Reykjavik and Beyond
Author(s): Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), pp. 215-235
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20042975 .
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Michael Mandelbaum
Strobe Talbott
REYKJAVIKAND BEYOND
T
late summer and autumn of 1986 were a busy, con
in Soviet-American
relations.
dramatic
and
period
fusing
the tone and substance of communications
Within four months,
and Moscow
oscillated
between Washington
sharply between
there would
and acrimony. At issue was whether
conciliation
between
and Mikhail
Ronald Reagan
be a second meeting
If summitry futures had been traded like commod
Gorbachev.
fortunes
would have been made and lost. The two leaders
ities,
in a kind of arbitrage, trying to make quick
themselves engaged
political profits from the swings of the market.
In July and August Reagan and Gorbachev
let
exchanged
arms
of
control
and
each
ters,
experts
delegations
dispatched
to the other's capital. Momentum
seemed to be building toward
an
a summit in Washington
at the end of the year. Then
in Moscow.
American
the
journalist was arrested
Suddenly
slowed. But in the midst of
mood soured, and the momentum
what turned out to be a minor crisis, Reagan and Gorbachev
made clear first to each other and then to the world that they
were determined
to proceed with the business between
them.
a
one
to
which
hold
became
of
They agreed
meeting,
quickly
most
encounters
the
in the history of relations
extraordinary
in
between
their countries,
the annals of high-level
perhaps
diplomacy.
The two-day meeting
in Reykjavik,
11
Iceland, on October
broke
with
all
of
U.S.-Soviet
the
12, 1986,
virtually
precedents
JB^he
relations.
There
were
scarcely
any
preparations.
The
meeting
that took place was entirely different
from the one the Amer
not a full-fledged
icans had expected. They had anticipated
summit but, in President Reagan's words, "the last base camp"
is a senior fellow and director
Michael Mandelbaum
of the East-West
on
at the Council
relations project
Relations.
Strobe Talbott
is
Foreign
are the co-authors
bureau
chief of Time magazine.
of
Washington
They
on
for the Council
Reagan and Gorbachev, a book to be published
Foreign
in January
Relations
1987 by Vintage
from which
House,
Books/Random
this article is adapted.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
216
on the way to a Washington
summit. Yet the agenda turned
out to be much broader,
and the issues discussed
far more
even
those the Americans
had envisioned
than
consequential,
full summit itself.
for the anticipated
was a failure.
In some obvious ways the Reykjavik meeting
At least in the short term, it derailed
the summit process and
dramatized
the fragility of the U.S.-Soviet
Not
relationship.
since Khrushchev
had refused to meet with President
Eisen
in
hower in Paris in 1960 and argued with President Kennedy
an
encounter
had
Vienna
the following
between
the
year
and Soviet leaders ended so badly. In Iceland, when
American
from his final session with Gorbachev,
his
Reagan
emerged
usual
jaunty
manner
was
was
his mood
missing;
grim.
to the press immediately
In reporting
afterward,
Secretary
Shultz appeared exhausted,
of State George
dejected and de
feated. He had to fight to control his emotions. He repeatedly
to describe
the weekend.
used the word "disappointment"
an
at
White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan,
impromptu
at Keflavik Airport,
lashed out at the Soviets,
press conference
saying that "they finally showed their hand; it showed them up
for what they are." He said that "there will not be another
summit
near
in the
future
as far
as
I can
see."
and the
the meeting
collapse
Despite
spectacular
was also significant,
if
there
tentative, prog
ensuing acrimony,
of
the
ress
on
arms
"potential
sides moved
control.
In his
press
that were
agreements"
to accommodation
closer
conference,
Shultz
"breathtaking."
on a number
of
spoke
two
The
of
issues
than their top officials had considered
possible beforehand.
In violation of all conventional
wisdom about sound negoti
and Gorbachev
Reagan
ating tactics and prudent diplomacy,
on
issue dividing
the biggest, most difficult
engaged each other
to structure
of
and limit their huge stockpiles
them?how
to improvise. Working
then proceeded
nuclear weapons?and
toiled through the
groups of experts with no clear instructions
on matters
that years of
night to hammer out compromises
two
to
themselves
resolve.
The
leaders
had
failed
negotiation
on
one
of
the
variations
tabled
oldest, most
spontaneously
themes of the nuclear age?
implausible and least productive
But they also spent
nuclear
disarmament.
and
general
complete
time adjusting their proposals for more practical
considerable
measures
verifiable
that could become
part of achievable,
agreements.
They
failed
at the
last minute
to overcome
the principal
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
217
obstacle to a treaty that might significantly reduce the levels of
on both sides. They could not resolve the
offensive weaponry
of how,
if at all, to constrain
President
Reagan's
question
was then, as it had been for
sdi
Initiative,
Defense
Strategic
to be for some time, the most
several years and promises
relations. Gorbachev
in
issue in Soviet-American
contentious
sisted that the program would give the United States military
and a first-strike
technical superiority
capability against the
U.S.S.R.
insisted just as forcefully
President Reagan
that SDI
a
shield against all offensive
would produce
purely defensive
forces
nuclear
and
was,
therefore,
the
moral
alternative
to
based on mutual
assured destruction.
traditional deterrence
leader would accept the other's reasoning.
Neither
But the meeting
did offer a glimmer of hope of a world in
which the United States and its allies would be less threatened
It also demonstrated
that sdi gives
by Soviet ballistic missiles.
in
the United States considerable
the effort to achieve
leverage
such a world through arms control.
n
The
encounter
Reykjavik
was,
in a
sense,
Gorbachev's
re
venge for the Geneva summit of the previous year. The earlier
in November
1985, had taken place on Reagan's
meeting,
terms. The atmosphere
had been civil, even cordial. It left a
lingering image in the eyes of the world of the two men seated
before a crackling fire in a pool house on the
comfortably
shore of the lake. They were photographed
shaking hands,
smiling, chatting earnestly but amiably. Before going home
at which they signed a
they made a joint public appearance
a "new
the
press proclaimed
communiqu?.
Perhaps inevitably,
spirit
of Geneva."
The most
feature of the Geneva meeting
for
important
was what had not
Gorbachev
come
to
happened: Reagan had
the summit and gone home without yielding even the
slightest
concession
on
sdi,
the
American
policy
that
most
concerned
the Soviet leaders. Because he had succeeded
in "protecting"
sdi at the summit,
was
hailed by the American
Reagan
right
as
as
was
he
just
enthusiastically
praised by the center and the
left for resuming high-level Soviet-American
diplomacy.
The general secretary may have run into trouble when he
arrived home inMoscow
His comrades among
empty-handed.
the Kremlin old guard and the military
could not have been
that
the
to
summit
had
failed
pleased
stop or even slow down
218
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
sdi. As a result of whatever
he encountered
in the
displeasure
never
Gorbachev
have
decided
Politburo,
may
again to let
himself be lured to a summit at which sdi would be finessed.
much of 1986, the two leaders engaged
in a
Throughout
slow-motion
fencing match over whether
they would hold a
In the atmosphere
second meeting.
of good feeling that had
them in Geneva,
enveloped
they had agreed to meet again the
in
the
United
States, and the year after that in
following year
the Soviet Union. The White House wanted
the second meet
case
no
in
in
1986
and
later
than September,
any
June
ing
before
the November
elections.
The Kremlin
congressional
made clear that it was not interested
in another meeting with
out
concrete
in arms
progress
control.
Soviet
indi
spokesmen
cated that June was much too soon for the necessary prepara
tions and suggested
that their leader would renege altogether
on his
to attend a second summit rather than
promise
partici
than another photo oppor
pate in what would be little more
tunity.
Even as they seemed to be stalling on a second summit, the
on behalf of a moratorium
Soviets stepped up their propaganda
on
all nuclear
testing
ons
a
and
reduction
phased
of nuclear
weap
that would
of both sides' arsenals
lead to the elimination
of
the century. These proposals were designed
for
by the end
to
was
maximum
international
Each
also
appeal
public opinion.
a
sdi. A
way of attacking
the
development
of
comprehensive
the nuclear-driven
test ban
X-ray
would
laser,
which
prevent
some
scientists think is the most promising
for space
technology
the elimination
of offensive
based defenses;
nuclear weapons
15 years would seem to make strategic defense all but
within
the
At
superfluous.
concrete
concessions
in Geneva.
counting
most
For
as
of them
same
at
time,
the
example,
ongoing
Soviets
arms
they dropped
the American
"strategic"
located
the
in Europe,
were
control
their
negotiations
insistence
forward-based
that could
some
making
on
systems,
reach Soviet
terri
tory.
to insist on progress
in arms control as a
By appearing
the Soviets were
condition for holding the summit conference,
to
exert
and
pressure on Reagan,
political
psychological
trying
whose
interest
in another
meeting
and
in an
arms
control
accord was evident from his statements during the spring and
summer. Time was running out for him. By 1987, even if his
personal popularity remained high, the United States would be
It would be more
deep into the next presidential
campaign.
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
than usual to conduct foreign policy.
difficult
the Soviet Union would be especially vulnerable
and
ideological
of
passions
the
Policy toward
to the partisan
season.
election
219
Moreover,
concerns over the federal
growing public and congressional
a
threatened
deficit
backlash
budget
against military
spending,
including on sdi.
to leave the
For Ronald Reagan
in a blaze of
presidency
a
he
need
second
summit in
superpower
might
statesmanship,
was
late 1986 and another
before
office.
Moscow
leaving
to
attempting
get
arms
American
in ex
concessions
control
change for keeping to the agreed schedule. In early September
Gorbachev
in an interview with the Czechoslovak
complained
Communist
Party newspaper Rud? Pravo, "We have not moved
an inch closer to an arms reduction agreement,
despite all the
efforts
made
the U.S.S.R."
by
as
for another Reagan-Gorbachev
they set conditions
were
the
Soviets
however,
meeting,
looking for a way
evidently
to justify one. For a while they seemed to abandon, or at least
that they had made earlier among the
loosen, the connection
Even
arms
various
control
In
negotiations.
with George
ing in Geneva
Andrei Gromyko
had insisted
diate-range
nuclear
forces
in a meet
1985,
January
then Foreign Minister
Shultz,
that the three issues of interme
(inf),
strategic
arms,
and
space
and
defensive
systems had to be resolved "in their interrelation
summit of
ship." Yet starting with the Reagan-Gorbachev
November
1985, Soviet officials began saying they would be
willing to settle for an interim inf agreement,
progress toward
a nuclear
test
ban
or
perhaps
even
so-called
confidence-build
such as strengthened
ing measures
procedures
accidental start of a war in Europe.
In
short,
the
Soviets
seemed
ambivalent
for avoiding
about
a
the
summit.
to claim, as
They did not want to allow Reagan's
supporters
had
after
the
Geneva meeting,
that standing
tall and
they
firm
had
and
off
that
Gorbachev
had
knuckled
holding
paid
under to the President. At the same time
were worried
they
about the consequences
of yet another breakdown
in Soviet
American
their professed fidelity to a great
diplomacy. Despite
tradition, the men in the Kremlin are extremely
revolutionary
conservative. They are deeply uncomfortable
with discontinu
The failure to hold a follow
ity, uncertainty,
unpredictability.
up summit would represent all three. And they were genuinely
worried about the future of the nuclear competition. A
respite
from?or
perhaps
a
long-term
arrangement
for
the
regulation
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
220
of?that
competition was important
the peredyshka, or breathing
space,
to carry
order
out
his
domestic
were to have
ifGorbachev
that he seemed to need in
program.1
Soviets had to calculate the likely impact of American
on their interests. As the end of his
ap
politics
presidency
a
become
lame
would
Some
duck.
Soviet
Reagan
proached,
officials said that their leaders were tempted simply to wait out
what they called "this impossible Administration"
and hope
The
someone
for
more
"reasonable."
But
worst-case
given
their
penchant
for
analysis, Soviet officials had to consider at least the
that the next American
would be even
possibility
president
more strident in criticizing their political system, more vigorous
even more
in attacking
their empire on its flanks, perhaps
to strategic defense. As they surveyed the American
committed
see a number of
potential presi
political landscape they could
to fit that description.
In dis
who
seemed
dential candidates
cussions with Americans,
Soviet specialists on the United States
showed deep curiosity about the presidential
prospects of Rep
and
Senator
Paul Laxalt (R
resentative Jack Kemp
(R-N.Y.)
Nev.).
that the Soviets had experienced
the difficulties
Moreover,
a certain
with Reagan gave the President
political advantage
if one were
in managing
the domestic politics of an agreement
a
achieved. He would have little difficulty getting
treaty ratified
Gorbachev
Senate.
both
and
had incen
the
Thus,
Reagan
by
tives
to meet
again.
Ill
The
second
two leaders seemed to be moving
in the direction of a
one
were
of the unforeseen
when
summit
jolted by
they
events
that
have
made
the
conduct
of
Soviet-American
rela
over the years. The episode
started
tions so accident-prone
with a scene out of a grade-B film about the FBI, which was
thriller about the
followed by one from an equally hackneyed
a Soviet physicist on
KGB. On August
23 Gennadi
Zakharov,
the staff of the United Nations, was arrested while attempting
secrets from an agent who had been
to purchase
intelligence
he was the victim of entrapment,
for the FBI.While
working
in espionage. The kgb retaliated
Zakharov was clearly engaged
1
See
Arnold
"U.S.-Soviet
Horelick,
and the World
1984;
Affairs, America
of Gorbachev's
World,"
Foreign Affairs,
Return
The
of Arms
Relations:
Control,"
"The
and Joan Afferica,
Bialer
and Seweryn
1985.
America
and the World
Foreign
Genesis
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
221
a superficially
similar trap in Moscow
for Nicholas
by setting
News
World
for
U.S.
&
the correspondent
Daniloff,
Report; one
on
a
of his Soviet contacts arranged for meeting
August 30, at
a sealed envelope.
Secret policemen
which he gave Daniloff
and claimed that
arrested Daniloff
then suddenly appeared,
state
secrets.
Unlike
the envelope contained
Zakharov, Daniloff
did not know what he was receiving and had no thought of
was the victim of a primitive frame
buying the information. He
to arrange a trade of Daniloff
tried
for
Soviets
then
The
up.
their
own
man.
some Soviets admitted privately,
their government
seri
that
the
Daniloff
would
the
affair
underestimated
outrage
ously
in the United
States. The Reagan Administration's
provoke
to that of the American
initial reaction was mild compared
since one of their own was
media. This was not surprising,
too, took a harder line than the
being held hostage. Congress,
some
members
White House, with
insisting that all business
was
set
free.
until
Daniloff
with Moscow
stop
In late September
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevard
States to take part in the opening
nadze came to the United
and met with President
session of the U.N. General Assembly
and
State
of
Shultz.
Both sides had hoped
Reagan
Secretary
would
the
for a summit. But
the meetings
groundwork
lay
s
Daniloff
the
and compli
poisoned
imprisonment
atmosphere
The potential effects of the
cated the agenda of the meetings.
to the cause.
whole affair seemed absurdly out of proportion
Because of the depth of hostility and mistrust between
the
As
superpowers,
emplify
wrong?and
Soviet-American
Murphy's
at
Law:
the worst
relations
whatever
possible
can
time.
often
go wrong,
Over
to
appear
the
ex
does
years
go
much
has gone wrong, often scuttling the best-laid plans of statesmen
on both sides. The U-2 incident of May 1960 led Khrushchev
to storm out of the Paris summit;
the Soviet
invasion of
to hold the
in August
1968 delayed agreement
Czechoslovakia
Arms
Limitation
Talks
the
invasion
of Af
(salt);
Strategic
not
U.S.
that
the
Senate
would
ghanistan virtually guaranteed
ii
salt
a
treaty; and the downing of Korean airliner
ratify the
in September
1983 impeded Shultz's effort to reengage
the
on a
in quiet diplomacy
re
U.S.S.R.
of
bilateral
and
variety
gional issues.
For all the differences
them, these incidents had
among
three important features in common, which they shared with
concern with
the Daniloff
affair. First, the Kremlin's
security
222
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
almost
always
takes
over
precedence
and
propaganda
diplo
to keep loyal Communists
in
macy. Moscow was determined
no
matter
in Prague
the price
in
and Kabul
what
power
as
was
to
it
determined
its
international
get
just
opprobrium,
agent out of an American
jail by any means necessary. Second,
if what the Soviets do leads to a crisis in their relations with
States they are quick to blame Washington.
And
the United
in
relations
has
the
third,
always proved temporary.
disruption
On September
29 Daniloff was released as part of a compromise
too,
Zakharov,
whereby
direct
exchange.
was
to be
returned
home,
but
not
in a
of both the
affair was all too characteristic
The Daniloff
to
American
Soviet
and
the
Soviet Union
itself
challenge
policy.
It illustrated anew the nature of the Soviet system: the institu
that find expression
tionalization of paranoia and xenophobia
the corruption
in a deep animosity
toward foreign journalists;
enemies and, in the
of the law; the obsession with exposing
absence of real enemies, with finding and framing scapegoats
these tasks so well that it
instead. The Soviet system performs
internal security
does other things badly. A state that defines
terms
in
of the power of the police finds it
almost exclusively
all too easy to give short shrift, not to mention
inadequate
resources,
to other
forms
of
security,
such
as
economic
well
organs" is the stock Soviet euphemism
being. The "competent
for the KGB. The unintended
implication of the phrase is that
an implication
that is not
all other organs are incompetent,
altogether
wrong.
Thus
incident served
the Daniloff
cans that the basis of their objections
lies deeper
than
opposition
to remind many Ameri
to the other superpower
to the U.S.S.R.'s
expansionism
and
Soviet foreign policy is ob
its threatening military programs.
because
Soviet
the
army and its baggage
largely
jectionable
have treated
train of commissars, diplomats and propagandists
inmuch
Poland and Czechoslovakia
the people of Afghanistan,
for
the same way that the kgb treated Nicholas Daniloff?and,
who
dissident
Yuri
Orlov
that matter, Andrei
Sakharov,
(the
as
to emigrate
was released from a labor camp and allowed
of the Daniloff
affair), and so many
part of the resolution
others.
criticism
received considerable
the episode Reagan
During
the Shultz-Shevardnadze
from the right for allowing
meeting
to proceed, for trying to keep plans for a summit on track, and
"business as usual" with a regime that
generally for continuing
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
223
was holding
But business as
captive an innocent American.
limited business,
usual with the Soviet Union was, by definition,
interest in the avoidance of
driven by the superpowers' mutual
war and by very little else. It was the kind of business that had
even
albeit with delays and distractions,
historically proceeded,
affair. If
than the Daniloff
in the face of episodes far bloodier
the United States refused to do business with the Soviet Union
to say nothing
until Moscow began to treat its people decently,
of foreign journalists and the citizens of neighboring
countries,
no superpower business would ever get done. In truth, episodes
affair are not simply bumps in the road to
like the Daniloff
summits,
they
are
itself.
the pavement
IV
to redouble
the two leaders'
The Daniloff
affair seemed
to meet face to face. Each was confident of his
determination
own ability to project an appealing but also commanding
and
two shared the belief that, as indi
persuasive personality. The
exert direct control over the
and
should
could
viduals, they
between
their
countries, rather than leave it to the
relationship
over
which
incident
they presided. The
giant bureaucracies
to both men of how relatively minor
served as a reminder
can
events
out
spin
of
control.
their
In a series of communications
Daniloff
was
to
allowed
leave
with
the
House
the White
U.S.S.R.,
before
Gorbachev
ex
pressed irritation over the uproar in the United States that the
had provoked,
detention
but also frustration
and
journalist's
so
U.S.-Soviet
should
often
that
the
relationship
impatience
seem to defy deliberate,
coherent management
from the top.
to Reagan on Septem
In a letter that Shevardnadze
delivered
wrote of the need for the two leaders to
ber 19, Gorbachev
involve
the
themselves
stalled
meeting
summit.
personally,
diplomatic
as a way
of
process.
accelerating
so as
He
to
impart
an
proposed
preparations
"impulse"
to
the Reykjavik
for
a
Washington
to his aides, was immediately
inclined to
Reagan, according
was
to
the symbolism of meeting
attracted
the other
accept. He
leader in a city halfway between
their two capitals. He was
encouraged
by Donald Regan, who felt that the President had
in
Geneva
the year before that he could deftly handle
proved
his Soviet counterpart.
Some of Regan's associates said that the
chief of staff also had his eye on the calendar: a mid-October
come a few weeks before
in Reykjavik
would
the
meeting
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
224
elections of November
4, in which the President's
congressional
as
would
be
it turned out?to
vain,
party
fighting?in
keep
would remind the elec
control of the Senate. The meeting
on
torate that the Republican
flag was still firmly planted
diplomatic high ground.
was
Gorbachev's
30,
proposal
kept secret until September
the
when Daniloff was safely out of the Soviet Union. Then
President
that he would go
stunned the world by announcing
to Iceland ten days later.
to expect
The Soviets had led American
officials
that inf
Since the Geneva
would be the focal point of the meeting.
summit the year before,
the Soviets had been hinting,
and
was
to
that
Gorbachev
prepared
sign
occasionally flatly stating,
a
inf
separate
from
unlinked
agreement
arms
other
control
Arms
issues. Of the three sets of talks in Geneva?Strategic
and
and
Reductions
Talks
inf?the
defense,
(start),
space
under
third had always been the most political. The weapons
own
in
their
the rubric of inf were destructive
enough
right,
in terms of military
although
they were all but incidental
to the numbers and capabilities
in
firepower when compared
was
inf
in the
the strategic category. But
vitally important
of
Ameri
so-called
Euromissiles
the
nato;
symbolized
politics
ca's
to use
commitment
Western
Europe.
American
its own
Conversely,
was
deployments
nuclear
the Soviet
part
of
to
weapons
campaign
a broader
protect
to block
the
to encour
effort
of the United States from Europe.
age the "decoupling"
When
it came time to make a deal that would be the center
piece
of
a summit,
ward
inf. That
matic
need
Shultz
and
negotiation
concrete
to achieve
were
Shevardnadze
far more
agreement
to
drawn
lent itself to the immediate
diplo
than
easily
did start
and the space and defense
talks, where there were
at stake, such
and
vitally important military questions
thorny
on devel
as whether
billions
States should spend
the United
the Soviet
oping exotic antiballistic missile systems and whether
Union
would
have
to
spend
comparable
sums
on
countermea
sures.
But when Reagan arrived for the first session in Reykjavik,
he found that inf was neither the main item on the agenda nor
was it detached
from the other, more difficult,
strategic issues.
a
full of papers
had brought with him
Gorbachev
briefcase
a
arms control
than
less
outlining
nothing
comprehensive
as other
as
start
well
and
with
sdi,
inf,
agreement
dealing
issues
such
as nuclear
weapons
testing.
In
the words
of
one
of
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
the President's
leader was "going
the Soviet
aides,
225
for the big
casino."
From the beginning
that while Gor
it was clear to Reagan
to make some unexpectedly
bachev had come prepared
forth
on
some
sort
all
be
coming concessions,
contingent
they might
on
of reciprocal American flexibility
sdi, although exactly what
that flexibility would have to involve was not at first apparent.
to meet with
from his first session with Gorbachev
Emerging
his advisers, President Reagan said, "He's brought a whole lot
of proposals, but I'm afraid he's going after sdi."
was
Gorbachev
a
proposing
version
of
what
arms
many
control
inside and outside
the Administration
had
specialists
some
what
had
For
advocated.
many
long anticipated?and
a
of
months
had
about
the
they
speculated
possibility
"grand
in which the United States would accept signifi
compromise"
on sdi in exchange
cant constraints
for equally
significant
in Soviet offensive forces. The Soviet incentive for
reductions
was
such a compromise
defensive
system,
plain. An American
even if it were not
would
force the
effective,
particularly
Kremlin
into an expensive and potentially disruptive
round of
arms
the
race.
sdi
Moreover,
a new
represented
kind
of
com
in exotic technology,
at least
where
the advantage,
petition
would
be
with
the
United
States.
Those
who
initially,
pondered
the possibilities
for such a compromise
had never been certain
to reduce their
about how far the Soviets would go in offering
most
straints
offensive
threatening
on American
to
in order
weapons
re
obtain
defenses.
In Reykjavik Gorbachev
and his colleagues moved
toward
that
the
that
response
answering
question,
although
emerged
was
not
conclusive,
tentative
of
or
precise
accord
reached
the weekend
during
confusion.
considerable
exact
The
binding.
were
There
terms
were
subsequent
reductions
others
over
second
paganda
phase
than
were
the course
seemed
real
to
slated
take
of ten. Some
more
arms
like
control.
place
conditions
stipulated.
over
five
of the provisions
reveries
Utopian
In the week
after
the
disagree
ments about exactly what had been decided, what
had been attached and what timetable had been
Some
of
the subject
years,
for the
or
pure
pro
the summit,
senior Administration
officials
launched an intense public re
lations campaign to reverse the impression that Reykjavik had
ended in failure. They engaged
in a surreal debate with the
Soviets, and sometimes with each other, over whether by 1996
the world
was
to be
free
of
all nuclear
weapons,
as
the
Soviets
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
226
or only of all ballistic missiles. Neither
the President
was
on
at
first quite clear
that point.
Regan
a
in
session
President
climactic
During
Sunday
Reykjavik,
ten
elimination
of
within
the
ballistic
missiles
Reagan proposed
most
This
have
of
Soviet
Union
its
would
the
years.
deprived
States with an
formidable weapons while
leaving the United
contended,
nor Donald
advantage
in nuclear-armed
bombers
and
cruise
missiles.
Gor
countered with a variation of a proposal he had been
of all nuclear weap
since January for the elimination
making
ons, which would have left the Soviet Union with numerical
in conventional
forces. Reagan replied, "That suits
advantages
bachev
me
fine."
maintained
that he had not
The President
subsequently
call for total nuclear disar
intended to endorse Gorbachev's
ten years; rather, Reagan
he had
mament
within
explained,
a
meant
to
that
nuclear
his
reiterate
long-standing hope
merely
free world would be achieved some day.
In the week after Reykjavik,
the Administration
adopted a
to the goal of elimina
unified public stance; it was committed
even that
ten years. However,
ting all ballistic missiles within
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
objective proved controversial.
a chance
to study the
upset that they had not been given
a drastic change in the
would
what
be
of
implications
military
leaders argued
basis for deterrence. Military and congressional
that a ten-year timetable for the abolition of ballistic missiles
of American
would undercut
support for the new generation
II
and
Trident
the
the
ballistic missiles?the
MX,
Midgetman
the elimi
or D-5 submarine-launched
missile. By promoting
nation of ballistic missiles within ten years, the Administration
was
tegic
unintentionally
modernization"
undermining
its own
much-vaunted
"stra
program.
the Admin
reminded
Experts on both sides of the Atlantic
were
to
the
crucial
istration that ballistic missiles
credibility of
over Western
the
umbrella
nuclear
the American
Europe;
on the American
deterrence
doctrine of extended
depended
a nuclear strike
capacity to retaliate quickly and effectively with
missiles were
ever
ballistic
attacked NATO;
if the Soviet Union
the principal means of carrying out that retaliation.2
2
on defense
that without
an authority
Sam Nunn
Senator
issues, contended
(D-Ga.),
non
in facing
the superior
find
itself at a disadvantage
would
the West
nuclear
weapons
did not
that the superpowers
bloc and said that he was "relieved
nuclear
forces of the Eastern
made
of Defense
these lines." Former
reach an agreement
James Schlesinger
Secretary
along
of a
"The Dangers
on Oct.
in Time magazine
in an essay
the same point
1986, entitled
27,
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
227
their long and tiring sessions in Iceland, Reagan and
had apparently been caught up in a make-or-break
in a bout of feverish
atmosphere. At the end they had engaged
to
outdo
each
the other in dem
with
trying
one-upmanship,
a
to
his
the
dream
of
nuclear-free
devotion
world.
onstrating
to his grandiose
Each had reverted
disarmament
appeals of
earlier in the year. That part of the documentary
record of the
to recede
weekend
into the footnotes
of
appeared destined
terms
the
that had been envisioned
for the
history. However,
more modest,
first five-year period were more
and
specific,
more in line with agreements
that the two sides had signed and
more
in the past. They were therefore
observed
likely to have
staying power.
to turn the terms
Detailed negotiations
would be necessary
to which
the two leaders had agreed
into a treaty. In the
such negotiations,
the stated goal of a
process of conducting
During
Gorbachev
50-percent
across-the-board
reduction
in
weapons
strategic
to be compromised.
But an accord along the lines
might
of the Reykjavik agreement would almost certainly compel the
Soviets to retire a significant portion of their large, multiple
warhead
intercontinental
ballistic missiles,
including some of
their notorious
which
worry the United States
"heavy" SS-18s,
because their accuracy, speed and destructive
capability make
them the potential
instruments
of a surprise attack. These
missiles have been the principal cause of American
concerns
about a "window of vulnerability,"
the driving obsession of the
American
strategic debate for nearly two decades. At Reykja
also agreed to consider provisions
that would
vik, Gorbachev
induce both sides to rely more on bombers, cruise missiles and
have
small,
single-war
head
mobile
that
icbms?weapons
are
better
suited to retaliation and therefore
less likely to pose the threat
of a first strike.
While
the Americans
wanted reductions of offensive forces,
the chief Soviet goal was restraints on defensive
systems?
sdi. Gorbachev
had proposed differ
specifically the American
ent kinds of restrictions at different
times.
When he assumed power in early 1985, Gorbachev
wanted
a
complete
ban
on
"space-strike
arms,"
including
all
research.
in an interview published
in Time magazine
in September
Then,
research might be allowed.
1985, he said that "fundamental"
Over the following months,
an extension
he proposed
of the
Nuclear-Free
in which
he also asserted
that abolishing
nuclear
World,"
because
the knowledge
of how to make
them would
simply not possible
weapons
always
forever
remain.
was
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
228
1972 Anti-Ballistic
for
to
"up
15
Missile
(abm) Treaty
for 15-20
years,
then
years."
in a letter to Gorbachev
in July 1986, Reagan
Meanwhile,
abm
had proposed
the
treaty for seven and a half
continuing
to withdraw
Neither
side
would
be
able
that
years.
during
was
to
The
of
duration
amenable
period.
question
obviously
the two could split the difference
and arrive at a
compromise:
ten
at
of
So
did
But
that did not
years.
figure
they
Reykjavik.
resolve the difficult question of what the abm treaty actually
in the way of research, development
and testing of
permitted
was over this
It
defensive
systems.
high-technology
space-based
issue that the Reykjavik meeting
collapsed.
indicated that he was inter
Early in the weekend Gorbachev
not until the
ested in "strengthening"
the treaty. However,
final unscheduled
session on Sunday afternoon
did he make
clear that by this he meant
that research during the ten-year
to the "laboratory."
period would have to be confined
Reagan
As he told Gorbachev
balked at that formulation.
and said
this definition
of permis
repeatedly afterward, he considered
sible research an attempt to "kill" sdi. When Gorbachev would
not budge,
the President
up his papers and the
gathered
on
a
note
ended
of
and
failure
recrimination.
meeting
in what was already
It was perhaps the most bizarre moment
a peculiar event; the President had not been prepared
to deal
or
in detail with the vital and immensely compli
conclusively
SDI and the
cated question of the future relationship
between
abm treaty; he had little opportunity
to take counsel from his
own
advisers,
not
to mention
from
technical
experts
and
Eu
leaders, on a subject that had impli
ropean and congressional
cations spanning both oceans and stretching far into the future.
a critical decision
on the spot, he
Yet he not only made
a
two
in
the
froze
leaders
into incompat
it
that
way
publicized
not
to
in
ible positions. Why did he
Gorbachev,
simply say
effect, "This is very interesting, a lot is on the table; we'll have
to study it carefully, and we'll get back to you"?
in the immediate
That question was not answered
post
One
official
and
of
justification.
explanation
Reykjavik
flurry
some pressure from the
was
under
felt
that
conjecture
Reagan
even to entertain Gorbachev's
pro
right. If he had appeared
at
to
of
he
have
vulnerable
would
been
doing
charges
posal,
the year
what he had avoided doing at Geneva
Reykjavik
before:
compromising
columnists
had warned
on
sdi.
Conservative
him before
congressmen
the meeting
not
and
to make
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
229
for
him afterward
any such compromise;
they congratulated
was his
not doing so. Even more
important to the President
a space shield that would
to
of
dream
the
commitment
deep
people from nuclear attack. He sensed
protect the American
that the Soviet leader was trying to get him to give up that
dream; he responded by walking away.
From the Soviet point of view, Reagan's position meant that
the United States was not willing to pay any appreciable price
least not
restraints to get offensive reductions?at
in defensive
to delay sdi deployment
for ten years
yet. Reagan's agreement
on the complete
to the abm treaty depended
and adhere
that same ten-year
of all ballistic missiles within
elimination
the room in
that virtually nobody outside
period, something
even
considered
where
the two leaders met,
Hofdi House,
a
In
the
feasible.
any event,
delay hardly represented
remotely
sdi
not
be
full
for
would
concession because
deployment
ready
for
at
least
ten
years
Moreover,
anyway.
understand
Reagan's
sharply not only from that of
ing of the abm treaty differed
of a number of key
the Soviets but from the interpretation
even
of the Americans
who negoti
of Congress and
members
ated the treaty in the early 1970s.3
Administration
After
the meeting,
spokesmen maintained
the right not only to
United
States
that the treaty gave the
conduct research but also to develop and test an sdi system
and
its components.
So when
the
ten-year
moratorium
ended,
the United
States might have some sort of defensive
system
to
in
Faced
with
Soviets
that
the
prospect,
put
place.
ready
would have no incentive to reduce their offensive forces. Quite
the
contrary,
they
would
have
every
reason
to
increase
their
for in order to deter the United
arsenal of offensive weapons;
and
the
Soviets
believe,
States,
they must be able to penetrate
States eventually
defenses
the United
overwhelm
whatever
on
Thus
the
defensive
half of the
Reagan's position
deploys.
a
came
to
at
down
refusal to
Reykjavik
grand compromise
on
sdi
the
of
that
the
Soviets
restraints
accept any
sought.
re
to "laboratory"
In his attempt to confine
the program
3
to
or
The ABM
research
but not development
treaty had long been understood
permit
defensive
"exotic"
In 1985 some members
systems utilizing
testing of space-based
technologies.
of the Reagan
"restrictive"
this traditional,
of the
Administration
challenged
interpretation
a
to which
advanced
short of
treaty. They
"permissive"
interpretation,
according
everything
see Abram
of SDI could proceed.
On
actual deployment
this subject
and Antonia
Chayes
and Development
under
of 'Exotic' Systems
the ABM Treaty:
Handler
The
"Testing
Chayes,
and Abraham
D. Sofaer,
"The ABM Treaty
Great Reinterpretation
and the Strategic
Caper";
Law Review, June
inHarvard
Defense
both
1986.
Initiative,"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
230
restrictive
sdi
Reagan's
be
on
insisting
a
new,
more
of the abm treaty, just as Reagan
interpretation
a more
advancing
maneuver.
to
seemed
Gorbachev
search,
one.
permissive
Each
concern
principal
side
was
room
had
to
to be
protecting
seemed
to "kill" it. Even many who were
Soviet efforts
as a way to defend
skeptical of his vision of the program
American
cities from nuclear attack believed
that the United
States needed to conduct a research program as a hedge against
the possibility that the Soviets, who also had a strategic defense
of their
research effort under way, would make a breakthrough
own
from
area.
in that
The research program
that even many skeptics supported,
forward
under the traditional interpre
however, might well go
to Gerard
its chief
tation of the treaty. According
Smith,
an
in
who
in
American
interview
negotiator,
spoke
published
Time shortly after the summit:
the laboratory,
of some new technologies
There
could be testing, outside
as
were not components
as
of a d?ployable
and devices,
system.
long
they
a
in
be
element
the
may
components
ongoing
negotiation,
Defining
key
current
but in the gray area between
the Soviets'
of
laboratory definition
and the Administration's
claim that anything
research
goes,
permissible
fear and Reagan's
Gorbachev's
there should be a way of accommodating
dream.
If Smith is right, the compromise
that the two leaders had
failed to reach at Reykjavik may yet be struck. Both leaders
to persist
At his press
in seeking an agreement.
promised
Gorbachev
after the meeting,
conference
said,
immediately
"The
road
we
accords
major
have
on
traveled
the
toward
reduction
these
of
major
nuclear
agreements?
arms?gives
us
us substantial gains here in Reyk
substantial experience,
gives
two days later he
a
televised address from Moscow
javik." In
some time.
said, "The American
leadership will obviously need
We
are
realists
and
we
clearly
understand
that
the
questions,
for many
unresolved
which had remained
years and even
can hardly be resolved at a single sitting." A week
decades
another one in which he com
after that speech he delivered
a distorted
was
version
side
American
giving
plained that the
are
not
that "we
of the events in Iceland. But he reaffirmed
that has
these proposals;
removing
they still stand. Everything
and development
been said by way of their substantiation
he added,
"The Reykjavik
remains as before."
meeting,"
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
facilitated,
"greatly
our
search
Reagan,
mistic that
of his own
tunity to
for the first time inmany
decades,
disarmament."
for
"I'm still opti
too, looked to further negotiation.
a way will be found," he said in a televised speech
"The door is open and the oppor
after Reykjavik.
the nuclear
is within
threat
eliminating
begin
. . .Our
reach.
probably
231
ideas
are
out
there
on
the
table.
won't
They
go
away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators
are heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward
the Soviets are ready." Within
three
whenever
and wherever
met again, this time in Vienna,
weeks Shultz and Shevardnadze
to try to pick up the pieces. That meeting
failed to break the
impasse
over
sdi
and,
in Shevardnadze's
words,
"left
a bitter
in Vienna
had the impression
that
officials
taste." American
the Soviets might be stalling for time to reassess the American
Party's regain
political situation in the wake of the Democratic
two
Senate
before
the meeting.
of
the
control
just
days
ing
called for patience
both Shultz and Shevardnadze
Nonetheless,
to press forward on future
their determination
and reiterated
negotiations.
in disappointment,
after they ended
immediately
were
and Vienna meetings
the Reykjavik
already
a
as
to
another
difficult
and discour
appear
stage,
beginning
aging stage perhaps but far from the last one, in the ongoing
effort to regulate the military competition
between
the super
Almost
therefore,
powers.
v
were
With
the Reykjavik meeting,
Reagan and Gorbachev
two-thirds of the way to matching
the trio of summits that
Richard Nixon
and Leonid Brezhnev
had held during
the
of
Relations
between
the
d?tente.
United
States
and
heyday
the
Soviet
Union
were
not,
however,
returning
to
the
condi
tions of the early 1970s. The political arrangements
of that
controver
sunk
down
have
into
the
with
past, weighted
period
sies and recriminations.
The Reagan-Gorbachev
relationship,
it turns out, will be different. Moreover,
however
however
the
on
arms
two
these
control
the
interaction
of
ends,
bargaining
course of relations in 1986,
leaders, including the roller-coaster
some
demonstrates
enduring principles about the Soviet-Amer
concern
ican relationship
itself. Those
principles
essentially
can do both to each other
limits?on
what the superpowers
and with each other.
232
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
One
is the limit to how far Soviet-American
relations can
his
first term, Reagan had been
deteriorate.
Particularly during
in 30 years, perhaps
the most anti-Soviet American
president
ever. He had aimed not at solidifying
the status quo in East
West relations but at overturning
it. His rhetoric toward Mos
cow had been harsh. The Soviet leaders had responded with
even harsher language of their own. Each side had tried
briefly
on the other. Yet at no time,
to impose a diplomatic
boycott
even
when
relations
were
at their
worst?even
after
the Korean
airliner episode and the Soviet walkout from the Geneva
talks
in 1983?had
there been a serious danger of war. Moreover,
none of the major agreements
that had been reached in more
came
settlement
unstuck. The European
that the
cordial times
never even came
d?tente of the early 1970s had produced
were the
the salt
under critical scrutiny. While
agreements
a
in force,
of
of
such
remained
deal
objects
good
scrutiny, they
in 1985 the two leaders found
at least until late 1986. And
to meet regularly. The business they had
themselves agreeing
to ignore.
with each other was too compelling
and
the
The first half of the 1980s,
policies that both sides
in that period, also showed that neither was likely to
pursued
over the other. By agreeing
in prin
gain a decisive advantage
accom
on a regular basis and to seek diplomatic
meet
to
ciple
some
on
of the issues that divided
modation
them, the two
the limits of their ability
leaders were implicitly acknowledging
For both men, this was a lesson
to get their way unilaterally.
that
took
some
time
to
learn.
In his June 1982 address to the British Parliament,
Reagan
and
said
unstable"
had called the Soviet Union
"inherently
crisis." He had implied
that itwas facing a "great revolutionary
that the United States should exploit that instability and aggra
in
vate that crisis. By the time he first met with Gorbachev
November
1985, he had ceased to make such claims. He had
even signed a presidential
that the
that concluded
directive
United States had at best only a very modest ability to influence
internal Soviet policy and should focus instead on influencing
its external policy.
One way to influence the foreign policy of the Soviet Union
was to discourage
anti
Soviet expansionism
by supporting
in the Third World. The Reagan Doctrine,
Soviet insurgencies
States to such support, was still
the United
which committed
at
of Reykjavik. But that hallmark
in
time
much
the
force
very
was
at
difficulties
encountering
policy of the Administration
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
233
home. On the issue of Nicaragua,
the White House was under
to couple the
and
and
pressure
congressional
public
military
humanitarian
aid for the anti-Sandinista
rebels with genuine
effort to achieve a negotiated
settle
support for the diplomatic
known
ment,
as
the Contadora
process.
there were signs that the Soviets, too, had begun
Meanwhile,
to understand
the limits of unilateralism
in the nuclear com
Nikolai
the
former
chief
of the Soviet Gen
petition.
Ogarkov,
eral Staff, spoke of the fruitlessness
of the arms race and said
that nuclear
Soviet specialists on
superiority was a mirage.
strategic affairs not only called for a "new way of thinking"
about the problems of stability?some
of them sometimes also
to
in new ways.
think
and
write
tentatively attempted
Some of the most
statements
that Gorbachev
interesting
made during his first 18 months
in power concerned what he
and
other
Soviet
spokesmen
referred
to as "common
security."
At the end of the Geneva
summit he expressed his "profound
conviction
that less security for the United
States of America
to
not
the
Soviet
Union
would
in our interests,
be
compared
since it could lead to mistrust
and produce
instability." He
on this theme in his address
elaborated
to the 27 th
Party
three months
later:
Congress
The
character
of present-day
leaves a country no hope of safe
weapons
itself
with
and
means. The
technical
task of ensur
guarding
solely
military
seen
as
is
a
can
and
be resolved
ing security
increasingly
political problem,
. . .
... It is vital that
can
be
mutual.
only by political means.
Security
only
all should feel
of the nuclear age
equally secure, for the fears and anxieties
in politics and concrete
actions.
generate
unpredictability
Gorbachev's
reassuring words may simply have been part of
another Soviet campaign to lull and divide the West. But
they
if belated,
may also have reflected the beginning of a welcome,
Soviet recognition
that the Leninist principle
that politics
is
always
a matter
of
kto-kogo?who
will
prevail
simply not operative, or for that matter even
Gorbachev's
strategic nuclear relationship.
a
Soviet
conclusion
to the
similar
bespoken
the West had long since reached; however
compete
elsewhere,
in
serve
conducting
the
nuclear
over
whom?was
in the
acceptable,
words may have
one
in
strategists
fiercely
they may
arms
race
the
best
their own interests by
an
superpowers
maintaining
and
the
of
equilibrium
jointly fostering
goal
strategic stability.
Even though many details remained
to be clarified and nego
234
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the
tiated,
suggested
some
modate
more
terms to which
the Soviets
that they might be prepared
stable
concerns
American
nuclear
and
in Reykjavik
agreed
to accom
eventually
to achieve
cooperate
a
balance.
sdi had undoubtedly
played an important part in inducing
to
the Soviet leadership
rethink what common
security meant
in the strategic nuclear competition.
It had forced them to face
some
more
to
of
the
of their
up
consequences
dangerous
excessive accumulation
of land-based ballistic missile warheads.
in the familiar area of offensive
If they pressed for advantages
into the unfa
weapons,
they might find themselves plunging
miliar and treacherous
terrain of high-technology
strategic
To
defense.
arrived
matters
make
feel much
there first, and would
too,
Reagan,
came
up against
would
the Americans
worse,
more
to
obstacles
have
at home.
altering
the nuclear
the superpowers. As he made clearer than
relationship
ever at Reykjavik,
sdi was his bid to change the rules, indeed
to change the game itself. But by then, for all his own devotion
to sdi and for all the disagreements
about how the abm treaty
to offer re
he found himself having
should be interpreted,
that the program would proceed under the
peated assurances
terms of the treaty, sdi therefore seemed likely to flourish only
to the extent that it was compatible with deterrence
and arms
was
to
increase
the
bound
control. Reykjavik
pressure on him
as
a
in offensive
to use it
chip" to get reductions
"bargaining
between
weapons.
That
was
rationale
original vision, proclaimed
over the United
astrodome
weapons
and
"impotent
a
far
cry
from
the
President's
in March
1983, of an impregnable
States that would render nuclear
obsolete."
while Reagan's
conduct at Reykjavik demonstrated
the
in that vision, few officials outside
his continuing
belief
shared his hope. Virtually his
Oval Office of the White House
the idea of a com
either had abandoned
entire government
deterrence
traditional
that would make
defense
prehensive
never
to
in the first
or
idea
the
subscribed
had
unnecessary
Indeed,
place.4
the lim
If the Reagan-Gorbachev
relationship demonstrated
could do to thwart each other
its to both what the superpowers
it also illustrated
and how far their relations could deteriorate,
on
in their relations. The poten
the upper limits
improvement
4
See Michael
Books/Random
Mandelbaum
House,
1987,
and Strobe
4.
chapter
Talbott,
Reagan
and Gorbachev,
New
York:
Vintage
REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND
235
in Reykjavik would certainly go
tial accord that was glimpsed
on
offensive weapons established by the
beyond the limitations
II treaty of 1979. But the
salt
if it ever
grand compromise,
came
about,
would
scarcely
represent
strategic
offense.
a whole
new
approach
to strategic arms control. Quite
the contrary, it would reaffirm
not only salt ii but salt i
on
by linking limits
strategic defense
with
restrictions
on
that
Thus, even as they broke with some of the procedures
their predecessors
were
had followed, Reagan and Gorbachev
in the direction
of restoring a measure
of continuity
moving
as
with the past. Moreover,
to live and
had
learned
just
Reagan
work with Gorbachev,
he was learning to live with the old,
familiar problems of asymmetries
in force structures,
theoreti
cal vulnerabilities
and the moral as well as practical dilemmas
of deterrence.
If the worst that was likely to happen between
the superpow
ers was not all that bad, the best was not all that
good. The
fundamental
of Soviet-American
conditions
relations were
in turn, meant
that the ritual of Soviet
likely to persist. This,
was
a
American
to
have
summitry
likely
long run, and for all
reasons
the
that had led Reagan and Gorbachev
to engage in
that ritual themselves, both in the fairly traditional summit at
Geneva
in November
1985 and in the strange
interlude at
a
later.
year
Reykjavik