What Do They Know, and Whom Do
They Hold Accountable? Citizens in
the Government–Nonprofit Contracting
Relationship
David M. Van Slyke
Christine H. Roch
Georgia State University
ABSTRACT
Devolution and pressures from elected officials and citizens to reduce government
involvement in service provision have increasingly led many public agencies to contract
with nonprofits for service delivery. In this article we consider the effects of the changing
institutional arrangements governing the delivery of publicly funded social services on
citizens’ satisfaction and ability to hold service providers accountable. Specifically, we
consider whether citizens are able to accurately identify service providers as nonprofit or
governmental providers and investigate what drives individual perceived and actual use of
nonprofits for social services; what the relationship is between perceived and actual use and
a citizen’s satisfaction with social services; and whether satisfaction with services influences
the likelihood that citizens will correctly identify a provider as a nonprofit or governmental
agency. Using public opinion data, we examine these questions empirically. Our results
suggest that citizens are more likely to misidentify nonprofit service providers as
governmental agencies when they are less satisfied with the services that they have
received. The public management implications of contracting with nonprofit organizations
and citizen satisfaction and accountability are discussed.
As devolution and other governmental reforms continue, pressures from elected officials
and citizens to reduce government involvement in service areas in which there are
alternatives to public provision have increased. As a result, many public agencies are
contracting with nonprofit organizations to provide services, most notably social services
(DeHoog 1984; Romzek and Johnston 2001; Salamon 1995). Although contracting can be
viewed as part of the larger governmental reform movement taking place over the last
decade, it is generally justified on the basis of efficiency arguments (Donahue 1989; Savas
1987; Sclar 2000). The potential efficiency gains of contracting are well understood—as
government contracts it reduces its own propensity to encroach on private markets and
For their valuable comments, we would like to thank John Thomas, Greg Lewis, Charlotte Steeh, Carolyn Hill, Beryl
Radin, and the JPART reviewers.
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muh013
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 191–209
ª 2004 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc.; all rights reserved.
192
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
harnesses the power of market competition, with two frequently cited outcomes being
reduced costs and service quality improvements (Kettl 1993; Savas 2000). Essentially, the
argument is that contracting with nonprofit organizations increases both productive
efficiency (costs and service quality in general) and allocative efficiency (the match
between citizens and services) (Smith and Lipsky 1993). In many ways, it is this argument
that is at the center of the movement toward a ‘‘customer-centered’’ public administration
paradigm (Smith and Huntsman 1997).
If increases in efficiency do occur, then citizens should also report higher levels of
satisfaction with services. Many studies have examined citizen satisfaction with public services such as public safety, public transportation, and mail delivery (Miller and Miller
1991; Poister and Henry 1994). With a few exceptions (DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990;
Schneider et al. 2000), there is a gap in the empirical literature about the relationship
between the changing institutional arrangements governing the delivery of services and
citizen satisfaction.
In this article we consider the relationship between the use of nonprofits for service
delivery and citizen satisfaction in a key area: social service delivery. Thus, we use the
term citizen to refer to individuals who participate in the consumption of public goods and
services provided by governmental and nonprofit agencies.1 Social services is a policy area
in which nonprofit organizations have participated extensively, with contracting arrangements representing approximately 72 percent of all forms of social services privatization.2
In recent years, approximately 50 percent of the average nonprofit social service
organization’s funding came from government, with one of every three public charities’
missions focused exclusively on social services.3 The extensive participation of nonprofits
in the delivery of social services is often linked to the complex issues involved in the
delivery of such services. This is a policy area that consists of programs with goals and
outcomes that are not easily defined and measured and of clients often possessing varying
degrees of tractable and intractable problems and with varying levels of motivation for
receiving treatment. Other factors also contribute to the complexity of providing social
services, including legislative and funding lag times; a lack of competition and provider
alternatives (both secular and sectarian) that are often tied to the high cost of entry and
client demand factors; delivering programs that require a level of continuous care; and
government’s dependence on specific providers in markets, especially at the rural level, in
which only one nongovernmental provider may be available (Johnston and Romzek 1999;
Saidel 1991; Salamon 1995; Van Slyke 2003).
Our study of citizens’ satisfaction with social services focuses on their ability to hold
governmental and nonprofit organizations accountable for the quality of the services they
receive. In particular, we consider whether citizens are able to accurately identify service
providers as nonprofit or governmental actors. We test for this accuracy by examining
actual versus perceived use of nonprofits and governmental service providers among
We acknowledge that some of these individuals may in fact be noncitizens.
See U.S. General Accounting Office 1997, appendix 1: ‘‘Forms of Privatization and Frequency of Use in State
Programs and Services.’’
3
According to Hodgkinson et al. (1996), this figure includes financial resources in the form of grants, contracts for
providing services, and payments for individuals (i.e., Medicaid or Medicare). These figures are cited in Boris 1998.
Hammack (2001) suggests that the percentage of nonprofit revenue derived from the federal government since the
1980s is at least one-third. However, this does not fully account for the role of states and use of block grants under
devolution. See also DeVita 1997, table 3.
1
2
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
a sample of citizens who reported contacting a social services agency. We also examine the
relationship between the identification of a service provider as a nonprofit or governmental
actor and reported levels of satisfaction with services. Are citizens in fact holding
governmental and nonprofit providers accountable for the quality of services received?
Thus, this research investigates the following three questions: (1) What drives
citizens’ perceived and actual use of nonprofits for social services? (2) What is the
relationship between perceived and actual use and citizens’ satisfaction with social
services? (3) When do social service users incorrectly identify a service provider as
a governmental agency or nonprofit organization, and what role does satisfaction play in
that misidentification? We believe that these questions are critical to understanding the
impact nonprofits are having as they increasingly deliver social services under contracts
with various government entities. Nonprofits are increasingly filling a role that some have
termed as ‘‘third-party government’’ (Salamon 1989), implying that nonprofit organizations and their personnel are the new street-level bureaucrats with which citizens are
likely to interact (Kettl 1993). If nonprofits occupy a position of accountability because of
the services they produce and deliver to clients under contract to government, then it is
critical to understand whether citizens receiving services can accurately identify the
organization providing the services and hold that organization and its employees
accountable for the quality of services they receive. In addition, understanding the factors
influencing citizens’ identification of service providers is central to the ability of citizens to
use information to hold organizations providing public services accountable for their
satisfaction (Behn 1999; Romzek and Johnston 2001).
We begin by considering the increasing use of nonprofits to deliver social services.
Next, we focus on the citizen and government/nonprofit relationship in service delivery
and develop a number of expectations about factors that should influence citizens’ abilities
to identify service providers, their levels of satisfaction with those service providers, and
their ability to hold government accountable for service quality. We investigate our
questions empirically by using public opinion data from the Georgia Poll, a quarterly
public opinion poll administered to Georgia residents, and consider the results of our
analyses in the conclusion.
THE INCREASING RELIANCE ON NONPROFITS FOR SERVICE DELIVERY
Today, privatization is part of a nationwide governmental reform effort and involves
‘‘changing from an arrangement with high government involvement to one with less,’’ with
contracting being the most widely used form of social services privatization (Savas 1987,
88). The passage of federal and state welfare reform legislation has enhanced the use of
contracting by elected officials and agency managers who seek less government
involvement in private markets and service delivery. A frequently cited privatization
argument is that government, as a monopolistic producer and distributor of goods and
services, is inefficient because of higher salaries and more generous benefits, political
patronage, union influence, red tape, and a lack of incentives and sanctions to reduce costs
and budgets.4 Advocates for privatization suggest that increased management flexibility
and specialized expertise can lead to reduced costs, improved service, and fewer
4
These are consistent criticisms leveled against government action most notably by public choice theorists. For
a treatment of public choice theory, see Niskanen 1971 and Buchanan 1977.
193
194
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
public monopolies in policy areas in which treatment and delivery alternatives exist (Bennett
and Johnson 1981; Donahue 1989; Goldsmith 1997; Kettl 1993; Morgan and England 1988;
Prager and Swati 1996; Salamon 1989; Savas 2000). The extant literature on contracting
suggests that success depends on the types of service being contracted, the existence of
highly developed and competitive markets, the specificity of the contract, the observability
and measurability of what is being contracted, and the ability to enforce accountability and
evaluate program outcomes (Van Slyke 2003). Many of these same attributes are frequently
used as reasons to contract and work with nonprofit organizations.
One reason government contracts with nonprofit organizations rather than for-profit
firms is because they are perceived as solving the ‘‘contract failure’’ problem. Contract
failure is the theory that nonprofit organizations arise and are used in service areas in which
there is a high level of asymmetric information between the producer and purchaser of
a service and when the complex nature of the service provided makes it difficult to
objectively measure performance. Nonprofit organizations may be preferred over for-profit
firms because they have less of an incentive to act opportunistically by exploiting
information asymmetries for their own organizational interest, they are governed by boards
of volunteer trustees, and they cannot legally distribute any profits they generate. Weisbrod
(1988) suggests that when consumers are poorly informed about services and performance
is difficult to measure, customers may prefer the nonprofit organizational form under the
assumption that they will not be exploited for profit-motivated reasons. Smith and Lipsky
have found that ‘‘clients may be inclined to trust nonprofits to provide high levels of care or
service, reliable advice, expert judgment untainted by commercial considerations . . . if
they know that the organizations they go to for help . . . are not motivated by the prospect of
distributing profits’’ to producers (1993, 28–29).
There are several consistent findings across empirical studies examining the
government–nonprofit social service contracting relationship. These findings include
a lack of competition by service and geographic market, gaps in administrative capacity,
and insufficient performance measures; poorly defined and inadequately enforced
accountability mechanisms; goal divergence between policies and implementation
practices and procedures; and nonprofit dependence on public funds that can lead to
mission drift, deprofessionalization, and diminished service quality (Alexander, Nank, and
Stivers 1999; Beinecke and DeFillippi 1999; Commons, McGuire, and Riordan 1997;
DeHoog 1984; Gronjberg 1993; Johnston and Romzek 1999; Kramer 1994; Saidel 1991).
These studies find, however, that citizens may be treated differently as a result of each
party in the government–nonprofit relationship pursuing a different goal. Such divergence
raises questions about accountability and whether important democratic values such as
equity and access are practiced. This strain results in part from insufficient and
uncoordinated information exchange and a failure to consistently deliver coherent
messages about policies, programs, requirements, and expectations from government to its
contractors and then to clients.
WHOM DO CITIZENS HOLD ACCOUNTABLE?
The issue of whom clients hold accountable in the government–nonprofit contracting
relationship has been an issue of concern for some time, though not one that has been
empirically addressed. A range of accountability concerns stemming from the increasing use
of nonprofits under contract to government for producing and delivering services has been
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
identified. Smith and Lipsky suggest that one of the most troubling concerns is how the
connection between citizens and government becomes ‘‘eroded when private agencies
produce public services’’ (1993, 118). Two questions they raise are, ‘‘Who manages citizen–
client discontent with services? and who is responsible for client grievances?’’ (1993, 118–
19). These are important questions because the process of and responsibility for governance
can become blurred in a contracting relationship as complex as that involved in social
services. It is important that the connection among government policy, its agencies,
contractors, and clients be strong when nonprofits are producing and delivering publicly
funded services, for important democratic attributes, such as choice, equity, and access, are
not necessarily valued in the same way by nonprofit organizations. Nonprofits, by virtue of
their origins, mission, policies, funding sources, and governance mechanisms, enact a set of
choices that are different than those of government. Many nonprofits are selective in the
clients they treat, operate on a ‘‘first come–first served’’ basis, are more heterogeneous in the
services they deliver, and frequently do not disclose information in the same open manner as
government agencies. Each of these differences presents democratic accountability concerns for governments that contract with nonprofits to produce and deliver services to citizens.
The accountability literature is replete with frameworks and prescriptions for
designing contracts and systems that hold service providers accountable for meeting the
goals and performance expectations of government (Behn 1999; Dicke and Ott 1999).
Romzek and Dubnick (1994) have developed one of the more widely used typologies in
which accountability is represented within four different quadrants, specifically the
hierarchical/bureaucratic, legal, political, and professional core task areas. The quadrant
that focuses on citizens and their ability to hold accountable those parties responsible for
delivering quality services is in the area of political accountability. However, Romzek and
Johnston, in their study of social service contracting in Kansas, find that ‘‘while client
contact and satisfaction measures were collected, they were given less emphasis in the
overall evaluation of contractor performance than indicators such as headcounts and case
loads’’ (2001, 11). The growing use of the ‘‘customer model’’ and third parties to deliver
services concerns scholars such as Hauque (2001), who argue that there is a diminishing
publicness about government accountability and reduced levels of transparency. Such
reductions lead scholars such as Peters and Pierre (1998) and Behn (1999) to question who
is responsible for whom and for what.
CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES
If service providers are to be accountable to citizens and responsive to the changing levels
of citizens’ satisfaction with services, then it is critical that providers not only measure
satisfaction but also be able to identify factors outside of changes in service quality that
may influence satisfaction. One tool used for gauging citizen satisfaction with public
services in terms of effectiveness, impact, quality, and productivity is the citizen survey.
Citizens are asked about their own perceptions of service quality and trust with government
in general and with specific services, such as road quality. They are also frequently asked
their perceptions of how people in general feel about government and the services it
provides. Miller and Miller’s (1991) study focuses on residents’ evaluations of local
governmental services in their own context compared with like services provided
elsewhere and finds that the average rating of city services by citizens was ‘‘Good.’’5
5
The ‘‘Good’’ category was on a five-point scale that ranged from ‘‘Very Bad’’ to ‘‘Very Good.’’
195
196
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Poister and Henry (1994) find no significant differences in individual attitudes about the
quality of services delivered by the public and private sectors.
Other studies have identified a series of individual-, political-, and institutional-level
factors that are likely to influence citizen satisfaction (DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990).
Much of the empirical research that has examined citizen satisfaction with government has
focused on the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender,
education, and income (Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992; Thompson 1997). For instance,
Burns, Scholzman, and Verba (2001, tables C10.5, C10.7.1, C11.10.1) and Thompson
(1997) find that age, education, and sex are significant predictors of participation in
political activity and in estimates of service satisfaction. Sharp (1986) identifies
relationships between level of education and income and different forms of political
participation and contacting behavior. Mauser (1998) reports finding that more educated
and informed consumers selected nonprofit organizations over other types of organizations
for service delivery. One explanation is that individuals with more education have the
ability to obtain different types of information important for making decisions and are
shown to be more proactive in making contact with those organizations that provide the
type of service they require (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001).
Race has also been found to affect the use of services, with blacks less likely than
whites to use public services (Hero 1986; Jacob 1972; Thomas 1982) and with blacks less
satisfied with public services (Brown and Coulter 1983; Durand 1976; Jacob 1972). In
general, the relationship between demographic categorizations, such as race, and citizens’
use and satisfaction with services can be most readily explained when these variables are
considered as proxies for political attitudes and a variety of community involvement
measures, such as home ownership and length of residence in the community, which
researchers have argued should be positively related to service use and satisfaction
(Brown and Coulter 1983; DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons 1990; Lyons and Lowery 1989;
Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995).
Factors other than demographic attributes are also likely to influence satisfaction.
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) note that party affiliation is a significant predictor
of satisfaction with government, with Democrats more favorably inclined than Republicans
to government service provision. Brooks and Lewis (2001) find that conservative
individuals and those who identify their party affiliation as Republican have lower levels of
trust in government and favor private alternatives in service provision. Conservatives are
also more likely to contribute money and time to nonprofit and religious organizations.
Contextual factors may also matter. Sharp (1986) finds that location has an effect on
contacting behavior and suggests that differences exist between urban and suburban
residents in their propensity to contact compared with individuals in rural areas. In part,
this may also be a function of who provides services within these different geographic
contexts and the degree to which provider alternatives exist. Previous research has shown
that competition among service providers does not always exist in rural contexts. This
limits citizens’ choice and selection of service providers and can result in government
dependence on a single provider (Saidel 1991; Van Slyke 2003). In addition, Lyons,
Lowery, and DeHoog suggest that ‘‘institutional arrangements . . . may also influence the
public’s perception of the quality of public services’’ (1992, 116; see also Mauser 1998).
There is a limited number of studies in which client satisfaction with services and variation
by institutional arrangement (government, nonprofit, and for-profit) has been examined
(Mauser 1998; Schlesinger 1998). Similarly, Serra (1995) finds that of the variables
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
thought to affect citizens’ satisfaction in their experiences with government agencies,
knowledge of institutional arrangement is one of the most important determinants that
citizens use in assessing how government agencies have selected service providers.
However, as a number of authors have noted, gaps continue to exist in our understanding of
the effect that individual demographic characteristics and institutional arrangements have
in predicting satisfaction with government.
THE MISTAKES THAT CITIZENS MAKE WHEN EVALUATING SERVICES
In evaluating services, citizens also make errors when assessing the quality of services. For
instance, Stipak finds that ‘‘respondents were largely ignorant of the basic facts about how
their local services were provided’’ (1977, 50). Citizen errors with regard to what
government does and does well can be classified as attribution errors and assessment
errors. Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog note that an attribution error is when a citizen (1)
‘‘fails to recognize that a particular unit of local government is providing the service in
question; (2) holds a unit of local government responsible for providing a service that is not
being provided by any of the several local governments; and (3) holds a local government
responsible for a service actually provided by another local government’’ (1992, 30). Thus,
attribution errors may occur when citizens fail to accurately identify the organization
delivering services to them and consequently are unable to hold it accountable for the
quality of the services that they receive.
A second type of error can occur in the assessment of quality or performance. In the
Swindell and Kelly (2000) study, the authors are concerned with citizens’ evaluations of
service quality as an objective measure of program performance. The gap between citizens’
levels of satisfaction and objective measures of performance has been documented by other
research as well (Stipak 1977). Citizens clearly do not have access to sufficient information
to make judgments similar to those made by professional evaluators. Many studies have
focused on citizen awareness and knowledge of privatization, programmatic outcomes,
service quality, and satisfaction (Link and Oldendick 2000; Miller and Miller 1991; Poister
and Henry 1994; Stipak 1977; Swindell and Kelly 2000; Thompson 1997); however, there
are few empirical studies that have analyzed citizen satisfaction with nonprofits delivering
social services under contract to government.
If clients have difficulty evaluating quality and identifying the organization delivering
the product, then how do clients hold the provider accountable for the service they are
receiving? In one of the few studies conducted on a related question, Permut has found that
clients were ‘‘unable to recognize nonprofits as nonprofits,’’ ‘‘did not perceive anything
different about nonprofit,’’ ‘‘did not care if an organization was labeled nonprofit,’’ and
‘‘did not feel that nonprofits would treat them more fairly or honestly’’ than other types of
organizations (1981, 1626). Smith and Lipsky (1993) in their seminal study also find that
clients did not necessarily know when they were receiving services from government
agencies or nonprofit organizations and did not express concern about the type of
organization providing the service.
METHODS
We base our study on data from a statewide telephone survey called the Georgia Poll,
conducted by the Applied Research Center at Georgia State University during fall 2000.
All adults eighteen and over who lived in Georgia were eligible for the poll. They were
197
198
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
selected using random digit dialing and a computer-assisted telephone interviewing
(CATI) system.6 The poll is administered quarterly, and for the fall 2000 poll, 846 residents
were randomly selected and interviewed from October 18 to November 9, 2000, on
a variety of public policy issues that included citizens’ experiences with social service
delivery, perceptions of school boards, attitudes about candidates in the fall 2000 election,
approval ratings of elected officials (president, governor, state schools superintendent), and
problems facing the State of Georgia (education, transportation, social welfare, etc.). The
response rate was 35 percent, and the average length of the survey was just under sixteen
minutes. The survey questions used in the analyses that follow are available in the
appendix. In table A.1, we report both sample and population demographics.7
In our empirical analyses we focus on the subset of 220 respondents who reported that
they had contacted a social service agency. We identified this subset of respondents
through their responses to the following question: ‘‘Social service agencies are
governmental and nonprofit agencies that provide health and welfare services. Have you
ever contacted a social service agency?’’ We identified the type of social service agency
used by the respondents through the question ‘‘Whom did you contact?’’ Based on this
series of questions, it is not known whether the contact was to obtain information or
services, switch service providers, or register a complaint.8 Note, as is evident in table A.1,
that members of this subset are more likely to be female than the typical poll respondent.
This difference likely reflects the greater dependency of women on social services.
With the aid of a list of government and nonprofit agencies in the State of Georgia, we
coded the providers as either governmental or nonprofit organizations.9 Respondents were
6
There are several advantages to this method. For example, (1) it includes individuals with unlisted numbers and
those who have recently moved; (2) respondents cannot look ahead to see what questions are coming next, thereby
allowing a higher quantity of spontaneous, candid verbatim responses; (3) the interviewer can clear up questions or
misunderstandings; and (4) a CATI system controls the distribution of the sampling pool, records the data directly into
the computer, can be programmed to implement skip patterns or branching, and informs the interviewer when an invalid
response has been recorded. There are several limitations to the study methods and data that should be noted as well: (1)
some respondents may report what they perceive to be socially acceptable answers when speaking to a person on the
telephone; (2) skepticism of telephone surveys has increased because of numerous telemarketing calls or solicitations
(Kennedy and Vargus 2001, 489).
7
Note that the respondents to the poll are more likely to have completed college and more likely to be female than
the typical Georgia resident. These differences may reflect the higher rates at which women typically respond to
telephone surveys (Asher 2001, 80), as well as the greater difficulty associated with contacting low-income residents
using a phone survey methodology (Fowler 1993, 54–68).
8
The type of social service used by the respondent is not known. This could have an impact on the individual’s
perception of service provider and satisfaction with the service. Social services vary widely in terms of treatment time
frames, protocols, and location, as well as cost, evaluation of performance, and the qualifications of the social services
provider. For example, providing quality child care is different on each of these measures than providing services to
individuals who are mentally ill and chemically addicted.
9
No proprietary companies were reported. Although a very small number of the organizations could have been
reclassified as faith-based organizations, we did not do this for the following reasons. First, there is considerable
disagreement on what separates faith-based from faith-related or faith-associated organizations (Smith and Sosin 2001).
A range of organizations exists from large, highly bureaucratized, faith-associated agencies such as Catholic Charities
to small and medium locally administered and congregationally supported faith-based organizations. Second, because
the Charitable Choice policy is an executive order applied to five federal agencies but administered differently by states,
and because there remains a dearth of empirical evidence that the faith component associated with faith-based service
delivery leads to more efficacious service delivery, we have classified the relatively few faith-based organizations
included in the sample as nonprofits (which are overwhelmingly secular). The issue of whether faith-based
organizations are more effective than government and secular nonprofits is currently on the research agenda of many
Charitable Choice researchers. However, at this point the evidence is very mixed and not persuasive enough to partition
faith-based organizations as distinct from the secular nonprofits represented in the sample.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
omitted from the following analyses in cases in which a respondent provided insufficient
information in order to code the organization as either government or nonprofit. Although
respondents may have contacted both nonprofit and governmental social service providers
for more than one particular type of service, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families–related employment services or food stamp assistance, each respondent was asked
to identify only one agency. Because the identities of the respondents are confidential and
anonymous, we did not then contact the organizations the respondents reported contacting
to verify their own self-reported contact. While this study is one of the first empirical
investigations directed at better understanding the relationship between the organizational
form of service providers and citizen satisfaction with those services, we also recognize that
our focus on the users of social services limits the generalizability of our results.
RESULTS
Who Uses Nonprofits?
We begin by considering when citizens are more likely to rely on a nonprofit than
a governmental social service agency for social services. In particular, we focus on whether
factors predicting use differ when comparing perceived use and actual use of nonprofit and
governmental providers. As discussed in the previous section, our coding of the agencies
named by the respondents allows us to identify whether the agencies named by respondents
are governmental or nonprofit providers. Our survey instrument also allows us to determine
respondents’ perceptions of the organizational form of the providers. In the survey, after
naming a social service agency, respondents were asked whether the agency they had
contacted was a nonprofit or part of the government. We use respondents’ responses to this
question as an indication of their perceptions of providers as government or nonprofit. In
using this information we were able to determine (1) whether the provider identified by the
respondents actually was a nonprofit or governmental social service provider and (2)
whether the respondents believed that the provider they had identified was a nonprofit or
governmental social service provider.
We use citizens’ responses to these questions as dependent variables in two separate
probit models.10 Although citizens may be directed by governmental service providers to
nonprofits that provide specialized services, we believe that variables such as ideology and
education identified earlier in the article may play a role in whether citizens take advantage
of those services offered by nonprofits. For instance, more conservative citizens, who may
be reluctant to take advantage of governmental services, may be more likely to take
advantage of services offered by nonprofit providers. Competition, location, and the
number of potential service providers may also influence the likelihood that citizens rely on
a governmental or nonprofit service provider.
These models take on the following form: ‘‘(Perceived) Contact with a Nonprofit
Provider 5 f (ideology, demographic and other controls),’’ where ideology is represented by
a measure of partisanship. The variable Republican takes on a value of 1 if the respondent
identifies him- or herself as a Republican and a value of 0 if the respondent identifies him- or
Note that in order to model citizens’ contact with governmental and nonprofit providers, we must restrict our
analysis to those cases in which the respondent provided sufficient information to code the organization as either
government or nonprofit. Thus, the number of respondents included in this initial analysis, and in the analyses reported
in tables 2–3, is smaller than the number reported when modeling respondents’ perceived use of governmental and
nonprofit providers.
10
199
200
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Table 1
Probit Models of the Use of Nonprofits for Social Services
Actual Use of Nonprofits (n 5 164)
Coefficient
Change in
(SE)
Probability
Republican
Years of schooling
Black
Atlanta metro area
Own residence
Married
Constant
x2
ÿ.791* (.407)
ÿ.031 (.053)
ÿ.532* (.309)
.496* (.263)
ÿ.045 (.160)
.171 (.282)
ÿ.581 (.826)
9.06
ÿ.175
ÿ.007
ÿ.118
.110
ÿ.010
.038
Perceived Use of Nonprofits (n 5 202)
Coefficient
Change in
(SE)
Probability
ÿ.174 (.336)
.024 (.051)
ÿ.298 (.314)
.669** (.262)
ÿ.168 (.193)
.337 (.300)
ÿ1.810** (.857)
12.18*
ÿ.016
.002
ÿ.028
.063
ÿ.016
.032
Source: George State Poll. (For more information, see http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwsps/srp/georgiastatepoll/index.htm.)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Changes in probability indicate marginal effects. Thus, we report the proportional
change in the predicted probability of y given a discrete change of x from its minimum value to its maximum.
*
p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
herself as a Democrat or independent. We expect that more conservative citizens will prefer
to take advantage of services offered by nonprofits than those by governmental agencies.
Demographic and other controls are represented by a series of variables. Citizens who are
less well off should have a larger need for social services and thus should be more likely to
make use of social service providers. Because of the large number of missing responses for
the question asking residents about their income, we include a series of variables as proxies
for socioeconomic status. First, we include the variable own residence, which takes on
a value of 1 when the respondent reports owning his or her own residence. The variable
years of school represents the number of years of schooling completed by the respondent.
The variable black takes on a value of 1 if the respondent has identified him- or herself
as black and a value of 0 otherwise.11 In order to control for differences in the availability
and accessibility of providers in and out of major metropolitan areas, we also include
a dichotomous control for whether the respondent lives in the Atlanta metro area.
In the first column of table 1, we report the results for the model of whether citizens
actually contacted a nonprofit or governmental service provider. While some individual
coefficients are close to meeting conventional tests of significance, the model is not
significant. Thus, there exists no significant relationship between our set of independent
variables and whether citizens report contacting a nonprofit or governmental agency.
In the second column of table 1, we report the results for the model of whether citizens
believed they contacted a nonprofit or governmental social service provider. These results
suggest that citizens in the Atlanta metro area are more likely to believe that they are
receiving services from nonprofits. This result is likely a function of the greater visibility of
nonprofits in the Atlanta metro area than elsewhere in the state; this visibility appears to
translate into a greater awareness of nonprofits. Note that otherwise we find no relationship
between our set of predictor variables and citizens’ perceptions of service providers as
nonprofit or governmental organizations. Thus, these results indicate that accessibility and
visibility are likely to be key determinants of citizens’ perceptions of service providers as
nonprofits or governmental agencies; these factors, however, do not significantly influence
11
While the nonblacks in this sample were largely white, the small number of respondents who identified
themselves as Hispanic or Asian are included in this category.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
citizens’ actual use of nonprofits.12 We next turn to consider citizens’ reported levels of
satisfaction with these different service providers.
Are Citizens Satisfied with Services Provided by Nonprofits?
In the survey respondents were asked to grade the quality of the services provided by the
social service agency they had contacted.13 Because we are interested in when citizens are
satisfied with the services they receive, we focus on the question of when citizens grade the
quality of service provision as an A. We use the letter grade A because we are confident
that these citizens were in fact satisfied. Our rationale for this decision is based on the work
being conducted in education research (Farley 1995; Stanley and Baines 2001; Teixeira
1996) and measuring citizen satisfaction with government performance (Hatry 1999).
Research on the use of grades as an assessment tool suggests that grade inflation has had
a deleterious effect on interpreting true levels of achievement. As Farley (1995) notes,
a grade of B has become average in terms of assessing achievement. Thus, we suggest that
an A represents a measure of satisfaction less prone to citizen indifference in the area of
service quality because of the uncertainty about whether citizens associate average
performance and satisfaction with a grade of B or C.
We estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable takes on a 1 if the citizen
gives the social service provider a grade of A and a 0 if the agency receives some other
grade. We include a predictor variable that represents whether the respondent in fact
contacted a governmental or nonprofit social service provider, as well as a predictor
variable that indicates whether the respondent believes that she has contacted a nonprofit or
governmental provider. We include as controls the same independent variables as included
in the previous model. Thus, we are able to determine whether actual use of nonprofits,
holding perceived use constant, is associated with higher levels of citizen satisfaction.14
Note that the coefficient for the Atlanta metro area in the model for actual use is also positive and close to
conventional significance. Thus, we acknowledge that in a larger sample this factor may in fact also significantly predict
actual use as well as perceived use.
13
Given the nature of public opinion data and the time period in which the data used in this study were collected, we
wanted to examine the extent to which the 2000 presidential campaign may have sensitized citizens to issues
concerning government costs, contracting, and performance and thus subsequently may have influenced citizens’
ratings of the quality of service providers. Respondents in the survey were asked, ‘‘Which issue do you believe is the
most important issue facing the State of Georgia?’’ This question is one indicator of the extent to which the respondents
were in fact concerned with governmental reform. Approximately 40 percent of the respondents identified education as
the most important problem facing the State of Georgia. Almost 9.7 percent of the sample respondents identified social
issues as the most important problem, followed by 8.3 percent identifying social welfare and health issues and 7.8
percent identifying budget and taxes. Only 2.4 percent of the respondents identified government reform as the most
important problem facing the state. Therefore, we believe that the poll respondents were in fact responding to actual
services provided by government and nonprofit agencies. We do note, however, that sensitization effects associated
with a presidential campaign in which government costs and performance were issues may have influenced some
individuals to connect issues including alternative forms of service provision, such as vouchers and school choice, and
government performance in certain policy areas, such as education, to their responses to questions about the quality of
social services available in the country, their satisfaction with social services, and their identification of service provider
type.
14
We acknowledge that including the variables actual use and perceived use may introduce multicollinearity into
our model. However, we include both variables in order to correctly specify our model; we argue that satisfaction will
be driven by both actual use of nonprofits and perceived use. This specification may lead to larger standard errors,
making it more difficult to get significant coefficient estimates. Our estimates, however, remain unbiased (see Achen
1982, 82–83).
12
201
202
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Table 2
Probit Models of Citizen Satisfaction with Social Services Received from Service Providers
Citizen Satisfaction (n 5 155)
Coefficient (SE)
Change in Probability
Use of Nonprofit
Perceived use of nonprofit
Republican
Years of schooling
Black
Atlanta metro area
Own residence
Married
Constant
x2
.062 (.397)
1.385*** (.489)
ÿ.397 (.360)
ÿ.040 (.058)
ÿ.531 (.332)
ÿ.129 (.289)
ÿ.012 (.170)
ÿ.230 (.298)
ÿ.185 (.923)
19.21**
.021
.459
ÿ.132
ÿ.013
ÿ.176
ÿ.043
ÿ.004
ÿ.076
Source: Georgia State Poll. (For more information, see http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwsps/srp/georgiastatepoll/index.htm.)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Changes in probability indicate marginal effects. Thus, we report the
proportional change in the predicted probability of y given a discrete change of x from its minimum value to its maximum.
*
p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
The results in table 2 indicate that it is perceived use of nonprofits, rather than actual
use, that appears to drive higher levels of satisfaction with nonprofit providers. Thus, these
results suggest that the positive image citizens have of ‘‘nonprofit’’ is sufficient to increase
their satisfaction with services. Note that blacks also appear less likely to give service
providers an A (p , 0.11, two-tail test), replicating the findings of previous research
(Brown and Coulter 1983; Durand 1976; Jacob 1972).
Nonprofits, thus, appear more successful than government in selling their image and
branding themselves as ‘‘effective service providers.’’ It is important to note, however, that
the scrutiny directed at government by the media, interest groups, and elected officials is
often more intense and critical than that applied to nonprofit organizations, perhaps
allowing these organizations to sustain a more positive image. But is attributing service
provision to a nonprofit organization enough to increase citizen satisfaction? Do citizens
randomly confuse nonprofit and governmental service providers?
Fact and Fiction: The Link between Satisfaction and Identifying Social
Service Providers
We now turn to consider when citizens are likely to incorrectly identify the type of provider
from which they receive social services. We estimate a probit model in which the
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 when the agency is incorrectly identified and
a value of 0 otherwise. We include in our set of predictor variables a variable indicating
whether the respondent had in fact contacted a nonprofit or governmental agency. We also
include our measure of satisfaction from the previous model and an interaction term
between satisfaction and type of agency. This term allows us to test whether the likelihood
of misidentifying a nonprofit social service provider is linked to citizens’ levels of
satisfaction with those services. We also include the same controls as in the previous
models.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
Table 3
Probit Model of the Misidentification of Social Service Providers
Citizen Satisfaction (n 5 155)
Coefficient (SE)
Change in Probability
Use of nonprofit
Years of schooling
Black
Atlanta metro area
Satisfaction
Nonprofit satisfaction
Own residence
Married
Constant
x2
3.889*** (.790)
.121 (.104)
.883 (.580)
ÿ1.426** (.698)
.834 (.667)
ÿ2.481** (.983)
ÿ.183 (.338)
ÿ.356 (.523)
ÿ3.684** (1.596)
60.01***
.129
.004
.029
ÿ.047
.028
ÿ.083
ÿ.006
ÿ.012
Source: Georgia State Poll. (For more information, see http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwsps/srp/georgiastatepoll/index.htm.)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Changes in probability indicate marginal effects. Thus, we report the
proportional change in the predicted probability of y given a discrete change of x from its minimum value to its maximum.
*
p , .10; **p , .05; ***p , .01, two-tailed test.
The results in table 3 suggest that citizens are more likely to incorrectly identify
nonprofits than governmental agencies. The significant interaction term denotes a decrease
in the likelihood that citizens will misidentify nonprofits when they are satisfied with the
services they have received; thus, when they are dissatisfied with the services received
from nonprofits, they are more likely to incorrectly identify the service provider as
a governmental agency.15 This analysis provides important evidence that citizens’
misidentification of nonprofits is not simply a random phenomenon. Rather, the perception
may exist that nonprofits deliver services of a sufficient quality to warrant a positive
satisfaction rating. At the same time, a poor service experience that yields a negative
satisfaction rating is more likely to be attributed to government because the quality of
services provided by public agencies is perceived to be inferior.
CONCLUSION
This research represents a first step in understanding the extent to which citizens, as users of
publicly funded services, can distinguish the type of service provider delivering program
services. In some cases government delivers publicly funded services, but increasingly
under devolution, privatization, and welfare reform, many services are also delivered by
nonprofit organizations. Our findings suggest that it is citizens’ perceptions of the provider,
and not their actual use, that drives satisfaction with the agency and the services it provides.
We believe that this is an important finding not previously addressed in the literature on service satisfaction or in the public and nonprofit management literatures. Organizational image
may simply be more important to citizens than the actual quality of the services they receive.16
We conducted a simple interaction between service satisfaction and correct identification. The chi-square of
0.0299 suggests that higher grades are not associated with a greater likelihood of misidentification.
16
We are not suggesting that nonprofits fail to offer high-quality services but, rather, draw attention to perceived
versus actual use with regard to influencing one’s personal satisfaction with services.
15
203
204
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
These findings also reveal that citizens are likely to misidentify nonprofits in a systematic
fashion. Citizens who are dissatisfied with services actually being provided by nonprofits are
more likely to believe that the entity providing the service is a governmental agency. This
misidentification may serve to reinforce citizens’ more positive assessments of services
provided by nonprofits.
Our findings also suggest broader implications for democratic governance.
Devolution and welfare reform have had a significant effect on the degree to which
public agencies contract with nonprofit organizations for service provision. To the degree
that knowledge acquisition on the part of citizens is less easily achieved in a contracting
environment, a lower degree of democratic accountability may result in terms of citizen
voice, access, and equity than the purported bureaucratic reforms are intended to fulfill. As
access, equity, and voice mechanisms are weakened because the information held by
citizens is inconsistent and disjointed, these same citizens may have fewer opportunities
and incentives to obtain correct information, receive high-quality services, offer feedback,
and hold individuals and agencies accountable. A challenge to be considered, then, is
that the structural mechanisms by which contracting relationships are arranged should be
aimed at increasing citizen knowledge of the relationship between government and its
contractors.
We believe that this research also suggests that government could realize new benefits
from its contract relationships with nonprofit organizations. When government is publicly
financing and providing services, it should brand and market those well-run programs so
that citizens may correctly attribute and assess quality as a reflection of government’s
commitment to quality. In those instances in which government contracts, emphasizing its
role in the selection of high-quality providers to deliver services under contract should also
serve to improve government’s image and citizens’ satisfaction with services. Citizens
receiving quality services can attribute credit not only to the service provider but also to
government for having acted in the capacity of a ‘‘smart buyer’’ in arranging the service
provision. This issue goes to the joint and coordinated roles that government and nonprofits
engage in and the complex process of funding services; identifying, referring, and treating
citizens; monitoring service delivery; and evaluating both program quality and the effect
on recipients. Understanding the various lines of authority and responsibility in contractual
relationships in which government and nonprofit agencies both fund and deliver services
remains a governance challenge.
It is important to note several limitations of the current study that can inform future
research. First, information should be collected on the purpose of the agency contact
(obtain information, obtain services, obtain referral, register a complaint), type of service
(employment training, child care, Medicaid eligibility), the point of contact (caseworker,
supervisor, senior manager), the number of contacts, the time period over which the
contacts occurred, the availability of service provider alternatives (public, nonprofit, faith
based, for profit), and the type of service provider evaluation available to citizens (survey,
interview, site inspection). This information would improve our understanding of a client’s
experience and may also clarify the determinants that shape citizens’ perception of use and,
in turn, how they identify a provider as either government or nonprofit. The well-known
time and cost constraints of public opinion surveys limited the extent of our investigation.
Finally, the recourse citizens have if the services they receive are of poor quality is an
important criterion for analyzing determinants of citizen identification of and satisfaction
with certain types of service providers.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
Given these limitations, we believe that this research has implications for
accountability in service provision. Our findings suggest that it is important for public
managers to consider strategies for informing citizens about how services are provided, the
organizations providing them, and the recourse they have if they are dissatisfied with their
service experience. Future research should explore the reliability and generalizability of
these conclusions across a broader range of actors and policy domains.
APPENDIX
Below are survey questions asked in a telephone poll in the State of Georgia (see table
A.1).
On a scale of 1–4 how much trust do you have in government in Washington to do what is
right? [allow 2]
,1. Just about always
,2. Most of the time
,3. Some of the time
,4. Never
,98. Don’t Know (DK)
,99. Refuse to Answer (RF)
On a scale of 1–4 how much trust do you have in state government to do what is right?
[allow 2]
,1. Just about always
,2. Most of the time
,3. Some of the time
,4. Never
,98. DK
,99. RF
How would you rank the overall quality of social services available in this country?
,1. A
,2. B
,3. C
,4. D
,5. F
,98. DK
,99. RF
Social service agencies are governmental and nonprofit agencies that provide health and
welfare services. Have you ever contacted a social service agency?
,1. Yes
,2. No
205
206
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Table A.1
Georgia Population and Sample Demographics
White
Black
College graduate
Female
Married
Georgia
Poll Sample
(n 5 816)
Subsample A
(n 5 220)
Subsample B
(n 5 155)
67.60%
26.60%
24.30%
48.45%
54.00%
64.89%
25.77%
39.80%
60.47%
56.01%
58.80%
30.00%
36.86%
73.30%
55.70%
62.74%
27.57%
36.13%
78.21%
56.41%
Note: Subsample A includes all survey respondents who reported that they had contacted a social service agency. Subsample B includes
all survey respondents who provided sufficient information to code the organization name provided as either government or nonprofit.
Census information for ‘‘college graduate’’ describes Georgia residents twenty-five years old and older. Census information for
‘‘married’’ describes Georgia residents over the age of fifteen.
,98. DK
,99. RF
Whom did you contact? [open response]
,98. DK
,99. RF
Was the agency . . .
,1. nonprofit?
,2. part of the government?
How would you rank the quality of the agency’s request to your response?
,1. A
,2. B
,3. C
,4. D
,5. F
,98. DK
,99. RF
REFERENCES
Achen, Christopher. 1982. Interpreting and using regression. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Alexander, Jennifer, Renee Nank, and Camilla Stivers. 1999. Implications of welfare reform: Do nonprofit
survival strategies threaten civil society? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28 (4): 452–75.
Asher, Herbert. 2001. Polling and the public: What every citizen should know. Washington, DC: CQ
Press.
Behn, Robert D. 1999. The new public management paradigm and the search for democratic
accountability. International Public Management Journal 1 (2): 131–65.
Beinecke, Richard H., and Robert DeFillippi. 1999. The value of the relationship model of contracting in
social services reprocurements and transitions: Lessons from Massachusetts. Public Productivity
and Management Review 22 (4): 490–501.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
Bennett, James T., and Manuel H. Johnson. 1981. Better government at half the price. Ottawa, IL:
Carolina House.
Boris, Elizabeth T. 1998. Myths about the nonprofit sector. Urban Institute, July 1. Available at
www.urban.org/periodcl/cnp/cnp_4.htm.
Brooks, Arthur C., and Gregory B. Lewis. 2001. Giving, volunteering, and mistrusting government.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20 (4): 765–69.
Brown, Karin, and Philip Coulter. 1983. Subjective and objective measures of police service delivery.
Public Administration Review 43 (1): 50–58.
Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. The private roots of public action:
Gender, equality, and political participation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Commons, Margaret, Thomas G. McGuire, and Michael H. Riordan. 1997. Performance contracting for
substance abuse treatment. Health Services Research 32 (5): 631–50.
DeHoog, Ruth Hoogland. 1984. Contracting out for human services: Economic, political, and
organizational perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press.
DeHoog, Ruth Hoogland, David Lowery, and William E. Lyons. 1990. Citizen satisfaction with local
governance: A test of individual, jurisdictional, and city-specific explanations. Journal of Politics
52 (3): 807–37.
DeVita, Carol J. 1997. Viewing nonprofits across the states. Urban Institute briefing. Available at
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID5307019.
Dicke, Lisa A., and J. Steven Ott. 1999. Public agency accountability in human services contracting.
Public Productivity and Management Review 22 (4): 502–16.
Donahue, John D. 1989. The privatization decision: Public ends, private means. New York: Basic Books.
Durand, Roger. 1976. Some dynamics of urban service evaluations among blacks and whites. Social
Science Quarterly 56 (3): 698–706.
Farley, Barbara L. 1995. ‘‘‘A’ is for average: The grading crisis in today’s colleges.’’ Issues of Education
at Community Colleges: Essays by Fellows in the Mid-Career Fellowship Program at Princeton
University, June 1.
Fowler, Floyd. 1993. Survey research methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Goldsmith, Stephen. 1997. The twenty-first century. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Gronjberg, Kirsten A. 1993. Understanding nonprofit funding: Managing revenues in social service and
community development organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers.
Hammack, David C. 2001. Introduction: Growth, transformation, and quiet revolution in the nonprofit
sector over two centuries. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 30 (2): 157–73.
Hatry, Harry P. (1999). Performance management: Getting results. Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press.
Hauque, M. S. 2001. The diminishing publicness of public service under the current mode of governance.
Public Administration Review 61 (1): 65–82.
Hero, Rodney E. 1986. The urban service delivery literature: Some questions and considerations. Policy
18: 654–77.
Hodgkinson, Virginia, and Murray Weitzman, with John A. Abrahams, Eric A. Crutchfield, and
David R. Stevenson. 1996. Nonprofit almanac 1996–1997. Washington, DC: Independent Sector.
Jacob, Herbert. 1972. Contact with government agencies: A preliminary analysis of the distribution of
government services. Midwest Journal of Political Science 16: 123–46.
Johnston, Jocelyn M., and Barbara S. Romzek. 1999. Contracting and accountability in state Medicaid
reform: Rhetoric, theories, and reality. Public Administration Review 59 (5): 383–99.
Kennedy, John M., and Brian Vargus. 2001. Challenges in survey research and their implications for
philanthropic studies research. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 30 (3): 483–94.
Kettl, Donald F. 1993. Sharing power: Public governance and private markets. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Kramer, Ralph M. 1994. Voluntary agencies and the contract culture: Dream or nightmare? Social Service
Review 68 (1): 33–60.
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. The people’s choice: How the voter makes
up his mind in a presidential campaign. New York: Columbia University Press.
207
208
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Link, M. W., and R. W. Oldendick. 2000. The role of survey research in the benchmarking process.
Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management 12 (1): 138–64.
Lyons, William E., and David Lowery. 1989. Citizens’ response to dissatisfaction in urban communities:
A partial test of a general model. Journal of Politics 51 (4): 841–68.
Lyons, William E., David Lowery, and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog. 1992. The politics of dissatisfaction:
Citizens, services, and urban institutions. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
Mauser, Elizabeth. 1998. The importance of organizational form: Parent perceptions versus reality in the
day care industry. In Private action and the public good, ed. Walter W. Powell and Elisabeth S.
Clemens, 124–36. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Miller, T. I., and M. A. Miller. 1991. Standards of excellence: U.S. residents’ evaluations of local
government services. Public Administration Review 51 (6): 503–14.
Morgan, David R., and Robert E. England. 1988. The two faces of privatization. Public Administration
Review 48 (4): 979–86.
Niskanen, William A., Jr. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Permut, S. E. 1981. Consumer perceptions of nonprofit enterprise: A comment on Hansmann. Yale
Law Journal 90: 1623–38.
Peters, B. Guy, and John Pierre. 1998. Governance without government? Rethinking public
administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 (2): 223–43.
Poister, T. H., and G. T. Henry. 1994. Citizen ratings of public and private service quality: A comparative
perspective. Public Administration Review 54 (2): 155–60.
Prager, Jonas, and Desai Swati. 1996. Privatizing local government operations. Public Productivity and
Management Review 20 (2): 185–203.
Romzek, Barbara S., and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1994. Issues of accountability in flexible personnel
systems. In New paradigms for government: Issues for the changing public service, ed. Patricia W.
Ingraham and Barbara S. Romzek, 263–94. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Romzek, Barbara S., and Jocelyn M. Johnston. 2001. State contracting, social service networks, and
effective accountability: An exploratory model. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30–September 1.
Saidel, Judith R. 1991. Resource interdependence: The relationship between public agencies and nonprofit
organizations. Public Administration Review 51 (6): 543–53.
Salamon, Lester M. 1989. Beyond privatization: The tools of government action. Washington, DC: Urban
Institute Press.
———. 1995. Partners in public service: Government–nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization: The key to better government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers,
Inc.
———. 2000. Privatization and public–private partnerships. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers,
Inc.
Schlesinger, Mark. 1998. Mismeasuring the consequences of ownership: External influences and
the comparative performance of public, for-profit, and private nonprofit organizations. In
Private action and the public good, ed. Walter W. Powell and Elisabeth S. Clemens, 85–113.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, and Christine Roch. 2000. Allocational efficiency: You
can’t always get what you want—but some do. In Choosing schools: Consumer choice and the
quality of American schools, by Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Melissa Marschall, 164–84.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sclar, Elliott D. 2000. You don’t always get what you pay for: The economics of privatization. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Serra, George. 1995. Citizen-initiated contact and satisfaction with bureaucracy: A multivariate
analysis. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5 (2): 175–88.
Sharp, Elaine B. 1986. Citizen demand making in the urban context. Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press.
Van Slyke and Roch
Citizens in Government—Nonprofit Contracting Relationship
Smith, G. E., and C. A. Huntsman. 1997. Reframing the metaphor of the citizen–government relationship:
A value centered perspective. Public Administration Review 57 (4): 309–18.
Smith, Steven Rathgeb, and Michael Lipsky. 1993. Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of
contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smith, Steven Rathgeb, and Michael R. Sosin. 2001. The varieties of faith-related agencies. Public
Administration Review 61 (6): 651–69.
Stanley, Gregory, and Lawrence Baines. 2001. No more shopping for grades at B-Mart. Clearing House
74 (4): 227–31.
Stipak, B. 1977. Attitudes and belief systems concerning urban services. Public Opinion Quarterly 41:
41–55.
Swindell, D., and J. M. Kelly. 2000. Linking citizen satisfaction data to performance measures: A
preliminary examination. Public Performance and Management Review 24 (1): 30–52.
Teixeira, Serna E. 1996. The meaning of grades. Social Studies Review 36 (1): 84–85.
Thomas, John C. 1982. Citizen-initiated contacts with government agencies: A test of three theories.
American Journal of Political Science 26 (August): 504–22.
Thompson, L. 1997. Citizen attitudes about service delivery modes. Journal of Urban Affairs 19 (3):
291–302.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1997. Privatization: Lessons learned by state and local governments.
Report to the Chairman, House Republican Task Force on Privatization, March, GAO/GGD-97-48.
Van Slyke, David M. 2003. The mythology of privatization in contracting for social services. Public
Administration Review 63 (3): 277–96.
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and equality: Civic
voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Weisbrod, Burton. 1988. The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
209