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HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
CLEAVAGETHEORYMEETSEUROPE’SCRISES:
LIPSET,ROKKAN,ANDTHETRANSNATIONALCLEAVAGE
LiesbetHooghe
UniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill
GaryMarks
UniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill
ABSTRACT:
ThispapertheorizeshowtheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisishavereinforcedatransnationalcleavagethathas
atitscoreaculturalconflictpittinglibertarian,universalisticvaluesagainstthedefenseofnationalismandparticularism. Radical right and green parties take polar positions on Europe and immigration, place more salience on
them,andexhibitgreaterinternalunitythanmainstreamparties.Theperforationofnationalstatesbyimmigration, integration, and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect in their
classicarticle.
KEYWORDS:cleavage,politicalparties,Eurocrisis,Europeanintegration,elections.
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1.Introduction
HavetheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisiscongealedadistinctivestructureofconflictinEurope?1In
thispaperweusethebuildingblocksofacleavagetheoryofpartycompetitiontoarguethatEuropehas
been transformed by a new divide. Cleavage theory claims that the issues that divide voters are connected in durable dimensions, that political parties make programmatic commitments on these issue
dimensionswhichareself-reinforcing,andthatasaresultofissuecoherenceandprogrammaticstickiness,changeinpartysystemsisapunctuatedprocessthatarisesfromshocksexternaltothepartysystem.
Summarizinganextensiveliteratureoverthepastdecade,wedescribetheemergenceofatransnationalcleavagewhichhasasitscoreapoliticalreactionagainstEuropeanintegrationandimmigration.
Theperforationofnationalstatesbyimmigration,integration,andtrademaysignifyacriticaljuncturein
the political development of Europe no less decisive for parties and party systems than the previous
juncturesthatLipsetandRokkan(1967)detectintheirclassicarticle.Forchallengingpartiesontheradicalrighttheseissuesrelatetothedefenseofnationalcommunityagainsttransnationalshocks.TheEuropeanUnionisitselfsuchashockbecauseitintroducesrulebythosewhoareregardedasforeigners,
diminishes the authority exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic
insecurityamongthosewholackmobileassets,andfacilitatesimmigration.Immigrationisperceivedas
athreatbythosewhoresentculturalintermixingandtheerosionofnationalvalues,bythosewhomust
1
WewouldliketothankDavidAttewellforresearchassistance.Earlierdraftswerepresentedataworkshop,TheoryMeetsCrisis,organizedbytheauthorsattheSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,June30-July12016,attheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,1-3September2016,ataconference,“SteinRokkan’sHeritagetoContemporaryPolitical
Science: Understanding Representational and Policy-Making Challenges in Multi-Jurisdictional Polities,” University of Bergen,
September20-212016,the26thPhDSummerSchooloftheECPRStandingGrouponPoliticalPartiesattheUniversityofNottingham, September 23 2016, and the Comparative Working Group at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, October 18,
2016.Wethankparticipantsattheseevents,andespeciallyJanRovnyandFrankSchimmelfennig,forcommentsandsuggestions.Thisresearchwasco-fundedbytheEUENGAGEHORIZONgrant#649281andbytheCenterforEuropeanStudiesatthe
UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill.WealsothanktheRobertSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,forhosting
asFellowsinJune-July2016andforfinancingandhostingtheconference“TheoryMeetsCrisis”inJune2016,whereafirstdraft
ofthispaperwaspresented.
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competewithimmigrantsforhousingandjobs,and,moregenerally,bythosewhoseekculturaloreconomicshelterintherightsofcitizenship.
Wetermthiscleavageatransnationalcleavagebecauseithasasitsfocalpointthedefenseofnationalpolitical,social,andeconomicwaysoflifeagainstexternalactorswhopenetratethestatebymigrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule. This conception has much in common with prior conceptions,
but because we wish to outline its character, sources, and consequences in ways with which other
scholarsmightdisagree,weadoptadistinctivelabel.
Theemergenceofanewcleavagerevealsthecausalpowerofsocialforcesinthefaceofestablished
institutions.Perhapsthesinglemoststunningconsequenceofthecrisesisthebreakthroughofaradical
rightpartyinacountry,Germany,thatwasperceivedtobepracticallyimmune.Forthisreasonalone,
thecrisescanbeconsideredtohaveusheredinanewera.However,virtuallyeverycountrycontainsits
ownsurprises,andwerewetofollowthemwewouldbelostinfascinatingdetail.
Ourfocusinthisarticleisonthegeneralcharacterofconflictsthathavearisen,theirrelationtothe
existingstructureofpartycompetition,andhowtheyhavealreadyreshapedpartysystems.Thecrises
arecriticaljuncturesthatreveal,intheopenairsotospeak,thelatentpressuresthathavebuiltupover
thepasttwodecades.Theysuggestthatpartysystemsaresubjecttodiscontinuitiesratherthantoincrementalchange,andthattheresponseofapartysystemtoexogenouschangecomesfromvotersratherthanparties.
Inthenextsectionweexplainwhywethinkcleavagetheorycanhelpusunderstandwhathashappened.Wehavenohesitationindroppingthepresumptionthatpoliticalpartiesareexpressionsofalreadyformed,denselyorganized,andsociallyclosedgroups,whilebuildingonthreefundamentalclaims
ofcleavagetheory:partysystemsaredeterminedinepisodicbreaksfromthepastbyexogenoussocial
forces; political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change
comesintheformofrisingparties.
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Theremainderofthisarticleprovidesevidencethatthishasindeedhappened.Thefollowingsection
conceivestheriseofatransnationalcleavageasareactiontoreformsthathaveweakenednationalsovereignty,promotedinternationaleconomicexchange,increasedimmigration,andexacerbatedcultural
andeconomicinsecurity.WeexaminetheeffectoftheeconomicandmigrationcrisesinraisingthesalienceofEuropeandimmigration,andthenshowthatthemodalresponseofmainstreampoliticalparties
wastostayputontheseissues.Voterschanged,butmainstreampartiesdidnot.
We then present evidence that competition on European integration and immigration is structured
onthenewcleavage.TheTANpoleofthiscleavageisstakedoutbytheradicalright.2Radicalrightpartiestakemoreextremepositionsontheseissues,placemoresalienceonthem,andexhibitgreaterinternalunitythanmainstreamparties.ByvirtueoftheircommitmenttoGALvalues,greenpartiesarelocatedatthealter-pole.JustasthereligiouscleavageandtheclasscleavagewereraisedbyCatholicand
socialistpartiesononesideofthedivide,sothetransnationalcleavageismobilizedbyradicalrightparties at one extreme. As the transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been
compelledtocompeteonissuesthatliefarfromtheirprogrammaticcore.
2.Cleavagetheory—thenandnow
Cleavagetheory,originatinginLipsetandRokkan(1967),conceivesanationalpartysystemastheex-
pressionofunderlyingsocialconflicts.Revealingly,LipsetandRokkanignorestrategicinteractionamong
parties in explaining the structure of contestation. Instead, they focus on the basic cleavages that undergirdpartysupportoverthemediumorlong-term:thenationalrevolutionthatproducedacleavage
between the central state and peripheral communities and between the central state and a supranational church; and the industrial revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later a work-
2
TANreferstothetradition/authority/nationalpoleofaculturaldimensionwithGAL(green/alternative/libertarian)attheoppositepole.
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er/employer cleavage. In each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were expressions—or, to put it more directly, instruments—of self-conscious, socially closed groups. Conflicts betweenworkersandemployers,betweenthoselivinginperipheralcommunitiesandcentralstatebuilders,andbetweensecularistsanddefendersoftheChurchwererootedincollectiveidentitiesthatwere
expressedingrass-rootsmovementsandhierarchicalorganizations.Thesolidaritythatexistedinthese
groupswasmuchmorethananexpressionofthesocialoroccupationallocationofanysetofindividuals.Itwasexperiential,theoutcomeofrepeatedconflictwhichdefinedandsolidifiedthecompositionof
in-groupsandout-groups(Bartolini2000;Marks1989).3Thepoliticalorganizationsthatexpressedtheir
voiceweremuchmorethanconvenientvessels,but“politicalactorsthatgavecoherenceandorganized
political expression to what otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences”
(Kriesi2010:673;BartoliniandMair1990).
Beforewegoanyfurther,itisworthnotingthattheexistenceandsubsequentdeclineofsocialclosurearenotallornothing.Socialclosurewasfarfromcompleteevenintheimmediatepost-WorldWar
IIdecades.RecallthataroundoneinthreeBritishmanualworkersvotedLiberalorConservativeinthe
1950sand1960s(Stephens1979:404).Aclassicinvestigationofcleavagevotinginitsgoldenagefinds
that, for fifteen advanced democracies, occupation explained just 4.9 percent of the variance in party
choiceinthemediancountry,Franceunderthe4thRepublic,andreligionexplainedjust8.0percentin
the median country, Canada (Rose 1974: 17). Franklin (1992: 386) provides extensive data suggesting
thatthemedianvarianceinleftvotingexplainedbysocialstructureinfourteencountriesdeclinedfrom
around20percentinthe1960stoaround12percentinthe1980s.Recentliteratureexplainingcontemporaryradicalrightorgreenvotingattributesaround10to12percentofthevariancetomodelstapping
3
ThishasaffinitieswithMarxism.KarlMarxregardedclassconsciousnessastheoutcomeofcollectivestruggleinwhichindividualswouldcometoseetheirfateasboundtothatoftheirclass.Objectiveclasslocationhadtobeactivatedinconflictbeforeonecouldspeakofclassasapoliticalcategory.
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education, occupation, rural/urban location, sex, and age (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Dolezal 2010;
Norris2005;Oesch2008).
Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities (Bornschier
2009: 2). What matters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give rise to durable
cleavagesthatstructurepartycompetition.Thequestionstheyputunderthespotlightare1)Whatare
thefundamentaldivisionsinasociety?2)Whichdistinctionsamongapopulationbecomethebasesfor
cleavages? 3) How do these cleavages interact to shape voter preferences? 4) How are voter preferencesexpressedinpartyformationandcompetition?5)Howarecleavagesmediatedbytherulesofthe
gameandbypartystrategies?
In coming to grips with these questions, we draw on cleavage theory to make the following
moves:
! Thestrategicflexibilityofapoliticalpartyonmajorconflictdimensionsisconstrainedtotheextent it has a durable constituency of voters, a decentralized decision-making structure, a selfselectedcadreofactivists,aself-replicatingleadership,andadistinctprogrammaticreputation
(Schumacher,deVries,andVis2013).Politicalpartiescanbeflexibleonparticularissues,buteffortstoshiftpositionatthelevelofaconflictdimensionarerare.Thatistosay,politicalparties
areinducedtoseeklocalmaximaincompetingforvotes(LaverandSergenti2009).4Inaddition
toshiftingitsissueposition,apoliticalpartymayseektosubsumeanissueintothedominant
dimension,bluritsresponse,orignoretheissue(Rovny2015:913;Lacewell2015).Theproblem
forestablishedpartiesisthatalocal,blurring,orstatusquoresponseismoreeffectiveforasingleissuethanforasetofstronglyrelatedissues.
! Hence,thesourceofdynamisminpartysystemsinresponsetomajorshiftsinvoterpreferences
isthegrowthofnewpoliticalparties.Thebasicpremisesofcleavagetheoryarethatexogenous
4
Itissimplynotpossible,onstrictlylogicalgrounds,toidentifyavotemaximizingstrategyforanypartyinapopulatedtwodimensionalspace(LaverandSergenti2009:43).
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forcesshapedemocraticpartysystems;thatchangecomesfromvoters,notestablishedparties;
thatpoliticalpartiesareprogrammaticallyinflexible;andthatasaconsequence,theresponseof
a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than reformed,politicalparties.
! Bythetimemasspoliticalpartiescameonthescene,cleavageswerealreadyinstitutionalized.
Now the sequence is reversed. Competitive party systems exist prior to the onset of any new
cleavage.Hence,itmakesnosensetobelievethatchallengingpoliticalpartieswillberootedin
pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising parties and voters has
changed because political parties are now formed alongside a new cleavage, rather than decadesorcenturiesafter.Politicalpartiesareactors,notsubjects,intheformationofsocialdivisions.
! Cleavagetheoryisabouttheinteractionofcleavagesratherthanthereplacementofonealignmentbyanother.Soinsteadofconceivingpartysystemchangeasaprocessofrealignmentin
whichanewdimensionofconflictcomestosupersedeapriordimension,cleavagetheoryasks
how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political expression of a subsequentone.Inpartysystemsthatloadthediceagainstnewparties,anewcleavagecanbeexpected to produce intense frictions within parties. In low-barrier multi-party systems, by contrast,anewcleavagecanbeexpectedtoproducenewchallengingpartiesthatexistalongside,
withoutreplacing,partiesformedonpriorcleavages.
! Lipset/Rokkan were alert to social changes that were corroding class conflict, but they had no
ideathatthecontainers—nationalstates—weregoingtobetransformedinthedecadesaround
theturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.Territorialidentityasamotiveforconflictwasthoughtto
beathingofthepast.Nationalismwasthedead-endresultofinter-warfascism,nevertoberepeated.Ethnicnationalismwithinstateswasconsideredaninertremnantoflong-pastperipher-
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alresistancetonationbuilding.Intheabsenceofterritorialidentity—perhapsthemostpowerfulsourceofmasspoliticalmobilization—domesticconflictwascompressedtoleft/rightconflict
aboutwhogetswhat.WhenthepoliticalgorillaofnationalismlefttheroomafterWorldWarII,
domesticdebatewasnarrowedtoeconomicissues,i.e.theroleofthestate,taxes,andwelfare
spending.LipsetandRokkan(1967:13)recognizedthat“Functionaloppositionscanonlydevelopaftersomeinitialconsolidationofthenationalterritory,”buttheywereunabletoseethat
nationalterritorymightbedeconsolidatedinauthoritativeredesignandthemovementofpeoples.
3.ATransnationalcleavage
Theinstitutionalpointofdepartureforapost-Lipset/Rokkancleavageisaseriesofmajorreformsin
theearly1990sthatdiminishedthecostofinternationaltradeandmigrationwhilediffusingauthority
from central states to bodies within and among them. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) extended EU authorityoverwiderangesofpubliclife,madeitmucheasierforpeopletoworkinanotherEUcountry,
createdacommoncurrency,andturnednationalsintoEuropeanUnioncitizens.Thedissolutionofthe
Sovietempirein1989releasedmorethanonehundredmillionpeopletotradeandcirculatewithinthe
European Union. The World Trade Organization (1994) was negotiated in the early 1990s, as were regional trade organizations, now totaling thirty-five in number (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks forthcoming).
The1990swerethecuspofarapidincreaseininternationaltrade,internationalmigration,andeconomicinequalitythathavetheirideologicalrootsintheThatcher-Reaganyears.However,theconsensuson
transnationalismencompassedthemainstreamleftaswellthemainstreamright.
Theintellectualbasisfortransnationalismisbroadanddeep.Thelowerthetransactioncostsofinternational economic exchange, the greater the scope for specialization and economies of scale. A core
premise of neoclassical economics is that introducing common standards and diminishing barriers to
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tradeandinvestmentincreaseseconomicgrowth.Fromapublicgoodsperspective,nationalstatesare
bothtoosmallandtoolarge.Manyofthemostintractableproblemsthatconfronthumanity—including
global warming, failed states, species loss, and environmental degradation—require ongoing cooperationamongstatesandtheirpopulations.Nationalsovereigntyanditspoliticalexpression,thenational
veto, are obstacles to problem solving, which is why many international organizations pool authority
amongtheirmemberstatesinquasi-majoritariandecisionmaking(HoogheandMarks2015).Functional
efficiencyintheprovisionofpublicgoodscallsforgovernanceatdiversescales,includingregionaland
globallevels.
However, transnationalism proved to be highly contentious, particularly in Europe where in-
creasedtradeandinterminglingofpeopleswenthandinhandwiththecreationofasupranationalpolity(Hurrelmann,Gora,andWagner2015:55-6).Europeanintegrationraisedfundamentalissuesofrule
and belonging for those who wished to “defend national culture, language, community and national
sovereigntyagainsttheinfluxofimmigrants,againstcompetingsourcesofidentitywithinthestate,and
against external pressures from other countries and international organizations” (Marks and Wilson
2000:455;Prosser2016:748-9).Beginningin1999,theChapelHillExpertSurveytappedthepositionsof
politicalpartiesonaGALversusTANdimensionwhichprovedtobestronglyassociatedwithsupportfor
Europe.
Transnationalism also has transparent distributional consequences, biasing the gains from trade to
thosewhohavemobileassets.Loserswhofeeltheyareslippingwithnoprospectofupwardmobilityresent the dilution of the rights and protection of citizenship by a global elite that views national states
andtheirlawsasconstraintstobefinessedorarbitraged.AsMartinWolf(2016)wroteintheFinancial
Times: “[T]he share of immigrants in populations has jumped sharply. It is hard to argue that this has
broughtlargeeconomic,socialandculturalbenefitstothemassofthepopulation.Butithasunquestionably benefited those at the top, including business.” Resentment can be sharp among those who
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valuenationalcitizenshipbecausetheyhavefewalternativesourcesofself-worth.Nationalismhaslong
beentherefugeofthosewhoareinsecure,whosensetheyarelosingstatus,andwhoseekstandingby
identifyingwiththegroup.Thepromiseoftransnationalismhasbeengainsforall,buttheexperienceof
thepasttwodecadesisthatithurtsmany.Hence,oppositiontotransnationalismisformanyapopulist
reaction against elites who have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart and Norris 2016; van
Kessel2015).
4.Thesocialbasis
Fromthelate1990s,severalwritersbegantoconsiderEuropeanintegrationfromacleavageperspective.5ExplainingtheriseofthevotefortheradicalrightinSwitzerland,Kriesi(1998:180)pointedto“the
emergenceofyetanothernewcleavage–thecleavageopposingthenewmiddleclasswinnersofthe
transformationofWesternEuropeansocietiestothegroupoflosersoftheverysameprocess.”Inthese
years,aflowofpublicationssuggestedthatconflictoverEuropecutacrosstheleft-rightdivide,thatEuropewaspartofalargerculturalconflict,andthatthisconflictwassociallystructured.Inachaptertitled,“Europe:ANewElectoralCleavage?”Evans(1999:220)madethecasethatEuropehad“thepotential to cross-cut and restructure partisan divisions in the British electorate.” Marks and Wilson (2000:
433)suggestedthatEuropeanintegrationamountstoa“constitutionalrevolution,”whichtheyanalyze
from a cleavage perspective. Hooghe et al. (2002: 979) went on to argue that “Nationalism, antiimmigration,andtraditionalismgohandinhand”andconstitutedadistinctdimensionofconflictdriven
byradicalrightparties.Andinhisinfluentialbook,Bartolini(2005:395;404)assertedthatEuropeanintegration was a process of fundamental territorial re-articulation that could produce a new cleavage
5
Inglehart(1971:992)detectedapost-industrialcleavageinwhichayoung,educatedsectionofthemiddleclasswouldrealign
onlibertarianvaluesandworkerswouldbepotentialrecruitsforconservativeparties.Inhisearlyformulation,Inglehartmade
theconnectionwithinternationalism:“[T]helibertarianpositionseemslinkedwithinternationalism.Thisfollowsfromthefact
that,accordingtoouranalysis,thepost-bourgeoisgroupshaveattainedsecurityinregardtoboththesafetyandsustenance
needs;insofarasthenation-stateisseenasabulwarkprotectingtheindividualagainstforeignthreats,itislessimportantto
post-bourgeoisrespondents”(1971:997).
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“rootedin…lifechancesandmaterialopportunities”thatwould“cutheavilyacross,reshuffle,andreshape”nationalpoliticalparties.
Inaseriesofempiricallyrichbooks,Kriesi,Grande,andco-authors(2006;2008;2012)haveexplored
howEuropeanintegrationandimmigrationhavestructuredpreferencesandpoliticalconflictinBritain,
France,Germany,Switzerland,theNetherlands,andAustriabypittingthewinnersofglobalizationwho
favor transnational integration against losers who seek demarcation. Winners and losers have contrastingeconomicinterestsandculturalpreferences,withthedifferencemostpronouncedonthecultural dimension. Winners and losers have social-structural characteristics that are equally distinctive:
“Twoofthemostimportantgroupsonthewinners’side,highlyeducatedpeopleandsocio-culturalspecialists,arefarmoresupportiveofopeningbordersthanarethosewithlowerlevelsofeducationand
thosewhoareunskilledworkers”(Kriesietal2012:73).
Themostactivepoleofthiscleavageconnectsnationalandwesternvalues,defenseofnationalsovereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. These are reinforcing issues for those who
feeltheyhavesufferedtransnationalism—thedownandout,theculturallyinsecure,theunskilled,the
de-skilled,i.e.thosewholacktheeducationneededtocompeteinamobileworld.Educationemerges
asapowerfulstructuringfactorwithadoubleeffect.Itisnecessaryforthosewhorelyontheirowntalentstoliveaneconomicallysecurelifeinaworldwithlowbarrierstotrade.Justasimportantly,educationshapesthewayapersonlooksattheworldandtheirfellowhumans.Educationallowsapersonto
seethingsfromtheotherside,akeytoempathyforthosewhohaveadifferentwayoflife(Bornschier
andKriesi2013).
Educationappearstoshapeattitudesontrade,immigration,andglobalizationbecauseitaffectsboth
values and economic interests (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 2007).6
6
Accesstohighereducationshapesaperson’slife-longattitudes(Triventi2013:499).Controllingforsocioeconomicstatusand
attitudinalvariables,CofféandVoorposte(2010:442)findthat“YoungpeoplewhoseparentsvotefortheSVP[SwissPeople’s
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Thisviewgainedcredibilitywhenpoliticaleconomistsinvestigatingtheeconomicundergirdingoftrade
attitudesfoundapowerfulandunexpectededucationaleffect(MaydaandRodrik2005;O’Rourkeand
Sinnott 2002). Individuals with limited education are much more likely to have an exclusive national
identity(PolyakovaandFligstein2016:Table5),andthereisevidenceofa“wideningeducationalgapin
Euroscepticattitudes”sincetheMaastrichtTreaty(Hakhverdianetal.2013:534).Kuhnetal(2016:38)
find that “people with low levels of educational attainment are more sensitive to increased economic
inequality than are highly educated individuals.” Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2014) show how
culturalvalues,inparticularcosmopolitanbeliefs,drivethepositiveassociationbetweensupportforEurocrisisbailoutsandhighereducation.Card,Dustmann,andPreston(2012)concludethatculturalconcerns are more decisive than concerns about wages and taxes in explaining attitudes to immigration
among less educated respondents. Students of immigration had always considered non-economic
alongside economic factors, but the role of community, identity, and framing appears to be even
strongerthanoriginallythought(ChandlerandTsai2001;SidesandCitrin2007).
5.TheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisis
In the same way that the Bolshevik revolution was a critical juncture in the expression of the class
cleavage, the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a
transnational cleavage. These crises have raised the salience of Europe and immigration in public debate,intensifieddivisionswithinmainstreamparties,andhaveledtoanupsurgeofrejectionistpolitical
parties(HoboltandTilley2016;HoboltanddeVries2016).Attheveryleast,itis“tempting”–toadopta
Party]aresignificantlymorelikelytosupporttheSVP.”Longitudinalsurveyresearchsuggeststhatattitudesunderpinningrightwingextremismarerootedinearlychildhood,persistoveraperson’slife,andaretransmittedintergenerationally.Analyzing
nineteenwavesoftheGermanSocio-EconomicPanel(SOEP),AvdeenkoandSiedler(2015)findthatamalewhoseparentsexpressaffinitytowardaright-wingpartyisthirteenpercentmorelikelytosupportaradicalrightparty,controllingforincome,
education,andunemployment.
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wordthatLipsetandRokkan(1967:47)useinasimilarcontext–tosaythatsomethingfundamentalis
takingplace,namelythegenerationofadistinct,rooted,anddurableconflictthatwilloverlayanddisrupttheexistingstructureofpartycompetition.
Thecrisesthemselvesprovidesomecluesregardingtheirlargersignificance.Thefirst,economic,crisis
transmuted into a distinctly European crisis when Chancellor Merkel declared soon after the Lehman
Brothers collapse that every country must act separately to defend its financial institutions. Under intensepressurefromGermanpublicopinion,whichwasvehementlyopposedtoEurozonebailouts,Merkel committed her government to preserving Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the anti-bailout
clause prohibiting shared liabilities or financial assistance. Eurozone governments were trapped in a
postfunctionalist dilemma. On the one side they were impelled by an unrelenting functional logic towardfiscalunion.Ontheothertheywereunnervedbytenaciousdomesticresistance.
Theresultwasaseriesofincrementalreformsthatstavedoffdisasterwhileprolongingtheagonyof
austerity. Fearing open debate, parliamentary votes, and popular participation, national governments
revertedtoconventionaldiplomacywhichhadtheintendedeffectofempoweringnationalexecutives
and,atleasttemporarily,avoidingEUinstitutions(Jones,Kelemen,andMeunier2015).7TheEuropean
StabilityMechanismwasbasedonatreatymodificationwhich,ingeniously,avoidedreferendumsbyrequiringonlyatwo-lineamendmenttotheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.Since2012,
the European Central Bank, a technocratic institution insulated from popular pressures, has been instrumental in providing much needed liquidity. Piecemeal reforms, alongside banking union and upgradedfinancialsurveillance,didjustenoughtosavetheEurozoneandavertthedefaultofheavilyindebted countries. National governments have taken the path of least political resistance, keeping the
7
InJune2010,thesegovernmentssetupalimitedliabilitycompanyunderLuxembourglawwithseventeen(national)shareholderstoprovideemergencyloanstoGreece,Ireland,andPortugal.InSeptember2012,theysetupanintergovernmentalorganization,theEuropeanStabilityMechanism,againinLuxembourg,thistimeunderinternational(notEuropean)lawtoprovide a financial firewall for distressed countries. As Schimmelfennig notes, “asymmetrical interdependence resulted in a burden-sharing and institutional design that reflected German preferences and its allies predominantly” (Schimmelfennig 2015:
179).
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Euroafloatwithregulatorymeasures,whileavoidingpopulistpressuresthatwouldariseinmajortreaty
reform(cfBörzelandRisse,forthcoming).
The outcome was a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations (Laffan 2016; Tsoukalis
2014).Discursiveanalysisrevealsthatthisrifthassharpnationaledgesandfeedsonsimplisticnational
stereotypes(Mylonas2012).Redistributionwasperceivedasanissuewithprofoundconstitutionalimplicationsfornationalcommunities(OtjesandvanDerVeer2016).ThenetresultwastoraisethesalienceofEuropeanintegrationindomesticdebate,particularlyamonggroupsandpartiestakingextreme
positions(Hutter,Grande,andKriesi2016;Risse2014).
Expert estimates summarized in Figure 1a show that the salience of European integration has increasedmarkedlysince2006,fromameanof4.60inthatyearto5.93in2014,adifferencethatishighly
significant(p=.000).TheFigurealsorevealsthatsalienceisskewedtoEuroskepticparties,whichiswhat
onemightexpectonanissuethathasbecomepolarized.Northernimpositionofordo-liberalismandfiscalausteritybackedbyasystemofsanctionsprolongedtheEurocrisiswhileitfailedtocontaintherise
ofnationalistpoliticalparties.Ironically,radicalrightpartiesgainedintheverycountrieswherenational
interest shaped government policy. In the South, by contrast, austerity and currency inflexibility producedeconomicmiseryandresentmentwhichwasmobilizedchieflybytheradicalleft.
10
Salience of European integration
Figure1a:SalienceofEuropeanintegration
8
6
4
2
0
1
3
5
Position on European integration
7
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Note: Salience is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from “not importance at all” (0) to “of great importance” (10). The
continuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:2006and2014datafrom
theCHEStrendfile.
Figure1b:Salienceofimmigration
10
Salience of immigration
8
6
4
2
0
0
2
4
6
Position on immigration
8
10
Note:Salienceisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom“noimportantatall”(0)to“extremelyimportant”N=157.(10).
Thecontinuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:Source:2010data
fromtheCHEStrendfile.
Figure1brevealsthatthesalienceaccordedtoimmigrationissimilartothatforEuropeanintegration.
Politicalpartiestakingextremepositionsonimmigrationtendtoemphasizetheissuemorethanthose
takingmoderatepositions.And,similartopartysalienceonEurope,theU-curveistiltedupforparties
thattakestrongrejectionistpositions.Partysalienceonimmigrationin2010(Figure1b)isconsiderably
higherinthenorthwesternandsoutherncountries(6.63and6.23,respectively,onazerototenscale)
thanincentralandeasternEurope(4.09).WhereascountriesintheNorthwestandSouthwererecipientsintheflowofpopulationwithinEurope,thoseintheEastweredonors.Aregionalbreakdownof
thesaliencedatasuggeststhatevenbeforethemigrationcrisisof2015,immigrationwasperceivedto
beamajorissueintheNorthwestandSouth.Thesalienceofimmigrationin2010exceedsthesalience
ofEuropeanintegrationateverywaveoftheCHESdata.
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Thepartysaliencequestiononimmigrationwasaskedtoexpertsonlyin2010,sowecannotassess
change. However, mass surveys suggest that the migration crisis, which became acute from August
2015,ratchetedupconcernwithimmigrationinthegeneralpublic.InSpring2014,priortothecrisis,15
percentofthosesurveyedbyEurobarometerselectedimmigrationas“oneofthetwomostimportant
issuesfacing[ourcountry]atthemoment.”InnoEasterncountrywasimmigrationflaggedasimportant
by ten percent of the respondents, while nine countries in the North or South registered double-digit
figures.InSpring2016,theoverallfigurehadincreasedto28percent,alevelofconcernsecondonlyto
unemployment (33 percent) and greater than for the economic situation (19 percent), health (16 percent),orterrorism(16percent).CentralandeasternEuropeancountrieswerenolongerinsulated.Immigrationwasatop-twoissueinallEasterncountriesexceptRomania.
6.StickyPoliticalParties
Cleavage theory is a theory of discontinuity in the response of party systems to serious exogenous
shocks. Change comes chiefly in the form of new political parties that challenge existing parties on a
newcleavage(deVriesandHobolt2012;Rovny2012).Thepositionalmaneuverabilityofpoliticalparties
establishedonpriorcleavagesisconstrainedbyself-selectedactivists,self-replicatingleaders,andembeddedreputations.Farfromrationalactorsmakingoptimaldecisions,politicalpartiescanbeconsideredtobesatisficerswith“theirown‘boundedrationality’thatshapesthewayinwhich[they]cometo
termswithnewchallengesanduncertainties”(MarksandWilson2000:434;DaltonandMcAllister2015;
Kitscheltetal1999;MarksanddeVries2012).Complexorganizations,ingeneral,adaptwelltogradual
change,butarechallengedtorespondtomajorchangeintheirenvironment(Aldrich2007).
Theevidenceisinlinewiththis.PoliticalpartiesinEuropeappeartobesticky,asacleavageperspectivewouldleadonetoexpect.PartysystemshaverespondedtoconcernsaboutEuropeanintegration
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andimmigration,butthishasnothappenedbecausepoliticalpartieshaveshiftedposition.Figure2displayskerneldensityestimations(KDE)usingChapelHillExpertSurvey(CHES)dataonpartypositioning
onEuropeanintegrationfor215nationalpoliticalpartiesintwenty-fourEuropeancountries(Bakkeret
al.2015).Eachcurverepresentstheprobabilitydistributionforachangeinpartypositioningbetween
successivewavesacrossfiveconsecutivesurveys:1999,2002,2006,2010,and2014.Negativenumbers
on the X-axisdenoteadeclineinsupportonaseven-point scale, and positive numbers an increasein
support.8 The probability distribution is strongly peaked: 90.1 percent of the political parties surveyed
movelessthanonepointineitherdirectionacrossconsecutivesurveys.Thereisabitmoremovement
acrosslongertimespans,butnotmuch.Just17.2percentofthepartiesshiftmorethanonepointover
threeCHESwaves,and20.0percentshiftmorethanonepointoverfourCHESwaves.Thisisconsistent
with Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016: 145) finding, based on their expert survey, that parties “do
notchangetheirintegrationstancetoanygreatdegree.”
8
Kerneldensityestimationisanon-parametricmethodinwhichthedataaretreatedasarandomizedsampleandthedistributionissmoothened.WeuseStata’sdefault,theEpanechnikovestimator,whichselectsasmoothingbandwidthof0.123forthe
two-wavekernelfunctionandabandwidthof0.171forthethree-wavefunction.
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Figure2:KernelDensityCurveforChangeinPartyPositiononEuropeanIntegration,1999-2014
Note:ChangeinsupportforEuropeanintegrationonaseven-pointscalefrom1(stronglyopposed)to7(stronglyinfavor)
overtwowaves(N=566);threewaves(N=388);fourwaves(N=230);andfivewaves(N=98).Source=1999,2002,2006,2010,
and2014datafromtheCHEStrendfile.
Expertevaluationsofpartypositioningonimmigrationgobackto2006.Overtheperiod2006to2014
we detect similar stability (see Table 1). Of 140 parties that we track over the period, only three shift
morethantwopointsinanyonedirectiononimmigration.Theaverageabsolutechangeoverthisperiodis0.59onimmigrationand0.55onEuropeanintegration,bothonaseven-pointscale.9Partiestend
9
Positioningonimmigrationisestimatedonaneleven-pointscalerangingfrom“stronglyopposestoughpolicyonimmigration”
(0)to“stronglyfavorstoughpolicyonimmigration”(10).Forcomparability,werescalethevariablezerotoseven,andreverse
thescalesothatahighervalueindicatesapro-immigrationstance.
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to switch back and forth over time. The average raw change over this eight-year period is just –0.02
pointsonimmigrationand+0.05pointsonEuropeanintegration.
Table1.ChangeinPartyPositioningonImmigrationandEuropeanIntegration,2006to2014
Changeoverthree
waves
Absolutechange
Immigration
Directionalchange
Europeanintegration
Immigration
Europeanintegration
Meanvalue
0.59
0.55
-0.02
0.05
Medianvalue
0.49
0.35
0.05
0.07
Min;maxchange
0;2.30
0;2.79
-2.30;+1.80
-2.79;+2.41
#partiesmoving+/-2
3
6 3morerestrictive
3moreoppositional,
points
3moresupportive
StandardDeviation
0.50
0.53
0.78
0.76
Numberofparties
140
143
140
143
Source:ChapelHillExpertSurvey(Bakkeretal.2015).Europeanintegrationisscaledfromstronglyopposed(1)tostronglyin
favor(7).Forcomparabilitywerescaletheoriginaleleven-pointscaleforimmigrationtoaseven-pointscalerangingfromrestrictive(1)toliberal(7).
Beforewemoveon,weneedtoassessthevalidityofthisfinding.Partymanifestos,ingeneral,reveal
greater change than expert judgments (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 767ff). There are several possible
reasonsforthis.Oneisthatcodingofpartymanifestosatthelevelofanindividualissuemightproduce
greaterchangethanexpertevaluationatamoregeneraldimensionallevel.Thiswouldbethecaseifpoliticalpartieswereabletomaneuveronspecificissues,butweremoreconstrainedonbundlesofissues.
Asecondpossibilityisthatexpertsthinkalongcleavagelinesin“recordingthelongstandingcoreprincipledpositionsofparties,”whichmightleadthemtodowngradeeffortsbypartiestoshifttheirpositions
(McDonaldetal.2007).Thiswouldhappenifmanifestosrecordattemptsbypartiestoshapehowthey
areperceived,whileexpertsevaluatehowpoliticalpartiesareactuallyperceived.Ifso,onewouldexpectexpertstousemanifestosasonesourceamongotherstoestimatepartypositioning.Expertscan
plausibly be regarded as Bayesians who use party manifestos alongside other indicators, such as
speechesmadebypartyleaders,toupdatetheirjudgments.
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OnemightexpectvoterstobeBayesianstoo.Giventhetimeandcognitiveconstraintsontheirpolitical attention, voters tend to rely on generalized conceptions of party identity (Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler 2002). These tend to be stable over time. The European Election Survey (EES) asks voters to
placepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheresultsaresimilartothoseusingCHESdata(see
appendix).DaltonandMcAllister(2015:768)findstrikingconsistencyacrosstimefortheleft/rightpositioningofparties,withassociationsfromelectiontoelectionaround0.96.Remarkably,theconsistency
in party positioning appears to decay little across three or even four elections. On this evidence, one
mustlookbeyondpartypositioningtoexplainhowpartysystemsrespondtoexogenousshocks.
This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue positions, one
wouldanticipate1)sharptensionswithinmainstreampartiesonanewdimension,particularlyinhigh
barrier systems, and 2) the growth of challenging parties, particularly in low barrier systems. The evidencewehaveisinlinewiththis.Figure3revealsthatseriousinternaldissentishighestamongpolitical
parties that take a middling position on European integration in 2014. Inresponse to a new cleavage,
moderationdoesnotproduceconsensus.Dissentisloweramongpartiesthattakepolarpositionsonthe
keyissues.
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Figure3:DissentonEuropeanintegration
8
Dissent on European integration
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Position on European integration
6
7
Note:N=208politicalparties.Dissentisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom0(partywascompletelyunited)to10
(partywasextremelydivided)inresponseto“WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthe
courseof2014?”Source:Datafor2014fromtheCHEStrendfile.
Conservative parties may be particularly prone to internal dissent because they combine neoliberal
support for transnationalism and nationalist defense of sovereignty (Marks and Wilson 2000). Four of
the six parties with a dissent score higher than 5.5 in 2014 are Conservative: the British Conservative
Party(dissent=7.3),Lithuania’sOrderandJustice(6.0),Italy’sForzaItalia(5.9),andFrance’sUMP(5.8).
Institutionalrulesplayarolehere.BritainandFrance,theEuropeandemocracieswiththehighestbarrierstopartyentry,havehadexceptionallevelsofintra-partydissentin2014andoverthe1999to2014
periodasawhole.TheBritishConservativepartyhasbeenmoredeeplyriventhananyotherparty,and
inthewakeoftheBrexitreferendumismorebitterlydividedthanever(Hobolt2016;Tzelgov2014).
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7.Theriseofpartiesonthetransnationalcleavage
Moderate political parties based in the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan have declined
acrossEurope.Onaverage,thevoteshareforsocialdemocratic,Christiandemocratic,conservative,and
liberalpartiesfellfrom75percentinthefirstnationalelectionafter2000to64percentinthenational
electionpriortoNovember2016.Withfewexceptions,thesepartieshavecontinuedtosupportEuropeanintegrationatatimeofincreasingskepticism.In2014,justsevenof112mainstreampartiestooka
positiononthenegativesideofourEuropeanintegrationscale.
ConsensusonEuropeamongmainstreampartiesdidnotmattermuchwhentheissuewasmarginal.
Mainstreampartiessoughttode-emphasizetheissueto“retainthecurrentdimensionalcompetition”
(DeVriesandHobolt2012:263;Green-Pedersen2012:126-7).PriortotheEurocrisis,PeterMair(2007:
12)couldwritethatthefamedEuropeangiantdescribedbyFranklinandvanderEijk(1995)“isnotonly
sleeping,buthasbeendeliberatelysedated,sothatJack–intheshapeofthemainstreamparties–can
runupanddowntheEuropeanbeanstalkatwill.”Nolonger.ThegianthasawakenedinaneraofconstrainingdissensuswhenattitudesoverEuropeareexpressedinnationalelections,Europeanelections,
and,aboveall,innationalreferendumcampaignswhichescapemainstreampartycontrol(Hoogheand
Marks2009;GrandeandHutter2016:40;Treib2014).
InmuchofEuropethecriseshavereinforcedanewtransnationalcleavagethathasatitscoreaculturalconflictpittinglibertarian,universalisticvaluesagainstthedefenseofnationalismandparticularism (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Golder 2016: 488; Höglinger 2016). Recent literature has produced a
seriesofconvergentconceptstodescribethis:demarcationvs.integration(Kriesi,Grande,etal.2006;
2012);libertarian-universalisticvs.traditionalist-communitarian(Bornschier2010);universalismvs.particularism(HäusermannandKriesi2015;Beramendietal.2015);cosmopolitanvs.communitarian(Teney,Lacewell,andDeWilde2013);GALvs.TAN(Hooghe,Marks,andWilson2002).
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Europe and immigration—issues that have risen sharply in salience as a result of the crises—are
flashpoints in the generation of this cleavage. These issues are perceived from diametrically opposing
standpoints by TAN and GAL political parties. Whereas social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative,andliberalpartiesaresimilarlypositionedontheseissues,TANpartiesandGALpartiestake
distinct positions that place them at the polar extremes. The coefficient for variation among TAN and
GALpartiesis0.53onEuropeanintegrationand0.96onimmigration.Formainstreampartiesitis0.19
and0.38,respectively(CHES2014).
Whereas political parties formed on prior cleavages conceive of Europe and immigration as loosely
connectedissues,TANandGALpartiesconceivethemasintimatelyconnected(MarchandRommerskirchen2015).TheassociationbetweenthepositionsthatmainstreampartiestakeonEuropeandimmigrationis0.33;forradicalrightandgreenpartiesitis0.82(CHES,2014).Transnationalismintheformof
supportforEuropeancooperationandfreemovementisstronglyconsistentwiththesociallibertarian,
cosmopolitan, and universalist values of green parties. Equally, but in the opposite camp, rejection of
EuropeanintegrationandimmigrationlieatthecoreofTANdefenseofthenationagainstexternalforces(Tillman2013).TANandGALpartiestakemoreextremepositionsonEuropeandimmigrationthan
mainstream political parties. They tie these issues into a tightly coherent world view. They consider
themasintrinsictotheirprograms.And,correspondingly,theygivetheseissuesgreatsalience.
EverycountryinEuropehasbeendeeplyaffectedbythepoliticalfalloutofthecrises,butthewayin
whichpartysystemshaverespondedvarieswidely.Cleavagetheorysuggeststhatthisreflectsthepartypolitical expression of prior cleavages and the character of the crises. What matters from a cleavage
perspectiveishowissuesthatmightotherwisebeunconnectedformacoherentprogram,howpolitical
partiesgainareputationaroundsuchprograms,howthoseprogramsaredifferentiatedfromthoseof
existingpartiesonpriorcleavages,andhowpartiesonanewcleavagearepolarizedinresponsetothose
issues.
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InmostwesternEuropeancountries,theconflictovertransnationalismhasbeentakenupasanew
cleavagebyTANandGALpartiesandasanextensionoftheprioreconomicleft/rightcleavagebyradical
leftparties.ThecircleatthecenterofFigure4encompasseseightcountrieswithsuchpartysystems.In
contrast to radical right and green parties, radical left parties conceive transnationalism as a distributionalissuearisingfromtheeffectsofinternationaleconomicexchange(HoboltanddeVries:2016:7;
BrigevichandEdwards2016;VanElsas,Hakhverdian,andvanderBrug2016).TheyrejectEuropeanintegration on the ground that it hurts those who cannot take advantage of transnational mobility, but
they retain a conventional leftist commitment to working-class internationalism and do not take a
strongpositionagainstimmigration.
Figure4:Green,TAN,andradicalleftvote,2014
Note:Votetotalsforgreen/radicalrightandradicalleftpartyfamiliesinthenationalelectionpriortoNovember2016.Seeappendixfordetails.
InthecountriesofeasternEurope,mostofwhichareencompassedinthelongnarrowellipseinFigure4,theGALsideofthetransnationalcleavageisweakorabsent.Thechiefresponsetothecriseshas
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beenthegrowthofthevoteforradicalrightparties.Thisisfilteredthroughpre-existingcleavages(Casal
Bèrtoa2014).Insomecountries,CommunistruleforgedanaffinitybetweeneconomicleftandTANvalues. This was opposed by those who favored market reforms and cultural openness (Coman 2015: 3;
Marksetal.2006).Here,Left-TANversusright-GALconflictwasreinforcedbytheprospectofEUmembership which required market-oriented reform and liberal democratic institutions (Vachudova and
Hooghe2009:188).Incountrieswheresizeableethnicminoritieshadbeenatthecoreofacommunist
federation(Estonia,Croatia,Latvia,Slovenia),formercommunistpartiessupportedmulticulturalismand
leaned GAL, while the anti-communist right defended the ethnic majority and espoused TAN values.
Hence,inthesesocieties,anaffinitybetweenLeft-GALandRight-TANdeveloped(Rovny2014a,b).
Inresponsetothecrises,bothgroupsofeastEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalright
parties.However,theresponsecamelaterthanintheWest.AllbutSloveniaandSlovakiawereoutside
theEurozoneattheonsetofthecrisis,andsowereshieldedfromthebitterdistributionalbattlesthat
marked southern Europe.10 Further, immigration became a hot issue across eastern Europe only from
May2015followingtheEuropeanCommission’smigrant distributionscheme.Priortothattime,most
wereemigrantsocieties(Allen:2015:8-10;BustikovaandKitschelt2009;Koev2015;Rovny2014a).11
InFigure4theUnitedKingdomislocatedamongthecountriesofEasternEuropewitharadicalTAN
partyandnoradicalleftparty.ThereasonforthislieschieflyintheUK’spluralityelectoralsystemwhich
exaccerbates conflict within the major parties and punishes minor parties lacking territorially concentrated support. The transnational cleavage has been expressed outside the party system in the Brexit
referendumandbytheflashriseoftheIndependenceparty.TheConservativepartyisrivenbyconflict
10
RohrschneiderandWhitefield(2016:142)notethatinCentralandEasternEurope“partyreputationsarelessstronglyembeddedintheelectorate.”Crossnationalvariationintheideologicalspaceisalsogreater(Savage2014;RovnyandPolk2016)
andthereisalargerrolefornon-ideologicalissuesconcerningcorruption,goodgovernance,andpopulism.Thishasproduced
politicalpartiescombiningmoderateagendasoneconomicandsocio-culturalissueswitharadicalanti-establishmentrhetoric
(e.g. Res Publica in Estonia, New Era in Latvia, SMER in Slovakia, and TOP09 in the Czech Republic). The phenomenon is describedas“centristpopulism”(Pop-Eleches2010)and“mainstreamreformism”(HanleyandSikk2016:523).
11
The salience of immigration for radical right parties in Eastern Europe is 6.56 on a zero to ten scale, compared to 9.40 in
westernEurope.
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betweenitsnationalistandneoliberalfactions,andintheabsenceofaradicalleftparty,theLabourpartyhasshiftedtotheleft.
SouthernEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalleftpartiesinresponsetothecrises.Largely as a consequence of austerity, the Eurocrisis reinforced rather than challenged economic left-right
conflictcenteredondistributionandwelfare.ThishassharpenedtheeconomiccaseagainstEuropean
integration(OtjesandKatsanidou2016).WhereasTANpartiesintheNorthstrivefortheethnichomogeneity of the nation, radical left parties, predominant in the South, emphasize civic nationalism and
territorialcontrol(Halikiopoulou,NanouandVasilopoulou2012).ThedistributionalframingoftheEurocrisisexplainsalsowhy,intheSouth,radicalrightpartieshavesofarnotbeenthechiefbeneficiaries
ofmainstreamdisaffection.InPortugal,Spain,andIreland,radicalrightpartiesstartedfromaverylow
supportbase.TheyhavehadtocontendwithconservativepartieswithastrongTANinclination,which
havesofarbeeneffectiveinaccommodatingculturaloppositiontotransnationalism(AlonsoandKaltwasser2014).OnlyinItalyandGreecedidradicalrightpartieshavemorethantwopercentofthevote
priortothecrisis(Ignazi2003).InItaly,radicalTANsupporthasremainedjustabovetenpercent,while
in Greece it increased from 3.7 percent in 2007 to 10.7 percent in the 2015 national election (Ellinas
2014;LamprianouandEllinas2016).However,inbothcountries,theradicallefthasbeenthemajortargetfortheexpressionofdiscontent.
8.Conclusion
TheexperienceofthepasttenyearsfollowingtheeconomiccrisisandmigrationcrisisleadsustoreconsidertheresearchprograminitiatedbyLipsetandRokkan.Thereasonsfortherejectionoftheprogramfromthe1980sareseveral,andtheyremainpersuasive.Partysystemshaveunfrozenasnewpolit-
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ical parties have risen and old parties have declined. More fundamentally, the organizations that tied
voters to parties—including churches for confessional parties and unions for socialist parties—
encompassasmallershareofthepopulationandhavelessinfluenceonthosetheydoencompass.Finally, the life-long attributes that structured political preference—chiefly social class and religion—have
losttheirpredictivepower.
However,webelievethatthesedevelopmentsdonotexhaustcleavagetheory.Cleavagetheoryhypothesizesthattheresponseofapoliticalpartytoanewsocialdivisionisconstrainedbyitslocationon
apriorsocialdivision.Justasitwasdifficultforapartybasedonreligiousconflicttosubsumeclassconflict,soitisdifficultforapoliticalpartybasedonclassconflicttosubsumeconflictovertransnationalism.Hence,cleavagetheoryexplainspartysystemchangeasadisruptiveprocessratherthananincrementalprocess.Extantpoliticalpartiesareinconstantmotionastheyseektoadapttheirpositionsto
thepreferencesofvoters,buttheyareabletosustaintheirsupportonlyinnormaltimes.Theirefforts
toadaptareconstrainedbythepolicycommitmentsofself-selectedactivistsandleaders,bybrandreputationsembeddedintheexpectationsofvoters,andbytheinterestsandvaluesoftheirsocialbase.
Hence,thedynamicsoflong-termandshort-termchangeappeartobedifferent.Upclose,onecan
detect almost continuous adjustment by political parties to the preferences of voters. Over longer
reaches of time, they appear to be moving in quicksand. The crises reveal this starkly, and provoke a
theoreticalchallengeforfutureresearch:Howcanoneputshort-termstrategicresponseandlong-term
cleavageconstraintsonthesamepage?
Cleavage theory implies that party system change is discontinuous. It is characterized by periods of
relativestabilityaspoliticalpartiesjostletogainsupportandbyperiodsofabruptchangewhennewpolitical parties rise up in response to a critical juncture. The evidence presented here suggests that the
crisesofthepastdecademaybesuchacriticaljunctureforEurope.InaDownsianmodelofissuecompetition,onewouldexpectexistingpoliticalpartiestorespondtovoterpreferencesbysupplyingappro-
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priatepolicies.However,ascleavagetheorypredicts,thepositionalflexibilityofpoliticalpartiesisheavily constrained. Change has come not because mainstream parties have shifted in response to voter
preferences, but because voters have turned to parties with distinctive profiles on the new cleavage.
ThesepartiesraiseissuesrelatedtoEuropeandimmigrationthatmainstreampartieswouldratherignore.RadicalTANpartiessettheframeofcompetitiononthesetransnationalissues,andgreenparties
takediametricallyoppositepositions.Bothpartiesgivetheseissuesmuchgreatersalienceintheirappealstovotersthanmainstreamparties,andtheyarelesshandicappedbyinternaldivisions.
Theresult,accordingtocleavagetheoryisnotrealignment,butaccretion.Theshapingpowerofprior
cleavagesdiminishesovertime,butfewdiecompletely.Theterritorialcleavage,thereligiouscleavage,
andtheclasscleavagehaveeachlostbite,butnonehasbeenextinguished.Cleavagetheoryconceives
layersofpartisanattachmentratherthanthereplacementofonedimensionofcontestationbyanother.
Thepartysystemofacountryreflectsitshistoryofpriorstrugglesaswellasitscurrentdivides.
Becausetheexpressionofacleavagedependsontheinstitutionalizationofpriorconflicts,auniform
response to a new cleavage is unusual. The one exception in Lipset and Rokkan’s account is the class
cleavage,rootedintheindustrialrevolution,whichproducedmajorsocialistpartiesacrosstheboard.12
ThetransnationalcleavagehashaddistinctlydifferentexpressionsacrossEurope.Themajorcontrastis
between the South, where the crisis has widened the class divide, andthe North, where cultural concernsaboutcommunityandimmigrationhavepulledlesseducatedvotersawayfromleftpartiestoradicalrightparties.
LipsetandRokkanwouldnotbesurprisedtofindthataperiodoftransformativetransnationalismhas
given rise to an intense political reaction. Viewed from the present, the cleavage structure of Europe
beginswithonesweepingjurisdictionalreform,theriseofthenationalstate,andfinisheswithanother,
12
ThoughnotintheUnitedStatesforreasonsexploredinLipsetandMarks(2000).
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the internationalization of economic exchange, migration, and political authority. The cleavage arising
fromnationalstateformationisstillverymuchinevidenceinminoritycommunitiesthatcontinuetoresistnationalassimilation(HoogheandMarks2016).Thecleavagearisingfromtransnationalismmayalso
endure.Itisgroundedineducationalopportunitiesthathavepersistenteffectsoveraperson’slife,and
whichareconveyedtooffspring.However,thefunctionalpressuresthathavegivenrisetotransnationalismareperhapsevenmoredurable.Transnationalexchangeandsupranationalgovernancereflectthe
benefitsofscaleinhumanaffairs.EveniftheEuropeanUnionweretofail,immigrationstop,andtrade
decline,theforcesthathaveledtotransnationalismarelikelytopersist.
29
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Appendix
TableA.1:Partyposition,dissent,andsalienceonEuropeanintegrationandimmigration
PositiononEuropeaninte“HowwouldyoudescribethegeneralpositiononEuropeanintegrationthattheparty’s
gration
leadershiptookoverthecourseof[year]?Onaseven-pointscale:
1=stronglyopposed
2=opposed
3=somewhatopposed
4=neutral
5=somewhatinfavor
6=infavor
7=stronglyinfavor
[Don’tknow]
SalienceofEuropeanintegra- “WewouldlikeyoutothinkaboutthesalienceofEuropeanintegrationforaparty.Over
tion
thecourseof[year],howimportantwastheEUtothepartiesintheirpublicstance?”Onan
eleven-pointscale:
0=noimportance,nevermentioned
10=greatimportance,themostimportantissue
DissentonEuropeanintegra- “WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthecourseof
tion
[year]?”Onaneleven-pointscale:
0=Partywascompletelyunited
10=Partywasextremelydivided
[Don’tknow]
Positiononimmigration
“Positiononimmigrationpolicy.”Eleven-pointscale:
0=fullyopposedtoarestrictivepolicyonimmigration
10=fullyinfavorofarestrictivepolicyonimmigration
[Don’tknow]
Note:scaleisreversedinanalysis,andforTable1,recalibratedtoaseven-pointscale.
Salienceofimmigration
“Importance/salienceofimmigrationpolicyforeachofthefollowingparties”Onanelevenpointscale:
0=notimportantatall
10=extremelyimportant
[Don’tknow]
Source:ChapelHillexpertsurveytrendfile,whichcombinesfivewaves(1999,2002,2006,2010,2014)for14Northwestern
andSouthernEUmemberstatesandfourwaves(2002,2006,2010,2014)for10Central-andEastEuropeancountries.Cyprus,LuxembourgandMaltaarenotincluded.Estimatesareaverageplacementsbypartyexperts,aggregatedbypartyand
country.Foradiscussionofthereliabilityandvalidityofthedata,seeBakkeretal.2015;Hoogheetal.2010;Marksetal.
2007;SteenbergenandMarks2007.
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TableA.2:Categorizationsbygeographicalregion,partyfamily,timepoint
Region
North=Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Netherlands,Sweden,UK;
South=Greece,Ireland,Italy,Portugal,Spain;
East=Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia.
Partyfamily
“Mainstreamparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatLipsetandRokkanrecognizedinthemajorpartyfamilies
thatexpressedthehistoricalreligiousorclasscleavage,i.e.theChristiandemocratic,socialdemocratic,liberal,andconservativepartyfamilies.Wecategorizeapoliticalpartyasmainstreamifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES),theAllianceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),ortheEuropeanConservativesandReformists(ECR),or
ifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorresponding
mainstreampan-Europeanpoliticalparty:EuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists
(PES),theAllianceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),theAllianceofEuropeanConservativesand
Reformists(AECR),theEuropeanDemocraticParty(EDP),EuropeanChristianPoliticalMovement(ECPM).
“Newcleavageparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatidentifywiththeGreenorradicalrightpartyfamily.
Wecategorizeapartyasgreenifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheGreens–EuropeanFree
Alliance(Greens/EFA),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliated
withtheEuropeanGreenParty(EGP).WeexcluderegionalistpoliticalpartiesintheEuropeanFreeAlliance
(EFA).
Wecategorizeapartyasradicalrightifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeofFreedomandDirectDemocracy(EFDD/EFD),orEuropeofNationsandFreedom(ENL),orifnotrepresentedin
thecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorrespondingpan-Europeanpolitical
party:theAllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope(ADDE),theAllianceforPeaceandFreedom(APF),the
EuropeanAllianceforFreedom(EAF),theAllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements(AENM),theEUDemocrats(EUD),MovementforaEuropeofLibertiesandDemocracy(MELD),ortheMovementforaEuropeof
NationsandFreedom(MENF/MELD).
“Radicalleft”partiesarethosethataremember(orappliedtobemember)oftheEuropeanUnited
Left/NordicGreenLeft(GUE/NGL)intheEuropeanparliament,orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,affiliatedwiththeNordicGreenLeftAlliance(NGLA),thePartyoftheEuropean
Left(PEL),theEuropeanAnti-CapitalistLeft(EACL),ortheInternationalMeetingofCommunistandWorkersParties(IMCWP).
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Post-crisis
election
(Figure4)Votetotalsforgreen,radicalright,andradicalLeftpartiesinthenationalelectionpriortoNovember2016.Inthethreecountriesthathadnotyetconductedasecondnationalelectionsincethecrisis
wesubstitutevotetotalsbyvotesharesprojectedbythreeormoreopinionpollsfromSummer-Fall2016.
Thevotepercentagesarefortheelections(orpollaverage)inBelgium(2014),Denmark(2015),Germany
(2013),Greece(2015),Spain(2016),France(2012),Ireland(2016),Italy(pollaverage),theNetherlands
(2012),UK(2015),Portugal(2015),Austria(pollaverage),Finland(2015),Sweden(2014),Bulgaria(2014),
CzechRepublic(2013),Estonia(2015),Hungary(2014),Latvia(2014),Lithuania(2016),Poland(2015),Romania(pollaverage),Slovakia(2016),Slovenia(2014).
A.3:ChangeinpartypositioningonEuropeanintegrationreportedbyvoters(EES)andexperts(CHES)
TheEuropeanElectionSurvey(EES)asksvoterstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheCHESexpertsurvey
asksexpertstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration.Bycomparingcomparewave-to-wavepartyshiftscalculatedby
Adams,Ezrow,andWlezien(2016)foreightcountriesinthe1999,2004,and2009EESsurveyswithwave-to-wavepartyshifts
inthe1999-2002,2002-2006,2006-2010CHESexpertsurveys,itispossibletocomparehowvotersandexpertsviewchangein
partypositioning.Acrossconsecutivewaves,themeanabsolutechangeinpartypositiononEuropeanintegrationis0.52ona
10-pointscalecomparedto0.59forCHES,convertedtothesamescale.Soonaverage,votersandexpertsperceiveaboutthe
sameamountofchangeinpartypositioning.
mean
absolutemean
minimum;maximum
Voters(Adamsetal.)
0.14
0.52
-1.35;1.41
Experts(owncalculations)
0.10
0.59
-1.48;2.71
Adamsetal.concludethatcitizens’perceptionsofpartyshifttrackexperts’perceptions,albeitwithamodestbivariatecorrelation(r=0.26),whileestimatesofpartypositionsusingEuromanifestosdonottrackcitizens’perceptions.
40
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES
HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
TableA.4:GREENPARTYFAMILY
Country
ElecCHES
Partynamein
CHES
Votein
CHES CHESecotion partyabbreEnglish partyid post-crisis GAL/TA
nomic
year
viation
election/ Nposi- left/right
poll
tion position
(2014)
(2014)
AustrianGreen
Austria
Polls
GRUNE
1304
12.0
1.7
2.8
Party
Belgium
2014
ECOLO
Ecolo
104
3.3
1.2
2.2
Belgium
2014
Groen!
CzechR.
2013
SZ
Denmark
2015
SF
Estonia
2015
EER
Finland
2015
VIHR
France
2012
VERTS
Germany
2013
Grüne
Hungary
2014
LMP
Hungary
2014
E14
Ireland
2016
GP
Latvia
2014
LKS
Latvia
2014
ZZS
Lithuania
2014
LVZS
Lithuania
2016
LZP
Netherlands
2012
GL
Romania
Polls
USR
Spain
2016
ICV
Sweden
2014
MP
UK
2015
GREEN
CHESEU FamilyaffiliaEuropean/
position tioninEuro- international
(2014) peanParlia- familyaffiliament(most tion(mostrerecent)
cent)
6.5
Greens/EFA
EGP
6.3
Greens/EFA
EGP
Groen!
105
5.3
1.2
2.0
6.2
Greens/EFA
EGP
GreenParty
SocialistPeople’sParty
Estonian
Greens
GreenLeague
2107
3.2
1.3
3.7
6.6
noMEP
EGP
206
4.2
3.1
2.3
4.6
EFA
EGP
2207
0.9
4.3
6.0
6.0
noMEP
EGP
1408
8.5
0.8
4.4
5.9
Greens/EFA
EGP
GreenParty
German
Greens
Politicscanbe
Different
Together2014
605
5.5
1.4
3.3
6.2
Greens/EFA
EGP
304
8.4
2.2
3.5
6.2
Greens/EFA
EGP
2309
5.3
2.9
3.6
5.3
Greens/EFA
EGP
2310
2.1
2.4
4.9
6.6
Greens/EFA
EGP
705
2.7
2.6
3.8
4.4
noMEP
EGP
2402
1.6
8.3
2.9
2.9
Greens/EFA
EGP
2405
19.5
7.2
5.7
5.0
Greens/EFA
EGP
2507
22.5
6.2
3.4
4.7
Greens/EFA
EGP
2521
2.0
NA
NA
NA
noMEP
EGP
1005
2.3
1.0
2.7
6.5
Greens/EFA
EGP
2713
9.1
NA
NA
NA
noMEP
EGP
518
1.3
0.9
2.0
4.8
Greens/EFA
EGP
1607
6.9
1.6
3.5
4.4
Greens/EFA
EGP
1107
3.8
1.0
2.0
5.2
Greens/EFA
EGP
GreenParty
LatvianRussianUnion
Unionof
Greensand
Farmers
Lithuanian
Peasant&
GreenUnion
Lithuanian
GreenParty
Green-Left
Unionforthe
Salvationof
Romania
Initiativefor
Catalonia
Environment
Party-The
Greens
GreenParty
Legend:Greens/EFA=Greens–EuropeanFreeAlliance;EGP=EuropeanGreenParty
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES,ISSN:-----------Copyright©2016-Universityof……..
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES
HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
TABLEA.5:RADICALRIGHTPARTYFAMILY
Country
Election
CHES Partynamein
CHES
Votein
CHES
CHES
year partyabbreEnglish partyid post-crisis GAL/TAN economic
viation
election/ position left/right
poll
(2014) position
(2014)
CHESEUFamilyaffilia- European/
position tioninEuro- international
(2014) peanParlia- familyaffiliament(most tion(most
recent)
recent)
Austria
Polls
FPO
FreedomParty
1303
34.0
8.8
5.5
1.9
ENF
MENL
Belgium
2014
VB
VlaamsBelang
112
3.7
9.0
5.5
2.6
ENF
MENF
Belgium
2014
PP
People’sParty
120
1.5
7.5
8.5
2.5
noMEP
ADDE
2005
3.1
8.6
3.7
3.3
ECR
none
2007
4.5
9.6
1.4
1.5
noMEP
none
2014
4.2
8.0
4.3
3.0
EFD
MELD
2112
6.9
7.7
5.3
2.3
ENF
MENF
215
21.1
8.4
4.5
1.9
EFD/ECR
MELD
TrueFinns
1405
17.7
9.1
4.1
1.6
EFD/ECR
ACRE
NationalFront
Movementfor
MPF
France
NationalDemoNPD craticPartyfor
Germany
Alternativefor
AfD
Germany
PopularOrthodox
LAOS
Rally
Independent
ANEL
Greeks
610
13.6
8.9
5.9
1.2
ENF
MENF
612
0.2
8.9
8.0
1.2
EFD
MELD
309
1.3
9.8
5.3
1.7
non-inscrit
APF
310
4.7
8.7
8.3
1.6
EFD,ENF
none
410
0.0
8.3
5.3
3.3
noMEP
MELD
412
3.7
8.6
5.1
2.2
noMEP
none
415
7.0
10
2.9
1.1
non-inscrit
APF
2308
20.2
9.5
4.0
1.2
non-inscrit
AENM
1.1
ENF
ANsuccessor,
2.2 cooperates
withFN
MENF
BulgarianNationVMRO-BND
alMovement
NationalUnion
ATAKA
Attak
NationalFrontfor
NFSB theSalvationof
Bulgaria
DawnofDirect
USVIT
Democracy
DanishPeople’s
DF
Party
Bulgaria
2014
Bulgaria
2014
Bulgaria
2014
CzechR.
2013
Denmark
2015
Finland
2015
PS
France
2012
FN
France
2012
Germany
2013
Germany
2013
Greece
2015
Greece
2015
Greece
2015
Hungary
2014
Italy
Polls
LN NorthernLeague
811
13.3
9.1
7.3
Italy
Polls
Fdl BrothersofItaly
844
3.3
9.3
5.6
NA NationalAlliance
2406
16.6
8.1
5.9
5.7
ENF/ECR
ACRE
XA
GoldenDawn
Movementfora
JOBBIK
BetterHungary
none
Latvia
2014
Netherlands
2012
PVV
FreedomParty
1017
10.1
7.8
4.6
1.1
ENF
EAF
Poland
2015
PiS
LawandOrder
2605
37.6
8.5
3.1
3.8
ENF/ECR
ACRE
Congressofthe
KNP
NewRight
2614
4.8
8.8
9.6
1.1
ENF
none
Poland
2015
Poland
2015
SP
UnitedPoland
2616
NA
8.6
3.4
3.0
EFD
MELD
Poland
2015
KUKIZ15
Kukiz’15
2617
8.8
NA
NA
NA
noMEP
none
42
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES
HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
Slovakia
2016
Sweden
2014
UK
2015
SlovakNational
Party
SwedishDemoSD
crats
UKIndependence
UKIP
Party
SNS
2809
16.7
9.4
4.8
2.3
EFD
MELD
1610
12.9
9.2
5.4
1.3
EFDD
ADDE
1108
12.7
9.3
8.6
1.1
EFD
ADDE
Legend:ECR=EuropeanConservativesandReformers;ENF=EuropeofNationsandFreedom:EFD=Europeof
FreedomandDirectDemocracy;ACRE=AllianceofConservativesandReformistsinEurope;UEN=UnionforEurope
oftheNations;ADDE=AllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope;AENM=AllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements;
APF=AllianceforPeaceandFreedom;EAF=EuropeanAllianceforFreedom;MELD=MovementforaEuropeofLibertiesandDemocracy;MENF=MovementforaEuropeofNationsandFreedom.
TableA.6:RADICALLEFTPARTYFAMILY
Country ElecCHES
Party CHE
tion
party
namein S
year abbrevi- English paration
ty
id
Workers
Partyof
Belgium
Communist
Party
Bohemia
&Moravia
Unity
ListRed/Gre
enAlliance
LeftAlliance
Communist
Party
LeftRadicalParty
LeftParty
Vote
in
postcrisis
election/
poll
CHES
GAL/T
AN
position
(2014)
CHES
economic
left/righ
tposition
(2014)
CHES
EUposition
(2014)
Family
affiliation
inEuropeanParliament
(most
recent)
European/international
familyaffiliation
(mostrecent)
119
3.7
2.8
0.2
3.4
noMEP
IMCWP
210
3
14.9
6.6
1.0
2.7
GUE
PEL/
IMCWP
213
7.8
2.1
1.0
1.8
noMEP
PEL/EACL
140
4
7.1
1.9
1.7
4.3
GUE
NGLA/PEL
601
4.8
3.9
1.2
2.6
GUE
PEL
603
1.7
3.4
3.8
5.8
GUE
PEL
624
0.7
2.4
1.1
2.1
GUE
PEL
Belgium
2014
PVDA
CzechR.
2013
KSCM
Denmark
2015
EL
Finland
2015
VAS
France
2012
PCF
France
2012
PRG
France
2012
PG
Germany
2013
LINKE
TheLeft 306
8.6
4.9
1.3
3.0
GUE
PEL
DieTier
Human
Environment 312
Animal
Protec-
0.3
4.0
2.0
4
GUE
EuroAnimal
Germany
2013
43
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES
HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
tion
Greece
2015
SYRIZA
Greece
2015
KKE
Ireland
2016
SF
Ireland
2016
SP
Ireland
2016
PBPA
Italy
Polls
RC
Italy
Polls
SEL
Italy
Polls
M5S
Netherlands
2012
SP
Netherlands
2012
PvdD
Portugal
2015
CDU
Portugal
2015
BE
Slovenia
2014
Spain
2016
Spain
2016
Spain
2016
Sweden
2014
Coalition
ofthe
Radical
Left
Communist
Party
WeOurselves
Socialist
Party
People
Before
Profit
Alliance
Communist
Refoundation
Left
Ecology
Freedom
FiveStar
Movement
Socialist
Party
Partyof
theAnimals
Democratic
Unitarian
Coalition
LeftBloc
403
35.5
2.1
1.4
3.4
GUE
PEL
404
5.6
5.8
0.1
1.1
noninscrit
ICMWP
707
13.8
5.1
1.9
2.8
GUE
none
708
2.9
1.9
0.5
2.2
GUE
EACL/ICMWP
709
1.0
1.2
0.4
2.3
noMEP
EACL
803
NA
1.0
0.1
2.0
GUE
PEL
838
3.7
0.3
0.7
3.1
GUE
none
845
27.9
2.6
3.4
1.4
EFD
none
101
4
9.7
4.1
1.0
2.1
GUE
none
101
8
1.9
2.3
2.4
3.7
GUE
NGLA
120
1
8.3
4.2
0.3
1.9
GUE
none
10.2
0.7
0.7
3.1
GUE
PEL
6.0
1.3
0.7
3.7
noMEP
PEL
NA
1.4
1.8
4.6
GUE
PEL
0.4
2.1
1.1
4.7
GUE
none
21.2
1.8
1.3
4.4
GUE
none
5.7
2.0
1.4
2.1
GUE
NGLA
120
8
291
2
United
Left
United
IU
504
Left
Basque
EHBildu Country 524
Unite
Podemos WeCan 525
LeftPar- 160
V
ty
1
ZL
Legend:EACL=EuropeanAnti-CapitalistLeft;GUE=EuropeanUnitedLeft/NordicGreenLeft;NGLA=NordicGreen
LeftAlliance(NGLA);PEL=PartyoftheEuropeanLeft;IMCWP=InternationalMeetingofCommunistandWorkers
Parties.
44
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES
HoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
45