Structural Victimization and Favoritism: Structure of Political Opportunities
and Threats and Movement-Countermovement Interaction in Segmented
Composite Regimes**
Eitan Y. Alimi
The Hebrew University
Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler
University of Haifa
* We wish to thank David Meyer, Suzanne Staggenborg, Sidney Tarrow, and Gregory Maney for
insightful comments on earlier versions, as well as reviewers for and editors of Comparative Politics.
** Forthcoming in Comparative Politics
Recently, a growing body of work has begun reevaluating the utility of theories and
models developed in democratic settings for our understanding of the dynamics and
trajectories of contentious politics in nondemocracies1. While avoiding the erroneous
claim that contentious episodes in non-democracies constitute a distinct category, it
has been shown that in situations of extreme repression certain features of contention
have greater gravity and, as a result, are likely to produce particular, path-dependent
trajectories of contentious episodes.
This article contributes to this bourgeoning body of works by critically
evaluating the applicability of theories that deal with how movementcountermovement interaction is shaped by changes in the structure of political
opportunities and threats (hereinafter: SPOT). Despite the prevalence of movementcountermovement interaction in contemporary politics and the influence of changes in
SPOT on this interaction, the amount of research explicitly theorizing on the topic is
fairly underrepresented2. The situation is even less encouraging when it comes to
what Tilly and Tarrow3 label "segmented composite regimes", referring to the
-1-
existence of at least two different systems of rule within one state dividing different
population groups along ethnic, religious or racial lines.
In segmented composite regimes we usually see one movement, which we
label structurally disadvantaged, situated in an authoritarian-like political environment
and facing systematic repression and discrimination. In contrast, members of the
structurally advantaged movement have broad, equal civil and political rights, the
ability to exert significant direct influence over government personnel and policy, as well
as receiving protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents. We argue that the
unique structural features of segmented composite regimes produce differences in the
characteristics and types of SPOT each movement faces and this, in turn, has
important bearing on the nature of movement-countermovement dynamics.
Employing the case of the Palestinian and Jewish settler movements during the
1987-1992 Intifada, we critically examine the validity of three extant theoretical
propositions pertaining to how changes in SPOT influence movementcountermovement interaction. We argue, first, that the emergence and endurance of
movement-countermovement interaction is shaped less by the mere structure of
governmental authority and more by the particular form and content of power
relations in which both opposing movements as well as the authorities are situated,
with its own mixed practices of material and non-material victimization and
favoritism. We demonstrate further that the nature of the interaction between both
movements is likely to be shaped no less by the specific SPOT each movement faces,
than by how one responds to the other's strategy and tactics. Last, we show how unity
or fragmentation among actors within each movement is a function of variations in
the strategic position of each movement as a result of changes in SPOT, their
-2-
respective space of action and repertoire of contention, and the political leverage each
could exert herewith.
We first summarize the key theoretical aspects of movement-countermovement
interaction as they specifically relate to SPOT, and point to three possible sources of
"anomaly" when applied in segmented composite regimes. Following a brief
overview of the historical specificity of SPOT in both cases/movements we
demonstrate the validity of our arguments with respect to each proposition. We
conclude by discussing the generalizability of our analysis, and point to several
avenues for future research.
SPOT and Movement-Countermovement Interaction
The term SPOT refers to consistent, although not necessarily institutional, formal or
permanent dimensions of the political environment, that encourage or discourage the
group from engaging in contention, by altering its strategic position and hence its
ability to exercise political leverage in a favorable or an unfavorable manner 4. In
speaking about how changes in SPOT influence contention, it is important to focus on
(1) how both favorable and unfavorable changes combine to shape contention (i.e.,
what has come to be termed "opportunity/threat spirals"5); (2) the various levels and
types of political opportunities/threats (e.g., movement, national, regional or
international); and (3) asking what and for whom opportunity/threat develops6.
Regarding the influence of SPOT on movement-countermovement interaction,
the work of Meyer and Staggenborg7 has been pivotal. First, the particular features of
SPOT at a given time and place situate different potential challengers in different
strategic positions, and hence, provide them with differing political leverage with
which to engage in effective collective action on particular issues. Second, the very
ability of one movement to mount a challenge of any visibility and impact as a
-3-
response to favorable changes in SPOT, or as a proactive attempt to alter SPOT,
creates the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. Third, social
movement campaigns “have a ‘demonstration effect’ for political countermovements
– showing that collective action can effect (or resist) change in particular aspects of
society”8. Fourth, the very attempt on the part of a given movement to promote
change and challenge established interests creates grievances and political
opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and
issues. Lastly, movements can alter SPOT for subsequent challengers, including their
own opponents, in which case the opposing movement is a critical component in the
SPOT the other side faces.
As compelling as Meyer and Staggenborg’s movement-countermovement
framework is, we suggest that in segmented composite regimes the ability of a
structurally disadvantaged movement to move beyond a mode of resistance involving
evasion or deception to form a social movement and establish a strategic position is
highly dubious. Given the arbitrariness and capriciousness with which security and
military state forces act to repress challengers, securing the support of public opinion,
political allies, and a favorable international climate are formidable tasks for the
disadvantaged movement to accomplish9. As Boudreau argues, "activists under more
moderate regimes can focus on concerns about recruitment, publicity and movement
outcomes, for regime moderation narrows the general possibility of direct
repression… [whereas]… movements under authoritarian regimes must always
anticipate state repression, and explicitly incorporate this anticipation into their
plans"10.
Boudreau's distinction is useful for highlighting the particularities of
segmented composite regimes regarding movement-countermovement interaction.
-4-
Broadly speaking, whereas regimes that either value and safeguard democratic
legitimacy (e.g. the US), care little about democratic legitimacy (e.g. China), or are
not deeply segmented (e.g. Japan and North Korea respectively) are all more likely to
have consistent SPOT, authorities in segmented composite regimes (e.g. Pre-1993
South Africa) are more likely to engage in what both Rasler and Maney11 call mixed
or inconsistent responses to ethnonational movements. Authorities in segmented
composite regimes are often caught between the contradictory, at times mutually
exclusive, logics of democratic legitimacy and ethnic nationalism. While the quest for
democratic legitimacy – domestically and internationally – might encourage inclusive
responses to ethnonational challengers, the "ethnocratic"12 structure and nature of the
regime mandates repressive state responses to the disadvantaged movement and
concessive responses to the advantaged opposing movement. Whereas the
disadvantaged movement uses the democratic discourse and (limited) practice as a
source of pressure on authorities to open the polity or to establish a strategic position
for itself, the advantaged movement uses the ethnocratic discourse and (extensively
privileging) practice as a source of pressure to close the polity and neutralize its rival.
Furthermore, the unique structural features of a segmented composite regime
prescribe the different gravity of a given level of SPOT for each movement. While the
disadvantaged movement is more likely to seek recourse at the international level of
SPOT, the advantaged movement (and authorities – see below) is more likely to
consider international involvement a threat. As will be shown, the particularities of
Israeli segmented composite regime have featured a systematic favoritism of the
settler movement at the expense of a structurally repressed and excluded Palestinian
movement. These particularities have rendered SPOT highly consequential in shaping
a triadic dynamics between the two movements and between each and the state.
-5-
Our second concern regards the tendency to settle for a somewhat passive
conception of the role of the state. Unlike the authorities-free Pro-Life and Pro-Choice
interaction that Meyer and Staggenborg depict13, in segmented composite regimes it is
more accurate to treat the state as a fully engaged and actively involved actor in
contentious episodes14. The state in our view should be treated as a proactive actor not
only in playing a pervasive role in influencing movement-countermovement
interaction, but also as an actor with its own SPOT, thereby experiencing threats and
opportunities in coping with challenges.
Finally, Meyer and Staggenborg’s notion of movements as fields of actors,
rather than a unitary, monolithic entity opens up the possibility for important insights
into the movement-countermovement interaction. Actors of the same movement can
indeed complement each other, yet they can also undercut each other’s strategy and
tactics on the way to promoting the movement’s goals15. In situations of extreme
discrimination and repression, contentious collective action tends to be about basic
human needs, resources and rights, all of which are seen as inalienable and are
safeguarded in democracies16. Under these repressive circumstances, which often
produce extreme forms of contention, it is just as likely to expect factionalism within
a movement. This is even more likely to be the case where state forces systematically
and pervasively intrude to thwart unity and maintain division. Thus, while Meyer and
Staggenborg take issue with the unity premise and seek to explain what generates
fragmentation within movements, it is also important to ask what explains unity
among actors within a movement despite strong incentives for fragmentation.
The Historical Context
Scholars who have studied the Israeli-Palestinian case suggest that Israel’s decision to
extend its domination over the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the June 1967
-6-
War established a segmented composite regime17. The Israeli occupation of the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (hereinafter: Territories18 – see appendix for
a short timeline) established a dual ruling system based, first and foremost, on ethnonational affiliation.19 The Palestinians’ space of action became primarily contingent
upon Israel’s policy as implemented mainly through military orders and regulations.
This structural change positioned the Palestinians in a “blocked opportunity” situation
in the sense that they were not allowed to participate in the Israeli political system, the
arena in which their lives and future were determined. Economically, legally, and
culturally, the Palestinians in the Territories faced a multi-faceted set of restrictions
and were deprived of most human rights, individually as well collectively, such as
confiscation of natural resources and deportation20.
A central facet of this existential threat took the form of land confiscation and
settlement. Rooted in an informal policy of “ongoing temporality”21 with regard to the
Territories’ future status, yet seen by rightwing forces both inside and outside the
Israeli Knesset as an opportunity to fulfill the biblical vision of Greater Israel, the
Territories witnessed a steady rise in Jewish settlements, with Gush Emunim (Block
of the Faithful) as the main movement that gradually turned into a central and
extremely influential political actor22. For members of the Block any territorial
withdrawal was considered a betrayal of both the Heavenly Providence and the
genuine version of Zionism23. As Figure 1 shows, while there is a relative increase in
the number of new settlements following the rise to power of Begin-led rightwing
coalition in 1977, it nonetheless seems that irrespective of changes in Israeli policies
and coalitions there has been a steady rise in both number of settlements and their
population. The relative decrease in the number of new settlements beginning in 1985
is explained by the shift from building new settlements to expanding existing ones.
-7-
Reproduced with permission: Hazan and Rahat, “Israeli Political Parties and Settlements,” in Cheryl A.
Rubenberg (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2010)
What has made the settlement project possible is related to the massive assistance of
various governmental offices and agencies in construction licenses, infrastructure,
education, funding and protection24. This, in addition to the proportional
representation feature of the Israeli political system that granted the relatively smallin-size religious parties disproportionate political influence, and the fact that over the
years movement leaders have become members of the Knesset and ministers25, have
all combined to account for the rapid growth and resiliency of the movement in
particular, and the settlement project in general.
The growing presence of Jewish settlers led to heightened tension between the
two populations, with growing occurrences of mutual inflictions of damage and harm,
and the rise of more brutal aspects of Israeli repression. In many of these incidents
there were growing signs of a developing practice of tacit consent by the Israeli army
when it came to law enforcement against Jewish settlers26. Whenever Palestinian
-8-
activists responded or initiated attacks it led to what has come to be called "an
appropriate Jewish response", namely, building new settlements on Palestinian
territories27.
Revealingly, the Israeli military occupation became a driving force in the
consolidation of a Palestinian national-social movement inside the Territories. This
process was accompanied by three closely related developments. First, a gradual
adaptation of insurgency tactics in response to Israeli counterinsurgency measures of
deportations, arrests and curfews, resulting in growing reliance on a civil
disobedience mode of contention28. This was part of the larger shift within the
movement from externally-driven politics of resistance to internally-driven politics of
liberation29. Second, a steady rise in organizing and mobilizing efforts at the
grassroots levels by local activists with differing, often conflicting, ideologies, action
strategies, and political agendas (i.e., Nationalist, Communist, Islamic camps). Thus,
while tensions and conflicts among the Palestinian organizations located outside the
Territories continued, signs of cooperation and lessening of ideological differences
among the various grassroots organizations were strengthened30. Third, a growing
familiarity with the deepening division inside Israel over the future status of the
Territories, which intensified significantly with the rise of leftwing progressive social
forces who called for a new division of Israel west of the Jordan River with the
establishment of a Palestinian state. As shown in recent studies31, this familiarity with
the domestic Israeli division extended to a shared understanding that conditions were
ripe to trigger contention, and translated into systematic attempts to expand on that
division as a way to improve their political leverage, increasing the likelihood of
promoting their goal of national liberation.
-9-
Between late 1987 and 1992, the Palestinian movement mounted a five-yearslong episode of contentious collective action aimed at shaking off the Israeli
occupation (hence, the term Intifada – Arabic for shaking off). Despite considerable
difficulties they managed to gain world attention and empathy, forcing Israel to begin
recognizing their right to self-determination, as was the case at the Madrid Peace
Conference in October 1991.
SPOT and Palestinian—Settler Interaction
In what follows, we analyze how SPOT has shaped Palestinian and the Jewish settler
movements' interaction in the following arenas: Between each movement and the
authorities; between both opposing movements; and within each movement. To this
end, we take our initial lead from Meyer and Staggenborg's work, expanding
particularly on their three central theoretical propositions as they relate to each arena
respectively.
Between Movements and Authorities
Relating to how the particular features of a state’s political structure influence
movement-countermovement interaction, Meyer and Staggenborg suggest that
"movement-countermovement conflicts are most likely to emerge and endure in
states with divided governmental authority"32. Whereas in unitary states (e.g.
Britain) the government can implement policy without serious challenge from
internal opponents, in states with divided governmental authority the multiplicity of
power bases creates external political allies to aid mobilization and alternative
venues in which to press claims.
Based on our delineation of the contentious arena, one would be led to expect
no emergence, let alone endurance of movement-countermovement interaction.
Formally speaking, the features of the Israeli governmental authority structure are far
- 10 -
from being considered unitary. Yet, as noted, this has not been the case with regard to
the Palestinian population, which has had to cope with the most unitary governmental
authority structure possible. In spite of the gradually strengthening peace camp, the
majority of Israelis have had strong opinions about their historical rights over the
Territories, as well as about the importance of holding on to the Territories for the
security of the Israeli state.
With the consolidation of the Intifada, even those progressive left-wing forces
were temporarily way-laid, joining the general fear of the nature of the unfolding
events. According to Herman, it took some time for Israeli peace organizations to
realize the precise nature of the struggle, which resulted in the suspension of peace
initiatives in the belief that "this is not the right time"33. Supportive evidence of the
general attitude of uncertainty and insecurity is found in a panel survey, conducted in
December 1987 and October 198834, revealing that in terms of short-term concerns,
policies and means, Israelis became even more hawkish (e.g. less supportive of
negotiation with the PLO), and more willing to forsake the rule of law when it
jeopardizes security concerns. Moreover, several actors within the Palestinian
movement earnestly and systematically called for the destruction of the Israeli state, a
fact which only compounded those fears.
Nonetheless, and despite the highly repressive setting faced by the Palestinian
insurgents, an enduring contentious movement-countermovement interaction did
emerge. This was related, first, to systematic attempts by the most central Palestinian
grassroots organizations to capitalize on those favorable changes in the Israeli SPOT
in order to establish a strategic position at the international level which, in turn,
narrowed Israel's space of action. To that end, Palestinian activists consciously
refrained from portraying the uprising as a zero-sum game and acted to limit the use
- 11 -
of deadly weapons. Fully aware that using their weapons arsenal would not only result
in bloodshed on their part35, but that it would also alienate the Israeli progressive
forces as well as potential international allies. Hanna Siniora, editor of al-Fajr, called
for nonviolent resistance to the occupation, stressing that,
“…Palestinians must talk to the Israeli populace, the Israeli electorate … this
is an election year in Israel. The Palestinians should not simply hand victory
to the right-wing parties … [we must] not alienate the international
community or the Israeli worker”36
The decision to limit violent acts and to focus mostly on disruptive tactics (as
well as conscious efforts to minimize factionalism – see below) had already been
reached during the early phases of the uprising on the part of the Unified National
Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU37), at times against the directives of the Tunisbased PLO leadership. For example, when Israel assassinated Abu-Jihad, Fatah’s
second-in-command, in April 1988, the UNLU consciously refused to accept the
Tunis-based PLO’s call for the use of arms. This refusal was part of the UNLU’s
overall strategy to convey the Palestinian struggle as a nonviolent struggle and nonthreatening to the Israel public38.
While initially Israeli leftwing forces were alarmed by the consolidation of the
Intifada, the limited violence approach facilitated the renewal of their support. In
addition to the Committee for Beita (see below), groups such as Peace Now, Israelis
by Choice39, the Confederation for Peace and Coexistence, and the Committee for
Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue, were highly active in initiating acts supporting the
Palestinian struggle. As an example, on December 15, 1988, Peace Now and Israelis
by Choice issued a press release announcing the co-sponsoring of a series of
- 12 -
encounters between Israelis and Palestinians based on the principle of visits between
guests and hosts rather than rulers and ruled.
Secondly, the Palestinians' relative success in implementing their strategy, in
turn, put both the Israeli authorities and the settlers on the defensive with clear signs
of unfavorable political conditions, regionally and internationally for the former, and
domestically for the latter. Regarding Israeli authorities, there was growing evidence
that the intifada was about to spill over not only into Jordan but also inside Israel (i.e.
Israeli Arabs/Palestinians). Already in late December 1987, Israeli-Arab public
figures call for a day of general strike as an expression of Palestinian nationalism.
This coincided with a wave of clashes and confrontations with Israeli police,
assistance to Palestinian activists from the West Bank and Gaza in photocopying and
distribution of leaflets, money transfers, and the like. The fear of the development of a
"fifth column" brought Sharon, at the time a Likud Member of Knesset, to argue,
"They want to destroy us instead of fighting with us as loyal citizens of the state"40.
In the face of such a threat, and despite a UN Security Council Resolution 605
strongly deploring Israel’s “merciless policy” for controlling the Intifada, Israel
reacted disproportionately (see Figure 2), employing a policy of "force, might, and
beatings"41. This overreaction, however, not only failed to produce the expected
result, but it also coincided with growing unrest among Palestinians in Jordan,
constituting approximately two third of the population. This unrest compelled King
Hussein, to the dismay of Israel, to relinquish Jordan's judicial and administrative
claims over the West Bank and to recognize the PLO as the sole, legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people on July 31, 1988.
- 13 -
Figure 2. Palestinian and Israeli soldier deaths during the Intifada
350
289
300
Palestinian Deaths by Military Forces in
OT
285
Military Forces Deaths by Palestinians
in OT
250
200
150
125
91
Count
100
50
0
22
0
Dec. 1987
6
4
1988
1989
3
1990
1
1991
Source: First Intifada Data, B'Tselem Website (retrieved June 23, 18:54PM)
Regarding the settlers, while first signs of unfavorable shift in the settlers’
advantageous strategic position began to appear prior to the Intifada (e.g., Foreign
Minister Peres' attempt to promote the London Agreement of April 1987), the
deepening threat posed by the intensifying uprising not only pushed them to violently
act against Palestinians, but also facilitated the state practice of closing its eyes to
such attacks. This practice was, in part, the result of increased settler leaders' pressure
on the government and the IDF to exert a heavier hand in dealing with the
Palestinians threatening that otherwise they would have to deal with the situation on
their own.42 Instances of settlers targeting Palestinians and damaging their property
became a daily routine, along with the occasional distribution of anonymous leaflets
containing information and material regarding how not to get caught and/or be
identified by the Israeli authorities and the military.43
An example of the lack of the Israeli authorities' ability to control the settlers'
actions took place on April 6, 1988, during an incident known as the Beita events, in
a village near Nablus. Without any coordination with the military, a group of settlers
initiated a provocative tour and walked into the village. Stoned by the villagers,
- 14 -
settlers began to shoot, as a result of which two Palestinians died, one was severely
injured, and one Jewish settler died. The Israeli authorities' decision to demolish
thirteen houses in the village, compounded by settlers' demand to raze the village and
expel all its inhabitants44, generated a harsh public outcry and condemnation both
within Israel and internationally led by the Committee for Beita, a joint PalestinianIsraeli committee. The eventual success in preventing the realization of the settlers'
demand only served to further infuriate settler activists, leading to a wave of
subsequent attacks on Palestinians with the Israeli government incapable of regaining
full control over the situation45.
Lastly, this and other incidents of settlers' vigilantism, together with the high
levels of Palestinian casualties, only heightened international pressure on Israel and,
in the process, forced Israel to change its mode of repression. Following the Beita
events, the Bush Administration intensified its pressure on Prime Minister Shamir,
with Secretary of State Baker criticizing Israel’s use of repressive measures and
demanding a freeze on new settlement construction. Israel did not fully stop
approving new settlements, and the US threatened economic sanctions46. Yet Israel
was, nonetheless, unable to continue freely with the historically patterned practice of
an "appropriate Jewish response" to Palestinian attacks, as well as being forced to
modify its repression measures.
Thus, as of late 1988 Israel looked for ways to minimize direct contact
between soldiers and Palestinian activists through, among others things, using
collective measures of repression (e.g. curfews), and later by introducing the use of
"rubber bullets" (steel marble covered by a thin layer of rubber, fired at lower
velocity), which were meant to lower the Palestinian death toll. However, the number
of Palestinian injuries continued to remain high, and Israel could only use collective
- 15 -
measures of repression limitedly. This not only played into the hands of the
Palestinians, but it also infuriated the settlers, pushing hardliners to intensify their
lethal, vigilant attacks on Palestinians and to warn the government of a violent
reaction against the military if it interceded.47 If, until early 1988, most foreign media
reporting on the Intifada had relied upon the previous well-established frame of the
Arab-Israeli violent conflict over land, this situation facilitated the Palestinian effort
to successfully promote the cause of legitimate national defiance against an unjust
military occupation48.
In sum, our analysis shows that the emergence and endurance of the
Palestinian and Jewish settler movement-countermovement interaction was shaped
less by the mere structure of governmental authority. It was the ability of the
structurally disadvantaged Palestinian movement to expand on the democratic
legitimacy logic of Israel as a precondition for creating favorable SPOT for their
struggle and, in turn, to pressure the state authorities. While this accounted for the
emergence of movement-countermovement interaction, it was the ethnocratic-driven
mixed practice of concession and repression, prompting the Israeli authorities and the
settlers to overreact, that accounted for its endurance. The more difficult it became for
Israel to regain some measure of control over the settlers in the face of harsh
international pressure the stronger the strategic position gained by the Palestinians and
hence, their ability to mold the unfavorable political conditions in which they were
situated.
However, several developments that took place during late 1989 and 1990
combined to threaten the Palestinians' painstakingly achieved strategic position, hence
their ability to further promote their struggle. These developments included, inter alia,
a greater reliance on Israel's part on covert modes of repressive measures (i.e.
- 16 -
undercover squads), and Arafat’s unconditional support for Saddam Hussein’s
invasion to Kuwait in August 1990 that not only reduced international support for the
Palestinian struggle, but also diverted attention from the Middle East, allowing Israel
to impose a general curfew over the Territories for forty-five days. It is to how these
changes in the Palestinians' strategic position, as well as the settlers', enhance
understanding of the contentious interaction between both movements that we now
turn.
Between Movements
A central proposition put forth by Meyer and Staggenborg deals with how
"interactions between opposing movements prevent the complete institutionalization
of tactics by either side"49. This is expected to be the case because movements must
innovate or escalate their tactics as a response to their opponents or in order to garner
media attention, which at times may push them to reduce activities in institutional
arenas even though political conditions are conducive to such tactics. While accepting
the overall logic of this proposition, our analysis shows that the structural asymmetry
between both movements and, as a result, the specific SPOT each sought to influence
was central in shaping the nature of their interaction.
As noted, the nature of the Palestinian struggle, their situation, and the attempt
to get world attention and sympathy pushed the Palestinians to adapt and discipline
their strategy and tactics of contention. Even when the threat from Jewish settlers’
vigilantism was at its height and government repression was blatant, Palestinian
grassroots leaders and activists did their best to avoid tactical escalation, as expressed
by a UNLU leaflet published already on January 21, 1988:
"Let us teach the settlement movement a lesson and remind it that we do not
forget our confiscated lands… for the sake of continuing the blessed
- 17 -
uprising, deepening the embarrassment of the enemy, and achieving wide
world support, we call on you to: concentrate all efforts to cultivate the
land… to engage in acts of solidarity…"50
Later on, as the time for national elections in Israel was approaching, a second
leaflet by the UNLU, published on October 9, glorified the Sumud (i.e. patience and
perseverance) as the effective mode of struggle. It states: "UNLU bounds its head to
honor the perseverance of our masses in Hebron who heroically and tenaciously
fought off the forces of occupation and the settler herds, preventing Levinger and his
mob from desecrating al-Halil al-Rahman tomb"51.
Indeed, in contrast to what the aforementioned proposition would lead us to
expect, data on settler/Palestinian mutual attacks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(Figure 352) shows no clear pattern of action-counteraction. Revealingly, during the
height of settler attacks on Palestinians, we see no outbidding on the part of
Palestinians. It is only during 1990 and 1991 that Palestinian counteractions seem to
be on the rise, and yet at the same time, attacks by settlers appeared to be dropping.
Figure 3. Palestinian and Settler Deaths during the Intifada
20
Palestinian Death by Settlers in OT
Settler Death by Palestinians in OT
15
10
7
6
5
5
5
4
4
Count
2
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
4
2
2
1
1
0
Dec.87Mar.88
Apr.88Jun.88
Jul.88Sep.88
Oct.88Dec.88
Jan.89Mar.89
Apr.89Jun.89
Jul.89Sep.89
Oct.89Dec.89
Jan.90Mar.90
Apr.90Jun.90
Jul.90Sep.90
Oct.90Dec.90
Jan.91Mar.91
Apr.91Jun.91
Jul.91Sep.91
Oct.91Dec.91
Source: First Intifada Data, Be'tselem Records; Five Years of Intifada, IDF Spokesperson Publication
- 18 -
Regarding the settlers, here too, what engendered settlers' mode of action was rooted
not only in the very fact of Palestinian attacks, as Meyer and Staggenborg's
proposition stipulates, but more in the combined effect of developing favorable
political conditions for the Palestinians at the regional and international levels, as well
as meaningful unfavorable changes for the settlers in the Israeli political system. At
the regional and international levels, the aforementioned "disengagement speech" of
King Hussein of July 1988 was the first sign of alarm. To this, one should add the
increased world empathy and sympathy for the Palestinian struggle, culminating in
the invitation to Arafat to address the UN General Assembly, and the unilateral
Declaration of Independence in late 1988. From inside Israel, while settlers who
initiated attacks on Palestinians continued to enjoy significant leeway from IDF
forces, political conditions were quickly changing with the rise of a national unity
coalition (1988-1990) that, although dominated by rightwing forces, also included the
Labor Party and Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister.53
It was only when SPOT changed unfavorably for the Palestinians and favorably
for the settlers, most notably with the formation of Shamir's exclusively rightwing
coalition in mid 1990 which presented a much clearer pro-settlement policy, coupled
with clear success in controlling the Intifada, that we see a marked de-escalation in
settlers' tactics. Revealingly however, this de-escalation was momentary. Immediately
following the end of the crisis in the Gulf, the US administration renewed its pressure
for an international peace conference between Israel and the Palestinians which, at
best, Shamir was able only to postpone, while the settlers were put on the defensive
all over again.
It was at that stage when the Palestinians turned into a certified actor that we see
how the interactions between opposing movements prevented the complete
- 19 -
institutionalization of tactics by either side. Thus, we argue, the nature of the actioncounteraction dynamics between both movements was likely to be shaped no less by
the specific SPOT each movement faced, than by how one responded to the other's
strategy and tactics. While this was most apparent during the early stages of the
Intifada given the structural asymmetry of both movements, changes in SPOT also
had an influence, although to a lesser degree, during the later stages of the uprising.
However, analyzing these dynamics without taking into consideration the influence of
dynamics within each movement and the way these are also influenced by changes in
SPOT, would render our understanding of movement-countermovement interaction
incomplete.
Within Movements
Relating to within movement dynamics, Meyer and Staggenborg propose
that, "conflict between opposing movements exacerbates intramovement battles over
collective action frames [because, inter alia,] the heightened conflict draws the
attention of bystander publics to join in the conflict"54. This is expected given that the
conflict between the opposing movements becomes symbolic of larger cleavages in
society, with the likely result of tensions and discord as the need to move to the
moderate center may counter the action frame and political agenda of less moderate
groups within the movement.
Our analysis of the internal dynamics within each movement, however, reveals
that unity and fragmentation over collective action frames (but also over action strategy
and tactics) were not only the result of the contentious interaction between both. It was
also related to variations in the strategic position each movement had and/or sought to
achieve. In a situation where a given movement struggles to improve its strategic
position (or establish one) interactions with the opposing movement is likely to
- 20 -
produce unity. Conversely, in a situation where a given movement struggles to
preserve its strategic position, interactions with an opposing movement is likely to
produce fragmentation.
While differences of ideologies, action strategies and goals have always been a
central feature of the broad Palestinian movement, the influence of the specific nature of
changes in Israeli SPOT, as argued, led to conscious attempt to lessen differences of
ideology and action strategy and tactics among conflicting camps within the movement.
This meant a systematic effort to coordinate activities and framings as part of the attempt
to present the Intifada as a national defiance against an unjust authority through shaking
off the occupation, based on the understanding that it would better serve their cause.
Coordination between the nationalist forces and the Islamic Jihad was relatively
successful, the result of past collaboration and of Fatah’s support of Jihad’s operations,
coupled with the fact that the latter was relatively small in size and poorly resourced.
Similar attempts to coordinate with Hamas, however, were more complex. Still,
throughout most of 1988, Hamas, despite critique of the nationalist’s methods and
tactics, did not openly oppose the UNLU, and while its leaflets had different emphases in
style, values, and modes of action55, there was a consistent call for unity to maintain the
momentum of the Intifada.
Revealing, and in contrast to what the above proposition stipulates, tension and
preexisting ideological differences began to surface most markedly only after concrete
political gains and improved strategic position of the UNLU. As an example, on July 19,
1988, in the context of Israeli attempts to cause confusion and distrust through
distribution of fake leaflets56, Hamas called for unity with the UNLU, warning the
people of the uprising to, "beware of false leaflets by the military and collaborators
calling for attacks on the [nationalist] popular committees and defying UNLU's leaflet
- 21 -
no. 21… we cannot allow ourselves to do so for the sake of unity of the nation and the
intensification of the uprising" (leaflet # 26). However, in a matter of three weeks
following King Hussein's speech (July 31, 1988), facing threat to its standing and
influence within the movement, Hamas published its Charter expressing the group's
political challenge to the PLO, not only on the issue of who represents the Palestinian
people but also on the pace and tone of the uprising. As it reads, "with all our
appreciation for the Palestinian Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into
- and without belittling its role, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic
Palestine with the secular idea"57.
Later on, in November 1988, first during preparations for the Palestinian
unilateral declaration of independence, and then during Arafat's speech in the UN
General Assembly in December 1988 in which, among others, he recognized Israel,
these tensions developed into a profound rift. Trying to minimize this fracture, the
UNLU, in a leaflet published five days after the declaration of independence, urged the
Palestinian fundamentalist groups to, “… prefer the national interest of our people,
over their sectarian interests and premises, and to stop with the manifestations of
negative positions…since they serve the enemy”58. Hamas reacted sharply, issuing a
leaflet (no. 33) which called for “Struggle and confrontation on Sunday the 25th of
December memorializing the establishment of the Jihad groups in Palestine by the
shahid Abd al-Kader al-Husseini … let the uprising continue in Jihad.” While during
the early months of 1988 Hamas’s use of deadly violence was relatively marginal59, the
proceeding months witnessed a gradual yet steady increase in its use of acts of
terrorism, such as the kidnapping and assassinations of Israeli soldiers.
Things deteriorated further when the developing crisis in the Gulf in August 1990
threatened to weaken the strategic position of the movement as a whole. Indeed, in the
- 22 -
face of an unfavorable international climate and decreasing visibility of the uprising (in
part due to changes in Israeli mode of repression – see above), growing evidence of
battles and factionalism accrued. The hampered effectiveness of the “restricted violence”
strategy increasingly frustrated and infuriated the population and gradually pushed
hardliners from within the PLO (DFLP and PFLP activists) to collaborate with Hamas
activists. This included issuing joint leaflets calling for escalation of the Intifada by using
deadly weapons, and harshly criticizing Arafat-led Fatah members for their willingness
to participate in the pending international peace conference and the territorial
compromise it entailed. If previously the issue of the settlements and the settlers was
referred to as part of the more general reference to the occupation and as a source of
solidarity, from then on explicit calls to attack Jewish settlers began to appear. A leaflet
by Hamas60 published a week following the lethal confrontation at the Temple Mount in
which seventeen Palestinian worshipers were killed and 150 injured, including the
injury of eleven Israelis, reads: "We call all Muslim groups worldwide to train jihad
battalions and set the ground for liberation… All Jewish settlers should be targeted,
their blood and property permitted"61. This was also the time when the first signs of
internal strife between Fatah and Hamas activists began to surface, as was the case in
Nablus in May 1991 when Hamas activists accused Arafat-led Fatah members of treason
and collaboration with the Israeli enemy62.
Regarding the settlers, the logic seemed to be operating in reverse,
demonstrating again the importance of relating to variations in the strategic position
of each movement in addition to the very fact of interaction between both.
Reconnecting with the above analysis regarding the Palestinian strategically
conscious attempt to restrict the use of violence, it is possible to suggest that it was
the very ability of the Palestinians to sustain the Intifada along with the worsening
- 23 -
political conditions back home put the settlers on the defensive, with growing
evidence of fragmentation and disagreements over tactics and framings.
Intramovement battles surfaced between two camps: the formal, highly centralized
and institutionalized Yesha Council63), and the informal body, remnant of the Block
of the Faithful, which had become segmented and polycentric with various small
organizations (e.g., Rabbi Kahane-led Kach) and key figures (e.g., Daniella Weiss,
Rabi Levinger).
Fragmentation was already surfacing as early as 1987 as the Intifada gradually
consolidated, and political initiatives to resolve the Palestinian situation were
proposed. Intense struggle over the leadership of the Yesha Council occurred between
the militant camp comprised of Weiss and Rabbi Levinger among others, and the
moderates, including Otniel Shneller and Rabbi Bin-Nun. Later, when the Intifada
shifted into higher gear, ideologically-driven tactical differences produced even
deeper divisions between those who argued that the settlement community should not
rely on the government and the military to offer security and, as such, should take the
law fully into their own hands even if this meant confrontations with army forces64.
At the other end, there were those who insisted on cooperating with the military and
working in line with the directives of the government, desperately trying to preserve
the legitimacy of the movement. For example, in June 1989, the mayor of Kiryat Arba
(Hebron) issued a letter to Roni Shaked, a journalist and commentator for the Israeli
newspaper Yediot Achronot, saying that statements made by Noam Federman, a
former leader of the Kach movement did not represent the opinions of the population
of Kiryat Arba.
With relative improvement in the strategic position of the settler movement's
agenda (e.g., Shamir as Prime Minister of a rightwing coalition in June 1990), a
- 24 -
regaining of unity began to develop, translating into collaboration with the
government and with the IDF, revealingly during the same time when Palestinian
attacks on settlers was on the rise (see Figure 3). Thus, if during 1988 and 1989 an
organization called the Committee for Safe Driving in Yesha took a defiant stance
toward the government and the IDF and initiated numerous violent attacks against
Palestinians65, in May 1990 that same organization showed a much more conciliatory
approach. In a letter to PM Shamir, the chairperson asks, "to bring to the attention of
his honor the recent escalation… I regret that we are forced to bother you with these
matters in these days when his honor is probably extremely busy with forming a
government."
Yet, as noted, this relative unity was brief. With the renewal of the Bush
Administration’s attempts to convene an International Peace Conference, and
Shamir's willingness to settle for expansion of existing settlements instead of the
establishment of new ones, fragmentation resurfaced. While heads of the Yesha
Council acted closely with their political to secure funding for settlements militants
re-entrenched themselves through taking a much harsher stance. When Ehud Barak,
the new Chief of the General Staff, refused to use the military to secure a settler's rally
throughout the West Bank during May 1991, militants declared that "the Block will
haunt Barak till he is eliminated"66.
Conclusions
Our analysis of the Palestinian and Jewish settler movements' interaction as shaped by
changes in SPOT in the context of the Israeli segmented composite regime informs
the theory in three important ways. First, with regard to the arena between movements
and authorities, the emergence and endurance of movement-countermovement
interaction is not a mere reflection of the structure of governmental authority, but the
- 25 -
result of changes in the particular form and content of power relations, on various
levels, in which both opposing movements as well as the authorities are situated yet
seek to mold. Second, with regard to the arena between movements, the nature of the
action-counteractions between opposing movements is likely to be shaped no less by
the specific nature and level of SPOT each movement faces and seeks to influence
than by how one responds to the other's strategy and tactics. Third, with regard to the
arena within movements, we argue that unity or fragmentation among actors within
each movement relate to variations in the strategic position of each movement as a
result of changes in SPOT, their respective space of action and repertoire of
contention, and the political leverage each could exert herewith.
Are the theoretical adjustments we propose generic enough to be applied to
other segmented composite regimes? We find similarities between our analysis and
Luders'67 work on the repressive setting of the racially-divided American South in
which civil rights activists operated and how authorities were deeply involved in
modulating the mobilization of the white supremacist countermovement.
Additionally, our analysis echoes Maney's68 work on the ethnonationally-divided
Northern Ireland in which he argues for a see-saw-like dynamics, namely, how an
opportunity for one movement is immediately a threat for the opposing movement
with the result of preventing the complete institutionalization of each movement's
tactics.69
Notwithstanding, dissimilarities exist. Regarding Maney's work, for example,
our analysis suggests that the extent to which interaction between the opposing
movements prevents the complete institutionalization of tactics by either side is a
function of the specific institutional arena each seeks to influence, and the specific
ratio of political opportunities and threats at any given time for each movement. In
- 26 -
which case, controlling for structural differences and practices of material and nonmaterial favoritism and victimization would help reveal variations in each arena of
interaction, the interplay among the three, as well as in the saliency of a given arena
of interaction in shaping the overall dynamics of contention. A comparative design of
this type holds the promise for further contributing to the broader, recent endeavor of
informing theories and models developed in democratic settings based on contentious
episodes in nondemocracies.
Palestinian—Israeli/Jewish settler contentious history
1967
The Six Day War. Israel's occupation of the Territories; military rule is imposed.
1968
First settlement initiative. A group of settlers hold the Jewish Passover Seder at the
Park Hotel in Hebron.
1970
Approval of settlement in Hebron (Kiryat Arba) and in the Gaza Strip.
1973
The October (Yom Kippur) War
1974-5 First wave of Palestinian protest in reaction to attempts by Block of the Faithful to
settle Sebastia.
1977
Begin-led Likud rightwing party wins the National Elections; a rise in new
settlements occurs.
1978-9 The Camp David Accord; the formation of the Jewish Underground; the formation of
Peace Now.
1980
First instance of an "appropriate Jewish response" in reaction to a murder of a settler
in Hebron.
1982
Israel pullout from Sinai; June 1982, Israel invades Lebanon, followed by growing
domestic opposition to the War.
1983-4 Uncovering of the Jewish underground responsible for a series of terrorist attacks
against Palestinians.
1987
Outbreak of the Intifada. The UNLU takes the lead. The formation of Hamas.
Notes
- 27 -
1
Paul D. Almeida, Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925—2005
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Vincent Boudreau,
Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Charles D. Brockett, “The Structure of Political
Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics,
23 (1991), 253-74; Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements
in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
2
Kenneth T. Andrews, "Movement–Countermovement Dynamics and the Emergence
of New Institutions: The Case of “White Flight” Schools in Mississippi," Social
Forces, 80 (3, 2002), 911-36; Joseph E. Luders, The Civil Rights Movement and the
Logic of Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David
Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure
of Political Opportunity," American Journal of Sociology, 101 (1996), 1628-60;
Mayer N. Zald and Bert Useem, "Movement and Countermovement Interaction:
Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement," in Mayer N. Zald and John D.
McCarthy, Social Movements in an Organizational Field, (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1987).
3
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder CO: Paradigm
Press, 2006), Ch. 8.
4
Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Sidney Tarrow, Power in
Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5
Jack A.Goldstone and Charles Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and
State Repression in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” in Ronald R. Aminzade,
Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney
- 28 -
Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, eds., Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 179-94; Doug McAdam, Sidney
Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Stuart A. Wright, Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City
Bombing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
6
David Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity",
Social Forces, 82 (2004), 1457-92.
7
Meyer and Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of
Political Opportunity".
8
Ibid., p. 1632.
9
Clifford Bob, “Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of
protest among Nigeria's Ogoni minority”, Social Problems, 49 (2002), 395-415;
Boudreau.
10
Boudreau, p. 11.
11
Gregory M. Maney, “From civil war to civil rights and back again”, Research in
Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 27 (2007), pp. 3-35; Karen Rasler,
“Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution”, American
Sociological Review, 61 (1996), 132-152.
12
Nadim N. Rouhana, Palestinian citizens in an ethnic Jewish state: Identities in
conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
13
Meyer and Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of
Political Opportunity," p. 1651.
14
Luders; Wright
15
William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest. 2nd ed (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1990).
- 29 -
16
Rita K. Noonan, “Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective
Action Frames in Chille's Transition to Democracy,” Sociological Forum, 10 (1995),
81-111.
17
Moshe Lissak, “The Intifada and the Israeli Society,” in R. Gal, ed., Ha’milhama
Ha’shviyt [The Seventh War] (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hamehuachad, 1990); Miron
Benvenisti, Mahol Ha’Haradot [Fatal Embrace] (Jerusalem: Maxwell-MacmillanKeter, 1992).
18
But also the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
19
It is noteworthy that in the Israeli/Palestinian case, as well as the other cases we
refer to, religion also plays a role, while not necessarily as the original basis for the
divide, certainly in cementing it and in propelling radicalization.
20
Virgil Falloon, Excessive Secrecy, Lack of Guidelines (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1986);
Joost Hiltermann, Israel’s Deportation Policy in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza
(Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1988).
21
Reflecting the inability (one would say unwillingness) of the Israeli government to
reach a decision. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Metzukot Ba'utopia [Trouble in
Utopia] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1990).
22
Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism,"
Jerusalem Quarterly, 21 (1981), 28-47; Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord:
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1988).
23
David Newman, "From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush Emunim and
the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society," Israel Studies, 10 (2005),
192-223.
24
Akiva Eldar and Idith Zertal, Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel
1967-2004 (Or Yehuda: Dvir Publishing House Ltd, 2004), (Hebrew).
- 30 -
25
Including Likud, National-Religious Party, Tehiya.
26
David Weisburd, Jewish Settler Violence: Deviance as Social Reaction (Penn State
University Press, 1989); B'Tselem, Law Enforcement vis-a-vis Israeli Civilians in the
Occupied Territories, Comprehensive Report (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, March 1994).
27
Eldar and Zertal.
28
Ruth M. Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004); Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular
Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank”, Sociological Forum 18 (1, 1993),
47-71.
29
Salim Tamari, “What the Uprising Means”, Middle East Report, 152 (1988), 24-30.
30
Joost Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1991).
31
Eitan Y. Alimi, William A. Gamson and Charlotte Ryan, “Knowing Your
Adversary: Israeli Structure of Political Opportunity and the Inception of the
Palestinian Intifada,” Sociological Forum, 21 (2006), 535—57.
32
Meyer and Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of
Political Opportunity," p. 1637.
33
Tamar Hermann, The Israeli Peace Movement - A Shattered Dream (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 99.
34
Arian Asher and Ventura Rafael, Public Opinion in Israel and the Intifada:
Changes in Security Attitudes 1987-88 (Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies, August 1989).
35
Rashid Khalidi, "The Uprising and the Palestinian Question," World Policy
Journal, 5 (1988), 497-518.
36
Hanna Siniora, al-Fajr, 1988, p. 7.
- 31 -
37
The UNLU was an informal, clandestine coalition of grassroots activists from the
various organizations, formed during December 1987.
38
Edy Kaufman, “The Intifada’s Limited Violence,” Journal of Arab Affairs, 9
(1990), 109-21; Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, The Stone and the
Olive Branch: Four Years of the Intifada – From Jabalia to Madrid (East Jerusalem:
JMCC, 1991).
39
An organization of veteran Jewish immigrants (‘Olim Hadashim’), founded in
1988.
40
Benvenisti, p. 83.
41
Zeev Shiff and Ehud Yaari, Ha'intifada [The Intifada] (Tel Aviv: Shoken, 1990), p.
149
42
A letter by Yesha Council sent to ministers of the Israeli Government (May 1989).
43
Undated leaflet no. 4, signed D"B, acronym of Dikuy Bogdim (Hebrew for
repression of traitors), a militant right-wing student group.
44
Joe Stork, "The Significance of Stones: Notes from the Seventh Month," Middle
East Report, (No. 154, 1988), pp. 4-11.
45
Zertal and Eldar, pp. 145-160
46
Ibid., p. 157.
47
In February 1989 the military force sent to the Palestinian village Azun-Hatma to
stop a settler pogrom became the target of settlers' fury and violence (Hadashot,
February 10, 1989)
48
Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict – News from the Middle East
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
49
Meyer and Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of
Political Opportunity," p. 1651.
- 32 -
50
Shaul Mishal and Reuven Aharoni, Avanim Ze Lo Hakol [Speaking Stones] (Tel
Aviv: Hakibutz Hamehuad, 1989), p. 68.
51
Ibid., p. 151.
52
No systematic or comprehensive data on injuries exists. Cases of foreign citizens,
such as tourists, and non-Territories civilians are excluded.
53
But also the exposure of the Husseini document in August 1988, revealing the
secretive talks between Likud and PLO representatives already in summer 1987, a.k.a.
the Amirav-Husseini Agreement.
54
Meyer and Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of
Political Opportunity," p. 1653.
55
For a systematic comparative analysis of several of UNLU and Hamas leaflets, see
Mishal and Aharoni.
56
Daud Kuttab, "The Palestinian Uprising: Self-Sufficiency," Journal of Palestine
Studies, 17 (1988), 36-45; Jamal R. Nassar and Heacock Roger, The Intifada:
Palestinians at the Crossroads (New York and London: Preager, 1990).
57
See Shiff and Yaari.
58
UNLU leaflet 29, November 20, 1988
59
Shaul Mishal and Sela, Avraham, Zman Hamas: alimut ve’pshara [The Hamas
Wind – Violence and Coexistence] (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 1999).
60
Hamas, leaflet 65, October 14, 1990. The Civic Administration, Department of Arab
Affairs. IDF Leaflet Collection, IDF/Ministry of Defense Archive, Tel-Aviv, Israel.
61
Palestinian Leaflets as a Means for Guiding the Population in the Territories, No.
XV (October 1991). IDF Leaflet Collection.
62
Ibid., p. 14
- 33 -
63
The Yesha council united all of the other council heads in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, including mayors of Regional Councils and mayors of the Local Councils.
64
Zertal and Eldar, pp. 322-25.
65
Ibid., p. 144.
66
Maarive Newspaper, May 19, 1991.
67
Luders, The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change.
68
Maney, “Variations in the Causes of Ethnonationalist Violence: Northern Ireland,
1969-72,” The International Journal of Conflict Management, 16 (2005), 70-96.
69
See also Andrews, and Meyer and Staggenborg ("Thinking about Strategy," Paper
prepared for the American Sociological Association, August 9-10, 2007, Hofstra
University, Hempstead, New York) for a similar point.
- 34 -