GERMANY AND ITS MINORITIES, OR SURPRISES OF THE CENSUS OF 2011
On 31 May 2013, Destatis, Germany’s Federal Statistical Office, announced the first findings of
the census conducted two years earlier.
Surprise: Germany was found to have 1.5 million fewer inhabitants than expected. In France and
Germany alike, the discovery elicited pessimistic remarks: “alarming finding,” “demographic
decline,” “calculation error.” But in fact the discrepancy has nothing to do with the low birth rate
in Germany. And this kind of disparity between inter-census annual updates and census results is
found in all western countries, including England and France. There was another surprise, though,
of a different nature: the Muslim population’s low response rate to census questions on religion.
François Héran discusses these two results, resituating them in their legal and socio-political
context.
The first data from Germany’s 2011 census were
divulged on 31 May of last year. [1] They were eagerly
awaited, since the preceding censuses dated back to
before reunification: 1987 for the Federal Republic and
1981 for the GDR. Several difficulties explain the lag
(see Box 1). In the intervening years, demographers
had had to settle for other sources: municipal registers,
the accuracy of which was declining as there was no
systematic recording of departures or effective
transmission of address changes from one Land to
another, and Mikrozensus, a wide-ranging annual
survey of a sample amounting to an estimated onehundredth of the population (830,000 persons) drawn
from an obsolete residential database. It was high time
to update the census.
For financial reasons, census organisers in industrial
countries—Germany included—now prefer to focus
their efforts on sampling and estimation techniques.
[3] After cross-checking several administrative sources,
Destatis questioned all homeowners. From this base it
then drew a sample made up of approximately 10% of
the population, who were then enjoined to answer a
“census survey.” All retirement homes and other
institutions were included. A post-census survey was
also conducted to verify the soundness of the results.
In all, one-third of the country’s population was
contacted. The published findings are an extrapolation
to the population as a whole at the census reference
date: 9 May 2011.
Box 1: The new German census: why the delay?
The GFR was forced to suspend the 1983 census
process due to organized protests against the
transfer of sensitive (in this case religion-related)
information to other databases. As there was no
West German equivalent of France’s data
protection law, the Constitutional Court in
Karlsruhe stepped into the breach, handing down
an unprecedented census act (Volkszälungsurteil)
stating that anyone living in a society under the
rule of law had a right to determine whether
statistical data about him or her could be divulged
and how they could be used. The law establishing
this principle, called the right to “informational
self-determination”(informationnelle
Selbstbestimmung), required a total revision of
data collection and processing procedures.
A new census designed to comply with the new
legal requirements was conducted in 1987 but
once
again
elicited
strong
opposition.
It was not only a matter of legally securing census
operations; the Federal state also had to obtain
consent from all Länder to coordinate and fund
them. These undertakings took time, but Germany
did manage to meet the deadline fixed by a 2008
European Union regulation requiring member
states to use 2011 as their reference year. [2]
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr
Immigration: fewer “second-generation” residents than in France
Immigration was a major focus of the first published results. Immigrants were found to account for 13.2% of the
population, half of whom have been settled in Germany for over twenty years. An additional 5.7% of the population
has at least one immigrant parent (not including immigrants who arrived prior to 1955, mainly repatriated Germans
from territories that are now part of neighbouring Slavic countries). These two generations taken together—18.9% of
the total population—form Germany’s population “of immigrant background” (mit Migrationshintergrund). The
figure is slightly below the 2011 Mikrozensus estimate of 19.5%.
These figures are comparable to those for France, but the generations are distributed differently. [4] The proportion
of “second generation” residents, i.e., individuals born in the host country but to at least one immigrant parent, is
lower in Germany than in France: 6% as opposed to 10%. The period during which France took in the greatest number
of immigrants (nearly twice current flows) was 1950-1974, and this labour migration was followed by family
reunification and marital migration, though at lower levels. Germany had already received labour migration prior to
1974, but in the 1990s it became Europe’s leading destination country (to be overtaken by Spain in the 2000s
decade). In addition to Turkish migrants, Germany had begun taking in refugees from the Balkans (many of whom
have since left) as well as Russian and Kazakh migrants with claims to German origin.
Immigration flows diminished somewhat in the late 2000s, but since then Germany has again become a major
receiving country, with nearly one million recorded entries in 2011 and more than a million in 2012, primarily from
Central Europe but with a rapid increase in Spanish and Greek immigration due to the economic crisis. However,
these flows are too recent to have engendered a “second generation” as numerous as the one in France.
Among migrants and migrants’ children settled in Germany and counted in the 2011 census, the most heavily
represented countries of origin Turkey (17.9%), followed by Poland (13.1%), the Russian Federation (8.7%),
Kazakhstan (8.2%), Italy (5.3%), Romania (3.7%), Greece (2.4%), Austria (2.2%) and Croatia (2.2%). Taken together,
the two generations form a relatively youthful group: 42.1% are under 30 years, as opposed to 27.8% in the rest of
the German population; only 9% are 65 years or over, as against 23.3% in the rest of the population.
The census brings to light marked variations in the geographical distribution of migrants and migrants’ children
(Figure 1). While migrant settlement areas are largely determined by degree of urbanization and industrialization, a
specific factor is operative in the new Länder: the fact that they used to constitute the GDR, which was closed to
immigration. Though the Schröder government officially abandoned the idea that Germany “is not an immigration
country” in the late 1990s, that idea seems to have persisted in the East, in fact as well as in representations.
Figure 1 . Share of the population represented by immigrants and persons with at least on immigrant parent, 2011
German census Note : The hatchings announce “new Länder”
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr
More housing than expected—but fewer inhabitant
Immigration also plays a role in one of the major surprises of these census results. In mid-2011, the population
estimates based on local registers and annual demographic updates predicted 81.7 million inhabitants, but the
census found 1.5 million fewer, or 80.2 million. The number of housing units, on the other hand, turned out to be
higher than expected by half a million (40.8 million as opposed to 40.3).
A journalist at Der Spiegel wondered if the million and a half inhabitants had just “evaporated overnight.” But this
kind of estimation error is hardly surprising given the length of time elapsed since the last available censuses: 25
years for West Germany, 30 years for East Germany. In England-Wales, for example, one decennial census came out
below annual update estimates (-1,140,000 in 2001) and another above (+464,000 in 2011).[5]
The same oscillation has occurred in France: the 1999 census found half a million fewer inhabitants than predicted
(after nine years of estimates); the 2004 edition found 420,000 more (due to a new, more detailed data-collecting
procedure)—an uncertainty that INSEE is currently working to reduce by means of a rotating system of annual census
surveys.[6]
The new Länder’s phantom migrants
In the Germany of 2013, the “disappearance” of so many inhabitants has elicited a sense that the country is once
again in demographic decline. Given that the fertility rate is far below replacement (at fewer than 1.4 children per
woman), the country has been recording approximately 190,000 more deaths than births, whereas in France births
exceed deaths by 250,000. However, in this case the need to revise estimates of total inhabitants downwards has
nothing to do with the low birth rate. Study of the census makes it clear that the problem is due first and foremost to
incomplete recording of departures by foreigners, specifically departures from the eastern Länder.
In fact, the deficit varies spectacularly by nationality and Land (Figure 2). It is tiny for the population holding German
nationality (-0.6%) with modest spikes in the city-states of Berlin (2.5%) and Hamburg (3.3%)—a finding in itself
remarkable. However, no less than 15% of the foreign population estimated on the basis of local registers is missing.
The total number of enumerated foreigners thus falls from 7.3 million to 6.2 million, meaning that foreigners account
not for 8.9% of the population but 7.7%.
Figure 2. Relative disparity between the population as enumerated in May 2011 and the results of annual
population updates, by Land and nationality (%) Note : The hatchings announce “new Länder”
Source : Destatis, Office fédéral de la statistique.
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr
Box 2. Unprecedented data on homosexual couples with children
Whereas many analyses of 2011 British census findings focused directly on “races,” religions and languages,
publications on the German census tend to handle the question of minorities more discreetly. Among
noteworthy innovations is direct mention of the sex of partners in civil unions. Destatis estimates that there
are around 34,000 same-sex partnerships in Germany, 60% of them male and 40% female; also that 5,700
children are being raised by same-sex couples, 83% of whom by female couples.
Religion: spectacular—and disappointing—results
Religion as it relates to immigration is a major focus of the census findings published to date. Two questions were
asked. Answering the first was compulsory for fiscal reasons, as members of religious communities in Germany pay a
church tax by way of state administrative services; Islam is not covered by this procedure. The second question, the
only optional one on the census questionnaire, was addressed to persons who did not declare membership of any of
the official religious communities referred to in the first question: Did they nonetheless identify with a religion, belief
system or philosophical view? Three options were available for Islam: Sunni, Shiite and Alevi (a more liberal version
of Islam present in Turkey). Organizing the religion section of the census into two tiers this way directly reflects the
German understanding of relations between state, individual and religion (Box 3).
Box 3. The state and religious faiths or denominations in Germany: the legal basis for census questions on
religion
Article 140 of Germany’s 1949 Basic Law states that “no person is under obligation to declare their religious
convictions.” That law reiterates the principle of the separation of church and state first formulated in the
Constitution of Weimar (1919), but it in no way prohibits cooperation between church and state.[7] The
major Christian denominations have the status of “religious community under civil law” (öffentlich-rechtliche
Religionsgesellschaft) but they are not integrated into the state apparatus. Believers who agree to pay a
church tax also agree to let their employer deduct it from their pay and to have the tax office transmit their
payment to the religious denomination of their choice. When a person moves, the administration accordingly
updates the list of church taxpayers it transmits to the churches. The idea behind the law is that the census
offers a good opportunity to check the accuracy of the tax lists.
This legal regime only covers longstanding religious institutions in Germany and therefore does not apply to
Islam. However, Muslims and followers of other religions are at liberty to set up private religious associations
protected by the fundamental German right to self-determination. The optional census question on religious
convictions was addressed specifically to members of those religions.
The combined results for the two questions on religion are both spectacular and disappointing (Figure 3). Once again
the weight of the communist heritage in the new, eastern Länder has made itself felt. Inhabitants of this part of
Germany are largely de-Christianized and have no experience of church tax; three-quarters of them either refused to
answer the question or stated no affiliation with the official churches, as against a mere one-fifth in the west.
Furthermore, only 5.3% of responses cited an affiliation with non-Christian religions and a mere 1.9% reported
affiliation with Islam. Destatis directors openly expressed their disappointment on this point: “unfortunately, this
means that the 2011 census cannot provide reliable results for these religions in Germany.”
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr
Figure 3. Reporting of religious affiliation in the 2011 German census
Note : The first five Länder listed are the new, eastern ones.
A test administered before the census showed that persons with low educational attainment found it difficult to
grasp the legal notion of “religious community under civil law” and the filtering function of the first question in
relation to the second.[8] Nonetheless, legal considerations prevailed, and the questionnaire was only very slightly
revised.
The extreme wariness of Muslims toward the census cannot be dissociated from the general context. The census
was conducted in social waters recently roiled by the August 2010 publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s polemic essay,
Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is doing itself in). Sarrazin, a member of the SPD, head of the Berlin Senate’s
finance committee and later on the board of directors of the Bundesbank, sharply accused Muslim immigrants as a
whole of not wishing to integrate, inordinately burdening social welfare system finances and “downgrading
[Germany’s] human capital.”
These polemical declarations caused a great stir throughout the country.[9] According to Die Zeit, sales of the book
topped 600,000 in November 2010 and by February 2011 had broken the 1.5 million mark.[10] Regardless of
whether Sarrazin revealed a latent state of mind in Germany or exacerbated that state, it is fair to say that spring
2011 was hardly a propitious moment for calmly reporting an affiliation with Islam in the census.
François Héran
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr
POUR EN SAVOIR +
G. Pison, France and Germany: a history of criss-crossing demographic curves & sociétés n° 487, Ined,
mars 2012.
A. Salles, Are women more economically active in Germany than France? Population & sociétés n° 493, Ined, octobre
2012.
SOURCES
[1] Destatis, Zensus 2011: ausgewählte Ergebnisse. Tabellenband zur Pressekonferenz, Wiesbaden,
mai 2013.
[2] Règlement (CE) n° 763/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil de l’Union européenne du 9
juillet 2008 concernant les recensements de la population et du logement.
[3] D. Coleman, "The Twighlight of the Census" [« Le crépuscule du recensement »], Population and
development review, 38 (supl. 1), 2012, pp. 334-351.
[4] P. Breuil et al., « Les immigrés, les descendants d’immigrés et leurs enfants », France, portrait
social 2011, Paris, Insee, 2011.
[5] Office for national statistics, "Components of population change and the mid-year population
estimates", London, February 2013.
[6] F. Héran et L. Toulemon, « Que faire quand la population recensée ne correspond pas à la
population attendue ? », Population et sociétés n° 411, avril 2005.
[7] F. Meisner (dir.), Droit des religions, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2010, s. v. « Allemagne », «
Appartenance religieuse ».
[8] B. Gauckler, « Die Entwicklung des Fragebogens zur Haushalte-befragung des Zensus 2011.
Ausgewählte Ergebnisse des quantitativen Feldpretests », Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und
Statistik, August 2011, pp. 718-734.
[9] B. Lestrade, « À propos du débat sur le livre de Thilo Sarrazin : quelle intégration scolaire et
professionnelle réelle des immigrés ? », Allemagne d’aujourd’hui, n°195, janvier-mars 2011, p. 18-37.
[10] H. Sezgin (dir.), Manifest der Vielen. Deutschland erfindet sich neu [« L’Allemagne se réinvente »]
Berlin, Blumenbar, 2011 (une trentaine d’auteurs issus de l’immigration musulmane répondent à T.
Sarrazin).
Institut national d’études démographiques • 133, bld Davout 75 980 Paris cedex 20 • www.ined.fr