Dutch-Swedish trade in the seventeenth century
Continuity in a dependent relationship
Jeroen Pool
5670101
MA thesis, Early modern history
University of Amsterdam
Voor mijn opa,
voor mijn papa,
voor mijzelf.
Voor een generatie Pooltjes.
(For my grandfather,
for my father,
for myself.
For a Pool generation.)
2 INTRODUCTION
7
PART ONE - PRE-1645
PART ONE – INTRODUCTION
14
1.1 KNOW-HOW (ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR)
1.1.1 Beginnings
15
1.1.2 First push: 1580s
16
1.1.3 Second push: 1618-1619
20
1.1.4 After the second push
24
1.2 NETWORKS
25
1.3 POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS
1.3.1 Institutional level: Swedish “mercantilism” and self-assertion
27
1.3.2 Political level
31
PART ONE – CONCLUSION
41
3 PART TWO - POST-1645
PART TWO – INTRODUCTION
46
2.1 KNOW-HOW (ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR)
2.1.1 New generation, different priorities
48
2.1.2 First characteristic: Dutch merchants’ activities disconnecting from
the Dutch market
48
2.1.3 Second characteristic: decline of importance Swedish market
51
2.1.4 Third characteristic: increased competition
52
2.2 NETWORKS
2.2.1 Point of entry
54
2.2.2 After the entry - network as consolidation of Swedish trade?
56
2.3 POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS
2.3.1 Institutional level: Sweden’s grand initiatives of commerce
58
2.3.2 Political level: Dutch-Swedish politics amplified
62
PART TWO – CONCLUSION
65
CONCLUSION
68
BIBLIOGRAPHY
73
SUMMARY
77
4 PREFACE
Coming from the old city centre Gamla Stan, crossing and moving up the hill on Södermalm, a big red,
white and blue-striped flag catches the wind above the street. On the street level a big iron gate partly
denies the view to what is apparently a courtyard, with a statue in the middle and, at the far end, a small
staircase leading up to a grand, majestic house. Indeed, calling it a palace would not be an exaggeration.
The Dutch embassy resides in the heart of Stockholm, Sweden’s capital. It is one of the few
embassies that has such a prominent and the same time regular position in the city. Hundreds of
Stockholmers pass by daily on their way to work, on their bikes in the summer, in thick boots and with
warm hats in the winter. The majority of those passersby know what is behind the gate (the overhanging
flag is a clear hint), but perhaps only a few know its true origin: the building was build for Louis de Geer,
one of the Dutch Republic’s most prominent merchants and certainly the single most prominent Dutch
trader in Dutch-Swedish trade during the seventeenth century. During the Dutch Golden Age and
Sweden’s stormakstid, ages he himself in many ways actually helped form and shape, both the fortunes
and influence of this merchant rose to infinite heights. And in De Geer’s wake came many other
Dutchmen.
The subject of this thesis has always been quite inevitable. Ever since moving from the
Amsterdam to Stockholm, I have been confronted with the footprints of my fellow countrymen in
Sweden. Upon hearing I am Dutch and studying history, almost every Stockholmer’s eyes lighten up in
recognition, followed by ‘Aah, but then you must know that’ the Dutch helped build Göteborg and that in
Stockholm there were many Dutchmen during Sweden’s stormakstid. In 1628, Dutchmen helped build
the Swedish flagship Vasa, a ship that was meant to be king Gustaf Adolf’s pride and joy - a joy that
lasted for only a few minutes, after which the top-heavy construction sank to the bottom of the
archipelago during its maiden voyage. Not so long after, Dutchmen helped redesign Slussen, the system
of sluices in the middle of the city. More examples can be given, but the overarching idea is the same:
during the seventeenth century, Dutch-Swedish relations were firmly in place. These relations were for a
substantial part based on mutual and, in the first half of the century, ever-increasing trade. To this day, De
Geer’s palace-like residence in Swedish capital attests to this and the latter would indeed be a daily
reminder for me of what once was. It therefore was a natural field of interest indeed.
This interest could have never taken the concrete shape of a master thesis without the expert
guidance from several university professors. Much gratitude I have towards my supervisors Marjolein ‘t
Hart (University of Amsterdam), Leos Müller (Stockholm University) and Clé Lesger (University of
Amsterdam). Marjolein ‘t Hart guided me through administrative mazes and provided the initial support
for my thesis. The discussions I had with Leos Müller at Stockholms universitet during the early phase,
5 as well as mr. Müller’s knowledge and suggestions, provided me with ideas and insights I would not have
gotten otherwise and were the initial seeds for my thesis. I am therefore very grateful mr. Müller agreed
to also be its second reader. Clé Lesger voiced the critical and much-needed hard questions I would
perhaps not have asked myself otherwise, and made sure that my thesis gained much more focus and can
be presented in the form it is in today. During moments of some despair, mr. Lesger kept his patience and
oversight and was steadfast, pointing me again in the right direction. Mr. Lesger to me was the perfect
supervisor.
Writing her master thesis at the same time as me was Sofie. Together, we followed an almost
similar study path, a path which for me was not always easy. When I decided to finally start work on my
master thesis one-and-a-half year after coming to Stockholm, in the Autumn of 2012, the initial
combination of a full time job with full time studies was challenging, to say the least. A part time job
somewhat lifted some of that challenge, but by then, Spring 2013, the inevitable stress and anxieties of a
definite deadline lurking ever-closer provided its own hardships, not only in terms of studies. Sofie was
the counter-balance in this. I would be bothered, Sofie would not. I would freak out, she would not. I
would question everything, Sofie would have the answers. Only now do I see how incredibly patient she
must have been with me. I love her and thank her for it, as I do for many other things.
My parents are the people without whom this thesis would not have been written in the first
place. Their support has been unquestionable throughout the whole of my studies, even during my many
side steps. After moving to Stockholm, I always knew and could feel in the back of my head that they
were somehow there with me. And often they were there, in person in Stockholm. We have come to
enjoy this beautiful city together, and Stockholm has become, in their own words, their second home. I
wouldn’t discard their former second home, Italy, just yet though.
This thesis, however, is dedicated to one more person. It is the person I made the promise to to
make sure it would be written in the first place - or better, to not let my quite spontaneous decision to
move to Sweden make me abandon this project. Ever since starting my History studies, the inevitable
question would be ‘How are the studies going?’, accompanied by slightly widened twinkling eyes and a
firm handshake. Throughout the years I would often answer with something general, not wanting to
bother too much with the details of the stress of a paper or an exam or of the fact that I lay in bed until ten
o'clock every morning. But now, seven years after starting my studies, to that one question there really is
only one answer left to give.
Opa Pool, de studie is klaar.
J.P.
Stockholm, July 4, 2013
6 INTRODUCTION
Historiographic framework
Dutch relations with Sweden have already received their fair share of academic scrutinization. Of special
interest have been the relations in the first half of seventeenth century, the period in which Sweden is
generally being perceived as becoming a ʻGreat Powerʼ and taking a prominent place on the stage of
European politics (an era known in Sweden as storkmakstiden). This rise, together with that of the Dutch
Republic during roughly the same time, means that scholars have been discussing how both entities
influenced each other during that period. Although some studies have focussed on aspects such as
cultural exchange, notably intellectual exchanges, architecture and urban planning and social welfare,1
the dominant theme has been that of trade - divided by two-subthemes.
Firstly, this theme has been discussed from a fairly broad economic stance. The number of ships
sailing and volume and kinds of goods shipped back and forth across the Baltic and North Sea, and,
deriving from that, the importance of both entities in each otherʼs and European economy often form a
central focus for many authors. Undoubtedly, the main academic dominating this field of interest is
Thomas Lindblad. His PhD thesis, published in 1982, focusses on Dutch-Swedish trade between 17381795: it questions how the general Dutch and Swedish economic development in that century converged
with or diverged from Dutch-Swedish trade specifically.2 Inevitably, he touches upon the origins of that
trade during the century before, and therein differentiates between three different phases which in later
years he would expand on in additional articles. The first is a phase of friendship (1614-1645) in which
the Dutch Republic and Sweden partnered up to safeguard themselves politically and commercially leading to what Lindblad calls the “zenith” of their trade relations between 1640 and 1645. It entailed the
heavy influx of Dutch merchants into Swedish society, most notably Louis de Geer, and their dominating
the Swedish economy.3 The period 1645-1679 was a period of “incidents” and saw a constant swing of
the “pendulum of power” between Sweden and the Republic - a period of hostility. Nonetheless, Dutch
influence on Swedish industry and trade remained high. From 1679 on there was a supposed phase of
neutrality, characterized by a “rejuvenation of the Dutch-Swedish partnership, albeit on a different
foundation”. A more precocious attitude between both powers, therefore, but a “strong economic
interdependency” nonetheless.4 Additionally, and closely linked to the earlier ‘phases’, in a key article on
the Dutch-Swedish trade in the second half of the seventeenth century Lindblad posits the notion of a
1
Rietbergen, “C.C. Rumpf” and Broberg, “The trade of ideas”; Noldus, Trade in good taste; Israel, “Dutch influence
on urban planning”.
2
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 5.
3
Lindblad also wrote an article on Louis de Geer, discussing the “quality and impact of his entrepreneurship”.
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”.
4
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 13-15.
7 Swedish emancipation, initially only politically (from the 1650s), but following that also commercially through a diversification of its export markets to include the British and through implementing
mercantilist measures, throughout the period 1650-1700. Finally, emancipation supposedly occurred also
transport-wise - by means of an increasing Swedish share in Dutch-Swedish trade from the 1680s.5
The second pillar of Dutch-Swedish trade that has received a good deal of academical as well as
more recent attention, are the Dutch merchants that actually conducted the trade with the Swedes. These
merchants often either moved or spent great deals of time in Sweden – especially Stockholm, the centre
of Swedenʼs trade at the time. The entrepreneurial approach has led historians to either write (sometimes
fully-fledged) biographies - such as in the case of “the father of Swedish industry” Louis de Geer - or use
these families – such as Momma, Grill and Trip - to get an insight into trade practices (investment
strategies, the importance and number of goods et cetera).6 It is Leos Müller that puts forward strongly a
case to look at trade relations not necessarily from what he labels a “structural approach” (“as the sum of
commodity flows, price variations and supply-demand relations”, a tendency which Lindblad has), but
from the side of the entrepreneur and his behaviour. Müller uses the latter as an identifier of - in the case
of the Swedish society - the merchants’ level of dynamism in a period where the Swedish state moved
from feudalism to capitalism. “In other words, the concept of entrepreneurial behaviour can be used to
link the structural and the actor-focused explanations.”7 In the conclusion to his research, Müller states
that the Dutch merchants “played a key role in building up market-oriented sectors of the Swedish
economy. [...] Their contribution was of a macro-economic character.” However, at the same time the
effects of their activities “cannot be understood from other factors (the general economic situation and the
institutional environment)”.8
In general, it has been the period before 1645 that has received the most detailed analysis and
academical inquiries by historians researching Dutch-Swedish trade relations in the seventeenth century.
To call the period after 1645 neglected would be an overstatement, but it comes close to it. This becomes
especially apparent if we realize that in most general accounts of Dutch-Swedish trade before 1645 Dutch
merchants, especially De Geer and Trip, are actively being used as key and detailed examples of the rise
of the Dutch dominance over Swedish trade. Yet, when the period after 1645 is discussed, actors
suddenly disappear, and the focus is on macroeconomic numbers, political relations and a Swedish state
that is trying to “emancipate”.
5
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”.
Dahlgren, Louis de Geer, and Lindblad, ‘Louis de Geer’; Müller, The merchant houses and Klein, De Trippen;
Müller, ‘The Dutch entrepreneurial networks’ and De Jong, ‘Dutch entrepreneurs’.
7
Müller, The merchant houses, 14. He seems similarities between his approach and Klein’s work on De Trippen.
8
Ibidem, 283.
6
8 In summing up, the seventeenth-century Dutch-Swedish trade relations have been viewed from
an entrepreneurial and macro-economic perspective, with the period before 1645 getting the most
academic attention, probably because it is seen as the period of the Dutch Republic building up and
eventually dominating Swedish trade. The period post-1645 has academically been surveyed in lesser
detail, but is accounted for as an era in which Sweden started implementing mercantilist strategies: not
only diversifying its export markets and therefore becoming less reliant on the Dutch as intermediaries,
but also bringing down the Dutch share in the mutual trade between the two countries. An emancipation
in other words.
New approach needed
As we saw, the literature on seventeenth century Dutch-Swedish relations in general and Dutch-Swedish
trade specifically has been expanding in the past few years. One major characteristic of this literature is
the emphasis on macro-economic relations and entrepreneurial behaviour. Especially the macroeconomic analysis done most rigorously by Lindblad, has, naturally, added a great deal to understanding
the balance of trade relations between the Dutch and the Swedes. There are, however, still some gaps and
uncertainties within the narrative of Dutch-Swedish trade. These become even more clear when we
consider what others have deemed as the foundations of successful Baltic trade.
It is Cátia Antunes who has been the first historian to fully theorize a more rounded approach to
trade relations in the Baltic. In her article “Atlantic entrepreneurship: cross-cultural business networks,
1580-1776”, Cátia Antunes looks into why and how the Baltic was mainly used by merchants for non
cross-cultural trading, in contrast to cross-cultural trade in the Atlantic. 9 By doing so, she disseminates
two key characteristics why general Baltic trade was so favourable to merchants: 1) continuity and 2)
nature of traded goods. By continuity Antunes means that merchants could count on a certain endurance,
a longer period of prosperous trade, in their business with the Baltic. Continuity was based on three
elements:
1. Knowledge and know-how how trade in the area functioned. Derived from having traded
with the area over a longer time already.
2. Pre-existence of well established and social and commercial networks, often perpetuating
the presence of the same families for generations in the Baltic. […] This continuous presence
contributed to the accumulation of knowledge, know-how, contacts and socio-economic
mechanisms to surmount possible political turmoil or economic downfalls.
9
Antunes, “Atlantic entrepreneurship”.
9 3. Political and institutional frameworks guarding economic life in the Baltic. Investors
operating in the Baltic were able to rely on diplomatic treaties, bilateral trading agreements and
letters of privilege to foreign communities in several Baltic cities. […] The existence of
diplomatic, economic and juridical frameworks helped to shape and secure most business in
the Baltic.
The second focus of Antunes’ framework is that of the nature of the traded goods, with again
three subelements:
1. Fairly low average investment.
2. Seasonality of trade and investments more steady and flexible.
3. A fairly high degree of specialization in terms of trading routes, products exchanged and
transportation capacities involved. This specialization was especially important once
associated with investments in bulk trade, since the profits under these general conditions were
quite considerable and therefore one could risk entering these markets on one's own private
account, or else within a joint venture with people from the same social and religious
background.
Strikingly, Dutch-Swedish trade throughout the first half of the seventeenth century ticks all of
the boxes of the continuity pillar of Antunes’ framework. Over the course of a couple of decades, the
Dutch Republic and its merchants’ increased trade-activities with Sweden testify to successful
entrepreneurial behaviour - the ability to seize on business opportunities, what I consider to be the
colouring for the “know how” pillar -, while social and commercial networks were being forged by those
Dutch merchants who (semi-)permanently moved to Sweden or else had regular business there. Indeed, it
seems no exaggeration to state that the Dutch were the dominant trading partner with the Swedes during
these decades. This also seems to come to the fore in the political and institutional frameworks that were
created then, since the first half of the seventeenth century saw, compared to previous times, an
increasing number of mutual-defence and commercial treaties signed between the two powers. Finally,
the trade between Sweden and the Dutch Republic was specialized, with the raw goods copper, iron and
tar as being the primary trade goods.10
10
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”, 13.
10 What is important to underline is that within Antunes’s continuity framework the above pillars
were all essential for a merchant to have successful trade relations with the Baltic region. This is
therefore where I suggest the first addition to the literature on Dutch-Swedish trade can be made: to
weigh all the factors - the entrepreneurial behaviour (the actors, in other words), the macroeconomic
numbers and the political and institutional relations - and assess their position within the Dutch-Swedish
trade system. How did the various aspects influence each other, which was a cause and which an effect?
The benefit of this approach is that it can make more clear what the actual catalysts of Dutch-Swedish
trade were.
Furthermore, to look at Dutch-Swedish trade in this way might give more insight into what
happened to Dutch-Swedish trade relations after their “zenith”, after 1645, and opens up the discussion
about the supposed Swedish emancipation. Because what the dominant literature fails to answer in a clear
way, is exactly how this turnaround came about: which elements of the framework had failed the Dutch?
The literature now focusses, mostly, on the one element of declining economic numbers and attributing it
one-on-one to Swedish emancipatory and mercantilist strategies. But what then, for instance, to make of
the fact that after the signing of the 1679 peace treaty of Nijmegen - some thirty years after the first true
Swedish mercantilistic measures were put into places - the Dutch share in Dutch-Swedish shipping rose
again to the same height as during the 1640s, considered to be the “zenith” of Dutch-Swedish relations?11
Compare this with Michael Roberts’ claim that the 1679 treaty “entailed the sacrifice of long-held
Swedish commercial ambitions”12, and the scholastic undecidedness becomes even more poignant. In
relation to this it is important to emphasise my believe that the ‘political and institutional’ pillar also
includes mentalities, or a ‘way of thinking’ by either side - in this case most essentially from Sweden’s
side. Because what were the Swedes really trying to achieve throughout the century? From what position
were they acting? I would therefore suggest that this is where the second addition to the literature can
made: the well-documented trade relations in the first half of the seventeenth century can, after careful
evaluation, give us a point of departure to better analyse the declining relations between the Dutch
Republic and Sweden in the years after.
11
Lindblad, ‘Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 215. The numbers on the share of the Dutch in Dutch-Swedish
shipping can be found in Lindblad, ‘Trade and transport’, 14.
12
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 132-133.
11 Main research questions
Thus, this thesis propagates a new approach to the literature on Dutch-Swedish trade relations in the
seventeenth century: to analyze it as a whole, rather than the sum of its economical, political and
entrepreneurial parts.
To be able to describe the whole, we first have to answer the question what made up the basic
characteristics of Dutch-Swedish trade in the period before 1645 and how these separate characteristics
influenced trade. I will do this based on the framework by Antunes, specifically the characteristics of its
continuity element, since this is, especially in relation to the second question, what is most at stake. The
second question is therefore what the characteristics of Dutch-Swedish trade were in the period post1645. Likewise, Antunes’ continuity pillar will be guiding in this. It is important to emphasise that the
characteristics of both periods will be discussed and weighed on their own. In doing so, we can better
assess what were the fundamental differences between the two periods in Dutch-Swedish trade.
Only in the conclusion may we therefore really answer, how the structure of Dutch-Swedish trade
changed throughout the seventeenth century, and why this was so.
Sources
As my sources, I will depend mostly on English and Dutch secondary literature, with some published
primary sources to support my analysis of the period post-1645 specifically. Even though the literature is
at times, especially for the period post-1645, fairly limited, it is possible to formulate my own positions
within the discourse. This hinges most importantly on my implementation of Sweden-focused literature.
Finally, because of the fundamentally and truly groundbreaking research Lindblad has done for
Dutch-Swedish trade relations, it is inevitable to make him central in the discussion. However, I value to
emphasize the fact that no unnecessary Lindblad-criticising is intended. The necessary critique already
suffices.
12 PART ONE
PRE-1645
13 PART ONE - INTRODUCTION
Part one will be dealing with the question what the specific elements were in Dutch-Swedish trade
relations that led to the development and subsequent Dutch hegemony in Dutch-Swedish trade in the
period before 1645. In order to answer this question, I dissect the relations between the two powers and
analyze them through three different pillars: the know-how (entrepreneurial behavior) pillar, the network
pillar and the political and institutional pillar, thereby discussing how the Dutch and Swedes related to
each other for every pillar. The exception in this is the network pillar, which has a specific Dutch focus.
Only by doing this can we subsequently and properly discuss how all three pillars related to each other,
answering the question on what Dutch-Swedish trade in general, and Dutch dominance over Swedish
trade specifically was based. This I will do in the conclusion.
To underline this: of specific interest is the fact that I, for the know-how and political pillar, will
pay special attention to the Swedish side of the equation also. This is because I am of the opinion that this
side of the coin has been severely neglected in Dutch-Swedish trade historiography of this period, yet
would give us insights that will alter how we evaluate Dutch-Swedish trade relations specifically, and
Dutch-Swedish relations generally for this period.
The delimitation of the period that forms part one is not strict, at least not for its beginnings. In
general, the main analysis begins in the sixteenth century, as it is that century in which, as I shall argue,
the first real Dutch advances in Swedish trade occurred. This goes against the general historiography on
the subject, which sees the year 1614 as the kickoff for increasing Dutch mingling in Sweden’s trade.
However, for each pillar, the beginnings are arbitrary and not set in stone, more conforming to what I
perceive as natural starting points (fitting within the framework of my analysis) than setting one fixed
starting date. The ending date for the analysis is more firm: Swedish-Dutch historiography has
emphasised that the turning point for Dutch dominance in Sweden’s trade was mid-century, neatly
aligning itself with the notion that the role of the Dutch in international trade was at its height in 1648.
The zenith of Dutch-Swedish relations (not just trade), by all accounts, was reached in the years 1640-45.
1645 therefore seems like a fitting point in time to use as the ending for part one.
There is much to be analyzed and discussed. Let’s get to it.
14 1.1 KNOW-HOW (ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR)
1.1.1
Beginnings
I argue that the years before 1645 saw two periods in which there was a significant push of Dutch
merchants seizing on business opportunities in Swedish trade.
This is not to say that Dutch-Swedish trade did not develop until those moments. In fact, multiple
smaller expansions occurred. A couple of centuries after Frisian merchants, in the eighth or ninth century,
for the first time opened up the trade route to the Swedish town Birka (only thirty kilometers from the site
that two centuries later would see the foundation of Stockholm), the expanding influence of the Hanseatic
League, during the thirteenth and fourteenth century, brought Dutch merchants to most Swedish ports. In
this period, the growing importance of the trade activities with Sweden by Hanseatic members in general,
and Dutch towns specifically, can be seen through the fact that a number of privileges were granted to
them.13 It was therefore during these times that Dutch traders initiated their first recurrent contacts with
the Swedes and which subsequently, this led to the Dutch merchants gaining trade privileges in Sweden
in the fifteenth century.14
Dutch merchants undoubtedly ingrained themselves more with Swedish trade in parallel to the
tremendously expanding Dutch-Baltic trade of the sixteenth century. They for instance established
themselves (semi-)permanently in Stockholm and shipped their products (the import to Sweden of a
limited number of European luxury goods and the export of Swedish goods such as elk- and goatskins,
iron and raw copper) mostly through Danzig and Lübeck - cities in which Dutch merchants were present
also. A regular system of bills of exchange between Stockholm and Antwerp had by then also
developed.15 Yet, although general trade activities seemed to have been stable and fairly regular, Dutch
traders had relatively little focus for any specific Swedish export commodity, relying also partly on the
import into Sweden of luxury goods. In general, Dutch-Swedish trade activities seemed to be deriving
mostly from the rapidly evolving Dutch-Baltic trade - focussing mostly on grain exports, with the imports
of luxury goods by the Dutch to the Baltic up to then not taking center stage. This was, as argued by
Jonathan Israel, the case until the end of the 1580s.16
13
Kolkert, Nederland en het, 1-2.
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 11.
15
In 1569, the Antwerp merchant Willem Danseville had a house in Stockholm. Luxury goods included wine and
cloth. Lesger, Wijnroks, “The spatial organization”, 19, 24-25.
16
Israel, Dutch primacy, 50.
14
15 1.1.2
First push: 1580s
Jonathan Israel derives this observation partly from the fact that the Dutch, according to him, did not
figure prominently in the trade with “the more northerly strands of Baltic commerce”, Stockholm being a
part of these. This was, according to him, a trend only broken through during the 1590s, “a fundamental
change [coming] about which led to a marked strengthening of the Dutch position”.17 Yet, his observation
is, as we shall see, at least partially incorrect. Dutch trade with Sweden started fundamentally changing
not from the 1590s, but already from the 1580s, with a clear increase of Dutch merchants’ interest in
mostly Swedish copper and Swedish iron. This was therefore not linked to the Dutch importation of
luxury goods and partially undermines Israel’s argumentation. Generally, the developments in the 1580s
mark the first significant push of Dutch entrepreneurs acting on specific Swedish trade opportunities.
Two elements contributed to this push. The first element is the evolution of Dutch domestic
industries and their want for more, high quality and cheap raw materials copper and iron - both of which
could dominantly be found in Sweden. The second element was a growing European demand for both
raw materials and therefore the possibility for the Dutch to establish an international entrepôt function.
For now, by way of introduction, it is useful to discuss a factor that perhaps not directly contributed to the
Dutch push for further rooting in Swedish trade (the previous elements did this more), yet was very
favourable to the Dutch to achieve their goals: the bad state of the Swedish economy around that time.
Sweden’s general development at the end of sixteenth century was very poor: the country was
still very much an agricultural society, with an urbanization level of 1,4%, compared to Europe’s average
of 7,6%. It’s economic development since 1500 had lagged behind the European standard also (an index
of 160 versus Europe’s 177), and its above-average population increase from 1500 to 1600 can be
explained as “benefiting” from the fact that the region was “still almost empty”.18 Owing to a poor
climate, harvests were bad, with a good season only coming along once every eight years.19 Transactions,
including taxes and duties, were still mostly done by natural means and the society was “semi-feudal[ly]”
structured, with no middle-class existing and the upper class not exactly lush with riches either.20 Thus, a
lot of Charles IX’s and Gustav Adolphus’ efforts at the beginning of the century were geared towards
increasing Sweden’s fiscality, getting its hands on cash to pay for its wars - wars that cost the Swedes
some 80 to 90% of its total state revenue.21 This in turn meant that the Swedish rulers, as their successors
throughout the same century, tried to get a firm, central hold on Sweden’s economic life. They organized
17
Ibidem.
Van Zanden, “Early modern economic”, 70.
19
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 43.
20
Klein, De Trippen, 244, 336; Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 205.
21
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 43.
18
16 the country’s trade system through a staple-town system, in the hopes of diversifying and promoting trade
(labour), while at the same time controlling and increasing the extracting of revenue, by giving only some
specific towns the right to conduct foreign trade.22 Swedish merchants were nonetheless scarce and
export trade limited. In the 1610s, only 15% of the country’s “surplus production” (that is the production
that is not used for sustaining a basic livelihood) was being sold on international markets.23 All this again
undermines Israel’s argument that the Dutch did not play a significant role in the Baltic rich trades due to
the minor role they played in the rich trades of, among others, Sweden: the Scandinavian power, due to
its impoverished, self-sustaining state, simply did not even form a significant market for luxury goods.
For the Dutch, there was no significant role to play here.
For Dutch merchants there were thus ample business opportunities in a country that was
economically “retarded for a lack of investment capital, market outlets, technological sophistication and
entrepreneurial skills”, yet had a strong need for monetizing its “unique natural resources” such as copper
and iron.24 The fact that Dutch merchants had been present in the area from already earlier on would have
certainly been a contributing factor to their possibilities to expand their activities when a growing world
demand became obvious. Already in 1572, a Dutch merchant founded a copper brass works near
Uppsala, with others, not necessarily Dutch, following his example in the 1580s, 1590s and during the
first decade of the 1600s. The 1580s also saw a Dutchman, Willem de Wijk, coming to Sweden, “[being]
authorised to organise the development of the iron industry”.25 In 1605, the copper brass works that
would become one of Sweden’s leading brass works - at Nyköping - was founded by a southern
Netherlander, Willem de Besche, who had come to Sweden in 1596.26 De Besche and other foreign
investors brought with them skilled laborers and new technologies, not only in bronze working but also
for the manufacturing of bar iron, originating from Germany and Walloon.27 Interestingly, this shows that
Dutch know-how of the Swedish trade market was already by then a two-way affair: initially merely
utilizing their cumulative years of experience to trade with Sweden, Dutch merchants, more and more
recognizing the possibilities and future importance of copper, tried to seize the opportunity during this
first push by promoting copper’s industrial production, and therefore brought their know-how to Sweden.
This was, of course, all in an effort to expand the value of their own exports. Although likely, it should be
noted that it is not clear if this development on the production side positively affected the export of
copper from Sweden. Yet, this development, by emphasising the increasing importance of copper in
Dutch-Swedish trade from the 1580s, does lend credibility to Michiel de Jonge’s otherwise somewhat
22
Müller, The merchant houses, 43-44.
Müller referring to Jan Lindegren in The merchant houses, 45.
24
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 78.
25
Kirby, Northern Europe, 149.
26
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 36-37; Klein, De Trippen, 331.
27
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 56-57.
23
17 flawed argument (in lacking comparison with previous years) that the years 1586 and 1587 made up “[the
first, short] period of growth”.28 The latter observation also breathes new life into Klein’s argument that
the Amsterdam market seemed to be gearing up to a copper staple already before 1613.29 Yet, Klein
places the start of this dynamic in the 1590s, while the above suggests that this should be placed back
even further, in the 1580s.
The trend of the increasing influence and activities of Dutch merchants in Swedish copper
continued throughout the 1590s and 1600s, with the merchants trading in Swedish copper profiting
heavily from an expanding Dutch industry centered around that commodity.30 Noteworthy is that
Dutchmen started acting as Swedish agents - more and more doing business on Swedish behalf. In the
late 1590s, Dutch merchants became factors of the then-still count Charles and tasked to sell Swedish
goods, including copper, and buy Dutch goods, probably arms.31 These Dutch agents did not only seek
business opportunities for the Swedes in the United Provinces, but also in for instance France.32 In the
1600s, the shipping of arms from the Dutch Republic to Sweden, with iron and copper going the other
way around, continued, with according to De Jong (though this time more easily accepted) another
substantial, short burst of growth in 1606-1608. In these years, the merchant Willem Dans came to the
fore as the main trader in Swedish copper who in 1608 was also sent as a royal agent for the Swedish
Crown to buy a substantial amount of arms,33 most likely paying for the arms with his own cash, while
getting repaid in copper by the Swedes.
The increased involvement of the Dutch with Swedish trade also gave way to a more or less
direct economic exchange between Sweden and some Dutch state institutions - specifically copper-forarmament-exchanges, commencing from the 1590s.34 In the 1590s, the Admiralty of Amsterdam was a
28
Ibidem, 47-48. It should be noted that De Jong means growth of state-regulated export trade; however, this trade
formed a major pillar of Swedish exports and was almost completely dominated by copper and iron. De Jong bases
his argument on the fact that in 1586 and 1587, the Dutch merchant Gerard Pels and a consortium around Gerard
Joosten and Tideman Cornelius bought large quantities of raw copper and some iron: respectively 35% and 43%
(1586) and 6% and 12% (1587) of copper of what the Swedish state had to offer. In addition to De Jong arguing this
“growth” in lack of comparison with years previous to 1586, the major downfall of the numbers between 1586 and
1587 (78% versus 18% in total) would in fact point to a downturn within that period.
29
Klein, De Trippen, 327-328.
30
Ibidem, 324-329.
31
Compare Klein, De Trippen, 327, and De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 48. One of these factors was Abraham
Cabeliau, who later, in the 1620s, would become the chief bookkeeper of the Swedish crown, as well as co-founder
and major of Gothenburg. Klein, De Trippen, 327; Wrangel, De betrekkingen tussen, 22-23. NNBW, 7, 259-260,
confirms his trade activities with Sweden, but only says it’s “not impossible” that this Abraham Cabeliau is that
same Abraham C. mentioned as being the chief bookkeeper of the Swedish crown. No mention is made of his part
in the foundation of Gothenburg, neither of him becoming its major.
32
In 1598, Count Charles ordered Hans de Vrind to go to La Rochelle, Bourdeaux and Bayonne to establish trade
connections. Römelingh, Een rondgang langs, 35.
33
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 48-49.
34
Until 1604 up to 12% of the Swedish state-owned copper production (in 1594) and under 3% of the iron
production were used for these purposes - not huge amounts. Ibidem, 48.
18 buyer of raw Swedish materials, and after 1602 the Chamber of Amsterdam of the Dutch East India
Company. In 1607 a contract for the buying, from Dutch side, of copper and iron and the selling of
shipping material was signed between the Admiralty of Amsterdam and, by then, Charles IX. The Kalmar
War between Denmark and Sweden - and the Dutch States General’s effort to stay as neutral as possible
in this conflict - between 1611 and 1613 temporarily halted the copper-for-armaments exchanges, leaving
Hanseatic merchants to fill the gap.35 Yet, Dutchmen acting as agents for the Swedish Crown, such as
Melchior van Laer, could still scour the Dutch market for opportunities to sell or pawn Swedish copper
for hard cash - cash badly needed for the Swedish war effort. Prime parties in these were, considering the
neutrality-attempt somewhat surprisingly, the Admiralties (again, specifically, of Amsterdam), the Dutch
East India Company and even the States General, lending or paying “thousands of Dutch guilders [...], to
be repaid in copper.”36 Michiel de Jong argues that since the transactions made for these exchanges were
not recorded by the Swedes (copper came straight from the Swedish Royal Warehouse - managing a vast
amount of the total Swedish copper production - and its selling was recorded in special accounts), “the
Dutch merchants’ share in the copper trade of the Swedish Crown must have remained at a low level”.37 I
do not agree with the seeming generality of his conclusion. True, in some cases the role and involvement
of Dutch merchants has not been ascertained, specifically in the just-now mentioned examples of copperfor-armaments deals between the Dutch state institutions and the Swedish Crown. Yet, as we have seen,
often their involvement was not only very clear, but also prominent, as we can see from the fact that
Swedish rulers such as Charles IX and Gustaf Adolf hired Dutchmen as their factors to sell Swedish
copper. 38 Furthermore, it is highly likely that Dutch merchants, with their increasing knowledge of both
the Dutch as well as the Swedish markets, in addition to them working as factors for Swedish rulers such
as Charles IX and Gustaf Adolf , provided the connections made.
Also, as part of this first push of Dutch involvement in Swedish trade, we have to note the
increased interest of the Dutch in a couple of other Swedish commodities. Iron figured, from the 1600s
on, more and more in Dutch merchants business interactions with Sweden. This had a direct relation, as
the Swedish copper had, with the growing of a Dutch domestic industry, in this case that of small arms
and armour. That was in turn connected to the fact that original supply lines with Liège (southern
Netherlands) and Germany were cut-off due to war, as well as the lower price and higher quality of
Swedish iron. The result of this was, according to De Jong, a “reorientation [of] the growing domestic
production of small arms and armour around the supply of Swedish iron between 1604 and 1630” - as can
35
It was forbidden for any Dutchman - soldier or sailor - to enter the service of either Sweden and Denmark, nor
sell them arms or ammunition. Hill, The Danish Sound, 84 and De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 49.
36
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 49.
37
Ibidem.
38
Another example are the earlier discussed transactions of 1586 and 1587 (see n28). The copper, some iron and
iron cannon balls that were bought were in fact sold by the Dutch merchants to the admiralty of Amsterdam.
19 partly be seen in the rise of the Dutch share in Swedish iron, going from 20% already in 1606-1608 to
40% in 1620.39 Additionally, tar and pitch, used especially in the shipbuilding industry, were under Dutch
control from early on. Their export towards the Dutch Republic by the 1610s was already a 56% share of
the total Swedish export of the goods, increasing to 64% some fifty years later.40
1.1.3
Second push: 1618-1619
The second push of Dutch merchants seizing on business opportunities in Swedish trade - in other words,
increased efforts of Dutch merchants to get a grip on Swedish export trade - came in the period 1618-19.
After the Kalmar War (1611-1613), Sweden faced a huge problem, because of Denmark demanding a
significant 1.000.000 riksdaler ransom for the fortress of Älvsborg as well as nearby situated Göteborg
and some other market towns.41 Taking into account Sweden’s economic state, it becomes clear that the
country had no such money. It was mostly Dutch merchants who could capitalize on the Swedish
struggles to find ways to pay for this ransom,42 a capitalization that had strong connections to and
partially built on the earlier evolved Dutch-Swedish copper trade and Dutch involvement in the build-up
of the Swedish copper industry. Furthermore, this second push had another characteristic: the definite
entry in the Swedish industry and export trade of big-capital Dutch entrepreneurs, putting the initial push
of Dutch involvement in Sweden’s economy in overdrive.
Sweden had a twofold approach to improving its finances. First, it sought to increase and thereby
profit from its exports, meaning copper and iron (the former at that time more important than the latter).
Second, and partially resting on the efforts to increase production, Sweden started borrowing money.
Both initiatives meant that the Swedes had to accelerate the already earlier initiated trend of the
development of the Swedish copper and iron industries even more, mostly succeeding in great fashion
with copper. This was partly done through monopolization by the Swedish Crown of the complete
Swedish copper industry.43 Dutch merchants, owing to the developing Dutch-Swedish copper and iron
trade over the past decades, must have been alert to this increase also and tried to get a stake in the actual
export of the goods. In 1615 a consortium of unknown merchants tried to get a full monopoly of the
39
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs, 52 and 55.
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 65. Lindblad’s assertion that tar gained in importance only from
the late 1630s is wrong. Lindblad, “Evidence of”, 208.
41
Kirby, Northern Europe, 123; Hill, The Danish Sound, 86. Not all accounts are as clear about the number of
paying-back terms the Danes forced upon Sweden: Most accounts stick to four years, while Charles Hill says six.
42
Ideas by Dutch agents working on Sweden’s behalf to solve these struggles were sometimes ludicrous. Abraham
Cabeliau, in a letter written in Amsterdam on May 27 1613, asked the Swedish king to send him three ships, which,
together with some others, would capture Spanish ships carrying silver. This would be done under Moroccan
banner, as was already negotiated by Cabeliau with the emissary of the Moroccan king. Römelingh, Een rondgang,
50.
43
Compared to 1600, Swedish production of copper had risen fivefold in 1620. Klein, De Trippen, 334.
40
20 Swedish copper (not only for the Dutch market) by offering the Swedish Crown a huge credit of 250.000
rd - an offer that eventually fell through, but shows the economical prospects Dutch merchants gave
copper. 44
Significantly increasing Dutch merchants’ involvement, and thereby the second push of Dutch
knowledge and know-how of Swedish trade, would materialize in the period 1618-19. In 1619 another
consortium, among others made up of the Dutch entrepreneurs Louis de Geer and his brother-in-law
Steven Gerards, did succeed in getting a monopoly of Swedish copper on the Dutch market. They agreed
with Gustaf Adolf on a four year deal, paying a total of 180.000 rd for the copper they would receive.
This was an event of significant curiosity, because it meant, in the words of Klein that “[the StatesGeneral] owned their souls in suffering, [for they] would no longer receive a pound of copper”.45 Spurred
on by the state-to-state economic exchanges from the years before, as well as the political commitment
the Dutch and Swedes had made to each other through a treaty in 1614, Sweden had, in 1616, borrowed
150.000 rd directly from the Dutch institution, to be redeemed through copper. An additional loan, of the
same amount, was made in 1618.46 The 1619-deal the Swedish Crown made with the Dutch
entrepreneurs, with its granting of the copper monopoly for the Dutch market to private Dutch
entrepreneurs, fully messed up that deal. It meant that already after three years the Swedish Crown had
one-sided fully given up its responsibility to repay the Dutch States-General’s loan through the sending
of copper - indeed, the loan was never repaid.47 The only help the Swedish Crown got in repaying its debt
to the States-General, was with repaying the interest on the loans - with copper as pawn. This help was
taken up, simultaneously to their involvement in increasing Swedish copper exports, by a number of
Swedish, German and Dutch merchants, including the Dutch merchant Louis de Geer and the Trip
family. A full takeover of the Swedish debt to the States-General by Dutch merchants seems not to have
occurred.48 This nuance has been unaccounted for in most other Dutch or English literature, and is in fact
misrepresented in the most recent literature on the topic, because it is often used an argument for
expanding Dutch control of the Swedish copper market.49 Although it must be admitted that the amount
44
Klein, De Trippen, 337 and 339.
Ibidem, 337-338.
46
RSG, 20 October 1616 and 8 december 1616; Klein, De Trippen, 335.
47
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 7.
48
One of che crucial quote on this is in Klein, De Trippen, 336: “Wederom had Zweden echter te veel hooi op de
vork genomen, want weldra haperde het aan de aflossing van de schuld. Het kostte zelfs de grootste moeite te
voldoen aan de renteverplichting. Gustaf Adolf nam daarbij onder andere Lodewijk [Louis] de Geer in de arm, die
gedurende een aantal jaren de rente aan de Staten-Generaal betaalde, waarvoor hij koper in betaling ontving.” A
thorough, if somewhat confusing account of the negotiations surrounding these events can be found in BreedtveltVan Veen, Louis de Geer, 56-62.
49
Leos Müller states: “The loan contract was finalized in 1616 and in the next two decades Swedish copper sales in
Amsterdam became a very important part of the economic exchange between the two countries.It also became the
subject of an extended dispute between the Swedish Crown and the Trip family, which took over the Swedish loans
45
21 of interest on the Dutch loan was in itself high enough to make Sweden deliver significant amounts of
copper to De Geer and the Trips,50 we can conclude from the successful 1619 deal that the sudden
expansion of Dutch involvement in Swedish export trade was already underway, regardless of the Dutch
merchants’ help to repay (the interest of) the Swedish state loans. The Dutch entrepreneurial involvement
in the latter only enforced the former, yet was not elementary to it.
The above makes clear that the Dutch-Swedish trade had changed dimensions since its first push:
instantaneous, huge investments were made by a very select group of Dutch entrepreneurs, thereby
immediately positioning themselves as the key stakeholders in Dutch-Swedish trade. Louis de Geer was
the first and most prominent of them, investing, with help of his brother-in-law Steven Gerards, in a
Swedish copper monopoly in 1619 in immense proportions. Their agreements with the Swedish Crown
were such that they were even exempt from the monopoly of the First Swedish Copper Company
(funnelling the Swedish selling of the Swedish copper), founded in the same year. Ironically and telling
about the increasing Dutch influence, investments in the First Swedish copper company were mainly by
Dutch and German merchants, with Louis de Geer paying again 125.000 rd, thereby getting a Dutch
friend and factor, Anthony Monier, on the board. The company was not very successful, but De Geer
used this company to make sure his credits to the Swedish Crown were repaid, a point to which I will
return soon. Other Dutch merchants, such as Paridon van Horn and Slicher, were in the meantime also
still investing in Swedish copper.51
The second main Dutch entrepreneurial investors in Swedish copper were undoubtedly the Trip
brothers. They had already in 1618 tried to get the full Swedish copper monopoly, but were beaten to it
by the Louis de Geer-Steven Gerards combination. Yet, from 1626-1627 they finally found their way into
the Swedish copper exports through aiding Louis de Geer in his efforts to pay the interest on the loans of
the Swedish Crown to the Dutch States-General, as well as, in subsequent years, by taking control of big
amounts of Swedish copper as pawn, given to them by a Swedish factor.52 The Swedish debt to the Trips
already around 1635 amounted to about 1,000,000 Swedish rd, a staggering amount indeed.53 And, just
like with the loan of the Dutch States-General, these debts were never repaid either, even though the 1645
treaty between the Dutch Republic and Sweden even had a full separate clause addressing this issue.54
in the late 1620s” [my italics]. Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial”, 61. Lindblad only mentions the fact that “the
Swedish state [appeared] as a less than ideal debtor”. Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 214. A search
in the RSG between 1619 and 1625 results in no mentioning of the unpaid loan.
50
The interest of the Dutch loan to Sweden over 1629 was 31.572 Dutch florins. Klein, De Trippen, 336.
51
Ibidem, 341. De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 50.
52
Klein, De Trippen, 336, 350.
53
Ibidem, 395.
54
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 117, n1.
22 Nevertheless, the total of Dutch merchants, through a number of copper monopolies granted by
the Swedish Crown throughout the years, eventually took full control of the Swedish copper exports. In
1620 Dutch merchants had a share of 30% in the royal copper export, the middle of the 1620s saw a dip,
but in the 1640s 74% of Swedish copper was exported to the Republic and Amsterdam replaced Lübeck
as the main European staple market for copper.55 Thereafter, Klein’s conclusion that there never was such
a thing as a single world staple market for copper becomes invalid, since in 1668, we see that the Dutch
had gained a 100% market share in the Swedish copper trade - with Sweden at that time being the
primary European source of the good, while the Dutch already controlled the second source, Japan.56
The second push of the Dutch from around 1618-19 was not only marked by copper, but also by
iron - albeit the latter gaining proper traction a bit later. Some of the same key players were involved
(Louis de Geer, the Trips, Steven Gerards), emphasising the crucial, exclusionary role big capital had
gotten. It was Willem de Besche, the same person as who we have seen in 1604 already investing in a
brass works in Sweden, who provided Louis de Geer in 1618 with invaluable advice and acted as his
factor in taking control of an ironworks in Finspong - the latter forming collateral for a loan with a very
high 20% interest rate that De Geer had given Gustaf Adolf.57 This investment would, together with De
Geer’s Swedish copper affairs around that time, form the start of Louis de Geer rise to him becoming the
“father of Swedish industry”. Yet, the statement, put forward by Lindblad, that De Geer “was quick
among Amsterdam merchants in realizing that the development of the still embryonic Swedish iron
industry offered far more interesting long-run opportunities for expansion than did the State-controlled
copper mining and trade” seems to me wrongly formulated.58 De Geer was directly profiting from Willem
de Besche’s earlier own investment in the Swedish iron industry (having moved to Sweden in 1595, he
had a managing role in the Finspong ironworks previous to the 1618-cooperation with De Geer), the
latter obviously also going for the long haul by investing in an industry, rather than a trade. What
differentiates the two men from each other is the fact that De Geer had the means necessary for the huge
investments required to make an immediate impact on both industry and trade, and still remain
independent, while De Besche more and more turned into an “employee of the king”.59 Furthermore, De
Geer was simply better connected, while De Besche stayed more of a middle-man.
55
Copper exports from Stockholm had risen from an average 650,000 Dutch pounds of copper in 1600, 1603, 1610
and 1613, to 3,264,000 and 2,611,120 Dutch pounds in 1619 and 1621 respectively. An important part of this was
shipped to the Dutch Republic. De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 45. Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”,
61, 64.
56
Compare Klein, De Trippen, Lindblad, “Trade and transport”, 13.
57
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 78. Klein, De Trippen, 247.
58
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 78.
59
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 69.
23 Louis de Geer’s push in the Swedish iron industry paid off almost immediately: already from
1621 Louis de Geer’s recent involvement in the iron industry enabled him to provide the Swedish army
with arms, made by his own Swedish-based factories, for Sweden’s Polish war campaigns. Between 1624
and 1629, Louis de Geer’s sales to the Swedes amounted to 810,000 guilders, while sales increased
between 1630 and 1633 and then amounted to 1,890,000 guilders.60 Yet, although these figures were
impressive, the Dutch needed more time to take over the iron market than the copper market, since only
in the second half of the 1640s did the balance sway towards them, with a 44% share going to the Dutch
market versus a 42% share of Swedish iron going to Danzig and Lübeck.61 Müller points out that the
ending of the Twelve Years’ Truce and Sweden entering the the Thirty Years’ War was a further catalyst
for the Swedish iron trade: not only was there, with the disruption of German supplies, a need for the
Dutch Republic for a new supply line of iron, Sweden also increasingly was in need of military supplies,
in addition to hard cash.62
1.1.4
After the second push
Undoubtedly, the entry of Dutch entrepreneurs in the Swedish economy and trade had a tremendous
effect on the development of Sweden’s economy, from which the Dutch entrepreneurs profited hugely
through their role in the export of the resulting products. The second push, as I have described it, was in
that sense only just that: an initiation leading to greater things over the next couple of decades.
De Geer and the Trips would each achieve dominance, the latter mostly in the copper trade, the
former mostly in the iron industry (yet working closely together with the Trips). But De Geer never gave
up on copper: in 1634 he renewed his contacts with the Trips and their investment in a new Swedish
copper totalled a staggering 2.4 million guilders.63 Additionally, he never seized to involve himself more
in Swedish business affairs or lend more money to the Swedish Crown, for instance in the Dano-Swedish
War (1643-1645). In one of the defining Danish-Swedish wars of the century, the Dutch States General
allowed Louis de Geer, on request of Sweden, to put together a war fleet - twice. The first fleet,
consisting mostly of modified trade vessels, was far from effective, while the second fleet had more
success, lifting the Danish siege of Göteborg. Tellingly, Queen Christina of Sweden gave De Geer few
praise, and would, following tradition, not pay back the costs De Geer had made for the outfitting of the
fleets.64
60
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 79.
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 63.
62
Ibidem; Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 79.
63
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 79.
64
Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek, 10, 275-277.
61
24 In the wake of big-capital entrepreneurs such as De Geer and Trip came other Dutch merchants.
In 1624, Willem Usselincx was granted the right to form a huge Swedish trading company, focussing on
Africa, Asia, America and “Magellanica”. It failed, perhaps of its scale. 65 Others had more success. The
Momma family, for instance, already had established contact with Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna
by 1621, because of their wish to invest in a Swedish brass works. Consequently, they were extensively
working together with the Trip family in the Swedish copper trade and later, in 1640, got involved in the
Swedish iron industry as well. In the years, even decades, after, having permanently moved to
Stockholm, they bought an increasing number of brass- and iron works, leading to them gain a monopoly
on copper production.66 Their role in Dutch-Swedish trade, specifically in connection to our analysis
model and the second period of Dutch-Swedish trade, will be further discussed in part two.
1.2
NETWORKS
It is undoubted that for the Dutch merchants active in Sweden, relations among each other were of crucial
importance to conduct successful trade. Indeed, some connections directly enabled the second push, but
had until then not gotten the chance to prove their durability. At times, these connections helped each
other to build up and consolidate their share in Swedish trade, at times actively trying to limit it. But
ultimately, the period pre-1645 was marked by Dutch merchants having to fairly quickly create their own
business networks related to Swedish trade, since no such network had been in place before. Thus, the
importance of the network relations in the period pre-1645 laid in the function of consolidating and
furthering the initial Dutch merchants’ trading successes in Swedish trade.
We can already speak of Dutch business networks relating to Swedish trade before the first push
(1580s). As we have seen, Dutch merchants being active in Swedish trade had connections in Lübeck and
Danzig, mostly because they shipped their goods through these two cities. But these networks were based
on trade that was fairly ad hoc and inconsistent, which made close ties within these networks less
important. Although the first push initiated a changing perception towards the possibilities of Swedish
trade, it was still dominated by a number of more or less random actors, who did not have much relation
to each other. This changed with the second push.
The Dutch merchants’ gaining a firm foothold in the Swedish iron industry, was explicitly built
on already resident Dutchmen in the area with whom previous connections were not necessarily clear.
65
66
Kirby, Northern Europe, 149; Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 26-27.
Müller, The merchant houses, 56-57.
25 This comes through in the fact that the period of the second push was marked by investments in an
industry. For instance, the entry of Louis de Geer in the Swedish iron industry, around 1618, is, as we
have seen, heavily connected to Willem de Besche’s earlier moving to Sweden. However, for De Geer’s
Swedish iron activities, specifically the export out of Sweden of guns, to succeed, he turned to the Dutch
merchant family specialized in the trade of this commodity: the Trip family. De Geer and Trip family
formed an official trading company in 1624 and the Trips would in the years after provide De Geer with
both credits and business connections on the Amsterdam market.67 The foundation for this cooperation
was undoubtedly marriage: already in 1603 had Jacob Trip, one of the initiators of the Trip trade in
Sweden, married a full sister of Louis de Geer.68 Thus, the two families had “transferred” their network
relation to Sweden.
However, Dutch merchants initially becoming active in the Swedish copper trade could do so
based mostly on the capital they brought to the table. For De Geer to succeed in gaining an entry in the
Swedish copper trade, he had to depend less on network connections in Sweden, more so, as we have
seen, on the amount of money he could provide to the Swedish crown, to outway other suitors. In this
case also, he then relied on family to seal the deal: it was De Geer’s brother-in-law, Steven Gerards, who
in 1619 and 1621 conducted negotiations with the Crown on his behalf. Unfortunately, it is not fully clear
how the Trips gained a foothold in the copper industry. Initially, they were one of the “other suitors”
during the 1618/19 bids for Swedish copper monopoly on the Dutch market, but had lost out to De Geer.
Nevertheless we may assume that de Geer’s previously mentioned relations with the Trip family is what
initiated both families to, through the same company as founded in 1624, started working together in the
copper trade of 1627. But, there is also evidence that the Trip family had gotten their hands on copper
already some years earlier, which makes Klein question if these supplies did or did not come from De
Geer also.69 It is nevertheless clear that the Trips had become a major player in Swedish copper and that,
regardless of a quarrel at the end of the 1620s and beginning of the 1630s, they perceived the furthering
of that success to partly rely on the connection between them and the De Geer.70 Indeed, the relations
between the Trip and Geer proved very durable and intensive: the Trips managed some of De Geer’s
industrial centres in Sweden.71
Thus, ultimately, the networks relating to Dutch-Swedish trade in the period pre-1645 were
characterized by their relative newness in Swedish trade. They had not been in place before, but once a
67
Klein, De Trippen, 247 and further.
Ibidem, 32-33.
69
Ibidem, 347.
70
Ibidem, 379.
71
Ibidem, 274-275.
68
26 creation of such network were needed, Dutch merchants were quick to do so. In that, they partly
depended on each other. As De Jong pointedly states:
“Family and business connections brought Elias Trip, Steven Gerards and Louis de Geer together in their
attempts to gain a position in the Swedish market for raw materials. From 1615 [sic!] at least this group
successfully participated in the Swedish importation of iron guns and managed to build up several gun
foundries for cast iron guns with the help of Louis de Geer's relative Wiliam Gillesz. de Besche. At that
point Steven Gerards possessed invaluable experience in developing gun foundries, Willem Gillesz. de
Besche contributed the institutional contacts with the Swedish Crown in leasing iron works and the knowhow concerning the use of local resources in running factories and mines in Sweden, while Louis de Geer
patronized a network of skilled Liegeois craftsmen in the production of iron and armaments, and Elias
Trip had the financial resources and the best contacts with the government representatives on the Dutch
market, the admiralties, the Dutch East India Company, and the Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland. The
assets that De Geer's partners brought to the consortium formed a strong basis for his success in the late
1620s and the early 1630s.”72
The significant omission De Jong makes, is the role of networks in the copper trade. In this respect, the
initial “attempt to gain a position” was most directly linked to financial investments, rather than
networks. However, networks were essential in consolidating and therefore furthering of the trade
successes.
1.3
POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS
1.3.1
Institutional level: Swedish “mercantilism” and self-assertion
Dutch-Swedish trade historiography on the period pre-1650 has often emphasised Swedish dependence
on the Dutch dominant role in developing the Swedish copper and iron industry and the Dutch turning
into the primary middleman to connect these goods with the world market. “The [Dutch] monopolistic
practices could be carried out in co-operation [sic] with the willing Swedish state” (Müller73), because “in
a commercial sense, the Republic was far more important to Sweden that the other way around”
72
73
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 53-54.
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 73.
27 (Lindblad74). In addition, it is generally asserted that the Dutch dominance in Swedish trade was
eventually diminished in the second half of the seventeenth century because Sweden started introducing,
around the turn of the century, “mercantilist” measures. The combination of these two conclusions has
become the dominant narrative of of Dutch-Swedish trade.
However, it is not the correct narrative. It is true that Sweden in this period very much needed
Dutch help and was in fact actively looking for it. But, as we shall see, it is also true, especially after the
second Dutch push, that Sweden already seriously undertook initiatives to improve its own understanding
of general trade and industry practices, and Dutch practices specifically. Furthermore, as argued by Erik
Thomson, Swedish statesmen did not try to copy these, but tried to take control of its own industries and
trade and form them to their own liking - “Swedenize” them.75 These efforts were not particularly
successful, but clearly represent an institutional environment which emphasises the ambivalence that
characterised Dutch-Swedish trade during the first half of the seventeenth century. More importantly, it
shows that Sweden already tried to introduce mercantilist policies during the first half of the century, and
was therefore not as “willing” as is being historiographically portrayed.
Already in the sixteenth century, Swedish king Gustav Vasa actively encouraged Dutch-Swedish
trade, even trying to circumvent Lübeck and Danzig’s trade position - costing him a trade war with the
Hanze city. But he tried to do this by promoting the usage of Sweden’s own ships.76 In 1605, Charles IX
tried to lure Dutch merchants to come settle in Göteborg and initiate trade with Persia, by offering them a
royal company charter - a company at that time being one of the standard modus operandi for Dutch
merchants; the granting of a royal charter making this even more valuable. Additionally, copper subsidies
were promised. The company was very beneficial to the Dutch, who started making money selling arms
and receiving royal copper, yet less to the Swedes: these specific Dutch traders did not move to
Göteborg, nor started trading with Syria.77
These examples were far from one-off. The 1615-offer an unknown group of Dutch merchants
had made for the copper monopoly, discussed earlier, had in fact broken down exactly because of
Swedish efforts to “Swedenize” Dutch trade practices: Gustaf Adolf had actually granted the Dutch
merchants’ company the monopoly, but with the specific requirement that it adhered to Sweden’s law,
and, in an effort to extend Swedish control, let the king name the company’s governor and keep an
oversight on the company’s accounts. The Dutch, not used to such deep state mingling in business affairs,
refused.78
74
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”, 11.
Thomson, “Swedish variations”. “Swedenize” is my term.
76
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, I, 7-8.
77
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 336.
78
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 335-337.
75
28 Other Swedish efforts to direct commercial activities, often dominated by the Dutch, would be
rife throughout the following decades. These attempts were often futile. In 1613 and 1617, two different
Trade Ordinances were set in place, with the latter making explicit a difference in the categories of ships
that entered Swedish waters: two kinds of Swedish-built ships, as well as a special category for foreign
ships. Foreign ships had to pay the most duties.79 In 1619, the Swedish need for cash prompted
Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna to gain support for the founding of a bank as a way to lean less on (foreign)
merchants’ investment money. Yet, precisely because of a the severe lack of money present in Sweden
among its towns and inhabitants, the burghers would only - ironically - start a bank if the Crown would
lend them a substantial amount of money.80 Even more ironic: it was to be a Dutchman, some forty years
later, that would found Sweden’s first bank.81 The First Swedish Copper Company was founded in 1619
to get Sweden to control its export of copper, yet was mostly in the hands of Dutch and German
merchants. In 1636, in trying to break through the dominance the mining district of Bergslagen had in the
Swedish iron industry, an ordinance banned any future replacement of foundries and their forges in that
area.82 Is it a coincidence that the district of Bergslagen contained, among others, the prominent iron
works of Louis de Geer? The ordinance was to no avail: sixty years later, 40% of all bar-iron was still
produced in the area. In the mid-1630s, the Swedish council halted the delivery of copper to the then
existing Dutch copper company, but the Swedish equivalent of this company (disbanded soon after)
could in no way afford this. It in fact ignored this degree and still continued to deliver copper to the
Dutch, to the dismay of the Swedish council.83 In fact, 1636 seems to have been something of a turning
point in Sweden’s approach to trade - it’s own “first push” in its know-how - because, in addition to the
previous actions, that year saw (as the years 1614 and 1617 had seen) the introduction of a Trade
Ordinance, specifying more rigidly who could trade within and with the Swedish realm and under what
conditions. The Ordinance was heavily protested against and probably was one of the reasons why in
1640, at the height of Dutch-Swedish trade, the Dutch still felt compelled to send a delegation to Sweden
to object to these measures.84
These Swedish efforts to regulate trade and industry were conscious, albeit at times somewhat ad
hoc, and can be put into perspective through an article by Erik Thomson. The article gives way to the
argument that Swedish statesmen, such as Axel Oxenstierna, actively tried to learn and modify Dutch
commercial institutions to fit Sweden’s own culture.85 To the Swedes, the Dutch Republic, with its free
79
Müller, “Swedish shipping”, 124.
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 341.
81
Kirby, Northern Europe, 238-239.
82
Kirby, Northern Europe, 237.
83
Klein, De Trippen, 391.
84
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 335; Lindblad, “Evidence of”, 205.
85
Thomson, “Swedish variations”. The following is based on Thomson, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
80
29 trade, was driven by “merchant statesmen” that only worked for their self-interest, mainly money.
Thomson is not the only historian to observe the Swedish disdain for this; in fact, it is a widely shared
view that the Dutch were profiting from their Swedish trade much more than the Swedes themselves
were, and that the latter were far from blind from this. The Swedish historian Wrangel noted that, when a
Dutch diplomatic representative, in order to stem the Swedish king Charles X favorable to a request, tried
to appeal to the protestant roots of both nations, the latter took out a riksdaler and said: “Here is your
religion”.86
If Sweden perceived the Dutch trade mechanics revolving around the private gain, this was a
complete opposite to the Swedish attitude: in monarchic Sweden the thing that mattered the most was the
public good. Thomson argues that his “public good” refers to many elements, including Swedish
sovereignty, interests of the various Swedish estates, as well as the Crown. I would argue that the “public
good” therefore also means the Swedish Crown’s efforts to increase Sweden’s fiscality. An example of
this is given by Kirby, discussing how the Swedish College of Commerce (formed in 1651) defended
initiating a monopoly by the newly-formed Swedish Tar company. To them
“[...] it was in accordance with the principles of the well-regulated state. The company, it was
argued, had helped keep prices at a good level, and had amassed a large sum of capital which
would provide His Majesty with foreign credit. If the company were abolished, the Dutch would
capture the trade, prices would fall, and the peasant would suffer.”87
Thomson goes on to discuss how the Swedes were in awe of and tried to learn from Dutch
commercial practices (including the Dutch practice of giving out company charters). Yet, Dutch
commercial practices were almost always at odds with Swedish statesmen putting the benefits of those
practices to use for Sweden’s specific goals. Furthermore, even Sweden wanted to imitate Dutch
practices, there was no fixed set of instructions for it to follow. What modern day economic historians
now often describe as ‘mercantilism’ (Leos Müller is one of those), argues Thomson, did not exist as
such in the period under consideration here:
“[Active] modification and choice was all the more necessary because Swedish statesmen had
not only to discover what [commercial practices] worked in the Netherlands, but also what
would suit the different conditions in Sweden and its empire.”88
86
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 9.
Kirby, Northern Europe, 235.
88
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 336.
87
30 A good example of how Sweden in fact thought it possible to make this work is given by the Swedish
resident in the Dutch Republic in 1664, Harald Appelboom. The resident, in 1664, was to limit a for the
Swedes unfavorable trade agreement with the Dutch as well write a report in which the latter was to try to
illuminate Dutch commercial practices for his superiors, so that they could use this to their own good,
their "economic independence”. Appelboom in fact goes on to praise the Dutch trade system, especially
the freedom of its trade. However, he then specifically feels the need to take up the issue if trade can
thrive better in a republic than in a monarchy. He is, as Kernkamp shows, probably referring to the
Dutchman Pieter de La Cour, whose own analysis of the success of Dutch trade, written two years earlier,
Appelboom seems to have followed very closely in writing his own. De la Cour’s memorandum, though,
emphasised the fact that successful trade had as its best environment a republican one. Appelboom
instead argues that trade can prosper just a well in a monarchy as in a republic.89
In the end, the tensions between Swedish ambitions and achieving these ambitions through
commercial means were clearly there. As succinctly summarized by Thomson:
“[Axel Oxenstierna] tried to cultivate Sweden’s commerce by devising institutions that would
advance the public good with savvy, capital and credit yet shield governance from self-interest.
If the Crown’s assets were too well shielded, self-interest would prompt few merchants to
engage themselves for the public good. Careless imitations of foreign institutions would threaten
Sweden with corruption and failure by endangering the realm’s credit and future [...]”90
We must conclude that Swedish statesmen in the first half of the seventeenth century could not alter the
Swedish dependability on Dutch commerce, nor did they succeed in finding a formula to modify Dutch
commercial practices and make them their own. Yet, as we have seen, they tried very hard and clearly
were in no way simply a “willing” entity.
1.3.2
Political level
The 1614 treaty between the Dutch Republic and Sweden is for many historians the natural starting-point
for relations between the two powers. It has been characterized by Thomas Lindblad as safeguarding
“mutual support in commerce and in case of war”, signifying “a new commitment for Sweden beyond the
Baltic and for the Republic in the Baltic”. Significantly, this commitment led, according to Lindblad, to a
period of friendship until 1645, due to “intensive mutual engagement and cooperation”.91 All this
89
Kernkamp, “Memoriën”, 299-302.
Ibidem, 343.
91
Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 214.
90
31 culminated in a “zenith of the Dutch-Swedish partnership between 1640 and 1645”.92 This has become
the leading narrative for many scholars of Dutch-Swedish relations throughout the years, thereby neatly
aligning itself with the idea of Dutch trading power reaching its high point in 1648.93
Yet, it is not the correct narrative. The period between 1614 and 1645 was in fact a constant
back-and-forth between two growing super powers who were eager to assert themselves and willing to
show this. This meant that from Swedish side a constant balancing between Sweden’s need for Dutch
commercial power, versus its wish for self-assertion in the Baltic region, thereby inevitably stepping on
Dutch Baltic toes. From the Republic’s point of view, all Baltic efforts in this period were geared towards
maintaining a pax neerlandica (Israel), in support both of its trade with the area - of which the trade with
Sweden increasingly became elementary -, as well as managing the impact of Thirty Years’ War.
Furthermore, as we shall see now, the back-and-forth of political balancing in fact has its roots in
the period before 1614, in the sixteenth century. This is a period severely underexposed in modern DutchSwedish historiography. Thomas Lindblad, one of the main scholars on the subject, only mentions some
of the treaties, the difficulties, during the Dutch War or Independence, of rapprochements between the
two powers due to religious differences and, with the overcoming of those differences, the fact that
Charles IX’s “efforts [to find an ally] were rewarded with the States-General of the Dutch Republic in
1614”.94 Assertions like these do not do justice to the political dynamics that were already evolving
during this period - especially in Sweden - and ultimately can be linked to Dutch-Swedish commercial
relations in the century after also. Therefore it is the period before 1614 that we first turn our attention to.
Pre-1614
Although as we have seen the first economic contacts were already established in the eighth or ninth
century, the first significant political contacts between Sweden and - from the late fifteenth century as
part of the Habsburg Empire - the Habsburg Netherlands came in the sixteenth century. These contacts
were established at a moment when the Dutch were increasingly taking on economic power in the Baltics,
while the Swedes had just taken their first steps to political independence.
Trade and political arrangements formed the core focus of treaty negotiations between Sweden
and the Habsburg Netherlands from 1526 to 1527,95 of which the political element was both far-reaching
92
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 13.
“[The defence treaty signed in 1614] opened a period of four decades of Swedish-Dutch co-operation in military
and diplomatic issues”, Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 61. Also: Klein, “Turning copper into gold”.
About the high point of 1648: De Vries, Van der Woude, The first modern economy; Lindblad, “Evidence of DutchSwedish trade”; Van Gelder, Trading places, 10, n31.
94
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 11. In all fairness, the focus in his book is mainly on Dutch-Swedish trade relations in
the eighteenth century.
95
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, I, 2-6.
93
32 and somewhat inflated. Although the suggested Swedish wish for a commitment with the Habsburg
Netherlands “above all other countries” can partly be regarded as negotiation rhetoric, the efforts to
negotiate for an “eternal peace” combined with a somewhat laughable going-to-war notice of six months
emphasises the intentions of the Scandinavians to come closer to the Dutch - however unattainable such
an agreement might prove. The indirect reason behind what might be called a certain overanxiety from
Swedish side to come closer to the Dutch seems quite obvious - though most Dutch historians of DutchSwedish relations have failed to take this into account: the Kalmar Union, the centuries-old personal
union between Denmark, Sweden and Norway, had, after the enthronement of Gustav Vasa, collapsed
just two years before because of increasing Swedish dissatisfaction with Danish rule.96 This collapse
caused immediate and major chaos in the Baltic. Now, Sweden was in need of an ally. To do so, it was
apparently willing to defy its main local backer in the region, Lübeck, in order to align itself with the
Northern Sea power that by that time was more and more showing signs to becoming the dominant
trading force in the Baltic, at least in terms of the trade that did not limit itself to the Baltic region only.97
The Dutch, for their part, went out of their way to accommodate the Swedish delegation, in an
effort to further cement commercial relations. The Dutch wishes entailed the freedom of supply of salt
and some other, mostly luxury goods, the fixation of costs for warehousing and convoying and, most
importantly, the rights to buy and sell goods at the same time and place as the Swedish merchants.98 All
this without the Swedes limiting the number of Dutch ships sent to conduct the trade.99 In other words, an
almost complete opening up of Swedish trade to the Habsburg Netherlands, of which Willem Vreede is
right to underline the apparent importance this fact might have been to the Dutch merchants.100 Yet, it is
not clear how much these agreements influenced actual trade, as we lack numbers for this period.
Nonetheless, these negotiations served as a prelude to the later continuous efforts of the Dutch to make
sure that access to and free trade in the Baltic was maintained.
Despite the efforts on both sides, only the two-year treaty of 1526 was put into place, which still
contained enough commercial privileges for the Dutch to annoy their ever-present enemies in the Baltic
and Swedish trade, the Lübeck merchants. To add insult to Lübeck-injury, the privileges were upheld
even after the treaty officially came to an end.101An “eternal peace”, as suggested by the Swedes, not
coming to fruition in the 1526 treaty seems to stem from the relative unimportance to the Dutch of such
an arrangement: their main goal, that of improved trade with Sweden, was, through that same treaty,
secured. I would argue that for the Dutch, the importance of trade with the Baltic still consisted mostly of
96
Kirby, Northern Europe, 59.
Ibidem, 6.
98
Salt was one of the main Dutch staple goods destined for the Baltic, including Sweden.
99
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, I, 5.
100
Ibidem, 5-6.
101
Ibidem, 5.
97
33 its grain trade and improved trade relations with the Swedes were only a bonus, partly echoing Israel’s
assessment that trade with Stockholm before 1590 [sic!] was not relevant, yet basing it on a different
foundation. The Dutch at that time already could count on Danish support and therefore easy passage
through the Sound,102 so endangering this construction by coming too politically close to the Swedes was
not something the Dutch were likely to do. The same sentiments seemed to have prevailed after the
Treaty of Speyer (1533), between Denmark and Habsburg - a treaty that gave the Dutch favorable Sound
dues.103 By that time, the Dutch were so perfectly aligned with both Denmark and Sweden, who between
the two of them had taken a break from their strife as well, that neither of the latter two were willing to
give in to Lübeck demands to cease trading with the Dutch104 - showcasing the apparent strength DutchSwedish trade relations had already gained by then.
The years after, though, the Dutch suffered from hostilities from both Denmark and Sweden.
During the Northern Seven Years’ War (1563-70) the Danes, in 1565, actively tried to limit Dutch trade
with Swedish posts in the Baltic,105 while the Swedish navy the year after raided a Dutch fleet of fiftytwo ships loaded with salt. This raid was huge: it provided Sweden with a year’s worth of the essential
commodity they so dearly missed - salt was an important conservative; it even has been stated that its
lack of availability was one of the reasons why Sweden so often went to war with Denmark - and was a
capture essential to them continuing the war against the Danes.106
Swedish mentalities and its first struggles for its dominium maris Baltici
This last action especially seems to contradict the previously seen approachment by the Swedes. Why
would they so openly show aggressive behaviour towards the power that before they wanted to “above all
countries” sign a treaty with? The answer might be found in the explanation that Sweden was by then, as
it would still be over a century later, very much preoccupied with its newfound struggle of dominion over
the Baltic region. Indeed, it is important to realize that exactly around this time, starting with the capture
of Reval in 1561, Sweden “had thus taken the first step in one hundred and sixty years of warfare over
the Baltic” (Hill107 ) and “laid the first stone of [the] country’s Baltic empire” (Roberts108 ). These were the
initial steps in the country’s dominium maris Baltici, the control over the usage of Baltic waters, as well
as its empire building (which, as Michael Roberts shows, are separate elements leading to the now-
102
The Danish King Christian II had been enamored by a Dutch woman and was indeed inclined to favor the Dutch.
Hill, The Danish Sound, 44.
103
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, I, 7.
104
Kirby, Northern Europe, 61.
105
Tjaden, “Frederic II”, 356. According to Geijer, the Dutch-Swedish treaty of 1526 was renewed again in 1551.
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, 8, n1.
106
Kirby, Northern Europe, 14, 113, 241.
107
Hill, The Danish Sound, 80.
108
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 9.
34 following question109). For years, historians have preoccupied themselves with answering the question
what the exact purpose of this empire-building was. Old School historians, as characterized by Michael
Roberts, suggest a political motivation behind Swedish foreign policies with two possible, not necessarily
mutually excluding elements: first, a need to provide for security in the midst of an area full of
antagonists (a defensive measure, in other words) and, second, a lust for power. The latter partly rests on
another argument that’s closely linked to the political: the fact that the Swedish nobility would ultimately
benefit from an expansionist policy because of property extensions, as well as the function of war as a
tool for silencing the peasantry. New School historians, on the other hand, advocate an economic motive
as the background for Sweden’s expansion. Sweden’s aim, so it is explained, was to capture the trade
between Russia and the West, and between the Baltic and the West as a whole, for that matter.
It is not the aim of my analysis of changing Dutch-Swedish trade relations to directly or
indirectly contribute to the above discussion per se. For our general purposes, it suffices to say that
Roberts sees wrongs and rights in both schools’ analytical frameworks and instead suggests that both the
political and economic reasoning were off and on put to the fore by respective Swedish rulers during the
stormaktstid. (Though Roberts’ argumentation against the New School seems more forceful than against
the Old.110) No, what is in fact most interesting in Roberts’ analysis - though slightly tucked away - is his
realisation that the Swedes, at that time, had
“a deep national psychological need [...] for self-assertion in the face of a world unaccustomed
to think that the Swedes were of much account in it. [...] An intense national pride, joined to an
uncomfortable sense of national inferiority [...]: without some sympathetic understanding of it,
no true appreciation of the Age of Greatness is possible.”111
It goes too far to use the above as an explanation for Swedish policies during its rise to power
over the next one hundred years, and Roberts is intelligible enough to only elaborate on this issue as a
way of deepening the previous discussion between both historiographic schools. It is, however, a justified
elaboration: other scholars have also noted this Swedish feeling of being (perceived as) a second-rank
nation and the Swedes actively trying to do something about it, for instance by emphasising their
glorious, ancient ancestors.112 Looking at Sweden’s actions and policies from this level, it transcends the
discussion of whether Sweden acted from economic or political intent. For our analysis, this insight is
incredibly significant, since it connects directly with the Swedish wish to, already during the first half of
109
Ibidem, 18. The following is based on Roberts.
Ibidem, 32. “There were, no doubt, moments when the economic motive was so important as to be predominant;
but there were many others when it was clearly subordinate”. Ibidem, 29.
111
Ibidem, 21-22.
112
Thomson, “Swedish variations”, 332; Rystad, “Ett fattigt” (Review), 1647; Kirby, Northern Europe, 161-162.
110
35 the seventeenth century, assert itself economically also, for whatever purpose. And even if this is not
accepted as a working theory, we can still use Roberts’ analysis for another insight, an explanation for a
prominent Swedish feature of the stormaktstid: Sweden’s (or better, its statesmen’s) inclination to
overreach. A constant wish for something it could not get, no matter if that wish was based on economic
or on political motives. Sweden’s political ambitions, for instance, were most of the time seriously at
odds with the country’s human and material resources. Sweden’s army, in 1632 consisting of 175,000
men strong who were mostly mercenaries, was too big to maintain and too insecure to rely on.113 As we
have seen, commercially, Sweden’s goal, already from the early seventeenth century on, ultimately was
to break free of dependence on Dutch trade and have full control over its own trade (or at least
configuring it to its own needs), but this was a goal highly unrealistic and efforts to achieve this were,
initially, not very effective at all.
This overreaching does not, of course, directly explain the Swedish capture of the Dutch saltfleet.
In many ways that simply was a way to survive extremely dire times and, as we can only say because of
the gift of hindsight, was part of the opening phase of Sweden’s rise to power. The capture was a risk that
the Swedes probably felt they were more or less compelled to take if they were to survive the crisis they
were in. But the capture does already partly illustrate the ambivalence, fuelled by the above-mentioned
Swedish feeling of perceived ineptness, that would ultimately be one of the main characteristics of
Dutch-Swedish political relations: the Swedish wish for self-assertion, versus its dependence on Dutch
commercial interests in the area, translating into political power play - thereby meaning that Sweden
would inevitably step on Dutch toes.
Sweden and the Dutch War of Independence
The War of Independence added a new dynamic to the Dutch’s Baltic affairs generally, and DutchSwedish affairs specifically. Suddenly, the role of the Spanish became, depending on whose perspective
you would look from, both a source of attention, concern and opportunity. Sweden and the Dutch were in
no way clear allies in this.
For the Dutch William of Orange, the conflict with the Spanish in fact was a reason to lean on his
old friend, King Frederic II of Denmark, and secretly persuade him to give low-key aid to the Dutch
revolt. Yet, this in no way meant Denmark aligning itself with the Dutch and against Spain: officially
Denmark aimed to have good relations with Spain and remain neutral, and this was something the Danish
were not willing to give up lightly.114 Sweden was also conspiring, albeit in a slightly different
113
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 44, 51. The latter problem would change with the professionalization
of the Swedish army by Charles XI.
114
Lind, “Being states” [digitally published].
36 constellation. In 1576, in an effort to form an anti-Danish alliance, John III of Sweden’s legate to Rome
negotiated with the representative of Philip II to support Spain in its efforts against the revolt in the
Habsburg Netherlands.115 Nothing came of this.
Dutch-Spanish antagonism played its part even in internal Swedish conflicts, specifically the
vying over the Swedish crown by Charles, the count of Södermannaland and his nephew, King
Sigismund of Poland. The latter was Catholic and thus enjoyed Spanish support, the former was
Protestant and therefore seemed a natural Dutch ally. Seemed. Because after Charles IX had taken over
power in 1599 (officially in 1604), his efforts to conclude a new treaty with both the Dutch as well as the
English were met with the kind of response the Dutch States-General would over the years prove apt to:
verbose politeness, combined with vagueness and non-commitment. The reasons for their initial
reluctance might be twofold: the Swedish requesting, as part of an alliance, the enrollment of Dutch
troops and warships in Swedish service was considered to be too strenuous for the Dutch’s own war
efforts, as well as the fact that the Swedes still had not paid back debts, taken up by John III’s
predecessor, Eric XIV, from some twenty years earlier.116 Charles’s warnings of a possible DanishSpanish alliance - made to dangle before the States-General by Swedish envoy after Swedish envoy in the
years after117 - emphasize the understanding the Swedes had about the importance of the Baltic to the
Dutch, which the Count, by continuously suggesting the signing of an alliance, tried to use to the
advantage of his own struggles.
Kalmar War and the 1614 treaty
The Kalmar War (1611-1613) between Sweden and Denmark was not at all welcomed by the Dutch, who
after the 1609 truce with Spain had more breathing space to start dealing with their Baltic interests. They
were primarily trying to restore the balance of power and bringing down the Sound dues to the 1544
Treaty of Speyer-lever - in the process taking a lot of effort not picking any side.118 The delegation sent to
the area was met with a Danish coldness that must have felt like bordering on hostility, with the Danes
emphasising that Dutch independence had cancelled the Speyer treaty and thus Dutch claims for
favorable Sound dues. Contact with the Swedes, although more reciprocal, gave few results also.
Tellingly, when in 1612 both parties were willing to negotiate peace, it was not the Dutch Republic, but
115
Kirby, Northern Europe, 115.
Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, 21-22. A third reason suggested by Vreede, that of the uncertainty of the actual
eventuality of the enthronement of Count Charles, seems implausible to me. If anything, this uncertainty would
have been an encouragement to support him.
117
De Jonge, Inlichtingen, 221, 226. RSG, September 8, 1610. Ironically, the same threat stemmed from Sweden
some two decades earlier, as then King John III was encouraged by the Spanish to hinder Dutch Baltic trade and
attack Danish fortresses. Tjaden, "Frederic II", 361 and Vreede, Nederland en Zweden, 12.
118
It was forbidden for any Dutchman - soldier or sailor - to enter the service of either Sweden and Denmark, nor
sell them arms or ammunition. Hill, The Danish Sound, 84 and De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 49.
116
37 England that mediated.119 The fact that the Danes came out of the war having gained the upper hand in
the Baltic power struggle must have seriously upset the Dutch - especially in relation to the Danish Sound
policies.120
Therefore, when the Swedes turned to the Dutch for an alliance around the same time, this was,
in Lindblad’s terminology - and I agree with him - mostly “to safeguard mutual commercial interests and
assure reciprocal military assistance in case of war”. But contrary to what Lindblad in a rather submerged
way also seems to argue, this was much more inspired by recent events, rather than a culmination of
some kind of seamless natural path of two powers that were “Protestant”, “self-asserted” and had “found
a common enemy in the Habsburg monarchies [including Poland] as well as anyone threatening to
disturb the balance of power in the Baltic” - all this supposedly with roots in the late-sixteenth century
efforts of Charles IX to make Dutch-Swedish relations more formalized.121 Separate elements of this
were definitely at play, including, significantly, the threat of Denmark after the Kalmar War aligning
itself with Spain and adding a whole nother, political, dimension to the events.122 But we have also seen
the serious attempts of the Dutch Republic, already during Charles IX’s reign and continuing throughout
the Kalmar War, to maintain its neutral stance, not necessarily being too reciprocal to Swedish avances.
Indeed, the story at that time could have played out very different also: if the Swedes would have come
out dominantly victorious, aiding the Danish cause could have just as well been the instrument for the
Dutch to maintain the balance of power - undoubtedly making sure the Danes would be more reciprocal
to Dutch commercial interests.
Thus, the 1614 treaty only came about because it was at this exact moment (the first moment
since 1526) that, suddenly, the greater politico-economical Baltic interests and fears of the Dutch
coincided with the interests of the Swedes. Sweden saw its pretentions to its dominium maris endangered,
while the Dutch feared a Danish state, growing in power and controlling the Sound, possibly involving
itself with Spain. The Dutch were at odds with the one power now seeming to fully control their access to
the gateway vital for their moedernegotie. In relation to that, the Dutch-Baltic trade as a whole had, over
the past three decades, gained in importance: in addition to grain being the primary Baltic trade
commodity, Dutch merchants, as well as the States-General, more and more had gotten a taste of the
possibilities of an extensive Swedish copper supply.123 The Swedes, with their underdeveloped means of
trade, had practically very little use for reduced Sound dues and were becoming more and dependent on
the Dutch buying or lending money against copper.
119
Hill, The Danish Sound, 84-85.
Already in 1613, this led the Dutch and Lübeck (!) striking a defensive alliance.
121
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 11-12.
122
Hill, The Danish Sound, 88.
123
In 1613, copper made up 44% of the total Swedish export value. Klein, De Trippen, 329.
120
38 Therefore, ultimately, the 1614 treaty between the Dutch Republic and Sweden 1) was the result
of the Dutch, after 1609, prioritizing their interests in an increasingly important commercial and political
region, 2) was the first time the Dutch actually actively asserted themselves politically in the region,
trying to uphold the balance of power, 3) was an ad hoc reaction to currently unfolding events
(specifically the Kalmar War), rather than the conclusion of a process already underway for some years
and, if there was such a process 4) had as its only clear element, commerce: the increasing activities,
accelerating in the couple of years before 1614, of Swedish copper being sold on the Dutch market.
Beyond 1614
The Dutch-Swedish treaty of 1614 bound the two powers for fifteens years. In no way, however, did this
mean that the Dutch Republic and Sweden would from then on tightly hold each others hands. In fact, in
many ways they would, again, both go their separate ways. In doing this, they would often go against
each other interests, although it was Sweden that annoyed the Dutch the most often. The two powers
would only come politically close again on moments that were absolutely necessary.
Sweden was politically very willing to assert itself in the first half of the seventeenth century. In
their Polish military campaigns of the 1620s, the Swedes brought war very close to prominent grain
entrepôts used by the Dutch, severely upsetting the latter.124 The Dutch, for their part, had already by
1621 grown increasingly annoyed with the Swedes. As Gunner Lind argues, and I agree with him, this
was probably related to them implementing their own trade measures (the Trade Ordinance of 1617 was a
milestone in that sense). Additionally, the The Thirty Years’ War also came into play. Thus, in 1621,
only half-way through the Dutch-Swedish alliance of 1614, the Dutch signed a treaty with the Danes,
though it would take until 1625 until a treaty would officially be ratified.125 This commitment certainly
did not mean the Dutch Republic suddenly became anti-Swedish, yet it shows how general Baltic access,
free trade and bigger political constellations were more important to the Dutch than Dutch-Swedish
relations per se. Denmark was not always perceived by the Dutch as the main aggravating entity and, if
necessary, either side - Danish or Swedish - could be chosen to further Dutch interests. This, in addition
to the fact that Swedes were severely behind with their repayment of the loans following the 1614 treaty,
made that an extension of the alliance in 1629 did not happen.
Following the former, Sweden interfered with Dutch commercial interest when, as a result of its
Polish wars, Sweden levied toll in a number of occupied Prussian ports. Only from the second half of the
1630s did a rapprochement occur again (Lindblad’s presumed Dutch-Swedish collaboration “under the
124
125
Ironically, the following is based on Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, unless otherwise stated.
Lind, “Being states” [digitally published].
39 umbrella of the Triple Alliance”, seems to be off, as there was no such alliance in that time126 ), leading to
a formal treaty in 1640. This rapprochement came about because Denmark could not live up to the
expectations as the driving Baltic force against the Catholic enemies in the Thirty Years’ War. Therefore,
the Dutch need to commit to the Swedish cause again at that time only happened because it was
politically expedient right there and then.
Indeed, it were Dutch that assisted the Swedes when the latter went to war with Denmark in
1644. Yet, this was much less politically influenced as is being portrayed. We have already seen that it in
fact was a private Dutch entrepreneur, Louis de Geer, who, acting on Swedish request, assembled two
Dutch war fleets. But at the same time as De Geer was outfitting his fleet in the Dutch Republic, the
States-General also allowed the Danes to do the same.127 This decision was based on a multitude of
reasons: their annoyance that Sweden had acted on its own when declaring war on Denmark (thereby
foregoing part of the 1640 treaty), the fact the Sweden attacking Denmark would take away much-needed
strength and energy of Swedish war-efforts from the battlefields of the Thirty Years’ War, perhaps even
on far-off dynastical ties between the Danish king Christian with England’s Charles I, whose daughter
was married to the Dutch Stadhouder Fredrick Hendrik.128 Therefore, the Dutch, instead of choosing
sides, were mostly concerned with mediating between Denmark and Sweden, restoring the balance of
power, and getting the two antagonists to cease their hostilities.129 Only when the Danes, after the war,
were still unwilling to lower the Sound dues, did the States-General send a huge Dutch navy fleet. Led by
Witte de With, it escorted hundreds of merchant ships destined for Swedish ports and took them through
the Sound.130 At the same time, Denmark, in its treaty with Sweden (Treaty of Brömsebro) conceded
majorly by granting Sweden a, limited, free passage of the Sound for Swedish ships.131 The tables had
turned, Sweden was now the dominant force in the Baltic.
126
Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 215.
Breedtvelt-Van Veen, Louis de Geer, 162.
128
Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek, 10, 275-277. Snapper, Oorlogsinvloeden, 99-100.
129
Snapper, Oorlogsinvloeden, 100; Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 9.
130
Breedtvelt-Van Veen, Louis de Geer, 20-21.
131
Hill, The Danish Sound, 147; Kolkert, Nederland en het Zweedsche imperialisme, 16.
127
40 PART ONE - CONCLUSION
The dominant academic discourse has emphasised the year 1614, more specifically the Dutch-Swedish
treaty and Dutch aid to help Sweden pay the Älsborg ransom, as a key moment in Dutch-Swedish trade
relations. Thomas Lindblad notes that “before 1614, the economic relations between the two countries
were of little consequence, after 1614 the mutual financial interests quickly grew intertwined”.132 Leos
Müller agrees, but also mentions events a couple of years further back: the signing of the Twelve Years’
Truce between the Dutch Republic and Spain, which opened up the Dutch rich trades with Sweden thereby paying lip service to Jonathan Israel’s theory about the Baltics and the role of the rich trades
therein.133 Peter Klein places the development of Dutch-Swedish trade around 1600.134 Michiel de Jong,
through focussing on the iron and copper trade and relying partly on Swedish historian Åke Sanström,
has subsequently argued that the role of the Dutch merchants in Swedish iron and especially copper
“changed drastically” in the period 1585-1630, with two short bursts of growth (1586-1587, 1606-1608)
and one longer burst (1614-1620).135
In partly following De Jong, I have argued that the foundations of Dutch-Swedish trade relations
of the seventeenth century were laid already around the 1580s, in what I have called the “first push” of
Dutch merchants seizing on business opportunities in Swedish trade. From that time, Swedish copper
became a prime focus for Dutch entrepreneurs, the latter increasingly recognizing the business
opportunities of the raw material; starting to invest in the Swedish copper industry and connected to that
acted as agents of Swedish Count and later King Charles IX. Additionally, copper-for-armaments
exchanges between Swedish and Dutch state institutions occurred regularly from the turn of the century
on. It is true that in terms of absolute numbers the economic relations before 1614 were not significant,
yet, in terms of Dutch merchants’ orientation towards the economic possibilities that Sweden had to offer
(and vice versa), this period was nonetheless key, especially in connection to the years following the
Kalmar War.
Furthermore, the political dynamics that would determine political and commercial mentalities
and attitudes of the seventeenth century, especially Swedish ones, were also rooted in the sixteenth
century. Both the Dutch and the Swedes were a rising power in the Baltic, and especially the latter
already showed it partly tried to take advantage of Dutch commercial power, while also being willing to
interfere with Dutch commercial and political interests in the area if it served Sweden’s own goals. A
good example is the Swedish capturing of the Dutch saltfleet. The Dutch, from their side, were not
132
Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 214.
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 59-60. Israel, Dutch primacy, 48-52.
134
Klein, “Turning copper into gold”, 4.
135
De Jong, “Dutch entrepreneurs”, 44-45, 47.
133
41 willing to pick sides between Denmark and Sweden, in fact seemed to be leaning more towards Denmark.
The 1614 treaty therefore mostly came about because of the sudden inevitableness of having to balance
Danish’ disturbing of the balance of power in the area (after the Kalmar War), rather than, as argued by
Lindblad, a Dutch-Swedish political trajectory unfolding from the late sixteenth century already.
In addition, the 1614 treaty was not a commercial treaty “in anticipation of what may come”.136
Rather than based on an earlier initiated political trajectory, the 1614 treaty mostly refers to an earlier
initiated commercial trajectory, the one described above. It afterwards most likely also paved the way for
the lending of money by the States-General, but this lending in itself was not key to increased DutchSwedish commercial ties. It was rather individual Dutch merchants who, based on the earlier Dutch
orientation towards the Swedish economic situation (including established Dutch contacts there, such as
Willem de Besche), took advantage of Sweden’s want for money by investing significant amounts of
money in monopolies for the Dutch market of Swedish copper - thereby putting the Dutch States-General
copper deal with Sweden offside - and also in the Swedish iron industry. They only started succeeding in
this from 1619, with an initial foray in Swedish iron industry already in 1618. It was the “second push” in
Dutch merchants’ seizing on business opportunities in Sweden’s economy.
The Dutch dominance in the Swedish trade throughout the period pre-1645 was therefore based
on the initiatives of a select group of private, individual merchants. Investing heavily, usually by giving
credits to the Crown that often were not paid back fully at all, they gained monopolies for the Dutch
market of Swedish copper exports, monopolies in the Swedish gun exports and, connected to the latter, a
significant stake of the iron industry in the twenty-five years following their second push. Louis de Geer
was focal in this; his help to outfit two Dutch fleets to come to Swedish aid in 1644-45 can be seen as the
culmination of his interest in Swedish trade. It must be emphasised, though, that it took him great pains to
get the credits he provided for this reimbursed.137 The same goes, though in much larger dimensions, for
the credits that the Trip family provided the Swedish Crown with, which should have been repaid in
copper. These repayments simply never occurred, accumulating to a debt of over 1,000,000 rd. Although
the Dutch merchants profited heavily from their monopolies in Swedish copper and gun exports,
sometimes the price was high as well.
Although already available contacts were important (specifically the example of Willem de
Besche proved essential), the second push initiated the foundations for the “social and commercial
networks” that were so important to create a successful trade constellation. The Dutch entrepreneurs
leaned on contacts in Sweden (specifically with the Swedish Crown), the Dutch Republic (for example de
Trip family as Dutch connection for De Geer), as well as each other (De Besche and de Geer), with the
136
137
Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 214.
Breedtvelt-Van Veen, Louis de Geer, 193; Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 29.
42 Amsterdam market as their focal sales point. Thus, this generation did not so much build on already
available social and commercial networks in Sweden, but, rather, transferred and quickly created their
own - similar to the earlier mentioned practice of them immediately putting in major amounts of money
to seize on business opportunities.
This all happened regardless of the fact that the political and institutional framework was not
necessarily favoring the Dutch merchants. On a general political level, Dutch-Swedish political relations
in the period 1614-1645 were far from Lindblad’s “period of friendship”. In fact, in these years the Dutch
States-General and Sweden often went their own political ways, where especially Sweden - in the midst
of their stormakstid - proved able to severely go against Dutch interests in the Baltics area. An example
of this is the fact that in 1629 the original 1614 treaty was not continued because of Sweden middling in
general Dutch-Baltic commercial affairs, not repaying its loan to the States-General and the Dutch
signing a treaty with Denmark some years before. The Swedes levying heavy tolls in Swedish-occupied
Prussian harbors around 1630 did not help either. Additionally, the Dutch aid in the Dano-Swedish War
of 1643-45 only materialized because of private Dutch initiative, whereas the Dutch States-General were
all the while looking for a middle ground. Therefore, to argue, as Müller has done, that the “Dutch
engagement in Sweden after 1609 [...] was very much a result of political initiative”, or, as he quotes and
again heavily follows Israel, “the Dutch capture of the Swedish copper and arms trade are both clear
instances of the pivotal role of Dutch state intervention, cartels and monopolistic practices in the
advancement of the Dutch seventeenth-century trade system” could not be further from the truth.138 The
only real stake the States-General had in Swedish trade was in its iron, which balanced the losing of
German iron supplies for the Dutch arms industry. Dutch dominance in Swedish trade therefore was not
state-initiated; in fact, far from it.
Furthermore, Swedish commercial (institutional) attitudes towards the Dutch merchants were
ambivalent, to say the least. On the one hand, Sweden depended heavily on the Dutch merchants’
entrepreneurial activities (money) as a catalyst for its infant economy, yet it was never fully in agreement
with this. This was in combination with Sweden’s greatly inflated ambitions, that looked to take control
of Sweden’s own commercial activities, in line with its rising political power status. Therefore, Sweden
aspired to break free of its status as a backward country, but in doing so, constantly was faced with
reality. It took Dutch money (both from the States-General and, mostly, Dutch individual entrepreneurs),
yet was never able to fully repay this - unless an individual such as De Geer found his own ways to even
the balance. It tried to learn from and allowed for - was even depended on - Dutch merchants’
participation in copper monopolies, Swedish trade companies and in the iron industry, yet tried hard and
unsuccessfully to direct the (financial) benefits of this to the greater Swedish good, the Swedish Crown. It
138
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 61-62.
43 implemented “mercantilist” measures through multiple Trade Ordinances, yet these had no direct effect
on the rising Dutch dominance in Swedish trade.
Therefore, ultimately, the rise of Dutch dominance in Dutch-Swedish trade, as well as Dutch
dominance over Swedish trade in the first half of the seventeenth century was much more a result of
Dutch individual entrepreneurial activity, specifically through the ways described throughout part one,
than part of a true love-story between two entities that were rising to power at the same time.
44 PART TWO
POST-1645
45 PART TWO - INTRODUCTION
In part one, I have analyzed on what basis the Dutch-Swedish trade was formed throughout the period
before 1645, and, in connection to that, how the Dutch came to dominate Swedish trade and industry.
In the upcoming part, I will look at the period after 1645. This is generally considered to be the
period in which Sweden “emancipated” from the Dutch and the Dutch lost their dominance over Swedish
trade. Thomas Lindblad sees as the primary reasons for this Sweden implementing mercantilist measures,
Sweden’s growing domestic economy, and the increased interest by other markets than that of the Dutch
Republic in Swedish raw materials. Specifically the English market showed this increased interest.139
Peter Klein on the other hand mostly refers to Sweden developing its economy, leading to the country
“some day turn[ing] to other foreign markets”, which then resulted in a distancing between Sweden and
the Dutch Republic.140 This contrasting shows that the literature is far from aligned in what was cause,
and what effect in the decline of Dutch dominance over Swedish trade. For instance, were the English
part of the reason or merely the benefactors of this decline?
The biggest example of the blur between cause and effect is the fact that Sweden emancipating
and the Dutch seeing their share in Sweden’s trade decline are put on the same line, as if they are the
same thing. Yet, our analysis of the period before 1645 has made one element of the argumentation that
Sweden supposedly emancipated, namely by “introducing mercantilist measures”, already much less
credible. It is clear that mercantilist efforts were already underway during the high times of Dutch
influence over Swedish trade. The notion that an introduction of these measures took place in the period
post-1645 can therefore already be dismissed. Perhaps, then, we should merely presume the efficiency of
the mercantilist measures improved? On the other hand, the argument could also be that, since Sweden
already tried, but failed to make these mercantilist measures effective during the period pre-1645, these
measures are not the reason why the Dutch lost their dominance in the period post-1645 in the first place.
Thus, if there are reasons to doubt the existence of an emancipation of Sweden, the question arises how
the other supposed reasons - increased trade with England, its growing domestic industry - influenced the
fact that the Dutch started losing an ever growing share in the Swedish trade. And, more existentially,
what exactly does it mean that the Dutch “lost their dominance” over Swedish trade – can we even speak
of such a thing?
The above shows there are many questions unanswered about Dutch-Swedish trade post-1645.
Yet, before we can start to answer these questions, we will have to take a big step back. In fact, part two,
just as part one, will initially solely analyze what the characteristics of Dutch-Swedish trade were in the
period after 1645. Again the framework of Antunes, with its separate pillars, will be used for this
139
140
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”.
Klein, “Turning copper into gold”, 3.
46 analysis, as well as the same main questions. The main question for the know-how pillar is in what way
the Dutch merchants seized on business opportunities in Swedish trade; for the network pillar how the
commercial and social networks helped the Dutch merchants gain entry in Swedish trade; for the political
and institutional pillar in what way the general Dutch-Swedish relations and the specific relations
between the Swedish Crown and the Dutch merchants influenced the Dutch merchants’ efforts to seize on
business opportunities. Only after first answering these separate questions for their specific pillars can we
in the conclusion of part two come back to the question how the pillars influenced Dutch-Swedish trade.
And only then can we discuss what were the causes, and effects, of the supposed declining Dutch
dominance over Swedish trade.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the fact that part two is only concerned with the outlining of
Dutch-Swedish trade characteristics for the period after 1645. Thus, it will try to analyze and assess the
characteristics for this period on their own merit. Although some overlap is at times unavoidable
(especially in the discussion of the network pillar), comparisons between the period pre-1645 and post1645 will have to wait until the general conclusion, which links part one and two, at the end of this thesis.
47 2.1 KNOW-HOW (ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR)
2.1.1
New generation, different priorities
I suggest that there are three characterizations for the efforts of Dutch merchants to seize business
opportunities in Swedish trade in the second half of the seventeenth century. First, the fact that the Dutch
merchants active in Sweden increasingly disregarded the Dutch market. This can be seen in the Dutch
merchants’ increasing investments in solely Swedish business activities, but also in the fact that the
Dutch merchants’ iron and copper activities in Sweden started to orientate more towards other markets,
specifically the English market. Second, the declining relevance of Sweden as a source for (raw)
materials for the success of the Dutch merchants.). Third, an increased competition for Swedish trade and
industry, as mostly shown through individual Dutch merchants’ inability to hold on to monopolies for a
longer time.
2.1.2
First characteristic: Dutch merchants’ activities disconnecting from the Dutch market
The first aspect that characterised the efforts of Dutch merchants seizing business activities in Swedish
trade was that of them increasingly disconnecting from the Dutch market, either by making investments
in Sweden that had no or little direct relevance to the former, or by diverting their exports to other
markets.
To start with the first, we see that throughout the second half the century, Dutch merchants more
and more invested in purely Swedish commercial activities. Yet, Dutch merchants solely focussing on
Sweden for their business opportunities, often actually going against the interests of the Dutch market,
were in itself not new. An example is the in part one mentioned effort to launch a Swedish trading
company for, among others, the Americas, in 1624. The initiator behind this was the Dutchman Willem
Usselincx, one of the founders of the in 1621-established Dutch West India Company. The Swedish
company, if successful, would have been a direct competitor to the WIC. This raises the question what
Usselincx, having interests in both, had to gain from this and emphasises the fact that the Dutch market,
already during the first half of the century, was far from always the sole interest of Dutch entrepreneurs.
However, examples like these occurred more regularly, durable and forceful from 1645 on. In
1646, De Geer got involved in what by Lindblad has optimistically been labelled a “joint Dutch-Swedish
48 colony on the African Gold Coast”, yet was mostly a Swedish colony funded in half by De Geer.141
Additionally, there were other Dutch investors, including Abraham van Eyck.142 Again, this colony
would serve as a direct competitor to the Dutch West-Indies Company and in fact made some headway
into Guinea. Louis de Geer’s son Laurens took over the company in 1649, even hiring a sacked-WIC
employee to help him run the colony. Only after some intriguing, involving a turnover of ownership of
the company to Denmark, did the Dutch WIC finally have enough of this company’s efforts to undermine
the WIC’s commerce and forcefully limited its activities.143 The same group of entrepreneurs that
founded this “Swedish WIC”, among them again Louis de Geer, also invested in the founding of a new
Swedish shipping company, Västerviks skeppskompani (license granted in 1646), that quickly became the
biggest of its kind in Sweden. Its main business activity focussed on importing salt from Portugal.144 The
new generation of Dutch merchants active in Sweden, among them the sons of De Geer and Trip, were
also not afraid to incur the wrath of the Dutch States-General: in 1653, in the midst of the First AngloDutch War, Laurens de Geer (Louis de Geer’s son) and Adriaen Trip loaded up a Swedish ship with arms
to be sold in England.145
In the 1640s, the Momma family came to Sweden from Amsterdam and turned into one of the
most prominent Dutch-German merchant families active in Sweden in the period post-1645. They have
been described by Klein as attaining a position in the Swedish trade very similar to De Geer, which is
something of an overstatement. Yet, they did attain great commercial power, leading to them being
ennobled in Sweden in 1669. Part of what their commercial power was based on, were their solely
Swedish investments. They took over the majorly expensive (and uncharacteristically risky) lease
contracts of Ex-Queen Christina’s domains of Gotland and Ösel, probably with hopes to make their
Swedish trade and industry, dominated by copper and iron, benefit from this. This investment proved to
be huge, but the profits much less so.146 Additionally, the Momma’s also invested heavily in Swedish
shipping: they founded two Swedish shipyards and one of them, Jacob Momma, took a big stake in
Västerviks skeppskompani. He became one of its biggest shareholders, as well as director, and - combined
with his shipbuilding activities - became “in the mid-1670s perhaps the biggest ship owner in Sweden”.147
The above activities were often wholly, and sometimes only partly, disconnected from the Dutch
market. In addition to Dutch merchants increasingly disconnecting from the Dutch market through
141
Lindblad, “Louis de Geer”, 79; Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 69.
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 27.
143
Elias, “Contract tot oprichting”, 370-371; Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 19.
144
Axel Oxenstierna also became investor. Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 17; Müller, The merchant houses, 180.
145
Elias, “Contract tot oprichting”, 372.
146
Müller, The merchant houses, 187-191.
147
Ibidem, 181.
142
49 exclusive investments in Sweden, they also disconnected from the Dutch market by exporting their
Swedish goods to other markets than the Dutch.
A good example of the latter is again given by the Momma family. Already from the 1630s, they
had became active in the Swedish iron trade. It was nevertheless only during the 1650s, after they had
moved to Sweden, that they actually started to dominate the Swedish iron export. Already from this point
on, the English market had gotten their attention, with the Momma’s shipping one-tenth of their iron
there. But this was just the beginning, since some twenty years laters, the English market received over
half of the Momma’s iron.148 In this, they followed a macro-economic trend: England’s demand for iron,
brass copper and tar was growing very rapidly after the turn of the century, stimulating imports.
Consequently, from the 1650s but especially the 1660s, it started importing primarily Swedish iron,
directly from Sweden. The Dutch entrepôt used to be its go-between, this role more and more declined.149
By 1669, the Dutch market no longer was the dominant market for Swedish iron: 41% of Swedish iron
went to England, 27.5% to the Dutch Republic. The Momma’s had therefore followed where the money
was. Others did the same. The Trip company active in Sweden after 1645 not necessarily ship their
Swedish iron to the Dutch market, but also to Hamburg and Lübeck, especially during the war years
1672-1674150 - markets that previously had been bypassed because of the prominence of the Dutch
market.
A similar example of how the Dutch market was no longer the sole market for Swedish goods
exported by Dutch merchants is provided by another business activity of the Momma’s. Although
initially focussing on iron, they gradually shifted their attention and started investing in the Swedish
copper industry, specifically in the fabrication of brass products. They were so successful, that around
1670 they had the “major part” of Sweden’s brass production as well as its trade under control. And
again, the Momma’s did not solely use the Dutch Republic as the market for this good, in fact, far from it.
True, Amsterdam still received the majority of brass wares, but London and Hamburg taken together
together already made up a bigger share, while Rouen was not far behind either. Here as well, England
was already on its way to becoming the leading import market of brass wires.151 The Momma’s, one of
the most prominent (semi-)Dutch merchant families in Swedish trade in the period post-1645, were thus
actively following macro-economic trends and, consequently, were not afraid to leave the Dutch market
out of the equation.
Finally, a third example of the disconnect between Dutch entrepreneurial activity in Swedish
trade and the Dutch market may be given through the Swedish tar trade. This trade had from 1648 until
148
Ibidem, 97, 98.
King, “The production”, 18.
150
Klein, De Trippen, 431, n9.
151
Müller, The merchant houses, 105.
149
50 1662 firmly been in the hands of the first Swedish tar company, the Norrländska Tjäruhandelskompanie.
This company fully controlled the export from Northern Sweden and Finland of the best quality tar, and,
significantly, had as one of its directors a Dutchman, Hans van Swinderen.152 Afterwards, with the rising
of the English market, the Tar company’s many successors started focusing more and more on this
market as well, trying to directly sell in London rather than selling tar to English factors in Sweden. They
did this, around 1677, probably with Dutch merchants being the middlemen in this. This was to the
disturbance of the Swedish Board of Trade, which felt that the English should get a fair chance at buying
tar for themselves, expressly stating that the English could act as a counterweight to the Dutch. The
Board’s complaints, and its subsequent measures to halt this trend, proved in vain.153 This episode
functions as a good example of how the Dutch, with the macro-economic shift towards England, had
clearly not lost their middlemen position, but in fact maintained it, actively mingling, to the annoyance of
both English and Swedish side, in Swedish-English trade relations.
2.1.3
Second characteristic: decline of importance Swedish market
The second characteristic of how Dutch merchants’ seized on business opportunities related to Swedish
trade post-1645 is that of those merchants being guided or affected by a relative decline in importance of
the Swedish market per se. Specifically some possible trade opportunities in Sweden were no longer as
unique compared to other markets, which had mixed results for Dutch merchants. In other words: the
Swedish market was partly losing its flair. Although this at first glance might seem contradictory
compared to the first characteristic, this actually highlights the strong diffusion of their activities.
One example of the Swedish market losing its uniqueness is the Trip company active in this
period. Although this company initially capitalized on certain typical Swedish goods that were wellsuited for monopolisation, once they lost that trade and started mostly dealing in what was to be
Sweden’s prime export commodity (iron), they in fact looked less towards Sweden.
Around the turn of the century, Jacob, Louis and Hendrik Trip - having worked together already
from the 1630s - became much more successful in their business activities in Sweden. Their business
activities concerning guns en tar led to a period of prosperity for the firm from 1648 to 1662.154 They had
through marriage linked themselves to one of the heirs of Louis de Geer, took ownership of De Geer’s
iron works that had exclusive rights to produce iron guns, thereby claiming its monopoly. This monopoly
was not very long-lived though, since in 1654 the Swedish gun exports were state-monopolized and
152
Klein, “A 17th century monopoly game”, 461.
Åström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, 85.
154
Klein, De Trippen, 426-427.
153
51 others, the Dutch merchants Momma among them, profited from this. This signalled the end of the direct
export of guns from Sweden by the Trips, yet in the years after they remained second-hand importers.155
Additionally, they also had the monopoly of the Swedish tar trade and were one of the key financiers in
the Dutch-founded Swedish Tar Company until 1662, when they also lost that monopoly. Then, after
having lost so many decisive monopolies, they started mostly focussing on iron.156 Yet, this was not
necessarily exclusively Swedish iron anymore: Müller has argued that, although Swedish iron still
dominated the Trips iron trade, in 1670 a considerable share was also made up of Liége iron. This share,
so Müller argues, was made possible again because the Liége iron channel, after the ending of the Thirty
Years’ War in 1648, had opened up again.157 It should be noted that iron had always had fairly easily be
available from a multitude of sources. But the fact that the Trips actively moved away from the Swedish
market is nonetheless telling. The Swedish market for iron had become less important.
The story is in many ways similar for Swedish raw copper and tar. Sweden at some point saw the
general dominance of its copper waning on the international market, especially from the early 1670s on.
Yet, in this case, less so by choice of the Dutch merchants than by inevitability. Increasing imports of
Japanese copper by the Dutch West Indies, the increased presence of Norwegian copper and, finally, the
Franco-Dutch War between 1672 and 1678 - in which Sweden was, at least in name, in opposition to the
Dutch Republic - negatively influencing Swedish copper exports and production, all made that the trade
in Swedish copper, still dominated by the Dutch until at least 1668, had become less profitable.158 In the
case of tar, the Dutch had found alternative sources in Russia, especially Archangel, at a time when the
English were still mostly reliant on Sweden for their tar.159
2.1.4
Third characteristic: increased competition
The third and final characteristic of Dutch merchants’ business activities in Swedish trade in the second
half of the century is something that already partly has come through in the above: a whimsicality, due to
increasing competition and difficulty of holding on to monopolies. The difficulty to hang on to
monopolies becomes apparent in both Dutch merchants’ vying for Swedish business opportunities among
themselves, as well as with Swedes. The new generation of the Trip family first had to share their
exclusive monopoly of the Swedish gun export with the Momma family, while shortly after, they lost it
altogether due to a state-monopolization. This monopolization was then put into the hands of a Swedish
155
Klein, De Trippen, 451.
Ibidem, 427, 457.
157
Müller, The merchant houses, 88.
158
Ibidem, 107.
159
Åström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, 87.
156
52 merchant Börje Cronberg and Dutch merchant Anton Bruyn, which also disrupted the gun trade of the
Momma’s.160 Then, in 1662, the Swedish Crown founded a new institute, the “factorie-comptoir”, that
was designated to control all of Sweden’s export trades, and through it put the gun monopoly in the hands
of the Dutchman Van Eyck and the Swede Von Friesendorff. As a final example, it was however
Cronberg who again in 1667 was offered the gun monopoly by the Swedish Crown.161 A similar trend can
be observed in the copper trade. As mentioned earlier, although Adriaen Trip, Louis de Geer and Daniel
Kock signed contracts with the Swedish Crown to take control of Swedish copper trade on the
Amsterdam market in 1650, this six-year agreement was in fact disbanded by the Crown already one year
after. In 1662, the copper monopoly was put by the Crown in the hands of the Swedish “factoriecomptoir”, yet in 1664 the Crown signed a new contract with, again, Börje Cronberg and this time also
Isaac Kock. From that year on, the constellation of merchants active in this specific copper syndicate
changed continuously and at some point also including the Momma family for a while.162
These examples show that monopolization of the Swedish exports of copper and guns was
seriously unstable after the turn of the century. Yet, they also show that there were quite a few, although
still fairly specific, number of Dutch and Swedish merchants that were still vying for the same business
opportunities. Additionally, in the iron exports - iron, being a good because of its relative low price level
and less exclusive character on the world market, not suited for monopolization - we find a number of
Dutch, Swedish and, especially from the 1670s on, English merchants to dominate.163 Competition had
thus increased on all fronts, but the Dutch often continued to place themselves in the position to take
advantage of the next reshuffle of monopolies, often in collaboration with non-Dutch merchants.
Yet, the question remains what can explain this increasing competition and inability to hold on to
monopolization? Partly the answer must be that Swedish entrepreneurs had seen their own commercial
power rise, becoming a much more prominent, but still far from dominant, force in the Swedish economy
- one, indeed, to be reckoned with. This is reflected in the fact that the country, "despite the burden of
war, and the heavier burden of peace”, had become “steadily richer. The living-standards of the nobility,
and after them of the non-noble civil servants and merchants, had by 1660 moved up towards the level
that was usual on the continent.”164 Yet, another part of the answer, I suggest, lies in the fact that the
Swedish Crown was in fact still continuously searching for money. In turn, its efforts to find this money
are linked, like they were during the first half of the century, to the Swedish state still trying to direct
160
Klein, De Trippen, 451; Müller, The merchant houses, 110.
Müller, The merchant houses, 112.
162
Ibidem, 101, 103.
163
Ibidem, 89.
164
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 50.
161
53 general commerce to benefits for its own good. Thus, we have to come back to this point later, in our
analysis of the political and institutional framework.
2.2
NETWORKS
2.2.1
Point of entry
I argue there was a distinctive difference in how Dutch merchants in the period post-1645 entered
Swedish trade. This difference had to do with the question whether the family roots of the merchants
were already present in Swedish trade in the period before 1645 or not.
The foundation on which the most prominent Dutch merchants in Swedish trade entered the stage
after 1645 was through family and marriage, with family ties of course being the most obvious way of the
two. The most powerful example is the second generation of the De Geer family: Louis de Geer had
accrued such a prominent stake in the Swedish trade and industry, that upon his death in 1652, he could
hand over shares to his children in many major Swedish business affairs. Of these children, De Geer’s
son, Laurens de Geer, seems to have been the primary benefactor. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, he inherited control over the Swedish West Indies Company, the company that his father had
helped found, as well as the Nörrkoping works. Other De Geer children also inherited Swedish industrial
sites previously owned by their father.165 Another example of family bonds leading to an entry into
Swedish trade we can find in the Van Eyck family. The position of the original Van Eyck member
coming to Sweden, Gillis, had not been as prominent immediately, but these activities did probably
orientate his son, Abraham van Eyck, to Swedish business activities as well: he owned a sugar distillery
in the 1640s, which was royally privileged in 1647.166 We will go into more detail about this family
shortly. Concluding for now, this new generation could therefore profit from or base their activities, at
least initially, on their family roots.
Yet, sometimes only family roots, even the ones that already should have a big stake in Swedish
trade from the period before 1645, were not enough, and required additional marriage strategies. This was
the case for the brothers Jacob, Louis and Hendrik Trip. They did not take over their uncle Elias’s
Swedish businesses. In fact, seeing as these businesses were dominated by disputes with the Swedish
Crown over a huge amount of unpaid loans, there was very little to inherit in this area. (The big exception
165
166
SBL, De Geer, släkt [digitally accessed 08-06-2013].
http://www.gbgtomter.se/Rote_6/6.16.pdf [digitally accessed 08-06-2013]
54 in this was Adriaen Trip, who because of his marriage with a De Geer family member had inherited a part
of the outstanding claim and tried to get back as much of the Crown’s debts as possible for many years
after his father’s death.167) Thus, they had to find their own way in Swedish trade. Their initial forays in
it, already from the foundation of their company in 1634, were far from successful.168 Their first hold in
Swedish trade only came when one of the brothers, Hendrick, married the daughter of a brother-in-law of
Louis de Geer, Matthias de Geer in 1646. This De Geer family member had also substantially engaged in
the Swedish iron industry, owning a prominent estate with ironworks, and shared the very profitable De
Geer privilege of exclusively producing Swedish guns. After the marriage between Hendrick Trip and his
daughter, Matthias de Geer granted Hendrick Trip - and thereby the Trip company he was a part of - a
share in his iron works and the exclusive right to forge guns also.169 How and if their networks helped the
Trips gain a foothold in their second major pillar of trade, tar, is unfortunately as yet impossible to
determine.170
For another group of merchants, marriage was the only way to get involved in Swedish trade.
This was the case with the Momma’s, who in 1631 married into a family that was already present in
Sweden, the Dutch family Bruyn. After this marriage, the Momma family initiated a company with the
Bruyn family, thereby evolving their Swedish trade. This marriage therefore in many ways paved the way
to make the move to Sweden. But the real ignition for their Swedish trade success lay in the fact that,
once in Sweden, another Momma family member married to a Kock - a family also already active from
before 1645.171 The Kock family were experienced in the copper industry, yet lacked trade experience, as
well as contacts with the Dutch market. Together, the Momma’s and Kocks could, and would, start their
path towards domination of the Swedish brass industry. Leos Müller has therefore, not without reason,
described the Momma’s marriage strategies as being “the key factor”.172
What becomes apparent when comparing the above ways of how Dutch merchants in the period
after 1645 could enter the Swedish trade, was how surprisingly little possibilities there were to enter this
trade based on already existing family ties. In the Dutch-Swedish trade, such ties obviously still had to be
created. Only in a few examples, the De Geer family being one of the most prominent of them, we see
that a new generation of family members could directly take advantage of the already earlier established
presence of their family. In most other cases, marriage was the only way to go.
Yet, what might ultimately be the most important conclusion in regards to the usefulness of the
networks to the Dutch merchants in Swedish trade, was that marriage was seen as a necessary step at all.
167
Klein, De Trippen, 400 and further,
Elias, “Contract tot oprichting”, 374-375.
169
Ibidem, 375; Klein, De Trippen, 447-449.
170
Klein, De Trippen, 459.
171
Müller, “The Dutch entrepreneurial networks”, 70.
172
Müller, The merchant houses, 247.
168
55 It shows that the Swedish trade environment had become a environment in which there were already
some key players with vested interests. One of the few ways to make a somewhat durable (!) entry into
this environment, then, was through marriage.
2.2.2
After the entry - network as consolidation of Swedish trade?
Or was it? How did these family and marriage ties actually further business? In this regard, I see a
divergence between the ones who already had family present in Swedish trade in the period pre-1645 and
who were key players in that period, the “second generation” group of merchants, and the ones who
primarily started their Swedish trade in the period post-1645 (including merchant families that might
have already been present in Sweden in the period pre-1645, yet were not key players then), the “first
generation” group of merchants. The first group mentioned had a surprisingly hard time being successful
in Swedish trade. The second group would become the dominant force in the new period.
When we talk about the merchants that had bonds with the key Dutch merchants of the previous
period, we obviously talk about the De Geer and Trip family. In the case of the former, what previously
been a true industrial De Geer-empire in Sweden, became after the death of Louis de Geer in 1652 very
diffused: the family estates, including their industrial complexes, were divided among no less than five
sons of Louis de Geer, each of the sons inheriting one estate. A sixth estate, perhaps the most prominent
one (Norrköping) was managed by all of them, with the help from Adriaen Trip.173 But the once famous
industrial De Geer complexes were no longer as thriving as they used to be: Laurens de Geer, writing to
Swedish king Charles X in 1658, asked for the reduction of the toll on the export of copper, emphasising
that his Norrköping works had not been profitable in ten years. The works had a mixture of iron and
copper production facilities, but copper had dominated.174 Only because of the poor laborers had Laurens
kept the works running.175 We can perhaps partly discard this rhetoric as coming from a business man
looking for ways to improve his business, not being afraid to exaggerate. But Laurens de Geer’s
comments were anchored more in reality than in fiction, because in 1666, the same year Laurens died, the
works had to be sold.176 (Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate the declining power of the De Geer’s in
Swedish economy. Through proxies, they dominated the Swedish iron exports throughout the 1660s and
continued to be a prominent family in Swedish society in the years after: in 1693, Karel de Geer did not
show up at a hearing - in which several Dutchmen were tried due to unlawful religious (calvinistic)
173
Breedvelt-Van Veen, Louis de Geer, 218-219.
Klein, De Trippen, 276-278.
175
Römelingh, Een rondgang, 51.
176
Ibidem.
174
56 services - calling on his “privilege”.177 ) Likewise, we have already seen how the Trip family managed to
hold on for some time to a number of monopolies, but eventually lost out, mostly became second-hand
importers of Swedish goods and actually shifted their attention away somewhat from Swedish trade. The
relations between the Trips and Sweden in the centuries after seem to have been mostly dominated by the
outstanding debts the Swedish Crown had to the Trips.
The Momma and Van Eyck families, on the other hand, seemed to have fared comparably much
better. The Momma family, as we have seen, grew to become one of the most prominent merchant
families, gaining a prominent role in the Swedish brass industry, iron trade, as well as the copper trade,
and investing a wide range of Swedish business activities, including credits to the Crown. As a reward,
the Momma brothers got an admission to the Swedish Board of Commerce in the mid-1660s, and were
also ennobled in 1669.178 Abraham van Eyck, after his initial workings with the sugar factory, steadily
built a powerful position for himself. He took part in the “factorie-comptoir” of 1662, also became
commissioner in the Swedish Board of Commerce in 1665, the “commerce president” of Göteborg in
1667 and was ennobled in 1672.179
Not for nothing has Leos Müller argued, in relation to his analysis of the Momma family, that
Dutch merchants trying to become active in Swedish trade in the period post-1645 (he does not explicitly
state this period as such), had to enter an “establishment”.180 Unless family ties had already given a
kickstart to this trade, the usage of marriage as a tool had to be employed. I agree with him, but want to
add that the success of this strategy varied for different groups. Specifically, marriage was necessary even
for some of the second-generation families, yet did not necessarily lead to success.
177
Ibidem, 96.
Müller, The merchant houses, 61; SBL, Jacob Reenstierna, http://www.nad.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/7568
[accessed 09-06-2013]; SBL, Abraham Reenstierna, http://www.nad.riksarkivet.se/sbl/artikel/7567 [accessed 09-062013]
179
SBL, Van Eijck, släkt [digitally accessed 01-06-2013]; http://www.gbgtomter.se/Rote_6/6.16.pdf [accessed 0106-2013]; Wrangel even mentions a Van Eyck family member became mayor of Göteborg, yet does not specify
which family member this was. Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 25.
180
Müller, The merchant houses, 248.
178
57 2.3
POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS
2.3.1
Institutional level: Swedish grand initiatives of commerce
Sweden’s economy in the second half of the century had reached a more developed stage. Yet Sweden
was still struggling to make commerce its own, thereby improving its financial position and strengthening
its independence. According to the dominant historiography, efforts to make this happen were initiated
from the turn of the century - mostly because from this moment on, so it is argued, Sweden introduced
mercantilist measures.Yet, as we have seen in our analysis of the period before 1645, these measures
were already undertaken from a much earlier moment on. An “introduction” of them in the period after
1645 is therefore a mislabelling. It is nonetheless true that in this period Sweden still tried, through
institutional changes, to control its own economy, thereby fulfilling its need for funds. We can
nonetheless try to assess what kind of impact these continued efforts had on Dutch dominance over
Swedish trade. We will see that the continued efforts to find credits provided for a very unstable trade
environment, both for the Dutch merchants as well as Sweden’s own upcoming merchants. They, too,
were faced with the consequences of “the public good”.
Primarily, I suggest that there is a shift in approach: rather than finding a mix between “learning”
from the Dutch as well as trying to limit them, Sweden efforts to control its own trade in the period post1645 were markedly rigorous and ambitious in their scope. In 1651, it established a Royal Board of
Commerce, also known as the College of Commerce. Its efforts were among other to gather information
for Swedish trade, provide assistance to Swedish merchants, deliberate on Swedish economic policies.
This College has been described by Lindblad as being “founded with the aim of enhancing domestic
control of trade and shipping, explicitly at the cost of Dutch involvement”.181 The last part, emphasising
the importance of the institution to limit Dutch influence, seems to me under appreciative of what this
College was in fact meant to achieve. The Swedish empire around that time had reached a peak, a fact
which could be observable for contemporaries also, especially in relation to Swedish-Danish relations:
the Swedes had finally gotten the upper hand over their primary contestant in the region, as became
visible in the results of the 1643-1645 war. Admittedly, this was no decisive victory. In the words of
Roberts: “until 1643 Danish encirclement was as much a reality as Swedish encirclement seemed to be to
Christian IV [of Denmark]; until 1721 a resounding Danish revenge [...] was at least a possibility”.182
Even if no ultimate height of the empire was perceived (this comes mostly from modern day historians
181
182
Lindblad, Sweden’s trade, 13.
Ibidem, 8.
58 gifted with the knowledge of what came after), then surely a time of overt regional dominance - a
situation quite unique to the Swedes. Therefore, the time was ripe for an all-out effort to “unify and direct
the whole trade and industry of the empire”, through the initiation of a grand project such as the College
of Commerce.183 To that end, a main office in Stockholm, and two others in the Baltics and Germany
were planned (though the latter two never coming into existence). Moreover, as becomes clear from Axel
Oxenstierna’s Instruction that accompanied the founding of the College, commerce was a goal in itself
also: the benefits the Swedes had reaped from the development of its trade and industry during the first
half of the century were obvious. This furthering of commercial development was to be achieved, so Axel
Oxenstierna apparently envisioned and Roberts explains, through Sweden taking a position of a “middle
man”, “encourag[ing] traders of all nations”, where “trade should be left to find its own way without
attempts by politicians to control it”.184
This was, then, the idea behind the College of Commerce, an idea much more grand than it
supposedly springing from the idea to specifically target Dutch dominance. Of course, the latter was at
least a welcome side-effect, perhaps even a necessity. And ironically, it was very much alike Dutch views
on commerce. In fact, it seems to me too liberal in relation to what the ultimate purpose behind the
College was: “a buoyant revenue [for the state]”,185 or, in other words, in service of the public good. As
we have already seen in our analysis of the period pre-1645, combining this purpose with the ideas on
how to achieve thriving trade had always been a constant struggle for the Swedes, exemplified by Axel
Oxenstierna’s legitimization of the College of Commerce. However, with the death of Oxenstierna in
1654, so seems to have died the force fighting the most for finding this equilibrium.
The generation of Swedish statesmen after Axel Oxenstierna continued with similarly grand
commercial initiatives, yet these initiatives were even more rigorous and controlling. The founding of the
Swedish “factorie-comptoir” in 1662 was a direct attempt to monopolise all Swedish export commodities,
putting them under one banner. Subsequently, it was conceived that this institution would set up offices
in a number of other markets with which Sweden had trade relations, Amsterdam being one of them.186
Just as with previous attempts, if initiatives like these were meant to relieve Swedish trade from foreign
control, is was undermined by the fact that the Swedes appointed a Dutchman, Abraham van Eyck, to be
one of its two protagonists. Actions like these, then, could not have had a considerable effect on the
Swedes seizing their own trade (especially because of additional, yet to be discussed reasons). And they
seriously undermine historian Elias’s opinion, supported by Kernkamp, that the founding of this
institution helped limit Dutch trade - indeed, the mere founding of this institution seemed for Elias and
183
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 100.
Ibidem.
185
Ibidem, 101.
186
Müller, The merchant houses, 111-112.
184
59 Kermp proof enough that the Swedes were effectively fighting the Dutch for the trade dominance.187
Klein has been critical of Elias as well, arguing in addition that the workings of the factorie-comptoir,
including the way it organized the monopoly of Swedish export trade, was nothing new to what had been
the norm by that time. Yet, even more significantly, he explicitly argues that the purpose of institution, to
him, was to merely encourage Swedish trade, and thereby also an improved Swedish fiscality, without
necessarily working against the Dutch: indeed, Klein argues, the proper functioning of the institution was
depended on Dutch financial backing, as the appointment of Van Eyck shows.188
Yet, anxiety over not being able to seize its own trade was growing within Sweden, especially
when from the 1670s also English merchants became more numerous in Sweden’s realm. In 1673, a
Trade Ordinance was formulated, leaning on similar ones from earlier in the century yet now articulated
much more forcefully, limiting the duration of the trading season in Sweden for foreign merchants, as
well as denying them the right to use Swedish native residents as their go-between in trade. Although
Stockholm started putting this Ordinance in effect, the Dutch and English protested forcefully and,
initially, successfully.189
Yet, this Ordinance proved to be merely the build-up to an all out offensive in the 1690s, when
Sweden attempted “to pursue a more aggressive trade policy”.190 In 1694 the Ordinance went into effect,
and in 1696 was enforced in full: all foreign merchants who had exceeded their rightful period of
residence (two months, later extended to four) and not being official Swedish residents were expelled.191
These measures were against both the Dutch and English, and the two Maritime Powers were in fact
jointly fighting these measures. Most significantly of all, in the paraphrasing words of Sven-Erik Åström,
“the Burgomaster and City Council […] pointed out that the time was now ripe for emancipation” [my
italics].192 Åström has additionally argued that the Swedes partly took these rigorous actions as a way of
“reprisal” for the way their neutral ships were treated during the at that time waging Nine Years’ War.193
Although this partly seems credible, especially in relation to my assumption that Sweden would not allow
its imperial credibility and honor stepped on so lightly, it appears to me that this angle politicizes the
1696 policy too much - links it too much to ad hoc political events. It does fit in Åström’s bigger
argument that Swedish shipping throughout the second half of the century prospered during periods of
war between the Maritime Powers, with Sweden seizing on those occasions to expand its own trade
187
Elias, “Contract tot oprichting”, 380-381; Kernkamp, “Memoriën”, 297-298.
Klein, De Trippen, 454-455.
189
Åström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, 58-61.
190
Kirby, Northern Europe, 323.
191
Ibidem, 65-69. Römelingh, Een rondgang, 55. Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 104.
192
Åström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, 66.
193
Ibidem, 71.
188
60 activities, to the detriment of those of the Maritime Powers.194 This is where I mostly concur with him
and would argue that the actions in this specific period were mostly a culmination of consistent Swedish
efforts to control its own trade throughout the whole century, intensifying in the second half. This is
reflected in the fact that throughout the second half of the century Swedish shipping had marginally taken
back a share from the total domination by the Dutch of Dutch-Swedish shipping. The Nine Years’ War to
the Swedes must have seem, as highlighted by the Stockholm burgomaster and its council, like a good
opportunity to finally put in place a decisive and radical effort. It turned out quite successful indeed.
There was a sudden and dramatic drop of the share of Dutch ships in Dutch-Swedish trade between 1685,
1690 and 1695, with a 20% drop between every interval (going from 63%, to 43%, to 22 %). Where
previous wars had not affected Dutch dominance in shipping as such (the only other major drop had been
in 1670, not even a war year), suddenly Sweden was now, over a longer period, dominating DutchSwedish shipping.195 This, therefore, is where I would add a nuance to Åström’s argument: although
Sweden perhaps “profited” from the many conflicts between England and the Dutch Republic after the
turn of the century by taking back part of the control of if its own shipping had, this part had been, up to
the Seven Years’ War, far from impressive. Only, roughly, during the Seven Years’ War a true,
impressive drop can be observed. It was something of a turning point indeed.
Due to outbreak of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), the 1696 Ordinance was temporarily
lifted. The regulation was however officially kept in place until 1720, when it was permanently cancelled,
exclusively, for the English.196 If the regulation would have been enforced for a longer period than the
initial four years, it would have remained to be seen if Sweden would have been able to uphold it. As
during the first half of the century, many of the Swedish Crowns economic efforts during the second half
were focussed on finding credits. This constant craving for credits undermined many of the Crown’s
efforts to direct Swedish trade; indeed there was loud protest even within Sweden about the 1696
regulation, because it severed the connection between foreign credits and domestic industry.197 This was
just one example of how, during the second half of the century, Sweden’s craving for money led to an
increasing unstable trade environment for Dutch, English and Swedish merchants, and an undermining of
Sweden’s own efforts to direct its economy. Other examples can be found. The foundation of the
“factorie-comptoir” was clearly an effort to monopolize Swedish export trade, yet the fact its position got
undermined can be seen not only by making a Dutchman one of its directors, but also from events after:
the fact that already two years after the foundation, the Crown signed new contracts with Cronborg and
Kock concerning the export of copper, taking away the monopoly from the “factorie-comptoir”. Even the
194
Ibidem, 64.
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”, 14.
196
Åström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, 71.
197
Ibidem, 66. 102.
195
61 gun monopoly by this institution was in jeopardy, because of the Crowns dissatisfaction with
“insufficient and late advances [credits]”. This dissatisfaction with the lack of credit was also the reason
why the Crown, not long after, offered the gun monopoly to Cronborg. To make the circle round: he had
been the victim of the Crown’s efforts to take away, hand out again and capitalize on monopolies in the
first place, losing his gun monopoly to the factorie-comptoir in 1652.198
The importance to the Swedish Crown of finding credits cannot be understated. For instance, the
money the Crown took from the signing of the copper contracts with Cronborg “played a key role in the
Crown’s financing of the Bremen War (1666-69)”.199 Yet, in the second half of the century, merchant
families previously aiding the Crown substantially with credits, such as the De Geer and the Trip family,
would not (the Trips), or simply could not (De Geer), do this any longer. On the other hand, the number
of possible lenders had increased to include also English and Swedes (Cronborg is a good example),
which made the Crown more suspect to, once a creditor’s use to the Crown was done or perceived as
unfulfilling, look for alternatives. This led to a Swedish economy in which multiple contestants would vy
over often-occurring business opportunities, yet had to therefore cope with the fact that those same
business opportunities were also increasingly unstable. Nevertheless, as we have seen earlier, the Dutch
were always in the center of those dealings, often at the receiving end.
2.3.2
Political level: Dutch-Swedish politics amplified
We have seen that Sweden, during the first half of the century, was not at all afraid to assert itself. It often
stepped on Dutch toes, provoking the Dutch, while the Dutch, from their side, did not necessarily pick the
Swedish side either. This was, as long as Denmark was cooperating. It has been stated that after the turn
of the century, Sweden, in addition to commercially, also politically emancipated. One major element in
this would undoubtedly have to be the fact that Sweden had reached a high point in its empire building, at
least around 1660. Yet, together with the Swedes, the Dutch and English interests in the Baltic had risen
as well. It changed some of the dynamics in the region and more forcefully put some of the direct DutchSwedish political struggles to the fore.
The first change of dynamic could be considered a solely Swedish one: Sweden on its way to
reaching the pinnacle of its power meant that, for a time, it felt quite free to do as it deemed fit in the
area. Especially the 1650s provide us with two good examples: in 1655, Sweden started another Polish
campaign and came very close to controlling Danzig - the Baltic grain depot of the Dutch - while in 1658
198
199
Müller, The merchant houses, 111-112.
Ibidem, 186.
62 it attacked Denmark in an effort to basically wipe if off the map once and for all.200 In both cases, the
Dutch had too much to lose to allow this to happen, in addition to the fact that Dutch-Danish defensive
treaties from 1649 and 1657 obliged them to come the Danish aid.201 The first time, the appearance of a
Dutch fleet was all it took to make Sweden back down. The second time, real force was necessary, and
the Dutch and Swedes battled on sea. This was not, it should be pointed out (which Lindblad fails to do),
a war in which only the Dutch got involved: it in fact turned into a complete alliance against the Swedes,
including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia and Brandenburg. In that, there was, at least
from the Dutch side, a statement: Sweden could have its empire, but there were limits. Those limits were
in this case mostly formed by Dutch interests, yet the other participants in the alliance had a similar
agenda. Not for nothing does Andres Lossky note that the anti-Swedish alliance was “defensive” and, in
fact, “most unusual for the seventeenth century”. It therefore “fell apart as soon as the immediate threat
from Sweden was removed”.202
Another change of dynamic was the role of Sweden in political constellations outside of the
Baltic. Because its expanding influence, Sweden figured more and more in the plans of other
international powers also. However, this was just a moment, after the 1650s (after decades of warfare, for
that matter), when Sweden felt it needed a period of relative peace and a “pacific, non-aligned policy”.203
Thus, when the Second Anglo-Dutch War involved a Dutch-Danish request to Sweden in 1666 to help
them close off the Sound to the English, Sweden did not reciprocate.204 Instead, Sweden mediated in the
peace negotiations at the end of the war, with the Dutch again reaching out to Sweden, granting it a
number of benefits, as a way to safeguard their gun supplies.205 In conflicts that came after, similar
Swedish reluctances unfolded: it was unwilling to sign a mutual defensive alliance with the Dutch when
the latter requested this on the brink of France’s invasion in 1672, yet was forced - due to the French
threat of a withholding of subsidies which it so dearly needed - to enter the war anyway on the French
side.206 Sweden had rather tried to keep the peace between the two countries, but was now sucked in to
war.207 It was indeed especially France that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, had developed some fairly
good bonds with Sweden over the years. France had subsidised Sweden already from an early point in
their mutual relations on, in the hopes of securing a counterbalance to France’s enemies in Northern
200
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 10. Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 216-217.
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 10.
202
Lossky, Louis IX, ix.
203
Kirby, Northern Europe, 192.
204
Ibidem.
205
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 12.
206
Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 217; Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 137; Kirby,
Northern Europe, 193.
207
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 13.
201
63 Europe.208 Because of the Swedes, reluctantly, backing France, the inevitableness of a Dutch-Swedish
clash seems, at least in hindsight, clear: the Battle of Öland took place in 1676, between a combined
Danish-Dutch fleet and a Swedish fleet. It was a total defeat for Sweden, and with that, an affirmation of
what it needed: a period of peace, quiet and, therefore, neutrality (as much as it could enforce such a
thing, anyway), in which it aimed to reorganize itself financially, socially and militarily. Part of this
Swedish reform was to make itself more independent, for instance from international subsidies.209
Depending on your viewpoint, the Dutch were not slow to either seize on the Swedish weak
political standing, or punish it for its forceful and unwelcome middling in the international political
theatre: as part of the treaty negotiations that followed on the wars raging in the 1670s, a Dutch-Swedish
alliance was put in place in 1681, which included a commercially very important “most-favoured-nations
clause”.210 Lindblad has somewhat side-noted this alliance and the commercial treaty that was a part of it,
only noting that this meant that “the time of hostility was over”. Yet, to Roberts, the treaty “entailed the
sacrifice of long-held Swedish commercial ambitions”. Indeed, Israel even bases his explanation for the
“eventual strength of the Dutch Baltic trade revival of the 1680s” on this Dutch-Swedish treaty.211 Yet,
and alas, he does not elaborate on what in the Dutch-Swedish trade exactly makes this so. We do,
however, see a sudden surge in Dutch-Swedish shipping in the mid-1680s, reaching a peak only obtained
previously in 1660.212 The 1681 alliance meant that Sweden was forced to aid the Dutch against,
ironically, the French during the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697). The Swedes were reluctant to do so,
instead trying very hard to stay neutral - for instance through signing a defensive alliance with
Denmark.213 This does not seem too strange in light of their attitude from the thirty years before. If
anything, Sweden had during that period become more defensive, more inward looking, trying to
capitalize on and make-function the empire it had created. But instead, it was forced, exactly because of
its imperial expansions, to take part in the bigger political game of cards. And in that game, the Dutch
continuously held the ace.
208
Lossky, Louis IX, vii-viii.
Ibidem, 3.
210
Roberts, The Swedish imperial experience, 133. Lindblad, “Evidence of Dutch-Swedish trade”, 218.
211
Israel, Dutch primacy, 302.
212
Lindblad, “Trade and transport”, 14, fig. 3.
213
Wrangel, De betrekkingen, 13-14.
209
64 PART TWO - CONCLUSION
The political and commercial story of Dutch-Swedish relations in the second half of the seventeenth
century, or so the main historiography has it, is one of a distancing of Sweden. “Emancipation” is the
keyword, most recently and strongly put forward by Thomas Lindblad, with others, notably Peter Klein,
sharing this opinion. The idea of an economic emancipation of Sweden strongly rests on the notion that
the English market took a bigger stake in Swedish exports, as well as the idea that Sweden introduced
mercantilist measures.
To start with the former, we have seen that this was true in terms of macroeconomic numbers: the
English market did grow, from the 1650s on, and, by 1700, became the biggest receiver of Swedish iron.
Consequently, English merchants became increasingly present in Swedish trade. But there is a crucial
nuance to be made in this. Dutch merchants took an active part in the trade of various goods between
Sweden and England. In fact, those Dutch merchants successfully active in Swedish trade had no
problem following macro-economic trends, often leaving the Dutch market behind them, thereby “riding
the wave” as best they could. The Momma family, for instance, initially entered Swedish trade based on
them trying to take advantage of increasing Dutch-Swedish iron flows. When the English market opened
up for iron, they were quick in their efforts to capitalize on this by, eventually, shipping half of their iron
directly to England. And, when they started focussing solely on copper instead, monopolizing that part of
the Swedish copper industry concerned with the high-quality fabrication of copper brass-wire, they again
could lean on the English market. Furthermore, Dutch merchants had become less dependent on Sweden
as their supplier of iron and copper: former iron supply routes had, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,
opened up again, and copper supplies from other markets were increasing. Thus, ultimately, the decline
of the Dutch share in the export of Swedish iron and copper can mostly be linked to a decreasing link
with the Dutch market, rather than a decreasing link with the Dutch merchants. Leos Müller is very right
to note that “merchants were not passive actors; they were capable of exploiting the situation”.214
The second reason why Sweden supposedly emancipated from the Dutch, through mercantilist
measures, is for the most part of the period post-1645, quite simply, a falsity. True, Sweden initiated a
multitude of trade institutions, such as the Royal Board of Commerce, or the factorie-comptoir. But even
if these institutions were aimed directly at the Dutch (as proposed by Lindblad), which is in many cases
highly doubtable, their effectiveness was lacking completely - undermined by the fact that often
Dutchmen financed and took part in them. This was directly related to the fact that Sweden was still
desperately in need of cold hard cash, which ultimately affected almost all its economic policies. It
affected the business opportunities of Dutch merchants in the way that it was very hard to take a sole,
214
Müller, The merchant houses, 274.
65 unique position in the Swedish trade, due to the constant shifting around of monopolies by the Crown.
The Crown could do this because there were more competitors, including Swedish merchants, testifying
to the growing strength of Sweden’s economy and thereby, apparently, its own merchants. But these
Swedish merchants did not necessarily overtake the Dutch commercial activities in Sweden - far from it.
Instead, the Dutch still initiated and found ample opportunities to make long-term investments in purely
Swedish activities, for instance the leasing of royal estates, or the shipping companies by the Momma’s
and De Geers, and the non-European chartered trade companies by them and the Van Eycks.
Additionally, the constant moving around of monopolies did not mean Dutch merchants were left out of
the loop. It only meant that it was hard for any merchant to become the sole leading Dutch merchant
family in Swedish trade; instead having to give way to a multitude of contenders of fellow country men,
supplemented by Swedes and later on English. The mercantilist measures were thus not only ineffective,
an analyses of their ineffectiveness leads to the conclusion that Sweden was in fact still very, very much
depended on the Dutch merchants, specifically their investments and credits. So much so, that even when
Sweden finally went to the extreme opposite, significantly limiting the presence of Dutch (and English)
merchants in the last decade of the century, the domestic industry’s protest against this was fierce. It felt
it could not sustain itself without the credits by the Dutch.
Nevertheless, if there is an insistence on finding a moment when it could be said that Sweden
“broke through” Dutch commercial dominance, it is in this latter period, when the share of the Dutch
shipping in Dutch-Swedish shipping dropped immensely. But this was a sudden drop, heavily influenced
by Sweden taking advantage of the war raging at the same time, and had as its only relation to general
Swedish efforts to introduce mercantilist measures the fact that it was an extreme measure taken, almost a
last resort.
To become active in the Swedish trade at all, Dutch merchants were heavily reliant on their
networks. These networks were predominantly formed with the express purpose of making an entry into
the Swedish establishment - “leaning” on previous family ties was in fact incredibly hard. The ones who
found this out were the ones most prominent in the period before 1645, the De Geer and Trip family.
Thus, the period post-1645 saw mostly a new generation and new families of Dutch merchants becoming
active in Swedish trade. This newness and inability to lean on already-entrenched advantages made that
they had to, in many ways, start from the beginning. Therefore, it cannot be said that the social networks
guarded the merchants from, for instance, “economic downfall”. They merely helped to ignite trade
activities.
The diplomatic level reflects the Swedish incapability to bend the Dutch to their will, as well as
its depending on money. Sweden thought, after defeating Denmark around the turn of the century, it had
become a major player, at least within the Baltic. This initially lead to some bold actions, notably the
66 Polish and Danish campaigns of the 1650s. But these actions were immediately halted by not only the
Dutch, but also others. To those countries, the Swedish empire could exist, but within the limits of other,
bigger political power play that was going on at the same time. Sweden very soon recognized this, and
tried to focus instead on maintaining its realm, not getting involved in some of the major wars of the
period post-1645. Yet, exactly because of its rise to prominence, it could not do this. Rather, it was
coerced - especially by France and its money - into a number of alliances and treaties which ultimately
were to her detriment, both politically and commercially. An example of this is the 1681 treaties with the
Dutch. Sweden was not ready, nor allowed, to fully stand on its own.
Therefore, in the end, we have to conclude that the Dutch perhaps became less dominant in some
aspects of Swedish trade, but still were dominantly influential in general Swedish commerce in the
second half of the century. To speak of a Swedish emancipation, commercially and politically, is an
overstatement.
67 CONCLUSION
In the previous pages we have evaluated what the characteristics were of the two separate periods of
Dutch-Swedish trade in the seventeenth century, based on the separate elements that form the continuity
pillar of Antunes’ framework. But the overall intent has always been to, ultimately, compare the trade
characteristics of the two periods and thereby answer he ultimate question of how those characteristics
changed and what this meant for Dutch dominance in Swedish trade. In other words, assess if and how
continuity in Dutch-Swedish trade was maintained throughout the whole of the seventeenth century.
Whereas in the period pre-1645 the Dutch entrepreneurial presence in Swedish trade was formed
through a number of significant pushes, the period after 1645 at first sight seems to lack Dutch merchants
riding higher and higher the waves of Dutch-Swedish trade. In many ways, the Dutch dominance that had
been created during the first half of the seventeenth century could, after having reached such staggering
dimensions, comparably only go down. De Vries and van der Woude’s observation about general Dutch
trade development of the seventeenth century seems appropriate in this regard:
“"The Republic's economic Golden Age drew to a close in the course of the 1660s and '70s as
the growth potential of the investment strategies of the preceding century fell to zero. […] The
generations after the 1670s are sometimes viewed as overly cautious defenders of the status
quo, lacking in imagination, daring, and energy. They certainly had reason to be cautious; they
had a great deal to defend.”215
Dutch merchants had gotten in this position in the first place by very early on recognizing the
commercial opportunities Sweden had to offer. Their ability to actually seize these opportunities might
have been even more impressive. Sweden’s meteoric rise to Baltic power resulted in an insatiable need
for money, a need Dutch merchants jumped on ferociously. Huge, instantaneous credits were handed to
the Swedes, over and over again, by a very select group of merchants, packaged as investments or
advances for to-be-supplied raw materials. This gave those merchants not only an immense stake in
Swedish industrial development, but also exclusive trade monopolies - the ultimate way for Dutch
merchants to actually capitalize on their investments. They channeled these monopolies towards the
Dutch Republic, the market which therefore also became the focal point for Swedish trade in general.
Since Sweden had the same kind of hunger for credits during the second half of the century, due to its
definite power position perhaps even more so, the same opportunities existed also in that period. But
whereas the select few Dutch merchants in the first period could provide credit after credit, this was no
longer the case or to the satisfaction of the Swedish Crown in the second period. This resulted, after
215
De Vries, Van der Woude, The first modern economy, 676.
68 1645, in a continuous shift of monopolies, abetted by increased competition for the Dutch by initially
Swedish, and later also English merchants. In the increased presence of Swedish merchants, the Dutch
merchants were, due to them earlier developing Sweden’s prosperity, somewhat the victim of their own
success. Yet, this the shifting around of monopolies did not leave the Dutch entrepreneurs out of the loop:
often the monopoly would, albeit for a shorter time than in the first half of the century, at some point be
put in the hands of a consortium partly backed by Dutch money again. The main difference between the
first and the second half of the century in these monopolies is therefore mainly the fact that the number of
Dutch merchants able to be active in them, had increased.
However, the (in)ability to monopolize Swedish trade was only one of the factors influencing the
Dutch merchants’ business opportunities in Sweden. Another factor was macroeconomic trends. In the
period pre-1645, the importance of Sweden as a supplier of raw materials to the Dutch market became
sky-high, due to its almost sole position as supplier of copper, and the closing down of other European
iron supply lines due to Thirty Years’ War. The ending of the Thirty Years’ War, thereby opening up
those same iron supply lines again, as well as the increased competition in the copper market and the rise
of England as an iron market, meant that the Swedish connection with the Dutch market became much
less important. If seen in a negative way, this only partly affected the Dutch merchants, who, again, could
no longer monopolize, yet still were key players. If seen a positive way, it could be argued that this
merely opened up new business opportunities for the Dutch merchants. Leos Müller observes: “in
general, the entrepreneurial behaviour of early-modern merchants reflected the given opportunities”,
while consequently “merchants were not passive actors; they were capable of exploiting the situation”.216
Indeed, the lesser importance of the connection with the Dutch market in itself was not
detrimental to the Dutch merchants’ position in Sweden. Whereas in the first half of the century the
capitalization on business investments was closely related to export trade to the Dutch market, Dutch
merchants in the second half of the century instead merely refocused their investment strategies on what
was commercially opportune for that period. Thus, much more energy was successfully put into investing
into solely Swedish commercial activities, as well as the emerging relation of Swedish-English trade. In
this, Dutch merchants could partly lean on the foundation of Dutch dominance in the period pre-1645,
since although the dimensions had changed, the Swedes were still looking towards the Dutch for capital
investments, giving prominent positions in Swedish commercial and political institutions in return.
Compared to first half of the decade, the deeper ingrainment in a greater variety of Sweden’s economic
blood vessels in the second half of the century is apparent. Therefore, if the Dutch after the first half of
century, in the words of De Vries and Van der Woude, had “a great deal to defend” in Swedish trade,
they did indeed do this with renewed energy and in very creative ways. De Vries and Van der Woude are
216
Müller, The merchant houses, 274.
69 therefore very right when they, finally, say that the Dutch merchants’ “search for new strategies to
address the new economic environment was nothing less than intense”.217
These new strategies, as well as the still active trade between the Dutch market and Sweden,
were not at all limited by mercantilist measures. The academic notion that such measures had a decisive
impact on Dutch dominance over Swedish trade, especially during the second half of the seventeenth
century, is by now over a century old and up to now steadily upheld, yet lacks any foundation.
Concededly, Swedish commercial institutions, ordinances and laws were put in place, and, as Müller
states when describing eighteenth (!) century Swedish commercial institutions, “no-one would doubt that
most of them are important in the long-run”.218 Yet, “the long-run” in the context of Dutch-Swedish trade
of the seventeenth century goes back to the implementation of any measures already at the beginning of
that century. The Swedish efforts in the years after might have multiplied, but were continuously and
without exception made ineffective by the same group of merchants whose influence these efforts were
supposed to curtail. Ironically, Sweden itself made sure of that, much in the same way as it was acting
self-defeating in the bigger political constellations of that time also. In that context, it was trying very
hard to show its maturity, yet this only resulted in Sweden having to face it had in many ways been
overscreaming and the vested powers putting it back in its place.
The only example that might serve the purpose of seeing any effective mercantilist measure can
be extracted from the events of the Nine Years’ War (1689-1697), when Swedish shipping finally broke
through the dominance of Dutch shipping. And even then, the Swedish ordinance banning foreign
merchants from the Swedish realm came only in 1696, a full five years after Swedish shipping had
already clearly showed it was on its way to take away Dutch dominance in mutual shipping. Sweden was
thereby merely reacting to an opportunity it was ad hoc presented, but its actions can be put in the larger
context of it trying to take control of its own trade for, by then, almost a century. What the available
evidence of this period therefore mostly supports, is the notion that Dutch dominance in Sweden’s iron
trade was passing at that time, emphasized by the fact that 1696 ordinance was only lifted, some years
later, for the English. This was the culmination of the trend, initiated since the 1670s, that the English
market was becoming Sweden’s primary destination for iron.
But in many ways, that was all it stood for. Sweden itself had had, in the second half of the
seventeenth century, no active role in the growing divergence between itself and the Dutch market, nor
did it prove able to free itself from its dependence on Dutch merchants’ activities, specifically the credits
these activities brought with them. Therefore, although initially using the elements of Antunes’ continuity
framework to analyze how those separate elements were different from each other in the two periods and
217
218
Ibidem.
Müller, “Swedish shipping”, 127.
70 thereby trying to formulate an answer to the question to what exactly went “wrong” in Dutch-Swedish
trade relations throughout the seventeenth century, we have to conclude that asking this question was
misguided in the first place. If anything, using the guidelines set out by Antunes’ model has shown us
that there was such a thing as continuity in Dutch-Swedish trade and that nothing inherently went
“wrong”. If there was such a thing as a “turnaround”, it must been explained in much different terms than
previously has been done by others.
This does not derive from using Antunes’ model normatively, as if by at all using her model
makes the conclusion of continuity inevitable. Admittedly, Antunes has formulated her model quite
normative; trying to formulate a point of reference for her own research, concluding that there was such a
thing as continuity in trade relations in the Baltic. This thesis has in its own approach expressly refrained
from taking a similar initial opinion: by limiting the evaluation of how the know-how (entrepreneurial
behaviour), network and political and institutional pillars in that framework were formed to two separate
periods designated as such by existing literature, we could then contrast those two periods against each
other and discuss the dominant discourse. In doing so, it has become clear that Antunes’ framework is not
always spot-on: the network pillar, for instance, provided far less security in maintaining a dominant
trade position for certain merchant families, as much as it mostly helped as a catalyst for sometimes only
short-lived, single-generation dominant trade activity by one merchant family. Not one Dutch merchant
family, or any merchant family, for that matter, seemed to have been able to ride the waves of Swedish
trade dominance for longer than one generation. The institutional and political pillars also gave much less
security than Antunes’ model suggests – the forces active in this strand in fact rather seemed to have
actively worked against the influence of the Dutch merchants. But the incapability of these forces to
achieve much at all, no matter how persistently set in motion throughout the whole century, attest to a
durability of the Dutch link in Swedish trade.
Indeed, if there is one thing that becomes clear through having used Antunes’ framework, it is
that although a lot of pillars failed in the Dutch in the end, something very strong persevered in DutchSwedish trade relations. It was the individual Dutch entrepreneur and his entrepreneurial behavior, with
the former constantly looking for the next most profitably opportunity, that took advantage of Sweden’s
weak financial position both throughout the first half as well as the second half of the seventeenth
century. The entrepreneur proved adaptable to the circumstances when macro-economic tendencies
seemed to firmly shake-up the old. In this, a turnaround of sorts can indeed be seen: in the way these
individuals chose to conduct their business they confirmed their ale-like capability to carve out new paths
for themselves, paths which did not necessarily lead to the greater glory of the Dutch Republic, much
more so to the greater glory of the continuity of their own existence.
71 It resulted in the link between Sweden and the Dutch market, either by choice or not, increasingly
being weakened, but the link between Dutch entrepreneurial activity and Sweden remaining strong. This
therefore, ultimately, meant that the Dutch dominance of Sweden’s trade had only selectively passed. A
continuation of successful Dutch trade in Sweden, albeit in different ways, had materialized. A Swedish
emancipation, had not.
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SUMMARY
This author of this thesis analyzes the development of trade relations between the Dutch Republic and
Sweden throughout the seventeenth century. He does so by evaluating two periods (pre- and post-1645),
as delineated by the dominant discourse, and for each period discusses how the trade relations were
shaped. The thesis derives its analytical model of trade relations from Cátia Antunes’s general model of
Baltic trade, specifically the part that focuses on continuity, divided into the pillars “know-how” (here
characterized as “entrepreneurial behaviour”), “networks” and “politics and institutions”. The latter pillar
has special attention for Swedish mentalities, intentions and actions. The author argues that there was a
strong form of continuity in Dutch-Swedish trade relations after 1645 and argues against the dominant
literature that states there was a Swedish emancipation in the latter period. Both individual Dutch
entrepreneurs as well as the Swedish need for financial support were elementary for continuity in DutchSwedish trade. The former by finding new ways to capitalize on their investments in Sweden, the latter
by continuously and reluctantly depending on those Dutch investments.
77