Insurgency-COIN in Nigeria!
In perspective
Paper delivered
by
omeni!
Defence Studies Department,
Kings College London at the
Joint Services Command and Staff College,
Defence Academy of the UK, Shrivenham
! Boko Haram (BH) is a Salafi-Jihadist* group waging an insurgency in northeast Nigeria.
! Over the years the group has posed a significant military threat and by 2014 it’s violence
has now become comparable to that by both the Taliban and the TTP.
! In June 2011 the Nigerian govt. set up a military Joint Task Force, Joint Task Force
Operation Restore Order (JTF ORO), to counter Boko Haram’s insurgency.
! In July 2013, there were indications that JTF ORO will be scraped; and in August 2013
the operation was replaced by newly created “counterinsurgency” Army Division (7 Infantry)
8000
7000
Most lethal perpetrator groups (2009-2013)
6000
5000
4000
# of Attacks
3000
# of Fatalities
2000
1000
0
Taliban
TTP
Boko Haram AQ (Iraq) Al-Shabaab
AQAP
ISIL
Al-Nusrah
Boko Haram: Brief Overview
BOKO HARAM!
!  Jamaat al as Sunnah lid da’wa wal Jihad
(translation: “Congregation of the People of
Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad”)
!  Widely known as Boko Haram
!  Salafi-Jihadist movement waging an
insurgency in northeast Nigeria since 2010
when the group re-emerged after a security
crackdown by Nigerian authorities that
dispersed the group and killed it’s leader,
Ustaz Yusuf.
!  Boko Haram today operates on two main
Area of territory being held by Boko Haram
fronts, the overt and the covert.
Boko Haram: Overt Front!
! 
The overt front includes insurgent fighters drawn from a mix of
sect adherents, conscripts from largely ethnic Kanuridominated areas, and mujahideen from Niger and Chad.
! 
This is Boko Haram’s backbone military
! 
Formations have capabilities bolstered by small arms and light
weapons (SALWs) obtained from Libya post 2011
! 
Front benefits from external training—likely from al-Qai’da
affiliates in the West and Horn regions of SSA.
! 
Confiscated SALWs from Nigerian security forces — including
APCs, Toyota 4x4 Hilux vehicles and other forms of ground
transport —now form part of the group’s capabilities.
! 
No longer an “unsophisticated” militia, as many assume.
! 
Relative to Nigerian military ground and air combat forces,
asymmetry has arguably been reduced over the years.
! 
Possesses protected mobility and anti-aircraft capabilities.
Heartland of the Boko Haram Insurgency
Boko Haram: Covert Front!
!  Boko Haram’s covert front is a loose network of ‘sleeper’ terrorist cells in several
towns in northern—and specifically but not limited to northeastern—Nigeria.
!  These covert cells infiltrate normal neighbourhoods and remain passive until they
are prepared to launch a terrorist attack.
!  Vehicle borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), IEDs and other forms of
Istishhad (martyrdom operations) have been integrated into the group’s tactical
portfolio since 2011.
!  Istishhad in particular is an area where Boko Haram has exploited its covert front;
most recently having the technical proficiency to effectively deploy teenage girls as
suicide bombers.
Fatalities in Boko Haram incidents inside
Nigeria, Data from ACLED
My research project
(Military COIN in Nigeria)
! 
My name is omeni. My thesis investigates military counter-insurgency in Nigeria.
! 
The project’s emphasis is on JTF ORO against BH, between June 2011 and July 2013.
! 
My methods include being embedded with military units, interviews, documentary material.
! 
Findings indicate areas in the chart below are important to understand COIN (in Nigeria)
Institutional
Isomorphism /
Organizational
Culture
Doctrine
LHS Chart:
Insurgency
Military activity at
operational level of
war
Training/learning
emphasis
(based off word
Operations
Combat
function
Noncombat
Joint Task Forcing
COIN Theory
Dissertation
count)
My project has produced a number of findings.
Today however, we shall consider three general
observations, each within the frame of COIN.
1. North-east Nigeria: a large geo-strategic area
2. Why do African militaries struggle with COIN?
3. How does Boko Haram end?
1. North-east Nigeria: a large geo-strategic area
7 Division
(Infantry)
Borno
1 Division
(Mechanized)
79 CG
Kaduna
Jos
2 Division
(Mechanized)
Oyo
3 Division
(Armoured)
M-JTF
Bde size multi-national force!
75 STG
Yola
FCT
Guards Bde!
(Infantry)
!  Four infantry battalions
!  Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger as
contributing countries
!  Operates around border regions
(orange highlight)
81 Division !
(2 Mech Bdes, 1 Recce)
Lagos
82 Division
(Composite)
Enugu
!  CO is Nigerian Brig. Gen.
Nigeria: Military Capabilities
! 
ACTIVE: 80,000
! 
Army: 62,000; Navy: 8,000; Air Force: 10,000
! 
Spread out across six main divs and Guards Bde
! 
Five maneuver divisions until 2013. 7 Div created August 2013
! 
COIN: No effective tour system so most units have not seen
combat. Operations against BHTs primarily infantry affair
! 
COIN: No naval component – most of NEN landlocked.
! 
COIN: NAF supporting role – around 54 combat capable craft
(around a third Alpha jets; around 9 attack Helicopters (Mi-24,
Mi-35s)
Isolated raid on BH
hideout by NA 1 Bde.
elements, Sokoto
Niger
Lake Chad
(Nigeria/Chad)
Maiduguri
Sambisa
forests
Cameroun
Entire Borno axis
is Area of
Responsibility
(AoR) of JTF ORO
1. Map of Nigeria, highlighting the
insurgents’ main area of operations
(northeast Nigeria)
3. Map of Helmand
2. Map of Borno State
province
(enlarged). Large area in
Afghanistan (Area:
question (area: 70,898km2).
58,584 km2).
The capital, Maiduguri,
considered heartland of the
insurgency
in
!  Huge area in question (NE Nigeria)
!  Borno state alone (70,898km2) is larger than Helmand province (58,584 km2).
!  Helmand considered one of most contested provinces by Taliban. 16 Air
Assault, 3 Commando RM and 12 Mechanised had especially difficult initial tours
!  “Stalemate” at Nawzad (2008-2009) indication of substantial troop requirement
!  Several thousand more troops subsequently deployed; mostly, US.
!  By Nov. 2010, over 30,000 total troops including coalition troops and Afghan
national Army (ANA) personnel; mostly from newly-activated 215th Corps.
!  More troops could make difference in COIN – is there basis in military theory?
!  There appears to be.
!  Sir Robert Thompson: “If the selected area is sufficiently limited so that the
government forces can saturate it, it is unlikely that the insurgents will seek
a major battle.”
!  US Army Col. Greg Julian: “In counterinsurgency doctrine, it should really
be a 10-to-one ratio of population [to troops]”.
!  British Army Doctrine: “counterinsurgency operations call for a ratio of 20
security force personnel for every 1,000 people: 1 in 50”
!  In practice it is difficult, though not impossible, to reach these targets.
!  Take Helmand, for instance. Population of around 1.4m. Population-troop ratio:
1,400/35 is about 40:1 around height of troop surge (Nov 2010)
!  Now, take Borno state. JTF ORO just over brigade strength (around 4,000
personnel) at its height (July 2013).
!  Population in Borno? Over 3.1m. Population-troop ratio: 3,000/4 is over 750:1
!  Even with current troop levels of 10,000 (generous estimate), ratio is still 300:1!
JTF contribution by component
!  In reality, JTF ORO mostly not 4,000 strong.
!  NA 21 Armoured Bde. formed nucleus. Other
supporting NA elements.
!  NAF 79 Composite Group was air component
!  DSS, Customs, Immigration, DIA non-combat.
Immigratio
n*
Defense
Prisons Corps
3%
Service
1%
DIA* Customs*
1%
3%
DSS* 5%
7%
Army
50%
!  Civil Defence corps role (non-combat; patting
down female mosque-goers for instance)
!  Prisons Service to inspect and advise on
detention facilities at 21 Bde.
!  Army and police only two components for
ground offensive/defensive ops.
Police*
20%
Airforce
10%
!  All components complained of capacity issues
*Denotes intelligence contribution:
!  JTF ORO still made commendable, and often
DSS: Directorate of State Security (Domestic intel.)
DIA: Defence Intelligence Agency (Military Intel.)
ignored, gains nonetheless. How?
!  Not Army-driven. JE instrumental to this
Police component also provides units to assist with
local (community level) intelligence
(1, 3,4,5) Joint
Interrogation Centre
(JIC) @ Giwa Barracks.
NA lead role
(1, 4) Special
Operations Forces
(SOF) contribution; hold
durbars with locals
Denotes information sharing
(1, 2) Armed Service
Component
1. NA contribution to COIN:
SOF; JIC; Armed Forces
component (assets &
personnel); detention
facilities at Giwa Barracks
3. DIA contribution to COIN:
Joint Intelligence Preparation
of the Operational
Environment (JIPOE); CIC;
JIC
(2, 3,4,5) Joint
Intelligence
Preparation of the
Operational
Environment (JIPOE)
(3,4,5) Core elements
of a “Central
Intelligence
Committee” (CIC)
2. NAF contribution to COIN:
JIPOE; Armed Forces
contribution including
counter guerilla, comms, air
mobility & air combat assets
4. Police contribution to
COIN:
JIPOE; CIC; JIC; SOF;
Bomb/IED Disposal
6. Immigrations contribution
to COIN:
JIPOE; Non-combat roles
incl/d. information sharing,
Civil-Military Operations
(CMO) & Logistics
(1, 2, 4) Town hall
meetings “shura” w/ local
district heads, imams,
mullahs, bulamas
5. State Security Service
contribution to COIN:
JIPOE; CIC; JIC
7. Customs contribution to
COIN:
JIPOE; Non-combat roles
inc/d. information sharing,
Civil-Military Operations
(CMO) & Logistics
(4) Bomb/IED
Disposal (unique
capability)
(6, 7) Non-combat
roles inc/d.: CMO,
Logistics & information
sharing 18
Some campaign features!
!  Within a year, CO got his military and non-military component commanders to work together
in a way I did not think possible in Nigerian military operational environment (NMOE):
!  NA personnel under command of police component commander – an outlier scenario in OE
!  Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) constituting DSS, Police, DIA, Army and Air force
!  As result of JIC efforts, IED specialist killed in Maiduguri – no suicide bombings for while after
!  Mobile police tactical bomb squad integrated into JTF ORO, despite that killing
!  Fewer colonels at battalion level discouraged operational inertia and avoided duplication of
command and staff function. May no longer be the case in current Army operation
!  11 additional police units (70 personnel per unit) deployed to bolster police component
!  Maiduguri became so safe I could drive without military escort (except night meetings) –
impossible to attempt now
!  We spent Christmas 2012 without a single incident — unlike previous and subsequent years
What happened next?!
!  By early 2013, JTF ORO began consolidating gains as the insurgent’s ability to conduct
attacks in an around Maiduguri became limited.
!  Attacks continued, but much fewer casualties per attack, indicated smaller scale attacks
!  The insurgent shifted his attacks to more porous border areas (such as Baga) where a
Multinational JTF (M-JTF), rather than JTF ORO were supposed to be active
!  May 2013; President Jonathan declares state of emergency
!  Thousands of troops deployed to northeast Nigeria
!  JTF ORO suddenly disbanded; replaced by newly created Army “counter-insurgency” division
!  Almost immediately, Boko Haram attacks increase by order of magnitude
!  Strategic decision to disband JTF ORO (run by Defence HQ) and replace with Army “counterinsurgency division” (run by Army HQ) remains a puzzle, based on study analyses
*I suspect most these attacks took place outside JTF’s AoR. April 2012 saw 41 killed in
a Kaduna Easter day Day bombing, for instance; one of several attacks outside Borno
Fatalities in schools and colleges
400
State of Emergency
Includes 300 killed in attack on border
350
village of Gamboru (Ngala)
300
250
Includes 185 killed in
200
multiple bombs in Kano
*!
150
*!
100
*!
50
0
Sep
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Reported civilian deaths in Boko Haram attacks Sep 2010 – 17 May 2014. Source: Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data project, created by Prof. Clionadh Traleigh, University of Sussex
Section summary!
!  Misunderstanding of size of northeast, vis-à-vis military effort required
!  Borno state borders (over 800km) possibly too vast to secure effectively
!  Despite gains made by JTF ORO, capacity remained an important issue
!  Disbanding JTF ORO nonetheless, a strategic mistake?
!  COIN theory and practice indicate numbers alone cannot defeat insurgent
!  Intelligence, airpower, winning local “hearts and minds”, local policing, civilian
contribution, “innovation in crucible of war” (Russell, 2010) — all play roles
!  Escalation of BH attacks since removal of JTF ORO indicates numerical advantage of
infantry div may not be a substitute for jointness and inter-agency approach
!  But perhaps government and military planners know best
2. It’s not just Nigeria. African militaries struggle to
counter insurgency
The question then becomes why?
!  Since 1949, outside of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), only in very few
instances — China, Cuba, Nicaragua as oft-cited examples, have
insurgent armies successfully overthrown indigenous governments without
direct Western intervention.
!  In SSA, insurgents have had far more success; by themselves.
!  In Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, DR Congo, Uganda, ruling governments
overthrown.
!  In Liberia and Somalia, the governments were only able to end, militarily,
the insurgents’ progress within metres of the capital buildings.
!  In Sierra Leone the RUF came tantalizingly close, reaching Freetown
Why?
Why is the insurgent so successful in sub-Saharan Africa?
!  Part of my thesis is that challenges of military capabilities (force structure,
combat readiness, sustainable capabilities), within African states, reduces
the asymmetry of conflict [1]
!  This effectively makes it easier for the insurgent to contest state power
!  Moreover a lot of the military budget spending is on equipment that is
poorly-suited for low-intensity conflict in Africa [2].
!  Nigeria’s purchase of Swedish Haubits FH77 (Bofors) in the 1980s as an
example.
!  Purchased from Sweden in the 1980s, lot of these 155mm guns now
moribund and never used despite about four dozen purchased.
!  These Howitzers can only be towed by C-130. As as the start of this year,
the NAF had five C-130H Hercules, four of which are listed as in storage;
so, just one active.
!  Logistics a major reason why many of the bofors were simply never even
taken out of storage.
!  This is just a minor example indicative of a larger trend that equipment is
bought, which is eventually left to rot
!  Just recently Nigeria Army also purchased even more T55 MBTs – a
puzzling tactical decision, especially given the security challenge it faces
So, moribund equipment an issue!
!  Behind Angola and South Africa, Nigeria is region’s largest defence spender*.
!  Yet, in terms of equipment, the Army keeps in service, platforms from several decades.
!  Soviet era T-55 tanks from the 1940s (from are 1950s variants) are today classed as the
Army’s Main Battle Tank (MBT). The other MBT, the Vickers Mk3, is from the 1960s and was
first delivered to the Nigeria Army in the early 1980s.
!  Similarly, FAL-FN and AK-47s are standard issue rifles. BH standard issue rifles are about the
same; making tactical skirmishes more even, despite the enemy’s arguably inferior training
!  The Nigeria Air Force (NAF), also active against BH, likewise retains 50-year old platforms
!  Retention & active service of moribund military equipment and hardware is problematic.
!  Accounts of Nigerian military’s equipment malfunctioning, and overheating, in-theatre due to
age and poor maintenance
!  Views from Nigeria Air force generals interviewed have particularly disturbing implications for
joint operational warfare
Nigeria Army (NA) also is particularly underfunded!
! 
Military spending determines military capabilities
! 
Nigeria might be the third highest defense spender in
SSA but defense spending is not military spending*
! 
Defence spending will typically include military
spending and security spending
! 
Army capital budget falls under military spending
! 
As an example, under security spending, Presidential
MoD
HQ, 34
Amnesty programme (PAP) and DDRR for Niger Delta
militants combine to 59Bn naira (about US$360m).
! 
NA budget for 2013 is N4.8Bn; (less than US$30m)
! 
This means NA got less than 1/12th what was used to
pay off/reintegrate militants in 2013. One twelfth.
!
! 
What does $30m buy the Nigerian Army?
Nigeria
Army,
4.8
Amnest
y (PAP),
23.6
Niger
Delta
militants
(DDRR),
35.4
Defence budget 2013:
Who get what? (Billions, N)
!  Maj. Gen. Muraina is the Nigerian Army’s Chief of Account and Budget.
!  Here’s his answer to the question:
“! For instance, the army budget for this year [2013-14] is just N4.8 billion.
Now, to provide only one item for the troops engaged in the operation in the
North-east will gulp most of the amount
Assuming we committed 20,000 troops, the jacket and the helmet is in the
average of about US$1,000. This means US$20 million, about N3 billion.
N3 billion as a percentage of N4.8 billion is more than 50 per cent and that
is just one item; we are not talking about uniforms, or boots, or structure
[sic] where they will stay; we are not talking about training, because training
is key to enhancing the capability of the force
”
What does this mean for the insurgent?!
! 
It is excellent news for the insurgent
! 
As a result of such capabilities challenges within African militaries, the insurgent in
sub-Saharan Africa does not need to be exceptional in any particular area of warfare
! 
He just needs to refrain from making mistakes while being able to exploit mistakes —
because African militaries will make mistakes — in order to protract conflict
! 
In the case of Boko Haram and the Nigerian Army, that mistake could be a
malfunctioning Shilka tank; misfiring RPGs; a poorly defended barracks; or an Army
unit, with poor prior intelligence, patrolling an area with strong insurgent presence
! 
So this is the first area of my hypothesis, that critical capabilities challenges within
SSA militaries lower asymmetry of conflict and make it easier for the insurgent to
contest state power [1].
! 
Two other factors may play a role as well.
! 
African militaries have a conventional warfighting mindset.
! 
By this I mean that winning “hearts and minds” and so-called “tea sipping” (with locals),
as in Afghanistan, is not really a strong point for African militaries
! 
So in asking them to counter insurgency, African militaries are tasked in a area where
they are particularly weak [3]
! 
This has the run-off effect of allowing the insurgent the space he needs to gain, through
coercion or persuasion, the local support that often proves important in guerrilla-style
warfare and even more conventional forms of war.
! 
The final point is that history indicates many militaries fail to recognize insurgency for
what it is; thus failing to put in place necessary countermeasures, until rather late.
! 
African militaries are no different, and often fall into this same trap [4]
! 
[1], [2], [3] and [4] together make the position of the African counter-insurgent very
difficult indeed: unenviable
! 
Is this the position the Nigerian military now finds itself?
3. So, how does Boko Haram end?
So, how will Boko Haram end?!
Seven broad explanations for, or critical elements in , the decline and ending of terrorist
groups in the modern era
!  Capture of killing of the leader
!  Failure to transition to next generation
!  Achievement of the group’s aims
!  Transition to a legitimate political process
!  Undermining of popular support
!  Military Coercion
!  Transition from terrorism to other forms of violence
These relevant factors can be both internal (brought about by the target) and external
(brought about by the coercer). Nor are they necessarily separate and distinct.
Two ways to counter terrorism
War Model
! 
Became prevalent post 9/11 when Bush
declared a “war on terror” that spanned three
countries (Pakistan border regions, Afghanistan
and Iraq) and was targeted at no less than three
Criminal Justice Model (CJM)
! 
Was prevalent pre-9/11
! 
Avoiding legitimization of terrorism is key aim of CJM
! 
Terrorists “arguably raised to international plane
(alongside nation-states) by declaring war on
enemies (Saddam, Taliban, al-Qaeda) then four
(AQI); and then five (Haqqani) and then…
! 
! 
them” (Totten, 2012)
! 
War Model sees terrorism as act of war, as
opposed to criminal act
! 
! 
! 
CJM addresses dilemma by treating terrorist as a
criminal, not a warfighter. They are denied political
recognition
they seek sanctuary (as opposed to the reactive
minimum force employed by the criminal justice
model)” (Ibid)
But these groups cannot, on the other hand, be
ignored, nonetheless
See the target(s) as the hunted, not the hunter;
so “proactively searches for terrorists wherever
Such victory arguably more difficult to predict
against non-state actor: Saddam, defeated couple
months. AQ, Taliban et al., - still here, still threat
enforcement assets to provide a max force
! 
Problematic as war should not be declared if rapid
military victory not feasible/foreseeable.
“Leverages military military rather than law
response” (Totten, 2012)
!
! 
However this also means they have criminal rights,
like civilians, and cannot be killed as “combatants”
Nigeria has adopted War Model against Boko Haram
Both models have downsides!
War Model
Criminal Justice Model (CJM)
! 
Going after the enemy this way, has a price.
! 
High human cost – over 6,500 dead in Iraq and
Afghanistan (US alone)
! 
High economic cost - over $1.3 trillion (US alone)
! 
Might have to eat in private, what you say in public, if
war model is adopted but no clear end in sight
! 
! 
! 
! 
sword: do not recite poetry to one who is not a
poet”
! 
Secret negotiations has benefits, however (Brown &
Dickenson, 2010). They help “avoid conferring the
same degree of legitimacy” (see Columbia and FARC)
Treating a large group — one that can wage
conventional military tools — as a “criminal
organization”, may well mean the threat is left to
Indeed, despite Bush’s mockery of negotiating with
! 
“terrorists”, negotiated settlements have been sought
with “terrorists in Iraq” (Totten, 2012) as well as with
both the Taliban and Haqqani.
Nigeria possibly in similar situation
– Ch’an Buddhist aphorism
asymmetric war and militate against more
Since 1990s, majority of conflicts ended not through
brute force outcomes, but “through dialogue,
negotiation and compromise” (Duyvesteyn &
Schuurman, 2011, p. 677)
! 
“When you meet a swordsman, draw your
! 
fester.
This is similar to the trap I argue many African
states fall into, by not misdiagnosing threat pf
insurgency and using wrong tools
Indeed, CJM could also backfire, even where
threat approximates initial assessment; see the
hunger strikes of Bobby Sands and other IRA
prisoners in 1981
How do terrorist groups typically end?
43%: Transition to political action
!  Provisional IRA
!  PLO
!  Moro Islamic Liberation Front
!  Niger Delta militas (Nigeria)
40%: Intelligence and police work
!  Provisional IRA
!  Aum Shinrikyo
7%: Military power
!  People’s Will
!  Shining Path
!  Kurdistan Worker’s party
Terrorism can escalate or evolve
Towards Criminality: !  Abu Sayyaf (Philippines)
!  Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia
!  Niger Delta militias (Nigeria)
Towards Full Insurgency: 10%: Goals achieve
!  Irgun Zvai Leumi (Irgun)
!  African National Congress (ANC)
!  Khmer Rouge
!  Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit
!  Communist Party of Nepal Maoists
!  Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
!  Boko Haram (Nigeria)
So, how will Boko Haram end?!
! 
Counter-terrorist techniques are best used in combination
! 
Methods can overlap
! 
Frequently, more than one technique has proven more effective than a
concentrated military thrust
! 
Even Sri Lanka and LTTE’s destruction in the Eelam War IV, oft-cited as an
example of kinetics’ utility, did not occur in isolation – there had been build up
! 
So, infantry-centric COIN against Boko Haram may be problematic
! 
My view is that the joint task forcing — even if the Army played larger role with
increased troops in the AoR — may have proven a better approach
! 
I use phrase “may have” due to the current phase of Boko Haram’s campaign
and the attendant question mark as to what will actually work at this phase
How will Boko Haram end – From a coercer’s perspective!
! 
For coercion to succeed, the coercer must exploit the particular vulnerabilities of the
opponent's specific strategy.
! 
Two main types of strategies in conflict:
! 
Mechanized (or "conventional") war and guerrilla (or "unconventional") war. ! 
In this context, "mechanized" refers to dominance of the types of mechanical weapons and
transport provided by the industrial revolution, not to battle tactics that rely on armored
vehicles and rapid mobility, such as the German blitzkrieg.
! 
Objective in mechanized war is destruction of enemy forces, by means of massive, heavily
armed forces that fight intense, large-scale battles along relatively well-defined fronts.
! 
Probably what military theorists like Clausewitz (largely) had in mind re: concept of “war”
! 
Success means routing opposing forces on the battlefield by inflicting sufficient losses to
destroy the cohesion of units so they cannot execute combat functions.
How will Boko Haram end – From a coercer’s perspective!
! 
Many military theorists argue that coercion does work, even against the insurgent
! 
You however need to understand guerrilla warfare as a very different forme de guerre
! 
Guerrilla warfare, by contrast, aims to gain control over population
! 
Usually begins with remote areas
! 
The insurgent uses these as anchors to control still larger segments of the population
and thus undermine support for the government.
! 
Guerrillas fight in small units dispersed over large areas with no well-defined front line.
! 
Combat is intermittent and at low intensity, avoiding major battles.
! 
The objective is gradually to wear down the opponent government's political authority
and thus its ability to field military forces, rather than to destroy those forces in battle.
! 
Boko Haram have proved very effective in this forme de guerre
How will Boko Haram end – From a coercer’s perspective!
! 
From a coercer's point of view, the most important difference between these two strategies is
that mechanized war is highly dependent on logistics and communications networks
! 
Guerrilla war, like that being fought by Boko Haram, is not
! 
Mao argues that aim in this form of war is fought across three phases
! 
Phase 1: Guerrilla tactics. Aim here is to undermine, rather than directly challenge, state writ
! 
Phase 2: Gather enough momentum and use population as anchor. Popular support in
contested area critical at this phase
! 
Phase 3: Critical mass reached, or approximated. Insurgent can now realize territorial
ambition and challenge state writ in more conventional ways
! 
With ingresses into NEN, and holding territory, BH seems to have reached phase three.
! 
As at the time of my fieldwork in 2012, they were phase two
! 
Noteworthy that guerrilla tactics never stops being tool of the insurgent, regardless of phase
BHTs
(2010-11)
BHTs
(2012-13)
Guerrilla
warfare
emphasis
People
know more
about them
100%
clandestine
No
territorial
ambition
Phase One
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
Targeted killings of senior leadership
(such as IED experts, tacticians and
overall head) more likely to degrade
group at this stage
Deterrence by denial as main COIN
strategy: harden vulnerable sites and
targets; degrade and disrupt group
operations
You don’t need troop surge here
Intelligence plays key role
Classic examples of phase 1 attacks:
UN & Edet House bombing in Abuja;
Bauchi jail break
Military
capabilities
increase:
Attacks
more
spectacular
Phase Two
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
Expect stalemate(s) here
By this stage a purely military solution
may be less feasible
Police role crucial – Strong military
presence among civilians not advised
Counter-insurgent should go nonkinetic: shuras, town hall metings,
community initiatives, CMO all key.
Attacks on military assets by insurgent
more rampant here. This is to bait an
over-reactive target response
“Courageous restraint” important as
insurgent will dare and test resolve
Classic example of phase 2 attack:
Attack on 21 Bde, Maiduguri
BHTs
(2014)
Military
capabilities and
critical mass
enough to realize
territorial ambition
Phase Three
The group:
!  Can now successfully challenge state
writ and realize territorial ambitions as seen
in capture (or attempted capture) of areas
such as Mubi, Konduga, Delwa, Bulabulin
and Damboa
!  Has enough military clout to negotiate from
position of power. Bad time for state to talk
!  Can demand inclusion in political process
or, if strong enough, may overhaul process
Expect:
!  Counter-coercion by punishment here.
Attacks on schools, marketplaces and
Mosques.
!  A practically guaranteed pathway to political
legitimacy, if the group is successful here
Army: ! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
Intelligence: Range of tactical issues prevent effectiveness: maps, welfare, campaign
logistics, poor equipment, duplicative command functions et cetera
Doctrine too kinetic: Switch from ROD to MAW seemingly academic
Spread too thin: Army is too engaged in rear area defense. Should not be
case. Army needed elsewhere and not equipped to do policeman’s job.
COIN too infantry-centric
Might be some confusion b/w Army’s PSO experience, and COIN. Army
experienced in PSO, not COIN. Western expertise critical here.
Campaign Plan should be JCP, reflecting inter-agency effort (JE).
! 
! 
! 
Negotiations may be problematic; Boko
Haram have apocalyptic ambitions and
already achieving goal of Islamic Caliphate
Boko Haram may be interested in prisoner
exchange, not broader negotiations
Govt., not military issue, mostly
Leader (Bubakar Shekau) disdainful of talks
Airpower: ! 
! 
! 
! 
DHQ and ONSA should play bigger role; AHQdriven campaign problematic
!  Intelligence should underpin every decision
(JIPOE)
HUMINT possibly the only viable form and should
be exploited.
Institutional Capacity
building for CT-COIN
Diplomacy
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
Doctrine, operations and the praxis
inadequate: contortionist caricature of
Western equivalent
MOOTW Vol. 4A & 5 to be locally informed
CT-COIN Center, NATRAC, AFCSC
curricula can, likewise, better reflect NMOE
This process should involve all relevant law
enforcement agencies; “JE”
NAF needs to decide what kind of force it wants to be. Interviews
with NAF generals indicate reform long overdue
Drone tech conversation premature: tech infrastructure not
available; low expertise; institution not disciplined enough and
drones being considered are overkill for relevant action set
Surface-to-Air craft too advanced for Alpha Jets to still be NAF’s
backbone. Airpower important to COIN but under right conditions
CMO: ! 
Worked during JTF-ORO, we need
to understand why
!  Needs joint task forcing to be
effective
!  Should be major consideration;
however, focusing on CMO in
insecure rear, may be problematic
Police: Should own rear area defense to free up Army resources and
decrease likelihood of civilian-related incidents.
!  Not the case, however. Since E-Rule, police role perfunctory
!  Police have broad local footprint should be exploited
!  But suffer from capabilities challenges and viewed locally as
corrupt and heavy-handed: Police incident kick started initial
insurgency in 2009, according to interviews
! 
How will Boko Haram end – Intelligence!
! 
Good intelligence should be sent as instrumental—perhaps even the CoG—of CT strategy
! 
This is regardless of whether—and arguably especially if—BHT’s phase 3 gains are reversed.
! 
Insurgent will struggle to survive without some form of passive or active local support
! 
There are a lot of shifts in the mood of the local population b/w authorities and insurgent
! 
Good intelligence is the means why which these shifts can be identified and underwritten by
action, or inaction, where necessary. Amongst other things, Intel can also,
(a) foil plots; (b) have a psychological impact: mistrust; (c) make the insurgent divert precious
resources for internal mole-hunts
! 
The DIA (military intelligence in Nigeria) alone cannot provide required intel, however.
! 
DSS, Police and other law enforcement structures, as well as community sources, should be
be a part of this process. Intelligence is from a “community”, not a military undertaking
! 
This is why a military campaign driven by AHQ, rather than DHQ, is, in my view, problematic
! 
As, even in the best of situations, good intelligence is hard to come by, so CMO is key; as is
use of tactics that do not undermine CMO efforts
How will Boko Haram end – Deterrence by denial!
! 
Intelligence not only consideration.
! 
Hard targets not hard enough and soft targets too soft, in most affected areas.
! 
Extended siege on 21 Bde (Maiduguri), overrun of 174 Bn (Abadan), overrun of 234 Bn
(Mubi) and multiple other military and police formations indicate the former. Multiple
suicide bombings at markets and commercial hubs indicate the latter
! 
Deterrence by denial aims to raise the cost of insurgent’s military campaign
! 
Police and effective policing can play a role in increasing cost of attacks in “rear area”
urban centers
! 
Market places, shopping centers, car parks—and the most likely locations for Istishhad
(Martyrdom operations) may need to have stricter security protocols.
! 
Right now it simply is too easy—there is practically no cost—for the insurgent to conduct
these attacks and poor policing measures there is little reason for the insurgent to be
dissuaded to begin with.
Final note
“The failure to study [African] militaries as important actors in rebellions is
surprising. Indeed, the most obvious question concerning almost all the civil
wars in Africa is: Why have militaries performed so poorly, given that the actual
armed threat posed by rebels […] can best be described as pathetic?”
– Herbst, Jeffrey (2004)
!  An important question
!  Military operations to counter insurgency in SSA do require grounded empirical
studies. Too much emphasis hitherto on groups, not military response
!  I hope this presentation, by considering counter-insurgency in Nigeria through a
slightly broader lens, contributes to reflection in this area.
!  Thank you
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! 
Author’s own field data
! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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! 
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