian defense
spending increased by roughly 14 percent in 2012 and about 16 percent in 2013. At the same
time, Chinese defense spending increased by about 14 percent in 2012 and more than 9
percent in 2013 (Eaglen, 2014). In 2012, the U.S. reduced its spending by $291 billion due to
the Budget Control Act, affecting NATO’s budget as the U.S. accounts for 75 percent of
NATO’s total budget. Despite the dip, the U.S.’ underlying budget expenditure is still close
to Cold War levels and continues to rise in other areas. This illustrates the U.S.’ effort to
maintain unilateral dominance for both conventional and unconventional conflicts. Domestic
supporters of big military spending such as during the Cold War saw this as no longer
necessary as conventional conflicts are unlikely and the only perceived threat is terrorist
attacks (Center of Defense Information, 2000).
Lynch further explains that the states’ reaction depends on the sources of threat to the balance
of power such as ‘the nature of certain political systems (communist, capitalist, or
democratic); an unbalanced distribution of international economic, political, and military
power (bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar); the quantity and quality of weapons systems in given
states or throughout the international system; or the presence of aggressive leaders of
powerful states’ (1992:12). Whatever the source of the threat, maintaining that balance is a
process, there is no long-term success and thus the effort to preserve the balance can never
end.
Lynch (1992) attached several attributes to the Cold War including the militarisation of
relationships, the globalisation of commitments and the ideological hysteria. Both sides
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
increased the military capability to intimidate, which was triggered by the perceived
unilateral projection of tension by one side onto another, which then reacted in a defensive
manner. It began as a political contest to secure control of European hegemony in the post
WWII period that finally expanded into a global standoff backed by military might.
Cold war activities outside of Europe were played out by loosely defined goals that resulted
in far more fatalities. The U.S.-Soviet dispute over Germany grew to become an international
phenomenon that led to progressive militarisation and the widespread anxiety that civilization
was at risk. The Cold War did not occur in fixed time and space. It was multidimensional.
Means such as political, diplomatic, psychological, economic and military were used in the
Cold War and this pattern seems to be repeated with the current contemporary global
conflicts.
With regards to the ideological hysteria, the Cold War was portrayed as an irreconcilable
clash of civilisations, which are capitalism vs. socialism and freedom vs. slavery. Lenin, for
example, believed that the conflicting principles of socialism and imperialism would result in
an unavoidable war (Lynch,1992). From the U.S.’ perspective, the Truman administration’s
foreign policy was based on a geopolitical approach to restore balance of power. President
Kennedy later expressed that the U.S. would “pay any price, bear any burden” to uphold
global freedom. This viewpoint presented the Cold War as ‘a contest of ultimate destinies’
(Stillman & Pfaff 1964, p 3). International relations continued to be based on power politics
even after the end of WW II and the founding of the United Nations. It was ideologically
based, reacting towards the growth of Soviet power rather than autonomous evaluation of
U.S. foreign policy priorities. Nonetheless, the U.S. later supported Communist states such as
China and Yugoslavia in order to jeopardise Soviet global influence. These showed that
ideological differences were not the sufficient explanation of the Cold War. Although both
powers believed their own revolutionary experience was the correct one, this alone did not
initiate the tensions that came out of the Cold War. Opposing ideological issues certainly
aggravated serious disputes but clashes of geopolitical interests seem to be a more important
factor. Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a combination of reasons why the Cold
War was fought-- Germany, global power balance, deterrence of war, and the U.S. and Soviet
ideology influence on the Third World. Again, here we see the pattern being repeated with
the current global conflicts. Although the Cold War ended, defending world freedom remains
a U.S. discourse to this day, suggesting this could heighten tension for the adversary states
wishing to counterbalance the U.S. global hegemony.
Other elements later recognised as new attributes of the Cold War included rising
polycentrism between alliances, limited utility of nuclear ordnances and mutual respect of
national and alliance interests.
New Cold War
The Euro-Atlantic institutional design and the invasion of Crimea are general explanations
for the recent conflict between the West and Russia. At the beginning of his presidency, Putin
was eager to establish a closer tie with the West, including the interest to join NATO. Soon
after the relationship began to untie due to Russia’s autocratic governance, the lax financial
aid from the West, and a widening gap of regional integration. Even during times of
collaboration on common security including nonproliferation, counterterrorism and
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
Afghanistan, Russia saw the Euro-Atlantic integration at its border nations a threat to its
interest (Charap& Shaprio 2014). On the other hand, the West saw Russia’s attempt to
obstruct its neighbors on deciding their own foreign and security policies similar to the Soviet
behavior towards Warsaw Pact members. This leads to a chain reaction in responses from
both sides. When the EU/NATO moved eastwards, Russia’s would countermove and escalate
the confrontation. For example, in April 2008, when NATO declared that Ukraine and
Georgia would become members, Russia reacted by attacking Georgia and recognising the
two breakaway regions as independent states of Russia. Another example was the EU Eastern
Partnership, which promotes enhanced economic relationship with Eastern states whilst
excluding Russia. Russia counter-moved by establishing its own regional security and
economic projects including Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the European
Economic Union for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
As the Soviet Union collapsed, the post-Soviet states turned towards the prosperous West and
the European institutions, which assisted the transformation of post-Communist Europe.
However, there was an essential flaw from the beginning in how the West dealt with Russia
and its neighbours. First, NATO/EU could not accept Russia as a full member because Russia
would not accept the terms that were imposed upon and nonnegotiable. That said, Russia was
too weak after the collapse that it could not prevent the Eastern European integration process.
To change the institutional order so that Russia could accept would also pose a huge risk
(Charap& Shapiro, 2014).
Thus, Russia viewed the stabilization programme for post-Communist states which excluded
Russia as a new method used to contain Russia (Ibid.). However, an alternative policy
“partnership without membership” was launched to seek a foundation for cooperation and
dialogue for both sides. These include initiatives such as the NATO-Russia Council and EURussian partnerships, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
Vienna Document, Conventional Force in Europe Treaty and the Open Skies treaty (Ibid.).
Ukrainian Crisis: the Background
The contemporary Ukraine crisis began with a confrontation between Europe and Russia
about their shared “neighborhood”. The Ukrainian government was taking part in
negotiations with the EU regarding an Association Agreement when pressure from Moscow
led Viktor Yanukovych to stop his plan.
Following this event, thousands of peaceful protestors came to Independence Square to voice
their concerns. In retaliation, the government authorized force against the protestors, which
led to approximately half a million people rallying the following day. Initially, the protests
were about the EU but it turned into ousting Yanukovych’s authoritarian regime. This led to
violence between government forces and radical protestors. A deal was agreed upon between
Yanukovych and opposition leaders together with EU’s and Russia’s ministers to stop the
crisis. The deal would reapply the 2004 constitution, hold early elections, place limits on
presidential authority and end occupation of buildings by protestors. However, the deal did
not hold and Yanukovych fled the capital while the government collapsed. The following day
the Parliament voted on removing him from office ‘officially’ and went forward with
installing a new government.
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
In the West, this was seen as a democratic victory whereas Russia perceived it as actions that
threatened its influence, made worse by the rise of the nationalist anti-Russia party in
Ukraine. Russia worried that the new party would revoke Russia’s military base agreement in
Crimea, and move towards EU/NATO membership that would eventually end bilateral
relations, which Russia’s energy and military sectors depended on. At the end of February,
Putin then decided to send special troops into Crimea. His goal was to secure the Black Sea
Fleet base in Sevastopol and pressure the new authorities to work in Russia’s interests.
Multiple agreements between Russia and the West had thus effectively ended. It is
understood that though the Ukrainian crisis would be solved, the tensions between Russia and
the West would not end. This is a serious threat to stability in Europe (Ibid.). The shooting
down of a commercial airliner, separatist destabilization in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian
takeover of Crimea require immediate responses but so far have been lacking. Further
estrangement by Putin’s move away from Western values will increase tensions. As the
security of Europe becomes a major crisis, the possibility of conflict has returned (Legvold,
2014).
Escalating a crisis can be beneficial, as long as one can outlast the other. However,
miscalculations are threatening aspects to foreign policy and can create mutual problems on
both ends. An example of this was the War between Iran and Iraq in the 80’s, where hundreds
of thousands of soldiers were killed, large sums of money spent and infrastructure on both
sides destroyed (Gay, 2014).
Similarly, the Ukraine crisis is a risky consequence of mutual miscalculations. As Saunders,
the executive director at the Center for National Interests expressed that “both U.S. and
Russian Governments are likely to believe that they possess acceptable policy options to not
only confront one another but to impose significant costs on the other party if necessary.” He
continued to warn “foundation of this judgment…is a failure to recognize the potential price
that their own nation may pay in a direct conflict (more likely) in a long-term adversarial
relationship”. Deeper global integration and globalization has made bilateral relations harder
to understand or predict and thus increase the chances of mistakes occurring (Ibid.).
New Cold War: Signs and Strategy Prediction
Signs
The West imposes sanctions in an attempt to deter Russian aggression but Putin’s reactions
suggest otherwise. Putin’s protection of Russian-speaking minorities and his pressure to give
autonomy to Russian speaking areas; the stirring up in Eastern Ukraine; Russian troop buildup along the Ukraine border; and its strategic nuclear forces drills, are signs suggesting a start
of a new Cold War.
The EU objectives to promote democracy, improve relationships and economic exchange
between states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia threaten Russia’s interests. Moldova and
the Baltic states, for example, are strategic natural gas producing areas. Putin’s former
assistant, Andrej Illarionov, affirmed this point by saying that the Russian president’s
fundamental goal is to restore Russian greatness of its former Empire (Donnelly, 2014). The
recent conflict in the Ukraine has led to new instability in the region, which has worried the
Finnish (Tisdall, 2014). Russia’s recent military aggression has prompted Finland’s president,
Sauli Niinisto to speak out to Europe, warning that it may be on a course to “a new kind of
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Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
cold war”. Niinisto accused the EU and U.S. of not taking Putin’s seriously; in particular after
Crimea was annexed by Russia and reports of Russian involvement of supporting rebels in
eastern Ukraine. Advisers to the Russian President have previously warned that Putin wants
to “regain Finland”. In the past several weeks, the West intercepted proactive Russian
military aircraft. Niinisto explained to the Guardian that Russia’s proactive air force and
Putin’s anti-NATO oratory poses “a situation that is not promising”. He went on to say, “I
have said we are almost at the gates of a new kind of cold war”. The British interception of
the Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bomber that “approached UK airspace” had been the second
incident in a matter of three days, confirmed by the Ministry of Defense. Britain is seen as an
important player in designing Europe’s policy against Russia. This as well as other incidents
have led NATO to caution that there was an “unusual level” of Russian activity in European
airspace (Withnall, 2014).
Strategies
Though some suggest the emergence of a new Cold War, this is not a complete replica of the
old Cold War. Saunders (2014) pointed out some ways which the New Cold War will be
different. First, the new Cold War would not last as long as the previous one because Russia’s
economy has fallen into recession and is facing accelerated capital flight. The U.S. and
Europe are considerably more superior economically, technologically and have a soft power
edge. The Soviet Union attracted support from authoritarian rulers to socialist followers
whereas post-Soviet Russia has not been able to generate an equally attractive ideology.
Communism no longer drives Russia’s actions but rather nationalism, irredentism and
revanchism. Russia today has won some friends through generous arms shipments and loans
that it has forgiven as in the case of Cuba; but it has not won any loyal followers. Russia
today would not be able to endure a long-term clash with the West, as it did during the Soviet
Union era. However, the modern nuclear strength, provided also the Chinese support, could
cause an equally costly war and could avert resources from more important global security
issues (Legvold, 2014). Russia would undoubtedly provide minimal efforts to help the U.S. in
deterring China’s aggression toward the disputed Islands (Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands),
which causes Japan’s concerns. Progress on other global programmes such as climate change,
nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare and terrorism would also be jeopardized.
Second, globalization and technology today have increasingly empowered the spoilers unlike
the past. Russia’s ability to utilize cyber-attacks, for example, could even the playing field
and have serious consequences for the West. The new Cold War will involve more variables
such as the use of nuclear weapons, drones, cyber-weapons, energy strategy and sanctions.
That said, today’s global online interconnectivity and real-time broadcast will make it
difficult for governments to steer public opinion in their favour unlike in the previous Cold
War.
The third difference is that Russia today is not a global power but a regional power. Russia
does not have global interests or commitments as it did during the Soviet era. Being a
regional power is not necessarily a weakness, however, as Russia can focus its attention on its
neighborhood and can move forces more swiftly to potential conflicts. The U.S. on the other
hand sees its resources spread thin from maintaining influence in the Middle East to Asia.
Since the world today is no longer a bipolar world, but a multipolar world, Legvold (2014)
argued that the new Cold War will not be global. New powers such as China and India will
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Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
be affected by the conflicts between Russia and the U.S. and will likely get involved to
mediate the conflict. Charap and Shapiro (2014) argued that the tensions between the West
and Russia are not only based on consistent ideological rivalry like the past, but rather the
unexpected development of relationship from political leaders on both sides. For example, in
2013, Putin and Obama committed together on Enhanced Bilateral Engagement, which stated
“The United States of America and the Russian Federation reaffirm their readiness to
intensify bilateral cooperation based on the principles of mutual respect, quality, and genuine
respect for each other’s interests…required enhanced engagement at all levels”. However, in
2014, sanctions were used on Russia for its actions in Crimea. The Enhanced Bilateral
Engagement did not hold.
Despite some differences, Legvold (2014) pointed out some similarities between the old and
new Cold War. First, Russian and Western leaders have begun framing the standoff in
unforgiving terms, similarly to the old Cold War where Stalin made a pre-election speech and
a month later Churchill’s speech of an Iron Curtain. Today, Putin defended his seizure of
Crimea by blaming the West for using illicit means against sovereign states. In retaliation the
deputy secretary-general of NATO said that Russia may no longer be seen as a partner, but an
opposition.
Second, in the beginning of the Cold War, both saw the reason of the conflict as the result of
the others’ actions. Neither side looked at the complex dealings that brought their relations to
the current low. Only after close calls during the Cuban missile crisis and the Berlin crisis did
both sides look at where their interests converged. This pattern is being repeated with both
now blaming and pinning the fault on the other side.
The third similarity of the two Cold Wars is that the U.S. and Russia do not expect a
relationship or are willing to take the first step in creating one. Additionally, Washington is
currently resorting to Cold War style reprisals to punish Russia for its aggression. Obama put
joint military activities on hold and ended missile defense negotiations. He also banned
exports to Russia of civilian technology that could have military uses, cut NASA’s
cooperation with its Russian partner, denied access to Russian specialists at the U.S.
Department of Energy and suspended Russian cooperation on civilian nuclear energy
projects.
And just as security of Europe was the centre point of the old Cold War, there is a renewal of
a security dilemma in Eastern Europe. EU/NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet
Union was rapid and has ventured close to Russia’s border. Russia responded by refortifying
its military power along the Western border. Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine have now
become key areas where the two powers are confronting each other.
Consequences of New Cold War
As the U.S. must support its allies in the wake of growing Russian threat and increasing its
readiness of a ground conflict in Europe, the Pentagon’s plan to cut spending and downsize
may become difficult. Additionally, the U.S. must maintain its focus elsewhere such as on
counterterrorism and imposing its strength in the Asia-Pacific seas to restrain China’s
expanding influence (Legvold, 2014). Economically, American business will struggle to
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Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
maintain a foothold in international economy, as Russia and China begin moving closer to
one another (Bremmer, 2004).
Russia will be impacted severely if it engages in a new Cold War with the U.S. and Europe,
because Russia depends more on the West for foreign capital and technology inflow to help it
diversify its highly resource reliant economy (Legvold, 2014). Russia is already feeling the
pinch with the deepening conflict as its currency depreciates, capital flows out, credit markets
weaken and the economy enters recession. The capital flight of $75 billion alone has left
Russia in roughly six months amid sanctions from the West (Ibid.). The sanctions on Russia
will hurt particularly those businesses which have felt the heat of rising capital costs. Besides,
the ability for Russia to maintain its current natural resource production for the next 10 years
has come under question. Foreign food imports have been banned. However, this has been
seen as an opportunity to boost domestic growth (Ibid.). Instead of compromising, Putin is
looking at cutting public spending to revive the economy. Without the West, Russia would
need to find new strategic partners such as China or other smaller states. These however are
not equal alternatives to the US and EU.
To avoid domestic unrest, Russia’s policy makers may pressure domestic opposition further.
Some of Russia’s close partners such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia may also distance
themselves from Russia in order to maintain a good relationship with the West. This could
undermine Russia’s economic union effort under the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
In addition, this conflict with the West would force Russia to stretch its military resources,
leaving it weakly equipped to handle other security challenges such as in the Caucasus,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Koreas and the border conflicts with China (Legvold, 2014).
Other international issues such as arms agreement that took the U.S. and Russia years to
agree upon has been undermined. It is now unlikely that they can agree on missile defense or
come to terms on the deployment of weapons in Europe. The U.S. missile programs might
gear up to an anti-Russian offensive, believing that Russia has infringed the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty. The possibility of improving current treaties, such
as the 1992 Open Skies that regulates unarmed surveillance flights could also be eliminated
(Legvold, 2014). Additionally, the clashes could undo promising progress by the 20 working
groups from the Bilateral Presidential Commission that was established in 2009; Cooperation
in fields that included prison reform, military, policy cooperation and counterterrorism. This
will affect their positions on reforms that are needed in the UN, IMF, and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation of Europe (Ibid.). Regarding energy security, it is unlikely that
the U.S. and Russia will cooperate in the hydrocarbon-rich Artic. Prior discussion in climate
impact on this region could be eroded. Foreign transnational business will have to bear the
costs of the Wests and Russia’s geopolitics. J.P. Morgan, for example, experienced a cyber
attack allegedly from Russia, affecting roughly 83 million business and households. This is
seen as the beginning of Russia’s use of cyber warfare as revenge against the Western
sanctions (Bremmer, 2014).
Moscow has turned east as its relations with the West deteriorate. Vankor and China quickly
agreed on the pipeline construction deal that would transport over $400 billion dollars worth
of natural gas to China. Close ties between Russia and China and the Cold War-styled
confrontation between the U.S. and the Russia could weaken not only the U.S. business
position in the world, but also forcing states to turn to either side. It is forewarned that
companies reliant on global business are at great risks and should not take this lightly (Ibid.).
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Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
Policy Suggestions
The increasing conflicts between the West and Russia have created a divide through Europe,
not only in the Ukraine but also in Belarus and Moldova. If the Ukrainian crisis is resolved,
the conflict may be lessened but not ended. And relations will not go back to normal as it did
after the Russian-Georgian war (Legvold, 2014). However, if the conflict escalates, then the
new Cold War too. Various policy suggestions have been made to resolve the conflict. These
could be concluded into four points of action including military policy; investments in
Ukrainian reforms; benefits and rights for Russian speakers; and negotiations without
preconditions (Donnelly, 2014; Charap& Shapiro, 2014; and Legvold, 2014).
First, the West should provide a military shield to Ukraine and the entire EU in order to
contain Russian aggression (Donnelly, 2014; and Charap& Shapiro, 2014). The Baltic States
are particularly at threat if the EU remains engaged with Ukraine. Thus, the EU will need to
develop closer ties with NATO, which has the equipped security means such as drones,
military equipment, know-how and nuclear weapons. This also requires training of
counterinsurgency, which will become more important during Russia’s informal war against
Ukraine (Ibid.). Although Crimea is gone and attempting to reclaim it may lead to a similar
stand of to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the EU and NATO must take a strong stance against
Russia’s annexation of Crimea or else it may not be the last. Eastern and Southern Ukraine
may be facing a similar situation.
This objective of the shield is not to rouse a possible war, but to deter Russia from further
entering Ukraine territory, which sanctions have failed to do. Sanctions are effective but not
once a territory has already been seized as in the case of Crimea. This is because Russia had
factored in the likelihood of Western sanctions and had already prepared to minimize its costs
on the economy. Putin has sought to reduce foreign exposure on Russian investments and
foreign holdings and made natural gas agreements with China, India, and Southern Europe to
diversify its natural gas export markets Europe must seek alternative sources in Africa and
Central Asia and pursue energy conservation in order to independent from Russia’s
geostrategic influence. Today, Russia supplies roughly 34% of gas to Europe and 100% to
Finland, making them vulnerable to any gas cuts.
Second, Donnelly (2014) suggested that the West should invest in Ukrainian reforms and
assist the state on the road to becoming a full member of the EU. Obtaining EU membership
requires states to undergo several democratic and economic reforms. This transformation is
costly but the resultant benefits on the economy and the citizens as well as an influx in global
investment are likely to outweigh the costs (Ibid.). Charap and Shapiro (2014) however
pointed out the limitation of this initiative explaining that the Euro-Atlantic institutional
enlargement to include post-Soviet states threatens Russia’s interests and in turn creates a
threat for regional stability and security. They further argued that the West must accept that
the model, which has been successful in Central and Eastern Europe, will not work for the
rest of the continent.
Third, Donnelly (2014) suggested promoting benefits and rights for Russian speakers. The
treatment of Russian speaking residents in EU states has not been good, particularly in
Estonia and Latvia. Thirty to forty percent of the population there have not been granted
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Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
ISA 2015 Annual Conference, Singapore
Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
citizenship. This has hurt Europe’s soft power projection and led some ethnic minorities to
buy into Putin’s promise to protect the rights of Russians outside its borders. If this problem
were solved, the EU would gain more support from Russian minorities and reduce long-term
conflicts in the region.
The cease-fire agreements, and recent elections have also not solved the conflict. Nor would
Western aid help resolve the problems facing the Ukrainian economy due to oligarchy clans’
persistent corruption. Military might deliver geopolitical supremacy, but peace delivers
economic prosperity and stability. Any war, with current military weapons and technology
would be devastating, and must be avoided. Nuclear weapons cannot be used for policy as
war with these weapons cannot be won. Security must rely on political means, and cannot
only be gained through military means (Ibid.)
Political leaders must assess the risks of the new Cold War, ignoring would intensify the
problems. It is in both the West and Russia’s interests to end the divide and make ‘damage
control’ as their first priority which until now has not been the case. Russia is attempting to
hold out against sanctions to show its intention to maintain interests in Ukraine whereas the
West tries to win Ukraine over. Leaders instead should understand the whole picture, not
fixating on the miniscule detail of the crisis. Western politicians and media focus their
attention predominantly on Putin, and his undesirable behavior that have hurt Western affairs
with Russia. This can lead policy decision on a wrong path by focusing on the main leader,
such as the cases of Saddam in Iraq, Qaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria. It is clear that
Putin has enormous influence over Russia’s foreign policy decisions as his Westernantagonistic policies received an 85 percent approval rating. But even if Putin was removed
from power, the problems could heighten as his successors may use an even stronger Russian
nationalist anti-Western rhetoric to gain popularity (Charap& Shapiro, 2014). The
fundamental question for European security is how to address its relationship with Russia.
Past disputes must be addressed in order to avoid any prolonged conflicts. Until both sides
see causes and costs that are involved with this conflict, resolutions are unlikely to be
reached.
Legvold (2014) suggested that damages of the new Cold War can be achieved with the
mentality of overcoming the mistrust and misperceptions built since the old Cold War that an
attempt to increase power and security is a zero-sum.
Eliminating mistrust however is not easy because any attempt to overcome hostility could be
portrayed as a weakness by domestic political opponents. The larger barrier to collaboration
is distorted notions of the other’s aims. To reshape mutual understandings, meetings at the
highest level of power where all issues are discussed and negotiated without any
preconditions are necessary. This does not mean that the West should accept Russia’s control
over independent nations. New agreements must be made that both Russia and the West can
agree on. This can only be realized if both sides consider their own behavior, are willing to
compromise, whilst avoiding the recurrent blame game. With regards to Ukraine, an
atmosphere should be created where the West and Russia can cooperate with Ukraine without
forcing it to choose sides. This will potentially cool down the tension as Russia’s interests can
converge with the West’s.
While it is hard to achieve such a solution in the face of lost trust, it is not impossible.
Compromises and policies shaped around long-term objectives should be emphasised.
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Dr. Deekana Tipchanta and Tilmann Kaiser
Panel: Asian Foreign Policy in Transition III: Great and Medium Powers
Paper in Progress
Coercion must be part of the negotiations in order for an outcome to be reached providing
that there is a risk of isolation and confrontation if Russia fails to agree.
Until present, suggested solutions have been top-down and imposed from the Northern
perspectives, carrying little considerations of what the Global South view as good solutions to
the New Cold War clashes between major power states that take place in their own countries.
We suggest that the Global South regionalism can strengthen conflicted areas and be an
appropriate platform to seek mutual agreement on resolutions.
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