EVALUATION OF
FINLAND’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
WITH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ms. Birgitta Berggren, SIPU International
Mr. Anders Olin, SIPU International
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 4
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 9
2.1
2.2
3.
The aim of the evaluation ........................................................................................ 9
Scope and approach.................................................................................................. 9
THE FINNISH CONTEXT .......................................................................................... 12
3.1
The Bosnian programme ....................................................................................... 14
4.
THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONTEXT..................................................... 18
5.
FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................... 23
5.1 Social sector.............................................................................................................. 23
5.1.1
Women’s projects in Mostar......................................................................... 23
5.2 Economic infrastructure ........................................................................................ 31
5.2.1
District Heating Project in Sarajevo ............................................................ 31
5.2.2
Donation of a railway tracklayer machine .................................................. 37
5.3 Reconstruction and Return.................................................................................... 40
5.3.1
The return process.......................................................................................... 40
5.3.2
Fida International in the Doboj area ........................................................... 41
5.3.3
FinnChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation in Ostra Luka/Orasje.... 44
5.3.4
The Finnish CIMIC work ............................................................................. 47
5.4 The judiciary............................................................................................................. 55
5.4.1
Independent Judicial Commission............................................................... 56
5.5 Other already evaluated projects........................................................................... 59
5.5.1
The Social Sector Support Project ............................................................... 59
5.5.2
The Gender Equity and Equality Project ................................................... 62
5.5.3
The Teacher Education and Professional Development Project........... 65
5.5.4
The ERNO News Exchange ........................................................................ 68
6.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE COUNTRY LEVEL .......................................................... 71
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
7.
The instruments....................................................................................................... 71
Relevance .................................................................................................................. 72
Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 73
Efficiency.................................................................................................................. 73
Sustainability............................................................................................................. 74
Project management ............................................................................................... 75
Other administrative considerations .................................................................... 75
Coordination and cooperation.............................................................................. 77
Post-conflict issues.................................................................................................. 78
THE FUTURE/RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................... 81
7.1
7.2
The need for continued international assistance................................................ 81
The future direction of finnish assistance........................................................... 81
ANNEXES
1.
Terms of Reference
2.
List of Informants (provisional)
3.
List of References (provisional)
4.
IPSA technical assessments
5.
Other donors’ programmes
2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AOR - Area of Responsibility
IDEJA - local NGO in Mostar
BAM – Bosnia and Hercegovina Mark (currency)
IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons
BHRPC – Bosnia and Herzegovina Railway Public Corporation
IFOR – Implementation Force, 1st Peace keeping mission in BiH
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina
IJC – Independent Judicial Commission
CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilisation
IMG - International Management Group
IPSA – a engineering consultancy in Sarajevo
CCM – Civilian Crisis Management
IPTF - UN International Police Task Force
CEDAW - The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women
ISO - International Organization for Standardization
CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation
JSAP - Judicial Structure Assessment Programme
CRPC - Commission for Real Property Claims
LWF – Lutheran World Federation
CTA – Chief Technical Adviser
MFA – Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
CWBIH - Connecting women in BiH
MHRR - Ministry for Human Rights and Refugee Return of BiH
DAC – Development Cooperation Directorate of OECD
NATO – Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
DFID – Department for International Development, UK
ODA – Official Development Assistance
DH – District Heating
OHCHR - The Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EBU - European Broadcasting Union
OHR - Office of the High Representative
PBS – Public Broadcasting Service of BiH
EE – Ekono Energy
PIC - Peace Implementation Council
EIB – European Investment Bank
PIU – Project Implementation Unit
ERNO – South Eastern European Regional Network of public
Broadcasters
PSO - Peace Support Operations Branch
EUPM - EU Police Mission
RRTF – Reconstruction and Return Task Force.
EUPM - European Union Police Mission
RS – Republika Srpska
EVN – Eurovision Network
RTRS – Radio and Television of RS
FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SAp - Stabilization and Association process
FCA - FinnChurchAid
SDA – Nationalist Bosniac party
FRC - Finnish Refugee Council
SFOR – Stabilisation Force, 2nd Peace keeping mission in BiH
FTV Federation of BiH TV
SSSP – Social Sector Support Project
GEEP – Gender Equity and Equality Project
TAER - Technical Assistance for Educational Reform (supported
by EC)
GFP - Gender Focal Points
GTZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
TEPD – Teachers’ Education and Professional Development
Project
GTZ – The German official aid agency
UNDP – United National Development Programme
HDZ – Nationalist Bosnian Croat party
UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
HJPC - High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IBHI – Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues
ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICVA – International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDA – International Development Association
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
WB – World Bank
CURRENCY
In all conversions Finnish Marks to EUR the following rate has been used: 1 Finnish Markka = 0.16819
Euro; 1 Euro (EUR) = 5.94573 Finnish Markka (FIM); 4,5 Finnish Markka=1 USD. The official rate of
the Bosnia Hercegovina Mark (BAM) is 0,5 Euro.
3
1.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SIPU International carried out the present evaluation between September 2003 and March 2004.
Around 115 persons have been interviewed during missions in Finland and Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The report begins with an overview of the Finnish policy environment and the administrative
structure in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is observed that since 1996, several policy
documents have been produced regarding international development cooperation to update its
foundations and principles in accordance with Finland’s new foreign policy outlook.
Harmonisation with EU and coherence of all foreign policy instruments is emphasised.
While several administrative reforms have been carried out there is not enough capacity at the
MFA to manage high quality development programmes, as has been observed in several other
evaluations.
The target for Finnish assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the peace process, has been
slow and dramatic at times. The Dayton agreement, far from perfect, has been difficult to
implement, due to nationalist divisive politics and the ethnic divisions which have still to be fully
reconciled. There has been dramatic progress on several fronts however, e.g. on the economic
front, with low inflation and stable (albeit minimal) state finances, and considering the return of a
million refugees and internally displaced.
A sample of nine projects and groups of projects were studied to form a base for country level
conclusions. They were the following:
NGO projects
1. Reconstruction of two Kindergartens in
Mostar, 1995-1996
Other
8. Small scale reconstruction by the
Finnish CIMIC Company, 2002-2003
2. Establishment of a Consulting Centre in
Mostar, 1999-2002
9. Support to the Independent judicial
commission, 2001-2002
3. Women’s projects in Mostar, 1998-2002
4. Return and reconstruction in Doboj,
2000-2002
5. Return and reconstruction in Ostra
Luka, 1998
Bilateral projects
6. District Heating in Sarajevo, 1996-2000
7. Donation of a Railway tracklayer, 19981999
In addition, recent evaluations of four other
projects have been taken into consideration to
broaden the basis for country level conclusions.
These projects are:
•
Teacher Education and Professional
Development Project (TEPD)
•
Social Sector Support Project (SSSP)
•
Gender Equity and Equality Project (GEEP)
•
The ERNO News Exchange
Summary of evaluation results
•
The programme has several strengths. Despite the lack of strategic guidance and genuine
coherence it has a degree of internal consistency. It is generally relevant in terms of the
needs assessments of BiH and WB, and the Dayton agreement implementation. It has
also been adjusted continuously to stay relevant. Its relevance in relation to Finnish
development policy goals is acceptable, with a clear emphasis on human rights and
democratic governance.
4
•
Finnish aid instruments have largely served well in BiH. NGOs and consultants have for
the most part been efficient and professional. A novelty within development cooperation,
the Finnish CIMIC company, has been found to be a very efficient and powerful
instrument, and it can well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and
humanitarian projects in the right circumstances. It needs, however, to be guided by
civilian agencies with a mandate to set priorities and coordinate the work.
•
Goal fulfilment seems in general quite high, and there is no major problem related to
overall efficiency of the programme. However, efficiency can be improved. A field
presence could increase efficiency by yielding more and better information, improving
monitoring, solving problems at source, and promoting synergies between projects.
•
The programme has had the largest impact in the promotion of return as well as in some
of the infrastructure projects. In the social and education sector a platform has been built
and national level impact is within reach.
•
The main weakness of the programme is sustainability. Projects are not designed with the
long term effects sufficiently in focus. However, ownership seems rather good and
getting stronger.
•
The project management structure of the bilateral projects has been both effective and
inclusive, and is one example of how Finland’s earlier development cooperation
experience has come to use in BiH.
•
The evaluation results confirm earlier evaluations’ observations regarding the weak
administrative capacity of MFA. The ministry’s administrative structures are not suitable
for development cooperation, and a chronic shortage of manpower compounds the
problems, especially regarding monitoring and follow-up. Progress has been made in
terms of organisation and procedures, but there is a need for a change of attitudes before
development cooperation can be administered professionally.
•
A positive characteristic is the responsiveness of the MFA which has been observed.
Such responsiveness is important, especially in post-conflict situations and will hopefully
be preserved in the continued integration of foreign policy instruments.
•
Finland has not been widely noticed in BiH, and its programme is not known to many
other donors. What is more, strategic and operational coordination has been weak,
leading to inadequate knowledge of the development on the ground. This is particularly
serious in some sectors where good coordination could make the difference between
success and failure.
•
The Finnish programme has been largely relevant also from a post conflict perspective. It
has been well balanced between the Entities. It has however not fully utilised
opportunities to play a more positive role in the peace-building process in project design
and implementation.
•
At present, Finland is looked upon as a credible actor in a few key sectors. The sectors,
and the reforms of the same, are of central importance for the Stabilisation and
Association process with the EU. The recommendations of this report include i a to
concentrate the future programme on such key sectors, thereby intensifying the
cooperation and improving the impact.
5
SELECTED EVALUATION RESULTS IN BRIEF
Key Findings
Conclusions
Lessons learned
The programme is not based on a country
strategy.
Country programming evolves “organically”,
but basing each new step on the experience of
the previous
Lack of country strategy inhibits country
evaluation since results cannot be
measured against any original expression
of will or intention.
Many different combinations of funding
modalities and implementers have been
used in BiH.
Finnish implementers in countries with no
representation are relatively vulnerable.
CIMIC can well be used for small scale
Finnish implementers in general have been projects, but needs guidance from civilian
agencies
effective and professional.
Recommendations
1.
Develop the new draft strategy together
with BiH into a useful guiding tool with
measurable goals.
2.
Take measures to increase political
awareness of implementing partners.
3.
Issue instruction on how to monitor and
handle risks
4.
Continue to develop CIMIC as a Finnish
speciality but raise awareness on the user
side on strengths and weaknesses.
5.
Improve capacity building components in
the cooperation between Finnish and
local NGOs.
6.
New creative procedures for NGOs are
encouraged possibly modelled from
CIMIC.
Consultants have no help or guidance from
local embassy and often have to represent
Finland
CIMIC has been a very effective
instrument, albeit with a high real
overhead.
Short NGO tradition in BiH civil society.
Local NGO partners often have
complicated management structures, poor Inadequate capacity building among local
administrative routines and poor reporting. partners of Finnish NGOs.
The choice of sectors has been relevant in
terms of expressed needs of BiH.
Overall the programme is found to be relevant.
The relevance with regard to Finnish
policy aims limited to human rights and
good governance.
Goal fulfilment and impact on project level The effectiveness of the programme is found
ranges from satisfactory to good
to be good
On country level there has been limited
but important impact in infrastructure and
return
National potential within education and
CIMIC funding model possibly replicable to
NGOs
social sector
Flexible funding of CIMIC very effective
No wastefulness has been observed
The programme is generally quite efficient.
Implementers are professional and
effective
A field presence could increase efficiency by
yielding more and better information,
improving monitoring, solving problems at
source, and promoting synergies between
projects.
Most projects have weaknesses in terms of Lack of sustainability and proper follow-up is a
general weakness of the programme
sustainability
Problems of sustainability not always noted
by MFA
Project management structure of bilateral
projects has been both effective and
inclusive
Limitations are shortage of human
resources at MFA and lack of field
presence
Project management model from developing
countries well working in BiH.
7.
Establish a liaison office in BiH.
8.
Take measures to improve sustainability,
especially in reconstruction for return
projects
9.
Take measures to improve capacity of
follow-up and evaluation.
10. When working in a sensitive environment
NGOs should have closer contact with
the policy making unit.
Direct contact with NGOs improved project
content, monitoring, and management
Some NGOs have been funded directly
from Unit for WB
A ministry for foreign affairs is not a “natural”
organisation for handling development
MFA’s documentation and filing of project
cooperation.
documents is not conducive to evaluation
The culture of MFA needs to be further
The new organisation appears innovative
adapted to the needs of long-term
and functional in theory, but much remains
development cooperation
before it is consolidated.
MFA staff have an unrealistic workload
Coherence of foreign policy is difficult to
achieve
11. Carry the reorganisation out fully, as
originally planned
12. Improve routines for documentation in
order to facilitate evaluation and follow
up
13. See no. 1.
Strategic planning weak
Finland has had very limited visibility in
BiH
At times, MFA has had inadequate knowledge
of current affairs in BiH.
14. See no. 7.
15. Plan for, and carry out improved
7
A low level of participation in the
international coordination mechanisms
In one project, Finland has no contact with
two other very active donors in the same
sector.
The balance of the assistance between the
entities has been kept, but many
opportunities for supporting inter-entity
relations have been lost.
coordination, for example by instructing
implementers to share information and to
inform about projects
The MFA apparently underestimates the
experience of other donors and the value of
coordination
The ethnic tensions have been approached in a
rather shallow way. Not enough efforts have
been made which genuinely promote ethnic
coexistence.
The post-conflict context is a dimension
which requires more innovative
approaches than ordinary development
cooperation.
16. Increase resources for advisory functions
regarding post-conflict and peace
building
The reorganisation could make MFA sharper
at crisis management.
8
2.
INTRODUCTION
In September 2003, SIPU International was awarded the contract to evaluate Finland’s
development cooperation with BiH during the period 1996 – 2003. The evaluation team
consisted of:
Ms. Birgitta Berggren has an extensive professional experience of administration and
management of international development cooperation in government service (Sida) and
as Secretary General of the Swedish NGO Foundation for Human Rights.
Geographically, her consultancy work has focussed on Southern Africa, Eastern and
Central Europe and the Balkans. She was in charge of the Swedish reconstruction and
rehabilitation support to Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Embassy of Sweden in Sarajevo
(1997 – 1999).
Mr. Anders Olin is a SIPU consultant since 2002 with a background at the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, and development cooperation in various capacities. Between 1996 and
1999 he spent most of his time in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Tuzla, he ran a field office
for the international NGO umbrella ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies).
In the capacity of Senior Democratisation Officer, he was in charge of implementing the
OSCE Democratisation programme in the cross-entity north-western region of BiH.
In addition, the local consultancy IPSA Institute was contracted for technical assessments
of two infrastructure related projects. The assessments were carried out by Mr Enes
Covrk and Mr Momir Majusevic.
The evaluation was carried out during the period Sept 2003 to March 2004 with two factfinding missions, one week in Helsinki in October and two weeks in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the beginning of November 2003.
2.1
THE AIM OF THE EVALUATION
According to the Terms of Reference (hereinafter ToR), the purpose of the evaluation is
to provide the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with lessons learned from the Bosnian
programme, as well as recommendations for the orientation of future Finnish
cooperation. Of particular interest is how issues and problems emanating from the unique
post-conflict and economic-political transition context of BiH have been addressed by
Finland.
The evaluation results are meant to guide the operationalisation of an upcoming strategy
for the region including BiH , as well as programming in future post-conflict situations.
2.2
SCOPE AND APPROACH
The programme has been evaluated in its entirety during the time period 1996 to 2003.
Not all activities have been studied at first hand, however. In accordance with the ToR,
nine different interventions have been scrutinised closely in the course of this
investigation. They represent the whole range of modalities, sectors, geography, and time
periods of the Finnish involvement in BiH.
On the basis of the findings from the project level, conclusions on the country level have
been reached. A number of other recently produced evaluations have also been taken into
account in order to broaden the base for analysis and cross-check findings.
In addition, in order to find something out about the origin and motives behind the
programme, it has been necessary to study the policy environment and the administrative
structures of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (hereinafter MFA) in Finland (Chapter 3).
Furthermore, the unique and quickly changing Bosnian context during the period has
been researched and outlined in order to serve as a background of the analysis of the
programme’s relevance (Chapter 4).
The projects have been evaluated according to the parameters prescribed in the ToR.
Firstly, against the background context of the sector and the country, the project’s
relevance is assessed, from the viewpoints of
(i)
The realisation of the Dayton agreement. In this context best practices for
assistance to peace building in post-conflict situations have also been
considered;
(ii)
the stated needs and priorities of BiH, as formulated in various documents
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (hereinafter PRSP);
(iii)
the needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries, and;
(iv)
the policy aims of Finnish development cooperation.
Secondly the project’s effectiveness is assessed, which is basically about defining goal
fulfilment, and the degree to which the project actually contributed to goal fulfilment. The
challenge here has been to identify the goals of the projects.
Thirdly, efficiency is assessed. No quantitative measurements have been possible, instead
possible alternative approaches and their pros and cons have been discussed.
Fourthly, sustainability is assessed. While a few of the projects evaluated are so recent
that a discussion of sustainability is difficult, most of them are sufficiently old for a useful
discussion of this aspect.
As a fifth parameter, the consistency of the interventions as part of a programme has
been assessed.
As additional parameters, the administration of the programme has been examined, i a
project management and monitoring as well as the level and quality of coordination and
cooperation with other donors. Also, gender and environmental aspects have been
brought to bear on the assessment of each project.
The evaluation is concluded with a discussion of the future. For the sake of comparison,
several donors have also been interviewed (see Annex 5). Time limitations have prevented
any in-depth study of their programmes, but the facts uncovered should be helpful.
Different methods and means have been used to carry out the investigation, including:
desk study; field visits; interviews with representatives of implementing organisations,
target groups and stakeholders; email survey of all relevant MFA staff; sub-contracted
studies by local experts specialised in the subject matter.
The scope of this evaluation is wide and it aims high. Readers of the present report
should, however, keep its limitations in mind.
While more than 100 people have been interviewed, there is still information which has
not been possible to corroborate or cross check due to difficulties of finding informants
and/or time limits. An email survey was sent out to 12 people but only 3 persons were
10
able to answer it. Consequently, there could well be factual errors and misunderstandings
in the report.
Another important limitation has been the non-access to certain key documents. It has
been difficult and in several cases impossible to find basic project documents. One reason
has been the language barrier. Documents in English or Swedish have been somewhat
rare. A few essential documents have been translated from Finnish to English.
As the focus of the evaluation was the country level, the individual project evaluations has
been kept limited. In terms of efficiency and project management, time has not allowed
for any detailed study of budgets and accounting. We have assumed that any
mismanagement in this regard will be detected by the yearly audits.
11
3.
THE FINNISH CONTEXT
Finland has been involved in international development cooperation since the beginning
of the 1960s. During the 1970s, it grew in terms of both cooperation partners and budget.
In the 1980s, Finland reached the UN target of devoting 0,7 per cent of its GNP to
development assistance.
Like most donor countries, Finland’s development cooperation was directed towards
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The need and the opportunities for
cooperation and assistance in central and eastern European countries became apparent
only after the Cold War had ended in the beginning of the 1990s. This coincided,
however, with a Finnish economic recession, which forced the government to drastically
cut back on all development assistance, from more than EUR 630m in 1991 to about
EUR 250m in 1994. Since then the ODA (Official Development Assistance) has slowly
increased to its present level at close to 500m.
The end of the Cold War, increased globalisation, and Finland’s full-scale integration into
the political and economic structure of Western Europe has radically changed the foreign
policy outlook. Since 1996, several policy documents have been produced regarding
international development cooperation to update its foundation and principles.
While the Nordic countries originally constituted the reference group for Finnish
development cooperation, they were replaced in the 1990s by the EU. The Decision-inPrinciple on Finland's Development Cooperation from 1996 emphasised the coherence of all
foreign policy objectives as a guiding principle. The primary development objectives are
stated to be the reduction of poverty, sustainable development, and human rights and
democratic governance. The government also resolved to draw up a more comprehensive
strategy for development policy, and this was done two years later in the Policy on the
Relations with Developing Countries. In this document, poverty reduction was replaced by
promotion of global security as the primary policy aim, and promotion of economic
interaction was added to the list. It outlined the different types of potential partners and
how the modes of cooperation should vary in accordance. This classification was further
elaborated in the third policy paper Operationalisation of Development Policy Goals in Finland's
International Development Co-operation from 2001. In the latter, a distinction is made between
“Long-term partnerships”, and “other partnerships”, which has relevance for the
assistance to BiH. For practical purposes, this document was the first Finnish attempt at
explicitly devising a model/approach for working with countries for other purposes than
traditional development cooperation, e g post-conflict situations or in cases of severe
environmental problems.
While the long-term partnerships will be sustained, the other partnerships’ time span are
clearly time- limited and determined case by case. The sectors and issues for cooperation
are chosen with an eye to specific needs, rather than based on the overriding objective of
poverty reduction. The choice of modalities and channels are also more dependent on the
actual situation than in the case of long- term partnerships, where government
programmes dominate. Finland does not even need to have a diplomatic mission in the
country. De facto representation could be obtained through multilateral and EU
organisations, Finnish non-governmental organisations, etc.
Examples of other partnerships are the Republic of South Africa, the Palestinian
Autonomous Territories, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor. Cooperation
12
expanded with these partners after 1996, “justified by the importance of prevention and
mitigation of conflicts and support for national reconciliation” according to the 2001
policy. As regards long-term partnerships, these will decrease and the remaining
partnerships will be intensified with fewer and larger programmes.
In line with the policy of greater coherence, a major reorganisation of MFA was carried
out in 2000. Until then the Department for Development Cooperation had been
responsible for aid management globally, while other foreign policy instruments were
handled by the regional departments. The reform aimed at integrating all foreign policy
instruments (aid, trade and diplomacy) at the point of the regional department. Only
advisory and coordination functions are retained in the new Department for
Development policy. For the same purpose, the present government has created a
combined post of Minister of external trade and development cooperation.
Due to the reorganisation, BiH has been handled by several units since 1996. The first
was the Unit for Latin America, Asia and the Mediterranean within the Department for
Development. Political relations were at the same time handled by the Central and
Southern Europe Unit within the Division for Europe. In May 2000, the Unit for West
Balkans was created. While always consulting with the “expert” departments such as the
Political Department and others, it has now the last say on all policy -related issues
regarding Western Balkans. It also took over the full responsibility for the assistance
programme.
In recent years, several reviews of the development cooperation have been carried out.
One is the Synthesis study of seven country programme evaluations from 2002. Two other reports,
which will be referred to here, are the DAC (Development Cooperation Directorate of
OECD) Peer Review from 2003, and the report from a government commission led by
Harri Holkeri from the spring of 2003.
Criticism regarding content has centred on the small volume per partner country, and on
scattered targeting on too many sectors. The result has been disintegrated programmes
and little impact, especially in terms of the main objective of poverty reduction.
The main weakness found, however, is the MFA administrative capacity, which is deemed
inadequate to manage high quality development cooperation programmes. This is a
serious problem both in Helsinki and in the relevant embassies, which all need to be
strengthened, according to the reports. The shortage of staff has led to weaknesses in
approaches and in project management generally. Baseline planning, monitoring and
evaluation have all been found lacking in terms of thoroughness and effectiveness in all
partner country programmes. DAC questions the appropriateness of the system of
reporting, evaluation and learning at MFA, which it views as unnecessarily closed and
ineffective.
The synthesis report recommends more untied aid, in the form of budget support, and a
concentration on key sectors or geographic areas, designed and implemented in line with
partner development policy. The recommendation to have fewer partner countries is also
made by DAC and the Holkeri committee. DAC also recommends introducing country
strategies to enhance accountability, transparency and monitoring. One of the
recommendations of the Holkeri commission was to increase the development
cooperation budget to 0,7 % of GNP. An important proviso, however, was to strengthen
the administrative capacity at the same pace as the budget.
13
Against the background of the various review results and above all based on the Holkeri
report, the government will submit a proposal for a new development programme before
parliament in January 2004.
3.1
THE BOSNIAN PROGRAMME
After the Dayton Peace Accord, all European countries showed strong commitment to
support the peace process, and Finland was no exception. The political pressure on the
unit assigned to start up the assistance to BiH was intense. The unit did its best to assess
the needs, by going on field trips to the country and donor conferences, but there was
little time for thorough or strategic planning of the interventions. The basic approach was
to try to make BiH’s priorities and Finnish expertise match. Low maintenance was also a
criterion, i e the projects must not be difficult to administer since there was a shortage of
personnel in Helsinki and no representation in the field. Partnerships were sought, since
this would help Finland to get more “bang for the buck”. It would also lessen the burden
on BiH by having fewer individual donors to coordinate.
Before Bosnia, Finland had limited experience of providing assistance to a country
ravaged by a brutal civil war. There had been some post-conflict work done in
Mozambique, in particular in cooperation with the World Bank. Following the Dayton
Agreement, it was also the World Bank which provided Finland with the first opportunity
to contribute to the recovery and reconstruction of BiH.
Finland does not use country strategies in the sense of a document which outlines
priorities and modalities in any detail. The guiding idea is to follow any existing action
plan that the country may have, as well as forming a country team in the MFA with
representation from relevant units. The strategy is created continuously by that group,
while not necessarily written down.
In 1999, the first written “strategy” document about the Finnish assistance to BiH was
produced. It is a rather descriptive document covering not only BiH but the whole region,
i e BiH, Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo, FYROM, and Albania. The regional
approach has been maintained in the strategic planning. A new strategy was drafted
during 2003 by the Unit, to be approved by the Ministry Steering Board.
The new strategy paper outlines a number of guidelines and principles for the period
2004-2006, including:
• Finnish support will be in line with the assistance of the EU, and other EU members’
bilateral programmes. The Stabilisation and Association process will be the main
framework for relations with BiH, with CARDS as the principal instrument for
coherent community assistance for the whole region. Finland is already, and will
continue to be active in the boards of the CARDS programme, and the Stability Pact,
as well as through its membership in the World Bank, European Investment Bank
(EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
• The Stability Pact will be an important supportive structure for regional cooperation
and harmonisation.
• All support should be in line with the Finnish development cooperation policy aims
and with special consideration of the Millennium Goals. Specific objectives (also
shared with EU) include establishing multiethnic, democratic systems, based on the
rule of law.
14
• The following areas are identified as priority areas for the international community,
and thus for Finland:
a) Public administration reform including the judiciary with a view to achieve Good
Governance and the Rule of Law.
b) Economic reconstruction and reorganisation of economic structures
c) Social development, including health care and education
d) Human rights, including the position of women and minority rights.
e) Protection of the environment, including waste-water treatment and cleaner
production methods.
f) Democracy and freedom of speech, and support for the civil society.
• Finland’s main approaches are to (1) develop human resources and administrative
capacity, (2) support the development of civil society organisations to various liberties.
An important guiding principle in this work will be that the assistance must support
“the local authorities and administrative structures in a manner that allows their active
participation in the goal-setting, planning and implementation of assistance”.
• The project format will dominate and the implementation will be done mainly by
Finnish consultants, motivated by the lack of expertise locally. While the strategy
opens up for sector support, it is estimated to be 3-4 years away. It also foresees
adjustment of the cooperation as the region’s countries get closer to EU accession.
• Regional cooperation will be encouraged and supported, mainly through assistance via
NGOs. It also states that NGO projects need to be long- term to be successful, and
that the NGOs have to be culturally competent.
• As regards guidance on country level the strategy paper is brief and non- specific. It
opens up for the possibility that the present evaluation will guide the
operationalisation of the strategy.
The Finnish assistance to BiH has been substantial during the period studied, and it has
consisted of many different types of support. In addition to the Development
cooperation budget, humanitarian funds, and some of the civilian crisis management
interventions can be counted as ODA according to DAC eligibility criteria. This is true
also for costs for refugees seeking asylum. A large portion of the total Finnish
expenditure to BiH is the force contribution to SFOR, which is not ODA.
The value of the total is not known. As regards individual components, figures exist but
they are conflicting. According to our ToR, the total commitments were the following
1996 to 2002 (in EUR million):
Table 1. Commitments for BiH according evaluation ToR
Source
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total
Terms of
reference
9,21
8,79
4,39
4,35
-
6,61
5,08
-
38,43
According to the Annual Report on Development Cooperation 2002, the total
disbursements for BiH 1995-2001 were the following (in EUR million):
15
Table 2. Disbursements for BiH between 1996-2001 (MFA Development year
book)
Source
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total
Annual
report
2002
11,59
7,71
8,05
7,62
4,64
5,34
-
-
46,39
The project lists received from the MFA have been put into the following table (in EUR
million). We are uncertain whether all of the figures really are disbursements.
Table 3. Disbursements according to MFA project lists
Source
1996
19971998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
total
Project lists
from MFA
7,1
11,6
12,6
13,9
7,7
7,2
2,5
62,3
As a comparison, the following figures can be found on DAC-online. The different tables
clearly show the confusing range of figures that circulate on the support to BiH.
Table 4. Disbursements according to DAC Statistics
Source
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total
DAC
Online
15,01
8,84
8,95
8,12
4,27
4,78
4,66
54,63
As regards humanitarian aid to BiH, there are clear statistics for the whole period. In 1996
EUR 3 million was given to WHO, WFP, IOM, UNHCR and some Finnish NGOs such
as FinnChurchAid (FCA). After that it decreased every year. In 2003 only mine clearance
was financed from the humanitarian budget with EUR 170 000.
As can be seen in the table below, during recent years, the Balkan region as a whole
received assistance at a value fully comparable with some of Finland’s long term partner
countries such as Mozambique (EUR 12.5m), or Namibia (EUR 7.4m).
Table 5. ODA disbursements to Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina
1999-2002, in million Euro. (source www.global.finland.fi)
Country
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Serbia
Montenegro
2,05
21,01
12,22
14,29
9,52
4,13
Bosnia
Herzegovina
-
7,62
4,64
5,34
4,95
2,47
ex-Yugoslavia
2,24
-
1,80
2,61
-
0,03
TOTAL
4,29
28,63
18,66
22,24
14,47
6,63
16
In 1999, there was a drastic increase in spending on development cooperation in the
region. In the autumn of 1999 Finland held the Presidency of the EU, which coincided
with the erupting crisis in Kosovo. It is likely that this explains the sudden increase.
The financial projection accompanying the draft strategy for the period 2004 -2006 sets
the level of spending for the whole region to around EUR 10 million per year.
17
4.
THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONTEXT
BiH is an example of what is sometimes called the triple transition, and which is not
uncommon in the post-conflict situations during the 1990s. The triple transition is a
security transition from war to peace, a political transition as well as a socio-economic
transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities and, frequently, the movement
from a controlled to a market economy.
The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in December 1995, had one overriding objective: To
end the war. Thus, much attention was paid to military aspects, much less to the need for
solid political and civilian structures in a post-conflict area. The territorial issue became
dominant, and the Dayton Agreement mainly confirmed the ethnic partition of Bosnia.
The warring parties, whose leaders had fomented ethnic confrontation for personal,
political and financial ends, were forced to accept compromises which they had little
interest in implementing. In this way, a pattern from other, similar conflicts was repeated:
To arrive at a peace settlement, agreement was reached on highly decentralised
constitutional structures with a weak central authority, a system which enabled the
nationalists to remain in power and obstruct political processes and social and economic
reform. The central issue of nation building, including ethnic reconciliation and
institutional development, suffered, i a from the great exodus to the West of about one
million people who settled permanently there, many of them representing the best
educated and dynamic strata of society. This is one of the reasons behind the absence of a
competent, well-informed political opposition to the nationalist leaders.
The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was commissioned with the military
aspects of the Peace Agreement. Initially, in 1996, 60.000 troops created a measure of
peace and security in the war-torn country. Gradually, however, as direct ethnic tension
slowly abated, the military presence has been reduced, and in December 2003, NATO
announced that SFOR will be reduced in the coming months to a deterrent force of
merely 7.000 troops.
Determined action has also been taken in 2003 to reform BiH’s own defence
establishment in order to create a State-level Ministry of Defence and a single Command
Control structure. A Defence Reform Commission presented a package of reform
proposals which were adopted by Parliament in November. In December, NATO offered
BiH to join “Partnership for Peace” in 2004. This offer is conditioned on the
implementation of defence reforms and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in
The Hague. At present, no less than 10 % of BiH’s GDP is spent on defence, with staff
costs as one important type of expenditure.
On the civilian side, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was charged with the
implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. The High
Representative reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and its Steering Board,
which has, on several occasions, found it necessary to extend the HR mandate and
powers in order to propel the implementation of the Dayton agreement.
The immediate post-war period was characterised politically by a lack of agreement
between the nationalist parties, strong resistance in the two Entities to joint policies and
institutions at State-level, and opposition in general to reforms. In November 2000, new
“non-nationalist” politicians came to power, who supported the OHR priorities: refugee
return, economic reform and strengthening of the common institutions. The new leaders
18
exercised a positive influence on the implementation of the property laws and the return.
Worryingly, in the national elections in the autumn of 2002, the nationalist parties
strengthened their positions, but eventually coalition governments were formed at State,
Entity and Cantonal levels. After constitutional and electoral reforms, the election period
has been extended to four years. At present, there appears to be a broader acceptance
among the political parties that cooperation is necessary at all levels of government to
meet the requirements of the ongoing EU Stabilization and Association process (SAp),
which began in 1999. During 2003, there has been a diminishing need for intervention by
the High Representative in the reform process. It is necessary for BiH to convince the
international community and the EU that the prerogatives of the High Representative are
becoming less needed and are being substituted by a genuine local wish to implement the
necessary reforms.
Following the Dayton Agreement, a five-year Priority Reconstruction Programme
amounting to USD 5.1 billion was presented by the European Commission and the
World Bank to the December 1995 Peace Implementation Conference in London. Its
purpose was to restore basic services, carry out essential infrastructure repairs, restart
economic activities and build institutions for economic management, and promote the
transition to a market economy. The return of refugees and internally displaced people
was a major cross-cutting issue. Annual conferences were held with a wide group of
donors who were committed in their support, and met their pledging targets. The fifth
and last of these conferences was held in 1999, and the grand total amount of USD 5.1
billion was reached. As of today, international aid disbursements amount to around USD
6 billion. The total disbursement for security is estimated at USD 12 billion.
The severity and complexity of the war and the proximity to Europe made the Bosnian
conflict the absolute focus of attention. When peace came, the whole world wanted to be
there and help. In addition to all the UN organs and international organisations, and
bilateral donors, there were 400-500 non-governmental organisations from virtually all
over the world. The character and quality of programmes varied considerably, as did the
agendas of all these actors. Against this background, it is obvious that coordination of
assistance has been a constant challenge during the period. During the war, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the UN lead agency, which it continued to be
for some years. After the war, the formal responsibility for the coordination of
reconstruction assistance was on the Bosnian government. Since the country was in
practice divided, more coordination was done on the entity level than would have been
ideal. OHR gradually took on responsibility for aid coordination, establishing sector
coordination structures for key sectors, in which donors were expected to participate
actively. This sector coordination was on the national level, and had difficulty being
effective on the reconstruction being organised on the local level, in spite the efforts of
UNHCR, International Management Group (IMG) and other coordination initiatives like
the ICVA NGO coordination programme. The only coordination scheme which can be
said to have been truly successful is the RRTF, which was active on all levels, and had the
firm support by all principal organisations and donors.
A process is in motion to strengthen the role of the State Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Relations in coordination of domestic development efforts and external
assistance flows. To establish an efficient system is important both in order to put the
government in the driver’s seat, and to make efficient use of diminishing international
assistance. UNDP has embarked on a project to support BiH in the creation of such
structures. The project is funded by Japan, Norway and Italy. Today, the responsibility for
19
coordination of development assistance is shared at State level between the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and the Directorate for European Integration. At
Entity level Development Units have been established (RS: in the Ministry of Economic
Relations and Coordination; FBiH: in the Ministry of Finance) and a not yet formed
Economic Policy Planning Unit is planned to come directly under the Council of
Ministers at State level. This project will create mechanisms to handle the development
programmes and projects in relation to BiH’s Economic Development Plans, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, including the Medium-Term Framework for Public
Expenditure, and to other long-term strategies. At present, a standardised database for the
utilisation of development resources in BiH is being established. Some databases for
coordination of external resources have been inherited, i a from earlier projects supported
by the IMG, from UNDP, and from various State institutions. It can be foreseen that the
World Bank model of annual Consultative Group (CG) meetings will be introduced with
donor pledges on a three-year basis. These CG meetings will also provide an opportunity
for evaluation and monitoring of available development resources.
The Dayton Agreement provided a framework not only for the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of BiH, but also for the transition to a market-based economy. Legislation
on macroeconomic management took place in 1997. Since then, a Central Bank, a single
stable BiH currency, a low inflation rate together with banking reforms in 2000-2001 have
been established successfully, and form a sound macroeconomic basis for further change.
The economic situation continues, however, to be quite serious. The recently presented
Development Strategy of BiH (2003-2007) – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) shows that
one fifth of the population should be classified as poor, with a higher poverty incidence
in the Republika Srpska (25%) than in the Federation (16%). Poverty is largely prevalent
in small war-torn semi-urban and rural communities. Unemployment (at pre-war level, i.e.
40%) is high. However, in the poor households at least one person has a job, and as such
belongs to the working poor. According to the World Bank, domestic production is not
expanding vigorously enough to offset declining international assistance. Significant fiscal
consolidation has been achieved. A substantial reduction in the public sector and less
spending on e.g. defence and police are needed, however, to provide funding for a fiscally
sustainable social sector development. At present, two-thirds of the State income is spent
on a bloated public administration and only one third on citizens’ needs. The conclusion
of the PRSP is that poverty can be combated through growth-promoting measures such
as a considerable expansion of the private sector, speedier privatisation and the
encouragement of foreign investments and exports.
In September 2002, the new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, launched a
comprehensive “Jobs and Justice Agenda” with the aim of creating a reformed businessfriendly economy supported by a reliable legal system. Within the framework of the
Agenda, a “Bulldozer Initiative” in cooperation with the business community proposed
50 reforms to stimulate business development, which were all adopted in half a year.
Since December 2002, OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan, is defined as “ensuring that
BiH is a peaceful, viable state on course to European integration” and has the following
core tasks:
• Entrenching the Rule of Law
• Ensuring that extreme nationalists, war criminals, and organised criminal networks
cannot reverse peace implementation
• Reforming the economy
20
• Strengthening the capacity of BiH’s governing institutions, especially at State level
• Establishing State-level civilian command and control over armed forces,
reforming the security sector, and paving the way for integration into the EuroAtlantic framework
• Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons
As to the EU Association Process, a good number of the EU “Road Map” conditions
presented in 2000 have been met. A European Feasibility Study presented in November
2003 allows BiH to move towards formal negotiations for an Association Agreement in
the latter half of 2004. 2009 could be a possible target date for EU membership.
However, real progress on a number of key reforms remains to be shown, above all a
strengthening of governmental authority on the level of the State. In addition, a better
compliance with existing international obligations and conditions (e.g. the Dayton Peace
Accord, outstanding EU “Road Map” steps, co-operation with the Hague War Crimes
Tribunal, etc.) is required. Many of the EU conditions coincide with those of the Council
of Europe, of which BiH became a member in April 2002. A Post-Accession Cooperation
Programme is assisting BiH to fulfil the commitments which that membership entails.
The first EU Crisis Management Operation under the European Security and Defence
Policy was launched in January 2003, when the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
with a staff of 500 police officers and 50 civilian experts took over from the UN
International Police Task Force (IPTF) and is now fully operational. The main task is to
monitor, support and assist the BiH police, giving priority to the safety of returnees and
fight against organised crime, including trafficking. Furthermore, the Government is
explicitly required to establish both a proper State-level Police Force with investigative
and law-enforcement powers, and a single Intelligence and Security Agency. Today, lawenforcement is divided between some 20 different police forces, according to the High
Representative. These are reforms of key importance to the rule of law and also essential
for European association.
The OHR also has focused strongly on the rule of law and necessary structural and
legislative reform. An Independent Judicial Commission has been in charge of
restructuring the BiH Court System at all levels, complemented by revisions of Civil and
Criminal legislation, Judicial Training Centres for judges and prosecutors, a single national
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (in April 2004) etc. When completed in March
2004, this judicial reform initiative will have created a basis for an independent and
effective judicial system, free from political influence. This would, according to the OHR,
make BiH the first country in the Balkans to completely separate the judicial branch from
the executive.
In October 2003, a total of registered refugee returns to and within BiH had risen to
nearly 1 million people according to UNHCR statistics. In 2002, the State Ministry for
Human Rights and Refugee Return (MHRR) together with relevant Entity Ministries
assumed a greater leadership role in the return process and will gradually take on full
responsibility. About 500.000 additional returns are expected to take place over the next
four years. At the end of 2003, OHR’s Reconstruction and Return Task Force handed
over responsibility to four regional centres which will be responsible for monitoring and
evaluating return-related projects.
A smooth transfer of the responsibilities of the Commission for Real Property Claims
(CRPC) to local institutions remains. At the end of October 2003, according to the OHR,
21
91% of Property Law Implementation cases are solved both in Republika Srpska and in
the Federation, and in Brcko District 96%. Thus, the goal of substantial completion of
Property Law Implementation by December 2003 is within reach, but coordination of
returns within the region must be improved. Some bilateral donors will continue their
support for return and reconstruction.
During 2003, the domestic trial of war crimes in a special panel of the State Court of BiH
has been discussed in a number of meetings. At the request of the UN Security Council
and the PIC Steering Board, an Executive Board with representatives from BiH and the
international community has been established by the OHR and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Financing has been secured by the
international community for the first two years of a Special War Crimes Chamber in the
Court of BiH and a War Crimes Department within the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. The
Special Chamber is expected to be operational by the beginning of 2005.
22
5.
FINDINGS
In this chapter, the results of the fact-finding will be presented. It is structured on the
basis of each studied project or group of projects, and these have been organised per
sector in chronological order.
Under each sector heading, there is a brief description of the background and recent
development of the sector. The projects or groups of projects are then summarised and
analysed in terms of the evaluation issues.
The projects are also discussed from the point of view of future cooperation options
including the possible transition from projects to sector- specific budget support.
5.1
5.1.1
SOCIAL SECTOR
Women’s projects in Mostar
Background. During the war, a new kind of women’s groups were formed in BiH. They
took organised action, assisting women who had become victims of war. Gradually, these
groups were supported by international organisations, and became members of
international solidarity networks which provided humanitarian aid. After the war, many of
them continued their work into the reconstruction and development phase, establishing
themselves as NGOs and focusing on education, legal aid, health care and psycho-social
treatment. As these organisations were faced with problems caused by gender-oppressive
domestic laws, i a on property rights, housing, employment and domestic violence, they
began to cooperate with other NGOs in their neighbourhood, across the Entity borders
or in other parts of former Yugoslavia.
Almost ten years have passed since the Bosniac-Croat conflict – a war within the civil war
– was brought to an end in 1994. Ever since, the international community has tried
repeatedly to heal the partition of Mostar and the violent, lawless relationship between the
two parties. After the war, the Croats and HDZ blocked every such effort. Now the roles
are changed and the Muslims and SDA prevent any attempt to initiate a dialogue. The
Croats gave up their resistance gradually, partly because the political scene in Croatia
changed, partly because a slight Bosniac majority of citizens in 1991, before the war, was
replaced in 2003 by a substantial Croat majority. This seemingly perpetual conflict has had
severe economic consequences.
Today, the city is still administered by three plus three municipalities and a joint City
Administration which is twice as big as that of any comparable BiH city. The parallel
structures permeate every aspect of daily life, from a dual court system and separate
systems for electricity, telephone and postal services, to two fire departments and two
public works enterprises. A major consequence of this maladministration is lack of
resources for education, social security systems, medical services, unemployment benefits
etc., in a city where the population is already hard hit by the consequences of war.
In March 2003, the High Representative gave the task of reorganising the city to a
Commission consisting of the local parties. The Commission failed to produce a
constitutionally acceptable solution. In September 2003, the High Representative
established another Commission, chaired by an international Chairman, with the
instruction to “achieve a comprehensive settlement” by 15 December 2003. Still in
23
January 2004, an agreement has not been reached on a single city administration. A
resolution of the status of Mostar is a Dayton requirement, and also a condition for an
EU Association Agreement. It can be foreseen that unless a compromise is reached, the
High Representative will impose a solution.
Connecting Women in BiH (CWBIH)
Background. A number of local and international NGOs were active in providing
support to refugee women in the Mostar area during and after the war. In 1998, the
Finnish organisation Marttaliitto began to support “Women in Reconstruction”, a project
initiated by the international Croatia-based NGO Stope Nade. In 1999, the Finnish
Refugee Council provided assistance to a “Consulting Centre” run by the local NGO
IDEJA (previously the local Stope Nade branch). Later in the same year, a close
coordination between IDEJA and the two Finnish NGOs was established, with the
Finnish Refugee Council supporting the “Consulting Centre” and Marttaliitto supporting
a group of women’s projects under the common heading “Connecting Women in BiH”:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Prijateljice, Konjic, 1997-2002
Stolac Women’s Centre, 2002
Women’s Centre in Capljina, 1999-2002
Blagaji container camp
Tailoring Project Mila, 2000-2002
Sumejja, Bijelo Polje, 1998-1999
The overall project objective was “Improving the working conditions of the women
support centres in the Mostar area.” The project objectives were:
• Rebuilding the communication network for women support centres
• Improving the mobility of extension services and consultants (a Mobile Team with
two vehicles)
• Support services for the women support centres
The target group and beneficiaries of the project were returnees, refugees and internally
displaced women and girls in the Mostar area.
Two excellent evaluation reports were made in June 2001 of “Connecting Women in
BiH” and of the “Consulting Centre” in Mostar by Raisa Venäläinen. Thus, what
remained for us to do was to examine the post-implementation impact and to follow up
the short-term recommendations for the remainder of the project period.
A. Prijateljice, Konjic
“If you have an income you can live anywhere, but with a house and no income, you can’t
live at all.” (Ramiza Zukanovic, Director, Prijateljice)
Prijateljice is a local humanitarian NGO established in 1996. It received Finnish support
during the period 1997/98 – 2002. Its aim is to promote women’s employment and
strengthen women’s capacity in rural areas all over the Neretva Canton. It has a strong
focus on the promotion of income-generating projects with education in combination
with production and service. The organisation is still, in 2004, supported by a number of
international donors. It is a strong NGO with a clear management structure. A
management team meets regularly to discuss and solve problems, to plan for new
24
initiatives and to coordinate the programme. This was the situation when the evaluation
took place in 2001, and the description is still valid. The organisation has its own incomegenerating projects and can contribute financially to meet humanitarian needs in the
community. From Marttaliitto the organisation has received material and equipment for
work with reconciliation and education.
In 2002, the project “Reconciliation – Connecting Women” was implemented and
covered the entire Canton. Prijateljice visited municipalities, involving all three ethnic
groups of refugees and local people, discussed, organised meetings and made people meet
again. They gave the displaced an opportunity to visit their pre-war homes, which were
occupied, and made them understand their rights in the municipalities. It opened for a
dialogue between the ethnic groups. According to the Director: “It was a big project and
it took a great deal of courage to work with it.”
Prijateljice has had many projects, some are still running, and they apply for more
support. The donors are on their way out, but there is still need for assistance. The staff
knew from the beginning that this would happen, and that is the main reason for the
income-generating projects. They provide sustainability. This is not the right time for
donors to withdraw. The Director again: “We still do not have the rule of law, and the
social system is out of order. The NGOs are left with the problems. The municipalities do
not function.”
B. Stolac Women’s Centre
Stolac Centre was established with Finnish support in 2002 to promote reconciliation
among the ethnic groups, and was implemented by Prijateljice in cooperation with
IDEJA, which did not function very well. The Centre organised courses in IT, English
and Spanish and also had some handicraft activities and a hairdressing course. The
IDEJA Mobile Team visited the Centre regularly.
Stolac was a divided town along ethnic lines and there were strong political tensions. The
politicians manipulated the population and encouraged an influx from other parts of BiH
to change the population structures. In spite of strong efforts from the Centre
management, the project groups started to fall apart after some months.
The Centre existed from January to July 2002, when it had to be closed. The equipment
was moved to other projects which were also supported by Marttaliitto. Three women
were each given a sewing machine, and at the end of 2003, they still get support from
Prijateljice to market their products.
However, the political situation in Stolac has now improved considerably, according to
the OHR office in Mostar. HDZ has stopped obstructing and 98 per cent of the refugees
have returned. There is a mosque in town, some 600 houses have been repossessed and
there is a gradual return to a more normal life. Recently some youth organisations in
Stolac lobbied for a new culture centre and got a wave of support from other citizens.
The city authorities had to yield. But that is a rare example of a situation where an NGO
could make a (political) difference.
C. Capljina Education Centre
25
Capljina Centre is an education centre which has received support from Marttaliitto from
1999 until the end of 2002. At the time of the evaluation in 2001, the participants in the
various courses – English, IT, accounting and handicraft – were mainly Croats and the
majority of the students were women. Hundreds were on the waiting list to the courses.
The regular staff consisted of the Centre Organiser, one English teacher, one IT teacher
and, later on, one person teaching Spanish. Administratively they were part of IDEJA and
reported to the Director of IDEJA. The IDEJA Mobile Team visited the Centre once a
week for counselling, primarily on legal, psycho-social or employment issues. There was
also close cooperation with the local authorities, but there was no support by any
volunteers. The evaluation contained recommendations regarding the improvement of
the administrative routines, and advice on possible self-financing and expansion.
Unfortunately the Centre did not have any telephone connection, and consequently the
computer training could not include the use of Internet.
The final report from the Centre in September 2003 shows the same staff structure, but
in addition the counselling has been strengthened by the support of volunteers from the
local administration or other NGOs. The project goal to facilitate the integration of
refugees and displaced persons in support of community rebuilding remains, with
significant results over the years. The project has continued to provide services which the
local authorities are not able to supply. It is not possible for an NGO like IDEJA to assist
in rebuilding the society without supportive political structures, but it can “build bridges”
at local level. The course activities improve chances for employment and are of psychosocial importance. In addition, they bring people from various ethnic groups together to
work and learn.
The counselling activities of the Mobile Team encouraged refugees/displaced to return to
their places of origin and inspired the creation of volunteer networks consisting of people
with different professional and ethnic background. The process of return is still going on.
The education programme also included information about people’s human rights and
how to protect them, e.g. in connection with the discrimination of women in employment
and protection of employee’s rights according to the labour laws.
The psychological treatment was mainly related to refugee trauma (loosing identity and
purpose of life, poor family relations, high risk factors among the school-age population
etc.). Legal aid was mainly provided in connection with the return process:
implementation of property laws and reconstruction of houses, often in connection with
return to Capljina from Mostar Centre. There was cooperation with OSCE, OHR and the
Ombudsman to obtain adequate support. Special support was provided to groups of
demobilised soldiers in cooperation with the Federation Ministry of Refugees and
Displaced Persons. That assistance – for 40 participants – was provided as part of a
World Bank project to improve the ex-soldiers’ employment possibilities.
The war had caused changes in the structure of inhabitants, as displaced Croats from
Central Bosnia instead of returning to their communities of origin had become a
dominant group, obstructing the process of reintegration of returning Bosniacs. These
were willing to return to Capljina and wanted their property back by means of the
property laws.
Quarterly reports have been presented to the Director of IDEJA for monitoring and
evaluation purposes. A database with records of all individual cases has been established
as recommended by the evaluation in 2001. The beneficiaries are requested to state their
26
opinion on the activities in special questionnaires. The volunteer work is also included in
the regular monitoring process.
As from January 2004, the Centre has become an independent self-supporting NGO. It is
still a very popular training institution and there is an increasing interest in its services.
The waiting time for participation in their courses is now 3 months. Gradually, the old
computers will be replaced, and the problem with the telecommunication is solved. The
main challenge will now be to earn enough money.
D. Blagaji container camp
At the time of the evaluation in 2001, 65-70 persons, mostly elderly, had lived for almost
8 years in a container village outside Mostar. Some NGO’s had provided clothing and
utensils. Often the villagers had no electricity or water, as often they could not pay the
bills. They lived in downright misery.
According to IDEJA, today the majority of these persons in Blagai have returned to their
earlier homes in the Stolac and Capljina areas. The Ombudsman in Capljina had assisted
them. Some persons are still in “buffer accommodation” outside Mostar, in new and
modern buildings. This will probably be their permanent solution.
E. Tailoring Project Mila
The tailoring workshop Mila started in Rodoc, then moved to Mostar and registered as a
local NGO in 1999. It received Finnish support in 2000-2002 (Bosnian Marks - BAM
24.000, approx. EUR 12.000) to cover running costs: rent, telephone and electricity. The
workshop had industrial sewing machines donated by a Spanish NGO, and some 15
students participated in an individual tailoring course. The workshop served the local
population, and most of the clients were refugees. The products were made to order, and
the prices were low. There were indications that the workshop could be sustainable to
some extent. Thanks to the foreign support they had managed to share some profits. The
2001 evaluation recommended that Mila’s staff should get some training in business
planning, management and marketing.
Today, some of the machines are in poor condition and must be replaced. The premises
are very small, which limits the workshop capacity. There is growing competition from
shops selling cheap imported clothes and the running costs are high. They cannot afford
to pay for the telephone and the heating costs, which are BAM 300 per month in the
winter. When they have paid their bills there is hardly any money left. Now they are
teaching 10 students in tailoring. If they had more space they could take on more students
and cover the costs for rent with the income from the training, but that is not possible at
present.
The socio-economic situation in general is very difficult. As a teaching organisation it can
hide behind the NGO status, but in actual fact they are “black” workers. The monthly
salary is BAM 250 per month and the staff cannot afford to pay BAM 160 in
social/pension fees. Maybe they will be able to pay taxes in the future. They think that
Finland left them too early, as the economic recovery of BiH is very slow and the
situation in Mostar still so difficult. The four women running the workshop are very
professional, they have customers, organise fashion shows etc., and do not feel that
27
marketing their products is a problem. They like their work and feel that they are
respected as professional dressmakers.
F. Sumejja, Bijelo Polje
The evaluation in 2001 did not cover this project. This Small Management School
received support from Marttaliitto from June 1998 until the end of 1999 with an amount
of DEM 21.600. It also got support from a number of other international donors.
The support was timely, “it helped the local organisation Sumejja to survive”, according
to the project’s final report. The education programme comprised 2 courses covering IT,
English and Marketing and Management with altogether 37 participants. 27 of those
found a job, either as employees or from starting their own enterprise. The education
programme was endorsed by the Federal Ministry of Education and was supported by
local academics. The project director was herself an economist by profession, and active
in a number of civil organisations.
In spite of repeated efforts during a visit to Mostar in November 2003, a meeting with the
Director could not be arranged.
Relevance and effectiveness of CWBiH. The activities of the projects under the
umbrella of CWBiH targeted immediate needs in a difficult post-war situation. Most of
the project objectives have been achieved. The various NGOs carried out their work in a
laudable manner. The cooperation with IDEJA’s Mobile Team worked well. There was a
great demand for psycho-social assistance and for support to reintegration into original or
new communities. The importance of legal assistance became evident in the return
process. It can be concluded that the project activities were of great relevance in a
demanding environment.
Impact and Sustainability. CWBiH has definitely had an impact on the lives of a great
number of women and men. It has brought people from various ethnic groups together.
It has helped many to move back to their old homes and often also assisted them in
gaining new professional competence. Great efforts have been made both by the Finnish
NGOs and the local project management to achieve self-financing. But now the donors
are gradually withdrawing, and unavoidably the socio-economic problems remain in many
places.
Concluding remarks. The evaluation report from 2001 tries to look into the future role
of these women NGOs. The need for reconciliation, social service provision and selfsustaining activities will remain for quite some time. Today, we know that some of the
NGOs have been dissolved, others struggle to survive, and yet another group is moving
on, revising their goals and involving themselves in the efforts to achieve greater equality
for women in everyday life (cf. the Chapter on GEEP). In the Mostar area, the target of
self-financing activities is difficult to achieve. On the donor side this should be followed
with more attention. The imminent closure of the Consulting Centre (see below) will be a
great loss to these women NGOs working in areas of extreme hardship.
IDEJA Consulting Centre
The Citizens Association IDEJA in Mostar is responsible for the planning and
implementation of the Consulting Centre project. The Finnish Government has
supported the Centre through the Finnish Refugee Council (FRC) for five years, 199928
2003. The total contribution amounts to EUR 235.462. The Centre also received support
from other donors, i a the European Commission and MZC, a Spanish NGO.
IDEJA was registered in 1999 as a service provision NGO. The Consulting Centre
project was planned by IDEJA in cooperation with the Finnish Refugee Council (FCA)
and implemented by the IDEJA staff together with IDEJA members working on a
volunteer basis. In 2002, the organisation had 120 registered members, who were experts
in various fields, mainly in medicine, education and law.
Since 1999, IDEJA has been engaged in activities related to psycho-social support, legal
advice and training in the Mostar area. The activities have been implemented in the
Centre’s premises in Mostar and through the fieldwork of a Mobile Team. The Education
Centre in Capljina was administered as part of IDEJA, but was funded through the
project Connecting Women in BiH, also supported by Finland.
The Manager of IDEJA monitored the Consulting Centre on a regular basis. The
progress of project activities was followed through three-month working plans and
reports. Databases and records on individual cases were kept in order to monitor the
activities, and beneficiaries gave feedback on questionnaires.
The Centre provided important services which the local authorities provided with
difficulty due to lack of resources. Over the years, the counselling services played a crucial
role in the reintegration of refugees, displaced and returnees. Many of them suffered from
post-traumatic syndrome caused by ethnic tension, the poor socio-economic situation and
constant migration. The project target group consisted of “people suffering from the
effects of the war, school children and their parents, breast cancer patients and their
families”.
Both individual and group counselling service were offered by the Centre. The group
counselling service was offered through special focused groups such as
• Help to Helpers, a programme for professionals in the social and health sectors
• New View, a programme for women suffering from breast cancer
• Workshops for Children, to address the problems in schools with a high
concentration of refugee children, a mixed ethnic background etc.
In 2002 (the latest figures available), 144 persons received individual counselling and 229
participated in group-counselling services.
The legal counselling service grew in importance, and in 2002 alone 561 persons received
this support. Most of the cases dealt with property law and labour law. Round table
seminars on legal issues and special education, on labour law and discrimination were
arranged.
For many years, the project was mainly focused on women. Experience showed, however,
that the male population was in great need of a similar support. The project revised its
target group and began working with both sexes, regardless of their socio-cultural and
ethnic background.
Relevance. Already in the work of the different women’s projects, it is obvious that the
Consulting Centre had a big role. The Mobile Team was able to reach out to areas where
people otherwise would have had no access to legal aid, nor to medical or psychological
services.
29
Impact. The Consulting Centre has played an important role in mitigating the harm and
suffering caused to people through the ethnic tension and political mismanagement for
several years. A great many people benefited from the qualified services provided by the
Centre.
Sustainability. IDEJA like many other NGOs in BiH has been totally dependent on
external funding, although efforts have been made at fund-raising and to charge fees for
membership and courses. The project activities were complementary to or provided the
services, which in a well-governed, democratic society would be financed within the
municipal social service. The need for this kind of counselling service will remain for a
considerable time, and the many competent experts in different fields will use their skills
and professional networks also in other contexts.
Concluding remarks. At the end of 2003, twenty doctors, psychologists and other
specialists from hospitals and health centres in both East and West Mostar were found on
IDEJA’s volunteers’ list. The competence and knowledge gained by the staff and
professional volunteers represent a valuable capacity which can be tapped if and when
Mostar eventually starts restructuring its service provision system into a single City
administration. The foundation has already been laid for a constructive reform
cooperation through the already established contacts between the Centre and the City
institutions.
When interviewed in November 2003, the management team was convinced that they
would have to close the centre at the end of December for lack of funding. Efforts to
find other donors to replace the Finnish funding had failed. It seems a sad waste to
dissolve this well-functioning, much needed service provision NGO, when so many good
initiatives – the Mobile Team, the volunteer scheme, the involvement of both women and
men, working groups on specific problems, such as child abuse etc. – have proven the
quality of the Centre. Therefore, continued support for one more year is strongly
recommended.
Kindergartens in Mostar
During the EU administration of Mostar, 1994-1996, Finland supported the
reconstruction of two kindergartens in 1995/96 at a cost of FIM 3.1 million in Mostar
East and West, respectively. Mostar was badly damaged by the war, and the project was
part of the humanitarian assistance to the city. The two kindergartens were visited in
November 2003. One of them, “Zvijezdica”, on the East side, inaugurated in March
1996, was in good condition. Not enough parents can afford to pay the fees, however, so
the upper floor is used by the Austrian Diakoniewerk, which runs a children’s project.
Italy, Germany and the EC have also contributed to that kindergarten. The other, “Kuca
od Kamena” on the West side, inaugurated in October 1995, has quite serious problems.
2 interior walls have simply collapsed and one is now in a very poor condition and will
probably collapse, if not repaired. In spite of this problem, most of the premises are in
use. Both kindergartens are now run by municipal authorities.
30
5.2
ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE
The reconstruction of basic infrastructure which was damaged in the war was started
immediately after the Dayton agreement was signed, and continued at a large scale all
through the 1990s and early 2000s. Now that most bridges and roads as well as basic
repairs of railways have been completed, schools and medical facilities constructed, and
energy supply restored throughout the country, the grant assistance in this sector is
coming to an end, but major investments financed by credits are still needed to further
develop and modernise sub sectors.
International credit and investment in infrastructure is now increasingly being planned
with a regional perspective. The European Commission and the World Bank established a
Joint Office for South East Europe in 1999 to coordinate international assistance for the
reconstruction and development. A regional Infrastructure Steering Group for South
Eastern Europe was established in connection with the Stability pact in 2001, with
representatives from all international banks and the European Commission. The purpose
is to facilitate coordination between donors and ensure adequate prioritization of regional
infrastructure investment in South East Europe, while at the same time promote regional
cooperation among the countries of the region.
Finland has contributed all in all approximately EUR 33,3 million to the infrastructure
sector in BiH. Two of the projects – the Sarajevo District Heating project and the
Donation of a railway tracklayer - are included in the evaluation sample and are discussed
below. In addition, Finland has financed one more district heating project in Doboj, and
two water related projects, one in each of the entities.
5.2.1
District Heating Project in Sarajevo
Seven persons were interviewed in Helsinki and Sarajevo in connection with the district
heating project. Sites were visited and a local consultancy company has been contracted to
make a technical assessment of the works carried out.
Background. The district heating (DH) project was part of a number of IDA
(International Development Association) financed “Emergency projects” in priority
sectors prepared by the World Bank (WB) in 1995 and approved by the BiH government
in March 1996. A delegation from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland was
informed by the World Bank of the planned projects during a field trip to Sarajevo in
early March 1996. After correspondence in late April and May, it was decided that Finland
would finance the technical assistance and part of the goods.
A Finnish consultancy, Ekono Energy (now renamed Elektrowatt Energy) was contracted
by the MFA to provide the technical assistance. Another consultancy, IVO, was
contracted to provide procurement services in Finland.
The counterpart and beneficiary in Sarajevo was Toplane, a public district heating utility
owned by Sarajevo canton. The Sarajevo district heating system was the country’s largest
before the war, providing heat to almost 50 000 apartments, or 45% of the pre-war
population. Due to war damage, freezing, and corrosion, the system was in 1996 only
partly working, heating merely 16 000 apartments.
A similar project was planned by the WB for Banja Luka, and credit resources were set
aside for that purpose. After DM 500,000 was embezzled from the credit account, these
plans came to a halt.
31
Project plan. Upon arrival in Sarajevo, Ekono Energy (EE) developed the WB project
document based on assessments carried out by themselves and the mechanical faculty in
Sarajevo. The project objectives were the following: (i) restore district heating services in
Sarajevo as soon as possible by reconstructing the district heat supply system as well as
building internal installations (pipes and radiators); (ii) enable BiH to reduce its gas
consumption through fuel switching by Toplane from gas to fuel oil; (iii) strengthen
Toplane’s institutional capacity; (iv) initiate network improvements.
The objectives were to be reached through:
• technical assistance to enable Toplane to carry out the very large emergency
project in a short time, and to improve Toplane’s institutional capabilities for the
longer term, in the areas of project management, engineering, financial and
commercial management, and system planning
• reconstruction of all parts of the district heating network, including boiler stations,
substations, distribution network, internal installation in apartment buildings.
The project was planned to be implemented in two phases. The first phase was a “fast
track” repair programme whose target was to bring the number of connected flats up
from 16 000 to 30 000 before the end of the heating season 1996/97, i e March 1997.
The second phase was the full reconstruction and improvement of the DH network
system as well as the institutional strengthening of Toplane, to be finished by the end of
September 1997.
Financing. The cost was projected at USD 38,6 million distributed as follows: Boilers
16,8; distribution networks 7,4; Substations 1,7; Internal installations 8,2; Building and
officer equipment 0,9; technical assistance 3,1; Data systems 0,5.
The main financing of the USD 40 million project was an IDA credit of USD 20 million
lent to the BiH government and then on-lent to the DH company Toplane. The rest was
sought as co-financing from donors.
The financing plan in September 1996 looked like this (in USD million):
WB
Finland
European Union
Unidentified donors
19,5
6,7
6,5
5,9
Finland’s contribution of USD 6,7 million was made as parallel financing, i e the
Finnish contribution would be used in accordance with Finnish conditions and
procurement guidelines rather than the WB’s. Finland made a separate agreement with
the BiH Council of Ministers for its part in the DH project. Finland agreed only to
finance equipment and technical assistance. Materials and installation works had thus to
be financed from the IDA credit and other co-financing sources.
As for all World Bank credit financed projects, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was
created within the DH company itself, Toplane. The PIU was to be headed by a senior
Toplane manager and supported by experts provided by Finland. Finnish technical
assistance was originally planned for only the first year. In September all important
procurement was to be finished so the PIU could go on without foreign assistance.
32
Implementation. The fast track phase went according to plan. No less than 18,000
apartments were reconnected to the network, making the total number of apartments
36,000 by the end of the heating season 96/97. Emergency repairs were carried out in 27
boiler stations (out of 130); 9 new substations were installed and repairs were done in
almost all (120 in all); internal installations (pipes and radiators) were repaired in more
than 20,000 apartments; and 3 km of pipeline in the distribution network was
reconstructed.
The preparations and procurement for the reconstruction phase started in parallel with
fast track phase. Already at the end of 1996 it became clear that the reconstruction phase
would have to be extended beyond September 1997, with the target end of 1998. Since
extensive engineering and procurement would be needed, extended Finnish support was
requested.
Additional delays, mainly due to shortfall in the financing and slow disbursement (see
more below) pushed the end date of the project until June 2000. At that point most
objectives had been reached. Another 9 000 apartments – severely damaged from the war
- received heating bringing the total up to 45 000 out of the pre-war 50 000. Some
apartments are situated outside Sarajevo canton, in Republika Srpska, and some are
obliterated by the war, and still not rebuilt. Furthermore, 25 boiler stations were
completely reconstructed and 18 repaired; 45,000 internal installations repaired; and all in
all 9 km of the distribution network repaired. In the process, all large boilers (together
providing 62% of the heat) were converted to allow for dual fuel, i e fuel oil or gas.
A project financing gap of USD 3,5 million made it necessary to cut some components
out. This affected the meter installations in each apartment, and rehabilitation of the
monitoring and remote control system.
Relevance. The project can be considered relevant for several reasons. Firstly, Sarajevo
has cold winters, and from a humanitarian viewpoint it saved a lot of people from
freezing to death and prevented the spread of communicable diseases. Secondly, to heat
their homes during the war, thousands of people had resorted to improvised and very
dangerous connections to the public gas system. The project made it possible to
disconnect 34,000 such connections thus vastly improving security. Thirdly, the dual
firing options make Sarajevo less dependent on gas. Fourthly, the project very probably
had an important psychological effect on the Sarajevans including non-heating clients. It
gave them the sense that things were back to normal and that peace was paying off.
The latter is related to the project’s effect on the post-conflict situation and the building
of peace. Not only were several thousand apartments in Sarajevo not included in the
project as they were situated in RS, but a similar project in Banja Luka never materialised.
Finland was early on acutely aware of the need to be perceived to treat the different
ethnicities with an even hand. Exactly how is not known, but the ministry managed to
identify Doboj as a town in RS where a district heating project could be supported by
Finland, thus balancing the infrastructure support between the entities. Finland’s total
contribution to the Sarajevo DH project was USD 8.48 million (4.88 for construction and
3.6 for technical assistance). In Doboj, Finland spent USD 2.7 million.
No gender disaggregated statistics exist, either on the beneficiaries of the TA or on the
end users of the heating. For the latter, there should not be any differences in how they
are able to receive the improved heating services. In the TA-team from Finland, most
were male engineers, but the Procurement specialist was a woman. In the management of
33
Toplane, it is also known that the Head of the Finance Section is a woman, as is the Chief
Engineer.
Effectiveness. Considering the limited time available, the project was well planned. The
project document is good in all formal aspects: It is thorough, well researched; risks are
taken into consideration, etc. Its main weakness lies in its over- optimism. As mentioned
above, the original project document states the finishing date for the full reconstruction
to September 1997. Ekono Energy realised early on that this was not realistic. The WB
had underestimated the amount of work needed on the system, and the time it takes to
order, manufacture and transport large components like boilers. WB also overestimated
the possibilities to make large turn key contracts for the reconstruction. The idea was that
such contracts would be prepared and started by September 1997, and then implemented
up until the closing of the credit in 1998. This turned out to be impossible. Furthermore,
the WB also built its time schedule on the idea that the DH system would be
concentrated to fewer but larger boilers in order to make the system more cost effective.
As it turned out that such a solution would cost more than the budgeted amount, it was
aborted.
These weaknesses in the plan, and, more importantly, the many delays in disbursements
of donor funding caused the project, and the Finnish role, to last significantly longer than
planned. If this has had a detrimental effect on its cost efficiency is discussed in the next
section. Here, we will focus on what was accomplished in the end.
And a lot was accomplished, especially during the first year when an incredible amount of
procurement and construction was carried out. The PIU was pushing its suppliers and
contractors to the maximum. The reports frequently speak of shortage of contractors in
Sarajevo, and the need to repeat inquiries to suppliers because the time to prepare the
complex tenders was too short, often 10 days or less. In 1996 alone, 135 inquiries were
sent out in total, and 102 purchases orders were made. That is roughly equivalent to one
inquiry per working day from July to December.
The WB had two sets of indicators to evaluate the achievement of project objectives: the
number of flats reconnected to the DH system; Toplane’s revenue collected as a
percentage of total annual operating costs. The project was rated as successful in the first
category. All of the stated targets of the project were met, except the components which
were taken out due to shortfalls in the financing. The latter parameter was deemed only
partially successful. The revenue did not grow as high as planned.
To improve the management of billing and collection, a new computer system was
designed and installed by a Finnish firm contracted by EE. They also trained the Toplane
staff on the system. While the system meant a vast improvement, it has been modified
twice and is still not perfectly suitable for the company needs, according to Toplane’s
financial manager. She said that they are thinking of buying another system from a local
source. To get the current system updated from Finland would be too expensive. This
highlights the disadvantage of buying a computer system from abroad. Updating and
support becomes difficult and possibly very expensive. On the other hand, systems of
equal capacity were probably scarce in Sarajevo in 1996. However, computer
programmers and IT providers did exist and a creative project design could have
integrated a local support mechanism from the beginning.
As a result of the system, the collection rate went up drastically from zero to 80% initially,
but stalled at 71% by 1999. WB and EE encouraged Toplane to try different means to
34
improve the situation. Today, the collection rate is 84% and almost all of it is in cash, as
opposed to earlier when vouchers stood for a large part of the payments.
While the WB rates the technical assistance only as partially satisfactory, due to the slow
improvement of the collection rate, this criticism is softened by the long list of
complicating circumstances that they also refer to. One can also discuss the choice of
indicators. The ratio of revenue and operating costs is not entirely within the means of
Toplane to influence. The Federation government sets the gas price, presently BAM 0,42
per cubic metre. The Canton, on the other hand, sets the fee for the heating, not
necessarily taking into consideration the gas price. The fees are controlled by the canton,
and the gas prices are being set by the Federation government. The result is a constant
shortfall for Toplane.
According to the Finance manager of Toplane, the collection rate would not have been as
high nor would they have as much control over their clients without the Technical
assistance provided by EE.
When asked what they valued the most in the technical assistance, Toplane highlighted
the procurement methods. They learned procurement according to WB procedures, and
the same routines are now used with a few adjustments. Project management is another
skill, which has been very useful. Nowadays, most non-routine activities are organised as
projects, with a temporary team of experts, and a designated and responsible team leader.
Toplane has, as the first enterprise in BiH, managed to get ISO certification for
environmental management as well as quality management. This could not have been
done without the technical assistance provided by the Finns, according to Toplane.
Furthermore, reporting has been improved by the project. While there was systematic
reporting also before, it was only for technical purposes. Now, reports are also to show
the public what is being done.
The overall effectiveness of the project in terms of impact on society has without doubt
been tremendous. It has literally changed the lives for a large part of the population of
Sarajevo.
Efficiency. The efficiency of the whole DH project was to a great extent controlled by
the Finnish contribution. The Finnish experts in their key positions in project
management and procurement more or less controlled the pace and quality of all the
construction work that was done, as well as, of course, the technical assistance
component.
The work force from EE:s side was two full time persons (Project Manager and
Procurement/cost control) and three almost full time engineers . They had two local staff
as secretary and interpreter. In addition, there were four short term consultants who put
in about 10-20 weeks per year in Sarajevo. From Toplane’s side there were about 20 staff
persons in the PIU.
As has been touched upon earlier, it seems that they and the whole PIU were stretched to
the limit during large parts of the project period, and they seem to have managed well on
the whole. The main problem in the reconstruction were delays, which were out-side the
PIU’s control. The greatest problems were posed by lack of donor funds. The pledged
EU contribution was not disbursed until 1999 and then it had shrunk to a fraction of its
pledged size. Also, the WB was guilty of delays when it tried to juggle advances to several
emergency projects at the same time, running out of funds in the process. Furthermore, at
35
one point all available contractors in Sarajevo were busy so activities had to be postponed
.
The project became 11% more expensive than originally anticipated. The PIU has been in
existence two years longer than originally planned, which added to the cost. According to
the final reports from the WB and Toplane, however, this increase in the project cost is
more than compensated for by the savings made by professional technical specifications
and efficient competitive procurement.
Almost all materials and equipment were procured from the outside. In a typical boiler
station it was only the chimney and the salt (added in one of the processes) that was
produced in BiH. The procurement financed by the Finnish contribution was almost
exclusively made from Finland. In the bilateral agreement signed in July 1996 it is stated
in article 4: “ The procurement shall be made primarily from Finland.” A special
procurement procedure was designed for the project, in order to save time in view of the
urgency of the fast track programme. The Finnish consultancy IVO helped out with
procurement in Finland, based on specifications coming from the PIU. The quality
assessment done by the Bosnian engineering consultancy IPSA Institute states that all
procured equipment is of good quality and manufactured by renowned firms. The costs
of materials were in fact lower than originally estimated which should be a sign of
effective procurement procedures. The cost of works contracted in Sarajevo also
decreased after the first year which shows that no cartels or rigging were affecting the
market there. There is in other words no question about the quality of the procured
goods from Finland. But it is of course not possible to know if equal quality could have
been obtained at a lower cost somewhere else.
The main problems encountered in procurement were a shortage of bids during a period,
as has been mentioned. In addition to the short tender time, there was the difficulty that
many firms were reluctant to do business in BiH. In spite of these problems, there is no
reason to believe that any big mistakes were made in procurement.
Ownership. Ownership of the project has not been an issue at all. This is partly due to
the fact that the PIU was placed in Toplane itself rather than being an external body. It is
also telling that the PIU was swiftly transformed into the Marketing and Development
Department after the project was finished.
The contact and cooperation between the EE consultants and Toplane staff seems to
have been good. Also, contacts with the Finnish Ambassador were frequent. The former
head of the PIU also visited Finland on several occasions and met with MFA in Helsinki.
According to the World Bank, the Finnish consultants were unusually well received and
appreciated. EE commented on the cooperation saying that the most important lessons
they took with them home was the vital importance of having a good working
relationship and full involvement of the local partner to achieve success.
Sustainability. A worry during the project was that Toplane was without a general
manager since the war. Without this key position filled with a competent person, a lot of
the improvements brought by means of the projects could prove short-lived. The project
team did what they could to speed this process up, but it was a decision to be taken on
cantonal level. Both WB and the Finnish ambassador put pressure on the canton to take
action, and eventually a manager was appointed in 1999. According to the interviewed
persons from Toplane the new General Manager has meant a great change in the
36
management; people work harder and are more disciplined. In return they have one of the
better developed workplaces in Sarajevo and their pay checks are always on time.
There could also be reason to worry about the future of the massive investment made in
the DH system. Very little has been invested in Toplane since the project was completed,
and the meagre resources are only enough to fix the most pressing problems. Next year,
the canton has promised to provide BAM 700 000 for housing rehabilitation (not directly
related to heating). Apart from that, investment seems too low and covers only the most
necessary repairs. It is sustainable as long as the new installations work but when they
start to deteriorate, no buffer funds will have been built up to finance replacement.
Monitoring and management. The project document states clearly that MFA was to
supervise the implementation of the project, and their representatives would participate in
supervision missions. The MFA would also receive monthly progress reports, quarterly
financial reports, and annual progress reports. Monthly reports were also sent to the WB.
It seems that this was rationalised so that MFA was content to receive copies of the WB
report.
5.2.2
Donation of a railway tracklayer machine
Seven persons were interviewed and a site visit has been made. A local consultancy
company has been contracted to make a technical assessment of the donated machinery.
Background. The railway system in BiH was in a poor condition after the war. Even
though some EUR 52 million has been spent by the international community to
reconstruct and rehabilitate it, several factors make a full recovery difficult. One is the
continuous rivalry and suspicion between the entities. Each entity has a public railway
company. The Federation even had a second one shortly after the war in Herceg-Bosna,
but that is now gone. Secondly, the railway used to get most of its revenue from
transporting goods from the heavy industries in BiH. Now these industries are closed or
work at a fraction of their capacity, hence lessening the need for transport. Thirdly, none
of the companies has enough rolling stock (railroad cars).
While the railway traffic has now started again, it is very slow due to the deteriorated
tracks. In most of the system 50 km/h is the speed limit, often less. The BiH railway
network is just over 1,000 km. Since BiH has many hills and mountains, there are 174
tunnels, 399 bridges and many sharp curves and steep gradients.
The emphasis of the international support has been to modernise the railway
management and reconnect BiH’s railway system to the rest of the region and Europe.
For this to happen, BiH needs to have representation on the national, state level to be
able to negotiate and make international agreements. For this purpose, the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Railway Public Corporation (BHRPC) was established in 1998 with a Board
of Directors from both entities. It is considered relatively successful compared to many
other joint institutions.
Currently, a modest level of passenger traffic has resumed all over the country, and the
recent rebuilding of the Samac bridge over the Sava river enables international traffic
through Croatia. Currently, a new railway law is being drafted by a working group
consisting of all railway companies and ministries as well as OHR, and some international
agencies like Swederail. The international community encourages and supports a process
towards making BHRPC the infrastructure manager for the whole country, leaving the
commercial operation to the entity companies. This will make BHRPC the owner and
37
caretaker of all tracks, giving equal access to the operators. This has so far met with stiff
resistance from the RS. On the positive side, recently new credits amounting to around
EUR 80 million were approved by the European banks EIB and EBRD. These credits
will finance several large track rehabilitation projects along the major lines of the network.
Those projects are expected to end in 2005.
In 1997, Finnish consultants (Blue Sky Consulting) working out of Zagreb, Croatia,
participated in the Sarajevo SIRE fair as representatives for DESEC, a Finnish
manufacturer specialised in Railway track layer machines. They established contact with
what later became the Federation of BiH railway company, but at the time was the
remnants of the former state railway company and still used the name BiH Railways. They
became interested in the tracklayer, and with the help of DESEC submitted a request to
the MFA. The MFA decided to contract VR Track (a Finnish state- owned railway
consultant) to carry out a feasibility study regarding the request. The feasibility study
concluded that there was a need for the machine, and that it could be well maintained in
BiH. It was pointed out that if only the Federation railway company would be the
recipient, the machine would not be utilised over the whole country. There was also
noted a shortage of track building materials which of course must be at hand if the
machine was to be utilized.
MFA now moved to support the request for financing, but this could only happen on two
conditions. First, only a joint BiH company could be the owner of the machine. Second,
there should be some kind of cost sharing arrangement. Finland’s first proposal was that
BiH should cover one fifth of the cost. The first condition was fulfilled by the signing of
an agreement in April 1998 to establish the BHRPC. The second condition was fulfilled
by BiH taking responsibility for some token costs for the transport of the machine after
delivery from Croatia to Sarajevo, plus training arrangements.
During the rest of the year, the dialogue went on between the MFA and from then on
BHRPC, via faxes and MFA-missions to BiH. It was agreed that the use of the machine
by the two entity companies would be regulated in a “book of rules”. The machine would
be physically based in each entity every other year, but could be used in any entity
depending on need. The Board of Directors of BHRPC approved the donation before it
was made just as it does with all donations.
The formal decision was taken in December 1998 and the machine and an accompanying
package of spare parts and accessories were ordered from DESEC Ltd. It was delivered
in August 1999. VR track, who themselves use the DESEC tracklayer carried out a 5-day
training on location of how to operate the machine. DESEC provided a 2-week course in
Finland for the Bosnian mechanics.
The total price for the package was FIM 6 634 520 (EUR 1 124 000). The Finnish
commitment was a maximum of FIM 7 million.
The support to the railways was supposed to continue, and Finland had another request
from BiH appraised by Finnish consultants. It was not pursued, however.
Relevance. The whole railway sector in BiH faces an enormous challenge in terms of
renovation of its network. It will need machinery, materials and labour to do it. The
tracklayer machine would seem to fit into this picture, but it is not so. Before the war
track overhaul was done with the help of four cranes, capable of replacing 200 metres of
track per hour. These cranes are still in use and serve the needs of the entity railway
companies, according to the local consultant’s report (see annex 4).
38
The donated tracklayer has roughly the same capacity as one of these cranes, but only
under very specific conditions. Its primary purpose is in fact to replace turnouts, and it
can only work efficiently on level surfaces where there is room for manoeuvre. Such
conditions are rare along the BiH railway network.
Even if the tracklayer had been better suited for the local requirements, there is yet
another reason why it is of limited relevance. Any kind of major track overhaul project
would be contracted out to a national or regional construction firm. Most likely, they
would use machinery of their own to do the job.
It can be added that an in- kind donation always risks to become an isolated event in a
situation when the sector needs long- term support, both institutional and material.
In terms of the need for peace- building, the donation had the potential of speeding up
rehabilitation, thus promoting normalisation of society. But that opportunity was lost
when the feasibility study observations about the lack of materials was ignored. If one had
been serious about promoting normalisation, a broader and integrated support
intervention should have been planned, which could have included also materials.
The donation also had the potential, in principle, to become one of building blocks for
better relations between the RS and Federation railway companies. But this would have
required much more, and longer term involvement from Finland.
Effectiveness. According to the MFA memorandum on which the decision to finance
the project was based, the project “supports the Bosnian rebuilding by improving the
operating conditions for industry and trade. At the same time it promotes the
normalisation of social conditions in the spirit of Dayton Peace Agreement. The
immediate aim of the project is to increase the operating capacity of the BiH railway
company as far as track and machine maintenance are concerned.” This is as close as one
gets to any clearly stated objectives of this intervention. Implicitly, however, the following
immediate objectives could be added: (1) To provide BHRPC with a tracklayer machine,
in order to (2) make it available to both entity companies for urgent railway rehabilitation.
The project has not been very successful in reaching these objectives. The tracklayer was
successfully delivered to Sarajevo, but after that two fundamental problems have haunted
the donation. Despite the elaborate arrangement for sharing the machine, it has been
placed only in the Federation since delivery. In fact, nobody from the RS is trained on the
machine. BHRPC sent four people from the Federation to Finland instead of 2 from each
entity. When asked about that, BHRPC simply says that no one came from the RS. There
were a few people sent from the RS to the on location- training upon delivery of the
machine. According to BHRPC, these persons abandoned the training, stating that the
machine was nothing for them. Regardless of whether this explanation is valid , the onesided representation went against the explicit instructions from MFA and DESEC and
the basic condition for the whole donation. There was, however, no action taken from
the MFA regarding the issue.
The other main problem with the donation is that while the machine fulfils all technical
and capacity requirements, it has hardly been used at all during the last four years. Since
1999, the machine has operated approximately hundred hours, laying not more 2,6 km of
rail, most of it in the immediate surroundings of Sarajevo.
According to BHRPC, the reason has been the lack of resources to procure building
materials for the renewal of tracks. The new credits from EIB and EBRD will increase
39
the chances that the machine would come to increased use in 2004 and 2005, but there
would still be a need for training in the RS.
Efficiency. MFA made the assessment that DESEC could produce the tracklayer
“significantly cheaper” than its central European competitors. Of course, this claim would
have been more convincing if an open tender procedure had been used. This was not
done, however.
Sustainability. The work carried out by the tracklayer is estimated to be of good and
long- lasting quality. The main sustainability issue in this project is, however, the fact that
the recipient side does not seem to take very good care of its expensive machine. It is
standing in the open in the derelict Blazoj depot outside Sarajevo. Corrosion is beginning
to show here and there, and some of the instruments/meters are damaged by the
humidity .
Ownership. The ownership of the Tracklayer was the big issue when the request started
to be discussed in the MFA. MFA realised early that the requesting company was
representing only one of the entities, and if they were to be the recipient, (a) Finland
could be seen as not treating the entities even-handedly, and (b) the machine would not
be used for the needs of the whole country. It seems however, that Finland
underestimated the political machinations going in Sarajevo at the time, and expected the
agreement to be respected.
Another aspect of ownership is the level of self- help that the intervention creates. This
donation was planned and packaged in a way to make the recipient as independent as
possible of Finnish help regarding the machine. The package included ample spare parts
and training for the local mechanics as well as the operators.
Management, Monitoring, and administration. The main reason for the project’s
waywardness is poor monitoring and follow-up. While obviously a lot of energy and time
was spent on the planning of the donation, attention lapsed when it came to the
implementation. The fact that four Bosniacs, and no Bosnian Serbs, were sent to training
in Finland was not discovered, or at least not acted upon. The same goes for the training
carried out by VR Track in which only Bosniacs participated.
Documentation regarding this project has been very poor. No final report is available
about the delivery of the machine.
5.3
RECONSTRUCTION AND RETURN
5.3.1
The return process
In 1998 OHR introduced a new body, the Return and Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF)
in the international effort to promote return. This task force had regional and local bodies
spread out over the country overseen by OHR. The idea of the RRTF was to gather all
actors involved in return issues around one table and jointly determine priority return
areas, needs and projects. Joint pressure would also be put on obstructing municipalities
and authorities to implement the Property Law, i e to evict illegal occupants and let the
true owners return. By uniting the donors, aid could also be used conditionally, so as to
bar obstructing municipalities from international assistance. RRTF has varied success in
different parts of the country, but after 1,5 years the persistence of the international
40
community began to pay off. Evictions began to take place and returns occurred in
increasing numbers.
The RRTF has also gone a long way to coordinate the multitude of actors involved in
reconstruction and other return related activities. This is an extremely complex task, made
even more difficult by such factors as uncertain financing, double occupancies , etc. A
useful tool in this coordination has been the mandatory approval by the RRTF for each
return project. While not being an approval procedure in the formal sense, this has forced
all NGOs and other organisations to communicate with the RRTF, which thus gained the
necessary overview to coordinate effectively. It worked largely because most donors
supported it by not financing proposals unless they had RRTF approval.
To date, more than a million refugees and IDPs have returned, and most municipalities
have carried out all necessary evictions. This constitutes a huge success. Another 500 000
will return during the next four years according to the projections.
In 2003, the process towards handing over the responsibility for return has been
intensified. Amendments to the legislation prescribe that the Ministry for Human Rights
and Refugees (MHRR) will take over responsibility for return at the beginning of 2004.
The amendments also contain changes in the State Commission for Return, and the
creation of a Return Fund. The Return Fund will be an independent institution (with the
State Commission as a Board), which will finance return initiatives in the municipalities.
The fund will be financed by the State, the Entities and Brcko District. Matching funds
are anticipated to come from the international community. Four regional centres will be
set up as the field structure of the MHRR. The current regional RRTF offices will hand
over responsibility to the new regional centres by the end of 2003. After that, only a small
unit at the OHR will be left to monitor the implementation of the new legislation. Several
informants have been critical of the process, which they view as premature and
unrealistic. The regional centres will need time to become functional. As it is, they hardly
have time to recruit staff before the end of the year. It remains to be seen if the handover
will take place as foreseen or if last minute changes will take place.
5.3.2
Fida International in the Doboj area
Background. Fida International (former Finnish Free Foreign Mission and LKA) is a
mission and development cooperation organisation serving the Pentecostal Churches in
Finland. Fida International (FI) is one of the seven so-called “framework organisations”
which receive long-term support from MFA’s Unit for Non-Governmental
Organisations. At present, FI receives EUR 3.7 million annually in support of its
development projects and humanitarian aid programme. In addition to the shelter
programmes in BiH, FI has begun to support local Roma communities in community
development, in cooperation with Finnish Roma who belong to the Pentecostal Church.
FI began its work in what was Yugoslavia already during the war, providing humanitarian
aid and starting a shelter programme in 1995. The Terms of Reference for the present
evaluation include the evaluation of FI’s shelter programmes in the Doboj area during
2000-2002, at a cost of EUR 500.000. These shelter programmes covered the villages
Besic (2000-2001), Suho Polje and Sjenina Rijeka (2001), and Kukavac/Donja Brijesnica
area (2002). In BiH, the work of FI with the shelter programmes is guided by the BiH
41
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Strategy of BiH for the implementation of
Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (the Dayton Agreement).
Doboj is situated on the Inter-Entity Border Line and is divided into three parts: old,
central Doboj, which is located in the Republika Srpska, and Doboj East and Doboj
South, which are located in the Federation. There are two city administrations. Over the
years, a great number of donors have been, and still are, engaged in reconstruction and
rehabilitation efforts, including other countries’ government agencies and international
NGOs.
In an interview, the Chief for Reconstruction and Development and Liaison Officer for
International Organisations in the central Doboj municipality praised the good
relationship between Doboj and Finland, both on project and on the official level, with
frequent visits by Finland’s roving ambassador. Over the years, several return projects had
been implemented with the assistance of FI and the Finnish CIMIC, and in addition a
basketball school had been initiated, which is very popular among local youngsters. All
agreements on housing projects followed the RRTF guidelines, including the three
parties: the municipality, the beneficiaries and the implementing organisation.
For each shelter programme, FI makes an assessment of the needs together with a local
architect. Immediately after the war, construction material was not easily available, but
these days both imported and local material can be bought. To begin with, tenders were
invited from a number of companies, but now mostly 1-2 entrepreneurs with
subcontractors are entrusted with the delivery of materials.
The greatest difficulty has been to judge how serious or determined the former
inhabitants of a village are in their wish to return. There is mostly a spokesperson
representing the return community, and some are honest and enthusiastic. It happens,
however, that the person in question is mainly looking after his own interest, and
sometimes this is discovered too late.
The team visited three villages in which the shelter programmes for 2000-2002 were
implemented. Comments from the interviews during these visits are presented below,
followed by general remarks as per our Terms of Reference.
Besic village (2000-2001)
This village is located in Doboj municipality in Republika Srpska. The aim of the
programme was to enable the minority return of Bosnian refugees to their homes in a
Serb community. The organisation for the Bosniac refugees in Doboj participated closely
in the implementation of the programme. FI cooperated with the Finnish CIMIC
Company, as the programme was implemented in its area of operation. 20 houses were
repaired, and 20 families, altogether 92 persons, could return to their homes.
We interviewed a young couple who had returned to the village at the beginning of 2000,
after several years as refugees. They had lived for three years in Doboj East in houses
belonging to other people, which was the main reason for their return. The man was the
village leader. Due to the difficulties to earn a living, they were now, much to their own
disappointment, on the verge of leaving their house and the village to try to find work in
the Federation. The reconstruction of the village had not been accompanied by any
agricultural credits or farming machines. A severe hail storm had destroyed the latest
harvest. Before the war, most of the people had worked in Doboj, combined with
42
agriculture in the village. The young man said that if he left, 30 other persons would
probably do the same.
Suho Polje village (2001)
We visited an elderly couple in one of the villages which received support in 2001. They
had returned in 2000 from Doboj East, where they had lived during the war. More than
130 Serb families had stayed in the village, but had later returned to Lukavac, Maglaj etc.
FI, the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and Mercy Corps had assisted in the reconstruction
and repair of houses. Compared with many other villages, Suho Polje was less destroyed.
The couple had received some assistance from CRS for their agriculture, and the husband
had also started to work as a floor-layer, buying his machinery on credit. Before the war
he had worked in the wood industry in Doboj. They manage to support themselves, but
wish they had some more cattle and farming machines. They have good relations with
their Serb neighbours and have started a water project together with them. Now they are
looking for funds to complete the village water system. Altogether 30-40 families have
returned.
This programme also was implemented in close cooperation with the Finnish CIMIC,
which assisted in the preparation of roads in Besic village (receiving continued support in
2001) and coordinated a USAID electricity project.
Lukavac municipality (2002)
In 2002, a shelter programme was implemented in Tuzla Canton, in the Federation, in
Donji Brijesnica village in the Lukavac municipality for 20 Serb families, and in Dubnica
village in the Kalesia municipality for 1 family, altogether 62 persons. This programme
supported the first minority return of Serbs to this Bosnian municipality, and the
implementation was not disturbed by any negative incidents. The tension among the
returnees decreased and the atmosphere improved significantly as the programme went
on. At the end of 2002, repair was going on in several houses, but out of 21 houses only 5
were inhabited.
At the time of our visit in November 2003, there were many repaired houses, but most of
them were still empty. This programme was a great disappointment to the FI
representative. The Serb community had promised that they would return. He felt
betrayed by the Serb spokesmen. Much work and much money had been wasted. FI had
cooperated with the Finnish CIMIC which had built a network of roads and a bridge, and
assisted in the coordination with USAID for the electricity installation. This,
unfortunately, was never implemented, as USAID decided to scale down their
commitment in the area.
We interviewed an elderly woman and her neighbour, an old retired man. In 1995, the
house of the woman and her husband was completely destroyed in the last military
offensive in the area, which became part of the Federation. However, they receive their
pension from Republika Srpska, only BAM 178 per month. They cannot farm, as their
land is mine-infested. Only 6 persons live in the village, in 3 houses. There is no
electricity. 17 families say that they would return if electricity were installed.
Relevance. The aim of FI’s shelter programmes is “to promote the free and safe return
of the refugees to their homes”. There has also been pressure on the municipalities
created by the Property Law Implementation Plan to ensure that the original owners can
repossess their homes. The programmes have been part of the peace and reconciliation
43
process and have thus been highly relevant in the context of the immediate needs of
numerous returnees.
Effectiveness. In a long-term perspective, the difficulties to earn a living in the old
environment have clearly been underestimated. The fact that the Serb refugees are less
willing to return to the Federation than the Bosniacs and Croats to return to Republika
Srpska has caused unforeseen problems to many donors, not only to FI. But the
difficulties to earn a living are the same in most of the projects, whatever the ethnic
group.
In its annual report for 2002, FI was hoping for a more complete return picture when the
electricity network had been reconstructed and when economic activities had restarted. In
2003, however, it became evident that USAID will not solve the electricity problem, and
that the economic recovery is much slower than expected.
Efficiency. The construction activities of the shelter programmes have been well planned
and implemented. The average cost per house is estimated at EUR 7-8.000. The FI annual
reports are detailed and informative enough. The houses were reconstructed in good
cooperation between the parties concerned, save for the unfortunate, only partly fulfilled
programme in Lukavac municipality. The Serb returnees had in fact carried out the
reconstruction of their houses themselves, and the Republika Srpska had financed those
repairs that required professional labour.
Sustainability. In some areas the sustainability is quite low due to the slow general
economic recovery, but it is difficult to judge if this applies to a majority of the returnees.
Efforts are made in FI’s annual report for 2002 to analyse the failures.
Conclusion. The shelter programmes have functioned very well from a technical point of
view, but it is necessary to pay more attention to the possibilities for the returnees to
support themselves when returning to their home villages. FI should provide advice on
whom to contact with regard to agriculture credits and extension services. Experience
from other areas within Tuzla Canton show that various credit schemes are indeed
available. FI should find it well worth to study such examples e.g. from the cooperation
between other donors and the Lutheran World Federation in Tuzla.
5.3.3
FinnChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation in Ostra Luka/Orasje
Background. FinnChurchAid (FCA), as part of its international development
programme, supports projects which are implemented by the Lutheran World Federation
(LWF). These projects receive financing from a global network of Evangelical Lutheran
churches which provide assistance to poverty-stricken people in acute need all over the
world.
All along the frontlines of the war in BiH the civilian population was severely affected.
One of these areas, in northern Posavina Canton along the Sava river, is the so-called
“Orasje Pocket”. Not being in the centre of events and, before the war, closely related to
Croatia, Orasje town and its surroundings received little attention and reconstruction
support after the war in spite of heavy destruction and densely mine-infested land. But
LWF, in cooperation with FCA, had programmes for humanitarian aid during the war in
this area, which then changed into activities to support reconstruction and return after the
end of the hostilities in 1995/96.
44
In 1996, FCA began to assist in the reconstruction in Orasje and surroundings. A project
plan to get more support to the village Ostra Luka was prepared by FCA and LWF and
submitted to the MFA in January 1997. Unfortunately, it took more than one year before
a decision was taken by the MFA, in March 1998, to support the project with an amount
of FIM 2.445.000. The project was to be coordinated by the LWF office in Osijek,
Croatia, north of the Sava river.
The project was implemented in two phases: Phase I January-May1998, and Phase II
June-October 1998. A final report was submitted in October 1998.
The Project. The overall objective of the project was to help the people of Ostra Luka to
move back to their homes and to return to normal life. The project had two main
objectives: to repair some 70 private houses and to repair essential community buildings
to be able to re-establish the most basic communal and social services.
Thus, the Community Centre with a municipality office and premises for the village
health centre, and an agricultural warehouse were repaired and reconstructed by local
contractors.
The repairs of family houses were carried out by the owners, except for some special
cases where elderly persons and single parents (mothers) received technical assistance.
The houses were divided into four categories, some of them needing only minor repairs,
whereas others were seriously damaged. FCA/LWF provided all the construction
material.
All the construction work was carefully planned, with account taken of the background
and needs of the beneficiaries, the quality and quantity of construction material etc.
Eventually, 104 families, among them several social cases in desperate need, had their
houses repaired. Two inspection rounds by FCA/LWF staff were made, and all work was
completed by the end of October 1998.
When preparing the project, attention had been paid to the aspects of self-sufficiency. A
special survey was carried out to verify the agricultural potential of the beneficiaries. It
showed that 101 families had roughly 140 ha of land, but 60 ha, i.e. 42 per cent, were still
mined. Every second family, or 59 families, had mines in their fields. The families used to
live from farming, husbandry and home gardening. Most of their cattle, some 800 cows,
and other animals were lost in the war. They were also engaged in the production of
baskets and furniture which was their primary source of money income. The fields used
for growing willows, the material for this industry, were heavily mined as well. FCA had
assisted this production already in 1996 by providing new machinery.
In the final project report in October 1998, FCA/LWF were recommended to follow up
the reconstruction project and investigate whether it would be possible to start a dairy
cattle programme. This, however, would require a comprehensive and costly de-mining
programme. According to the final report the de-mining of 50 ha (out of the 560 ha of
arable land still mined) would cost between DM 2.5 and 5 million. In 1998 the Bosnian
Croat Army (HVO) was engaged in some de-mining activities but lacked funds for fuel,
repair and maintenance. A request was submitted from LWF via FCA to the MFA
amounting to DM 114.000 for a 5 months de-mining programme. This operation did not
materialise.
In November 2003, the evaluation team visited Ostra Luka together with a representative
from LWF in Osijek and the former Project Manager for the reconstruction project. Our
45
discussion with representatives of the beneficiaries of the project, the former Village
Council President and his successor, was completely dominated by the difficulty to make
one’s living. All the reconstructed buildings, both private and communal, were of good
standard and well kept. The possibilities to sustain oneself were, however, almost nonexistent. The tobacco harvests, representing half of the agricultural production, had failed
during the last three years due to bad weather. The basket making had come to a standstill as the competition from other parts of the world is too keen. The mines continue to
be the main problem. A good part of the best land is still mine-infested and not much
clearing is going on. Out of 700 men who participated in the war, only some 200 have
jobs. They feel that they were indirectly punished because they managed to remain and
resist. Before the war, 300 people went abroad. Relatives sent money during the war, but
that has gradually stopped.
Visits to some families’ houses confirmed the description of the living conditions by the
Village Council President. Unemployment is a heavy burden, and the receding market for
their wicker products and the mines are the dominating problems. Large fields close to
the houses are inaccessible and present a great danger, especially to the children.
The reconstruction project had provided individual support, for which they were very
grateful. Would it be possible, in a second project, to assist in a more general way? The
LWF office in Tuzla is supporting a number of projects to engage people in economic
activities – could LWF offices in Tuzla and Osijek cooperate?
Relevance. As people wanted to return and highly appreciate the assistance they
received, the project can be described as most relevant. The project was implemented in a
participatory manner, engaging the beneficiaries in the reconstruction of their own
homes. The ownership factor is high.
Effectiveness. People have been able to come back, the houses have been well repaired,
but there has not been a return to “normal life”, as a great number of the families cannot
make a living. The heavy mining prevents them from using their land.
Efficiency. The implementation of the project was very efficient. The villagers repaired
their own houses, with few and understandable exceptions, and the FCA/LWF
coordinator monitored the project skilfully.
Sustainability. Very low, primarily due to the lack of de-mining.
Conclusion. Apparently the LWF representatives from Osijek and the former project
coordinator were taken aback by the depressing picture with which they were confronted.
The wisdom of supporting house reconstruction to an amount of FIM 2.445.000 for
people who cannot sustain themselves must be questioned. The successful Sidasupported cooperation between LWF and World Vision and the local agro-industry in the
villages around Tuzla could be studied and perhaps inspire alternative solutions. The
project in Ostra Luka was carefully planned, and under the heading “economic and
financial sustainability” in the project proposal it is stated that “the village may need some
further help for the rehabilitation of agriculture. This can only happen if de-mining takes
place in the village.”
For humanitarian and ethic reasons, but also for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency, it
is desirable that the request from FCA for support to de-mining be revived and
supported. The way things look today, this project is not completed.
46
5.3.4
The Finnish CIMIC work
Background. CIMIC, or Civil –Military Cooperation, is originally a NATO concept. It
denotes the activities that a NATO contingent carries out to secure and uphold good
relations between itself and the civilian society in which it is posted. While the concept
may have existed for a long time, it is probably safe to say that it had not been applied in
practice before the peace keeping mission in BIH. This is where it has been practiced and
where it has developed into what it is today. The NATO-led multinational peace keeping
force in BiH has consisted of up to 40 different nations, and each participating nation is
expected to take care of its own relations with the surrounding society in the way it sees
fit. In many cases this is done simply by keeping an open dialogue with people and the
local authorities, trying to solve any conflicts or problems that occur. Quite early in the
mission, however, CIMIC started to take on a more tangible character in BiH. The
reasons behind this development have partly to do with the powerful machinery that the
armies had with them and which could be put to use for the war-devastated communities.
It also gave the soldiers something to do, apart from patrolling, something which made
them feel useful. Additional factors were pressure and requests from the civilian
authorities (to help reconstruct roads and bridges), and later from the rest of the
international community (to be a supportive force in the return process). CIMIC in terms
of relief and reconstruction projects is known to have been carried out by Finland,
Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Turkey, Italy, Germany and USA
Surprisingly, the SFOR central command in Sarajevo has no overview or systematic
knowledge of what has been accomplished by CIMIC in BiH.. In some cases, like
Finland, this has evolved further. The Finnish force contribution became a dedicated
CIMIC company. It has received special funding to enable it to carry out projects in the
local environment.
The Finnish government has taken a great interest in the CIMIC activities. The Ministry
of Defence established a working group in 1998 to plan and design leadership training for
the specific purpose of CIMIC in crisis management. This has been followed by other
initiatives, some in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. After contributing
successfully with a CIMIC company also in Kosovo, Finland was asked by the allied
forces to send a CIMIC company to Afghanistan as well. Furthermore, Finland will in the
near future finance CIMIC courses in three locations in Africa to promote the concept
among peace keeping troops there.
CIMIC, and in particular the Finnish CIMIC experience, has also been the subject of a
dissertation at the Military Academy by Major Petteri Kurkinen. According to him, the
government work and involvement in CIMIC is one of the ways in which Finland is
strengthening its resource base and its international crisis management capacity to meet
the requirement from EU on both the civilian and military side.
The Finnish CIMIC concept. The development of the Finnish CIMIC concept in BiH
can be divided into three phases. The first phase was 1996 – 2000 in which the
formation of CIMIC took place. Finland’s first contribution to SFOR (or IFOR at the
time) was a reconstruction battalion. It was stationed in Doboj in the NordPol brigade,
which until 2001 was the home of the Finnish as well as Swedish, Polish, Danish, and
Norwegian SFOR contingents.
When it had completed the construction of the camp the Finnish battalion went on to
carry out some small projects “outside the wires”, such as the reconstruction of schools in
the area. The battalion’s own funds were used for the minor costs that occurred.
47
In 1997, the reconstruction battalion was replaced with an infantry battalion, but the small
projects continued, in close cooperation with the other contingents. Finnish MFA
funding started in 1998 with a FIM 3 million grant until the end of 1999. After that, a new
decision was taken each year until 2003 of approximately the same value. In addition,
there was funding from the European Commission as well as minor national funding
from Sweden and Norway. All financing was channelled through the G5 office, which is a
brigade- level section which coordinates with other international agencies and has the
overall responsibility for all civil- military relations. CIMIC units report to G5.
The second phase was from February 2000 to May 2001, when a new Finnish
commander (LtCol Reima Helminen) of the G5 started to work on a new and more
effective CIMIC structure. He put Major Heikki Wala in charge of creating the new
structure. The result was the CIMIC Company. This company was a mix of all
nationalities of the Nordpol Brigade. There was a project office, which was responsible
for designing and planning the projects. Their planning input came from the field from
three “centres” dividing the Area of Responsibility (AOR) between them. A Finnish
construction platoon was also part of the parcel, which could perform various tasks
requiring heavy machinery. The company was led by a Company Commander and a
Deputy, with the help of an Information Officer and local interpreters. In addition, a
National Support Element handled project payments to local contractors. The project
office had six project officers, two per CIMIC centre, and a Project Office commander.
Clearly, the company was well equipped in terms of human resources.
The third and final phase started when the CIMIC company was moved to Tuzla Eagle
base. From May 2001 to July 2003, Finns provided a CIMIC company to the
Multinational Brigade North, serving two American task forces and one Russian task
force, and in 2003, also the Nordpol brigade. In Tuzla, the whole Finnish contingent of
60 soldiers was completely specialised and concentrated on CIMIC. No heavy machinery
was included, however. Local contractors were hired to do the jobs needed and
occasionally American machinery was utilised.
While the AOR in Tuzla was four times bigger than in Doboj, the same organisational
structure was applied. There were three CIMIC Centres, with 2-3 teams in each. Each
team had between 2-8 members, each covering 2-4 municipalities, which included a
maximum of 20 return villages.
Activities depended, on the military side, on the wishes of the task forces, which were
communicated to CIMIC via “cooperation meetings”. On the civilian side, the central
forum was the Return and Reconstruction Task force, RRTF. Most reconstruction
projects were initiated through the RRTF.
In Tuzla, CIMIC’s role was also formalised in writing. Procedures and criteria were
included in the overall Standing Orders for the Brigade, and it was drafted by the Finns.
The purpose remained to provide direct and indirect support for the battalion’s
operations. For example, the projects always had an indirect impact on the SFOR troops
in that they improved security and gave good publicity for SFOR.
In 2001, 27 projects were implemented: 16 road projects, and 6 housing projects. The
total value was EUR 1,193,646.
In 2002, 46 projects were implemented, e g: 13 roads, 7 bridges, 7 housing projects, and
10 miscellaneous micro projects. The total value was EUR 1,120.857
48
In 2003, 74 projects were implemented, e g: 15 roads, 17 housing projects, 9 water
projects, and 25 miscellaneous micro projects. The total value was EUR 827,519 (only six
months)
Reconstruction projects during 2002 and 2003 are the primary focus of the present
evaluation. From statistics available, it can be seen that there is a clear general trend
towards smaller and less costly projects, so- called “miscellaneous micro projects”. In
terms of value, housing projects dominate the picture, although there are a larger number
of road projects. It can also be seen that the pace of implementing projects became
higher. During the last six months, no less than 74 projects were implemented.
Not only MFA funding financed these projects. There were some EU funding and some
from USAID through the US SFOR contingent. Finally, the CIMIC company had its own
funds which were devoted to certain projects. Five projects were financed by EU during
2002-2003.
From the ministry’s side there were two important limits on the projects: They could cost
a maximum of 50 000 EUR and they should last no longer than the current SFOR
mandate (extended on a yearly basis). From the brigade command’s side the following
criteria on projects were important: The project should: (i) support minority return; (ii)
have the support of RRTF; (iii) repair the damages caused by war; (iv) have a de-mining
certificate; (v) involve the municipality and the beneficiaries; and (vi) minimise the use of
SFOR resources.
Projects visited. In the following section, the projects visited by the team are described
one by one. In the subsequent section they will be assessed together in terms of the
various aspects prescribed in the ToR.
1. Zeljova village, in Banovici municipality in the Federation, 2001-2002.
This is the largest and probably the most controversial of the CIMIC projects. Zeljova
was identified by Banovici municipality and CIMIC as a Serb return village. RRTF,
however, did not believe that many Serbs would actually return, so it was not approved.
CIMIC went ahead anyway, which caused some tension with the RRTF. The pace of
return was disappointing at first, but according to Mr Wala, who was then in charge, only
seven out of 74 houses are still unoccupied.
Regardless of the occupancy rate, there was another valid argument for pursuing the
Zeljova project. By reconstructing these houses, at the Serbs’ explicit request, it became
possible to evict the beneficiaries where they were displaced (i e in Divic, RS) on the
grounds of double occupancy, and thus free Bosniac houses for return.
CIMIC did everything in Zeljova: roads, water and construction of houses and
installations. The cost of the Zeljova project was all in all about EUR 800,000. It was part
of a larger reconstruction package for which CIMIC received special funding in 2001,
about EUR 1.1 million. In addition to Zeljova, it covered housing projects also in
Banovici in the Federation and Bratunac, Srebrenica and Zvornik in the RS.
This was the first time that CIMIC actually reconstructed houses, and it was the first large
scale project. It was not repeated, mainly because it tied up too many CIMIC resources
for too long. The above mentioned guidelines in terms of maximum total value and time
limits were adhered to in all later projects.
2. Vrasevac, 2002
49
This is another Serb village in Banovici municipality where CIMIC reconstructed two
houses, the road and the water installation. In both Vrasevac and Zeljova, cooperation
with FCA and LWF made it possible to provide the returnees with agricultural inputs,
which will help them to sustain themselves and get established. The beneficiaries can
compose their own package up to a value of BAM 2500 (EUR 1275), which means for
example a maximum of 8000 strawberry plants or a green house, or 250 fruit trees.
3. Upgrades of housing in Josanica: Budget EUR 34 000, RS, 15 km south of Zvornik.
Josanica was a predominantly Muslim village before the war. It was in the frontline during
a period, so the houses were totally destroyed. It is quite a large village. Return has been
going on since 1998, and there are still people returning. Many donors and agencies have
been involved in the reconstruction and support to the returnees. At one point, there was
a joint programme with two NGO’s with house reconstruction in phases. But after the
first phase had been finished, the second NGO stopped its activities for some reason.
The result was that over a hundred houses were unfinished. CIMIC took responsibility
for 21 of these, and installed electricity, a front door, and a complete bath room in all of
them.
In one of the houses lived a father and a son, and they had been living there off and on
since 1999. They were now waiting for the rest of the family. They were very satisfied
with their installations, even though they have had to pay for some of the works needed.
4. Road reconstruction in Rasevo, 20 km south of Zvornik.
In Rasevo, the first mixed return project took place in 2001, which was an important
objective at the time of the RRTF, to serve as an example. Two neighbouring villages, one
Muslim and one Serb, had co-existed before the war, and both populations had become
displaced, as the frontline went back and forth in that area. All houses were completely
destroyed and the villages were mined. There was never any violence between villagers,
however.
When the first Serb returnees came in 2001, they had to walk 2-3 km through the forest
because the road was destroyed. When RRTF found out that there was a will to return
also on the Bosniac side, CIMIC was asked to build the road. In this case the road was
essential for the project. No material or machines could make it to the village without it.
Now, most of the original inhabitants in both villages have returned and once again coexist in peace.
5. Housing for Roma families in Srednja Trnova, 2003: Budget EUR 46 100, outside
Bijeljina.
Roma people are as marginalised in BiH as elsewhere in Europe, and although they were
often hard hit by the war, they are often forgotten. UNHCR had identified a group of
Roma families who had been living in sheds made of plastic for three years and tried to
persuade different donors to help them. In the end, it was only CIMIC who managed to
assist them. Three houses were reconstructed in spring 2003. (CIMIC delivered material
and the families paid neighbours and friends to build the houses). Now they have houses
but the electricity is only provisionally (and illegally) connected via a neighbour. Also this
group was visibly appreciative of the assistance they had received.
6. Janjari school in Ugljevik, RS , 2002: Budget EUR 12 750.
50
CIMIC staff came into contact with the school when reconstructing houses nearby. The
school was run down, and since it would get new pupils through the return, it was
decided to renovate it. It is a school with 32 pupils, grade 1-5 , but with room for more.
The school maintenance man was disappointed by the quality of the work that had been
done. The fire stoves were too small to heat the large class rooms, so the children were
freezing. The paint was already after one year cracking and coming off the walls. The
reservoirs for the toilets were of such a bad quality that they were broken more often than
working.
7. Roads and house clearing in Gorni Trestanica, 2003.
This Serb return village was one of the last projects for CIMIC during the spring of 2003.
It is actually a FinnChurchAid (FCA) project in which 26 houses will be reconstructed.
FCA has, of course, a special relation with CIMIC since their country representative, Mr
Wala, was one of the leading figures within CIMIC previously.
CIMIC’s role in this project was to reconstruct the roads and driveways, and to clear
house foundations. The returnees are given the material and will build their own houses.
When the buildings are ready, FCA has contracted local firms to install electricity, water
pipes, ceramics, and gutters/drainage pipes. At present 9 houses are ready and people are
moving back from Zvornik, Doboj, Brcko and Bijeljina.
Relevance. The relevance of all reconstruction projects for return was ultimately assessed
by the RRTF structure. Finnish CIMIC always followed the RRTF line. There was, as
mentioned, the exception of Zeljova, and there is another example, Visori village in Celic.
These are the only known two cases where CIMIC has acted outside the RRTF. The
conclusion is therefore that the CIMIC projects have been relevant in terms of serving
priority needs for minority return. It should be added that the CIMIC interventions were
often the key contribution that was lacking for successful return.
In terms of post-conflict and peace building, the return process is absolutely central. It
should not be forgotten that the projects were only the most tangible part of the CIMIC
work in support of return. The contracting of local construction firms gives a positive
side effect in the form of a boost to the local economy. Quite often return projects
created tension between the majority population and the minority returnees. Projects were
therefore increasingly incorporated measures which benefited also the majority
population. The constant assessments and patrolling by CIMIC made returnees and IDPs
feel more secure and accompanied. Their willingness and ability to provide information
and channel communication is another example of how they contributed.
The projects have been implemented in the Federation slightly more than in the RS, but
targeting Bosnian Serbs slightly more than Bosniacs.
Effectiveness. Effectiveness in terms of goal fulfilment has been high in all of the visited
projects. The quality of the works has been checked by CIMIC weekly site inspections, as
well as by a routine of not paying the last 5% of a contract until 12 months after the job is
finished. In this way the quality and durability of construction could be checked. This
procedure could, of course, not be applied during 2003, since the company was to leave
BiH in the same year.
Related to this or not, the few complaints about CIMIC work has been about poor quality
of the work. The school in Janjari is one example out of the sample studied here. OHR
51
stated that there also had been complaints about poor quality in projects in Bratunac and
Srebrenica in RS.
Efficiency. Finnish CIMIC always used competitive bidding to choose the contractor for
a project. It seems safe to say that the construction work could not have been much
cheaper with the same level of quality. Even though this is of course positive and a sign
of efficiency, it is not possible to say that CIMIC is an efficient way of implementing
reconstruction in general. While on the surface it looks great: zero Euros from the
development cooperation budget going to overhead and administration, it is in reality an
extremely expensive way of working. The Defence forces have not been able to give
information on what the costs have been in BiH, but Kosovo can be used as a
comparison. In the first deployment to Kosovo in 1999 there were a total of 700-800
Finnish troops. The total cost was estimated at 445 million marks. This means that every
soldier cost 556 250 marks (EUR 93,555) for the first year (445 million divided by 800). If
you have 60 CIMIC soldiers in the field, you immediately have an astronomical overhead,
which cannot be compared to any other aid agency.
One aspect is also the number of people involved. Seen from a strictly organisational
viewpoint, 60 people are a huge number seen in relation to the tasks. One can compare
with FCA which will now continue the work after CIMIC, and which has one
international staff person in the country.
Ownership. In the beginning, CIMIC projects were done by the military with military
machinery for the local population. Gradually the projects became more sophisticated and
included self-help components. The use of contractors instead of doing the work also
helped to increase the sense of local ownership. Towards the end more and more energy
was devoted to persuading the municipalities to contribute to the reconstruction projects.
In a few cases this also succeeded.
Sustainability. The big risk with return-projects is that the beneficiaries are not serious
about returning, and intend only to sell the house or use it as a summer house. There are
hundreds of newly built houses financed by the international community in BiH, which
have met this fate. According to one of the interviewed CIMIC Officers, each return
project was for this reason thoroughly researched before it was started. As an example, in
the above described Gorni Trestanica project, all beneficiaries were checked individually,
to see if they have received land plots in their current location, if they had the right
motivation for returning, etc. Out of 62 applicants only 26 were accepted, even though
the project was planned for 30 houses.
Even if all the intended beneficiaries do return, there is a multitude of problems which
threaten the sustainability of any return project, the most common one, of course, being
the often complete lack of jobs and ways to support a family. The same criticism as in the
previous chapter regarding unsustainable return projects can to a great extent be levelled
at the projects studied here. It is true that CIMIC did not design most of these projects,
and was in most cases only providing one component, but this does not lessen the
problem, nor take away responsibility of CIMIC for the effects of their activity. A
responsible donor must see to the big picture and endeavour to reach the end goal which
must be sustainable return.
Monitoring, administration and management. The field organisation of the CIMIC
company has been described above, and monitoring of the projects has been found well
52
working. What is less clear is how monitoring and management of the CIMIC activity has
been handled in Finland.
There have been several different actors involved on the Finnish end. The organisation
around CIMIC was changed in 2001, when the Peace Support Operations Branch (PSO)
of the Finnish Defence Forces took over all operational responsibility for the CIMIC
units. Logistically, CIMIC and all peace- keeping troops are served by the International
centre (or FINCENT). It was previously under the Ministry of Defence but has now been
transferred to the Defence Forces. At the same time, the CIMIC company has had more
or less direct relations with the Desk Officer at MFA regarding the projects, bypassing
PSO. In the Final report, the CIMIC commander expressed frustration over a confusion
of roles, and recommended that one point of contact in the Defence Forces should have
responsibility for projects- related issues. PSO comments that the procedures are in line
with that recommendation since 2001, but have not been followed, mainly because of old
habit.
The reorganisation led to a drastic improvement in the documentation of the CIMIC
company. Before 2001 there is very limited information available on what was actually
done, but from then on, each project was documented and accounted for.
It has not been possible for the evaluation team to speak to the person working with
CIMIC in the Unit for West Balkans, so very little is known about how the MFA has
monitored the CIMIC activities, about the administrative procedures and how the
Ministry actually views the CIMIC project implementation. The financing of the CIMIC
activities has come from the development cooperation budget, and each project proposal
from CIMIC has been individually approved by the Project Committee in the
Department for Development cooperation in the MFA.
There has been an agreement between the MFA and The Ministry of Defence on the use
of the funds. It is a standard agreement for using services of any governmental authority
in development cooperation.
CIMIC units as aid actors. The SFOR Mission Statement says that ”The Stabilisation
Force (SFOR) will deter hostilities and stabilise the peace, contribute to a secure
environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility
(AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil
implementation organisations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace,
without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” It is mainly by
force of the “contribute to a secure environment” clause that the CIMIC activities have
been motivated.
How has the CIMIC company been perceived from the point of view of beneficiaries and
other actors in BiH? For this purpose, interviews have been made with some local
government officials, beneficiaries, the principal organisations responsible for return,
OHR and UNHCR, as well as with several organisations with which CIMIC has
cooperated, like the international NGO Mercy Corps, and FIDA International and
FinnChurchAid from Finland.
One of the strengths of the Finnish CIMIC company was its access to flexible and
reliable funding. This meant that CIMIC could do what other donors and organisation
could not, and many times this has proven crucial for the success of a return project. This
could be the road which was absolutely essential for trucks to be able to deliver building
materials, but which no donor could build due to budget restrictions. The funding
53
arrangement also made it possible to take swift decisions. Approval for a project could be
received in a matter of days. This made them reliable. When CIMIC said that they could
do it, one could trust them that it would be done.
Some of the strengths of Finnish CIMIC that have been pointed out by different
interviewees stem from the simple fact that they are part of a large military mission. One
example is their vast field presence. Like no civilian organisation, no matter how large,
were SFOR able to cover ground. Finnish CIMIC had enough personnel and vehicles to
be in 5 or 10 different places or meetings at once, where any other organisation could
cover at the most one or two. CIMIC could pick up information in one place, verify it in
another and send it to a third place, everywhere in person. Having said this, CIMIC, or
rather SFOR, has been criticised by some for having very poor communication between
nations/AORs.
Another obvious strength is the access to all the resources that a modern military mission
possesses. As an example, when UNHCR in Bijeljina had problems with verifying the
distribution of land plots at the outskirts of the town, Finnish CIMIC could respond by
taking aerial photographs from a US helicopter. Swift mobilisation of a large number of
trucks to transport returnees and their belongings is another example.
Being Finnish seems to have worked to their advantage. According to one of the officers
who served in Tuzla, and also Kurkinen, being Finnish was perfect in an area where US
and Russia had to cooperate. CIMIC was sometimes a communication link between these
two nations. They are also more uncontroversial than the major powers in the eyes of the
civilians. Apart from the symbolism of being from a small and neutral country, Finnish
CIMIC benefited from the fact that its recruitment was from army reservists who had
civilian professions and experience. In this sense, Finland did not send out anything else
than its absolute elite for CIMIC purposes. For work with civilian projects for civilians,
experience from civilian life is of course an asset. Many other, professional armies cannot
provide this type of expertise. Furthermore, the Finnish CIMIC company had developed
and tested a field structure before coming to Tuzla, which also was an asset.
According to the UNHCR, the Finns with their personal style – low key, happy, calm,
friendly, smart, educated, prestige- less - had a special way of working with which they
could assess the security situation much better than other SFOR nations. In the process
they improved the security situation.
One limitation that has been found is that CIMIC soldiers are not the best negotiators,
and they are not comfortable in all types of difficult and tense situations which sometimes
occur in return processes. Nor are they well versed in legal issues and human rights or
humanitarian law.
They discovered themselves that they had a definite disadvantage when it came to
reaching the women in the returnee communities. In the last year they recruited 2 female
soldiers which made a great difference, but it was not enough .
While many, including UNHCR, appreciated all the information gathered and shared by
CIMIC, it goes without saying that in terms of gathering information and crosschecking
it, local Bosnian people are far better at it than any foreign soldier with a limited stay in
the country.
54
One could think the non-transparency, and unpredictability (if a crisis occurs, it will of
course have priority) which is perhaps inevitable for the military, could be perceived as a
problem for partners. This does not seem to be the case, however.
Rotation is a weak point for most SFOR contingents. Many organisations find it difficult
to cooperate with military officers who are replaced after six months with a complete
newcomer. The Finnish model of rotation in which all stay at least a year and only half of
the contingent rotate at the same time, received a lot of praise. This is an important lesson
for all nations wanting to engage in CIMIC. In order to have time to fully grasp a
complex and often politicised context on the ground, a 12 month rotation is minimum.
As has been stated above, a CIMIC company is very expensive to keep in the field. This is
the number one reason why a CIMIC company can never be fairly compared to an NGO.
A CIMIC company can only be a sensible alternative tool if it is already on the spot for
other reasons.
All humanitarian actors interviewed were asked if it was not odd or even unsuitable to
have military carrying out reconstruction for return. While they acknowledge that there
are situations where military involvement in humanitarian affairs is inappropriate, no one
felt that it presented a problem in the BiH context at this stage of the peace- building
process. Possibly, it would have been different in the years immediately after the war.
A weak point is the time limit of the engagement to one year max (SFOR mandate) which
makes lasting quality control and follow- up difficult. Here, the Defence Forces and MFA
have taken the right decision to limit activity to small and simple projects only.
For some reason, no reports from CIMIC have been in English. This is in spite of the
fact that the agreement between the Ministry of Defence and MFA says that reporting
should be in English. The Finnish-only reporting makes it difficult for evaluators, but also
inhibits Finnish sharing of its experience of CIMIC with other countries. While the
documentation regarding the project activity was improved – or rather started – in 2001 it
has still some way to go before it reaches an acceptable standard. The figures in the final
report are inconsistent and the fact that the final report is the only analytic document in
five years is telling.
In conclusion, a CIMIC company is a very efficient and powerful instrument, and it can
well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and humanitarian projects. In
this work, however, it needs to be guided by the specialised civilian agencies that are the
proper agencies to set priorities and coordinate the work.
5.4
THE JUDICIARY
In the wake of armed conflict, law and order suffer. During the years immediately after
the war, the reconstruction programme was mainly focused on the rehabilitation of
infrastructure, the restart of economic activities and the re-establishment of social services
in support of refugee and IDP return. Subsequently, however, the lack of initiatives
concerning the reform of justice and law-enforcement structures has been criticized.
According to several commentators, it should have been a major priority from the start.
Important opportunities early on to establish firmly the rule of law were lost, allowing for
corruption, financial crime and trans-national organised criminal networks to grow and
consolidate.
55
5.4.1
Independent Judicial Commission
Background. Among the population in general there is little confidence in the judicial
system. For poor people it is not easy to get access to the law. There is a great need for a
reliable and independent judiciary, free from political influence. The rule of law is a basic
requirement for a functioning democratic society. In addition, in BiH of today, it is an
absolute condition for the participation in the EU harmonisation process.
A large number of donors are active in this sector. The EU is the major donor, providing
economic assistance through the CARDS programme (Community Assistance for
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), which has been designed as the main
instrument for support to the countries covered by the Stabilisation and Association
Process. The most urgent elements in the “Road Map” presented by the European
Commission in March 2000 are gradually implemented, albeit at a slow pace.
Already in 1998, and repeatedly, the Peace Implementation Council urged the High
Representative to develop a comprehensive plan for judicial reform and welcomed the
establishment of a Judicial Structure Assessment Programme (JSAP) (initiated by the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Elisabeth Rehn). Further, in July
1999, the OHR presented a “Comprehensive Judicial Reform Strategy for BiH”. This
plan covered the entire criminal justice system, from the initial investigations by police,
through prosecution, and trial appeal, to the correctional system.
Based on the findings of JSAP and on this Strategy, and with the participation of i a
Finnish expertise, the legal structures were created for an Independent Judicial
Commission (IJC), which was established in March 2001 to be responsible for reforming
the judicial and prosecutorial system of BiH. The IJC consists of judges, prosecutors and
lawyers, both local and international, and it reports to the High Representative, who
provides the means necessary for the execution of the work.
During most of 2001, a Comprehensive Judicial Review process based on a peer review
of judges and prosecutors took place, only to be declared a failure on completion in
December 2001. Instead, in January 2002, the IJC recommended re-selection of judges
and prosecutors, using a more investigative approach covering their professional
background, examining complaints against them, assessing their suitability for office and
taking action against those “who act in violation of their legal obligations”. In addition, it
was decided to reinforce the review through a reappointment process to
• ensure independence by depoliticising the appointment process
• streamline the review system by eventually creating a single High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council at State level with decision-making powers over selection,
recruitment appointment, career progress or termination.
• restructure the Court system by reducing the number of courts and adapting the
number of judges and prosecutors to the new Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes.
There was a strong negative reaction from high-level members of the judiciary to these
proposed measures. However, the reinforcement of the review process through the
reappointment of judges and prosecutors became one feature of a larger package of
tangible judicial reform measures in 2002-2003, including laws on the establishment of
three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC) at State and Entity levels. IJC
received a new mandate from the OHR lasting until the end of December 2003, which
was recently extended until the end of March 2004. By then, the process of
56
reappointment solely on the basis of merit, under way since September 2002, of some
1.000 judges and prosecutors on middle and lower levels should be completed.
The intention is to merge the three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils into one
single BiH HJPC as of April 2004, and with some sections of IJC as its permanent
secretariat. Draft legislation has been prepared by the BiH and Entity Ministries of Justice
and submitted to Parliament for adoption. A single HJPC is one of the conditions for an
EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The IJC was expected to be down-sized by
1/3 in December 2003 and then to wind up at the end of March 2004. By then, the total
judicial reform process will have gone on for more than five years.
The EU and the US have been the main donors to IJC together with a substantial
contribution from Norway for court administration and management. As already stated,
Finnish legal experts - altogether 7-8 persons – have participated in the reform process in
various capacities since 2000. Most of them have been employed by the OHR. One of
them was seconded by the MFA. Financial support, EUR 159.500, was provided by
Finland in August 2001 for the recruitment, training, deployment and supervision of local
legally qualified staff (8 lawyers and 4 investigators) to assist in the review and
appointment of judges and prosecutors in the Entity HJPCs. Their recruitment was
delayed and the agreement was extended until May 2003, when a final report was
submitted by the IJC. Additional support was provided in October 2003, amounting to
approximately EUR 30.000, for the recruitment of another 6 local investigators to assist
in January – March 2004 with the back-log of cases in the HJPCs. All costs related to the
IJC are covered by Finnish Civil Crisis Management funds.
The Dayton Agreement provided for the establishment of a UN International Police Task
Force (IPTF), which in January 2003 was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) for
a period of three years. This project is an EU Crisis Management Operation in close
cooperation with the IJC, and Finland participates with a contingent of 18 police
superintendents. This support will be gradually downsized.
Relevance. Entrenching the law is one of the core tasks of the Office of the High
Representative in support of the BiH constitution. Furthermore, respect for the rule of
law is a condition for full participation in the EU Stabilisation and Association Process
and of a high priority in the country’s transition to a democratic state. It is also one of
Finland’s priority areas in the development cooperation with BiH.
Thus, Finland’s support to judicial reform, even if limited, has been highly relevant. The
provision of local lawyers and investigators in support of the long and cumbersome
reappointment process was – and still is – most timely. The participation of highly
qualified Finnish expertise in the drafting of laws, restructuring and consolidation of
courts etc. has been most valuable.
Effectiveness. The local lawyers and investigators of judges and prosecutors financed by
Finland on two occasions provided good support in the appointment and review work.
They established procedures for a successful reselection process, examining complaints,
preparing profile reports, conducting investigations, providing legal support to the IJC.
According to the IJC they contributed to a stronger and more effective judiciary and
prosecutorial service in BiH. The wealth of data collected during the reselection process
has now been fed into a tailor-made database to serve as an information resource for the
permanent secretariat of the future State HJPC.
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The qualified Finnish legal experts have been intensively engaged in the comprehensive
judicial reform process. All except one have been directly recruited by the OHR or the
EC.
Efficiency. IJC’s use of the funds under the first Finnish contribution was well
administered, with a request in the final report in May 12001 for permission to use a
minor unspent amount for additional investigative activities, if possible together with
additional funding.
Sustainability. The issue of sustainability of the judicial reforms, i.e. the financing of
physical structures, equipment, staffing etc. can be complicated during the first years
because of severance payments, renovation of premises etc. In the long run it is expected
that the reforms will yield substantial savings for the court system, i a as a result of the
merger or closure of courts. Experience from a Norwegian project on “Court
Administration and Management Reform in the Courts of BiH”, targeting three pilot
courts, will benefit all courts in the country. This includes the case registration system,
case management, back-log reduction, staff issues, installation of compatible computer
systems etc. Three reports on Court budgeting and funding have been issued by the IJC
with short- and long-term recommendations.
The issue of sustainability is also one of ownership, which can be jeopardised unless
enough attention is paid to the participation of the local community. There has been
much criticism on the local level, not only of the judicial reform process as such, but also
of its content, i.e. the change from a traditional continental system where the judge has a
prominent role, to a system in which lawyers and prosecutors get increased investigative
powers. According to the critics, there has not been enough interaction with the local
community, and insufficient consultations in connection with the drafting of the new
laws. The American experts have been accused of ignorance of other legal systems than
their own etc. Some of this criticism probably reflects the agony of transition and is
unavoidable when such far-reaching reforms are introduced.
Administration. As mentioned, the rule of law is one of Finland’s priority areas in
development cooperation. It appears, however, that most of the Finnish experts had to
find their way to the OHR on their own, by way of personal contacts, rather than through
any action on the part of the MFA. Only one of them is seconded by the MFA, financed
by Civil Crisis Management (CCM) funds in the MFA’s Political Department, as were the
two projects in support of local lawyers and investigators in BiH. Apparently, work is
going on in several ministries to coordinate training, working conditions, recruitment,
rules for leave of absence etc. According to information, the Ministry of the Interior is
drafting new rules for CCM and has the national responsibility for the national resource
base, whereas the Political Department in the MFA has the budget responsibility and
takes the (political) decisions.
In spite of repeated efforts we have not obtained a copy of the decision on the second
Finnish contribution to BiH (October 2003), nor information about the exact amount
allocated. There was also a poor follow-up capacity in the West Balkans unit, with outdated and incomplete information about project staff serving in the IJC etc.
Conclusions. The Finnish support to judicial reform in BiH has been valuable and
timely. When interviewed, the Finnish legal experts have expressed concern regarding the
strong pressure from the international community to speed up the reform. Reforms must
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be allowed to take time. The more you involve local staff, the better the results. Now it is
time for the BiH court system to assume responsibility for recruitment and discipline.
Any future Finnish support to the legal sector should not only be based on the priorities
of BiH, but also be carefully coordinated with the initiatives of other donors. Much
information and experience is to be found in Slovenia, which will become an EU member
state in May 2004. There is a great need for continued support in various areas of the legal
sector in order to implement the reforms: Legal drafting and much training, study visits
and international exchange (as the Nordic countries have systems corresponding to those
of BiH), equipment to the courts, support to Law Faculties and their libraries etc. The
Finnish experts’ long and comprehensive experience from BiH should be tapped for
advice and knowledge.
5.5
OTHER ALREADY EVALUATED PROJECTS
In line with the Terms of Reference, the results of some recent evaluations carried out by
others will also be taken into consideration in this evaluation. The projects evaluated are:
the Social Sector Support project, the Gender Equity and Equality Project, the Teacher
Education Development Project, and the Support to the ERNO News exchange.
The evaluations have been studied, but we have also interviewed some of the projects’
stakeholders in BiH to be able to correctly assess the evaluation results.
5.5.1
The Social Sector Support Project
Background/sector. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of BiH, which was
concluded in 2003, after extensive consultations, describes a social welfare system in acute
crisis. The pensions systems and the systems for protection of war veterans and invalids
are bleeding, since there are so few employees paying pensions fees. Large groups in BiH
are on the verge of slipping below the poverty line, and needs are increasing rapidly while
budget resources are very limited. As in several of the Balkan states, the social expenditure
far outweighs the budget resources. At the same time, BiH and in particular the
Federation has the lowest public spending in relation to GDP on social welfare in the
region.
The systems are fragmented with authority on several levels (in particular in the
Federation), and statistics of beneficiaries are very unreliable. According to the evaluation
of the SSSP carried out by Kendra Gregson in August 2003, in BiH “the social sector has
been compartmentalised with social assistance being looked at under one ministry, health
another, education another, the built environment another etc. NGOs were perceived as
carrying out activities in the interim until the government could take them over.
Businesses were not seen as playing a role at all”. Reforms to decrease and harmonise
various pensions and welfare payments are severely needed, but are of course politically
sensitive and difficult to initiate.
The main international actor in the social sector is the World Bank which has launched
two credit- based programmes for reforming the social sector, Social Sector Technical
assistance Credit (SOTAC) and Social Sector Adjustment Credit (SOSAC). A SOSAC II
programme worth US$ 50 million has been prepared but is now pending, awaiting
fulfilment of number of conditions on the part of BIH Governments, namely, progress in
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inter-entity pension issues, adoption of entity veterans' laws, unification of veterans'
administration and entitlement system in the BiH Federation.
Summary of project. The Social Sector Support Project (SSSP) has been implemented
by Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), an independent BiH chapter of
an international NGO with the same name. It was implemented in two phases: SSSP I
(1999-2000) and SSSP II (2000-2003). In the first phase, UNDP acted as the Finnish
counterpart, but in the second phase Finland decided to work directly with IBHI.
The project concept, which has been developed by IBHI, is to show by example that it is
possible to deliver social welfare services in municipalities with limited financial resources.
The solution is sought by good planning, cooperation across sectors, and making optimal
use of all types of willing and able organisations, public and private – the so-called mixed
model of social welfare. Four pilot municipalities have been involved in the project, two
in each entity. The end goal was that the lessons learned from the pilot municipalities
would be disseminated to other municipalities and influence entity and state policy and
lawmaking.
The project has had four components: (i) establishing management boards with broader
representation than previously, which would identify key areas for intervention; (ii) grantfinanced Special Focus Projects in mentioned key areas, carried out by public or nongovernmental organisations, (iii) training for social sector professionals; (iv) dissemination
of lessons learned.
Evaluation results. The evaluation by Kendra Gregson considers SSSP to be very
relevant given the social situation in the country. Its focus on the municipal level is also
considered apt, since this is the level where policy meets people.
According to the evaluation, the project has “…succeeded in launching the idea of a
mixed concept of social welfare both in theory and practice. It has established structures
assessing and implementing this model in four municipalities in BiH plus disseminating
information on these models other municipalities in the country.” However, the results
are mainly found locally, in the way of doing things. The project’s wider policy impact is
less clear.
The evaluation states that the targeted municipalities have improved their capacity to
respond locally to social needs, and that the project also made them increase spending on
social welfare. Furthermore, the project has had an impact on and influenced several
other municipalities. It has aroused interest in wide circles in the country, and managed to
provide input both into legal drafting processes, and the PRSP consultation process.
Among the proposed measures in the PRSP are the promotion of NGOs as social service
providers, and new legislation allowing tax reductions for donations from the private
sector.
The project has also promoted relations between NGOs and municipalities, increasing
the municipalities’ awareness of NGOs’ comparative advantages.
Interestingly, it is also concluded in the evaluation that the SSSP project has meant a great
deal for the institutional development of IBHI as well as turning it into a well- known and
credible actor in BiH on social policy issues.
The project is getting some moderate criticism regarding the sustainability of the
improvements. The mechanisms and commissions created by the project were
established, but whether they work according to the original idea and whether they will
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continue working at all after the project is not certain. Also, the training did not
sufficiently build local capacity to continue training after the project was finished. The
Special Focus Projects were not assessed in any detail, but it was observed that many of
them showed the need for continued donor assistance, thus not indicating sustainability.
One can also question the realism in the project claim to be showing examples to be
replicated in other municipalities. All municipalities cannot rely on the type of grant
funding and training schemes that the pilot municipalities received.
The evaluation also discusses the fact that IBHI was implementing both the SSSP and the
Gender Equity and Equality Project. The expectation was that the two projects would be
able to create synergies, being under the same organisational roof, and dealing with
complementary areas. The evaluation concludes that such synergies have been elusive,
mainly because the GEEP has been acting on the policy level, driven bilaterally between
the Finnish and BiH governments while SSSP has been IBHI driven and operating mainly
on the municipality level.
Significant points for the country level. One of the weaknesses of the evaluation is
that it does not at all address the project organisation and how the project was monitored
and followed up by the Finnish MFA. In fact, the project organisation and how the
project results have been anchored among the stakeholders is one of the strong points of
the project. Both IBHI and the Federation Ministry for Social Affairs, highly appreciated
the Steering committee, which included the MFAs from both countries and all levels of
government in BiH.
It was also in this context the project’s central aim: influencing policy by example was
most effective. The entity ministries for social affairs, who both have been represented in
the Steering Committee, have submitted a joint proposal to Finland for how to continue
after SSSP II. According to IBHI, Finland has something slightly different in mind,
however, which is more oriented towards policy making on the entity level.
IBHI’s own assessment is that a window of opportunity is now opening up. A new policy
oriented project will be able to draw upon the PRSP implementation process, which is the
base for further legal drafting. Other supportive factors are the EU SA-process as well as
the regional cooperation dimension with calls for harmonisation of social benefits etc.
The SSSP project is a good example of how Finland is not coordinating enough with its
donor colleagues. As has been mentioned, the World Bank is heavily involved in the
restructuring of the social sector on both entity and state level. The UK Department for
International Development (DFID) has started a similar project as SSSP, also in
cooperation with IBHI. According to the evaluation, German GTZ is involved in
developing the legal framework around private donations. Although MFA is now seeking
to extend the support for social sector reform, and a tender process is being prepared, it is
unclear how the Finnish support should relate to DFID, the World Bank or indeed any
other international assistance. The Desk Officer commented on the DFID project as a
copy of the Finnish project. If so, there is perhaps no harm done. There are enough
municipalities to implement pilot projects in for all donors. The next phase, however, will
be more sensitive to uncoordinated behaviour from the donors. The entities should move
in the same direction.
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5.5.2
The Gender Equity and Equality Project
Background. Women’s NGOs and groups started early to network and joint action was
taken to influence the authorities and to lobby for the understanding of women’s rights in
everyday life. Reports such as “The Status of Women in the Legal System of BiH” (1999),
seminars and debates provided forums for discussion and caught media attention. The
presence of international organisations in BiH helped to put pressure on the government
for reform and new legislation. The awareness of international conventions, the Beijing
Platform for Action (1995) and the opportunities to learn more about women’s position
in other countries made these organisations increasingly determined in their efforts to
promote women’s rights and issues of equality, and support women in politics.
As the BiH authorities should have been aware, BiH like other UN Member States is
bound by the Beijing Declaration. In addition, the ongoing EU Stabilisation and
Association process has reached a stage where BiH now is allowed to move on towards
formal negotiations for an Association Agreement in 2004. Among the conditions to be
met by BiH before then, there are many reforms promoting gender equality and which are
also required for membership in the Council of Europe.
A Gender Centre was established in the Federation in March 2000, and a similar Centre
was opened in RS in March 2002. In May 2003 the very important Law on Gender
Equality was adopted by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly. The implementation of this
law shall be supervised by a Gender Equality Agency within the BiH Ministry of Human
Rights and Refugees (MHRR). The Entity Gender Centres shall also monitor and
supervise the implementation of the law and submit annual reports to the MHRR. Three
Gender Equality Parliamentary Committees at State and Entity levels have been
established to undertake gender screening of draft laws submitted to the Parliaments.
BiH ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993. A draft CEDAW report on the
implementation of the Convention was presented by the Ministry of Human Rights and
Returnees for comments at the end of 2003, and is expected to be finalised soon. The
NGO’s have already written their “Shadow Report”, to be submitted simultaneously to
the CEDAW Committee.
In December 2003, a group of experts from the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, and UNICEF has participated together with the
Gender Centres in the process of creating a State Action Plan to confirm the methods of
implementation of the Gender law. At present, on the initiative of the Gender Centres, a
Law on Domestic Violence is also being drafted in cooperation with NGOs, judges,
policemen and social workers.
The Project. A Pilot Phase of the Finnish-supported Gender Equity and Equality Project
(GEEP) started in January 2000 and ended in July 2001. The budget amounted to FIM 3
million. A Mid-term Review of this first phase was made in April 2001, recommending
continued cooperation. Phase II started in October 2001 and will continue until October
2005. The Finnish contribution to this phase amounts to EUR 1 million, and the BiH
contribution is estimated at EUR 0.5 million (in kind). In May 2003 a Mid-term Review
was made of this ongoing second phase.
The project’s objective is the “attainment of a situation where conditions for gender
equity and equality exist and are prerequisites for democracy and good governance”. The
project purpose is the development of gender mainstreaming as a strategy, and
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development of techniques and tools for gender equality in the BiH context. The aim is to
enable direct and indirect partners to apply the gender mainstreaming method in their
work, using the tools and techniques developed by the project.
The five expected results of the project are:
• Developed and engendered legal and policy frameworks
• Increased awareness through debate on gender equity and equality in the BiH
context
• Increased gender disaggregated statistical information
• Strengthened media capacity to promote equity and equality
• Strengthened capacity of the two Gender Centres and Municipal Management
Committees to promote gender equality in collaboration with all levels of
government and NGOs
The project agreement was concluded between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in BiH and
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland. In BiH the two Gender Centres in FBiH and
RS function as Government Coordinating Agencies, and the Independent Bureau for
Humanitarian Issues (IBHI/BiH) is the Executing Agency. The Central Management
structure consists of a Supervisory Board, a Steering Committee and a Management Team
with representatives from IBHI and the two Gender Centres. Government Ministries at
State and Entity levels and municipal authorities constitute Implementing Agencies.
Municipal and Community NGO representatives form Municipal Management
Committees at municipal level.
Mid-Term Review of GEEP, May 2003. According to the Mid-Term Review team, the
first part of the second phase of the GEEP had successfully continued to support legal
and policy frameworks in the country. The newly established Gender Centres (GC) were
recognised as important policy actors. The review team, however, had difficulties in
assessing the exact outcomes of the project work, as the activities were described more as
part of an ongoing process and not related to quantified results. It was also difficult to
judge the exact role of each partner: the Gender Centres, the executing agency IBHI and
others. It was recommended that the project should prepare a list of quantified outputs
and outcomes for each goal and report on them at the end of the project.
The overall objectives of Phase II were still valid, and the review mission agreed with the
stage-wise and focused approach. But the time and resources allocated for reaching full
maturity of the mainstreaming were not realistic. The major technical support required
could not be expected from the BiH government alone. In general, the review mission
observed, gender projects were still planned with inadequate resources and with complex
results expected out of relatively short projects. Therefore, the review mission
recommended a third phase of minimum two years of Finnish support, either in cofinancing or singly, for the project from October 2005 onwards.
Relevance. The review team found the project relevant as it had helped to fulfil
requirements for membership both in the EU and in the Council of Europe. Beyond this,
we would add, the project meets a widely felt demand in the BiH society for the reforms
embodied in the Law on Gender Equality. The efforts during several years by many
citizens to bring an end to gender discrimination have been widely recognised.
Effectiveness. The Gender Centres had worked together, exchanging information and
learning from each other, and in accordance with a joint plan of work. A good foundation
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for a gender mainstreaming through a decentralised structure had been established, but
still needed major strengthening. Government – civil society relationships had been
initiated. Improved awareness on gender equity and equality had been achieved through
training and media campaigns. Media and national statistics institutions had been
sensitised. There had also been a constructive cooperation with NGOs, parliamentarians
and other groups. The project had gained visibility among donors as well as more widely
in BiH.
Efficiency. As will be readily seen, the management structure of the GEEP is rather too
complicated, and somewhat confusing. Thus, the review team’s wish for clearer structure,
roles and responsibilities between the Gender Centres and IBHI appears justified. At
present, the Gender Centres are running a huge network of Gender Focal Points (GFP)
at the different government levels, in the municipalities etc. Already at the presentation of
the project document for Phase II in 2001, a figure of 250 GFPs was mentioned. The
need for training and up-dating of these cadres must be a heavy administrative and
economic burden.
Sustainability. The Mid-term review team recommended the Finnish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to undertake an additional phase of the project for a minimum of two
years, providing support especially to the Gender Centres and Gender Focal Points. The
main reason for this proposal is the fact that gender projects require multiple efforts and
more extensive technical assistance than other sector projects. This argument is supported
by the “Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland’s Policy for
Developing Countries 2003-2007”, which states that “gender mainstreaming requires
more (resources), both human and financial. --- If there are no specialist personnel
resources, mainstreaming may fade away and change from ‘mainstreaming’ to
‘disappearing’ ”.
Concluding remarks. The Gender Centres, when contacted, seemed quite overburdened
with work and should definitely get more support to increase their institutional capacity.
In a long-term perspective, adequate gender-disaggregated data as a basis for information,
planning, research etc. is indispensable. The GEEP documents mention that it is an
explicit goal to gender-sensitise all relevant statistics. Therefore, GEEP ought to lobby for
a Gender Unit in the national Statistics Agency to be responsible for the production of
essential socio-economic, gender-related statistics.
The next 4-5 years will be critical for the Gender Centres. The recently adopted law will
be enforced at Entity level. Poverty and unemployment require a gender dimension. The
administrative structure is complicated and staff allocations unclear between IBHI and
the Gender Centres. Many internationally supported activities pay insufficient attention to
gender concerns. In response to the Mid-Term Review, IBHI has taken action during the
latter part of 2003, to implement several of the recommendations and include others in
the work plan for 2004.
If Finland decides to continue its support to GEEP during a third phase, this can be done
either bilaterally or in a co-financing arrangement with another donor, or possibly as a
regional intervention.
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5.5.3
The Teacher Education and Professional Development Project
Background. The education sector remains one of the most controversial sectors in
post-war Bosnian society. Due to nationalist interests, a variety of discriminatory practices
has prevailed throughout the education system. Over the years, the international
community has tried to mediate and to introduce compromise solutions, but to no avail.
Parallel classes in the same school, ethnically biased textbooks (especially in “national”
subjects like history and language), bussing of children to schools in neighbouring towns,
racist attitudes among teachers and parents are some of the problems which have marred
the school atmosphere. These attitudes, combined with vested political and economic
interests, have caused antagonism and frustration and prevented long overdue reforms of
the entire education system.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) identifies a low education level as the most
striking reason for poverty, and holds a thorough education reform to be necessary for
the successful implementation of all other poverty reduction measures. According to the
PRSP, the education sector suffers from insufficient financing and outdated and inflexible
systems that fail to meet the needs of a modern market economy. The World Bank’s
Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR-2002) highlights wasteful
expenditures, and poor services and results, particularly in higher education. Pre-school
education is unavailable to the poor children, who need it most. Access to general (i.e. not
vocational) secondary schools and subsequently to tertiary education is much too limited
and unequal. The present enrolment rates at secondary and tertiary level are very low.
Three quarters of the secondary education students are in vocational schools with a
narrow and out-of-date range of occupational choices and with few real job
opportunities.
At present, the guiding policy paper for education is the Education Reform Agenda that was
presented to the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in November
2002. Earlier that year, OSCE had been mandated to coordinate the international support
to education. Thus, this Reform document had been prepared by OSCE in cooperation
with six working groups, where the majority of the participants were local specialists.
More or less in parallel, and as part of the EC-supported TAER project (Technical
Assistance for Educational Reform), another reform initiative was prepared and launched
in October 2003 by the Entity and Cantonal Education Ministers as a White Paper on
Primary and Secondary Education in BiH. This document presents in great detail a most
comprehensive policy and strategy, based on the overall objective to realize an education
for all in BiH through a modernised education system in accordance with European
standards. The White Paper covers not only curriculum development, standards and
certification but also structural issues such as legislation, finance, organisation, and
management. It constitutes a commitment to reform by the BiH Educational Authorities.
Thus, there is a professional consensus on the need for reform clearly stated in the PRSP,
the PIC Strategy and in the White Paper. However, political and institutional resistance
based on vested interests and ethnic loyalties lingers on and must not be neglected.
From a Finnish point of view it can be noted that the White Paper refers to the results of
the TEPD project on inclusive education financed by Finland. In addition, a special
interest is expressed in the training of head-teachers in the second phase of the
Finland/BiH programme cooperation.
65
A number of donors are supporting the education reform programme. The World Bank
and the EC are not only the major donors, but also the only ones which have provided
significant funding for systemic reform. There is also close cooperation between the
World Bank, the Council of Europe and OSCE on higher education reform, e.g. on
legislation, which is part of the association conditions of the EU and the Council of
Europe. Several UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs have supported specific
projects such as teacher training, school repairs, IT-equipment etc., but are now gradually
phasing out.
The World Bank has so far provided support to three education projects. The two first
were emergency school reconstruction projects. The third Education Development
Project (2000-2004) supports the introduction of common education standards. The
World Bank is now about to finance a fourth Education Restructuring Project which
focuses on secondary and higher education. This project will provide much of its funding
through a Higher Education Fund, upon applications from schools and universities,
which will thus compete for funding to implement policy changes. This method is used in
the ongoing third Education Development Project with good results.
A measure of conditionality, however, will be applied: universities will not be eligible to
apply for funding unless they have undertaken institutional reform and have abolished the
autonomous status of the numerous faculties, thus consolidating the management of the
university into a single legal body. So far, only the University of Tuzla has implemented
such a reform. Another condition is the passing of a Framework Higher Education Law,
which is required also for a BiH membership in the Council of Europe and for accession
to the Lisbon Convention (recognition of qualifications concerning Higher Education)
and the Bologna Declaration Process (meeting European standards of university
education). These accessions would give BiH students increased mobility, easier
recognition of qualifications and improved quality of degree programmes.
The Project. The first phase of the Finnish-supported Teacher Education and
Professional Development Project (TEPD) project started in September 2000 and was
concluded in July 2003. The project budget amounted to EUR 2 million. The overall
objective was to contribute to initial teacher education and professional development in
education in order to meet the needs of the education system in BiH and European
standards. An evaluation was carried out in October 2003.
The project had two components:
1. Inclusive education seminars for teacher educators and teachers, including a sevenday seminar in Finland
2. The establishment of a Master’s Degree Programme at the University of Sarajevo’s
Faculty of Education with an emphasis on inclusive education
This initiative was expected to have a multiplier effect, and to contribute to a continuing
dialogue throughout the country about education of children with special needs and the
concept of inclusive education. An overall goal of the project would be the building of
peace and democracy.
Relevance. At long last, in 2004, the BiH education sector appears to have reached a
phase of reform implementation. When the TEPD started in 2000, it was still a most
controversial sector, and many donors avoided cooperation in education projects. The
choice of intervention model and content was difficult, even if the need for teacher
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training was obvious. Inclusive education turned out to be a good choice both for the
training of teacher’s educators and as a core subject for the Master’s Degree Programme.
Moreover, support to special needs education projects is one of the priorities in the
education sector in Finnish development cooperation.
Effectiveness. The project became one of the components in the efforts to achieve
European education standards, albeit of a modest dimension – it involved less than 100
persons directly. The participants were active both as providers and as receivers of skills
and knowledge, and they were eager to learn more about inclusive education; the project
coincided with the intense debate on education reform. They acted as mentors, authors,
members of working groups and advisory bodies, and they contributed to the quality of
the programme. According to the evaluation report, they have a strong feeling of
“ownership” of the project. The interactive, participatory approach and the modern,
child-centred methodology were much appreciated. The project kept a gender balance in
all its activities: in the recruiting of Master’s Degree students, seminar participants, project
staff, advisory boards, and guest lecturers and tutors. The project also managed to
promote peace and democracy at a professional level and over the ethnic and political
divide.
Efficiency and Sustainability. The project management model with a joint Supervisory
Board and a Steering Committee worked well. There has been good cooperation between
the Federal Ministry of Education and the TEPD. It should be noted, however, that the
Entity level Ministry of Education has little authority over the Canton Ministries, which
constitute the responsible authority for education in the Federation. In the Republika
Srpska the system is centralised and the Ministry of Education is the counterpart to
international donors. Thus, from a management point of view, it will be necessary for the
project to establish closer contacts at Canton Ministry level in the future. It is a question
of sustainability (and a recommendation in the evaluation report). Policy and budget
decisions are taken by the Canton authorities, and support from the Canton Ministry is
needed for a proper introduction of inclusive education. The Cantonal staff are
administrators and have little knowledge of education reforms. However, as a
consequence of reform legislation, the Cantons will probably have to accept a gradual
shift of responsibility to Entity level.
Future. The second phase of the project will start in February 2004 and will last until the
end of 2006 with a Finnish contribution of EUR 2 million. A post-diploma course in
inclusive education for class-room teachers will be one of the project activities. The major
component will focus on the education reform through the development of education
policy, administration and school management. The programme is designed to make use
of local competence and capacity from the outset and will build on achievements and
experience from the first phase. The project identification was based on requests from
both Entities.
The on-going structural changes in the education system make coordination with other
donors and with the coordinating bodies indispensable. The evaluation recommends
Finland to develop a public relations component in its project to make people aware of
the importance of inclusive education and of the tools offered by the project. Even more
important would be a determined action by the project management to liaise with other
donors and to participate in the coordinating structures, both national and international.
A number of other donors and actors in the education sector, when interviewed, were
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completely ignorant about the existence of this project – and, in fact, of Finnish presence
in BiH.
5.5.4
The ERNO News Exchange
Background. Media, and especially broadcast media, played a significant role in fanning
the ethno-nationalist hatred leading up to the war in BiH. In the reconstruction and peace
process, the media sector has received a lot of attention and donor support. The focus
has been mainly on the independent or commercial media. Public media, i e after the war
the Radio and Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS) and BiH Federation TV (FTV), has
received little or no international support, and mainly in the form of training of
personnel. One reason is that they receive financing from the respective entity
government. Another reason is that they, or at least FTV, has a hopelessly oversized
payroll, and refuses to take measures to lower its costs.
In June 2003 the old state Radio and television company of BiH, RTV BiH, was
liquidated by decree from OHR. The reform was implemented by the new state
broadcaster PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, established in 1999. Following these
decisions, a comprehensive public broadcasting system has, at least on paper, been
established, with the PBS on the national level and component services in each of the
entities, i e new versions of the current companies. All three components will have their
own boards of OHR appointed members, and there will be one board for the whole
system as well.
The process driven by OHR is extremely controversial and delicate. The divisions are still
very real among journalists, which is reflected by the fact that there are three different
journalist unions in BiH.
Media is addressed on a regional level by the Stability pact Working table 1 (incidentally
chaired by Finnish Ms Elisabeth Rehn). The countries of the pact have formulated a
Charter for media freedom.
ERNO means European Regional Network (the “O” is just added), and it is a
cooperation scheme between southern European countries within the framework of the
Eurovision Network of the European Broadcasting Union, EBU in Geneva. Eurovision
offers its members free usage of a daily selection of news items. These items are sent on
special channel which has computerised supplementary information on each item. The
EBU has organised its members in 4 regional services, and each region has its slot during
the day when its news items will be shown. Each regional window gets between 15 and 30
minutes depending on size and other factors. One of the regions is South Eastern
Europe, or ERNO. ERNO was inspired by the above- mentioned Charter, and when it
was created it was also the Stability pact countries who were invited: Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovenia, Turkey and the protectorate Kosovo. Greece and Turkey have not
yet joined the exchange, as they are already members of another EBU network.
Finnish support to the media sector started in 1996, when a journalist at the Finnish
national Broadcasting company YLE with extensive experience from former Yugoslavia
the Balkan managed to persuade the Global Department handling multilateral funding at
MFA to finance a salary of a UNESCO media advisor in Sarajevo. The advisor function
continued until 2002 with Finnish funding limited to the salary and DSA. One of the
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concrete achievements of this support is the creation of the Programme Bank, a media
library with TV programmes to lend to Bosnian TV-stations. As opposed to most of the
other broadcasted material at the time, this was legally obtained tapes donated from
broadcasters in Europe, including YLE.
The next Finnish project was the reconstruction of the BH TV, (now the Federation TV)
news desk in 1998-1999. Again, the same journalist initiated this project, which was a
conscious targeting of public service while nearly all international support went to
commercial stations. YLE contributed the manpower, and MFA contributed to the direct
costs with FIM 1,5 million.
The third Finnish intervention – the support project for ERNO - is also a cooperation
project with YLE. It is also part of a UNESCO media programme which is supported
financially by the EU, Finland and Denmark. Finland has supported ERNO since the
start in 2000 with EUR 168 000 per year until 2003. A continuation is now being planned.
UNESCO funds for ERNO are already committed until 2006.
The objectives of the ERNO project have been to establish cooperation between the
public TV companies in the region, developing them to become more open and
pluralistic. The cooperation around the exchange of news material is meant to increase
the exchange of information and thereby the awareness and knowledge of the people in
the regions. According to the project document the operational goal is “to develop a
system, infrastructure and organisation facilitating television stations in the region of SEE
to shoot, send and receive news material according to the specific regional needs.”
The support is rather comprehensive and consists of general management administration
by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) at YLE in Helsinki. The project is financing the
ERNO staff in the regional coordination office, as well as bi-annual coordination
meetings and seminars of all 11 members. It has also provided training, in 2003 primarily
on how to use digital equipment. Some equipment has also been provided, mostly
financed by UNESCO. Furthermore, staff exchange is part of the project activities as well
as a TV programme bank created by YLE, where everything exchanged is archived in
Helsinki.
ERNO started in 2000 and it is now running five days a week with a coordination office
in Sarajevo with a full- time and a half- time journalist. The day- to- day work of the
ERNO coordination office in Sarajevo is to organise the daily supply of news items to be
shown in the window. News desks in the member countries call up and order items.
Others inform on what they have. ERNO has a 15 minute slot, so max 5-6 items per day
can go in. The ERNO coordination office has the final say on the selection, and submits
a list to the EBU in Geneva, who does the actual broadcasting. The items are transmitted
via satellite to EBU in Geneva for further broadcasting. Once it is broadcast, any member
of Eurovision can use any item for free.
An evaluation of the support project was carried out in 2003 by Ullamaija Kivikuru. She
sees the exchange as well worth supporting as it is becoming more and more professional
and is turning into a major agent in the news arena in the Balkan, at a time when the big
media companies are decreasing their coverage and presence.
Her recommendation for the future is among other things to continue support and
increase the yearly volume to EUR 200 000 per year to allow for an extra coordination
meeting per year during three years and then declining support for 2-3 years, with only
EUR 100 000 per year. An explicit recommendation is also to localise control of ERNO
69
from Helsinki to the region. She also feels that the project could do more to widen and
deepen ERNO’s client base within the member companies to include other departments
than the news desks.
For the purposes of the present evaluation the following issues could be considered:
• ERNO is the only regional project in the sample and as such it is highly relevant in the
Balkans. It is good that material is exchanged on a regional level as much as possible
to increase consciousness about the conditions in the neighbouring country subtly
affecting values and outlook of professionals and viewers to decrease suspicion and
prejudice. If one looks only at BiH, with all its difficult problems in the media sector
one can of course question whether a news exchange should be prioritised.
• Most countries in the region have financial difficulties in purchasing material, and
ERNO suits them perfectly. For example, RTRS is a very frequent user of Eurovision
material, for the simple reason that they cannot afford buying material from news
agencies. All their foreign news items are from Eurovision. RTRS does not submit
material so often, but this has mainly to do with the fact that not so much of
international interest takes place in RS.
• The project seems reasonably effective in reaching its stated goals. The relations
between the companies have improved to the point that when RTRS get a request for
a news item they always try to deliver in spite of this being without payment. It is the
culture of the ERNO network members to support each other in this way. From an
efficiency point of view there may be questions regarding the fact that nearly half the
budget goes to the international CTA’s travel expenses. In the operations there seems
to be little waste. According to the ERNO coordination office, they have an 80%
usage rate out of a total of approx 85 items per month. The office staff consists of
one coordinator and 2 half time assistants.
• One difficulty for ERNO could be to find its place in the chaotic media structure of
BiH. Presently, ERNO rents offices from FTV. As the ERNO office is also the
external focal point for BiH in the exchange, this is inappropriate. The proper place
for ERNO would be to become a part of PBS. Furthermore, RTRS has its own EVN
desk and participates now more or less as an additional country member. Banja Luka
enters the statistics for the exchange with the same status as the other capitals.
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6.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE COUNTRY LEVEL
In this chapter, a number of conclusions concerning the whole Finnish programme in
BiH will be presented. They are based on the findings in the previous chapters, and
against the background outlined in the context chapters. We have structured this chapter
according to the evaluation issues, rather than by sectors or otherwise.
When looking at the Programme, the first question that comes to mind is if there is
something which holds it together. Is there a consistent pattern in the type of
interventions or something common about the profile, which makes it a programme
rather than just a list of projects?
We are aware that the programme has grown and developed “organically” rather than
according to a strategy based on the results of systematic consultations between the
countries. We have also learnt that there has been a process of afterthought and analysis
in the MFA during the period under review which has also manifested itself in the
programming. This is evident at least in the latter part of the period. At the same time,
can be noted, the programme has become increasingly varied. In 1996 there were six
projects (counting CIMIC as one project) in two sectors worth slightly over EUR 7m. In
2002, there were eight projects in six sectors worth roughly the same amount.
Perhaps a fair description is that the programme has evolved organically, but basing each
new step on the experience of the previous. In this way it has become more consolidated
over the years.
6.1
THE INSTRUMENTS
The terms of reference stress that the instruments used in BiH should be assessed, both
how they have functioned in BiH as compared elsewhere, and in terms of their utility incountry to achieve the desired objectives. There are two types of instruments involved.
The first is the modality used for assistance, or type of cooperation. The second type of
instrument is the channel, the implementing partner. Several combinations of these
instruments can be found in BiH.
The main modality used by Finland in BiH is project financing. In most cases Finland has
been the only donor, but in some cases they have been co-financing a larger project. In
some cases Finland, i e MFA has designed its own project, but for the most part the
projects have been designed by others and submitted to MFA for financing. Notably,
Finland has managed to persuade the BiH government to contribute to the cooperation
on a couple of occasions (e g GEEP and the tracklayer).
The modality also depends on the type of budget funding. In addition to the development
cooperation budget line, there has also been Finnish multilateral funding to the UN, civil
crisis management funds, humanitarian assistance, as well as the Finnish contribution to
the EU programme in BiH.
The implementers, or partners, include BiH public companies, Finnish consultants,
Finnish NGOs, international NGOs, UN organisations, Finnish public companies and
the Finnish Defence Forces. They will be commented on as appropriate in the following
sections, but a few general comments are called for.
Consultants have played a comparatively big role in BiH, since they are often the only
permanent Finnish representatives in the country. They have no embassy to turn to for
71
guidance in difficult situations, so they have to take on a greater responsibility than their
colleagues from other countries. This requires them to be more informed about the
country and the situation. This is of course especially true for a post-conflict country like
BiH, where the slightest thing can get politicised.
The consultants used in the District heating project were rated highly both in terms of
their technical and social competence. There have been instances, however, of less
successful consultancies. For example, the consultants who carried out the feasibility
study for the railway tracklayer donation did not have any previous experience, and they
severely underestimated the difficulties of arranging joint utilisation of the machine.
About 10 Finnish NGOs are active in the region, and several of them were active in BiH
already during the war on humanitarian mandates. NGOs get funded by MFA through a
special budget window. In the Bosnian case, however, several NGO’s projects, e g FCA,
have been funded directly from the Unit for West Balkans. According to FCA, this way
of working has been very encouraging. With the Unit for WB as an informed dialogue
partner the content and purpose of their project has been at centre stage. They have thus
avoided strict compartmentalisation and managed to bridge the shift from humanitarian
to reconstruction aid in an unusually seamless way.
In general, Finnish NGOs have been found to be quite efficient in their project activities.
They need however to pay attention to capacity building of their local NGO partners.
There is one example of having a local NGO as an implementing partner, IBHI. While
many positive things can be said about this cooperation, perhaps the most interesting is
how much it has meant for the institutional development of IBHI. It has also given the
organisation a platform as a well known and credible actor in BiH on social policy issues.
The most eye-catching of the implementers is probably the use Finnish peacekeepers for
reconstruction for return. The Finnish CIMIC rebuilt infrastructure, but promoted return
also by providing security, information protection of transports, monitoring return, etc.
The conclusion is that a CIMIC company is a very effective and powerful instrument, and
it can well be used for implementing small scale reconstruction and humanitarian projects.
In this work, however, it needs to be guided by the specialised civilian agencies that are
the proper agencies to set priorities and coordinate the work.
6.2
RELEVANCE
Is the programme relevant? By and large, the answer is in the affirmative.
The programme has a strong profile towards reconstruction and normalisation with more
than 50% of the total value directed towards infrastructure and 10 and 13 % respectively
on return and education. The emphasis has shifted during the period reflecting rather well
the changing primary needs of BiH during the period from the early WB assessments to
the PRSP of 2003.
Has Finland been true to its own stated policy aims when assisting BiH? In the table
below it can be seen that there is only a strong relevance in relation to Human rights and
democratic governance. The weak correlation to poverty reduction should not come as a
surprise, as this is not necessarily the main priority in “other” partnerships.
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Observations
Policy
aim
Reduction of
poverty
Sustainable
development
Human rights
Global security
and democratic promotion
governance
Promotion of
economic
interaction
Only indirectly.
Very few
projects have
poverty
reduction as
primary
objective.
Only slightly.
Positive
environmental
effects of district
heating, and small
forestry project.
Definitely. The
SSSP, TEPD, the
IJC support and
the GEEP all
contribute to
better
governance on
different levels.
The media
project
somewhat less
Some business
contacts may
have been
created in
connection with
the projects.
Difficult to
assess, but it
continues to be
the primary
reason for
staying in BiH
The large proportion of return related projects, and projects which in various ways
normalised or instilled a sense of normalisation among people, makes the programme
relevant also from a Dayton and post-conflict perspective. In this context, Finland seems
to have managed to strike a reasonable balance in its support between the two entities and
between ethnicities in the same entity. This is commendable, considering the fact that it
has been a very difficult environment and that the RS side was extremely complex to
work with.
6.3
EFFECTIVENESS
Goal fulfilment and impact ranges from satisfactory to good in the projects studied. The
question is if the programme has had any impact on the country level. One could argue
that major impact has been achieved in the promotion of return as well as in some of the
infrastructure projects. In the social and education sector a platform has been built and
national level impact is within reach.
The NGO implementation models and capacity has generally proven very effective,
although in several cases their administrative structure leaves something to be desired.
Of special interest is also the case of CIMIC, which became a marvellously effective
reconstruction agency in North Eastern BiH. Its effectiveness was partly due to the
personnel strength and military organisation, and partly due to its flexible funding
arrangement. While the former can hardly be replicated in the civilian sphere, the latter
could. It should be possible to experiment with the same kind of arrangement with a
NGO.
6.4
EFFICIENCY
There are many aspects of efficiency in development assistance. The limits of this
evaluation have prevented any scientific approach. Instead, reason has been used, and
estimates of proportionality between input and output.
Project implementation is in general efficient. The implementers know what they are
doing, and the projects are well enough designed. No wastefulness has been encountered
in the study.
73
There have been instances of inefficiency, but these have more to do with the
circumstances than the Finnish contribution. One example in point is the District heating
project in Sarajevo, which took 4 times longer than expected to achieve its goals. No text
book example of efficiency it would seem, but the reasons were optimistic planning on
the part of the World Bank and financing gaps.
CIMIC, on the other hand, can be seen as extremely efficient, but only if one ignores the
fact that the huge overhead was paid for by the defence budget.
Possibly, the ample use of consultants in every phase of the project cycle could be
questioned. This makes project planning and preparations comparatively expensive
compared with some aid agencies. On the other hand, it makes it possible to keep the
number of staff down, which could even it out.
An important conclusion is that efficiency could be enhanced by some sort of field
presence. A field presence would yield more and better information, the ability to solve
problems at the source, and to promote synergies between projects, short distance
between decision and implementation, etc.
6.5
SUSTAINABILITY
In most projects studied, there are questions regarding the sustainability of the results
achieved. The return and reconstruction sector is perhaps the most difficult one in this
regard, but we find that the projects have not been inventive enough in addressing the
issue. Credit schemes and extension programmes, are too few and far apart. Also the
SSSP evaluation questions the sustainability of several of the mechanisms and committees
put in place by the project, and the Special Focus Projects needed additional funding to
continue.
There is, however, a limit as to how much responsibility the donors can be expected to
take in this context. In the case of the District heating in Sarajevo for example, the project
included a component of preventive maintenance, which was not fully implemented. This
can be attributed to the shortcomings of Finland and its implementers. The fact that the
Sarajevo Canton does not allocate any budget means for investment, however, is a
systematic problem, which could not have been put right by the project. Furthermore,
one cannot expect all the outputs of a project to become permanent. The key objective of
the SSSP is to provide an example, to plant an idea, and whether such ideas survive is the
most important question.
The projects have had varied success in anchoring the activities and results in the relevant
BIH authorities. Both SSSP and GEEP seem to have a high level of ownership, in
particular on the municipal, but also on the entity level, which should increase their
chance of having permanent impact. Other signs of increasing focus on local ownership
are the fact that the second phase of the TEPD will have more local staff; that some of
the local women NGOs (in Mostar) have very dedicated and responsible management
groups; and that many of the reconstruction projects build on a strong participatory
approach.
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6.6
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Several of the projects (SSSP, GEEP and TEPD) have had a well working structure and
organisation. The steering and supervisory committees have had real functions and have
managed to involve the different stakeholders to a degree not otherwise possible. They
have also provided opportunities for direct interaction for the Desk Officer and the
Ambassador. This particular form of project structure has been developed and used by
Finland in developing countries. Thus, it is an example of how experience and models
from developing countries can constructively be put to use in a transition and postconflict context.
Unlike some other donor countries, Finland has negotiated and agreed on each project
individually with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of BiH, rather than trying to arrive at
one overall agreement. This has been appreciated by BiH, since such comprehensive
agreements are very cumbersome to prepare.
For the bilateral projects there is also an established project cycle from feasibility study to
evaluation and decision on extensions, etc, which seems well adapted to the MFA way of
working. Most of the steps are implemented by consultants, leaving decision making, and
management to the MFA. The main general weaknesses in project management would be
lack of manpower and lack of field presence.
A general observation is that the bilateral projects which are managed directly from
Helsinki are the best managed, and it is confirmed by the desk officers in MFA who felt
that the bilateral way of working brought them into closer contact with the partners, and
this benefited the projects. On the other hand, it also meant a greater work load.
For projects other than the bilateral, things are a bit different. NGO projects are normally
funded by the NGO department. While the approval of each project is needed from the
policy making unit, the link with the implementer becomes very weak. For consistency
purposes, it was a wise move, therefore, by the former desk officer to fund some of the
NGOs directly from the Unit for WB.
Other examples of how overall programme management is weakened are the projects
funded by the civil crisis management budget line. The Political department is controlling
the funds but consults with the Unit for WB before decisions. The observed result is that
the Unit for WB knows very little about this support although it is of central importance
for the continued development of BiH and the SA-process.
6.7
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The criticism levelled from previous studies of the Finnish development cooperation
regarding weaknesses in the administration can largely be confirmed also by this
examination.
A ministry is not the ideal development administration and especially not the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, for several reasons. There is a high turnover and rotation of personnel;
the normal mode of working is current affairs – short planning horizons and quick
solutions; the documentation/archiving system will all affect continuity and is not
conducive to follow-up and evaluation.
The reorganisation of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs aimed at greater policy
coherence, and several measures have been taken to improve the development
75
cooperation administration. Systematic routines have been established for various
formalities and agreements between donors, beneficiaries and municipalities, and a
handbook for how the development cooperation should be administered was published
in 2000. The new system has received credit. DAC considers it positive and enhancing the
interrelation between development cooperation and other areas.
In practice, however, it will take several years before the new organisation will show its
full merits. In the short term, the reshuffles and changes have caused uncertainty of roles
and responsibilities in the MFA, which in turn has affected performance. At present,
there are too few advisers in the Department for Policy Development, and several
vacancies in the Unit for West Balkans, which creates a completely unrealistic workload.
The reorganisation probably affected the West Balkans Unit (and before 2000 the
Division for Europe) more than many other units. Before 1995, the Department did not
work with development cooperation at all, and its desk officers had to address completely
new issues. To further complicate things, the Unit for West Balkans still has separate
desks for development cooperation for each country, and has still some way to go before
completing the intentions of the reorganisation.
The human resource issue is not new, however. In 1996, while there was a very strong
will on the political level in Finland to engage in BiH, this was not matched at all by
human resources in the MFA. In fact, there was not even a specific Desk Officer
appointed until September 1997.
The aspect that suffers most from the lack of capacity is monitoring and follow-up. This
was reflected i a in the outdated information from MFA staff on some of the projects
included in the evaluation. Follow-up is especially important for return projects where the
beneficiaries continue to be vulnerable long after the project is terminated. This is an area
where also the CIMIC projects could be found lacking.
The lack of a permanent field presence means that many issues, which could have been
solved by an embassy have to be solved in Helsinki and add to the work burden. It
should be said, however, that the performance of the present roving Ambassador was
praised by many respondents. She has shown an interest and visited projects far more
often than some of her colleagues stationed in Sarajevo.
A positive characteristic, which may be in part attributed to the political culture within the
MFA, is the responsiveness which can be observed. Responsiveness is important for
post-conflict situations, where developments on the ground are rapid. Over time, the
programme has also been adjusted in response to the needs and developments in BIH.
The decision to channel substantial reconstruction funds through the Peace keeping force
was unorthodox but pragmatic and motivated by the positive earlier experience and the
estimated potential. Likewise, there has been swiftness when needed, as in the case of the
Sarajevo district heating, where the rather complex Finnish contribution was mobilised
within two months.
On the other hand, sometimes sluggishness has been demonstrated. The bilateral project
cycle has also proven to cause large time gaps, which can hurt continuity in the projects.
NGO projects are only screened once a year, which is not conducive to post-conflict
work.
Strategic planning is rather weak. In 1999 the first written “strategy” document about the
Finnish assistance to BiH and the West Balkans was produced. It is widely referred to as a
76
strategy, but is really more a memo describing the Finnish assistance at the time. The new
strategy is significantly improved, although it needs refining to become a useful guiding
instrument, firmly based on Bosnian priorities. Having said this, there are definitely
instances of strategic thinking in the programming. One example was the original plan to
connect the gender project with SSSP, TEPD and Finnish support in the media sector.
This plan was not realised for unknown reasons.
The lack of a written country strategy as a starting point, presents a problem when
evaluating a programme like this. The results cannot be measured against any original
expression of will or intention on the part of the donor. Several other problems
encountered in the course of this evaluation point to the fact that the present system is
not very conducive to evaluation.
It has been time-consuming to obtain project related documents from the MFA. Some
documents have not been received at all, despite numerous requests. Another problem
for a non Finnish speaking evaluation team, is that most documents are in Finnish only.
Eight documents have been translated for the sake of this evaluation. It is not a question
of very unusual or special requests. The documents requested have been basic project
documents, decisions, statistics, etc.
The preparedness for identifying and providing the documents to the evaluation team has
been surprisingly low. A frequent reply from several different persons has been: “Sorry, I
cannot help you, that was before my time” which illustrates the problem of continuity and
institutional memory. A frequent rotation of personnel from the capital to missions
abroad, in combination with deficient filing routines, makes it difficult to track even
recent activities a few years back.
The Finnish system for reporting and evaluation was also criticised by the DAC peer
review. We can only concur, and recommend improvements as well as introducing the
consistent use of country strategies with clear goals.
Despite efforts, it has also proven impossible to get a complete overview of the totality of
the Finnish assistance, including development cooperation, humanitarian aid,
peacekeeping, civil crisis management projects, elections monitoring, and possibly other
interventions. A request directed to the Global Department about the Finnish multilateral
aid and how much of it goes to BiH, went unanswered, as did a request to the Political
Department on the civil crisis management activities in BiH. The difficulties involved are
illustrated by the fact that the Head of the Unit West Balkans himself tried, at one point,
to get such an overview, but failed. This is somewhat surprising considering how much
Finland is spending, and the political value that such figures have in the external relations.
It is also a reasonable question from any tax payer.
6.8
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
Finland’s presence in the established coordination forums in BiH has been minimal. The
Finnish consultants and other implementing agencies have kept a low profile. A modest
approach is typically Finnish, and is an asset in most circumstances. However, it does not
contribute to visibility, something which can be very important for the success of a
project.
77
While real coordination cannot be expected from a consultant, who is only mandated to
implement a contract , there could be more specific instructions to Finland’s
implementing agencies to interact and share information with other agencies.
The exception is the CIMIC company, which has been exemplary in its coordination with
the RRTF in Doboj and Tuzla. The fact that the RRTF was such an effective
coordination mechanism has probably prompted all organisations involved in return to
coordinate better.
In terms of strategic and operational coordination, this can only effectively be done by
MFA staff or, of course, diplomatic representation. Some periods it is even more crucial
to coordinate closely with colleagues in the field. The SSSP is presently in such an
obvious period. Still, MFA has not approached either DFID, or the World Bank to
discuss how to divide the task between them in the social sector.
6.9
POST-CONFLICT ISSUES
At a recent lecture in England, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown discussed the
lessons learned from peace building in BIH. The need for a robust military presence was
one. The mistake of not having a good plan ready from the start was another. The civilian
authority, i e OHR was not given enough powers to do its job from the start. This partly
explains another mistake: not addressing the major structural reforms, above all the rule
of law at an early stage. Late action in these areas has made the normalisation slower and
more difficult than necessary, according to Ashdown. Another lesson is for the
international community to organise in a manner which enables it to move fast and take
decisions. This means delegation of authority from the capitals to the people in the
country to move the process forward. Also, the international community should make full
use of the stick and carrots instruments, but in a coordinated and determined way –
coordinated conditionality. The most important lesson, according to Ashdown, is that
peace- building takes time. In addition, regional stability is necessary, and there is a need
for legitimacy and vision of a civilian authority.
The post-conflict context has been touched upon several times in the present report in
connection with the discussion of the relevance of each examined project. It has also
been discussed in relevant parts of this chapter. In this section some of these lines will be
drawn together.
Some of the most important findings from BiH are the following:
• In spite of having no previous BiH experience and limited post-conflict
experience, Finland has managed to create a programme which was relevant to the
post-conflict challenges facing Bosnia in 1996. It has since then gradually been
adjusted to the transition agenda. The most important features are the large
proportion of return- related projects, and projects which in various ways
normalised or instilled a sense of normalisation among people.
• Finland has had a neutral image and no previous political luggage which has been
an advantage in some of its work in BiH
• In response to the ethnic divisions and in support of national building, Finland has
endeavoured and managed to strike a reasonable balance in its support between
the two Entities and between ethnicities in the same Entity. This is commendable,
78
considering the fact that it has been a very difficult environment and that the RS
side was extremely complex to work with.
• At the same time, treating the entities and ethnicities even-handedly is at best only
a passive measure, in that it prevents things from getting worse. It is possible that
Finland could have done more for reconciliation and peace. In some cases,
valuable opportunities for increasing the peace building impact of the projects
have been lost. In a post-conflict country, the underlying conflict is still there. To
help people work on peace-building and reconciliation is as important as any
reconstruction or development objective.
• The reorganisation of MFA and the integration of development issues with other
policy issues is interesting from a conflict management perspective as it narrows
the gaps between political analysis, needs analysis and project design.
• The development of the CIMIC concept is an example of how Finland could
prepare itself for participation in international crisis management. Any
corresponding development on the civilian side does not seem to have taken place.
The intervention regarding the rule of law in BiH was modest, and did not seem to
have any pretensions of being a test case for a future rapid reaction capability in
this sector, as most of the Finns were recruited on their own rather than being
seconded by the MFA.
• Finland has insisted on bilateral government-to-government agreements even
where not expressly required to do so. this has lent recognition to the government,
thereby in some measure strengthening it, and contributed to stabilisation.
• It is difficult to handle aid in a post-conflict situation without having
representation/info gathering permanently on the ground. One needs knowledge
to act appropriately. This does not have to imply a full-blown – and costly –
diplomatic representation.
Any future Finnish post-conflict assistance will be part of a joint effort, and if the crisis is
close to Europe, the EU will be an important, if not the main player. The EU will have to
respond to the crisis, and if it fails preventively, also assist in the post-conflict stage.
Thus, what remains important for Finland is to consider how best to prepare for a
contribution to a joint effort. Such discussions must also take other related policy areas
into consideration. One such related area is assistance for conflict
prevention/management and Civilian crisis management, which Finland and some likeminded countries like Sweden helped to put on the EU agenda, and which is now being
developed.
Another related area is civil-military cooperation within the framework of Finnish
peacekeeping forces, which has turned into something of a Finnish speciality, and which
has been addressed in the section on CIMIC above.
Development cooperation should be mutually supportive with both CCM activities and
peace- keeping efforts. For this to happen, joint strategic planning is required. This is
most important on the level of EU, but also on country level, as each country should
participate in a coherent manner. In sum, Finnish development cooperation in postconflict situations should ideally work closely with Finnish civilian and military crisis
management competence.
79
It has been reported to us that there now exists a group which discusses Iraq and how
Finland should best approach that particular situation. The group is said to have
representatives from all relevant departments and ministries as well as humanitarian,
development and business actors. Such groups are important steps towards good
coordination. The key challenge, however, is to make it operational enough to produce
some type of response characterized by clear priorities and division of labour.
80
7.
7.1
THE FUTURE/RECOMMENDATIONS
THE NEED FOR CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE
Great progress has been made in BiH. The Bosnians are now gradually shifting focus
from the challenges of post-conflict rehabilitation to the challenges of political and
economic transition. The country is moving to a stage in which its government
institutions will have to shoulder the full responsibility for the country.
This is a tall order, however, considering the level of administrative capacity and
governance today. There are great needs of capacity- building, and the international
community is re-positioning itself to provide key support for the continued process. It
will be a more limited support but provided to key areas under specific conditions. It
should support, not replace, Bosnian efforts.
Selective external support is absolutely necessary for BiH to complete its transition, but it
is also true that we cannot afford BiH not to complete its transition. The truth is that no
one with any knowledge of the country would say that the risk of renewed violence is
over yet.
In BiH, the International Community will increasingly mean the EU. Finland is active in
three of the most central sectors for the SA process. EU will be there for the long term,
and in accordance with its EU associated policy so should Finland.
7.2
THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF FINNISH ASSISTANCE
As mentioned in Chapter 3 a regional strategy for the Balkans is being finalised in the
MFA. While there is no time period specified, the financial annexes indicate continued
commitment to bilateral assistance to BiH as part of the Balkan region, at least for the
coming three years.
In the planning of the coming years’ activities, the MFA will of course take into account
the fact that the evaluations carried out for the three bilateral projects are all in favour of
extensions of the projects. Likewise, there are propositions emanating from the present
evaluation which could be considered. It is found, for instance, that the reconstruction
project in Ostra Luka should be supplemented with an additional component of mine
clearing in order to reach the objectives of the project. It also transpires as a good idea to
support the Consulting Centre in Mostar another year in order to make use of its capacity
and cadre of qualified volunteers in the preparation of municipal reforms which can be
expected to start in 2004. This should allow for a constructive phasing out of cooperation
between the consulting centre and the Finnish Refugee Council
In addition the following points could be considered by MFA:
• Develop the new draft strategy into a really useful guiding tool with measurable
goals.
• Until the administrative capacity in the MFA has improved, the number of sectors
should be kept low. By focusing assistance on 2-3 sectors, the cooperation can
become intensified and possibly achieve greater impact.
81
• It seems a good idea to continue working with the social and education sector.
Finland is now an established and credible player, and the two projects have the
potential to be developed and adjusted to the evolving context. The sectors are
also highly relevant to the EU Stabilisation and Association process.
• To promote regional cooperation is an explicit aim both of the EU and Finland.
The regional news exchange is a positive example of such cooperation. There
seems to be a potential for regional interaction also in the social sphere, and this
could be explored in the next phase of the SSSP. Furthermore, the GEEP could
possibly continue as a regional project
• Types of assistance: Project vs. Sector support. Sector support on the state level
could have positive effects on nation building, strengthening the state level and
forcing the entities to conform and cooperate. Sector support has to be well
prepared and monitored, however. There may be ways to design the project
support during the coming years in a way that prepares the ground for sector
support.
• Any future Finnish support to the legal sector should not only be based on the
priorities of BiH, but also be carefully coordinated with the initiatives of other
donors. There is a great need for continued support in various areas of the legal
sector in order to implement the reforms: Legal drafting and training, study visits
and international exchange (as the Nordic countries have systems corresponding
to those of BiH), etc. The Finnish experts’ long and comprehensive experience
from BiH should be tapped for advice and knowledge in this endeavour.
• The SSSP has a potential of having serious impact on the organisation of the social
service system. In coordination with other donors, the project will be able to make
the most of any opportunities that may open up in terns of legislation reforms.
• Plan for, and carry out improved coordination, for example by instructing
implementers to share information with other donors and to inform about project
achievements.
• Improve capacity-building components in the cooperation between Finnish and
local NGOs.
• Carry the reorganisation at MFA out fully, as originally planned. Provide the staff
training and guidance focussing on the administration of development cooperation
as envisaged in various annual plans and recommended by the Holkeri
commission. Improve routines for documentation in order to facilitate evaluation
and follow-up.
• In project proposals for reconstruction and return projects, the MFA should
require special emphasis on adequate sustainability components, like analysis of the
employment opportunities, need for credit schemes, etc.
• There are now examples of a field presence which is not necessarily embassies.
Finland has so-called Liaison offices in Kabul and in Pristina. Perhaps this is an
alternative for Sarajevo as well.
Specifically regarding post-conflict programming, recommendations include:
82
o Measures to ensure/increase the political awareness of implementing
partners of their role and the - intended or unintended - effects their work
may have on their surroundings. Such measures could include specific
instructions on how to monitor and handle risks.
o Measures to strengthen conflict analysis in all phases of the project cycle
and project management.
o Involve the NGO unit as to make it more responsive to suggestions and
requests. New creative procedures for funding NGOs are encouraged,
possibly on the basis of experience from the CIMIC company. When
working in a sensitive environment NGOs should have closer contact with
the policy making unit.
o Continue to develop CIMIC as a channel for ODA. Awareness should be
raised, however, on the user side of the particular advantages and
limitations involved.
o Increase resources for advisory functions regarding post-conflict and peace
building
o Ensure that the Finnish experience from working with the Independent
Judicial Commission is not lost and use it in the strengthening of the rule
of law in a civil crisis management context.
83
ANNEX 1
Terms of Reference for Evaluation of Finnish Development Cooperation with
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1. Subject of the Evaluation
After signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, Finland, together with the international community
committed herself to securing peace process and to support reconstruction in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH). The overall objective was to stabilise the society and to create favourable
conditions for refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes. It was estimated
that four years of heavy external financing would have been sufficient to revitalise different
economic sectors to function again and to ensure that a majority of refugees and internally displaced
people would have returned to their homes. Total external commitments in 1995-1998 amounted to
4.7 billion dollars. Yet in 1998 the international community noticed that the objectives were far
from being realised. Peace Implementation Council (PIC) pointed out in 1998 that the peaceful
situation is fragile and wholly depended on external support. Later in 1999 Office for Higher
Representative (OHR) listed necessary projects and activities for the coming two years and pledged
for long term international support especially for judicial, human rights, police, border control and
media institutions.
Finnish support activities in BiH begun in 1996. Since 1999 Finnish support has been based on a
strategy “Aid for Reconstruction of the Western Balkans”. The overall objectives of the Finnish
support were focused on the stabilisation of the society and creation of favourable conditions for
refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes. In addition, emphasis is laid on
institutional capacity building which requires longer term partnerships and 2-3 years financial
commitments. Finland has strived for ethnic balance and reconciliation in its support activities.
Through these activities Finland is supporting the implementation of the Stabilization and
Association Pact for the Eestern Balkans of the EU, the purpose of which is to bring the countries in
this region closer to the European standards and societies.
The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has prepared new guidelines to support the Western
Balkans. Finland participates to the reconstruction of BiH as a member of the EU, and supports
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which is the main EU strategy for provision of long
term support to the region.
According to the EU strategy, reconstruction of the Western Balkans will include:
• support to increasing livelihood
• development of civil society
• establishment and revision of government institutions
• support to macroeconomic structures.
The Finnish guidelines emphasise that physical and institutional reconstruction and cooperation has
to be based on active participation of the local authorities and institutions in all phases, including
objective setting, planning and implementation. As the institutional capacity and budgetary
monitoring systems develop, Finland considers transition from projects to sector specific budget
support. Project-based support will, however, be needed for some years especially in education
sector. According to the guidelines, Finnish support to BiH is politically justified as long as Finland
provides support to Serbia and Montenegro, as well.
According to these new guidelines cooperation with Bosnian and Herzegovina is based on Finland’s
general development cooperation aims, on close cooperation and coordination with EU`s CARDS
programme, and with the bilateral programmes of other EU member states. The strategy envisages
transition to sector specific budget support but points out that especially in education sector,
bilateral, project based support will be needed for additional 3-4 years.
Total Finnish commitments from 1996 to 2002 amount to approximately € 38.5 million. The table
below illustrates how Finnish support has developed since 1996.
Finnish commitments to Bosnia and Herzegovina, million euros by sectors
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
social infra
0,40
7,65
0,57
1,66
economic infra
5,26
1,05
3,12
0,93
emergency
3,36
0,68
1,05
WID
0,06
0,00
0,04
0,55
debt
0,00
planning
0,14
0,08
-0,01
0,17
TOTAL
9,21
8,79
4,39
4,35
2001
5,11
0,49
1,01
6,61
2002 TOTAL
4,87
20,26
10,35
0,21
5,78
1,66
0,00
0,38
5,08
38,42
Support to social infrastructure has been the most important sector, especially after 1999 with the
introduction of the Finnish strategy, whereas during the first years of support, reconstruction of
economic infrastructure was the biggest sector. Emergency aid was substantial in 1996 but has
declined. Other sectors, Women in Development, debt related activities and planning activities are
all rather modest.
Finnish support to BIH has utilized a number of different instruments. Finnish support to BiH has
been channelled through various instruments. Among bilateral projects the most substantial ones
have been District heating projects in Doboj and Sarajevo, and Support to Public Railway
Corporation to support economic infrastructure. In support of social infrastructure the biggest
bilateral projects are Teacher Education and Professional Development Programme, Water and
sanitation project, Support to social sector and Gender equity programme. Support to social sector
was first implemented as a multi-bi operation together with UNDP, but the second phase of the
project is being implemented by a local NGO Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI).
IBHI is also responsible for the implementation of phases 1 and 2 of gender equity programme,
funded by Finland. Also Finnish NGOs have been active in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The biggest
projects have been implemented by the Finnish Red Cross (prostheses and mine awareness
programmes), FIDA international (Support programme for physically impaired, Shelter
programmes in Doboj and Odzak), SASK to support labour unions and Marttaliitto and Suomen
pakolaisapu to support refugees/returnees and refugee/returnee women especially.
Finland has supported international organisations and structures by providing technical
assistance, staff, to OHR, and Independent Judicial Commission, UNESCO and OSCE, PIC and EU
police operations. Finally Finnish contingent/CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina has identified and financed numerous small reconstruction projects.
This evaluation will study policy relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of bilateral
development co-operation activities between Finland and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996-2003
and the administration of Finnish development co-operation in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In addition the evalaution will assess how successfully Finland has operated in a post-war country
as a member of the international donor community. Based on the country analysis, findings and
conclusions, the evaluation is also expected to provide justified and well grounded
recommendations for future orientations of Finnish cooperation including consideration of potential
sectors and modalities of future cooperation.
2. Background of the evaluation
In 2001 and 2002 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland commissioned a number of country
programme evaluations1 in the Finnish long-term development partner countries. Synthesis report of
the seven country programme evaluations concludes that cooperation has been effective and
relevant on a single project level, but there is little evidence on effectiveness on a programme or
country level. Furthermore impact and sustainability is largely unknown or unimpressive. Also
embassy staffing levels, training, “tools”, techniques and methods all required urgent improvement
for Finland to act as a partner in development.
As the annual commitments to Bosnia and Herzegovina have exceeded those to many developing
countries it is justified to see how Finnish cooperation has operated in BiH. As in the previous
country programme evaluations, the underlying question is “have we been in right place at right
time with appropriate instruments?”
Whereas the previous country programme evaluations addressed traditional developing countries,
this evaluation is expected to increase knowledge and understanding on how different development
cooperation instruments and practices function in a post conflict country, and is required to identify
the needs for reorientation and adjustment of approaches. Linked to this, the evaluation will also
assess the utility of different development cooperation instruments in a post conflict situation.
The evaluation results will be used in directing Finnish support to reconstruction of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in other post conflict countries in the future.
3. Evaluation issues
The aim of the evalaution is to assess Finland’s development cooperation with Bosnia and
Herzegovina in its totality. However, in the absence of clear country level objectives and indicators,
the evaluation’s conclusions will have to be based on project level findings.
The evalaution will assess implementation of Finland’s development co-operation priorities by
testing the relevance of Finnish activities relative to country needs and other donors’ activities and
further by testing the implementation of Ministry’s goals (has a particular approach been
implemented as planned?) and the results of that implementation (has implementation resulted in
the intended outcomes?).
On an intervention/project level, the evaluation will address the following evaluation questions:
Relevance - the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiearies’
requirements, country needs, global priorities and donor policies, more specifically:
1
By definition, a country programme evaluation covers one donor’s entire portfolio of development interventions to a
partner country.
• To Dayton Agreement, peace process and reconstruction;
• Finnish Development cooperation priorities, overall policy priorities and the strategy for
reconstruction of the Western Balkans, including ethnicity balance;
• Priority needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on verifiable documentation);
• Beneficiaries.
Effectiveness - extent to which the objectives of an intervention were achieved?
Efficiency - how economically different resources (funds, expertise) are converted to results. How
rapidly allocations are disbursed? If possible, the efficiency assessment could include comparison
of similar activities carried our by different aid instruments, e.g. small reconstruction projects
(houses) implemented by Finnish NGOs and CIMIC in the same region.
Sustainability - continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major assistance has
been completed. Sustainability evaluation will concentrate on insitututional and economic
sustainability, and the main questions include: do the beneficiaries have financial and human
resources to carry out activities without external funding, and/or has ending of external funding
caused weaking of quality and/or quantity of services? Assessment of the extent of commitment of
the Government of BiH (budget appropriations) and other stakeholders, including the NGO
community.
Consistency - how complementary the different elements of Finnish assistance to BiH have been?
In addition, the evaluation will assess
• Administration in the Ministry, and
• Coordination and cooperation with other donors and international organisations, as well as the
overall framework of SAP process.
To fully appreciate Finnish contributions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the evaluation should explore
and discuss the overall environment in BiH where the activities started and how different state and
cooperation structures have developed since Dayton Agreement. This context analysis should
include description of the immediate needs for reconstruction, and possibilities and limitations for
cooperation between the different ethnic groups and within the international donor community.
4. Methodology
The evaluation will be based on primary data (project management documents, interviews and site
visits) and secondary data (other evaluations and research).
The main task of the evaluation team is the acquisition of primary data, analysis of project
management documents, arrangement and conduct of interviews in Finland and in BiH and the site
visits. Concerning secondary data, the Ministry will provide the evaluation team with a compilation
of all available data including management documentation (agreements, reports, agreed minutes
etc.), other evaluation reports, reviews and other studies.
The evaluation will proceed inductively starting from project level and proceeding to country level
analysis. The main concern in this inductive approach is to ensure that a sufficient number of
projects are evaluated to enable country level assessment. This means that in order to obtain as full
a picture of the cooperation activities as possible, the selection of projects to be evaluated will have
to consider three variables:
1. Projects from all main sectors; social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, emergency aid
and women in development;
2. All main cooperation modalities, support through bilateral project support, local NGOs,
Finnish NGOs, INGOs and international organisations, and Finnish contingency/CIMIC;
3. Geographical representation covering activities in the Fedaration of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including Mostar, and in the Republica Srpska.
In addition to this evaluation, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is currently evaluating four of its
projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Teacher Educator Development Programme (TEPD) is being
evaluated in on-going education sector evaluation, Support to Social Sector will be evaluated in
summer-autumn, a mid-term review of Phase II of Gender Equity project is being carried out in
summer 2003 and of TV News exchange project in autumn 2003. These evaluations will be
considered and will benefit country level conclusions and recommendations of this country
programme evaluation. In addition to the information gained from evaluations/mid-term reviews in
the social sector mentioned above the following projects are proposed to be looked at:
Bilateral project support:
• Support to District Heating Programme in Sarajevo. Finland has supported World Bank
coordinated reconstruction programme of district heating with total amount of € 6.7 million.
• Support to Public Railway Corporation, € 1,177 million, committed in 1998. The objective of this
project was to promote economic activity and reconstruction of railways by providing Public
Railway Corporation with a machine to rehabilitate the tracks.
Finnish Battalion/CIMIC
• Small projects managed by CIMIC in Doboj (activities in Tuzla will not be included in this
evaluation). Total commitments € 3.6 million in 1999 - 2003. The objective of this small project
facility has been to improve the socio-economic situation of the people living in the area and
returnees by providing support to reconstruction of small scale constructions (houses, schools).
Finnish NGOs
• Doboj shelter programme by FIDA international, € 500 000 in 2000-2002. The objective of this
project has been to support return of refugees by reconstruction and renovation of houses.
• Women reconstructing Bosnia and Herzegovina by Marttaliitto, € 180 000 in 1998-2002. The
project supported women in five centres for women in Mostar by providing skills training,
entrepreneurship training, psycho-social counselling etc.
• Establishment of Counselling Centre in Mostar, by Suomen pakolaisapu, € 190 000 in 1999-2002.
The project assisted in establishing a Counselling Centre for women in Mostar.
• Support to Ostra Luka families, returnees and displaced people. Reconstruction of family houses
and community buildings in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina by Finnchurchaid. Total
commitment € 411 000 in 1998.
Support to International Organisations:
• Hiring legal experts to Independent Judicial Commission, € 160 000 in 2001-2002. The objective
was to support IJC operating under OHR.
Emergency aid:
• Reconstruction project of Zgoni kindergarten in Mostar West and construction of Zulic
kindergarten in Mostar East, total € 517 000. Projects were implemented by EU Administration in
Mostar in 1995 and 1996.
Duration of the evaluation should not exceed six months if not agreed otherwise between the
Ministry and the Consultant. The evaluation is proposed to begin with a desk study phase, including
review and analysis of all availalble documentation and interviews in the Ministry and relevant
organisations in Finland, followed by a field visits to Sarajevo, Mostar and Doboj at least. During
the field visits, the team should try to meet the intended final beneficiaries2 of the Finnish support to
assess, wheter the projects have been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and whether they
have brough sustainable benefits to the target groups. Other key informants include the projects’
implementing partners and immediate beneficiaries3.
6. Evaluation team
The tenderer is requested to propose a team that the tenderer seems most fit to undertake the
evaluation. The Team should include nominated Team Leader who bears the overall responsibility
of the evaluation. In addition the Team must include sector experts and independent local expert(s).
In the proposal the tenderer is requested to clearly allocate tasks between the members of the Team.
The Team should possess individually and as a Team the following qualifications:
- experience in carrying out development co-operation evaluations
- experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- knowledge of Finnish Development Co-operation policies and understanding of the
principles of Finnish development co-operation
- thorough knowledge and understanding of the critical development related issues in
the sectors under evaluation
- good command of English
The tenderers are welcomed to point out and highlight any other qualifications that the Team and its
members possess that are of relevance to the evaluation.
Evaluation teams consisting of both men and women are encouraged.
7. Reporting
On the basis of the desk study, the evaluator is requested to prepare a general description of Finnish
support to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an inception report. This report should briefly present main
political and economic developments in the country after Dayton Agreement, main national and
international strategies, international cooperation and coordination of aid activities, and a general
2
3
Those who are to benefit from the improved services provided by the project.
Those who benefit immediately from the project, implementing organisations.
appreciation of Finnish support in that context. Also, the inception report should include more
detailed evaluation questions to be addressed during the field visit.
The evaluator will submit draft final report within six months from the signing of the contract. The
report should include concise summary of main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The
evaluator is encouraged to take a critical approach and not to shy from even provocative statements.
The report should be written in a reader-friendly way.
After submission of the draft final report there shall be a presentation of the report in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, after which possible changes and amendments are made, and final report is
submitted.
Both the interim and final report shall be submitted in English language (word- and PDF-form).
ANNEX 2
LIST OF INFORMANTS
Aaltola, Matti, former Desk Officer for BiH, MFA
Agic, Hariz, Professor, Director, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla
Bach, Helene, Regional FRESTA Coordinator, Royal Danish Embassy, Sarajevo
Backström, Lars, Head of Humanitarian Unit, MFA, Helsinki, Finland
Balta, Klelija, Gender Programme Manager, Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees
Begovic, Emir, Infrastructure Department Manager, BHRPC
Benes, Avis, Head of Public Affairs, OHR South, Mostar
Blomberg, Jouko, Head of Agency International Development Cooperation, YLE, Helsinki
Brankovic, Omer, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Relations and Cooperation, RS
Bryant, Roger, Head of Regional Centre Banja Luka, OSCE
Bundalo, Zlatko, Professor, Advisor, Ministry of Education and Culture, RS
Carrico, Renne, Senior Public Administration Reform Advisor, OSCE RC Banja Luka
Cicic, Miroslav, Assistant of Minister of Roadway and Traffic, RS
Conrad, Christof, Deputy Director, Education Department, OSCE, Sarajevo
Curcic, Faruk, Vice General Manager, BHRPC, Sarajevo
de Boer, Jan, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands, Sarajevo
Djurdjica Brankic, UNHCR Satellite office Bijeljina
Dockhorn, Juergen, LTC, SFOR HQ, CIMIC Liason Officer to WB, USAID and IMF
Elding, Bo, Head of Sida Office in Sarajevo
Ellmen-Parmala, Sari, Head of Recruitment Unit, MFA, Helsinki
Francic, Vesna, Dept of Infrastructure, World Bank, Sarajevo
Golubovic, Nada, President, United Women, Banja Luka
Granulo, Asima, Finance Manager, Toplane, Sarajevo
Hadzialic, Mirzo, Marketing and Development Director, Toplane, Sarajevo
Hakola, Harri, Director for Development Cooperation, Fida International
Halilovic, Hazim, Deputy Minister of Education, Tuzla Canton
Hansen, Steen Malthe, First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy, Sarajevo
Hanssen, Jon, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Sarajevo
Helminen, Reima, Lieutenant Colonel G.S., Personnel and Training, Peace Support Branch
Hranic, Tomas, Project Coordinator, LWF, Osijek, Croatia
Hrzic, Branka, Director, IDEJA, Mostar
Iivonen, Eija, Head, Restructuring Department, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo
Ikonen, Pertti, Director, Unit for NGOs, MFA, Helsinki
Jolkkonen, Ritva, Director General, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki
Junozovic, Azra, National Education Officer, OSCE Sarajevo
Kangasniemi, Kaija, Marttaliitto ry, Helsinki
Keating-Chetwynd, Sarah, Education Officer, Council of Europe, Sarajevo
Kelles Viitanen, Anita, Consultant on gender issues
Kieffer, Claude, Director of Education Department, OSCE Sarajevo
Kiesiläinen, Kari, Director General, Dept. of Judicial Administration, Ministry of Justice, Helsinki
Kljajic, Tanja, journalist, coordinator of ERNO at RTRS, Banja Luka
Knjezevic, Ivana, Teacher, Capljina Education Centre
Kokkala, Heikki, Education Adviser, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki
Kopic, Luna, Village Council, Ostra Luka
Koskenniemi, Eero, Counsellor, Political Department, MFA, Helsinki
Krunic, Spomenka, Director, Gender Centre, RS
Kumpulainen, Lena, Project Coordinator, Finnish Refugee Council, Helsinki
Kurkinen, Petteri, Major G.s., Staff Officer, Eastern Command HQ, Finland
Ladjabi, Meriem, Coordinator, IDEJA Counsulting Centre, Mostar
Larson, Erik Nils, ABA –CEELI
Larsson, Marie, Programme Officer, Sida Office, Sarajevo
Lehikoinen, Eeva-Liisa, Project Manager, Jaakko Pöyry Infra, Espoo, Finland
Lekic, Zeljka, Coordinator, ERNO, Sarajevo
Lesic, Zorica, Operations Analyst, World Bank, Sarajevo
Loman, Timo Henrik, Deputy Head of Investigation, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo
Lottrup, Axel, LTC, CIMIC Chief, SFOR HQ, Butmir/Sarajevo
Manninen-Visuri, Helena, Programme Officer/Humanitarian Aid, FinnChurchAid, Helsinki
Masnikosa, Milan, Chief Engineer, Toplane, Sarajevo
McKean, Michael, Mercy Corps, Tuzla
McMinn, Meredoc, Head of Satellite Office in Zvornik, UNHCR
Möllander, Anders, Ambassador of Sweden to BiH, Sarajevo
Morel, Terry, Head of Protection Unit, UNHCR Sub Office for Northern BiH, Tuzla
Mulaomerovic, Resad, Manager, Infrastructure Area Sarajevo, Railways of Federation of BiH
Muratovic, Hasnija, Adviser for Education Development, Federal Ministry of Education, Sarajevo
Nayar, Haridas, Programme Manager/Sr. Policy Adviser, UNDP
Olsson, Katarina, Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm
Overland Andersen, Frode, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Sarajevo
Papic, Zarko, Resident Director, IBHI, Sarajevo
Pasalic-Kreso, Adila, Dr., MA Programme Director, University of Sarajevo
Pasic, Zijad, Federation Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, Sarajevo
Pavelic, Svetlana, Portfolio Manager, UNDP
Pejic, Tunjo, Village Council, Ostra Luka
Pesic, Mariko, Project Coordinator, LWF, Osijek, Croatia
Petric, Aleksandra, Human Rights trainer, United Women, Banja Luka
Petric, Natalija, Legal Adviser, United Women, Banja Luka
Pihlatie, Heidi, (former Head of Unit for Latin America and Mediterranean), Embassy of Finland, Rome
Pinjo, Mirza, Head of Department for Multilateral relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BiH
Pirvola, Lauri, Manager District Heating Systems, Elektrowatt-Ekono, Espoo, Finland
Pozderovic, Ediba, Coordinator, Education Centre, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla
Prins, Margriet, Deputy Head RRTF, OHR Head office, Sarajevo
Radojcic, Novak, Chief for Reconstruction and Development, International Liaison, Doboj Municipality
Rasidagic, Esref –Kenan, Project Manager, IBHI, Sarajevo
Rautanen, Pekka, Maintenance Manager, VR Track Ltd, Helsinki
Rehn, Elisabeth, Chairperson Working Table 1, Democratisation and Human Rights, Stability Pact
Rizvanovic Sefik, Adviser, Ministry of Civil Affairs, BiH
Robinson, Jonathan, Head of RRTF, OHR Tuzla regional office
Roche, Ralph, Judicial Reform Officer, Independent Judicial Commission, Sarajevo
Rudic, Zivko, Inspector, Ministry of Transport and Communications, RS
Ruhomäki, Olli, Advisor, Dept. for Development Policy, MFA, Helsinki
Schröder, Holger, Deputy Head of Operations, Delegation of the European Commission to BiH. Sarajevo
Selimovic, Semina, Director, LWF, Tuzla
Siliämaa, Leo, Head of International Programmes, FinnChurchAid, Helsinki
Sirkiä, Paula, Desk Officer for BiH, Unit for West Balkans, Europe Division, MFA
Smajlovic, Saban, Coordinator, Education Centre, Pedagogical Institute, Tuzla
Somun, Lejla, GEEP coordinator, IBHI, Sarajevo
Stenius-Mladenov, Birgitta, roving Ambassador, MFA, Helsinki
Suomalainen, Nina, Adviser to the Chair Working table 1, Stability Pact, MFA, Helsinki
Takala, Elsi, (former Desk Officer for BiH) Regional Manager, Unit for East and West Africa, MFA, Helsinki
Tarpai, William, Head of UNHCR Office Tuzla, BiH
Tepponen, Antti, Head of FIDA International, Tuzla, BiH
Thomasson, Ristin, Kvinna till Kvinna, Sarajevo
Tisma, Valerija, Education Department, OSCE, Banja Luka
Uusihakala, Juho, Consulting and Advisory Services, Helsinki
Väänänen, Juhani, Head of Unit for West Balkans, MFA, Helsinki
Vainikka, Vesa-Pekka, Senior Advisor, District heating systems, Elektrowatt-Ekono, Espoo, Finland
Vejzovic, Majda, Director of Kindergartens,Stari Grad Municipality, Mostar
Vilo, Jarmo, Cpt, formerly with CIMIC Company, Multinational Brigade North, SFOR
Virtanen, Pirjo, Counsellor, Unit for Evaluation and Internal Audit, MFA, Helsinki
Vukmanic, Vesna, Project Coordinator, ICVA Sarajevo,
Wala, Heikki, FinnChurchAid, Banovici, BiH
Weiner, Michael, Head of Office for Technical Cooperation with BiH, Embassy of Austria
Westler, Richard, Senior Transport Sector Advisor, Economic Dept., OHR, Sarajevo
Withrow, Scott, Senior Democratisation Officer, OSCE RC Banja Luka
Zecevic, Asim, Assistant of Minister of Labour and Social politics, Federation of BiH, Sarajevo
Zecevic, Hazim, General Manager, Toplane, Sarajevo
Zillén, Eva, Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm
Zukanovic, Ramiza, Director, Prijateljice, Konjic
ANNEX 3
LIST OF REFERENCES
Statistics
• Finland’s ODA net disbursements 1991 – 2002 according to budget classification, Table, 2 p,
from website
• Finland’s ODA, budget appropriations 1991 – 2003,
• Bilateral and multilateral Development assistance in 1991-2002, disbursements
• Finland’s bilateral ODA disbursements, Main recipient countries, 1999-2002
• The 25 largest recipient countries of Finland’s ODA in 1970-2002
• Finland’s ODA 1961 -2003, Budget appropriations
• Finnish bilateral ODA disbursements by country and region 2002
• www.oecd.org
Strategy
• Finland’s support for the Western Balkans, Draft strategy, 20 April 2003
o Table of total disbursements 1999-2002, and planned appropriations for 2003-2006
• Finland’s Development cooperation, yearly report 2002, selected chapters:
o How the objectives are reached
o Reconstruction of the western Balkans
• Strategy for Assistance to Post conflict Western Balkans, Nov 1999
• Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland’s Policy for Developing
Countries 2003-2007
• A Development Co-operation Manual for Non-Governmental Organisations, Principles and
Guidelines, MFA, July 2003
• Education for All – Finnish Development Cooperation in the Education Sector, MFA, 2001
• De mänskliga rättigheterna och Finlands utrikespolitik, MFA, November 2000
• Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of BiH, 2003, Council of Ministers
Project-specific documentation
• Women’s Projects in Mostar
o Connecting Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Project Evaluation Report, June 2001
o Various Annual Reports on the separate women’s projects
o Report for Stolac Center, January-July 2002
o Support to the Consulting Centre in Mostar, Evaluation Report, June 2001
o Project document: Connecting Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (undated) on a Consulting
Centre in Mostar; Marttaliitto ry and the Finnish Refugee Council (or MFA?)
o Annual Report 2002 from IDEJA Consulting Centre
o Quarterly Reports January-March and April-August 2003 from IDEJA Consulting Centre
o Comprehensive Project Descriptions from IDEJA Consulting Centre, November 2003
o Agreement between the EU Administration in Mostar and the MFA of Finland on
support to two Kindergartens in Mostar, July 1995
o International Crisis Group: Building Bridges in Mostar, November 2003
o OHR documents on the Mostar Reform Commission on a single city administration,
September 2003 – January 2004
•
District Heating Project
o Fax correspondence btw MFA and World Bank from April –June 1996
o Assessment report from Sarajevo, Jun 1996, Ekono Energy
o Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of BiH concerning
Finnish support to the emergency district heating reconstruction project, July 1996
o Project Continuation plan for the year 1999, Toplane, Sarajevo, 20 August 1998
o
o
o
o
o
•
Decision memo of MFA for 1999, December 1998, MFA
Project continuation plan for the year 1998, Toplane, Sarajevo, 26 August 1997
Final report, May 2000, Ekono Energy Ltd.
Implementation Completion report- BiH Emergency District heating reconstruction
Project Trust fund credit no. 024034, October 1999, World Bank
Reconstruction and development program in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Progress update,
June 2002, The World Bank
•
Railway project
o Fax correspondence btw BiH and MFA from 1998-1999
o Agreement between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska on the
establishment of a joint railway public corporation as part of transportation corporation
o Decision memo for the aid to Bosnian railways, December 1999, MFA
o Company Profile and current situation, August 1996, BiH Railways
o Agreement between Finland and BiH concerning Finnish support to Railway Public
Corporation in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina
o Letter to BiH MFA concerning the Finnish donation of a truck layer machine. August,
1998
o Memorandum for Govt Decision, 16 December 1998, MFA
o Terms of Reference for the Appraisal of a proposal for a Master Plan for maintenance
and repair of railway infrastructure in BiH, August 1999, MFA
o BiHTMAP – The JICA Study on Tranport Master Plan in BiH, Seminar III, February
2000, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
o Rehabilitation and development of railway infrastructure in BiH, 2003, BHRPC
o List of priority rehabilitation and reconstruction projects of the railway infrastructure on
pan-European corridor Vc and parallel to corridor X financing by EBRD and EIB loans,
2003, BHRPC
•
Fida International in the Doboj Area
o Annual Reports 2000 – 2001 from Fida International
o Memo from Fida International on Doboj Municipality, construction material provision
etc., October 2003
o Evaluation of LWF’s Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance in Northeast BiH, October
2002, Stockholm Group for Development Studies AB
•
Support to Ostra Luka families, returnees and displaced
o Project document, November 1997
o Final Report, October 1998
o Returnee and Reconstruction Programme in Western Balkans 2002 - 2004
(FinnChurchAid)
•
Finnish CIMIC work
o Svenska Bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo, 2001, Sida Evaluation
o www.nato.int
o Government decision to grant FIM 3 million to Finnish Engineering battalion, 1998,
MFA
o Law on amendment to the law on Refugees from BiH and displaced persons in BiH
o Final report on the use of project funds by the Finnish SFOR troops in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1998-2003, 2003, CIMIC Company Commander Major Markus Rento
o Civil-military cooperation in Crisis management operations, 2001, Dissertation by Petteri
Kurkinen for General Staff Officers’ course at the National Defence College
o Various texts on CIMIC by Petteri Kurkinen, 2003
Independent Judicial Commission
o OHR: Jobs and Justice – Our Agenda, September 2002
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
OHR: Decision of the High Representative on the Establishment of the Independent
Judicial Commission, March 2001
MFA Decision to grant support to IJC for recruitment of local lawyers and investigators,
May 2001
Project Plan, August 2001
Agreement between MFA and OHR, October 2001
Request for Extension of project period, May 2002
IJC Progress Reports (8), April 2001 - May 2002
Final Report, May 2003
IJC publications:
Uniting Judicial Services – Achievements, September 2002 – August 2003
Work Plan of HJPCs and IJC September 2002 - December 2003, November 2002
Work Plan of IJC, March – December 2003
Analysis: Estimated Cost Impact of Reform and Forecasted Long-run Savings, May 2003
Court Budgeting and Court Funding in Federation and Republika Srpska, June 2003
HJCPs publications:
Periodic Report No.1, September – December 2002
Interim Report, August 2003
Statistics on Ethnic and Gender Representation; November 2003
The IJC Mandate to be completed on March 31, 2004; November 2003
International Crisis Group
Rule over Law – Obstacles to the Development of an Independent Judiciary in BiH, July
1999
Courting Disaster – The Misrule of Law in BiH, March 2002
Other evaluations
• Evaluation of Bilateral development cooperation between __ and Finland, Generic ToR for all
country programme evaluations, 2003
• Evaluation of the Support to Social Sector–Project (SSSP) in BiH
o ToR, June 2003
o Report August 2003
• Mid term review of Gender Equity and Equality Project (GEEP) in BiH
o ToR May 2003
o Report June 2003
• Review Mission on Finnish support to News Exchange in the Balkans
o ToR, August 2003
o MISSING: Final Report, expected 1 Oct
• Evaluation of Finnish Teacher Education and Professional Development project (TEPD),
o ToR, March 2003
o Final Report, October, 2003
• The level and quality of Finland’s Development cooperation, Special Committee Report,
Other donors
• CARDS, various documents
• Svenska Bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo, Sida Evaluation 01/10/03
• Sweden’s assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida Evaluation 99/24
• Sweden’s Country Strategy for development cooperation BiH, 2003-2005, Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs
• Evaluating external assistance to the Western Balkans – with special emphasis on BiH, UTV
Working Paper 2001:5
• Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002- 2006, European Commission, Directorate
Western Balkans
• The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe- Second annual report, 2003,
European Commission
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Shared Modernisation Strategy for Primary and Secondary Education in BiH, Bih Educational
Authorities, EC-TAER programme and EU, October 2003
Council of Europe: Framework Programme of Co-operation with the Entity Ministries of
Education in BiH 2002-2004, July 2002
Open Society Fund BiH: Education Programme 2003-2005
OSCE/Mission to BiH: Programme Summary, October 2002
UNDP: BiH Human Development Report 2002
International assistance to BiH, 1996-2002 – A tentative analysis: who is doing what, where, 2003,
UNDP/Govt of BiH
FRESTA South Eastern Europe Programme, Programme Document 2003-2004, Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Draft proposal for an integrated system for economic planning and development resources
coordination, October 2003, BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic relations.
BiH – From Recovery to Sustainable Growth; World Bank Country Study 1997
BiH Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank, July 1997
BiH Priority Reconstruction Update, World Bank, September 1999
BiH Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, World Bank, October 2002
World Bank Reconstruction and Development Program - Progress update, 2003
The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe, A Regional Strategy Paper, World
Bank, March 2000
World Bank: 4th BiH Education Restructuring Project, Project Appraisal July 2003
Other reference material
• OHR BiH: Essential Texts – General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Agreement),
Protocols from Peace Implementation Council Meetings etc.
• Law on Gender Equality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 21, 2003
• International Crisis Group: Implementing Equality – The “Constituent Peoples” Decision in
Bosnia & Herzegovina, April 2002
• International Crisis Group: Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments. Paddy Ashdown and the
Paradoxes of State building, July 2003
• Sveriges Utrikesdepartment:: Mänskliga rättigheter i Bosnien-Hercegovina 2002
• A wealth of OHR speeches and pressreleases 2002-2004
• Finland vill bli bäst på bistånd, article in Sida’s magazine Omvärlden,
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
ANNEX 4 A
Technical evaluation of Donation of tracklayer machine
GENERAL INFORMATION
Project Reference
Donor
Contractor/Supplier
Acceptor
Recipient
Project title
Project code
Sector
Beneficiary (ies)
Project value
Government of the Republic of Finland
DESEC Ltd., FIN-39700 Parkano, Finland
Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina Railways Public
Corporation (BHRPC)
Donation of Finnish Tracklayer Machine
863 030 01
Railways
Railways of Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (ZFBiH) and Railways of Republic
of Srpska (ZRS)
€1.177.315,001
Project Overview
This Project was considered by the Government of Finland within general
incentive of this Government to maintain solid relations with Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The basics for this consideration was the following:
•
•
•
The desire to strengthen the existing cordial relations between the two
countries;
To emphasize the importance of adherence to the Dayton Peace
Agreement, specially in respect of democracy and human rights; and
Recognition of the urgency for reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It was recognized before, through the Donor Conferences organized by local
Government, IFI’s and particular donors/Governments, that railways sector in
the country would have important role in overall rehabilitation of economy of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Consequently, the team of two Finnish experts came to Bosnia and
Herzegovina in June 1998. The purpose of their visit was to spot critical
aspects of required rehabilitation of the railways system in the country with the
specific focus on the railway infrastructure. In addition, they were authorized
to link the local needs with potential supply abilities of companies from
Finland. As the outcome of this activity, the Government of Finland approved
1
This value corresponds to the value of Finnish currency called Finnish Mark, which was
still valid in 1999. At that time, the value of the equipment was FIM 7.000.000,00, which was
equal to the value stated in the Project Evaluation Sheet.
1
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
the Project of Tracklayer Machine TL 50 to be supplied by DESEC Ltd. to the
local recipient in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Project Background
The total length of railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 1.031km. It is
mainly composed of two main railway lines with North-South and West-East
orientation.
Main line of North-South orientation is actually alignment of the Pan-European
Corridor V, branch C, which connects Budapest in Hungary with Ploče Port in
Croatia through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is very important
corridor for Bosnia and Herzegovina because it enables the link to PanEuropean Corridor X in Croatia and it also enables connection to the Port of
Ploče, as the main Port for economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Main line of West-East orientation is the parallel line to aforesaid Corridor X and
it has importance for economies located along the line with the access to
Corridor V, branch C and link to Serbia and further on towards Eastern Europe.
The network is based on standard European gauge of 1.435mm and most of
the network is classified as D4 category, which means maximum loads of 22,5
tons per axle or 8,0 tons per linear meter. All the lines are single-track, except
one section of 87kms along the Corridor Vc (Zenica-Doboj). Around 75% of the
network is electrified with mono-phase 25kV, 50Hz AC system. The only part of
the network, which is not electrified, is located in the Northeast part of the
country in the region of Tuzla. In that part of the network, trains are operated by
diesel-locomotives.
Enclosure 1 gives an overview on the railway network in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The performance of the Sector of Railways in the pre-war time (1990) was the
following:
•
•
Freight Traffic Volume: 25,2 millions of tons and 4.410 millions of ton-km;
Passenger Traffic Volume: 13,0 millions of passengers and 1.318 millions of
passenger-km
The Sector of Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing with a lot of
challenges in the post-war period. As a consequence of the war activities, the
railways system sustained heavy damages as most of its facilities have been
put out of operation. Total war damages were roughly estimated to around 1
billion Euros. More than one third of these damages pertains to the
infrastructure: 20 bridges were completely destroyed, numerous tracks were
broken, overhead contact lines damaged and signalling and telecommunication
facilities destroyed. Moreover, the heavy machinery for infrastructure
maintenance was destroyed, as well as the rolling stock.
In order to rehabilitate this condition, local Government, Railway Authorities and
international institutions started with implementation of relevant programme of
railways recovery. This programme was foreseen to be implemented in three
stages.
The aim of the first stage of the programme was to put back into operation all
railway lines along the network with minimal technical requirements such as
reduced transport volumes, low operational speeds and minimal safety
3
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
measures. This stage was covered by the Emergency Transport
Reconstruction Program (ETRP) and may be regarded as completed.
The second stage of rehabilitation, which is still underway, aims to achieve
approximate pre-war level of functionality, although it does not imply a
compulsory return to all pre-war conditions. The implementation of the second
stage is supposed to respect technical and operational changes arisen in the
meantime, namely signalling, telecommunications and remote control.
The third stage, whose starting time is not yet stated, relates to the further
development of railways in line with contemporary trends in Europe, traffic
demand and economic potential of the country, in order to compete effectively
with other transport means.
The post-war performance of the Sector of Railways is given by the tables
below.
Table 1 - Railway Freight Traffic in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Growth Trend
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
ŽFBiH
106 Ton10 Tons
km
1,394
18
1,632
44
2,605
73
2,774
115
3,328
140
3,796
164
4,200
177
3
ŽRS
106 Ton10 Tons
km
127
7
178
2
265
11
473
31
951
82
1,060
119
1,174
132
3
BiH in total
106 Ton10 Tons
km
1,521
25
1,810
46
2,870
84
3,247
146
4,279
222
4,856
283
5,374
309
3
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletins published by Office of Statistics in FBiH and RS 2002.
Table 2 - Railway Passenger Traffic in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Growth Trend
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
ŽFBiH
103 Pass.
1,232
225
181
182
197
200
218
6
10
Pass.-km
30
6
5
10
9
12
15
ŽRS
103 Pass.
1,648
1,236
1,570
1,299
1,145
1,100
904
6
10
Pass.-km
32
33
53
41
38
41
38
BiH in total
106
103 Pass.
Pass.-km
2,880
62
1,461
39
1,751
58
1,481
51
1,342
47
1,300
53
1,122
53
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletins published by Office of Statistics in FBiH and RS 2002.
Such low transport volumes by railways in BiH in relation to the pre-war
volumes are the consequence of the political and economic situation in the
country, which is still away from full recovery. On the other hand, another factor
was the very low level of technical performance of the railway infrastructure in
terms of allowable loads, speeds and safety. Enclosures 2 and 3 present the
current track condition along the railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This is the situation in spite to the fact that international community allocated
some €52 millions for recovery of railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key
obstacles were slow recovery of industry to be served by railways and very
slow implementation of the second stage of railways recovery.
4
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
The aforesaid amount was mainly dedicated to the implementation of projects
under the first phase of railways recovery. In addition, there is new financial
support, given by the EIB and EBRD with total amount of around €80 millions,
which is to be allocated to the Sector of Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
proceed with the implementation of projects under the second phase of
railways recovery. This is the package of projects funded over the loan
arrangements and implementation of these projects is underway.
The most important projects under aforesaid projects and that are related to
this project, are given in the table below.
Table 3 – Relevant Railway Projects Under the EBRD/EIB Package (€)
Item
FBiH
RS
BiH in total
Continuing-action Line
1.750.000
0
1.750.000
Tamper
Dynamic Stabiliser
1.450.000
0
1.450.000
Ballast Regulator
575.000
1.150.000
1.725.000
Track Overhaul
13.500.000
0
13.500.000
Bradina-Konjic
Track Overhaul
0
9.500.000
9.500.000
Jošavka-Banja Luka
Track Completion
800.000
185.000
985.000
Tuzla-Zvornik
Total:
18.075.000
11.335.000
28.910.000
Source: EBRD – Bosnia and Herzegovina: Project Scoping for Railway Rehabilitation, 2001
Components stated in the table above pertains to required heavy machinery for
the track maintenance and to the most critical sections along the network,
which require urgent overhaul activity. The last component of section TuzlaZvornik relates to the completion of the track since the line was put into
operation just before the start of the war but with lot of technical and operational
restrictions (missing sleepers, fastenings, welds, ballast, etc.).
The implementation of these projects is underway. However, construction
works have not started yet since the majority of Tenders are under evaluation
of the Banks. It is to expect that most of these projects will be completed in
2005.
Two railway companies in both entities, Railways of FBiH (ZFBiH) and
Railways of RS (ZRS), have the full scale of responsibilities for the
management over railway infrastructure (maintenance, operations, construction
and modernisation) in the respective entities. This is a direct consequence of
the Dayton Agreement, which regulates the transport infrastructure issue at the
entity level. At the same time, it leaves the space for the entities to form “public
corporations” to act as the “joint structures” between the entities in order to
regulate inter-entity and international transportation issues2. Consequently, the
first Public Corporation was formed in the Sector of Railways in April 1998.
2
Look in Enclosure 4 – Dayton Agreement Annex 9.
5
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
This body is called Bosnia – Herzegovina Railways Public Corporation
(BHRPC) and it is managed in accordance to the Agreement on
Establishment3.
It has to be noted that responsibilities of the Corporation are rather “delegated”
than real ones. Also, the sources of funding are mostly depending on donations
or entity subsidies, since there is no opportunity for the Corporation to act as
the infrastructure manager along main part of the railways network at least and
to collect the “access fee”. Everything is strongly dependable on entities and
entity railway companies.
The legislation framework in the field of railways, which defines division of
responsibilities among various bodies in the country, is the following:
•
•
•
Law on Railways of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ŽFBiH) –
Official Gazette of FBiH N°. 41/01;
Law on Railways of Republic of Srpska (ŽRS) – Official Gazette of RS N°.
58/01; and
Law on Public Corporations Established pursuant to the Annex 9 of the
General Framework Peace Agreement for BiH– Official Gazette of FBiH N°.
19/00.
Project Components
According to the Agreement between two countries4, signed on February 4th
1999, the project components were the following:
•
•
•
Delivery of the Tracklayer machine (turnout and track element replacing
machine);
Delivery of pertaining accessories; and
Training of operating staff.
According to the Quotation no. 910997D, dated from December 4th 1998, the
selected supplier was Finnish company DESEC Ltd. Annex II of the abovementioned Agreement presents the details of the support.
This support included fund of maximum FIM 7.000.000,00 and it was supposed
to cover the following costs:
•
•
•
Purchase of the tracklayer machine and its accessories;
Training of maximum six trainees within the period of maximum two weeks
in Parkano, Finalnd; and
Costs of the Finnish agency responsible for the implementation of the
Project from the Finnish side.
3
Look in Enclosure 5 – Agreement between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska on the establishment of a joint railway public corporation as part of
transportation corporation.
4
Agreement between the Government of the Republic Finland and the Council of Ministers of
Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning Finnish Support to Railway Public Corporation in
Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
On the other hand, the Council of Ministers (Government of BiH) was obliged to
bear transportation costs of the machine and accessories. Also, this authority
needed to provide sufficient and qualified personnel in timely manner, to
provide the DESEC Ltd. with the radio frequency required for the remote
controller of the machine and to render any other assistance needed for the
facilitation of this Project.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES/OUTPUT
Project details about objectives and output are not very clear. Although there is
signed Agreement between two Governments about implementation of this
Project, there is no section in the Agreement which clarifies the objectives and
expected outputs of the Project. There are only declarative sentences, stated in
the introductory part of the Agreement, which describes in a general way the
background of the Project from the Finnish point of view.
However, looking at the available documents, it is to suppose that the
objectives of the Project were the following:
•
•
•
In general, to support the recovery of the country destroyed by the war;
In general, to support the need of rehabilitation of the railway infrastructure
in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of war-damages mostly; and
In particular, to enforce the position of the BHRPC in implementation of
Projects, funded by international donors or institutions, as a part of defined
responsibilities in the BHRPC Agreement.
Expected outputs are impossible to be clearly stated on the basics of available
information and documents. In that respect, only the following can be assumed:
•
•
•
•
A number of turnouts replaced by the machine within a number of
months/years, as a part of the track overhaul activities;
A number of kilometres of track overhauled by the machine, as a part of the
track overhaul activities;
Responsible Railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully capable for
operations and maintenance of the machine; and
BHRPC manages successfully with the machine in terms of time allocation
to the responsible Railways.
7
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
SITE SURVEY FINDINGS
Interviews
In November 2003, the expert team of evaluators conducted the interview and
the site visit to the place of current base of the machine. The interviews were
completed with the ZFBiH Manager for Mechanised Track Maintenance, Mr.
Resad Mulaomerovic and his staff responsible for operation and maintenance
of the machine. The main outcomes of these interviews are stated below.
In 1997, local Railways were introduced with information about the tracklayer
machine TL 50 for the first time by the DESEC. It was stated that the machine
operates as the tracklayer for both turnouts and track. It is also possible to
handle with the machine by the remote controller with a fixed radio frequency.
The machine is built on the “straddle-carrier” principle, which makes this
machine very flexible and with high load capacity. It can be transported on the
flat-wagon or on the special trolleys built for such purpose.
Although this document states that the machine may be used in multi-purpose
applications (track layering, turnout replacement, track maintenance,…), Mr.
Mulaomerovic stated that primary purpose of this machine type (TL 50) is
turnout replacement. Also, he stated that the machine could be used for track
replacement and layering but only on railway sections without terrain
difficulties in railway access and space for manoeuvring. The situation is that
local Railways used heavy rail cranes for this type of works before the war.
There were 4 cranes in operation of Geismar type in total, which could replace
around 200m of track in an hour, if worked coupled in doubles. So, practical
capacity of a single crane was some 50m/hour. Similar capacity was achieved
in use for TL 50 machine, although with rather occasional use. Those 4
cranes are still in operation and they are used by the local company
authorised for the track maintenance, called “Remont pruga d.d Sarajevo”.
This expert confirmed that the recipient of the Project was BHRPC and this
authority is the owner at the same time.
The machine is currently in operational condition but not in use. The
explanation was that there is no concrete plans for its use because abovementioned track overhaul activities were in delay. Also, it is not known if the
future contractor of these works will use this type of the machine for overhaul
works.
The machine has not been used in FBiH as well as in RS as foreseen.
Actually, it has been used in FBiH only. The explanation for non-use of the
machine in RS was that responsible people in ZRS were not interested for its
use, since they thought there are more important projects for themselves. This
company did not even send the personnel to be qualified for the use of this
machine to Finland. Unfortunately, there is no clear and written evidence
about it. It was also confirmed by the trained technicians in ZFBiH that ZRS
additionally sent few people from their side to be introduced with the TL 50,
upon its delivery to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, they abandoned the
“training” with explanation “this is not for them” or “we do not need this”.
Again, there is no written evidence of it.
The machine is physically based in Blazuj, nearby Sarajevo, in the Workshop
facility of Railways, which was used before for exclusive maintenance of
8
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
heavy machinery. Unfortunately, due to the war activities, this Workshop was
severely damaged and it can hardly work now without appropriate equipment,
tools and materials. As a temporary solution, most of the existing and
operational machinery is repaired in the Central Workshop Rajlovac, located
also in the vicinity of Sarajevo. This workshop at the moment has some better
conditions for the repair of the machinery.
However, reconstruction of Blazuj Workshop is also in the EBRD/EIB
package, so it is to expect that some better conditions will be provided by this
Workshop after 2005.
The maintenance has been properly conducted in the meantime and the
whole container with accessories is available on site. There was a critical
failure of one hydraulic engine just after the first action in the country. This has
been resolved by the local trained technicians, which replaced the engine
immediately. The additional delivery of this part was promptly resolved by the
original supplier in order to fulfil the commitment to have full set of
accessories available on site. This engine belongs to this set.
At the time of machine’s operations, there were no problems with the supply
chain of other materials (track, sleepers, etc.). However, the main problem
was rather seldom use of the machine within the period of 4 years (19992003). The table below presents the total use of the machine in the meantime.
Table 4. Use of TL 50 in period 1999-2003
No.
Description of
works
1
Training of 4
technicians
2
Track layering on
new railway
overpass
3
4
5
6
Track layering of
a new station
track at market
centre “Merkator”
Track layering on
tramway section
Track and turnout
layering of
industrial siding at
the Distribution
Centre
Track and turnout
layering in the
Workshop
Time of
works
Quantity
Number of
working
hours
(enginehours)
Parkano,
Finland
Line
SarajevoPloce at
section
8+5008+710
Freight
Railway
Station
Sarajevo
City of
Sarajevo
1728/05/1999
10 days
83
1316/07/2000
210m
20
22/09/2000
1.200m
16
0212/08/2001
1.160m
50
Rajlovac
15/09/2001
30m and 1
turnout
7
Blazuj
30/04/2002
50m and 1
turnout
10
Location of
works
Source: Report of Mr. Mulaomerovic, Sarajevo, November 5th 2003.
9
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
EVALUATION AND RATINGS
Evaluation
The evaluation criteria include relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and
sustainability of the Project.
Relevance: the implementation of this Project partially respond to the needs
prioritised by the local authorities. Although track overhaul projects have been
highlighted as top priorities, this type of machinery has not been mentioned at
all on any official priority list by the local Railways or other Bosnian
Authorities. There are few reasons for that. First of all, local Railways have
available cranes for the same type of works as for TL 50, which satisfies their
needs in terms of capacity. Secondly, local Railways expected that use of
heavy machinery for this type of works would be finally defined by a
contractor, which will complete the planned overhaul works. Finally, it has
been confirmed by the local experts that there are serious technical limits for
use of this machine under heavy alignment conditions, such as SarajevoCapljina Line for instance, which focuses use of this machine for turnouts only
on some sections.
Effectiveness: it is very difficult to evaluate this criterion having in mind
absence of clear objectives and outputs. However, some remarks can be
used for the evaluation if we include assumptions stated before. First of all,
this Project did not help to the local Railways to rehabilitate some sections
along the main lines in the country. There was one application in that sense
only (the second one from table 4). The use of this machine has been
facilitated partially, because one of stated beneficiaries did not use it at all and
the adequate training has not been done. The BHRPC is the owner but still
not enforced sufficiently to plan maintenance activities along with the use of
the machine. Finally, as the output, the result of TL 50 use is 2 turnouts
replaced, 2.650m of track replaced, out of which only 10% along main lines,
and 196 working hours in total, out of which 83 working hours were done as
training on the same machine.
Efficiency: this Project was mostly efficient since the funds foreseen to be
spent were in line to the estimations, as well as time, material and staff. The
critical issue in terms of efficiency is the Project did not achieve assumed
objectives. Two main points of it are “type of evaluation of priorities” done by
Finnish experts5 and evaluation of incomplete part of the assistance – ZRS
staff.
Sustainability: considering the level of achieved outputs, it can be stated that
the works done by this machine are sustainable and long lasting. However, it
must be noted that any further results will depend on management over this
machine by the BHRPC, ZRS, ZFBiH or other contractors for track overhaul
works.
5
It seems like strategic miss from the BHRPC but good marketing by DESEC. These funds
could be spent in a more efficient way.
10
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
Rating
Rating of each evaluation criterion is as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
Very good:
Good:
Medium:
Poor:
Very poor:
mark 5
mark 4
mark 3
mark 2
mark 1
Based on the aforesaid evaluation and marks, the table below presents the
result of the evaluation.
Table 5. Evaluation of the Project
Criterion
Rating
Descriptive
Mark
Relevance
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Sustainability
Total
(in average)
Poor
Poor
Medium
Very God
Poor/Medium
2
2
3
4
2,75
11
PROJECT EVALUATION SHEET: Tracklayer Machine DESEC TL 50
Photo Documentation
Figure 1. Parking location of the Tracklayer Machine in Blazuj Workshop
Figure 2. Container with Accessories
Figure 3. Tracklayer Trolleys for Transport
Figure 4. The Environment of Blazuj Workshop
12
ANNEX 4 B
CITY HEATING
EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION
PROJECT
IN SARAJEVO
DESIGN EVALUATION
Sarajevo, November 2003
INSTITUT IPSA SARAJEVO
Author:
Majušević Momir, dipl. Ing. maš.
Manager:
Prof. Dr. Ešref Gačanin, dipl. Ing.
Maš.
DESIGN EVALUATION
I PART: GENERAL PART
Design number
Design title
Sub - sector
Beneficiary
863. 01. 301
EMERGENCY CITY HEATING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT
IN SARAJEVO
ENERGY, CITY HEATING
BOSNA AND HERZEGOVINA, SARAJEVO
CONTRACTS ON AID
E.D.H.R.P.
Sarajevo
Source and type of
assets
IDA
WORLD BANK
- Basic loan
- Dutch loan I
- Dutch loan II
FINLAND
- Material 1996
- Technical Support
1997
E.D.H.R.P.
Sarajevo
DENMARK
- Material 1997
- Technical Support
1,30
0,10
1998
E.D.H.R.P.
Sarajevo
E.U.
1,90
Year
Project Title
1996 2000
Emergency
District Heating
Reconstruction
Project
Sarajevo
1996 2000
TOTAL AID:
Mio
USD
20,00
5,00
3,50
3,35
5,35
Purpose of the means
Material, work and
local supervision.
In the phase of
emergency works for
all parts of design.
1996 – 2000.
Distribution pipelines,
sub-stations, in-door
installation.
Financial training.
“Turnkey” contract
(in-door installations
for 7.000 apartments)
40,50
Comment:
Part of the 20 Mio USD loan, provided by World Bank, was temporarily divided
among Banja Luka Heating Systems (500.000 USD), Elektroprivreda (3.800.000
USD) and part for the realization of the gas installation project (5.000.000 USD). This
resulted with financial problems during the implementation of emergency city heating
project in Sarajevo.
II PART
HISTORY
Central heating system was used in Sarajevo, from the beginning of the XX
century, for heating of residential and offices. First large buildings, which were built
at that time (1910 – 1911) all had central heating installations (the Court, Railroad
Head Office, Presidency etc). The mass construction of residential buildings
containing multiple apartments began at the end of World War II and the central
heating installations became wide spread.
II – 1 – STATE OF AFFAIRS BEFORE THE WAR
City heating system in Sarajevo started developing since 1968 when J.K.P.
“Toplane” Sarajevo was founded.
In 1991 J.K.P. “Toplane” Sarajevo, was providing services to 40% of the population
(apartments) in the wider Sarajevo area. Approximately 180.000 of inhabitants were
users of this system, as well as the large part of the business and public areas in
the city.
City heating system consisted of 130 boiler rooms; big stand-alone boiler rooms
with more multiple boilers inside; smaller boiler rooms with one boiler inside. Total
of installed power of all boiler rooms measured 515 MW, from which 387 MW (75%)
was working capacity. This heat was transported by city pipeline hot-water network
with total length of 62 km, to the end-users.
There were 120 heating sub-stations included in the system and located either in
the boiler room itself or in the buildings of end-users.
System had two technologies implemented:
- first, 43 boiler rooms were providing independent networks with warm or hot water
for heating.
- second, each building or separated block of buildings had their own roof boiler
room (total of 87 roof boiler rooms).
Combined boiler rooms feeding system was used for the first type of boiler rooms
(gas/heating oil) and gas-only feeding for the second type of the boiler rooms.
Approximately 225.000 of the radiators were installed in the apartments, business
and public spaces.
II – 2 – CONDITION AFTER THE WAR – PRIOR TO THE PROJECT
During the war city heating system was largely devastated due to war and lack of
the liquid fuels or irregular and insufficient supply with natural gas.
The second reason resulted in major damage due to: installation freezing
accelerated corrosion and problems with insulation of the elements of the system.
End result was such that in 1996 only 16.000 (32%) users out of pre-war 50.000
could use the heating from the city system. “Toplane” were producing and
supplying the consumers with only 141 MW or 36% of 387MW before the war.
Out of the 130 boiler rooms, only 60 were operational with total approximate
installed capacity of 200MW, which is ca. 39% of the pre-war capacity.
Due to freezing, corrosion and insulation damages to the pipeline network, ca. 15%
of a total length of 62km had to be repaired (reinstalled). Most of the sub-stations
were out of order due to damages (freezing, corrosion) or lack of maintenance or
spare parts. Out of total 225.000 radiators in the system before the war, only 30%
or approximately 65.000 were operational.
III PROJECT CONTENT
A – “Emergency programme” of reconstruction
The aim of this part of the reconstruction programme is to make functional the cityheating network for heating of min. 30.000 apartments before winter. “Emergency
program” started in June 1996, and it was financed by Finland. Main components of
the “emergency programme” were:
- Reparation of the heating installation in approximately 20.000 apartments.
- Reparation of major damages and dilapidated parts of the distribution network (ca
3 km).
- Reparation of the sub-stations for this part of the network.
- Emergency repairs in the boiler rooms in order to increase the working capacity to
50 – 80%, in the settlements where apartments heating-ready.
- Reestablishment of the system of payment of service.
B – "Main programme of reconstruction"
Along with emergency programme of reconstruction, the main reconstruction has
begun. Goals of this part of reconstruction were:
- Reestablishment of the production, distribution and consumption of heat equal to
the pre-war level
- Enabling the decrease in the gas consumption and increase in natural oil
consumption
- Improvements to the system during the process of reconstruction
- Strengthening of the institutional capacity of “Toplane” – Sarajevo.
In order to complete these goals following components are involved in a
reconstruction project:
- Boilers and boiler rooms
- Distribution networks
- Sub-stations
- House installations
- Providing equipment for the buildings for "Toplane" Administration
- Establishment of database collection of financial and other (billing and payment,
preventive maintenance, geodesic information system)
- Mechanism (meters) for measuring of heat consumption.
State of affairs of the heating system – Sarajevo:
IV – EVALUATION OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT
IV – 1: SUCCESS OF THE PROJECT REALIZATION
A.- "Emergency programme" of reconstruction
a.) Until the end of 1996, 30.000 apartments were heating-ready, and until the
end of the heating season 1996/1997 (April 1997), the total of 34.000
apartments.
b.) Reparation of the installations was conducted in ca 20.000 apartments,
including the installation of new radiator units, radiator valves and radiator
connections and cleaning of internal networks. Approximately 3 km of
damaged and dilapidated parts of distribution network were rehabilitated.
c.) 9 sets of new heating substations were installed, and existing sub-stations
inside the buildings were repaired (damaged segments were replaced).
d.) Emergency repairs in 27 boiler rooms were made in order to satisfy the needs
of the repaired home installations.
e.) Billing and payment system is operational since December 1996.
f.) ''Toplane'' offices were repaired for the staff of Toplane Administration and for
the requirements of the PIU project implementation team.
Main goal, to heat-up 30.000 of apartments until winter 1996, has been achieved.
B. – "Main Reconstruction Programme"
a.) Some 45.500 apartments were heated at the end of the project, which is
slightly less than the number of apartments connected to the network before
the war (ca 48.300 apartments). The reason for this is the level of devastation
of some of the apartments, which renders the reparations of the heating
impossible.
b.) Ca 9 km of the distribution network has been reconstructed according to the
plan
c.) All foreseen sub-station reparation works have been done and 80 sub-stations
now have flow meters installed.
d.) 26 complete or partial reconstructions of the boiler rooms, has been done
including the construction of additional 8 roof boiler rooms. Another 17 boiler
rooms have undergone smaller or insignificant repairs in order to achieve prewar level of heat production.
e.) I. phase of the reconstruction of remote control and monitoring, which consists
of 66 roof boilers (of total 87), 9 out of 43 main boiler rooms and 9 out of 120
sub-stations
Standalone boiler rooms:
Boiler room Čengić Vila 1 – before and after reconstruction
IV – 2. WORKING CAPABILITY OF THE PROJECT
Standalone and roof boiler rooms
Evaluated working capability (readiness) in reconstructed boiler rooms (normal
and roof ones) amounts to 100% comparing the plan (the assets spent). However,
in the boiler rooms where only essential repairs have been made while repairs of
the secondary priority have not, it is hard to estimate the capability of these boiler
rooms to produce heat for a longer period of time neither are these considered to
be reliable for an extended period of time. All these boiler rooms are operational
despite their outdated equipment so they require increased attention and frequent
maintenance. The aim of the project was accomplished in the boiler rooms where
full reconstruction or replacement of the basic equipment has been completed.
The capability for the efficient operation and achievement of the designed
capacity of these boiler rooms is 100%.
Distribution network
Main part of the known damages to the distribution network was repaired and this
part of the network has been enabled for long-term (safe) operation. Works must
be continued after the detailed tests of the network have been conducted. These
works are gradually being done by Toplane in accordance with their limited
financial possibilities.
Heat sub-stations
Total of 14 new packages, which have been installed solved problems in the respective
parts of the system, however, more than 100 sub-stations with outdated equipment remains
so they do not provide for long term safety. The works must be done continually and
consist mainly of replacements of the dilapidated component with new ones and
installation of new flow meters. Additionally, inclusion of these sub-stations into a remote
control and monitoring system must continue.
House (in-door) installations
All physically functional apartments in the areas covered by city heating network
are, connected to the heating system. Until the end of 1999 number of apartments
with introduced central heating reached 45.000, which was the achievable
maximum at that moment. This number could not have been increased without
major architectural works or new consumers. The problem of replacement of old
convectors with new modern radiator units remains. Hence, the projected goal
has been achieved.
IV – 3. SELF-SUSTAINABILITY
All parts of the heating system which are part of heating system Toplane –
Sarajevo, and which have been thoroughly reconstructed as a part of this project
are capable of uninterrupted work and are self-sustainable assuming that there is
regular and quality maintenance, which was the case during 2000 – 2003.
Toplane – Sarajevo have undertaken a number of necessary organisational and
personnel changes in order to elevate the quality of this segment to a required
level, which was done with success.
IV – 4. QUALITY AND DURABILITY OF THE WORKS CONDUCTED
All works encompassed by the reconstruction process have been done with
necessary quality. This was the finding of the inspection of a part of the
reconstructed boiler rooms (standalone and roof boiler rooms), sub-stations and
house installations.
Durability is guaranteed by the selection of the equipment and materials used
during the reconstruction. All important parts of particular installations are product
of renowned European companies in this field.
V. – CONCLUSION
All works foreseen by the “City heating emergency reconstruction projects” in
Sarajevo have been done according to the programmes:
- " Rapid Programme" of the reconstruction
- " Main Programme" of the reconstruction
An important aspect to emphasise is the respect of deadlines during the works as a part of
the Emergency reconstruction programme. The works of the rapid reconstruction
programme have been completed as planned (until winter 1996) which significantly aided
to relatively fast stabilisation of the situation in Sarajevo after the 4-year war as far as the
city heating is concerned.
-
Main reconstruction programme has helped to reach the pre-war level of
production, distribution and consumption of heating energy. In addition to this
utmost important segment, the same programme resulted in significant level of
modernization of the heating production system in general:
Installation of the flow meter
Automated water preparation (softening) for the whole system
New water filtration system etc.
Particularly great progress has been made in the field of equipment for the data
collection for billing and payments of the consummated heat, which increased the
percentage of service payments to Toplane Sarajevo.
The works have been done with quality, using quality materials, which will
significantly increase the functionality, efficiency and durability of the heating
system in the city of Sarajevo.
Particularly important expert and organisational help was provided by the expert
team from Finland, who were present on the spot during the reconstruction
process.
VI – RECCOMENDATIONS
In order to fully modernise and complete the heating system in Sarajevo we recommend raising funds for the following tasks:
-
Replacement of the remaining old boilers, mainly in smaller boiler rooms with the installation of the corresponding equipment
-
Replacement of the remaining parts of the old and outdated equipment in normal
and roof boiler rooms.
Replacement of old parts of the equipment in sub-stations
Completion of reconstruction of dilapidated distribution network
Further replacement of the dilapidated convectors with new and modern radiator
units (in-door house installations)
Connecting remaining smaller boiler rooms, roof boiler rooms and house substations to the remote control and monitoring system.
Starting the implementation of the Programme of installation of heat meters for all
consumers of the heat energy which are part of the Toplane Sarajevo heating
system
Replacement of the manual radiator unit’s valves with automated thermostatic
valves
-
ANNEX 5
OTHER DONORS’ PROGRAMMES AND EXPERIENCES
Norway. From humanitarian aid, Norway went straight into democratisation and human
rights. Only later, and parallelly, did reconstruction come into the picture, mainly with a
shelter and return focus. Both democratisation and reconstruction have now largely been
phased out. Some demining activities will continue. Norway supports rule of law by
providing substantial financial support to the IJC, and is, like Finland, also seconding
experts to the Independent Judicial Commission. Economic development will be the
predominant focus in the next period. Norway’s strategy is to create clusters of mutually
supportive projects in sectors where Norway has a comparative advantage: small industry,
fishery, IT etc. They view institutional development and capacity building as central and if
they will go into some infrastructure support it will only be the carrot for an institutional
capacity building component. Norway does not want to participate in basket funding or
sector support. If they finance something they would rather be the only donor, which is a
quite rare attitude among donors who generally want to share the responsibility. The
Norwegian embassy had no knowledge about the Finnish aid programme.
The Netherlands. The Netherlands provided hundreds of millions of Euro for
reconstruction during the years after Dayton. This assistance was spread around the
country but concentrated to the region around Srebrenica. Projects were mostly
implemented by NL NGOs and targeted infrastructure, roads, electricity, water and
heating.
Currently they have phased out reconstruction completely and are now focusing on good
governance and economic development. NL represents BiH in the World Bank and IMF
as the leader of their group. Among other things, they will support the transfer of
authority for return to the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. The Commission for
Real Property Claims will transfer their database to the Ministry with Dutch support, and
NL – like Sweden - will support the ministerial field presence in the form of Regional
Centres, see more below
Interestingly, the NL has an organisational structure of its MFA similar to the Finnish in
which they have completely integrated the development department in the geographical
departments. They made the reorganisation earlier than Finland and according to the
embassy, it works very well. The respondent felt that it was often a strength being able to
understand the political and often thorny context when administering aid projects.
Dutch CIMIC has channelled development financing on the same scale as the Finnish
according to the respondent. They have a limit of merely KM 50 000 (approx. EUR
25 000) for reconstruction projects, but they have been involved in a larger scheme where
business development and contacts between Dutch and Bosnian business has been the
focus. This has i a resulted in minister level meetings and matchmaking trips for joint
ventures in both directions.
The NL expressed worry over the lessening interest from donors at a time when BiH still
was not beyond the point of no return.
Austria implemented a sizable rehabilitation programme after the war. As a result of
austerity measures taken by the Austrian government in 1997-2000, the allocations for
development cooperation were severly curtailed. In 2002, Austria made available 0.26% of
its GNI for development cooperation. Now Austria has set a goal of raising these funds
to at least 0.33% of the GNI by 2006.
Reconstruction of the infrastructure still plays a central role. The Austrian cooperation
with BiH is focused on three sectors:
• environment, in particular water
• support to higher education
• economic development, especially promotion of small and medium-sized
enterprises
In addition, some support to public administration, democracy and human rights is
planned.
The water projects have been finalised after complete restructuring of the water facilities
in six municipalities. At present, implementation support in the form of technical
assistance is provided to safeguard the investments. The Austrian reconstruction
programme for FBiH is focusing on Cantons 4 (Zenica-Doboj) and 6 (Central Bosnia,
Travnik-Vitez), and in RS on Banja Luka and Mrkonjic Grad. Support to higher education
is on-going together with Austrian Universities, and will continue.There will be a strong
emphasis on economic regeneration. This will include support to information points and
to an Entrepreneurship Centre together with Tuzla University and the business society.
There is also a significant CARDS Programme, and Austria wishes to add on to that.
In January 2004, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) was established as a stateowned company, supervised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Although ADA does not
avail itself of country strategies, it does have sectoral strategies. It seems probable that
these will be broken down in due course into country chapters.
Sweden. At present, a Country Strategy for Swedish Development Cooperation with
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-2005 provides the guidelines for Sweden’s engagement in
BiH. The objectives laid down for Swedish cooperation with countries in the Balkans
include the objectives peace and stability, and the transition to a market economy, which
also are reflected in the cooperation with BiH. The aim of Sweden’s cooperation is to
support the integration of BiH into European structures through the Stabilisation and
Association Process. In addition, Sweden is guided by BiH’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper, which is yet another instrument for closer integration with EU structures.
Many donors are currently decreasing their support or have already left the country.
However, Sweden has the intention to continue providing substantial assistance for some
years to come. During this strategy period, there will be an emphasis on institution
building, support in the financial sector for the transition to a market economy, and
increased assistance to the social sector. The need for contributions to sustainable return
of refugees and displaced persons is still great and will continue, containing i.a. microcredit schemes in support of amsll-scale agriculture and enterprises. In the area of
democratic governance there will be a focus on institution building at central government
level and on the strengthening of the judiciary. The programme will also comprise
assistance to projects for youth, media, culture, HIV/Aids prevention and protection of
the environment.
Denmark has something of a unique approach in BiH. While devoting DKR 100 million
in 1996 on reconstruction, a principle decision was taken in 1999 not to direct any
development cooperation resources to BiH or other parts of Europe. Such funds would
only go to the least developed and poorest countries in the world. Instead, Denmark
created the so-called FRESTA programme in 2000. With the sub title “Peace and Stability
through cross-boundary civil society collaboration”, it is based on NGO activity. The
model for the programme came from the Danish support to the EU candidate countries e
g the Baltic countries. It is structured as a fund with a value of about DKR 150 million
per year. It is in principle global in scope, but special emphasis has been given to South
Eastern Europe since the start, where about a third of the total budget is spent. The
FRESTA South Eastern Europe (SEE) programme objectives are in line with the Stability
Pact. The heaviest components are media and refugee issues followed by youth and
human rights.
European Commission. The EC began to provide non-humanitarian assistance to BiH
in 1996 throught two programmes, Phare and OBNOVA. These covered a multiplicity of
interventions in a wide range of sectors guided by annual programmes. Humanitarian
assistance from the EC was delivered during 1991-2000 through the ECHO programme.
Until 2000, the EC programmes in BiH covered refugee return, economic reform,
employment regeneration, reconstruction of technical and social infrastructure, institution
building, social cohesion and development (including education and health), peace
implementation, democratisation, human rights, and civil society.
Since 2000, BiH is a full participant in the Stabilisation and Association process and the
EC Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 states the priority areas for cooperation. The EC
CARDS programme assists BiH in meeting these objectives by focusing on democratic
stabilisation, administrative capacity building, economic and social development,
environment and natural resources, and justice and home affairs.
BiH determines its own rate of progress within the SAP, but in order to meet the
objectives, the BiH authorities have to take ownership of reform, take the European
agenda seriously and address issues of conflict prevention and poverty reduction. Under
this Country Strategy, BiH has the opportunity to build up the country into a modern
democratic state. A Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP), which is part of the
Country Strategy Paper (but covering only 2002-2004) sets out the objectives, expected
results and conditionality in greater detail.
In 2004, the final year of the present MIP, the programme will focus on administrative
capacity building, justice and home affairs, economic and social development and to some
extent environment and return. In November 2003, a European Feasibility Study
confirmed that BiH can move forward in 2004 towards formal negotiations for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This is, however, conditioned on a number of
important commitments still not implemented: economic reform, the rule of law,
governance, and media, plus compliance with existing international obligations an
conditions (cf. Chapter 4 in main report).