6March2017
SubmissiontotheInquirybytheSenateFinanceandPublicAdministrationReferencesCommittee
intogendersegregationintheworkplaceanditsimpactonwomen'seconomicequality
From:TheWorkandFamilyPolicyRoundtable
CommitteeSecretary
SenateStandingCommitteeonFinance and Public Administration
POBox6100
ParliamentHouse
CanberraACT2600
[email protected]
TheWorkandFamilyPolicyRoundtable(W+FPR)ispleasedtomakeasubmissiontothecurrent
inquirybytheSenateFinanceandPublicAdministrationReferencesCommitteeintogender
segregationintheworkplaceanditsimpactonwomen'seconomicequality
ThissubmissionwasdraftedbyProfessorSiobhanAusten,CurtinUniversity;AssociateProfessorMeg
Smith,WesternSydneyUniversity;andAlexandraHeron,SydneyUniversity,withinputfromother
W+FPRmembers.
TheW+FPRhasastronginterestinpolicymeasurestoaddressthegenderpaygapandthe
contributionofgendersegregationtoit.Butwewishtoemphasisejusthowmuchisalreadyknown
aboutgendersegregationinemploymentinAustraliaandtheproblemsitraisesinensuringthat
womenarefairlyremuneratedforthepaidworktheydo.Therehavebeenaplethoraof
governmentandotherinquiriesthathaveexaminedvariousfacetsofgenderinequalityinAustralia.
Yetveryfewoftheirrecommendationshavebeentakenupbygovernment.
Inourviewthecriticalproblemisthelackofpoliticalcommitmenttotakinganyseriousactionto
addresstheproblemsidentified.Wemustceaseanalysingandlamentingtheproblemofgender
segregationandpaygapsandstarttoimagineandimplementfar-reachingandinnovativepolicyas
partofawidereconomicandsocialvisionforAustralia.Amulti-faceted/multi-levelapproachis
requiredtoaddressgendersegregationandpayinequity.
Theattachedsubmissiondrawsonourcollectiveresearchexpertiseintheareaofgender
segregation,thegenderpaygapandworkplacerelations.Wewouldbehappytoexpanduponour
submissionatapublichearing.
Yourssincerely,
EmeritusProfessorBarbaraPocock
Co-convenorsW+FPR
DrElizabethHill
1
ProfessorSaraCharlesworth
.
WhatistheAustralianWork+FamilyPolicyRoundtable?
TheRoundtableismadeupofresearcherswithexpertiseonworkandfamilypolicy.Itsgoal
is to propose, comment upon, collect and disseminate research to inform good evidencebasedpublicpolicyinAustralia.
TheW+FPRhelditsfirstmeetingin2004.SincethentheW+FPRhasactivelyparticipatedin
public debate about work and family policy in Australia providing research-based
submissions to relevant public inquiries, disseminating current research through
publicationsforpubliccommentaryandthroughthemedia.
The Roundtable is a network of 35 academics from 17 universities and research
institutionswithexpertiseonwork,careandfamilypolicy.
DrElizabethAdamson,UniversityofNSW
ProfSiobhanAusten,CurtinUniversity
ProfMarianBaird,UniversityofSydney
ProfRowenaBarrett,QueenslandUniversityofTechnology
DrDinaBowman,BrotherhoodofStLaurence&UniversityofMelbourne
DrWendyBoyd,SouthernCrossUniversity
DrMichelleBrady,UniversityofQueensland
ProfDeborahBrennan,UniversityofNSW
EmeritusProfBettinaCass,UniversityofNSW
ProfSaraCharlesworth,RMITUniversity(co-convenor)
DrKayCook,RMITUniversity
DrAmandaCooklin,LaTrobeUniversity
A/ProfRaeCooper,UniversityofSydney
DrLaraCorr,AustralianNationalUniversity
AdjunctProfEvaCox,JumbunnaIndigenousHouseofLearning(UTS)
ProfLynCraig,UniversityofNSW
DrMarianneFenech,UniversityofSydney
EmeritusProfSuzanneFranzway,UniversityofSouthAustralia
DrMyraHamilton,UniversityofNSW
AlexandraHeron,UniversityofSydney
DrElizabethHill,UniversityofSydney(co-convenor)
DrJacquieHutchison,UniversityofWesternAustralia
A/ProfDebraKing,FlindersUniversity
DrFionaMacdonald,RMITUniversity
ProfPaulaMcDonald,QueenslandUniversityofTechnology
A/ProfJillMurray,LaTrobeUniversity
EmeritusProfBarbaraPocock,UniversityofSouthAustralia(co-convenor)
A/ProfFrancesPress,CharlesSturtUniversity
ProfAlisonPreston,UniversityofWesternAustralia
2
DrLeahRuppanner,UniversityofMelbourne
A/ProfBelindaSmith,UniversityofSydney
A/ProfMegSmith,WesternSydneyUniversity
ProfLyndallStrazdins,AustralianNationalUniversity
ProfTrishTodd,UniversityofWesternAustralia
ProfGillianWhitehouse,UniversityofQueensland
KeyPrinciplesoftheWork+FamilyPolicyRoundtable
TheW+FPRhas12keyguidingprinciplestoinformitsworkandcomment.Webelievethat
inprinciple,workandfamilypolicyproposalsshould:
1. Recognise that good management of the work-life interface is a key characteristic of
goodlabourlawandsocialpolicy.
2.Adoptalife-cycleapproachtofacilitatinggoodwork-familyinteraction.
3. Support women and men to be workers as well as mothers, fathers and carers, and
activelyencouragefathersascarers.
4.Facilitateemployeevoiceandinfluenceoverworkarrangements.
5. Ensure sustainable workplaces and workers (e.g. through ‘do-able’, quality jobs and
appropriatestaffinglevels).
6.Ensuregenderequality,includingpayequity.
7.Protectthewell-beingofchildrenandotherdependants.
8.Ensurepredictablehours,earningsandjobsecurity.
9.Promotesocialjusticeandthefairdistributionofsocialrisk.
10.Treatindividualsfairly,regardlessoftheirhouseholdcircumstances.
11. Ensure flexible working rights are practically available to all workers through effective
regulation,educationandenforcement.
12.Adoptpolicyandactionbasedonrigorous,independentevidence.
See http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org for details of the W+FPR and its
activities.
3
Summary
In making our submission to the Inquiry by the Senate Finance and Public Administration
References Committee (the Committee) into gender segregation in the workplace and its
impact on women's economic equality (the Inquiry), the W+FPR wishes to bring to the
Committee'sattentionthelargeandcomprehensivebodyofknowledgethatAustralianand
internationalresearchersandpolicymakershavedevelopedinrelationtogenderworkplace
segregationinAustraliaandelsewhereanditsadverseimpactsonthegenderpaygap(and
the gender care gap). These issues have been the subject of many inquiries and empirical
researchreportsoverthepastdecades,manyofwhicharedescribedanddrawnoninour
submission. Numerous recommendations from those inquiries and research clearly
demonstrate that a multi-faceted/multi-level approach is required to address gender
segregation,anditsmostperniciousmanifestation–genderpayinequity.
In its 2016 Election Benchmarks1 the W+FPR set out specific ways of addressing the
gendered barriers to occupational choice and advancement which result in workplace
gendersegregationandpayinequity.Theproblemwithaddressingtheseissuesisnotlack
of knowledge and understanding of what would work but rather the lack of political
commitment to taking determined action to effect change. We recommend that the
Committeemakethispointvigorouslyandprominentlyintheirreport.
Below, our submission addresses the Inquiry's terms of reference by focusing on gender
occupational segregation in the workplace including the contribution of the gendered
undervaluationofjobstothisoutcome.Institutionalconstraintsincludingstronggendered
socialnorms,lackofqualityreducedhoursjobsandlessthanoptimalavailabilityofformal
care provision for dependants create significant barriers for women wishing to combine
paid and unpaid work (and men wishing to care). These constraints are the fundamental
causesofAustralia'sgenderedlabourmarket.
1
TheW+FPR2016ElectionBenchmarksareavailableat:http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Work-Care-Family-Policies_Online_s.pdf
4
Oursubmissionalsoexaminesandexplainswhyexistingmeasuresofgendersegregation
underestimateitsextent.Itgoesontodiscussthedifferent‘rationalchoice’and
‘institutionalconstraint’approachestounderstandinghowsocietyandtheeconomywork.
Whichapproachistakenbypolicymakersandotherstakeholdersaffectstheiranalysisof
thecausesofworkplacegendersegregationandthegenderpaygapandwhethertheyare
susceptibletoremedybypolicyaction.
TheW+FPRadoptstheinstitutionalconstraintapproachandinthissubmissiondrawsonthe
W+FPR2016ElectionBenchmarksandotherinitiativestooutlinepolicydirectionsthatare
positiveforgenderequalityandeconomicperformance.
Introduction
The male employment rate (for those aged 15-64) is currently 78.1%, whilst the female
employment rate is 68.1%. Women in employment also work fewer hours than men with
54% working full-time (men, 83%).2 These different working patterns are intimately
connected with women carrying out considerably more unpaid work than men, and
undertaking the majority of informal care for children and parents (Meagher 2014). The
challenges which women face in combining paid and unpaid work contribute to gender
industrial and occupational segregation in the labour market which this Inquiry is
investigating. A recent estimate suggests that industrial and occupational segregation
togethercontributedto30%ofthegenderpaygapinAustraliain2014(KPMG2016).
Therearemanydifferenttypesofgendersegregationinthelabourmarket.Thissubmission
focusesonhorizontaloccupationalsegregation,whichencompassesdivisionsbytypeofjob,
whilstalsoacknowledgingtheverticaldivisionsthatrelatetothedifferentrepresentationof
menandwomenatdifferentlevelsofparticularoccupationalhierarchies(forexample,the
over-representation of women academics in junior and casual lecturing positions, and the
over-representationofmaleacademicsintheprofessoriate).
The broadest set of occupational classifications (eight occupations covering the whole
workforce, at the highest level of classification) and their gender composition is shown in
Table1below
2
ABS(2017)LabourForce,Australia,Detailed-ElectronicDeliveryDec2016,Cat.No.6921.0.55.001.The
employmentrateistheproportionofthecivilianpopulationofacertainagegroup.
5
Table1:Occupationsbygenderandpart-timeandfull-timehours
Source:WGEA(2016)usingABSdata
TORa:Thenatureandextentofindustrialandoccupationalgender
segregationinAustralianworkplacesrelativetocomparablejurisdictions,
includinggendersegregationintertiaryeducationcourses.
We make three points here. The first is the high level of occupational gender segregation
when analysed using the occupational classification method used in Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) data, that is the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of
Occupations(ANZSCO).Thiscontainsfivedifferentlevelsofdetailedclassificationfromeight
atlevel1,thebroadest(seeTable1above),tograduallymoredetailed(fourfurtherlevels,
oftenreferredtoasone-,two-,three-,four-andsix-digitlevels).
ThesedatademonstrateahighlevelofoccupationalsegregationinAustralia.Censusdata
for2011enablemeasurementoftheleveloffeminisationofdifferentoccupationalgroups
at the ANZSCO 3-digit level. These measures reveal that several occupational groups –
personal assistants and secretaries, receptionists, child carers, education aides and
midwiferyandnursingprofessionalsallhaveafeminisationrateofmorethan90%,whilst
thecategoryofpersonalassistantsandsecretariesis97.8%female.Thedataalsoshowthat
severaloccupationsarealmostcompletelydominatedbymen.Seventeenoccupationshave
a feminisation rate of less than 10% and several occupations, including bricklayers and
carpentersandjoiners,haveafeminizationrateoflessthan1%.
6
%female
ThedegreeofoccupationalsegregationintheAustralianlabourmarketshowslittlesignof
change. Figure 1 below shows the feminisation rate of the largest 20 occupational groups
(at the 3 digit classification level) in 2006 and 2011, highlighting the absence of any
substantial change. Indeed, across the 20 occupational groups (which together comprise
closeto50%ofallemployees),theaveragechangeinthefeminisationratewasonly0.1%
between2006and2011.3
Figure1:Top20OccupationsbyLevelofFeminisation,2006and2011
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
%female2006
%female2011
Source:ABS(2006,2011)CensusofPopulationandHousing4
Whilstthelevelofoccupationalsegregationshownintheabovechartisundoubtedlyhigh,
it does not provide a complete picture of the extent of segregation in the Australian
workforce.
Our second point is that the above ANZSCO data does not disclose the segregation that
occurs through the different roles of men and women within the various occupational
groupings. In the academic workforce, for example, there is a relatively equal
representation of men and women (the feminisation rate of the ‘tertiary education
teachers’groupwas48.5%in2011).However,withinthisworkforcetherearelargegender
differences in discipline areas, employment contract types (continuing, fixed-term,
sessional,casual)andrepresentationinthedifferentlevelsoftheacademichierarchy(May,
3
KMPG(2016)findsthatoccupationalsegregationhasdecreasedslightlybetween2007and2014(using
annualdatacollectedbytheHouseholdIncomeandLabourDynamics(HILDA)survey(pp25)
4
MikeDockery’sassistancewithdataonfeminizationratesacrossoccupationsisgratefullyacknowledged
7
Peetz,andStrachan2013).Gibbon’sresearchonthecareerbarriersfacedbywomenpilots
in the Australian defence forces provides a further example of vertical segmentation. It
demonstrates the way the patterns described above for academics can occur in nontraditional areas of employment for women within the sector (military), specific service
(navy,armyorairforce)andinthenarrowfieldofaviationwithineachservicearea.These
pockets of highly feminised workforces are obscured even when relatively detailed
occupationalgroupsareexamined(Gibbon2014).
Thirdly, the measures of occupational segregation based on ANZSCO data (such as those
used in Figure 1) are also limited by their reliance on occupational classification systems
which are themselves reflective of the pattern of gender segregation (Blackwell 2001a,
2001b). For example, Burchell et al. (2015) note that, in the European context, the areas
where most women are employed are often treated in these classification systems ‘as
rather undifferentiated aggregate occupations, while men’s employment areas are more
finely disaggregated, reflecting the historical bargaining power attached to men’s specific
skills.’
TORb:Factorsdrivingindustrialandoccupationalgendersegregationinthe
Australiancontext
The issue of occupational gender segregation has been the subject of numerous
investigationsinformedbyarangeofdisciplines,includinglaw,economics,psychologyand
sociology. In a survey of the literature, Austen, Jefferson and Lord (forthcoming) grouped
thebroadliteratureonthecausesofgendersegregationintotwooverarchingapproaches.
Oneemphasisestherational,individualdecisionsbyindividualsandorganisationswhohave
fullcontrolovertheirdestiniesincludingtheadvantageswithwhichtheyareborn5,andthe
other highlights the effects of institutions (including social norms) and regulatory
frameworksongenderedpatternsofwork.Fromthesetwocontrastingapproachesspring
verydifferingunderstandingsofgendersegregationinpaid(andunpaid)work.
The rational choice approach includes the influential household production models of
orthodox economic analysis. In these, gender segregation is treated as the product of
women’s‘rationalchoice’tonotinvestinasmuchhumancapital(educationalqualifications
and training) as men and to pursue (often lower paid) occupations which allow more
reconciliation between waged work and care responsibilities. However, the relevance of
these models has been undermined by contradictory evidence, including the significant
growthinwomen’sinvolvementinarangeoffieldsofhighereducation(asreflectedinthe
datainTable2).Ataconceptuallevel,therationalchoicemodelsaredeficientbecausethey
failtotakeaccountofthewaysinwhichoccupational‘choices’andtheirconsequencesare
shapedbylabourandotherinstitutions.
5
SeeFolbre(2016)foranincisiveandgenderedcritiqueofthenotionthatthewagesapersonearnsaretheir
‘JustDeserts’fortheworktheydo.
8
Table 2: Ratio of Female to Male Enrolment Count by Field of Education (Domestic
Students),2015
Natural and Physical Sciences
Information Technology
Engineering and Related Technologies
Architecture and Building
Agriculture Environmental and Related Studies
0.98
0.19
0.18
0.64
1.1
Health
Education
Management and Commerce
Society and Culture
Creative Arts
Food Hospitality and Personal Services
Mixed Field Programs
Non-Award course
Total
2.67
3.1
0.88
1.81
1.54
0.58
1.7
1.56
1.37
Source: Department of Education and Training (2015), UCube Data, accessed on January 21 2017 at
http://highereducationstatistics.education.gov.au/Default.aspx
In contrast, as shown in the institutional approach literature, individuals’ occupational
choicesareunderstoodtobeconstrainedbyarangeofgenderedsocialnormsandlabour
institutions, which often operate in a way that forces women into accepting lower status
andoftensegregatedjobs(CromptonandLyonette2005;FaganandRubery1996;Rubery
and Fagan 1995; Tomlinson 2006). Institutional studies highlight an initial broad set of
factorsascontributingtooccupationalsegregation:
• Discriminatory or gendered recruitment and other practices, including promotion,
thatacttoexcludewomenandmenfromnon-traditionaljobsareas(RiachandRich
1987,2006;BudigandEngland2001;England2005);
• Organisational requirements for long work hours, or working hours that are
inconsistent with significant caring responsibilities and standard childcare
arrangements(e.g.,breakfastmeetings,travelrequirements)(Cha2013;Nielsonet
al.2004);
• Organisations’ criteria for career success that emphasise continuous uninterrupted
employment,ratherthannon-linearcareerswhichallowforcareerbreaksorperiods
ofreducedhoursworkrequiredtoundertakecare(McDonald,forthcoming);
• A scarcity of jobs where it is possible to combine work and family responsibilities
including lack of access to flexible work arrangements (especially part-time work),
even when such policies are available (e.g., Kornberger et al., 2010; Stone and
Hernandez,2013);
9
•
Technologythatmaycausesomeworktobeperceivedtobephysicallydemanding,
but which may be open to a broad range of individuals if work is re-designed,
particularlyinthelightoftechnologicaladvances.
percentpartome2011
InAustraliatheeffectofthesefactorsisapparentindatashowingverylowratesofparttimeworkinhighlymasculinisedoccupations(seeFigure2below)
Figure2:Top20OccupationsbyPart-TimeRate&LevelofFeminisation,2011
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
top20occupaoonsbysize2011
Source:ABS(2006,2011)CensusofPopulationandHousing
Government policy settings are an important determinant of occupational segregation
becausethey:
a)
Directly shape the actions available to employers. For example, work hours
regulationsinfluencetheabilityofmenandwomentocompeteforthefullrangeofjobs.
b)
Shape the incentives available to employers. For example, minimum wage
protectionslimitthegainstoemployersfromthelowwagespaidtomarginalisedworkers,
andindoingsounderminethefinancialdriversofoccupationalsegregation.
c)
Influence the impact of employers’ actions on women’s occupational choices. For
example, child care and elder care policies can reduce other drivers of occupational
segregation by ameliorating the constraints imposed on carers by current working-time
regimes.Affordable,high-qualityandaccessiblenon-home-basedcareoptionsincreasethe
rangeofoccupationsinwhichparentscanwork.
10
Internationalstudiesshowthatparentalleave,childcareandflexibleworkingoptionshavea
positiveimpactonwomen’sworkforceparticipationof(see,forexample,Korpietal.2013;
Martin et al. 2014 for parental leave). Research also points to a negative relationship
betweentheavailabilityofaffordable,accessibleandhighqualitychildandeldercareand
the likelihood of women’s participation in lower-status/lower-paid occupations and/or
employmentcontracts(ConnollyandGregory2008).
TORc:Economicconsequencesofgendersegregationforwomen,including
thecontributionofindustrialandoccupationalgendersegregationtothe
genderpaygap
Thispartofoursubmissionaddressestheapparentlyconflictingevidenceontheeffectof
occupationalsegregationonthegenderpaygap.SomeAustralianstudiesidentifypositive
effects (see Baron and Cobb-Clark 2010) whilst the majority find negative outcomes. We
showhowthesedifferentresultsreflectthemeasurementissuesdiscussedabove,andraise
importantconcernsrelatingtotheundervaluationoffeminisedoccupations.
Studiesoftheeffectofoccupationalsegregationwhichhaveidentifiedfavourableeffectson
the gender pay gap have relied on the application of decomposition techniques6 to broad
occupational data. As such, their results have a very specific (and potentially confusing)
meaning.Specifically,theresultsimplythat,keepingcurrentwagestructuresconstant,the
movementofwomenfrombroadoccupationalgroupswheretherateoffeminisationishigh
(suchasclericalandsalesworkandprofessionals)tothosewherethefeminisationrateis
low(suchaslabourersandtransportandproductionwork)wouldincreasethegenderpay
gap(seeAustenetal.,2015).
This result arises because women’s pay outcomes in the broad occupational groups (the
eightgroupsatlevel1)wheretheyareunder-representedarecurrentlyrelativelypoor;and
women’s pay outcomes in some of the broad occupational groups where they are overrepresented are currently relatively high. As noted above (Table 1), women are relatively
wellrepresentedinthebroadoccupationalcategoryof‘professionals’,andtheyareunderrepresentedinthebroadoccupationalcategoryof‘labourers’.The‘thoughtexperiment’of
decompositionanalysisinvolvesshiftingwomenoutoftheprofessionalgroupandintothe
labouringgroup–andthenexaminingthechangeintheiraveragewage,undertheexisting
wagestructure.Notsurprisingly,theaveragewageofwomenfallsandthegenderpaygap
increases.
Thistypeofanalysisclearlymissesmostoftheeffectsofoccupationalsegregationonthe
gender pay gap. When the decomposition approach is applied to data on broad
occupationalgroups,itdoesnotreveal:
6
Astatisticalmethodthatenablesanassessmentofthedifferentmeasurablefactorspotentiallycontributing
togenderpaygaps.
11
a) Theimpactsofsegregationonpayatfineroccupationallevels.Forexample,itdoes
notmeasuretheimpactsonthegenderpaygapofmen’sgreaterrepresentationin
the (relatively highly paid) Science, Building and Engineering Professionals
occupational group, and women’s greater representation in the (relatively lowly
paid)HealthandSocialProfessionalsgroup;and
b) The effects on the gender pay gap of vertical segregation, where men and women
are in the same occupational group but men disproportionately hold the senior
positions(forexample,asschoolprincipals)andwomendisproportionatelyholdthe
lowerlevelpositions(forexample,asteachers).
Theselimitationsofthedecompositionapproacharehighlysignificantgiventhatestimates
atasomewhatmoredetailedlevelofoccupationalclassification(the18classesatleveltwo,
ANZSCO)concludethat96.5%ofthetotalgenderpaygapisduetowagedifferenceswithin
the18broadoccupationalgroups(Cobb-ClarkandTan2010).
In this context, it is important to note the findings of an unpublished examination of the
effectsofoccupationalsegregationonthegenderpaygapthatusedthemorefinelygraded
classification of occupations in the 2011 Census (at level 3 referred to earlier). Dockery
(2016)measuredtheleveloffeminisationin97occupationalgroupsandcombinedthisdata
withmeasuresavailableintheHILDAsurveytoassesstheeffectofoccupationalsegregation
on individual wage outcomes and the gender pay gap. Dockery found that occupational
segregationincreasedthegenderpaygap,albeitbyarelativelysmalldegree.Healsofound
anegativecorrelationbetweentheleveloffeminisationinanoccupationandthe(hourly)
wageoutcomesofthemenandwomenemployed(thatisthehigherthefeminisationlevel,
the lower the hourly rate in that sub occupation), with the largest negative impact
associated with men’s wage outcomes (that is men had lower wages than women in the
occupationsexamined).
The negative relationship between the degree of occupational feminisation and the wage
outcomesofemployeesfoundinDockery’sstudy,areinlinewithinternationalstudies.The
findings are consistent with the phenomena of undervaluation, which is the tendency for
employers to ascribe a lower value to work done in more feminised occupations (see
Levanon,EnglandandAllison,2009).
Thelinksbetweenoccupationalsegregationandundervaluationareanimportantaspectof
the economic impact of gender segregation. However, these are also overlooked in
decomposition analyses because the decomposition technique takes the current
occupationalwagestructureasagivenandisonlyconcernedwiththeeffectsonthegender
paygapofthedistributionofmenandwomenacrosstheoccupationalwagestructure.
12
Theeffectsofoccupationalsegregationonundervaluationoccurinavarietyofways.
• Segregationreducesthelikelihoodthatgenderedassumptionsandpracticeswillbe
challenged. These assumptions and practices include treating women’s skills as
‘natural’andrelyingonnotionsofawoman’sessentialnatureasacarer(and,thus,
lessconcernedwithmaterialrewards).AsFolbrenotesintheUScontext‘Cultural
constructions of gender…. still promote self-interest for men and altruism for
women,encouragingamoralaswellasphysicaldivisionoflabor’(2016:36).These
assumptions mean essential job skills (for example social skills and other skills
associatedwithcaringordomesticlabour)arelesslikelytoberecognised,described
in detail and rewarded appropriately. Australian evidence shows that these
assumptions and the practices arising from them are currently used to justify low
ratesofpayinkeyfemale-dominatedoccupationsinthecaresector(Austenetal.,
2013;Charlesworth&Macdonald2015).
• Segregationincreasesthechancesthatwomenwillworkinpart-timejobsthatare
undervalued because they fail to comply with a male norm of full-time work. For
example, Preston and Yu (2015: 44) found a part-time/full-time pay differential of
22.5% and argue for arrangements ‘that ensure fair and equitable treatment of all
part-timesrelativetofull-timers.’
• Segregation makes male comparators less available for the evaluation of women’s
work,increasingthelikelihoodofmisrecognition(andsubsequentlyundervaluation)
ofwomen’sskills.Burchelletal.(2015)notethatsegregationcontributesdirectlyto
the undervaluation of women’s skills when the formal pay and grading structures
usedforfemale-dominatedjobsarebasedonmale-typeskills.
Occupational segregation also contributes to the gender division of labour in many
households because couples often make decisions about who will undertake market work
andcareworkonthebasisofearningcapacity.Thegenderdivisionofhouseholdlabourand
gendered cultural norms is a key component of the care penalties faced by many women
over their life course (eg, Livermore at al 2011), including higher rates of poverty in older
age.
Becauseoccupationalsegregationistypicallyassociatedwithwomen’sunderrepresentation
injobswithdecision-makingauthority,itisalsonegativeforwomen’srepresentationinthe
politicalandcorporatesphere,whichhasdynamic,long-termeffectsonwomen’seconomic
outcomes.
13
TOR d: Approaches to addressing gender segregation as it relates to
economicinequalityandthegenderpaygapincomparablejurisdictions
For reasons of time we do not address this Term of Reference but there are many useful
analyses from international bodies on gender segregation and the gender pay gap
comparing attempts by different countries to deal with this issue, including and some
exampleswhereprogresshasbeenmade.Twocomprehensiveresearchreportsareoneby
theEuropeanCommission,(2009)andonebytheILO,RuberyandKoukiadaki(2016).
TORe:PolicyDirectionsandLegislativeIssues
This part of the submission is divided into two sections. The first section sets out general
principlesforsocialandeconomicpolicythatarepositiveforpromotinggenderequalityand
outlines a number of different policy initiatives. The second section contains detailed
guidanceonlegalmechanismsfortacklingthegenderpaygapinoccupations,industriesand
individualfirms
1.
PolicyDirections
Theinter-relatedissuesofsegregationandundervaluationaswellasdismantlingbarriersto
women'semployment(e.g.lackofchildcare)mustbeaddressedtoimprovegenderequality
in relation to pay. For example, reductions in the gender pay gap will require action that
addressestheover-representationofwomeninlowerpaidoccupations,andactiononthe
undervaluationofworkthatiscommonlyundertakenbywomen.7
The W+FPR’s 2016 Election Benchmarks provide specific proposals capable of early policy
action.8 We also propose that the Committee recommend the Government consider the
development of a longer term gendered industrial strategy. Two components of such a
strategyaredescribedbelow(pointsa)andb)).Thefirstwouldboostwomen’semployment
by expanding the care infrastructure and the second would revalue care work by paying
workers more. Both proposals have been developed by the UK Women’s Budget Group
(WBG).9
7
Thisalsoimpliesthatitisn’tnecessary–orevendesirable-foractionaimedatgenderequalitytotargetzero
occupational segregation, or to discourage women from working in traditionally female-dominated sectors,
suchasthecaresector.Indeed,somestudieshavefoundthattheover-representationofwomeninthecare
sector of the economy has contributed positively to the growth in female employment in recent decades
(MandelandShalev2009;BettioandVeraschchagina2009).
8
TheW+FPR2016ElectionBenchmarksareavailableat:http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Work-Care-Family-Policies_Online_s.pdf
9
AnetworkofleadingUKfeministeconomists,researchers,policyexpertsandcampaignerscommittedto
achievingamoregenderequalfuture.
14
a)
Investinginthecareeconomy
Thisisaproposaltoinvest2%ofGDPinformalcareservicesforpre-schoolagechildren,for
thosewithadisabilityandtoprovideeldercareinsevencountriesincludingAustralia.WBG
modelling indicates that, compared to10 a similar investment in construction industries,
greateremploymentimpactscouldbegenerated11(DeHenauetal2016). Theinvestment
wouldgeneratejobsinthecareindustry(‘direct’impacts),inassociatedindustriesneeded
to supply services and materials for the care services created (the ‘indirect employment
effect’),andthroughpositiveeffectsonhouseholdincomeboostingdemandgenerally(the
‘inducedemploymenteffect’).InAustraliatheestimatedreturnfromsuchaninvestmentin
careworkisanextra600,000jobs,ascomparedto387,000jobsfromasimilarexpenditure
onconstruction.
The importance of this initiative for gender equity arises from its positive impacts on
women’s employment and earnings. Women’s employment rate would rise more than
men’s and in Australia this would reduce the gender employment gap by 2.6 percentage
points, achieving a 21% reduction in the gender employment gap.12 Additionally, there
would be significant community and economic flow on effects including increased taxes,
decreasedspendingonsocialsecurityandanimprovedsocialcareinfrastructure.
b)
Investinginchildcareworkers’salaries
Ensuringthepaymentofdecentwagesandconditionsintheearlychildhoodeducationand
care sector13 as advocated by the W+FPR 2016 Election Benchmarks14 will have further
positive impacts on gender equality and economic performance. The WBG modelled this
typeofinitiativeonthebasisof(1)payingchildcareworkersatthelevelofequivalentstaff
inprimaryschoolsand(2)expandingchildcaretoafreeuniversalsystemproviding40hours
weekly for 48 weeks per year, in the United Kingdom context (De Henau 2016). They
estimate substantial direct, indirect and induced employment growth would result, and
predictanincreaseintheabilityofunpaidcarerstoenterorincreasepaidwork.Thegender
payandemploymentgapswouldbereduced.
The cost would be high: In the UK this would amount to 3% of GDP. Most funding would
come from all the employment gains made, due to the tax take increasing (direct and
indirectonconsumption)andsocialsecurityspendingreducing(88%).AproposalfortheUK
wasthatarangeofrevenueraisingmeasures(taxincreases)wouldalsobeneeded.Similar
initiatives are under discussion in Australia. Some have been previously advocated by the
10
Acceptingbothtypesofinvestmentareneeded.
Subjecttotheeconomy’scapacity.
12
DeHenauetal.2016:26.
13
InAustraliaearlychildhoodeducatorshaveaqualificationanywherebetweenafouryearteachingdegree
andasixmonthcertificateIIIinchildcare.
14
TheW+FPR2016ElectionBenchmarksareavailableat:http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Work-Care-Family-Policies_Online_s.pdf
11
15
W+FPR and are contained in the W+FPR’s Election Benchmarks,15 such as reducing
superannuationtaxbreaks.
2. Legalmechanismsfortacklingthegenderpaygap
a) TheFairWorkAct2009
AsRuberyandKoukiadaki(2016:26)note‘[w]hileitistruethattheexistinggenderpaygap
isprimarilyasocioeconomicproblem,particularshortcomingsinequalpaylegislationhave
limited progress in this area’. This is strikingly true of federal equal pay legislation in
Australia. As shown in the detailed discussion below, whilst many commentators were
reasonablyoptimisticthatthelegislation’s‘potential’wouldberealisedinconsideringthe
successful social and community workers equal pay claim in 201216 (eg Charlesworth and
Macdonald2015),morerecentdevelopmentsinthechildcareeducators’case(seebelow)17
havederailedthesehopes.
Thus we include below a short description and evaluation of the operation of equal pay
provisions in labour law in Australia. We hope the Committee will find this useful in
understanding how a situation has been reached where it is unlikely that the equal
remunerationandrelatedprovisionsintheFairWorkAct2009ascurrentlyconfiguredand
interpretedwilloperateeffectivelytoaddressthegenderpaygap.
The weaknesses in equal remuneration regulation are counter-productive for pay equity
and the Committee needs to recommend action to implement the many proposals for
changestotacklethisandotherproblemsinequalremunerationprovisionsinlabourlaw
astheW+FPRhavepreviouslydetailedinitsElectionBenchmarks.18
Evaluationofequalremunerationprovisionsinlabourlaw
This section of the submission identifies the complexities in the assessment by Australian
tribunals’ofthevalueofwork,specificallyasitconcernsequalremunerationapplications.
Assessing work value is a routine feature of tribunal decision-making and wage setting.
However,thismatteristhebasisofparticularattentionandcontestinthecontextofequal
remuneration proceedings where the assessment of equal or comparable value is a
requirement. In short how do tribunals reconcile differences between work that is
normatively ‘masculinised’ and ‘feminised’ work. From the outset, such assessments and
theequalvaluediscoursesunderpinningthem,havebeenhighlycontested(Webber,1985).
Within Australian equal remuneration proceedings there has been an inconsistency about
whether comparative assessments of work, and specifically comparative assessments of
15
TheW+FPR2016’sElectionBenchmarksareavailableat:
http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Work-Care-FamilyPolicies_Online_s.pdf
16
EqualRemunerationCase[2011]FWAFB2700;EqualRemunerationCase[2012]FWAFB1000.
17
EqualRemunerationDecision2015[2015]FWCFB8200
18
TheW+FPR2016’sElectionBenchmarksareavailableat:
http://www.workandfamilypolicyroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Work-Care-FamilyPolicies_Online_s.pdf
16
masculinised and feminised work, are fundamental to tribunals’ assessment of equal or
comparable value (Smith, Layton & Stewart, forthcoming). In the context of a highly
segregatedlabourmarketandaplateauingenderpayequityratios,theresulthasbeena
halting and shifting case law and uncertainty about whether the objective of equal
remuneration is supported by the policy and institutional apparatus that has been
developedtosupportit(Macdonald&Charlesworth,2013).
The development of Australia’s remuneration regulation has proceeded as a series of
distinct changes. These are outlined briefly below and there is also reference to recast
approachestoequalremunerationdevelopedinNewSouthWalesandQueenslandin2000
and2002.19
1969and1972FederalEqualPayPrinciples
Priortogenderpayequityreformin1969and1972,Australia’sfederalindustrialrelations
jurisprudence was characterised by the inclusion of gender as an explicit and acceptable
criterioninwagefixing(O’Donnell&Hall,1988;RyanandConlon,1975).Theestablishment
of separate female rates of pay was promoted through two principles adopted by the
CommonwealthArbitrationCourtin1912.20Undertheseprinciples,equalpaywasgranted
towomenonlyinthoseoccupationswheremen’semploymentwasatriskduetotheuseof
‘cheaper’ female labour. Where this risk did not exist, and because of the inherent
‘suitability’ofwomenfortheworkathand,womenweregrantedaproportionofthemale
rate,basedontheassumptionthattheydidnothaveafamilytosupport(Short,1986,p.
316).Furthersupporttothisprinciplewasprovidedin1918whentheCourtfixedalower
minimum basic wage for women in the clothing industry, based on their cost of living
needs.21
The barrier of institutionalised sexism in wage fixing was partly reversed by the
determination of equal pay principles in 1969 and 1972. In 1969, the Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission (ACAC) adopted the principle of equal pay for equal work, which
rested on a narrow interpretation of equal pay. The decision only applied to situations
where‘workperformedbymenandwomenwasofthesameoralikenature’.22Aspecific
exclusion applied to work predominantly undertaken by women. This construction limited
theavailableremediestowomenwhoworkedinidenticaljobstomenbutreceivedlower
award wages than their male counterparts. As a result of the restrictions in the 1969
principle, only 18 percent of women in the workforce received equal pay (Scutt, 1992, p.
278).
The restricted nature of the measures available under the 1969 decision soon became
apparentandledtofurtherapplicationsaspartofproceedingsforthe1972NationalWage
19
Foracomprehensivereviewseealsotheappendicesonfederalandstateequalremunerationregulationin
Layton,SmithandStewart,2013.
20
RuralWorkers’UnionvTheMilduraBranchoftheAustralianDriedFruitsAssociation(1912)6CAR61.
21
FederatedClothingTradesoftheCommonwealthofAustraliavArcher(1919)13CAR647,at709.
22
EqualPayCase1969(1969)127CAR1142,at1158.
17
Case. As a result of the 1972 proceedings, the effective exclusion of female-dominated
industries from the ambit of the 1969 decision was lifted through the introduction of the
broaderprincipleof‘equalpayforworkofequalvalue’.23Forthepurposeofassessingthe
value of the work, comparisons could be made between male and female classifications
within an award. However, where such comparisons were unavailable or inconclusive, for
example where the work was performed exclusively by females, the principle allowed
comparisons to be made between female classifications within the award or in different
awards. It also acknowledged that in some cases comparisons with male classifications in
other awards might be necessary and that problems might be encountered, particularly
wherecross-awardcomparisonswereinvolved(Layton,Smith&Stewart,2013,p.132).
1986ComparableWorthProceedings
The widened scope of the 1972 principle was viewed as advantageous to equal
remuneration reform. However, there was limited detailed examination of the concept of
equalvalue,astheproceedingsthatfollowedthe1972principlewerelargelydeterminedby
consentwithoutsubstantiveworkvalueinquiries(Thornton,1981,p.473,477–80;Bennett,
1988, p. 540–1, Rafferty, 1994, p. 453–4; Short 1986, p. 316). This context shaped the
comparable worth proceedings which arose from an application for wage increases for
nurseswheretheapplicants,supportedbytheAustralianCouncilofTradeUnions,soughta
series of rulings from the tribunal including that it apply the 1972 equal pay for work of
equalvalueprinciplebywayoftheconceptofcomparableworth.24Inrejectingcomparable
worth, the ACAC determined the comparable worth approach was contrary to the 1972
equal pay principle’s direction to work value inquiries. The Commission indicated further
uneasewiththeconceptofcomparableworthasamethodofcomparison(Layton,Smith,
Stewart,2013,p.49,135),notingthatcomparableworthaspractisedintheUnitedStates
‘refers to the value of the work in terms of its worth to the employer’.25 Further its
acceptanceasawagefixingprinciplewouldopenafloodgateofapplicationsinotherareas,
whichcouldunderminecentralisedwagefixation:
It is clear that comparable worth and related concepts, on the limited
materialbeforeus,havebeenapplieddifferentlyinanumberofcountries.At
itswidest,comparableworthiscapableofbeingappliedtoanyclassification
regardedashavingbeenimproperlyvalued,withoutlimitationonthekindof
classification to which it is applied, with no requirement that the work
performedisrelatedorsimilar.Itiscapableofbeingappliedtoworkwhichis
essentially or usually performed by males as well as to work which is
essentially or usually performed by females. Such an approach would strike
attheheartoflongacceptedmethodsofwagefixationinthiscountryandbe
particularlydestructiveofthepresentWageFixingPrinciples.26
23
EqualPayCase1972(1972)147CAR172.
TheRoyalAustralianNursingFederationandtheHospitalEmployees’FederationofAustraliasupportedby
theAustralianCouncilofTradeUnions.
25
ComparableWorthCase(1986)13IR108,at113.
26
ComparableWorthCase(1986)13IR108,at113.
24
18
LegislativeCommitmenttoEqualRemuneration
Federal industrial relations legislation was amended in 1993 to enshrine the objective of
equalremunerationformenandwomen.27Theeffectoftheseamendmentswastogivethe
Commission power to issue equal remuneration orders to secure ‘equal remuneration for
work of equal value’ with this term explicitly defined to mean rates of remuneration
established without discrimination based on sex.28 Only one case proceeded to extended
arbitration that considered the assessment of work value. These proceedings featured an
unsuccessfulapplicationbytheAutomotive,Food,Metals,Engineering,PrintingandKindred
Industries Union (AMWU) on behalf of process workers and packers employed at HPM
Industries. The Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) determined that
applicantsnotonlyhadtodemonstrateequivalenceinworkvaluebutwererequiredalsoto
establishadiscriminatorycauseforanymale/femaleearningsdisparitythatwasthesubject
oftheapplication.29
Thelimitationofthediscriminationtestwasthatitfailedtorecognisethegenderednature
of wage disparities (Smith & Stewart, 2010). Women receive lower income because they
workinlowpaid‘feminised’jobs,whichhavebeenundervaluedthroughoftencomplexand
overlappingprocessesdeeplyembeddedinAustralia’ssystemofwagefixingandindustrial
relations (Smith & Ewer, 2008, p. 59). In those proceedings the AIRC’s only specific
commentary on the measurement of equal value arose because the applicants sought to
use competency standards to demonstrate equivalence in work value; in response the
Commission considered that the competency standards process was not appropriate to
establish equivalence. While the Commission found that the competency standards
provided ‘an objective and gender neutral mechanism for measuring the relative
competencies’,theywerefoundnottoprovideameansforassessingotherattributes,such
as ‘elements of responsibility that are not skill-related, the nature of the work and the
conditions under which the work is performed’.30 The Commission noted that work value
inquiriesremainedthemeanstosupportapplicationsforequalpayorders(Layton,Smith,
Stewart, 2013, p. 138), with work value defined as ‘the nature of the work, skill and
responsibilityrequiredortheconditionsunderwhichtheworkisperformed’31.
The 1993 equal remuneration amendments remained largely unchanged through the
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) but were amended by the
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) in an important respect.
Applicants were required to cite explicit reference to a comparator group of employees,
defined in the legislation as ‘the employees whom the applicant contends are performing
27
BywayoftheIndustrialRelations(Reform)Act1993(Cth)whichamendedtheIndustrialRelationsAct1988
(Cth).
28
ThroughreferencetotheInternationalLabourOrganisation’sEqualRemunerationConvention1951(No.
100).
29
HPMCase(1998)94IR129,at158.
30
HPMCase(1998)94IR129,at159.
31
HPMCase(1998)94IR129,at161.
19
work of equal value to the work performed by the employees to whom the application
relates’.32
EqualRemunerationPrinciplesinNewSouthWalesandQueensland
Extended consideration by Australian industrial tribunals of the design of equal
remuneration regulation would next occur through a series of pay equity inquiries, most
notablyinthestatejurisdictionsofNewSouthWales(1997-98)andQueensland(2001),that
would inform recast regulatory approaches to gender pay equity through new equal
remuneration principles (Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales, 1998a;
Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales, 1998b; Industrial Relations
Commission of New South Wales, 1998c; Queensland Industrial Relations Commission,
2001). These principles gave expression to legislative provisions in both jurisdictions that
made reference to equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value. 33 These
principlesgaveexplicitfocustogender-basedundervaluation,ratherthandiscrimination,as
a means of assessing whether the objective of equal remuneration had been met.
Applicantscoulddemonstratethattheobjectiveofequalremunerationforworkofequalor
comparable value was not met, on the basis that the work, cited in the application, was
undervalued.NordotheERPsrequirethatapplicationsdemonstrateundervaluationbyway
ofreferencetoexplicitcomparatorgroups.Undervaluationisnotexplicitlydefined,butthe
Queenslandequalremunerationprincipleliststhefeaturesofanoccupationorindustrythat
maybeindicatorsofundervaluation.Theseincludewhethertheworkhascarriedafemale
characterisation, the industrial features of feminised industries and occupations, and
whether sufficient and adequate weight has been placed on the skills and responsibilities
typicallyexercisedinfeminisedwork.Bothprinciplesallowforanassessmentthatexisting
rates of pay may not have been properly set, and provide the capacity for the tribunal to
assessthecurrentvalueofthework(Layton,Smith&Stewart,2013,p.51).Thoseprinciples
in turn became the basis for significant wage increases for feminised occupations in both
jurisdictions.34
EqualRemunerationProvisionsintheFairWorkAct
The developments in New South Wales and Queensland opened up clear differences
between state and federal industrial jurisdictions in the regulation of gender pay equity.
Giventheadventofasignificantlyexpandednationaljurisdictionthatwouldoperatetothe
exclusion of state labour law there was considerable focus on the equal remuneration
provisionsoftheFairWorkAct(Smith&Stewart,2014).35Arelatedquestionconcernedthe
32
WorkplaceRelationsAct1996(Cth)s622.Theseparticularamendmentstookeffect27March2006.
ReEqualRemunerationPrinciple(2000)97IR177;EqualRemunerationPrinciple(2002)114IR305.
34
See Re Crown Librarians, Library Offıcers and Archivists Award Proceedings —Application under the Equal
Remuneration Principle (2002) 111 IR 48; Re Miscellaneous Workers’ Kindergartens and Child Care Centres
etc (State) Award (2006) 150 IR 290; Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Queensland Branch, Union
of Employees v Australian Dental Association (Qld Branch) Union of Employers (2005) 180 QGIG 187; Liquor
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Children’s Services
Employers Association (2006) 182 QGIG 318; Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v
Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd (2009) 191 QGIG 19; Australian Workers’ Union of
Employees, Queensland v Queensland Community Services Employers Association Inc (2009) 192 QGIG 46.
35
FairWorkAct2009(Cth)(FWAct).
33
20
sustainability of the wage increases awarded through equal remuneration applications in
state jurisdictions, given the regulatory change that had transferred significant areas of
coverage to the federal sphere (Connolly, Rooney & Whitehouse, 2012). The legislation
authorised Fair Work Australia (FWA, which replaced the AIRC), to make ‘any order it
considersappropriatetoensurethat,foremployeestowhomtheorderwillapply,therewill
beequalremunerationforworkofequalorcomparablevalue’.36
TheSACSCase
TheprovisionsintheFairWorkActweretestedbywayofanapplicationbytheAustralian
Services Union for equal remuneration orders in the Social, Community, Home Care and
Disability Services Industry Award 2010.37 FWA handed down the first of the two major
decisions in the proceedings in May 2011. The major features of this first decision were
FWA’sfindingthattheworkwasundervaluedonagenderbasis,andFWA’sdirectiontothe
parties to make further submissions on remedy. FWA’s finding of gender-based
undervaluationoperatedasasetoflinkedconclusionsthatdrewsignificantinspirationfrom
the evidence concerning the nature of work in the SACS industry (Cortis and Meagher,
2012).ThusFWAconcludedthat:muchoftheworkiscaringwork;suchacharacterisation
cancontributetodevaluingthework;theworkisundervalued,andgiventhatcaringwork
hasafemalecharacterisation,theundervaluationisgender-based.38TheASUweredirected
to make further submissions on remedy, including specifically the extent to which the
undervaluation was gender-based.39 In a February 2012 majority decision concerning
remedy, FWA largely accepted the use of care work as a proxy for gender-based
undervaluation.40 Akeyfeatureoftheminoritydecisionwastheviewthattheapplicants
hadfailedtodemonstratetheundervaluationofworkintheSACSsectorwasgender-based,
astheyhad‘notsoughttomakecomparisonsbetweenwomen’spayandmen’spay’.41
TheEarlyChildhoodEducationandCareCase
The provisions were tested on a second occasion, in July 2013, when applications were
made for equal remuneration orders in relation to certain workers in the early childhood
educationandcare(ECEC)sector.Ratherthanaddressingthesubstantiveapplicationinthe
first instance, the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission (FWC, as FWA had by then
become), sought submissions on the legislative and conceptual framework for the
proceedingand,afteralengthydelay,handeddownadecisioninNovember2015dealing
withpreliminaryissuesofinterpretation.42
36
FWActs302(1).TheequalremunerationprovisionsarecontainedinPart2-7ofthelegislation.
ApplicationforEqualRemunerationorderbyAustralianMunicipal,Administrative,ClericalandServices
Union,FWAFormF1,11March2010.ThefourotherunionsweretheHealthServicesUnion,theAustralian
Workers’UnionofEmployees(Queensland),UnitedVoiceandtheAustralianEducationUnion.Thecase
proceedingstoFWAhadthesupportoftheCommonwealth-SeeGillard(2009)andAustralianGovernment
andAustralianServicesUnion(2009).
38
EqualRemunerationCase[2011]FWAFB2700at[253].
39
Ibid,at[286],[295].
40
EqualRemunerationCase[2012]FWAFB1000at[63].
41
Ibid,at[87],[96].
42
EqualRemunerationDecision2015[2015]FWCFB8200.
37
21
Therulingisnotableforitsemphasisonstatutoryconstructionandits‘close,textual
analysisofPart2-7whichpersuadedthebenchthattherewerecogentreasonstodepart
fromtheapproachtakenbythebenchintheSACScaseinthreecriticalrespects’(Stewartet
al.2016,15.43).43First,applicationsmustreferenceacomparatorwhichmustbeofthe
oppositegender.44Toestablishthejurisdictionalbasisrequiredbythelegislationforan
ordertobemadeinfavourofagroupoffemaleemployees,anapplicantmustidentifya
groupofmaleemployees,doingworkofequalorcomparablevalue,whoreceivehigher
remuneration.Itisinsufficientforapplicantstoshowthat‘anemployeeorgroupof
employeesofaparticulargenderareconsiderednottoberemuneratedinaccordancewith
whatmightbeconsideredtobetheintrinsicortruevalueoftheirwork’.45Indoingsothe
Commissionrejectedgender-basedundervaluationasameansofassessingwhetherthe
objectiveofequalremunerationforworkofequalorcomparablevalueismet.Toassessthe
comparisonofjobsthebenchindicatedthatitwouldrelyonworkvalueinaccordancewith
theestablishedindustrialunderstandingsoftheterm.46
Secondly,thecomparisondoesnotrequiretheexplicitidentificationanddisregardofany
differenceswhicharenotgender-related.Applicantsarenotrequiredtoidentitythat
proportionofthewagedifferencebetweenthecomparatorsthatweregender-related.The
precisereasonsforthedifferenceinremunerationareirrelevanttotheinitialquestionof
whetherthereisabasisformakinganorder,thoughtheymayberelevanttotheFWC’s
decisionastowhethertoexerciseitsdiscretiontoredressthatdifference.Thirdly,andona
relatedpoint,ifalackofequalremunerationcanbeestablishedbetweenthetwogroups,
thereisnowarrantfor‘discounting’anyremedytoexcludepaydifferencesthatarenot
gender-related.Inthisregardthebenchstressedtherequirementins302(1)toensure
equalremuneration.OncetheFWCissatisfiedthatequalremunerationislacking,itmay
choosetograntaremedyornot,notingthatthedecisiontoissueanequalremuneration
orderremainsadiscretionaryone.Inchoosingtomakeanequalremunerationorder,the
FWCmustbridgetheentiregapbetweentheremunerationofthetwogroups,subjectonly
tothephasing-inofincreasesspecificallyallowedbythelegislation.47
The insistence by the Full Bench on binary, gender-based comparators has narrowed the
groundsonwhichequalremunerationclaimscanbeheardasequalityforwomencanonly
be claimed through reference to a masculinised benchmark. This elevates as primary a
discoursewherebyequalityforwomenisequatedasequalitytomen;thistestservesasthe
benchmark for comparison and thus the means to success, or failure (Palmer, 2002).
Utilisingtestscoheredaroundthe‘malecomparator’speakdirectlytothewayinwhichlaws
43
ThissectionofthesubmissiondrawssignificantlyontheoverviewofthecaseprovidedinStewartetal.
(2016).
44
EqualRemunerationDecision2015[2015]FWCFB8200at[158],summarisingthemoredetailedreasoning
laterinthejudgment.
45
Ibid,at[290].
46
Ibid,at[279]-[280].
47
Ibid,at[223]–[228],[305].
22
can impact upon women and men differently (Smith, Layton, Stewart, forthcoming). In a
segregated labour market, the mandatory requirement for a binary comparator fails to
recognise and respond to the differences between masculinised and feminised work. The
requirement for a binary comparator weakens the capacity of the objective of equal
remunerationtobemetastheCommissionwillrelyonanarrowlycasttestthatexcludes
considerations of whether the rates of pay, at the subject of the application, align to the
contemporaryassessmentofthework.
Prior to moving to the proposal for publication of gender pay gap data we draw the
Committee’s attention to the FWC’s recent decision48 to cut penalty rates for Sunday
workersinthecontextofmodernawardreviewsofhospitalityandretailawards.Thiswill
negatively affect large numbers of retail and hospitality industry workers. This decision
highlightstwomattersthatarecriticaltotheconsiderationofgenderpayequity.One,the
capacity of modern award reviews to cut rates of pay for low-paid workers in feminised
areasofwork,andtwothelimitationsinthecapacityofmodernawardreviewstoaddress
equalremuneration.
b) Publicisingthegenderpaygapbyindividualemployers
Currently,non-governmentAustralianemployersof100andoveremployeesalreadyhave
systems to collect extensive gendered pay information for their annual gender equality
reportingtotheWGEA,butthisdataisnotmadepublic.Thissuggeststhatpublicreporting
ofindividualemployergenderpaygaps(GPGs)couldbeimplementedinAustraliawithlittle
delay or extra employer work. A scheme could be devised that would allow employers to
accompanytheirGPGdatawithanexplanationofwhyagapexistsandtheiractionplansto
overcomethis.SuchaninitiativeislikelytoprovideanaddedimpetustoaddressGPGsat
firmlevelandforemployerstopressGovernmentforpolicychangeswhichcouldhelpthem
achieve more equitable pay outcomes. McGrath-Champ and Jefferson (2013) suggest the
needforsuchanimpetusintheirilluminatinganalysis(basedontheirdetailedinvestigation
intotheGPGsinalargeprofessionalservicesfirminAustralia)ofthecurrentproblemsin
identifyingandremedyingfirmspecificgenderpaygapseveninfirmscommittedtodoing
soandhavingextensivegenderpaydataavailabletothem.
The feasibility of the proposed measure has been demonstrated recently in the United
Kingdom. There employers with 250 or more employees will be required to publish their
annual gender pay gaps in a range of ways from April 2018.49 These include average and
median hourly gaps, average and median bonuses, the percentage of women and men
employedreceivingabonusandtheproportionsofbothmenandwomenineachoffour
equalpaybandsconstructedbyanemployerfromtoptobottomofthefirm’spayrange.
48
4yearlyreviewofmodernawards–PenaltyRates2017,[2017]FWCFB1001.
TheEqualityAct2010(GenderPayGapInformation)Regulations2017,availableat:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/172/contents/made
49
23
Conclusion
Australian policymakers and researchers have developed a large and comprehensive body
of knowledge about gender segregation in Australia: it has been the subject of many
inquiries and research projects many of which are described and drawn on above.
Numerousrecommendationsfromthoseinquiriesandresearchclearlydemonstratethata
multi-faceted/multi-levelapproachisrequiredtoaddressgendersegregation,anditsmost
pernicious manifestation - pay inequity. Yet the problem remains that there is a lack of
political commitment to taking determined action to effect change. We recommend that
theCommitteemakethispointvigorouslyandprominentlyintheirreport.
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