Public Choice
DOI 10.1007/s11127-013-0094-6
Immigration, redistribution, and universal suffrage
Raul Magni-Berton
Received: 22 October 2012 / Accepted: 18 June 2013
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract The effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated. This paper
contributes to this debate by testing two explanations, which are that (i) immigration tends to
reduce redistribution due to people’s higher levels of xenophobia, and that (ii) immigration
affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote. Since the demand
for redistribution depends on the (expected) gap between median voter income and mean income, immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because, as non-citizens, they do not
change the median voter’s income, but, as economic stakeholders, they do affect the mean income. Four empirical consequences of (i) and (ii) are tested at the individual level. Evidence
from the European Values Survey in 45 countries confirms (ii), showing that immigrants’
expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that
it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high. In contrast, (i) is globally
rejected since the impact of the citizens’ declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends
to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used.
Keywords Immigration · Redistribution · Universal suffrage · Xenophobia · Median
voter · Public opinion
The rise in immigrant populations in the last decade has introduced a large minority of
people into developed countries who are entitled to economic rights (such as property rights,
labor rights, and so on), but not to political rights. When foreign immigrants are residents,
they cannot vote, hold political and administrative offices, serve on a jury, or participate
more broadly in the country’s political decisions, at least not in the national elections.1 But,
contrary to other populations deprived of political rights, such as children or prison inmates,
immigrants are stakeholders of the productive system. This implies that as the number of
1 The only exception being New Zealand, where all permanent residents may vote. Several countries grant
such a right at local elections.
B
R. Magni-Berton ( )
Science Po Grenoble, PACTE, Department of Political Science, Grenoble University, Grenoble, France
e-mail: [email protected]
Public Choice
immigrants increases, the proportion of residents entitled to vote decreases. Thus today’s
societies are moving away from universal suffrage, not because of restrictions on political
rights, but because of a spectacular increase in cross-border mobility. In such a context,
citizens can make decisions knowing that other stakeholders cannot.
This situation is particularly relevant for redistribution, because immigrants are taxpayers
and tax consumers, but not tax decision-makers.2 This has been demonstrated by Razin
et al. (2002) using the standard theory of the size of government under majority rule, and
it can be intuitively illustrated here: when the number of immigrants grows, and assuming
immigrants to be poorer than natives, the proportion of the fiscal revenues ending up in the
hands of immigrants increases, which implies that voters will opt for lower taxes. However,
this explanation has never been tested at the individual level. This article provides such a
test.
Note that the current path for non-citizens to be franchised is through naturalization. Naturalization is legally possible in all European states, but it takes time.3 These time requirements, associated with the rise in immigration, lead to a larger disenfranchised population,
even though the immigrants themselves are not permanently disenfranchised. In 2010, in
the European Union, 47 million residents are foreign-born and, among them, 69 % are not
citizens (6.5 % of residents) (Vasileva 2011).
While recent studies have provided evidence of a negative correlation between income
redistribution and the rise in immigration (Roemer et al. 2007; Finseraas 2008; Senik
et al. 2009; Eger 2010), only a small strand of the literature on this issue provides an explanation based on immigrant disenfranchisement (see Razin et al. 2002; Hansen 2003;
Mayr 2007). Most studies tend to view immigrants as belonging to ethnic, religious or
linguistic groups that differ from those of the natives and argue that heterogeneity, especially ethnic fractionalization, reduces the size of the welfare state (Mueller and Murrell 1986; James 1993; Lind 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Empirically, focusing
on the U.S. case, scholars have found evidence that racial stereotypes or lack of solidarity with immigrants influence white people’s support for welfare spending (Gilens 1999;
Alesina et al. 2001; Luttmer 2001), even though in other countries the relation is weak or
insignificant (Soroka et al. 2006; Van Oorschot 2008). Note that until very recently in the
United States—unlike in Europe—race has not distinguished between citizens and immigrants, so, initially, the results had nothing to do with immigration. However, this effect
leads Alesina and Glaeser (2004, 11) to predict that “if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare
state.”
All in all, two mechanisms link immigration to the demand for income redistribution.
First, the “anti-solidarity explanation” (Finseraas 2008) assumes that redistribution is the
result of citizens’ altruistic preferences (Hochman and Rodgers 1969), and that individu2 In recent history, there has been a clear trend towards bringing democracies closer to universal suffrage.
Women or different ethnic minorities have obtained the right to vote in the last century and several studies
have proved that these events have led to an increase in the level of redistribution (Lott and Kenny 1999;
Aidt et al. 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008). In fact, franchise extension to poorer populations on average tends
to increase inequalities among voters and, hence, leads to a greater political demand for redistribution. Note,
also, that when the franchise is limited, franchise extension can reduce income taxation (Plümper and Martin
2003; Aidt and Jensen 2009).
3 For example, beyond special requirements that can be more or less demanding, in France, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, immigrants can qualify for enfranchisement after five years of residence; in Germany, after
eight years; in Italy, Poland and Spain after ten years; 12 years are required in Switzerland.
Public Choice
als are more altruistic toward their own ethnic group than toward other (Tajfel et al. 1971;
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Therefore, it concludes that ethnic diversity reduces the demand for the welfare state.4
Second the “selfish-citizen explanation” assumes that redistribution is the result of citizens’ selfish preferences under majority rule (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and that immigrants are disenfranchised. It concludes that immigration affects the political demand for
the welfare state in different ways.5
Both explanations differ mainly with respect to the role played by solidarity with immigrants, i.e., by whether the immigrants’ welfare is an argument in citizens’ utility function.
The empirical consequences of these explanations are tested with a static micro-level analysis based on survey data. The next section details the hypothesis of a relationship between
immigrants as nonvoters and redistribution. In Sect. 2, the dataset and the micro-level tests
are described, and Sect. 3 reports the findings. Finally, Sect. 4 provides a broad discussion
of the empirical and normative implications of the results.
1 Redistribution and universal suffrage
This section develops the selfish-citizen explanation and provides four testable hypotheses
to distinguish it from the anti-solidarity explanation. According to the selfish-citizen explanation, support for the welfare state can increase among citizens who feel disadvantaged
in the labor market compared to immigrants (H1), while among other citizens this support decreases with immigration (H2). According to the anti-solidarity explanation, though,
xenophobia should systematically reduce support for the welfare state (H3). These effects
are expected to amplify when the number of immigrants is large (H4).
1.1 The Meltzer and Richard model
The most famous political economy model for explaining the level of preference for redistribution has been provided by Meltzer and Richard (1981), hereafter M&R, who stated that
the demand for redistribution depends on the gap between the mean income and the median
income. The model starts with the assumption that agents are rational, self-interested, and
fully aware, and it assumes that agents regard redistribution as a way to maximize their own
incomes. M&R argue that, first, under a linear tax rate, with lump-sum and proportional
redistribution, the agents’ preferences can be placed in a one-dimensional space: the richer
the agents, the less favorable they are to introducing redistribution. Second, under majority
rule, the median voter is decisive. So, the policy outputs as well as the majority’s preference correspond to the median voter’s preference. Third, under universal suffrage, a person
who earns the median income is the median voter. Therefore, redistribution maximizes the
earnings of the agent with median income.
4 Another variant is based on a concept of redistribution as a public good. Assuming that redistribution is a
kind of public good and that individuals cooperate more with people who belong to their own ethnic group
than with other people (Putnam 2007; Habyarimana et al. 2007), ethnic diversity will reduce the demand for
the welfare state.
5 When immigrants have voting rights, immigration affects the demand for the welfare state as well. However,
as I will show below, when immigrants are entitled to voting rights, the impact of immigration on redistribution is opposite to when immigrants cannot vote.
Public Choice
Hence the model asserts that the collective preference for redistribution is greater when
the gap between median and mean income is wider, and that the optimal tax rate brings
the median income closer to the mean income, while maintaining a level of inequality that
provides taxpayers with incentives to optimally finance redistribution. Thus, the demand for
redistribution is
demand for redistribution = yK − ym ,
(1)
where y is the mean income, ym the median income and K a coefficient that gauges the
negative effect of a tax rate increase on productivity.
The M&R model has been tested several times (Bradley et al. 2003; Iversen and Soskice
2006; Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Moene and Wallerstein 2003), but the results are at best
uneven. However, recent public opinion research supplies evidence of a positive relationship
between inequality and support for redistribution (Finseraas 2009; Georgiadis and Manning
2012). These differences in the evidence provided could be due to the complex causal chain
implied in the model: inequality causes perceived inequality, which causes support for redistribution, which leads to redistribution. The simplest way to test M&R’s mechanism is by
observing causality in the chain’s middle link: the perception of inequality leads to stronger
support for redistribution.
1.2 Introducing partial suffrage
In this study, I define “immigrants” as agents able to undertake economic decisions, but not
political decisions, and “partial suffrage” as a situation in which such agents exist. The aim
of this subsection is to analyze the consequences that can be expected when we replace universal suffrage with partial suffrage in the M&R model, i.e., when the population proportion
of foreign-born residents increases.
The first consequence is that the median income does not necessarily match the median
voter anymore. Here, the median voter is the agent who earns the median income among
citizens ymc . Hence, under partial suffrage, the demand for redistribution of ymc remains the
same as under universal suffrage only if the mean income of citizens y c equals the mean
income of immigrants yi . In this case, substituting it into the M&R formula
y c nc + y i ni
(2)
K − ymc
n
does not produce any changes when immigrants arrive. However, when y c > y i , the mean
income in the whole population falls below that in the citizen population. Thus the demand
for redistribution should also decrease. In other words, the median income among citizens
is—at the time of new immigrants’ arrival—too close to the general mean income, exactly
as if too much redistribution has occurred. As a consequence, voters should ask for less
redistribution.
This mechanism suggests that the impact of the arrival of immigrants, who are on average
poorer than citizens, is comparable to that of an over-redistributive situation under universal suffrage. Indeed, both configurations lead to declines in the demand for redistribution
due to a reduction in the distance between the median and the mean income. Nevertheless,
one difference stems from the fact that, on the one hand, over-redistributing leads to an
increase in the median income, while the mean income remains stable and, on the other
hand, low-income immigration decreases the mean income (at least temporarily) without
affecting the median voter’s income, so the distance is reduced through a different mechanism.
Demand for redistribution =
Public Choice
Moreover, when y c < y i , the mean income increases, and the median voter can maximize
his/her income by demanding more redistribution. Thus, the immigration of high-income
earners increases the demand for redistribution.
Note that (2) also implies that the magnitude of this effect depends on the proportion of
citizens in the general population. In other words, the smaller is the population percentage
of immigrants (i.e., the closer the political system is to universal suffrage), the smaller the
impact of y c = y i on demand for redistribution.
1.3 Dynamic models
Until now, citizens have been considered only as people who assess their actual earnings before deciding their degree of support for redistribution. Yet, political economic explanations
for redistributive policies argue that the level of exposure to labor market risks, especially
unemployment, is the main determining factor of the individual preferences for redistribution (Cusack et al. 2006). So, in contrast to the M&R thesis, people are expected to anticipate
their future income.
In such conditions, two scenarios are possible. First, since redistribution is regarded as
a simple transfer, individuals support redistribution when they expect to lose income and
to have to deal with their own downward mobility (Benabou and Ok 2001). Alternatively,
if redistribution is viewed as insurance, support for it increases when people perceive the
risk of future income loss. In this case, people do not necessarily expect that their incomes
will fall, but rather that the standard deviation of their future income will increase. Thus,
assuming citizens’ aversion to risk, they will demand more redistribution.
Both scenarios are compatible with a kind of perceived threat from immigrants. When
the latter are regarded as competitive in the labor market, some citizens fear losing their jobs
or part of their incomes, or, simply, suffering from downward mobility. In this case, immigrants introduce both risky competition with citizens and, on average, a downward mobility,
sometimes associated with an income loss for citizens. Contrary to the static M&R model,
immigrants can produce fear of labor market instability even when they are, on average,
unskilled and relatively poor, because they compete for jobs with those citizens who benefit
from redistribution.
In contrast, when immigrants are regarded as non-competitive in the labor market, citizens who do not fear income losses, benefit from upward mobility due to the arrival of
new low-income stakeholders who reduce the mean income. In particular, the median voter,
who is a native-born member, would now lose under the current income tax rate because
a larger share of the revenues they generate would benefit the migrants whose number has
increased. So, citizens who earn the median voter’s income or above now support a lower
tax rate (Razin et al. 2002).
Note, however, that this argument can be formulated in two different ways. First, immigrants affect the desire of the median voter for redistribution according to whether immigrants are expected to earn above or below the median income. Second, immigrants may
also affect the support for redistribution depending on whether they are expected to decrease citizens’ incomes through labor market competition or through tax-financed wealth
transfers. These different analyses may have different psychological effects on, for example,
xenophobia. People prefer richer immigrants who increase the size of the cake to competitive immigrants who make their own situations unstable. However, as far as redistribution is
concerned, both analyses are conjectured to have the same impact: in both cases individuals
become relatively poorer compared to the mean income, even though in the second case
Public Choice
they also risk becoming absolutely poorer, while this is not the case in the first interpretation.
1.4 Testable hypotheses
Three testable hypotheses are provided to test the selfish-citizen explanation:
(H1) when citizens believe that immigrants take jobs away from natives, their preference
for redistribution increases and
(H2) when citizens believe that immigrants strain the welfare state, their preference for
redistribution declines.
Notice that only H2 is compatible with the anti-solidarity explanation. In order to clarify
this point empirically, it should also be expected that
(H3) Demand for redistribution also depends on the lack of solidarity with immigrants.
Moreover, the expected effects described in H1 and H2 should be amplified when the respondents believe that the proportion of immigrants in the population is large.
(H4) The perceived population share of immigrants increases the validity of H1 and H2.
Finally, the impact of specific beliefs about immigrants—such as those listed above—should
exclusively influence citizens, at least in the expected direction.
2 Data and methodology
I use data from the last round of the European Values Survey (EVS) conducted in 2008.
These data are interesting for several reasons. First, they cover 45 countries and almost
70,000 respondents (countries and respondents per country are described in the appendix).
Most countries are quite poor and receive “white collar” immigration. They are rarely studied and, for all these reasons, they are worth taking into account. Also, this database asks
questions that are well adapted to the aim of this article. Only citizens are taken into
account in the estimations, meaning people within the country who are thus entitled to
vote.
2.1 Demand for equality and for social protection
The demand for redistribution is the dependent variable. It is difficult, in the real world, to
identify how to measure redistribution. It can be regarded both as a form of insurance or as
a way to equalize incomes. For this reason, I have used two indicators.
The first one measures support for redistribution as a way of protecting people from risks.
The respondents had to place themselves on a ten-point scale: “The government should take
more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (9) versus “People should take
more responsibility to provide for themselves” (0). This question indicates the demand for
social protection, meaning: insurance-type redistribution.
The second indicator captures the preference for redistribution based on equalizing incomes. The scale is: “Incomes should be made more equal” (9) versus “We need larger
income differences as incentives” (0). This second dependent variable is called demand for
equality.
Public Choice
Table 1 Statistical description of variables*
Mean
s.d.
min
max
Dependent variable
Demand for equality
4.68
0.011
0
9
Demand for social protection
4.01
0.011
0
9
Immigrants take jobs away
4.94
0.011
0
9
Immigrants strain the welfare state
5.42
0.011
0
9
−0.49
0.011
−9
9
Concerned by fellow-citizens
2.00
0.004
0
4
Concerned by immigrants
1.75
0.004
0
4
Too many immigrants
2.16
0.005
1
5
−1
1
1
10
About immigrants
Relative competitiveness
Individual control variables
Preference for freedom
0.095
0.004
Right-wing
5.38
0.01
Female
0.002
1
2
46.37
0.07
14
108
Education
3.08
0.005
1
Income
1.212
0.005
0
Religious attendance
2.390
0.007
0
Age
1.554
6
14.73
6
* For all variables but income, the unit is 1. The variable income includes 611 values computed from specific
scales for each country, adjusted for PPP
Surprisingly, neither indicator is correlated with the other. Besides, both of them appear
to be continuous and normally distributed variables, in which the value 4 is the mean, the
median and the mode of the demand for social protection, whereas this value is 5 in the case
of demand for equality (see Table 1).
2.2 Perceived immigrant competitiveness and solidarity with immigrants
According to the selfish-citizen explanation, the perception of immigrants’ labor market
competitiveness has an impact on citizens’ attitudes toward redistribution, regardless of the
extent of solidarity with foreign-born arrivals. The main concern of this prediction is separating the competition effect from the solidarity effect. Indeed, when immigrants are perceived
as competitive, they are also more accepted by the people who earn less than the median
income, because immigrants contribute to paying taxes, and by rich people who are keen to
share the fiscal burden. This fact has been highlighted by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010),
who demonstrate that, regardless of their incomes, people are less xenophobic toward highly
skilled immigrants. Also, Senik et al. (2009) have found a correlation between perceptions
of immigrants’ contributions to national prosperity and attitudes toward immigration. In order to avoid this problem, I need to identify four groups: xenophobic and non-xenophobic
people, on the one hand, and citizens who believe that immigrants are competitive in the
labor market, or not, on the other. This means that people can be xenophobic because they
think that immigrants are competitive with their fellow citizens and, conversely, they can be
unxenophobic when they perceive immigrants as non-competitive.
Public Choice
Hence, I use two questions that ask respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale:
(A) Immigrants take jobs away: Immigrants take jobs away from natives (9) versus immigrants do not take jobs away from natives (0)
(B) Immigrants strain the welfare state: Immigrants are a strain on the welfare system (9)
versus immigrants are not a strain on the welfare system (0)
On the first scale, immigrants are regarded as dangerous because they actually compete with
citizens in the labor market. So, immigrants are considered to be at a potential advantage
compared to citizens as far as income is concerned. On the second scale, immigrants are
viewed as poor and disadvantaged when competing with citizens.
Note that both scales can measure some kind of xenophobic attitude: whatever the immigrants’ level of competitiveness, they are perceived negatively. However, in case A xenophobia should lead to a demand for redistribution, because immigrants threaten citizens
with downward mobility, while in case B citizens should oppose redistribution because noncompetitive immigrants facilitate citizens’ upward mobility.
It is also worth noting that the correlation between both variables is high (r = 0.52).
This could indicate that many people answer both questions in similar ways. In fact, there
is a set of people that are systematically opposed or systematically favorable to immigrants.
Hence, whatever immigrants do, respondents will keep seeing them either as a threat to or
as a benefit for society.
Nevertheless, in this paper, I argue that, whatever the level of xenophobia, only the relative perception of the immigrants’ average economic situation is relevant. That is why I
also use a variable that is the result of subtracting immigrants take jobs away from immigrants strain the welfare state (called relative competitiveness hereafter). Thus, the larger
is this value, the more competitive immigrants are deemed to be. This indicator does not
consider the level of xenophobia, because people answering 9 for both questions have the
same score as the individuals answering 0 for both questions, but it captures the intensity
of the preference for one idea of immigrants over the other. Therefore, it measures why
people are more sensitive to one issue than another, regardless of their degree of xenophobia.
Regarding negative beliefs about immigrants, existing studies measure attitudes toward immigrants mainly by offering options about their perceived numbers (Mayda 2006;
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2004; Givens 2004). In the EVS survey, the most widely used question is whether respondents agree with the statement “Today
in my country, there are too many immigrants”. Respondents had to choose among five
responses: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and disagree strongly
(see Simon and Lynch 1999; Givens 2004). This question is correlated with both Immigrants
take jobs away (0.41) and Immigrants strain the welfare state (0.44), but not correlated with
Relative competitiveness. However, it provides an ambiguous piece of information: it measures both the perceived number of immigrants and negative attitudes towards them (“too
many”). So, this question can be viewed as a measurement of generic xenophobia, as well as
the perceived proportion of immigrants in the country. When this variable is interacted with
Immigrants take jobs away and Immigrants strain the welfare state (which encapsulate negative attitudes towards immigrants), its effect plausibly captures only the perceived number
of immigrants.6
6 For interaction terms, I computed the items to obtain a variable using two values: 1 when respondents
strongly agree or agree with the statement and null otherwise.
Public Choice
Finally, in line with the explanations based on solidarity, the demand for redistribution
arises when people feel solidarity with fellow-citizens or with immigrants. I use two variables which measure the level of solidarity with those populations. Citizens were asked
to what extent they are concerned by the living conditions of fellow countrymen (Concerned by fellow-citizens) and of immigrants (Concerned by immigrants), on a five-point
scale.
2.3 Individual and contextual control variables
Above all, I have to test that beliefs about immigrants’ labor market competitiveness is a
cause, and not an effect, of attitudes towards redistribution. To identify the specific impact
of beliefs about immigration on the demand for redistribution, the general attitudinal predisposition towards redistribution is held constant. Basic values in favor of the free market
(hereafter Preference for freedom) are measured by the respondent’s choice between freedom and equality.7
Another dimension potentially able to account for both perceptions of immigrants and
support for redistribution is the right-wing or left-wing identification (Van Der Brug and
Van Spanje 2009). Within this framework, people located on the left side of the political
scale are expected to favor immigration and to oppose the market. I used the classic selfplacement on the ten-point scale in which 1 is “left” and 10 is “right”. The variable is,
therefore, called right-wing.
Beyond these attitudinal controls, I enter several structural independent variables. Income
is a decisive variable and the most appropriate indicator of this is the monthly household
income in Euros (×1000), adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).8
Finally, I have taken into account three major demographic characteristics: Gender
(1 = female), Age and Education (in six points given by the ISCED code). Older people and females are more likely to support redistribution (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003;
Keely and Tan 2008); religious attendance traditionally is associated with less support for
the welfare state.
At the aggregate level, studies of the impact of inequality on the demand for redistribution
use the Gini coefficient to measure the skewness of the income distribution. Its effect has
sometimes been observed—in line with the M&R hypothesis—as positive (Aalberg 2003;
Finseraas 2009), sometimes as insignificant (Lübker 2007; Kenworthy and McCall 2008)
and some studies point to a negative relationship (Bowles and Gintis 2000). According to
the M&R hypothesis, Gini impacts the demand for redistribution only among the people who
earn the median income or less. Therefore, the Gini coefficient is interacted with belonging
to the median income or less category (Gini—low income) and it is expected to have a
positive impact, especially on the demand for equality. On the other hand, the demand for
social protection, which implies insurance-type redistribution, can be more influenced by
the country’s degree of openness to trade (Rodrik 1998). Immigrants are not the only reason
for income-loss risks: the domestic labor market is more vulnerable to turbulence on the
world markets when the economy is more open. In line with Finseraas (2009), I measure
7 Respondents who have chosen the statement “I would consider personal freedom more important, that is,
everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance” is coded 1, while people who believe that
equality is more important, “that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not
so strong” equals −1. Note that about 6 % of respondents did not agree with either of these statements. They
are coded with 0.
8 PPP is derived from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2008 Edition).
Public Choice
trade openness (in natural logarithms), using exports plus imports as a share of GDP, in
constant prices. However, since this mechanism concerns the people whose income is more
affected by market turbulence, trade openness is interacted with low levels of education, i.e.,
the fraction of the population with a secondary education or less (trade openness (ln)—low
education). Low education is here a proxy for vulnerability to market instability.
3 Results
3.1 Individual and country level correlations
Before proceeding to a multivariate analysis, simple correlations at the individual and country levels are computed. Table 2 correlates the demands for equality and for social protection
with the variables related to solidarity with immigrants and their labor market competitiveness. Each country’s score is the mean of the individual answers given by the citizens of that
country.
Interestingly, the results are ambiguous with respect to the demand for equality, while
the demand for social protection clearly is affected by the perceived degree of immigrants’
competitiveness. More accurately, at an individual level, the demand for equality is associated positively with negative opinions about immigrants, but it is also positively correlated with feeling concerned by immigrants (and, to a lesser extent, by citizens), in line
with the anti-solidarity hypothesis. No significant correlations are registered at the country
level.
The results are more interesting with respect to the demand for social protection. The
latter is positively correlated with believing that immigrants take jobs away from citizens
and negatively with believing that immigrants strain the welfare state. Subtracting one from
the other (relative competitiveness) leads to a difference that is strongly and positively correlated with the demand for social protection. These results are confirmed both at the country
and individual level. Solidarity with citizens and immigrants has a positive impact, while
thinking that there are too many immigrants surprisingly remains positively associated with
redistribution at the individual level.
While these results have to be confirmed with a multivariate analysis, they suggest that
when redistribution is regarded as a form of insurance, people assess the way in which their
Table 2 Correlations at country level and at individual level in 45 European countries
Immigrants take jobs away
Immigrants strain the welfare state
Relative competitiveness
Concerned by fellow-citizens
Concerned by immigrants
Too many immigrants
Demand for equality
Demand for social
protection
Country
level
Country
level
Individual
level
0.30∗∗
0.02∗∗
Individual
level
0.18
0.10∗∗
0.15
0.06∗∗
0.06
0.05∗∗
−0.05
0.03∗∗
0.10
0.003∗∗
0.23
0.05∗∗
0.04
0.003∗∗
0.13
0.05∗∗
−0.04
−0.27∗
0.54∗∗
∗∗ Significant 5 % level ∗ significant 10 % level
Each country’s score is the mean of the individual answers given by the citizens of that country
−0.05∗∗
0.07∗∗
0.01∗∗
Public Choice
Table 3 Estimations of citizens’ demand for equality and social protection with structural control variables
Demand for equality
Demand for social
protection
OLS
Probit
OLS
Probit
Immigrants take jobs away
0.077∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.031∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.013
(0.012)
0.005
(0.005)
Immigrants strain the welfare state
0.010
(0.016)
0.002
(0.007)
−0.037∗∗
(0.014)
−0.013∗∗
(0.006)
Female
0.154∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.228∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.076∗∗∗
(0.014)
Age
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
Education
−0.063∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.059∗∗
(0.009)
−0.106∗∗∗
(0.026)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.011)
Income
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.075∗∗
(0.014)
−0.106∗∗
(0.026)
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.012)
Religious attendance
0.025∗
(0.015)
0.007
(0.007)
0.007
(0.016)
0.003
(0.007)
Gini × low income
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
ln (Trade Openness) × low education
0.183∗∗
(0.083)
0.063
(0.043)
0.230∗
(0.126)
0.119∗∗∗
(0.051)
Constant
5.023∗∗∗
(0.165)
0.335∗∗∗
(0.085)
3.619∗∗∗
(0.217)
−0.302∗∗∗
(0.088)
N
47309
47309
47448
47448
R2
0.15
0.09
0.07
0.04
Standard errors, corrected with the cluster method (by country), are in parentheses
We include country fixed effects
∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
own situation in the labor market could be affected by immigration, regardless of their level
of solidarity with immigrants. In contrast, when redistribution is simply a way of equalizing
incomes, the results do not have a clear interpretation.
3.2 Multivariate estimations with structural controls
In order to estimate our ten-point scale dependent variable, several methods have been used,
but, whatever the method, the results do not change. I choose to mainly show here the results
from a simple ordinary least squares method, as if the relationships were thus, because the
results are more easily interpretable. However, Table 3 compares OLS and Probit estimations
with structural controls.9 Both sets of regressions also include country fixed effects and error
variances are corrected using the cluster method. This largely ensures the quality of the
estimations.
9 In the Probit model, the dependent variable is dummy (I have considered the answers from 1–5 values as 0,
and the values from 6 up to 10, as 1).
Public Choice
Table 3 offers two estimations of the demand for equality and two for the demand for
social protection. In each case, the first column uses OLS estimation (take jobs away and
strain the welfare state), while the second column uses Probit estimation. Only structural
control variables are taken into account, to avoid any concern about endogeneity.
In the four columns, the classic individual control variables have the expected impact:
income, education, and being male have a negative impact on the demand for redistribution.
Religious attendance and age have no influence.
The impact of contextual variables globally confirms the hypotheses tested, with some
caveats. The Gini coefficient significantly and positively affects the demand for social protection, while it has no impact on the demand for equality. This result confirms the political
economy model even though it was expected to better explain the demand for equality than
the demand for social protection. On the other hand, trade openness has the expected impact
on both the demand for social protection and for equality (in the latter case, only in the OLS
estimation).
Concerning immigrants, the variable Immigrants take jobs away has a positive impact on
the demand for redistribution, but it is significant only in the case of the demand for equality,
while the impact of Immigrants strain the welfare state is significant and negative as far as
the demand for social protection is concerned. This result partly confirms hypotheses H1
and H2.
3.3 Multivariate estimations with structural and attitudinal controls
Tables 4 and 5 present several OLS estimations with different specifications that take into
account structural and attitudinal control variables. Including attitudinal controls does not
change the global findings reported previously. However, they allow us to shed light on
hypotheses H3 and H4 and on the relationship between the different motives associated
with redistribution. The results globally confirm the selfish-citizen hypothesis (H1, H2, H4).
The anti-solidarity hypothesis (H3) is not clearly invalidated, even though the results are
somewhat fuzzy. The control variables are steady and in line with what Table 3 already
established. The attitudinal variables not related to the immigration issue (Preference for
freedom and Right-wing) negatively influence the demand for redistribution in all estimations, as expected.
Table 4 estimates the demand for social protection. Column 1 shows, as in Table 3,
the opposite impact of Immigrants take jobs away and of Immigrants strain the welfare
state, with only the latter significant at the 5 % level. The same effect is confirmed in column 2.
Feeling concerned by fellow-citizens does not significantly influence support for social
protection, but caring about immigrants does, at the 10 % level (column 1). However, thinking that there are too many immigrants (column 2) does not have the expected negative
impact, but a positive one. These results go a small way to confirming the idea that solidarity with immigrants (H3) can explain support for redistribution.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate the previous estimations, but use the Relative competitiveness
variable, and the results do not change.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 test H4. The impact of Immigrants takes jobs away and of
Immigrants strain the welfare state is expected to be amplified when people perceive that
there are “too many” immigrants. This expectation is confirmed only for the first hypothesis, not for the second. In particular, while the Immigrants take jobs away coefficient is
not significant in standard specifications (columns 1 and 2), it becomes significant when
−0.292∗∗∗ (0.032)
−0.071∗∗∗ (0.021)
0.203∗∗∗ (0.032)
−0.002∗∗ (0.001)
−0.090∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.089∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.010 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
0.175 (0.025)
4.259∗∗∗ (0.228)
35718
0.09
4.136∗∗∗ (0.238)
36290
0.09
Constant
N
R2
4.018∗∗∗ (0.217)
36290
0.09
−0.291∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.071∗∗∗ (0.021)
0.204∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.002∗∗ (0.001)
−0.095∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.089∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.006 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
0.191 (0.021)
0.021∗∗ (0.010)
0.017 (0.034)
0.056∗ (0.029)
(3)
coef. (s.e.)
4.100∗∗∗ (0.214)
35718
0.09
−0.292∗∗∗ (0.032)
−0.072∗∗∗ (0.021)
0.207∗∗∗ (0.032)
−0.002∗∗ (0.001)
−0.085∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.087∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.010 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.002)
0.174 (0.125)
0.031 (0.030)
0.021∗∗ (0.010)
(4)
coef. (s.e.)
4.190∗∗∗ (0.241)
36290
0.09
−0.290∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.071∗∗∗ (0.020)
0.200∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.002∗∗ (0.001)
−0.094∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.090∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.007 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
0.183 (0.120)
0.003 (0.014)
0.030∗∗ (0.013)
0.018 (0.032)
0.053∗ (0.028)
−0.009 (0.012)
−0.039∗∗∗ (0.014)
(5)
coef. (s.e.)
Standard errors, corrected with the cluster method (by country), are in parentheses. We include country fixed effects. ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
0.072∗∗ (0.028)
0.001 (0.012)
−0.44∗∗∗ (0.014)
−0.290∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.070∗∗∗ (0.020)
0.202∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.002∗ (0.001)
−0.100∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.090∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.006 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
0.195 (0.121)
−0.020 (0.033)
0.047∗ (0.028)
0.012 (0.013)
−0.033∗∗ (0.013)
(2)
coef. (s.e.)
Immigrants take jobs away
Immigrants strain the welfare state
Relative competitiveness
Concerned by fellow-citizens
Concerned by immigrants
Too many immigrants
Immigrants take jobs away × too many
immigrants
Immigrants strain the welfare state × too
many immigrants
Relative competitiveness × too many
immigrants
Preference for freedom
Right-wing
Female
Age
Education
Income
Religious attendance
Gini × low income
ln (Trade Openness) × low education
(1)
coef. (s.e.)
Table 4 Estimations of citizens’ demand for social protection
4.016∗∗∗ (0.218)
36290
0.09
−0.291∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.071∗∗∗ (0.020)
0.204∗∗∗ (0.031)
−0.002∗∗ (0.001)
−0.095∗∗∗ (0.026)
−0.089∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.006 (0.015)
0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
0.191 (0.121)
0.007 (0.013)
0.018∗ (0.010)
0.017 (0.034)
0.056∗ (0.029)
(6)
coef. (s.e.)
Public Choice
Public Choice
it is interacted with the perceived number of immigrants. When both variables are combined into Relative competitiveness, however, the results are also not significant at the 5 %
level.
Let us now consider the demand for equality (Table 5). The positive effect of Immigrants
take jobs away is confirmed, but the variable Immigrants strain the welfare state is now
insignificant. Taken together (columns 3 and 4), the expected effect is observed. Again, the
most notable effect is provided in columns 5 and 6. When these variables are interacted with
too many immigrants, the effect is clearly amplified in both cases. In particular, Immigrants
strain the welfare state regains its significant and negative influence on the demand for
equality when respondents think that there are too many immigrants. On the other hand, the
coefficient Immigrants takes jobs away is simply larger when immigrants are viewed as too
numerous.
Finally, variables measuring hostility to immigrants do not have their expected signs.
Solidarity with immigrants has a barely significant impact (10 % level), and its sign is positive. Hypothesis 3 is, however, better confirmed in terms of solidarity with fellow citizens,
which positively influences the demand for redistribution.
All in all, the most consistent finding, reinforced by the perceived number of immigrants, is the positive effect of Immigrants take jobs away. So, H1 is confirmed in most
estimations.
Immigrants strain the welfare state tends to maintain the expected negative sign, even
though, with respect to support for equality, this effect is visible only when the variable is
interacted with too many immigrants. So, H2 is also broadly confirmed.
The evidence for H3 is weak. Generally negative attitudes towards immigrants do not
seem to have the expected influence. On the other hand, solidarity with others (with immigrants and with fellow citizens) affects the demand for redistribution. However, solidarity
specifically regarding immigrants seems to have no significant effect.
According to hypothesis 4, H1 and H2 should be truer when they are interacted with
Too many immigrants. This is confirmed in three cases out of four. Thus, H4 is globally
validated.
4 Conclusion
This article has compared two concurrent explanations for the observed link between immigration and attitudes toward income redistribution; it operationalized two concepts of
redistribution: the first is based on equality of income, and the second on social insurance.
The anti-solidarity explanation argues that lack of concern for immigrants’ welfare is
responsible for the (negative) link between immigration and the demand for redistribution.
Our data partly confirm this hypothesis since, on average, people are less concerned about
the living conditions of immigrants than about those of fellow citizens. Moreover, the data
show that, at an individual level, there is a positive correlation between solidarity for immigrants and the demand for more redistribution. However, after a multivariate analysis
with appropriate controls, the anti-solidarity explanation turns out to be globally weak:
indeed, the influence of solidarity is unsteady but robust only with respect to fellow citizens.
On the other hand, the selfish-citizen explanation states that citizens’ support for redistribution depends on their expectations about future incomes and their anticipated position
on the income scale. Those expectations are influenced by the economic changes produced
5.792∗∗∗ (0.185)
35776
0.16
5.621∗∗∗ (0.186)
36346
0.17
Constant
N
R2
6.085∗∗∗ (0.197)
36346
0.16
−0.219∗∗∗ (0.028)
−0.129∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.094∗∗ (0.041)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.142∗∗∗ (0.024)
−0.136∗∗∗ (0.030)
0.039∗∗ (0.015)
0.001 (0.002)
0.207∗∗ (0.101)
0.037∗∗∗ (0.011)
0.076∗∗ (0.037)
0.022 (0.031)
(3)
coef. (s.e.)
6.071∗∗∗ (0.184)
35776
0.16
−0.231∗∗∗ (0.029)
−0.134∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.101∗∗ (0.041)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.127∗∗∗ (0.022)
−0.137∗∗∗ (0.029)
0.042∗∗∗ (0.015)
0.001 (0.002)
0.180∗ (0.093)
0.081∗∗ (0.033)
0.035∗∗∗ (0.011)
(4)
coef. (s.e.)
9.616∗∗ (0.316)
36346
0.17
−0.220∗∗∗ (0.029)
−0.134∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.097∗∗ (0.041)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.119∗∗∗ (0.022)
−0.132∗∗∗ (0.029)
0.037∗∗ (0.014)
0.001 (0.002)
0.180∗ (0.097)
−0.035∗∗ (0.017)
0.062∗∗ (0.028)
0.062∗ (0.035)
0.062∗ (0.032)
0.045∗∗ (0.019)
0.019 (0.015)
(5)
coef. (s.e.)
Standard errors, corrected with the cluster method (by country), are in parentheses. We include country fixed effects. ∗∗ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
0.010 (0.032)
−0.231∗∗∗ (0.029)
−0.136∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.108∗∗ (0.041)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.118∗∗∗ (0.021)
−0.133∗∗∗ (0.029)
0.042∗∗∗ (0.014)
0.001 (0.002)
0.177∗ (0.091)
0.063∗ (0.035)
0.058∗ (0.032)
−0.220∗∗∗ (0.029)
−0.134∗∗∗ (0.025)
0.100∗∗ (0.041)
0.000 (0.001)
−0.123∗∗∗ (0.022)
−0.132∗∗∗ (0.029)
0.037∗∗ (0.014)
0.001 (0.002)
0.187∗ (0.098)
0.072∗∗∗ (0.011)
0.005 (0.013)
0.076∗∗∗ (0.011)
0.008 (0.015)
Immigrants take jobs away
Immigrants strain the welfare state
Relative competitiveness
Concerned by fellow-citizens
Concerned by immigrants
Too many immigrants
Immigrants take jobs away × too many
immigrants
Immigrants strain the welfare state × too
many immigrants
Relative competitiveness × too many
immigrants
Preference for freedom
Right-wing
Female
Age
Education
Income
Religious attendance
Gini × low income
Trade Openness (nl) × low education
(2)
coef. (s.e.)
(1)
coef. (s.e.)
Table 5 Estimations of citizens’ demand for equality
6.076∗∗∗ (0.198)
36346
0.16
−0.219∗∗∗ (0.028)
−0.128∗∗∗ (0.024)
0.092∗∗ (0.041)
0.001 (0.001)
−0.144∗∗∗ (0.024)
−0.137∗∗∗ (0.030)
0.039∗∗ (0.015)
0.001 (0.002)
0.211∗∗ (0.101)
0.038∗ (0.022)
0.022 (0.015)
0.076∗∗ (0.036)
0.020 (0.031)
(6)
coef. (s.e.)
Public Choice
Public Choice
by the entry of new workers into the labor market. Within this framework, solidarity with
immigrants does not play any causal role, and citizens assess their present or future position in order to evaluate if they will benefit personally from more or less redistribution.
This mechanism is broadly confirmed by our data. Indeed, when immigration is viewed
as leading to more instability in the labor market, citizens opt for more redistribution. On
the other hand, when immigrants are seen as being less educated and less skilled people
who will benefit from income transfers, citizens anticipate, on average, that they themselves
will gain from redistribution, leading them to display less support for it. Moreover, this
double effect proved to be stronger when citizens believe that there are ‘too many’ immigrants.
This psychological mechanism is the necessary condition for the selfish-citizen explanation. Its consequence is that the demand for redistribution changes with immigration, except
when immigrants’ profiles are similar to those of citizens.
To conclude to the idea that immigration affects not only the demand for redistribution,
but actual redistribution, two assumptions are required. First, redistribution policies are a
response to citizens’ demands. Some authors remain skeptical about this causality (Kenworthy 2009), which is why this paper does not take any stance on this point. Second,
people correctly perceive immigrants’ numbers and labor market competitiveness, which
largely also is questionable: according to our data, individuals’ perceptions of the number
of immigrants are significantly, but weakly correlated with their effective number (0.04).
Besides, according to recent studies, and contrary to what around one of three respondents
in our sample believe, foreign labor likely does not have a relevant negative effect on the
natives’ job opportunities (D’Amuri et al. 2010; Longhi et al. 2006; Schmidt and Jensen
2012).
However, if we assume that these assumptions are valid, the question whether or not to
give immigrants the right to vote surely would have a major impact on debates on the welfare state. For example, we can determine whether the optimal level of redistribution is more
easily reached when immigrants are enfranchised, or when they are not. Also, if maximizing political inclusiveness leads to rising prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), then
extending voting rights to all economic agents can favor economic development. Whatever
the answer, according to this empirical analysis on individual preferences for redistribution,
the issue of immigrants’ voting rights certainly appears to be an important element in the
debate about redistribution and the economy.
Acknowledgements The author would like to thank André Blais and the other members of the Canada
Research Chair in Electoral Studies, Abel François, Anna Jeannesson, and Robert Kowalenko for their helpful comments. Finally, I would like to stress the excellent comments from two anonymous reviewers who
considerably improved this article.
Appendix
Column I: Observations included in each country (peoples who have answered both questions about redistribution).
Column II and III: Available data on foreigners (persons who are not citizens of the
country of residence) per country in the sample and according to Eurostat (Vasileva 2011).
The correlation is r = .94.
Public Choice
Albania
Azerbaijan
Austria
Armenia
Belgium
Bosnia Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Belarus
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Montenegro
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
Macedonia
Great Britain
Kosovo
Respondents
Foreigners (sample) (%)
1455
1157
1455
1446
1501
1475
1413
1445
1450
929
1733
1478
1483
1058
3039
1392
2041
1482
1486
797
965
1431
1474
1386
1549
1389
1402
1427
1543
1085
1475
1462
1380
1431
1458
1430
1341
1383
1111
1230
2226
1470
1428
2004
1521
1
0
2
1
6
1
1
2
0
6
1
3
16
0
4
0
4
7
0
2
4
0
22
0
47
2
8
5
2
5
0
4
0
0
0
0
6
9
4
19
0
1
1
8
20
Foreigners (Eurostat) (%)
11
10
16
4
6
16
3
6
8
2
7
9
7
17
1
43
4
4
7
0
4
1
4
12
6
22
7
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