NIDS China Security Report
2013
National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
NIDS China Security Report 2013
Published by:
The National Institute for Defense Studies
2-2-1 Nakameguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8648, Japan
Phone: +81-3-5721-7005
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: http://www.nids.go.jp
Copyright © 2014 by the National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written, prior permission from the publisher.
This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in January 2014.
ISBN 978-4-86482-010-3
Printed in Japan
NIDS China Security Report 2013
Contents
Preface
iii
Executive Summary
iv
Acronyms and Abbreviations
vi
Introduction
China’s New Assertiveness
2
Possibility of Crisis Management with China
3
China’s External Crisis Management System
Centralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society
6
From Leading Small Groups to State Security Committee
9
Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command
12
China’s Concept of Crisis Management
Crisis Management to China
16
Chasing Conflicting Targets
18
Politics of Crisis Management
21
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
The 2001 EP-3 Incident
26
Toward Accident Prevention
29
Conclusions
Column The Role of Chinese Think Tanks in Foreign and Security Policy Making
Column The Fire-control Radar-lock by a PLAN Vessel
36
8
38
i
Preface
Distributed widely in Japan and overseas, the NIDS China Security Report analyzes China’s
security policy and military trends from the mid- to long-term perspective. From the inaugural
issue released in April 2011, a series of reports has attracted keen interest from Japanese and
overseas research institutions and the media and provided increasing opportunities for dialogue
with experts and research institutions based on the analysis in the reports. We hope to continue
to make a contribution to facilitating policy discussions concerning China in Japan and other
countries, and to broadening opportunities for dialogue, exchange, and cooperation in the field
of security and defense between Japan and China.
This fourth issue focuses on crisis management in China. The report begins with an
overview of the Chinese mechanisms for decision-making and execution for international crisis
management and shows how Beijing regards unified decision-making as important. Reviewing
some research on Chinese crisis management, the report considers Beijing’s intellectual process
and concepts that lie behind deciding their behavior in crises. Then the study analyzes how
Beijing is preparing to prevent the occurrence of external crises and how they react to an actual
crisis, with a particular focus on Sino-U.S. relations as a case. This report carried out analysis
with reference to open source resources, including media reports and research materials. The
authors would like to thank a number of scholars from many countries and regions including
China for sharing their views and valuable insights.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those
of the Ministry of Defense or the Government of Japan. This report was authored by Masayuki
Masuda, Yasuyuki Sugiura and Shinji Yamaguchi. Editorial work was conducted by Yoshiaki
Sakaguchi (editor-in-chief), Akihiro Ohama, Shuji Sue, Naoki Tohmi, Masayuki Masuda, Rira
Monma and Akira Watanabe.
January 2014
NIDS China Security Report Task Force
National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
iii
Executive Summary
China’s External Crisis Management System
As a diversifying society has emerged in China, state-owned enterprises, local governments,
think tanks, and public opinion have become important actors that can influence Beijing’s
foreign and security policies, along with the Communist Party of China (CPC), the government
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Nonetheless, this does not mean the decentralization
of decision-making authority. The decision-making for important issues is exclusively made
by the CPC Politburo Standing Committee. The collective leadership system at the Standing
Committee, however, might impede swift decision-making. The PLA has no official authority
to directly take part in decision-making at the Politburo Standing Committee, whereas does
influence it through providing information and policy recommendations. The leading small
groups are in charge of providing information and recommendations, and coordination and
formation of policies under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee. The authority
of the groups relies on the status and responsibility of the political leader who concurrently
heads the Party, the state and the military. China’s maritime law enforcement agencies were
merged into the State Oceanic Administration/the China Coast Guard in June 2013. However,
its organization structure is complicated and the internal relationship of the agents remains
unclear. Almost nothing is currently clear about the State Oceanic Commission as the policy
coordination body and about the Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests
reportedly established in the latter half of 2012.
Concept of Crisis Management to China
China’s crisis management aims at preventing an escalation while maximizing its national
interests. Three sets of characteristics can be found in the Beijing’s crisis management:
adherence to principles and flexibility at the same time; the pursuit of self-righteousness and
initiatives; and the primacy of political decision. First, Beijing stands firm on issues related to
their principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity and hardly anything is compromised.
However, China often behaves in a relatively flexible manner, unless these principles are
breached. Second, Beijing tries to keep the appearance that the opponent, not China, is always
wrong in a crisis, while taking the initiative in its actual conduct. Third, Beijing strives to
properly use military, diplomatic and economic tools during a crisis. In addition, the primacy
of politics is established in Beijing’s crisis management concept; therefore, political decisions
are very important in realizing these characteristics.
iv
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
The handling of the 2001 EP-3 incident is regarded in China as one of the most successful
cases in Chinese crisis management. Beijing consistently stuck to the principle that the U.S.
side should bear full responsibility and make apologies, and to maintaining China’s legitimacy,
while Beijing was flexible in its actual behavior. Nevertheless, not only top leaders but also
working sections could not properly communicate with each other in the immediate aftermath
of the incident. Thus, how to establish and ensure an emergency communication mechanism
is an issue to be addressed in crisis management with China. Washington and Beijing have
discussed safety standards and procedures for military activities in peace time in the framework
of Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). However, Beijing has been focusing
on restricting U.S. military operations in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in MMCA
meetings. In addition, the shift of responsibility from PLA Navy (PLAN) to maritime law
enforcement agencies in order to conduct disruptive actions against foreign military activities in
the waters close to China gives rise to a new challenge for regional countries including Japan as
well as the United States; namely, how to approach China’s maritime law enforcement agencies
and move towards sharing safety standards with them?
A crewmember on a
Chinese trawler uses
a grapple hook in an
apparent attempt to
snag the towed acoustic
array of the USNS
Impeccable. (March 8,
2009) (U.S. Navy photo)
v
Acronyms and Abbreviations
vi
BCD
Border Control Department
CBMs
confidencebuildingmeasures
CCG
ChinaCoastGuard
CFIS
ChinaFoundationforInternationalandStrategicStudies
CICIR
ChinaInstituteofContemporaryInternationalRelations
CMC
CentralMilitaryCommission
CMS
ChinaMaritimeSurveillance
CPC
CommunistPartyofChina
CUES
CodeforUnalertedEncountersatSea
EEZ
ExclusiveEconomicZone
FALG
ForeignAffairsLeadingSmallGroup
FLEC
FisheriesLawEnforcementCommand
GAC
GeneralAdministrationofCustoms
GSD
GeneralStaffDepartment
IISS
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies
INCSEA
IncidentsatSeaAgreement
JMSDF
JapanMaritimeSelf-DefenseForce
KMT
ChineseKuomintang
MMCA
MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement
MSA
MaritimeSafetyAdministration
NATO
NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
NDRC
NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission
NPC
NationalPeople’sCongress
NSC
NationalSecurityCouncil
NSLD
NationalSecurityLeadingSmallGroup
PLA
People’sLiberationArmy
PLAN
People’sLiberationArmyNavy
PRC
People’sRepublicofChina
SAREX
SearchandRescueExercise
SARS
SevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome
SMS
SpecialMissionShips
SOA
StateOceanicAdministration
UNCLOS
UnitedNationsConventionontheLawsoftheSeas
UNSC
UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
WPNS
WesternPacificNavalSymposium
WTO
WorldTradeOrganization
Introduction
,
China s New Assertiveness
Possibility of Crisis Management with China
China’s New Assertiveness
Based on Deng Xiaoping’s strategic concept of
“TaoguangYanghui (hide capabilities and bide
time)”Chineseleadershavebecomeincreasingly
cognizant of the need to maintain a sound
internationalenvironment.Thisconceptaimsat
the gradual increase of China’s comprehensive
national power while avoiding direct conflicts
withothermajorpowers.Theideaof“thepathof
peacefuldevelopment”thatChinahasproclaimed
hasalsobeenregardedasconsistentwiththispolicy
direction.
Beijing, however, has become increasingly
assertiveaboutnationalinterestfromtheendof
the2000sagainstthebackdropofchangesinthe
globalpowerbalancefavorabletothecountry.As
theglobalfinancialcrisisbecameevidentinlate
2008,Chineseleadership,diplomaticauthorities
and the People’s LiberationArmy (PLA) have
been bolsteringclaims,since 2009in particular,
on China’s “core interests” with little room for
compromise,anddemandingwithastrongertone
thatothercountriesshould“respectthrough concrete
actions” China’s core interests (italic is a new
expressionfrequentlyusedsince2009).
In 2007, the Chinese government decided to
initiateregularpatrolsintheSouthChinaSeaby
the thenChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)of
theStateOceanicAdministration(SOA)underthe
bannerof“rightsprotection”(weiquan).Inaddition,
fortheprotectionofChinesefishingvesselsand
personnelintheSouthChinaSea,theFisheriesLaw
EnforcementCommand(FLEC),anorganofthe
FisheriesManagementBureauundertheMinistryof
Agriculture,hasalsoenhancedits“rightsprotection”
activities. Since 2009, it has been frequently
reported that under these “rights protection”
activities, Beijing has taken aggressive actions
againstthevesselsofothercountriesindisputes.
Oneoftherecentexamplesisthetwo-month
long(fromApriltoJune2012)confrontationbetween
governmentvesselsofChinaandthePhilippines
overthedisputedScarboroughShoal(Huangyan
Island)whichbothcountriesclaimtheirjurisdiction.
Beijing intensified diplomatic, economic and
military pressure on the Manila. Furthermore,
Chinesegovernmentvesselsremainedinandaround
2
the shoal and Chinese fishing boats continued
operationevenafterthePhilippinegovernmentships
retreatedfromtheshoalinJune.Thiseffectively
meansChina’snewoccupationoftheislands,while
theChinesegovernmentsaiditwasanactionof
“keepingeffectivejurisdiction”overtheislands.
A Chinese marine surveillance ship patrols around the
Scarborough Shoal (May 2012) (Kyodo News)
This new assertiveness might increase the
possibilityofsomecrisesarising betweenChina
and other nations in this region.At the 12th
InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS)
AsiaSecuritySummit(Shangri-La Dialogue)in
May2013,NguyenTanDung,theprimeministerof
Vietnam,whileavoidingnamingChina,remarked
“Somewhere in the region, there have emerged
preferencesforunilateralmight,groundlessclaims,
andactionsthatruncountertointernationallawand
stemfromimpositionandpowerpolitics.”
Japan’s nationaldefense whitepaper Defense
of Japan 2013, releasedinJuly2013,states“In
regardtotheissuesonconflictinginterestswithits
surroundingcountries,includingJapan,Chinahas
attemptedtochangethestatusquobyforcebased
onitsownassertion,whichisincompatiblewith
theexistingorderofinternationallaw.Theattempts
havebeencriticizedasassertiveandincluderiskrelated behavior thatcouldcausecontingencies.
Thus,thereisconcernoveritsfuturedirection.”In
otherwords,forcountriesinthisregion,theway
theydealwithactualorpotentialcrisesinvolving
Chinaisanimportantchallengeoftheirnational
security.
Introduction
Possibility of Crisis Management with China
These threat perceptionsand possible responses
of the regional countries mean a deterioration
ofsecurityenvironmentforChinaas well. For
instance, Yu Hongjun, Vice Minister of the
InternationalDepartmentoftheCommunistPartyof
China(CPC)CentralCommittee,clearlypointedout
securityconcernsforChina:theissuesintheSouth
ChinaSea;thediscordbetweenJapanandChina
overtheSenkakuIslands;the“re-balance”oftheU.S.
toAsiaPacificregion.Basedonthisunderstanding,
therearesomeargumentsthatcrisismanagement
isacritical matterforChinaasothercountries.
WhenitcomestoSino-Americanrelations,Chinese
PresidentXiJinpingstated“thetwosidesneedto
findanewwaytomanagetheirdifference.”He
alsomentionedthatChinashould“seekeffective
methodsforappropriatelycontrollingandresolving
theissue”ofthediscordbetweenTokyoandBeijing
over the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang announced “the two sides
shouldcontrolandsettle theirdifferencesinthe
SouthChinaSea.”Asaresultofthesestatements
oftheleadership,Chinesescholarshavebegunto
discussthewayofcrisismanagementinthesetypes
ofsituations.
Ne ve r t heless, d es pi t e C h i na’s ch a n ge,
international society, neighboring countries in
particular, regardChina’sactions as beingquite
inconsistent.Chinasometimesstandsfirmagainst
other countries and even undertakes dangerous
actions with the PLA, while at other times (or
sametime)itshowsafairlymoderateattitude.For
example,whilemaritimelawenforcementagencies
behave provocatively in the South China Sea,
diplomaticauthoritiesemphasizetheimportanceof
a“soundinternationalenvironment”anda“win-win
relationship.”ThesecontradictorypostureofChina
forceneighboringcountriestoquestionwhetherand
howtheycanmanageacrisiswithChina.
Why does China take these contradictory
a p p r o a c h e s , a h a r s h a n d f l e x i b l e s t a n c e
simultaneously when it faces actual or looming
crises against other countries? One possible
explanationisthelossofeffectivecontrolbythe
CPCleaderoveractorsintermsofChina’sforeign-
and security- policy-making process and their
implementation;thecontradictionsandinconsistency
inBeijing’sexternalbehaviormightbeinterpreted
asaresultoflackofgovernance.Ifthisistheright
explanation,theproblemistheabilityoftheParty
tocontroleachpolicy-executionbody,anditmust
betakenintoconsiderationinordertomanagecrisis
situationswithChina.Therefore,firstandforemost,
analysisoftheChinesesystemsandmechanismsfor
decision-makingorcoordinationisnecessary.
On the other hand, the explanation that the
external actions conceived by China already
includesome contradictory factors and features
is also feasible. According to this explanation,
China maximizes its profit through wielding
an uncompromising attitude or a calm attitude
accordingtothesituationatthetime.Ofcourse,
thishypothesiscouldbeconsideredcorrectonlyon
theassumptionthatChina’spolicy-makingishighly
centralizedtothetopleadersoftheParty.Toprove
thevalidityofthehypothesis,onemustexamine
fundamentalquestionssuchaswhatisacrisisfor
ChinaandwhatactionChinaconsidersrational.
Inthisreport,wearguethatthelatterhypothesis
is to the point in comparison with the former.
NIDS China Security Report 2012, released in
December2012,stressedthatwhilethenumberof
actorsinvolvedinthedecision-makingprocessis
increasing,finaldecisionsregardingimportantpolicy
issuesaremadebytheParty’sleadership,especially
theCPCPolitburoStandingCommittee.Thatis,
China’sexternalbehaviorisbasicallycontrolledby
thePartyleadership;contradictoryfactorsinChina’s
actionsreflecttoaconsiderabledegreetheintentions
ofthepartyleaders.
These Chinese domestic mechanism and
dynamicsofpolicymakingareimportantnotonly
foranalysesofChina’sbehaviorinanexternalcrisis
butalso,inabroadersense,forconsideringChinese
strategicdirection.Theinternationalcommunity
pays close attention to how China exercises its
growingpowerandinfluenceindealingwithconflict
ordispute.Neighboringcountriesinparticularare
concernedaboutwhetherthisever-moreassertive
country is abandoning the strategic concept of
“TaoguangYanghui” or its recent behavior is
basically justaresponsetocrisesandthereisno
3
fundamentalchangeinitsstrategy.Analysesof
China’sbehaviorincriseswilloffersomeinsights
tohelpunderstanditsstrategictrendsinalarger
context.
NIDS China Security Report 2013firstoutlines
China’sdomesticmechanismtodealwithexternal
crises,andshowsthatitssystemsandmechanisms
for decision-making are centered on the party
4
leadership.Thereportthenattemptstoascertainthe
featuresofChina’scrisismanagementconceptsby
reviewingresearchinChinatorevealitsparadigm
asaprerequisitetodealwithinternationalcrises.
Basedonthefindings,thereportofferscasestudies
onChina’sresponsestocrises,including,the2001
EP-3incidentandtheU.S.-ChinaMilitaryMaritime
ConsultativeAgreement(MMCA)mechanism.
China’s External Crisis
Management System
Centralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society
From Leading Small Groups to State Security Committee
Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command
Centralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
maintained a one party rulingsystem under the
CommunistPartyofChina(CPC)sincethePRC’s
foundationinOctober1949.TheConstitutionof
thePRCexplicitlystipulatesthatnationbuilding
must beconducted “under the leadership of the
CPC.”Meanwhile,pluralisticsocietyhas,tosome
extent,emergedinChinaasaresultoftheeconomic
growthassociatedwiththe“ReformandOpening
Up” policy,the participationtotheinternational
economicsystem,highlightedbythemembership
oftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)andthe
development of communication tools such as
theInternet.Assuch,thischangehasinfluenced
Chineseforeignandsecuritypolicies.
Currently,thehighestdecision-makingauthority
iscentralizedtotheCentralCommitteeoftheCPC,
in particular the PolitburoStandingCommittee;
however,itisbelievedthatthenumberofactorswho
caninfluencetheleadership’sdecisionsisincreasing
morethaneverbefore.Theseactorscanbedivided
intotwotypes:oneswhoareofficiallyauthorized
toengageindecision-making,andthosewhoare
unofficiallyengaging.
Theformertypeincludes:(1)agencies under
thedirectcontroloftheParty,suchasthePolicy
ResearchOffice,theGeneralOfficeoftheCPC,
theInternationalDepartmentoftheCPC,andthe
PropagandaDepartmentoftheCPC;(2)theState
Council’sagencies,for instance the Ministry of
ForeignAffairs,theMinistryofStateSecurity,and
the Xinhua NewsAgency; and (3) the People’s
LiberationArmy (PLA). These agencies are
traditionalactorsintheChineseforeignandsecurity
policy, and they engage in the decision-making
processthroughtheprovisionofinformationand
policyrecommendationsviaofficialchannelsof
eachagency.
The latter type of actors are: (1) Chinese
expertsandthinktanks;(2)state-ownedenterprises
including huge defense companies; (3) local
governments;and(4)thepublicopinionanddebates
ontheInternet.Theseactorsarerelativelynew,
gaininginfluenceonthepolicieswiththegrowing
pluralisticsociety. Little has been known about
theroutethroughwhichtheseactorscommunicate
6
theirinterestsorexpectationstodecision-makers.
Inparticular,itisdifficulttodemonstratetowhat
extentChinesepublicopinion,heavilytingedwith
nationalism,influencesforeignandsecuritypolicy.
Chineseleadershipanddiplomaticauthoritiesadmit,
however, that publicopinionisinfluentialinits
foreignandsecuritypolicy.
Thisstronginfluencecanalsobeobservedinthe
crisismanagementprocess.Forexample,facedwith
theunintentionalbombingofChina’sEmbassyin
BelgradebytheU.S.-ledNATOforcesinMay1999
andtheEP-3collisionincidentinApril2001,the
leadershipoftheCPCsoughtforthenormalization
of diplomatic relations between China and the
UnitedStates, whilegivingdueconsiderationto
public opinion in both cases. Domestic factors
haveincreasinglybecomeconstrainingregarding
decision-making in external crisis management
policiesbythecurrentChineseleadership.
Chinese
demonstrators
burn the
American flag
in Beijing.
(May 9, 1999)
(Reuters/
Kyodo News)
Nevertheless, the increase in the number of
influentialactorsinvolvedintheforeignandsecurity
policiesalongwiththediversificationofsociety
doesnotmeanthedecentralizationofauthorityof
decision-making.Thedecision-makingforimportant
issuesisexclusivelymadebythePolitburoStanding
CommitteeoftheCPC,consistingof7members,
andbythePolitburooftheCPC,consistingof25
members(including7 membersof thePolitburo
China’s External Crisis Management System
StandingCommittee).Amongothers,itisnotthe
Politburo,butthePolitburoStandingCommittee
which seems to retain the highest authority for
decision-makingonforeignandsecuritypolicies.
ThePolitburoStandingCommitteeholdsexpanded
meetings as needed to build consensus among
leaders.Inthisway,althoughthesocietybecomes
pluralistic,decision-makingoncriticalissuesisas
centralizedasever.
Thatsaid,currently,thereisnooverwhelmingly
charismatic leader like Mao Zedong or Deng
XiaopingamongthesevenmembersofthePolitburo
StandingCommittee.Therefore,inthePolitburoas
wellasthePolitburoStandingCommittee,decisions
onimportantissuesaremadeunderthecollective
leadership system. This collective leadership
system in the Politburo Standing Committee is
characterizedbysuchmechanismsas“thecollective
mechanism with divided responsibilities among
individuals,”“thegroupstudymechanism”and“the
collectivedecision-makingmechanism.”Asamatter
offact,eachmemberoftheStandingCommittee
alsoservesasthehighestexecutiveinimportant
organizationsincludingtheCentralCommitteeof
theCPC,NationalPeople’sCongress,StateCouncil
ofChina,ChinesePeople’sPoliticalConsultative
Conference,CentralMilitaryCommission(CMC),
CentralCommissionforDisciplineInspectionof
theCPC,and theCPC Propaganda Department,
basedonacollectivemechanismwiththedivision
ofresponsibilitiesamongindividuals.Eachmember
oftheStandingCommittee bringsanddiscusses
viewsandinformationoftheorganizationofwhich
theyareincharge,andtheymakeaconsensusanda
unifieddecision.
Through the group study mechanism, each
member of the Standing Committee tries to
understand other members’ views on important
issues tosmoothly reach aconsensus with each
other.ThesolidarityandcoherenceoftheCentral
Committee of the CPC is emphasized in the
collective decision-making. Even if there is a
disagreementwithinthemembersoftheStanding
Committee,itwillneverberevealedtotheoutside.
TheleadershipofthePartystressesthesolidarity
oftheCentralCommitteeandtheunifieddecisionmaking,undertheprinciplethattheminorityfollows
themajority.Fragmentationwithintheleadershipof
theCentralCommitteemustbeavoided.
Thisstrictcollectiveleadershipsystem,however,
mightimpedequickdecision-makingtomanagean
internationalcrisis.Forexample,inthe2001EP-3
aircraftcollision,thePLAreportedtotheStanding
Committeeimmediatelyaftertheincident,whereas
noquickinstructionsweregivenforthebranches
concerned.Thisisbecauseoftheabsenceofall
themembersoftheStandingCommitteeandthe
committeedidnotdelegateauthorityinanticipation
ofsuchaccidentstootherspecificseniorofficials.
Ontheotherhand,intheareaofforeignanddefense
polices,theStandingCommitteemembersaresaid
tobeinclinedtofollowtheopinionoftheparamount
leaderwhoservesastheGeneralSecretaryofthe
CPC,PresidentofthePRCandChairmanofthe
CMC.
ForinstanceitseemedthatHuJintaohimself
draftedthepaperexpressingChina’sofficialposition
towardNorthKorea’snucleartestinOctober2006
sincenoothermembersofthePolitburoStanding
Committeewantedtobearthefinalresponsibility
ofthematter.Inwartime,undertheguidanceofthe
paramountleaderwhoalsoservesastheGeneral
Secretary of the CPC, President of PRC and
ChairmanoftheCMC,theCMCwilltakedirect
responsibilityformilitaryoperationswhilereporting
to the PolitburoStandingCommitteeas needed.
AsofDecember2013,XiJinping,astheGeneral
SecretaryoftheParty,PresidentofthePRCand
ChairmanoftheCMC,istakingthecentralrolein
decision-makingprocessofthePolitburoStanding
Committeeforforeignandsecuritypolicy.
Meanwhile,thePLAdoesnothaveamemberin
thePolitburoStandingCommitteeofXiJinping’s
regime as was the case in Hu Jintao’s regime;
thePLAhasnoofficialauthoritytodirectlytake
partinimportantdecision-makingprocessatthe
highest level in the Party. Moreover, General
FanChanglongandGeneralXuQiliang,theVice
ChairmenoftheCMC,aretheonlytwowhocan
representthePLAamongthe25membersofthe
CentralCommitteeat the Politburoof theCPC.
In this sense, the PLA does not hold a superior
positionagainstpoliticalleaderswhorepresentparty
organizationsorgovernmentagencies.Thus,itis
likelythatthePLA’sdirectinfluenceonthedecisionmakingprocessitselfforexternalcrisismanagement
7
Column
The Role of Chinese Think Tanks in Foreign and Security Policy Making
Internationalanddomesticattentionisstarting
to focus on the expanding roles played by
Chinesethinktanksandresearchinstitutions
and their growing influence in China’s
diversifyingsociety.Ithasbeenpointedoutin
somerecentresearchthattheirroleshavebeen
expandingasBeijingincreasesitsinvolvement
ininternationalsociety.
China’sthinktanksareroughlyclassified
intothreetypes.First,researchinstituteswithin
theParty,governmentorPeople’sLiberation
Army (PLA), such as the Central Policy
Research Office of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China (CPC),
the National Development and Reform
Commission(NDRC)’sDepartmentofPolicy
Studies,thePLAAcademyofMilitaryScience,
and the PLA National Defense University.
Second, government-affiliated research
institutes such as the ChineseAcademy of
SocialSciencesundertheStateCouncil,China
Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR) as a think tank of the
MinistryofStateSecurity,orthoseunderthe
directauthorityoflocalgovernmentsincluding
theShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies.
Third,non-governmentalresearchinstitutes,
such as those in universities and private
researchinstitutes. Nevertheless,given the
financialsupportfromthepublicorganizations
includingtheCPC,thegovernmentorthePLA,
noneofthemcanbesaidtobeanindependent
organization,
T h e r o l e s o f t h i n k t a n k s i n c l u d e
formulationofinformation,intelligenceand
islimited.
Thatsaid,thePLAseemstotakeanimportant
role in providing inf or mation and policy
recommendationsfor referenceof the Politburo
Standing Committee when the Committee
decides policies to manage international crises.
8
policyproposalsaswellasshapingdomestic
public opinion and spreading international
propaganda. Furthermore, think tanksexert
an influence indirectlyon theCPC leaders’
decisionmakingandthe policydraftsmade
by the government agencies through, for
example,writinginternalreportsandattending
closedsessions;participatinginopenresearch
conferencesinsideandoutsideChina;exposure
indomesticandforeignmedia;andcontribution
to domestic and foreign major academic
journals.Aboveall,the“groupstudy”ofthe
Politburo of the CPC, which has been held
regularlyfromtheHuJintaoeraon,provides
expertswithavaluableopportunitytodirectly
presenttheiropinionstodecisionmakers.The
themeofthestudyisselectedbytheCentral
Policy Research Office of theCPC Central
CommitteeundertheguidanceoftheGeneral
OfficeoftheCPC,whiletheothernecessary
arrangements, including selecting suitable
participants, are made by each department
concerned.Forinstance,onJuly31,2013,
someexpertsincludingGaoZhiguo,director
oftheChinaInstituteforMarineAffairsunder
theStateOceanicAdministration,lecturedin
aPolitburogroupstudysessionchairedbythe
GeneralSecretaryXiJinpinginordertodiscuss
“maritime power”strategy. Basedon these
lectures,Xiemphasizedontheoccasionofthis
studytheimportanceofsafeguardingmaritime
rights and interests and stated that China
wouldneverabandonits“legitimaterightsand
interests”whileadheringtothepathofpeaceful
development.
InformationfromthePLAisprovideddirectlyto
theCMCortothePolitburoStandingCommittee
oftheCPCthroughtheGeneralSecretaryofthe
Central Committee of the CPC who alsoserves
as theChairmanof theCMC. Inaddition,PLA
representativesalong withciviliansare believed
China’s External Crisis Management System
toattend theexpanded meetingof thePolitburo
Standing Committee, which is summoned
dependingonthesituationinacrisis.Furthermore,
itisbelievedthatPLAofficialscandirectlysubmit
policyrecommendationsormeettoconveytheir
viewstocivilianleaders.TheGeneralOfficeof
theCMCandthePLAGeneralStaffDepartment
(GSD)seemtoplayacrucialroleintheprocess
of these provisions of information and policy
recommendation.
Infact,duringthe1995-96TaiwanStraitcrisis,
the information and policy recommendations
providedbythePLAareconsideredtohaveplayed
significantroles.Itisalsofrequentlypointedoutthat
informationprovidedbyGeneralXiongGuangkai,
theDeputyChiefoftheGSD,whoearnedJiang
Zemin’s deep trust, played a remarkable role in
dealingwiththe1999Embassybombingincident
andthe2001EP-3incident.
Thus, while the PLA’s authority to directly
engageindecision-makingprocessatthePolitburo
StandingCommitteeoftheCPCislimited,thePLA
appearstobeabletoprovidemilitaryintelligence
and policy recommendations exclusively to the
paramountleader.Giventhesepoints,thePLAis
oneoftheimportantactorswhocanexertacertain
degreeofinfluenceonthedirectionoftheprocess
oninternationalcrisespolicy.
From Leading Small Groups to State
Security Committee
The Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC
and the Politburo of the CPC have advisory
bodies known as “leading small groups.” The
groupsseemtobeunderthedirectcontrolofthe
CentralCommitteeoftheCPC,andthemembers
areselectedfrom relevantsectionsof the party,
the government and the PLA depending on
issuesagroupisresponsiblefor.Theirconcrete
responsibilities are considered to be providing
informationandrecommendations,andcoordination
andformationofpolicies.
Theleadingsmallgroupshavebeenestablished
traditionallyinthedecision-makingprocessofthe
CPC.Forexample,theCPCestablishedthegroups
forfinanceandeconomy,politicsandlaw,foreign
affairs,scienceand technology,andcultureand
educationunderthedirectleadershipoftheCentral
Committee and the General Office of the CPC.
Later,allthegroupsexcepttheCulturalRevolution
GroupweredisbandedinthechaosoftheGreat
Cultural Revolution; however, they have been
restoredoneafteranothersince1980s.
At present, thereareleadingsmallgroupsin
the Central Committee in the fields of finance,
diplomacy,Taiwan,andpublicsecurity.However,
itdoesnotmeanthatallthesegroupshavethesame
characterandduties.Thegroupsaredividedinto
twotypes:astandingbodytodealwithlong-term
agendas,includingtheFinanceandEconomySmall
LeadingGroup,andanadhocbodytodealwith
short-termissuessuchastheSmallLeadingGroup
forthepreparationsoftheBeijingOlympicGames.
Therearethreeleadingsmallgroupsinvolvedin
foreignandsecurityissues:(1)theForeignAffairs
LeadingSmallGroup(FALG);(2)theTaiwanWork
LeadingSmallGroup;and(3) NationalSecurity
LeadingSmallGroup(NSLG).Thememberships
ofthesethreegroupsareconsideredtobelargely
overlapping.Amongthethree,theFALGoperates
inonewiththeNSLG.Itispointedoutthatthe
majorresponsibilitiesofthegroupsare(1)important
policydecisionswiththeapprovalofthePolitburo
ormembersofthePolitburoStandingCommittee,(2)
judgmentonamajoreventorlong-termtrendsbased
onvariousreports,(3)inter-agencycoordination
amongtheParty,governmentandthePLA,and(4)
internationalcrisismanagement.
The members of the groups on foreign and
securityissueshavenotbeenofficiallyrevealed.
Nonetheless,accordingtoavailableliterature,the
FALG/NSLGisheadedbytheGeneralSecretaryof
theCPCCentralCommitteewhoholdsconcurrently
thePresidentofthePRCandtheChairmanofthe
CMC,withtheVicePresidentofthePRCorthe
PremieroftheStateCouncilashisdeputy.The
director of Central ForeignAffairs Office, the
9
administrativeorganoftheFALG/NSLG,isaVice
Premier-rank memberof theCentralCommittee
fromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs;atthemoment,
YangJiechiisbelievedtoholdtheposition.Other
members of this leading small group appeared
to include theVice Premier/State Councilor for
ForeignTrade,theMinisterofForeignAffairs,the
Minister of the International Department of the
CPC,theMinisterofStateSecurity,theMinister
of Public Security, the Minister of Commerce,
theDirectorofStateCouncilHongKong-Macao
Office, the Director of State Council Overseas
ChineseAffairsOffice,theMinisterof National
Defense,thePLADeputyChiefofStaffforForeign
AffairsandIntelligence,theHeadofPartyPublicity
Department,andtheDirectorofthePropaganda
OfficeofCentralCommitteeandInformationOffice
oftheStateCouncil.
ItissaidthattheTaiwanWorkLeadingSmall
Group is now headed by the GeneralSecretary
of the Party, holding concurrently the rank of
President of the PRC and the Chairman of the
CMC,withtheChairmanoftheChinesePeople’s
PoliticalConsultativeConferenceashisdeputy.The
directorofitsadministrativeorganisbelievedtobe
oneoftheCentralCommitteemembersfromthe
MinistryforForeignAffairsequivalenttotheVice
Premier.Othermembersofthisgroupincludethe
relevantVicePremier/StateCouncilorforTaiwan
affairs,ExecutiveSecretaryofthePartySecretariat,
HeadofthePartyUnitedFrontWorkDepartment,
MinisterofStateSecurity, Directorof theState
CouncilTaiwanAffairsOffice,ChairofAssociation
forRelationsacrosstheTaiwanStrait,Headofthe
Party Publicity Department,Vice Premier/State
CouncilorforForeignTrade,ViceChairmanofthe
ChinesePeople’sPoliticalConsultativeConference,
Vice Chairman of the CMC, and PLA Deputy
ChiefoftheGeneralStaffforForeignAffairsand
Intelligence.
Asadministrativeofficesforthetheseleading
small groups, the role played by the Foreign
AffairsOfficeandtheTaiwanWorkOfficearealso
important.TheForeignAffairsOfficereplacedthe
formerStateCouncilForeignAffairsOfficein1998.
OneoftheCentralCommitteemembersfromthe
MinistryofForeignAffairsorPartyInternational
Department,whoisequivalenttoVicePremier,has
10
servedastheDirectoroftheForeignAffairsOffice.
Thestaffoftheofficeconsistsofthepersonnelfrom
theMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheInternational
DepartmentoftheCPC.Giventhefactthatthe
ForeignAffairsOfficeservesastheadministrative
organ of the FALG and NSLG, diplomatic
bureaucrats can influence China’s foreign and
securitypolicytosomedegree.Ontheotherhand,
theTaiwanWorkOfficeandTaiwanWorkOfficeof
theStateCouncilarebasicallyasingleorganization
havingthesamepersonasthedirector.Theseoffices
areinchargeofvariousgeneraladministrativework,
includingdraftingandmanagementofdocuments,
arrangingmeetings,collection,managementand
deliveryofinformation,andsurveyandresearch.
Theleadingsmallgroup’sroleinforeignand
securitypolicieswassaidtobestrengthenedinthe
JiangZeminera.ThatJianghimselfheldthethree
concurrent posts of the chairman of the FALG,
NSLGandTaiwanWorkLeadingSmallGroupis
saidtohavemadethegroupsimportant.Also,Hu
Jintao,successorofJiangZemin’spositionasthe
tripledirector,isconsideredtohaveenhancedthe
numberandrolesofthestaffofthegroups.
Meanwhile, it has been pointed out that the
enlargedmembershipoftheleadingsmallgroups
mightmakeinter-agencycoordinationmoredifficult.
Asaleadingsmallgroupis justanadvisorybody
fortheCPCbasedontheparty’snoticeordecision
withoutauthorityandcapacityaccruingfromlegal
foundation, it heavily depends on the director's
authorityandpowerintheCPCinordertoplaythe
multiplerolesmentionedabove,includingpolicy
recommendation.Furthermore,theleadingsmall
groupscannotmakeanypolicydecisionsbytheir
ownforimportantfieldssuchasforeignandsecurity
policies.Theyneedtoobtainanapprovalfromthe
CentralCommitteeoftheCPCandthePolitburo
Standing Committee in particular as the only
authoritiestomakesuchdecisions.
Consideringtheselimitationsoftheleadingsmall
groups,Chinahasdiscussedtheestablishmentofan
agencyequivalenttotheNationalSecurityCouncil
(NSC)oftheU.S.Chinaappearedtoestablishthe
NSLGwithaviewtodevelopitintotheNSCinthe
future.Sincethen,itisbelievedthatJiangZemin
proposedtheestablishmentofanagencyequivalent
tothe NSCintheBeidaiheConferencein2002,
China’s External Crisis Management System
anditwasraisedagaintwoyearslaterintheFourth
PlenarySessionofthe16thCPCCentralCommittee
toestablishanagencybasedontheNSLG.
Againstthisbackdrop,itwasdecidedtofound
theStateSecurityCommitteeintheThirdPlenary
Session of the18th CPC Central Committee in
November2013.Accordingtoacommuniqueissued
afterthesession,thepurposeofthiscommitteeis
toimproveChina’snationalsecuritysystemand
strategytosafeguardthecountry.GeneralSecretary
XiJinpingpointedoutthatChinahadtoestablish
apowerfulagencytoconsolidateandcontrolall
nationalsecurityactivitiesintherelentlessforeign
and domestic security environment. He then
explainedthatsuchestablishmentwouldstrengthen
thecentralizedandunifiedleadershipinthenational
securityfieldanditwasanurgentbusiness.
TheactivitiesoftheStateSecurityCommittee
remainunclear.HuaYiwenstatesinhiscommentary
inthePeople’s Daily(theoverseasedition)thatthe
backgroundforthefoundationoftheStateSecurity
Committeeisthestill-deterioratinginternational
and domestic security environment. According
tothearticle,theconceptof nationalsecurityis
nowconstitutedwithnotonlytraditionalsecurity
elementssuchasdiplomacy,nationaldefense,and
militarybutalsofactorsinabroaderscopesuch
aseconomics,finance,energy,information,and
society. Then he continues to describe that the
existingFALGand/orNSLGareinformalandadhoc organizations and are not able to play any
importantroleasthecoreagencyinroutinenational
securityduties;furthermore,theydonothavethe
ability,budget,andmanpowertodealwithserious
emergencysituationsandtoestablish,coordinate,
and execute a comprehensive national security
strategy.HeindicatesthatBeijingmustestablishan
agencythatcoordinatesmanyrelateddepartments
withastrongleadershipand powertodeal with
severeandcomplicatednationalsecurityissues.
Ontheotherhand,ProfessorMengXiangqing,
DeputyDirectoroftheStrategicResearchInstitute
at the PLA National Defense University, puts it
in the PLA Daily that the lack of coordination
at high-levelsfor non-traditionalsecurity issues
includingcounter-terrorismisthemotive behind
thefoundationofthecommittee.Hearguesthat
thenon-traditionalthreatssuchassocialinstability,
economic or financial crises, environmental
destruction,andproblemsofethnicindependence
movements are increasing in China’s current
nationalsecurityenvironment,whilethetraditional
threatsagainstChina’sterritorialsovereigntyand
maritimeinterestsarenoteasing.Hestatesthat
Beijingrequirescoordinationatthehighestlevel
for unified command and action among related
departments.This is becauseChinaisfacingan
internationalizationofdomesticnationalsecurity
issues and vice versa, and therefore a mistake
indealing withdomestic problems willdegrade
Beijing’sstandpointexternally,whileamistakewith
foreignissueswillcauseinternalsocialinstability.
Heconcludesinthearticlethatthiscommitteewill
greatlyimproveBeijing’squickresponsecapability.
These articles appeared in China’s official
mediasuggestthatthereasonforthedecisionto
foundtheCommitteeintheThirdPlenarySession
wouldbe,withanewnationalsecuritystrategy,to
establishaunifiedleadershipandtoinstitutionalize
the policycoordinationamong relevant national
securitydepartmentsinordertorealizeswiftand
comprehensiveactionagainstdiverse,internaland
externalthreatstoChina’snationalsecurity.
It is not certain whether the State Security
Committee will be asimilar organization to the
NSCoftheU.S.Althoughtherehasbeentalkof
establishing an NSC-like body for coordinating
nationalsecuritypolicyforoveradecadeinChina,
ithasnotbeenestablishedbeforebecausetherehas
beenaconcern that the NSC would transfer the
authorityofdecision-makingonforeignandsecurity
policiesfrom the PolitburoStandingCommittee
to one individual, the General Secretary of the
CentralCommittee; the NSC might resultin the
transformationofthecurrentcollectiveleadership
system.Furthermore,iftheNSCisestablishedas
agovernmentagency,notapartybody,thereisa
riskthatthefundamentalprincipleoftheChinese
politicalsystemthatthegovernmentisledbythe
Party might bechanged. Therefore,it had been
pointedoutthatitwasquitedifficulttofounditasa
governmentagency.
While who heads this new State Security
Committeeisstillnotunveiled,Xiisconsideredas
themostlikelyprospect.Ifhedoestakethehelm
oftheCommittee,hispowerfoundationinnational
11
security policy will be reinforced. In anycase,
furtherresearchwouldberequiredonthemembers
ofthecommittee,itsrole,andthenationalsecurity
strategiesitwilldevelop.
Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command
TheChinesegovernmentannouncedattheNational
People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013 that it
wouldestablishtheStateOceanicCommissionas
the high-levelcoordination bodyanda renewed
StateOceanicAdministration(SOA)consolidating
theorganizationsandresponsibilitiesoftheprevious
SOA,theChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)under
SOA,theMaritimePoliceoftheBorderControl
Department (BCD) of the Ministry of Public
Security, the China Fisheries Law Enforcement
Command(FLEC)oftheMinistryofAgriculture,
andtheGeneralAdministrationofCustoms(GAC).
The SOA will enforce the maritime law under
thenameoftheChinaCoastGuard(CCG).The
responsibility,organization,andformationofthe
newSOAwereannouncedinJune2013,andthe
departmentofCCGwasestablishedwithintheSOA.
ThenewlyestablisheddepartmentofCCGasthe
headquartersoftheCCGandtheCCGCommand
Center is in charge of drafting the systems and
measures for the enforcement of maritime law,
proposingvariousregulations,coordinatingthejoint
commandofthemaritimelawenforcementactivities
bytheCCGunits,andtrainingtheunitsofCCG.
Inthisway,Chinahasconsolidateditspreviously
dividedmaritimelawenforcementagenciesintoa
singleorganization,exceptfortheMaritimeSafety
Administration(MSA)oftheChineseMinistryof
Transport.
However,theorganizationstructureoftheSOA
and CCG is complicated. First, the regulations
for the governance of the oceans and the law
enforcementaredraftedbytheSOA,andtheywill
befinallyauthorizedandannouncedbytheMinistry
ofLandandResourcesafteritsexamination.On
the other hand, the maritime law enforcement
activitiesimplementedunderthenameoftheCCG
requiretheoperationalguidanceoftheMinistry
ofPublicSecurity.Second,LiuCigui,thedirector
ofthepreviousSOA,wasmovedsidewaystothe
newSOAasthedirectorandthepartysecretaryof
theSOA,andMengHongweitookanewlyadded
12
officeofthevicedirectoroftheSOAandthedeputy
secretary of the party while serving as the vice
ministeroftheMinistryofPublicSecurity,which
isregardedasministeriallevel.Inaddition,Meng
assumedtheroleofdirectoroftheCCG,whileLiu
tooktheofficeofitspoliticalcommissioner.Since
thedirectoroftheSOAisrankedasequivalentto
theviceministers,MengwhoholdsaministeriallevelpositionbecomessuperiortoLiuwhoholdsthe
vice-ministerial-levelpostunlessheisdesignated
asministerial-level.Thus,littleisknownaboutthe
newlyestablishedSOAandCCGincludingtheir
oversightorganizationsandauthority.
The sign of
the newly
established
China Coast
Guard is put
up by officials
on the building
of the State
Oceanic
Administration
(July 2013)
(Xinhua/
Kyodo News)
The relationship between the newly refined
SOA/CCG and the PLA Navy (PLAN) remains
unclear.ProfessorLiangFangofthePLANational
DefenseUniversitypointsoutthatthePLAN,which
hascooperatedwiththeformerCMSandFLEC,
willbeabletoprovidemoreefficientsupportthan
beforetotheSOAbyvirtueoftheunification.
There have been few reports of the actual
activitiesorstatusoftheStateOceanicCommission
untilnow. Nothingiscurrentlyclearotherthan
that theCommissionis responsiblefor planning
andcoordinatingthenationalstrategyforoceanic
China’s External Crisis Management System
developmentandotherimportantissuesregarding
theocean,whiletheSOAisresponsibleforactual
operations. Li Guoqiang, researcher from the
ChineseAcademy of Social Sciences, indicates
thattheStateOceanicCommissioniscomposedof
severalministriesincludingagriculture,transport,
environmentalprotection,scienceandtechnology,as
wellastheSOA.LiuShuguang,thedeputydirector
oftheInstituteofMaritimeDevelopment,theOcean
UniversityofChina,explainsthattheStateOceanic
Commissionisnotanindependentbody,butapolicy
coordinatingmechanism.Furthermore,itisstill
unknownaboutthePLA’sinvolvementintheState
OceanicCommission,andabouttherelationship
betweenthecommissionandtheexistingPLA-led
NationalCommitteeofBorderandCoastalDefense.
AChinese-HongKong paper,Wenweipo,and
some Western media reported that the Central
Committee of the CPC newly established the
LeadingSmallGroupontheProtectionofMaritime
RightsandInterestsinthelatterhalfof2012asthe
principalgroupresponsibleformaritimerightsand
interests,andsomeChinesemediaalsomentioned
theexistenceofthegroup.Reportedly,thegroup
iscomposedoftheSOA,theMinistryofForeign
Affairs,theMinistryofPublicSecurity,theMinistry
ofAgriculture,andthePLA,andXiJinpingtook
thepostofchair.However,thesereportsmustbe
carefullyexamined becauseotherofficial media
suchasthePeople’s Daily,theofficialorganofthe
CPC,andthePLA Daily,theofficialorganofthe
PLA,havenotreportedanythingaboutthegroup
asofDecember2013.Inaddition,italsoneedsto
ascertainwhethertheleadingsmallgroup,ifittruly
exists,isastanding bodyliketheFALG/NSLG,
oranadhocbodyformedinresponsetogrowing
internationalattentiontoChina’smaritimeadvances.
Meanwhile,thiskindofleadingsmallgroupattests,
ifittrulyexists,thattheleadershipoftheParty
recognizesmaritimerightsandinterestsasapressing
issue.
Thus, theChinese maritimelawenforcement
agenciesarenowintheprocessofconsolidation.
Nevertheless,theactualstatussuchasthecompetent
authorityandthe progressofintegrationare not
currentlyclear. Detailsabout theStateOceanic
Commissionestablishedforhighlevelcoordination
alsoremainslargelyunknown.Furthermore,itis
stilluncertainwhethertheleadingsmallgroupon
protectionofmaritimerightsandinterestsactually
exists.However,thesemovesseemtoindicatethat
theChineseleadershiprecognizestheimportanceof
maritimeissues.Therearethreeimportantpoints
thatmustbepaidsomeattention.First,whichone
ofthefourmergedagencieswillleadtheoperation
ofSOA/CCG?Second,whoarethemembersof
theStateOceanicCommission,andhowdoesthe
PLAparticipate?Third,whatkindofrelationship
SOA/CCGwillestablishwithChina’sleadership?
Moreover, who, among the members of the
PolitburoStandingCommittee,takesresponsibility
toleadtheseagencies?
ThisconsolidationandreorganizationofChinese
maritimelawenforcementagenciesshould bea
concernforthecountriesaroundChina,including
Japan, as it will strengthen the capabilities of
theagencies. Inaddition, the newCCG, which
incorporated the former Maritime Police of the
BCD,seemstobeauthorizedpolicepoweratsea
thatCMSandFLECdidnotpossess.Atthesame
time, from the viewpoint of crisis management
of neighboring countries, the consolidation of
China’sdividedagencies,thatis,theunificationof
acounterpartforthesecountries,enablessmooth
communicationbetweentheirandChinesemaritime
agencies.
13
Figure: The Consolidation of the Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies
CCG Headquarter
CCG
Department
（Special tasks）
Ministry of Land
and Resources
Administration
State Oceanic
Administration
(SOA)
Same organization in
two names
Ministry of Public
Security
Operational
Guidance
China Coast
Guard (CCG)
Ministry of
Agriculture
General
Administration of
Customs
Ministry of
Transport
Cooperation
Maritime Safety
Administration
(MSA)
CGC Command Center
CCG Logistics Department /
SOA Finance and Equipment Bureau
CCG Political Department /
SOA Personnel Bureau
CCG North Sea Branch/
SOA North Sea Branch
CCG North Sea Fleet
CCG East Sea Branch/
SOA East Sea Branch
CCG East Sea Fleet
CCG South Sea Branch/
SOA South Sea Branch
CCG South Sea Fleet
Regional MSAs
Sources: “Provisions on Main Functions, Internal Structure and Staffing of the State Oceanic
Administration,” State Council Gazette, No. 20 (2013); “End of ‘Nine Dragons Stirring up the
Sea,’ Official Opening of China Coast Guard,” Beijing News (Xinjingbao), July 23, 2013, p.
A22; web pages of Shandong MSA, Shanghai MSA and Guangdong MSA.
14
MSA North Sea Law
Enforcement Fleet
(Shandong MSA)
MSA East Sea Law
Enforcement Fleet
(Shanghai MSA)
MSA South Sea Law
Enforcement Fleet
(Guangdong MSA)
Consolidation (June 2013)
State Oceanic Commission
China’s Concept of
Crisis Management
Crisis Management to China
Chasing Conflicting Targets
Politics of Crisis Management
Crisis Management to China
QuiteafewleadingChineseresearchersarguethat
China’scrisismanagementintheforeignaffairs
context is an activity to maximize the national
interestsasBeijingsimultaneouslyeschewswar.
ZhangTuosheng,directoroftheresearchdepartment
at the China Foundation for International and
Strategic Studies (CFISS) and the authority of
researchintocrisismanagementinChina,explains
thatthepurposeofcrisismanagementistoavoidan
escalationtomilitaryconfrontationswhileBeijing
pursuesitsinterestsandthengraduallyalleviatesthe
crisis.Itisfairtosaythathisviewissharedamong
Chinese experts and People’s LiberationArmy
(PLA)officialsandcapturesthebasicfeaturesofthe
Chineseconceptofcrisismanagement.
Professor Xia Liping, Deanof theSchoolof
PoliticalScience&InternationalRelationsatTongji
University,statesthatChineseculturedefinesthe
word“crisis”as“apossibledisasterordanger,”and
at thesame time regards the word “ji” in crisis
(weiji)asexpressingthepresenceof“opportunity.”
Accordingtothisdefinition,acrisiscanbecome“a
favorableturn”byeffectivelydealingwithit.From
thisviewpoint,crisismanagementtoChinais“a
policyandmeanstoavoiddangerousconflictswhile
realizingthefavorableturn.”Xiacomparesthis
ChineseperceptionwiththatoftheU.S.Asheputs
it,therearethreeacademicexplanationsofcrisis
managementintheU.S.:firstly,crisismanagement
aimsatapeacefulsettlementofconflicts;secondly,it
isaprocesstovictoryandthereforethepurposeisto
forcetheadversarytomakeasignificantconcession
inordertoenhanceU.S.interests;thirdly,itaimsfor
both.XiapointsoutthatwhileWashingtontendsto
takethesecondpositionwhenitdealswithacrisis
withmiddleorsmallpowercountries,ittakesthe
thirdwhencopingwithothergreatpowers.
Professor LiYunlong of the Central Party
SchooloftheCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)
studiestheconceptofcrisismanagementindetail.
He asserts that an international crisis has the
featuresofpeaceandwaratthesametime,since
itliesinbetween.Thus,thefirstpurposeofcrisis
managementisapeacefulsettlement;whetherwar
couldbeavoidedisthequestionofvitalimportance.
The second purpose is victory. Based on this
16
explanation,acrisisistheopportunitytoadvance
national interests;successful crisis management
ismeasuredbythemaximumcompromisebythe
opponent.Linotesthesetwoobjectivesarepursued
in crisis management. Crisis management is to
controlacrisistopreventprecipitatingawar,and
atthesametimetoprotecttheimportantinterests
ofthecountry.Thesedoublepurposesnecessitate
dual means toaccomplish them. Listresses the
fundamental way to manageacrisis is properly
using “coercion” and “negotiation,” and “crisis
managementisatechniquetoresolveconflictsand
accomplishnationalintereststhroughcoercionand
negotiation.”Thedualityofcrisismanagementcan
beobservedinsomeargumentsofPLAofficials
andresearchersinthemilitary.SunXuefuofthe
GeneralStaffDepartmentarguesinanarticlein
the PLA Daily,“amilitarycrisisbringsnotonly
dangerorthreatsbutalsosomekindofchance.[…]
Althoughchancesexistinmilitaryconflicts,they
arethicklyveiled,difficulttofind,andwillvanish
ina blink.” Moreover,ZhengJian,aresearcher
ofthePLAAcademyofMilitaryScience,defines
an international crisis as “bargaining between
two opposing parties centered on diplomacy.”
Furthermore,aPLAstudyintocrisismanagement
regardingtheTaiwanStraitlistsfourobjectivesto
beachievedthroughcrisismanagement:stopping
theescalationtowardswarandsolvingthecrisis
throughpeacefulmeans;pursuingtheirintereststo
themaximumextentpossible;removingthesource
ofthecrisis;maximizingtheirinterestsbychanging
thesituationthroughutilizingthecrisis.Assuch,the
generalpointislargelyconsistentwiththeviewsof
ZhangTuoshengandothers.
PLAofficialsandresearchersinthemilitaryuse
“deterrenceofwar”and“crisiscontrol”asanalogous
concepts.TheseareregardedaspartofBeijing’s
militarystrategy,andthePLAandthePLA-related
mediatendtousetheseterms.Anarticlepublished
inthemilitarynewspaperChina National Defense
News(Zhongguo Guofangbao)argues,forexample,
that“Controllingamilitarycrisisisanactivityto
tiltthebalanceinitsfavorbyusingseveralmeans
inordertoprotectnationalinterests.”Thearticle
alsopointsoutfiveprinciplesfortheachievementof
China’s Concept of Crisis Management
suchagoal:first,topursuelimitedinterests;second,
todistinguishanaccidentaleventandagenuine
conflictofinterests;third,tofocusonprevention
of a crisis; fourth, to wield various means in a
comprehensivemanner;andfinally,politicsmust
controltheactions.
Thewaytodealwithcrisesisacrucialissue
withinthePLAaswell.Forinstance,asChina’s
defensewhitepaper,China’s National Defense in
2002putsit,China’sstrategicguideline“stresses
thedeterrenceofwar”and“thePLA,byflexibly
employingmilitarymeansandinclosecoordination
withpolitical,economicanddiplomaticendeavors,
improvesChina’sstrategicenvironment,reduces
factorsofinsecurityandinstability,andprevents
local wars and armed conflicts.” Meanwhile,
China’s National Defense in 2006states,aboutthe
samesubject, that thePLA will“workforclose
coordinationbetweenmilitarystruggleandpolitical,
economic,diplomatic,culturalandlegalendeavors,
usestrategiesandtacticsinacomprehensiveway,
andtaketheinitiativetopreventanddefusecrises
anddeterconflictsandwars.”Furthermore,the2008
editionoftheWhitePaperexplainstheguideline
“laysstressondeterringcrisesandwars,”andthe
PLA“worksforclosecoordinationbetweenmilitary
struggleandpolitical,diplomatic,economic,cultural
andlegalendeavors,strivestofosterafavorable
securityenvironment,and takes theinitiative to
preventanddefusecrises,anddeterconflictsand
wars.”Thus,astheserevisionsoftheWhitePaper
show,thePLAcomestoplacemoreemphasisonthe
prevention,restrictionandeliminationofcrises.
The spokespersons for the Ministry of National Defense of
the PRC present the national defense white paper (March 31,
2010) (Kyodo News)
All these make it clear that it is difficult to
detachChina’scrisismanagementfromotherissues,
sincethescopeofitsconceptisquitebroadand
overlapswithmanyotherbehavioralconceptsfor
crisessuchas“coercion.”Thissuggeststhatitis
necessarytoconsiderBeijing’soverallapproaches
tointernationalcrisesinordertounderstandChina’s
crisismanagement.
Crisismanagementitselfisratheranewconcept
forChina;thefirstresearchonthesubjectappeared
inthe1990s,andsomeresearchwasintroducedin
theearly1990sfromtheU.S.Oneoftheearliest
works in the field was Hu Ping’s publication,
Analysis of International Conflicts and Study of
Crisis Managementin1993.Thenin the 2000s,
researchinthisfieldflourished.TheCFISSand
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
startedcollaborativeresearchoncrisismanagement
betweentheU.S.andChina,andpublishedtheir
worksin2006.Thus,recently,theresearchoncrisis
managementhasbeenburgeoninginChina.
ItwasnotaninternationalcrisisbuttheSevere
AcuteRespiratorySyndrome(SARS)epidemicin
2003thattriggeredthespreadoftheterm“crisis
management.” Faced with severe domestic and
internationalcriticismregardingthegovernment’s
incompetent handling of the situation, Beijing
recognizedthecountermeasuresforSARS-likeevent
andcrisisasamatterof“crisismanagement.”This
kindofcrisismanagementiscalled“publiccrisis
management,” which deals with non-traditional
securityissues,anditisconceptuallydifferentiated
from “international crisis management,” which
controlsinterstateconflictorcrisis. This report
covers only the latter; above all foreign crisis
management through which a nation deals with
frictionsandcriseswithothernation(s)overnational
interests.
WhatarethereasonsbehindChina’sembrace
of theconceptofcrisis management? Thefirst
reason is that Beijingexperienced a wide range
ofinternationalcrisesfromthelatterhalfofthe
1990stothebeginningofthe2000s.Namely,the
1995-1996TaiwanStraitCrisis,the1999bombing
incidentoftheChinaEmbassyinBelgradeandthe
2001EP-3incidentmaderesponsestointernational
crisesactualpolicypriorities.
Thesecondreasonisthatcrisismanagementfor
17
People wearing face masks as safeguards against SARS wait
for a bus (April 2003)(Kyodo News)
BeijingisconsistentwithDengXiaoping’sprinciple
“Taoguangyanghui”(hidecapabilitiesandbide
time).Chinamustavoidconfrontationsandmilitary
disputeswithexistinggreatpowers.Itmustnot
makeconcessions,however,onthenationalinterests
of principlessuchassovereignty byexcessively
stickingtotheavoidanceofwar.Therefore,China
cametoemphasizecrisismanagementasawayto
avoidanescalationtowarandsimultaneouslyto
pursueitsinterests.
Zhang Tuosheng suggests that a nation
confrontinganinternationalcrisis with possible
militaryescalationcanchooseamilitaryresponse
orcrisismanagement.Chinaexperiencedseveral
militaryconflictssuchastheKoreanWarandthe
Sino-SovietBorderConflictowingtoBeijing’spast
tendencytoadoptmilitarymeasures.Zhanggoeson
tosaythatmilitaryconfrontationsinvolvingChina,
however,havesubstantiallydecreased,especially
since the start of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and
openinguppolicy.
Furthermore,thenecessitytopreventthespillover
ofacrisisfromonesingleproblemintootherareas
isemphasized.InanarticleinthePeople’s Daily
written byYuan Peng of the China Institute of
ContemporaryInternationalRelationsforexample,
he states crisis management is important in the
relationshipbetweenWashingtonandBeijingsothat
theoverallrelationshipbetweenthemwillnotbe
negativelyinfluencedbyasingleproblem.
ThethirdreasonisachangeofChina’sdecision
making system. There were some charismatic
leaders like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping in
the past, and their opinions were so important
that almost all critical decisions were made by
themespeciallyduringacrisis.However,because
there is nosuch leader nowadays, the decisionmakingsysteminBeijingismorepluralisticand
institutionalized.Zhangpointsoutthatbuildinga
theoryforcrisismanagementis becomingmuch
morecriticalintheabsenceofcharismaticleaders
whocanexclusivelymaketheimportantdecisions.
Viewedinthislight,crisismanagementinChina
isnotdevelopedsystematicallyenough,giventhe
conceptof“crisismanagement”isarelativelynew
concept.
However,itdoesnotmeanBeijinghasnever
experienced crisis management. The CPC has
facedvariouscrisessincetheSino-JapaneseWar
andChineseCivilWar,andthoseexperiencesare
reflected in Beijing’s current approach to crisis
management. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC)alsohasvastexperienceincrisesfromits
foundation–someofthemendedupaswars,while
othersdidnot.TheyincludetheKoreanWar,the
1st to 3rdTaiwanStrait Crises, theSino-Indian
borderconflict,theSino-Sovietborderconflict,and
theSino-VietnamWar,as wellas theaccidental
bombingbyNATOforcesoftheChineseEmbassy
in Belgrade, the EP-3 incident,and theChinese
trawler/JapanCoastGuardcuttercollisionincident
neartheSenkakuIslandsin2010.Theseexperiences
constitutethebasisfortheChineseconceptsand
principlesoncrisismanagement.
Chasing Conflicting Targets
Aimingforcompatibility between two mutually
contradictoryfactorsisoneofthecharacteristics
ofChina’scrisismanagement.Thisseemstoresult
from thefact thatChina’scrisis management is
implementedwiththetwoobjectivesofpreventing
18
anescalationandmaximizingitsnationalinterests.
Threesetsofcharacteristicscouldbefoundfrom
researchintoBeijing’scrisismanagement:firstly,
adherencetoprinciplesandflexibilityatthesame
time:secondly,thepursuitoflegitimacy(orself-
China’s Concept of Crisis Management
righteousness)andtheinitiative;thirdly,theprimacy
ofpoliticsandthecomprehensivenessthatutilizes
politics,diplomacyandthemilitary.
For the first point, as is often pointed out,
althoughBeijingstandsfirmonissuesrelatedto
theirprinciplesincludingsovereigntyandterritorial
integrity, China behaves relatively flexibly and
makessomeconcessions,unlesstheseprinciplesare
violated.
The jointstudycarriedoutbyProfessorWang
Jisi of the School of International Relations at
Peking University and Xu Hui of the National
DefenseUniversityclaimsthattheprimeguiding
principleofBeijingistheintegrationofstrategic
principleswithtacticalflexibility.Inaninternational
crisis,Beijing’sofficialstanceisethicallytinged,
andtherefore,itsdiscourseisunyieldingandstrongworded.Inparticular,theprincipleofsovereignty
and territorial integrity has almost no room for
compromise.Nonetheless,Beijingdoesnotalways
takeuncompromisingactionsasitswordsimply.
Rather,itoftentakesaprudentattitude.
Drawingthe“dixian”(bottomline)asthestrict
minimum requirement is the key for Beijing to
makeitsprinciplesandflexibleattitudecompatible
witheachother.Chinacancompromisetosome
extentaslongastheoutcomeisabovethedixian.
Thissuggeststhatthetargetsinacrisisaresetin
a phasedand restricted way. Hence,debateson
crisismanagementinChinaregarditasimportant
tosearch for a solution to which the other side
canconsent, but without compromising China’s
principle.
Mea n w h ile, i t is n ot co nsid e r ed t o be
always necessary to forge a complete common
understanding with the opponent about China’s
principles.WangJisiandXuHuiarguethatinthe
pastpoliticalormilitarycrisesbetweenWashington
and Beijing, they have never approved of the
interpretationoftheotherpartyabouttheincidents.
WhatisimportantforChinaisthatitcaninterpret
incidents in a way that does not alter Beijing’s
positionon principles regardlessof whether the
opponentacceptssuchinterpretation.Bytaking
thisstance,itisargued,Chinacannotonlypreserve
its principlesandovercomethecrisiswithsome
self-restraint,butcanalsokeeptherightforfurther
demandsandactivitiesintheirhands.
These points are also emphasized by some
ofthePLAofficials.ChengXiaodongandother
researchersstressinanarticleinGuofang(National
Defense) Magazine that Beijing will make no
compromiseontheissuesofprinciples:territorial
sovereignty and the reunification problem; the
fundamentalissuesforthelong-termdevelopment
andprosperityofthecountry;andthecriticalissues
thataffect regimestabilityandethnicsolidarity.
However,theycanmakecompromisesasnecessary
to theextent where the principles would not be
violated.TheliteratureindicatesthatBeijingcandeescalateacrisisbymakingaconcessionifitcantake
arealisticattitude,establish“dixian,”setarestrained
targetandaccomplishtheobjectivewithoutfalling
belowtheline.
AccordingtoZhengJianofthePLAAcademyof
MilitaryScience,itisimportant,first,toestablisha
limitedtargetand“dixian”inordertokeepboththe
adherencetoprinciplesandtheflexibility;second,
nottooverlyconcentrateontheconflictofmorality
orprinciplesbutofinterests;third,tokeepflexibility
andbecautiousintakinganyactionthatmayresult
in an irreversible escalation; fourth, to be selfrestrainingtosomedegreewhenthesituationhasno
relationtoChina’simportantinterests;andfinally,to
considerapproachesacceptabletotheopponent.
The second characteristic of Beijing’s crisis
managementistopursuelegitimacyandtakethe
initiativeatthesametime.Thepursuitoflegitimacy
meansthatitisimportanttokeeptheappearance
thattheopponent,notChina,isalwayswrongina
crisis,andthatChinaforthatpurpose,searchesfor
domesticandinternationalsupportforitsposition.
Theissuesoftheprinciplesaredeeplyinvolvedin
thepursuitoflegitimacy.Thatis,Beijingconsiders
thattheprincipleswhichChinaprotectsarealways
legitimate rightsandacauseof thecrisis is the
violationofsuchlegitimaterights;theliabilityfor
thecrisisalwayslieswiththeopponentandChinais
apassivevictim.
P r of esso r Wu X i n bo of t h e Sc h ool of
InternationalRelationsandPublicAffairs,Fudan
University, points out four features of China’s
external crisis management: first, focus of its
concernsontheliabilityissue;second,emphasison
sovereigntyandnationaldignity;third,persistence
withsymbolicstyle;fourth,integrationofprinciples
19
andflexibility.
China has tended to emphasize ethical selfrighteousness according to its principles. For
instance, Wang Jisi and Xu Hui insist that
Beijingfirstlypoliticallyassessesacrisis,which
is followed by its consideration of whether the
legitimacy coincides with justice for China. In
otherwords,Beijingdecides politicallegitimacy
fromtheviewpointofChina’sprinciples,including
sovereignty,territoryandnationalunity.
Inaddition,Beijinghasrecentlyappealedfor
legitimacybyinvokinginternationallaws.Professor
Zhang Rui of the PLA Dalian NavalAcademy
proposes in his article on crisis management in
maritime confrontations that when a dispute on
maritimeissuesdevelopsintoacrisisthroughthe
interventionofagreatpower,Beijingshouldinitially
analyzethereasonsandcausesoftheintervener.
Then,heargues,itshouldunderminetheintervener’s
legitimacybyeffectivelyemployinginternational
lawsandfinallypromoteChina’slegitimacy.
Beijingalsoplacesimportanceonexplainingits
legitimacytodomesticsocietyandtheinternational
community.ChengXiaodongofthePLANational
Defense University and others argue that it is
crucialforBeijingtoseekbroadsupportfromthe
internationalcommunitybysufficientlymobilizing
several political and diplomatic means, which
include,forexample,expressionofChina’sstance
attheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)and
announcementofofficialstatements.
Besides, Bei jing does not always show
passiveness in its actual conduct. Instead, it is
emphasizedthatChinatakestheinitiativeandthat
passivebehaviorshouldbecarefullyavoided.That
is,recognizingthatitslegitimaterightsareviolated,
China tries to make proactive responses while
forestallinganyattemptsbyothercountriestoseize
theinitiativeinacrisis.
Indeed,thesecharacteristicsseemtobesimilar
to“activedefensestrategy,”whichisoneofthe
Chinesemilitary’sstrategicconcepts.In“active
defense strategy” it is important to combine
strategicdefensivepositionsandtacticaloffensive
operations.Thisstandsasthesamewayofthinking
astheaforementionedapproachtokeeping both
righteousnessandinitiatives.
ThethirdpointofChina’scrisismanagementis
20
thatChinautilizesforceandnegotiation,orinother
words,themixtureoftheuseofmilitary,political,
anddiplomaticapproaches.Comparingtheactions
takenbytheU.S.andChina,XiaLipinginsiststhat
Beijing tendstodeal with theopponent through
force and negotiation; namely, Beijing takes a
reciprocalapproachbyemployingnegotiationfor
negotiation,ormilitaryforceformilitaryforce.
ZhengJianoftheAcademyofMilitaryScience
notesthatpolitical,military,anddiplomaticpressure,
or, in some cases, restricted military force is
effectivetopromotenegotiations.Heconcludesthat
whentemperatemeasureshavenoeffectongaining
concessions,Beijingshouldresorttoeconomicand/
ormilitarysanctions.Hence,forceandnegotiation
areinseparable.
The achievement of political ends has top
prioritywhenBeijingdealswithacrisis,andthe
military is just a means for achieving the ends.
Xia Liping explains, “Crisis management in
internationalpoliticsisthecomprehensiveuseof
political,military,diplomatic,economicandother
meansandtheycouldbemoreeffectiveiftheyare
facilitatedbydiplomacy.”Beijingtriestoprotect
itsinterestswithoutprovokingwarthroughforce
andnegotiationbyproperlyusingpolitical,military,
economic,anddiplomaticassets.
Amongthem,militarymeasuresneedtobeused
prudently.Beijingthinksthatmilitarypowermust
notbeemployedwithoutdueconsiderationorin
ordertodefinepoliticalanddiplomaticobjectives,
despiteitsstrongcoerciveeffects.
Thus,China thinks military meansshould be
strictlycontrolledbypolitics.ZhengJianofthe
AcademyofMilitaryScienceemphasizes thatit
is necessarytocontinuouslycontrolthemilitary
dimension to have an efficient negotiation in
internationalcrises.ProfessorXuJiaofthePLA
Foreign Language Institute argues in his article
in the PLA Daily that the military must selfconsciouslyobeyordersandabidebytherulesas
theactionsanddispositionofthemilitarycouldbe
particularlysensitivemattersintheinformationage.
Literatures show that the nature of Chinese
crisismanagementisconsistentwithMaoZedong’s
principle“On justgrounds,toouradvantage,and
withrestraint”(youli, youli, youjie).Originally,Mao
expressedtheprincipleoftheCPCtofightagainst
China’s Concept of Crisis Management
theChineseKuomintang(KMT)in1940in“youli,
youli, youjie”;meaning“wearetobereasonable,
advantageous,andexercisemoderation.”However,
thissloganhasalsobeenfrequentlycitedtoconnote
“maintainlegitimacy,chaseactualinterests,and
pursuelimitedobjectives”inthecontextofcrisis
management. Perhaps,Wang Jisi and Xu Hui’s
study,forexample,explains howChinesecrisis
managementhasfollowedtheslogan.Facedwith
NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgradein1999andtheEP-3incidentin2001,
Beijingbeganbyproclaimingitslegitimacy“onjust
grounds,”stronglyblamingtheU.S.forviolating
China’ssovereigntyand territorialintegrity,and
placedWashingtoninan“unjustposition.”Thiswas
followedbythedemandthatWashingtonadmitted
itsmistakesandapologizesforwhatithaddone.
Then,sinceWashingtonmadeaconcessionthatwas
nottotallysatisfactorybutacceptableforBeijingas
adiplomaticsuccess(“toouradvantage”),Beijing’s
attitudebecameconciliatory“withrestraint”andthe
crisiscalmeddown.
The Embassy of China in Yugoslavia after the NATO bombing.
(Kyodo News)
Politics of Crisis Management
HowdoesChinaconcretelymanagecrises?First
andforemost,itshouldbenotedthatChinahasa
tendencytostresstheimportanceofthepolitical
relationship before taking concrete actions to
manageacrisis.China’smechanismtomanagea
crisismightnotfunctioninadeterioratingpolitical
relationship.WangJisiandXuHuipointout“It
isneedlesstosaythatthemostimportantfactorto
preventandmanageSino-Americancrisesisthe
politicalrelationshipbetweenthem.Inotherwords,
theimprovementofthepoliticalrelationshipisa
prerequisite tofacilitatecommunication, reduce
misunderstandings,restrainconfrontation,andreach
mutualagreementbetweenChinaandtheU.S.”In
lightoftheaforementionedcharacteristics,there
is little possibility for Beijing to promote crisis
managementwhenthepoliticalrelationshipwith
theopponent,ortobeprecise,itsownprinciple,
iscompromised.RegardlessofwhetherChina’s
principleisacceptedbytheopponent,itisdifficult
forChinatofacilitatecrisismanagementunlessits
claimisatleastmaintained.
There are three concrete methods for crisis
managementaccordingtosomestudiesinChina.The
firstistocommunicateinformationandintentions.
Itisimportanttomaintainalineofcommunication
incriseswhenmutualdistrustandhostilitygrows.
Theconcretemethodforthiscommunicationcan
bepersonallettersexchanged betweentheheads
ofstate,telephoneconversations,orofficialroutes
through diplomatic or intelligence agencies.
Hotlinesbetweenheadsorleadersatvariouslevels,
anemergencycontactmechanism,aspecialenvoy,
andtrackIIdiplomacyarealsoincluded.
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (L) shakes hands
with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan after signing an
agreement to set up a hotline between Washington and Beijing
(April 29, 1998) (Kyodo News)
WangJisiandXuHuistatethatthenumberof
casesofresolvedSino-Americancrisesisincreasing
21
asaresultofimprovedcommunicationmechanisms
toconveyinformationandintention.Forinstance,
theypointoutthattheEP-3crisisin2001wasbetter
managedthanpreviouscases,basedonthelessons
learnedfromtheembassybombingincidentin1999.
BeijingsentsomedefinitesignalstoWashington
tointentionallymaintainadequatecommunication
linesandthereweresomeimprovementstoguide
domesticpublicopinion.
Furthermore,someconsultationsorconferences
between the conflicting parties are required to
alleviatecrises.Thesedialoguescouldbeformalor
informal.
The second are coercive measures. As
previouslynoted,becausetheChineseconceptof
crisismanagementincorporatessomethingsimilar
tocoercivediplomacy,variouscoercivemeasures
areincludedintheconcretemeans.Thesemeasures
areusedtomaketheopponentsbehavefavorably
toChina,forexample,toenterintonegotiations
andtotakeadvantageofthenegotiationprocess.
They include actions from announcing strong
discourseandstatements,cancelingleaders’visits
orconferences,andimposingeconomicsanctions,
to strengthening the activities of the maritime
lawenforcementagencies toinsiston territorial
jurisdiction,andthePLA’sdemonstrativeactivities
andexercises.
Thethirdispropaganda.Chinaproducesskillful
propagandatoobtaindomesticandinternational
support,whichitregardsasveryimportant.Namely,
it is emphasized that China “will immediately
communicatethesituationofthemilitarycrisisand
itsrecognitionandfundamentalprincipleforthe
crisistotheUNSCtoobtainsympathyandsupport
intheUN.Furthermore,Chinawilldeclarepolitical
statementstotheinternationalsocietyexplaining
itsrecognitionofthecrisisandthefundamental
principlestodealwithit.”
Moreover, it is said that measures to deal
withdomesticpublicopinionhavebecomemore
significant owing to its increasing influence in
recentyears.ZhangTuoshengnotes,“theChinese
governmentincreasinglyregardsitasimportantto
payattentiontothetideofpublicopinionandto
guideitincrises.”WuXinbopointsoutthegrowing
public concern about international incidents,
and explains the government faced difficulties
22
prohibitingdemonstrationsandstruggledtolead
publicopinionduringthe1999embassybombing
incident.
However,itmustalsobenotedthattheCPChas
beentraditionallymanipulatingpublicopinionand
mobilizingpeopleininternationalcrisestoshowits
determinationandtostrengthenitsdomesticsupport.
Thus, what is clear from the analysis of
China’scrisismanagementconceptis,firstofall,
theimportanceofpolitics.Thecharacteristicsof
China’scrisis managementshow theimportance
ofpoliticaldecisionmaking.Namely,the“bottom
line”thatmustbeachievedinitsapproachto“stick
to principlesand keepflexibility”isdetermined
politically.Indeed,thereisnoobjectivestandardfor
it.Politicaldecisionsarealsoneededforitsapproach
to “legitimacy and initiatives,” in which China
keepsthepositionofapassivevictimwhiletaking
actionswithinitiatives.Asfor“comprehensiveness,”
Beijingtriestocontrolcrisesbyutilizingvarious
assetsincludingmilitary,diplomatic,andeconomic
ones.Wieldingtheseassetsandfactorswouldneed
politicaljudgmentsanddecisions.
Becauseofthecomprehensivenatureofcrisis
management, it is notsufficient tosee only the
militaryaspectinordertocomprehendBeijing’s
actionsinacrisis;aspectsotherthanthemilitary,
suchasdiplomaticandeconomicmeansshouldalso
be carefully observed. Beijing’s actions without
militarymeansdonotnecessarilymeantheactionis
conciliatory.ThatBeijingcouldemployanyother
meanstopursuetheirinterestsmustberemembered.
The second point of the Chinese concept of
General Secretary Xi Jinping inspects a PLAN vessel.
(December 2012) (Xinhua / Kyodo News)
China’s Concept of Crisis Management
crisismanagementisarequirementtoconcentrate
decisionmakingauthorityandcontrolofmilitary
force. ThecharacteristicsofChina’sconceptof
crisismanagementseemtobeconsistentwiththat
ofitspoliticalsysteminwhichagenciesandsectors
of the militaryandforeignaffairsare under the
leadershipoftheCPC.Hence,theperceptionsand
policytendenciesoftheChineseleadershipmustbe
thoroughlyexaminedinordertointerpretBeijing’s
actionsininternationalcrises.
23
Chinese Foreign Policy
Crisis Behavior
The 2001 EP-3 Incident
Toward Accident Prevention
The 2001 EP-3 Incident
China experienced several international crises
fromtheendoftheColdWarsuchasthe19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 embassy
bombingincident,the2001EP-3incident,andthe
2010Senkakuboatcollision.Thehandlingofthe
EP-3incident,whichoccurredinairspaceabove
international watersabout70 milessoutheastof
Hainan Island onApril1, 2001, is regarded in
Chinaasoneofthemostsuccessfulcasesofcrisis
management. Thissectionoverviewstheaction
takenbyBeijinginthiscase,andthenrevealsits
characteristics.
Chineseleadersheldameetingintheafternoon
ofthedayoftheincident,anddecideduponaninitial
policytodealwiththeincident.Theyconcluded
firstthattheMinistryofForeignAffairsshouldtake
responsibilityforworkinglevelcoordinationamong
theagenciesconcernedaswellasnegotiationswith
theUnitedStates.Second,itdecidedtomakethe
MinistryofForeignAffairsquicklydeclareChina’s
stanceinlightofthefacttheU.S.PacificCommand
hadalreadyreleasedthefirstannouncement,six
hoursaftertheincident.Theannouncement,posted
onthecommand’swebsite,said:
In international waters, a U.S. Navy EP-3
maritimepatrolaircraftonaroutinesurveillance
mission over the South China Sea was
interceptedbytwoPeople’sRepublicofChina
fighteraircraft.Therewascontactbetweenone
oftheChineseaircraftandtheEP-3,causing
sufficientdamagefor the U.S. plane toissue
a‘Mayday’signalanddiverttoanairfieldon
HainanIsland,People’sRepublicofChina(PRC).
Thisannouncementmeanttheinstigatorofthe
incidentwasChina.ItislikelythattheMinistry
ofForeignAffairswasrequestedinthemeetingto
makeitclearthattheresponsibilityfortheincident
wasnotwithChina.
In fact, that night, the Foreign Ministry
Spokespersongaveafullaccountofthemid-air
collision.Hestated,“OnthemorningofApril1,a
U.S.EP-3reconnaissanceplaneflewsoutheastof
China’sHainanIsland.”Therefore,“twoF-8fighters
26
[weresent]tofollowandmonitortheU.S.plane.
At9:07a.m.,theChinese planesmadeanormal
flightinanarea104kilometersfromthebaseline
ofChinese territorial waters.[...] the U.S. plane
suddenlyveeredatawideangletowardstheChinese
planes.TheU.S.plane’snoseandleftwingrammed
thetailofoneoftheChineseplanes,causingitto
losecontrolandplungeintothesea.[...]relevant
Chinesedepartmentsimmediatelysentsearch-andrescueplanesandshipstolookforthepilot.”“[We
are]deeplyconcernedaboutWang’ssafety.” He
further added, “The U.S. plane entered Chinese
airspacewithoutapproval,andlandedatLingshui
AirportinHainanat9:33a.m.” Heemphasized
thattheChinesefighterswereproperlytrackingand
monitoringtheEP-3inaccordancewithinternational
practiceandpressed“theU.S.sidetofaceuptothe
fact,bearfullresponsibility”
A U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane made an emergency
landing on Hainan Island. (China News/Kyodo News)
ThePartyleadershipheldanothermeetingon
April2toshareandconfirmthepositionofthis
statement on U.S. responsibility. Furthermore,
Chineseleadersestablishedapolicycalled“renji
fenli” (to deal with the aircraft and its crew
separately);Beijingintendedtoreturnthecrewon
HainanIslandtotheU.S.earlierthantheiraircraft.
Beijing aimed at an early settlement without
any deterioration of the Sino-U.S. relationship
throughthispolicy.WuJianmin,formerChinese
ambassadortoFrance,remarksthatChineseleaders
setApril15,EasterDay,asadefinitetimelimitto
letthecrewmembersgohome.Theyfearedthatif
Beijingkeptthecrewmembersincustodyduring
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
thisimportantfestival,theAmericanpeoplewould
feelantipathytowardsChina,resultinginanegative
effectonSino-Americanrelations.
OnApril3,Chineseleadersfinalizeditspolicy
guidelinesthatChinawouldengagein“aresolute
struggleagainsttheerroneousbehavior”oftheU.S.
butalso planaswiftresolutionconsidering“the
overall situation of Sino-American relations.”
JiangZeminissuedinstructionstoVicePresident
HuJintaototakechargeofdealingwiththeincident
before departing for a six-country trip to Latin
AmericawithVicePremierQianQichenandothers
onApril4.
ForeignMinisterTangJiaxuansummonedJoseph
W.Prueher,theU.S.ambassadortoChina,inthe
eveningofApril4toexplainChina’sstandpoint
regardingtheincidentinaccordancewiththefinal
policydirectiondecidedbytheChineseleadership.
Tangstatedfirstthatthe U.S. Navyaircraft had
“violatedrelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNations
ConventionontheLawoftheSeas(UNCLOS)”
andhad“alsodamagedtherelevantconsensuson
avoidingdangerousmilitaryactivitiesatseareached
betweenChinaandtheU.S.”inMay2000.Hethen
pointedout thatWashingtonshould havea high
regardforthe“facts”inBeijing’sannouncement.
HewentontodemandanapologyfromWashington
for the mistake and insisted that it would be a
preconditionforhandingoverthecrewmembers.
HealsodemandedtheU.S.“tostopdispatchingits
reconnaissanceaircrafttothevicinityoftheChinese
coast.”
TherewasalmostnochancethatWashington
would accept this request because they had
alreadystatedthe“facts”differedfromBeijing’s.
Washingtonmaintaineditsfirmanduncompromising
position,sayingitcouldnotapologizeforsomething
that was notitsfault. Nonetheless,Washington
tried“tofindaface-savingwayoutfortheChinese”
(CondoleezzaRice,thenAssistanttothePresident
forNationalSecurity)toavoidescalatingthecrisis.
Tothatend,theU.S.SecretaryofStateColinPowell
expressed“regret”overthemissingChinesepilotina
personallettertoChineseVicePremierQianQichen
onApril4.TheU.S.PresidentGeorgeW.Bushalso
expressed“regret”thenextdayoverthemissingpilot
andthelossofChineseairplane,whileappealingto
theimportanceoftheU.S.-Chinarelations.
Then eleven rounds of negotiations over the
wordingwereheldbetweenAmbassadorPrueher
andAssistant Foreign Minister ZhouWenzhong
afterApril5,sinceBeijingdidnotaccepttheword
“regret”asanapology.Beijingmadenoconcession
onWashington’s “required” apology, whereas it
wasflexibleaboutthewayitcouldbecarriedout.
Rice remarks in her memoir that Beijingsent a
signaltoWashingtonthatiftheU.S.“wouldsend
aletterthatsaidthatweweresorry”forthelossof
theChinesepilot,“wecouldendthecrisis.”This
wasnothingbutasuggestionbyBeijingthatitwas
showingaflexibleattitudebynotinsistingonthe
word“apologize.”Washingtoninitiallychosethe
word“regret,”then“sorry,”andfinally“verysorry”
throughrepeatednegotiations.
Foreign MinisterTang Jiaxuan received the
letterfromAmbassadorPrueheronApril11,after
a common understanding had been formed in
theMinistryofForeignAffairsthatthewording
“verysorry”wasequaltoaChinesewordmeaning
“apologize(daoqian).”BothPresidentBushand
SecretaryofStatePowellstatedtheywere“very
sorry”overtheChinese“missingpilotandaircraft”
and“theenteringofChina’sairspaceandthelanding
[that]didnothaveverbalclearance”intheletter.
China’sofficial newsagency, Xinhua,identified
thisletterasWashington’s“apologeticletter”and
reported immediately that the U.S. government
“expresseditssincerestapologies.”Becauseofthis
letter,Beijingallowedthe24crewmembersdetained
onHainanIslandtoleaveChinathenextday.
U.S.
Ambassador to
China Joseph
Prueher
holds a press
conference to
announce the
agreement
with China to
release the
detained crew.
(Kyodo News)
27
What is clear from China’s handling of the
crisis are that, first, Beijing consistently stuck
to the principle that the U.S. side should bear
full responsibility and make apologies, and to
maintainingChina’slegitimacy.Second,Beijing
wasflexibleinitsactualbehaviortorealizethefirst
pointmentionedabove;thatis,theyacceptedthe
wording“verysorry”asanapology.Itshouldbe
stressedherethatBeijingdidnotnecessarilywant
Washington’sfullconsenttoChina’sprinciplesand
legitimacy.TheU.S.sidestateditwas“verysorry”
forthelossoftheChinesepilot’slifebutdidnot
apologizeforitbeingtheirfault.WhilesomeU.S.
officialsfrequentlyemphasizedthis,therewasno
signindicatingthatthisraisedconcernsforBeijing.
Thismeansthatthecriticalmatterforbothsideswas
tohelptheotherpartymaintainitsposition.Third,
theMinistryofForeignAffairscouldbehaveflexibly
withthevirtueofthedefiniteguideline,the“renji
fenli,”foraswiftresolution,whichwastheconcrete
expressionoftheunderlyingpolicyof“considering
theoverallsituation”bythetopleaders.
Furthermore,itwasadistinctiveinstitutional
featurethatdecisionmakingonpolicyandguidelines
washighlycentralizedtotheCentralCommitteeof
theParty.Somepriorresearchandmediareports
arguethatHuJintaoplayedasignificantroleasthe
deputychairoftheNationalSecurityLeadingSmall
Group(NSLG),whichwasestablishedin2000to
reinforcethenationalcrisis managementsystem
aftertheNATObombingoftheChineseEmbassy
inBelgradein1999.Thatistosay,theauthorsof
thesestudiesandreportsunderstandthatHutook
overallcommandofthesituationasthedeputychair
ofNSLGinwhichtheCommunistPartyofChina
(CPC),thegovernment,andthePeople’sLiberation
Army(PLA)participated.
The guidelines and policies, however, were
discussed and basically decided upon in the
StandingCommitteeofthePolitburo.Thereare
relevantdescriptions in the biographyof Zhang
Wannian,thenvice-chairmanoftheCentralMilitary
Commission(CMC);immediatelyaftertheincident
“Jiang Zemin convened the Politburo Standing
Committee,andtheCommitteediscussedandmade
decisionsonthepolicyandprinciplesregardingthe
incident.”Thisseemstobeportrayingthesituation
insideBeijingfromApril1toApril3.LiPeng,who
28
wassecondinthePartyranks,wroteanoutlineof
theincidentinhisdiaryofApril2,whichsuggests
thatsomekindofmeetingontheincidentwasheld
ontheday.Therewaslittlepossibilityofhisbeing
amemberofNSLGor,inanothername,theForeign
AffairsLeadingSmallGroup(FALG),becausehe
wastheChairmanoftheStandingCommitteeof
NationalPeople’sCongress(NPC)atthattime.All
thesethingsindicatethatthepoliciestodealwiththe
incidentweredecidedintheStandingCommittee.
Ofcourse,thisisnottosaythatHudidnotplay
anyrole.Infact,heseemedtomakedecisionson
individualcasesaccordingtothePolitburoStanding
,
Committee s policy whenTangJiaxuan reported
on the progressof negotiations with the U.S. to
him. In addition, the nature of this incident, a
collisionbetweentwomilitaryaircraftmadeHu’s
involvementnecessary.Theincidentwasnot just
adiplomaticmatterbutamilitaryaffairinwhich
the PLA was involved as a directly concerned
party.ApartfromtheGeneralSecretaryoftheCPC
CentralCommitteeandtheChairmanofCMCJiang
Zemin,theonlyleaderintheStandingCommitteeof
thePolitburowhocouldissueorderstothePLAwas
HuastheVice-ChairmanoftheCMC.Itisagainst
thisbackdropthatHuwasresponsiblefordealing
withtheincident.Indeed,somemilitarymemoirs
andmediareportsinChinamentionthatHuissued
someorderstothePLAregardingtheincident.
Thishighlycentralizeddecisionmakingsystem
resultedinadelayintheinitialexternalresponseto
theincident.AlthoughtheSecretaryofStatePowell
tried to contact Foreign MinisterTang Jiaxuan
immediatelyaftertheincident,theattemptfailed.
Washington and Beijing lost contact with each
otherfortwodaysfollowingtheincident,except
fortheprotesttoAmbassadorPrueherpresentedby
AssistantForeignMinisterZhouWenzhong.Hence,
topleaderscouldnotproperlycommunicatewith
eachotherforone weekin theaftermathof the
incident.
Communicationbetweentopleadersattheinitial
stageisofvitalimportancetopreventtheescalation
ofcrises.Despitetheestablishmentofahotline
betweentheheadsoftheU.S.andChinaby2001,it
didnotfunction.InChina,itisdifficulttocontact
workingsections,suchasdiplomaticauthorities
unlessthePartyCentralCommitteedecidesonthe
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
policytodealwiththematter.Chinesememoirs
on this incidentalwaysstress thefact that each
subordinate organ’s response was based on the
decisionsoftheParty’sleadership.Thus,howto
establishandensureanemergencycommunication
mechanism with government and military
departmentsaswellastopleadersisanissuetobe
addressedincrisismanagementwithChinaforany
othercountries.
Toward Accident Prevention
In addition to responses after incidents, the
preventionofmilitaryaccidentswhichcouldcause
crises is a key issue of crisis management with
China.ForcountriesintheregionandtheU.S.,
avertingmilitary-relatedcontingencywithChina
in peacetime is an important policy challenge,
considering the rapid modernization of Chinese
seapoweraswellasairpowerandtheirexpanding
sphereofoperations.
Asfrequentconfrontationofnavaland/orair
forcesoftheU.S.andChinahadbeenwitnessedin
theareanearChinasincetheearly1990s,Military
Maritime ConsultativeAgreement (MMCA)
wasconcludedinJanuary1998betweentheU.S.
DepartmentofDefenseandtheMinistryofNational
Defense of the PRC. Since then, Washington
andBeijing havediscussedsafetystandardsand
procedurestoavoidmilitaryincidents.
Washingtoncametorecognizethenecessityto
preventunforeseenmilitary-relatedcontingencies
whentheaircraftcarrier USS Kitty Hawk and a
ChineseHan-classnuclearsubmarinesquaredoffin
theYellowSeainOctober1994.TheKitty Hawk,on
routinepatrolin“internationalwaters”intheYellow
Sea,encounteredtheHan-classsubmarine,andthe
U.S.dispatchedS-3Vikingantisubmarine patrol
aircrafttowatchthemovementofthesubmarine.
Inresponse,Chinasenttwofighterjets.Thevolatile
stand-offcontinuedfornearly70hours.Whilethe
situationfinallysettleddownwiththedepartureof
the Han,Beijingfolloweduptheincidentwitha
warning,issuedtotheU.S.NavalAttaché,thatthe
PLAwouldopenfireinasimilarincidentinthe
future.
Inthewakeofthisincident,Washingtonasked
Beijingtobuildaframeworktoavoidsuchincidents
with the Incidents atSeaAgreement(INCSEA)
betweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionin
1972inmindasamodel.Moreover,theleadersin
WashingtonandBeijing,havingexperiencedbitterer
confrontationduringtheThirdTaiwanStraitCrisis,
bothcametoperceivethesignificanceofavoiding
anaccidentand preventingescalation.TheU.S.
DefenseSecretaryandtheChineseDefenseMinister
reachedanagreementtostartadialoguetoavoid
anunforeseeablecontingencyatseainDecember
1996.Thedialoguebetweendefenseofficialsstarted
basedonthisagreement,andinOctober1997,the
topleadersinWashingtonandBeijingconfirmed
theirintenttoestablish“aconsultationmechanism
to strengthen military maritime safety, which
willenabletheirmaritimeandairforcestoavoid
accidents,misunderstandingsormiscalculations.”
Consequently,theU.S.DefenseSecretaryandthe
Chinese Defense Ministersigned the MMCA in
January1998.
U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen signs the MMCA
with China's Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian.
(U.S. DoD photo)
TheU.S.-ChinaMMCAMechanismiscomposed
of thefollowing threeframeworks. Thefirstis
annualmeetingsinwhichthedelegationofeach
partyisledbyatwo-starflagofficer.Thesecond
istheworkinggroupstostudyanddiscussagenda
29
items agreed at the annual meetings. The head
ofthedelegationisaseniornavycaptaininthis
meeting.Thelastisspecialmeetingsforthepurpose
ofconsultingonspecificmattersofconcernrelating
to theactivitiesatseaof their maritime andair
forces.
Thefirstannualmeetingwas heldinBeijing
inJuly1998. Thedelegationsexchanged briefs
ontheirnationallawsandregulationsgoverning
militaryoperationsatseaandagreedtoconvene
a series of working groups to discuss maritime
navigation safety issues. In the first working
group meeting held at the end of the year, the
internationalcommunicationsstandards,thelaws
ofthesea,andmaritimesafetyandnavigationwere
discussed.Then,whenthesecondworkinggroup
met in Qingdao in May1999, the agreed-upon
pointsculminatedinthepublicationofthe Study of
Sino-U.S. Maritime Navigation Safety, Including
Communications.Nonetheless,thePLApostponed
all military exchanges including the MMCA
meetings and halted discussions with the U.S.
aftertheNATObombingoftheChineseEmbassy
inBelgradeonMay8.Awrittenagreementwas
preparedintheMMCAworkinggroupmeeting,
whichresumedinMarch2000,andwaspresented
inthesecondannualmeetinginMay2000.Another
agreement about the avoidance of dangerous
maritime militaryactions wasconcludedin this
annualmeeting.
Notwithstandingtheseefforts,theEP-3collision
incidentinApril2001 revealed the weaknessof
theseefforts.Itwastheinternationalrulesabout
maritimesafetyandnavigation,andcommunication
thatwerediscussedintheworkinggroup,andwhich
hadalreadybeensignedbyWashingtonandBeijing.
Furthermore,theyagreedthatmilitaryshipsand
aircraftinthevicinityofeachothershouldavoid
hazardsaccordingtointernationalregulations,and
specified the regulations in the second MMCA
annual meeting. The agreement reads, “when
militaryairbornevehiclesencountereachotherin
internationalairspace,bothsidesshouldproperly
observethecurrentinternationallawandpractices,
andpaydueregardtotheflightsafetyoftheother
side so as to avoid dangerous approaches and
possiblecollisions.”
The wording “due regard” is used in the
30
ConventiononInternationalCivilAviation(Chicago
Convention)Article3(d),whosemeaninghadalso
beendiscussedduringtheMMCA.Thedelegation
representingtheU.S.intheMMCAworkinggroup
atthattimesaid“their[Chineseside’s]recognition
could well have prevented the EP-3E and F-8
accident.”
Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatChinahad
nointentionofavoidingmaritimeaccidents.The
EP-3incidentresultedinanMMCAspecialmeeting
inSeptember2001thatfocusedonprinciplesand
proceduresforthesafetyofmilitaryaircraftand
vesselsoperatinginthevicinityofeachother.These
points were subsequently discussed in the next
workinggroupmeeting.Furthermore,quiteafew
ChinesediplomatsandPLAofficialscontinuously
recognized thesignificanceof the MMCA to be
a mechanism for “military aircraft and military
vessels’avoidanceofaccidents,misunderstandingor
misjudgment”forbothsides,referringtotheJoint
U.S.-ChinaStatementinOctober1997.Inaddition,
while U.S. reconnaissance aircrafts’ operation
andChinesefighter jets’airinterceptsfrequently
occurredintheairspaceoffthecoastofChina,the
PLAconductedtheseintercepts“inamuchmore
professionalandsafemanner”aftertheincident,
accordingtoaU.S.Navyofficer.Moreover,direct
confrontationbetweennavalvesselsofChinaandthe
U.S.hassubstantiallydiminishedaftertheincident.
However,itisnoteasytoachieveacommon
standard for maritime military safty for China
and the U.S. Anofficialof PLA Navy(PLAN)
comments that the actual state of maritime
navigation safety falls far short of achieving
completion. He points out two fundamental
difficulties:first,“thereisafairlylargediscrepancy”
insecurityinterests,andstrategiesandoperating
methodsofthenavybetweenChinaandtheU.S.;
second, “the different understanding of general
principles of international maritime law and
treaties.”BeijingemphasizedinMMCAspecialand
workinggroupmeetingsresultingfromtheEP-3
incidentthat“thepresenceofU.S.reconnaissance
aircraftandSpecialMissionShips(SMS)”inthe
ChineseExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)presented
threatstotheirnationalsecurity,anddemandeda
halttothereconnaissanceoperationsratherthan
makingasafetystandard.
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
Beijing,fromthebeginning,takestheposition
thatallforeignmilitaryplanesandmilitaryvessels
canenjoythefreedomofover-flightandnavigation
intheEEZaslongasthereisnoconflictofinterests
withthecoastalstate.Thus,Beijingassertsthat
priorpermissionfromthecoastalstateisrequiredfor
militaryactivitiesintheEEZ.Fromthisstandpoint,
theactivitiesoftheU.S.militarywithoutBeijing’s
priorpermissionwouldbeseenasa“reconnaissance
operation”thatthreatensChina’snationalsecurity.
Onthecontrary,theU.S.considersthatUNCLOS
providesthattheEEZis“internationalwaters”for
freenavigationandover-flightofanycountries.
Thatistosay,Washingtontakesthepositionthat
thecoastalstate’s jurisdictionintheEEZ,which
Beijinginsistson,hasaneffectonlyonresource
development,andthereforehasnoeffectonmilitary
activities.WashingtonandBeijingarethusona
differentwavelengthregardingmilitaryactivities
intheEEZ.Meanwhile,thePLANvesselsoperate
within the U.S. EEZ around Guam and Hawaii
without prior permission from the U.S. Hence,
Beijing’sdeedsdonotnecessarilymatchitswords.
Itisalsonoteworthythatwhileitwasdifficult
to explicitly agree on safety standards with the
U.S.,Beijingassignedobstructiveactionstotwo
maritime law enforcement agencies, the China
MaritimeSurveillance(CMS)oftheStateOceanic
Administration(SOA)andtheChinaFisheriesLaw
EnforcementCommand(FLEC)oftheMinistryof
Agriculture(atthetime),inordertoavoidmilitary
accidentsorconfrontations.Yu Zhirong,former
senior official of CMS East ChinaSea Branch,
remarks that “faced with an increasingly acute
struggleovermaritimeinterestsbetweenChinaand
theU.S.andasevereenvironmentfortheprotection
ofthoseinterests,ahighleveldecision-makingbody
decidedthattheCMSshouldinheritthePLAN’sduty
torespondtoU.S.Navyvesselsconductingmilitary
surveillancemissionswithintheareaofChinese
jurisdiction.”HegoesontosaythatJiangZemin,
theGeneralSecretaryoftheCentralCommitteeof
CPCatthetime,demandedto“sticktotheprinciple
toprotectChina’smaritimerightsandinterestsand
preventthesituationworsening”formaritimelaw
enforcement agencies. WhileYu does notstate
the time of this decision, itseems to be around
2001fromthecontextofhiswriting.However,the
shiftofresponsibilityfromPLANtomaritimelaw
enforcementagenciesprogressedslowlybecause
mostofthevesselsofthemaritimeagencieswere
toooldforsuchtasksandonlyafewvesselshadthe
propercapacitiestocoverthevastEEZ.
TheideathatBeijingshouldusenotonlythe
assetsofCMSbutalsothewell-equippedfleetof
otherlawenforcementagenciessuchasFLECwas
emergingduringthesecondhalfofthe2000sfrom
severalPLANofficials.ProfessorFengLiang,one
oftheChinesedelegatesfortheMMCAworking
group,arguedthatthemaritimelawenforcement
agenciesshouldbeusedinpeacetimetoavoiddirect
militaryconfrontationswhiledecreasingthedirect
useofthePLAN.LiXingguang,presidentofthe
PLANMilitaryCourt,asserted,withanexplanation
from China’s standpoint for foreign military
activitiesintheEEZ,thatChinashouldreinforce
thejurisdictionalcontrolintheEEZ,respondingto
militaryactionsbysuchcountriesastheU.S.Oneof
themeasuresforthatisstrengtheningthemaritime
lawenforcementactivities,whereashedidnotrefer
totheroleofthePLAN.
Infact,mostoftheinterruptionsagainstU.S.
militaryactivitiesintheChineseEEZhavebeen
mainlycarriedout bylawenforcementagencies
orfishing boatsfrom2005,notthePLAN.The
vesselsandaircraftoftheChineselawenforcement
agenciesaresaidtohaveenhancedtheirarmament
aftertheestablishmentoftheChinaCoastGuard
inJune2013.Nonetheless,thereislittlepossibility
thatanydisruptiveactionsbythemshouldcause
aseveresituationincludingalarge-scalemilitary
confrontation becauseof theirlighterarmament
comparedtothePLAN.
,
China Coast Guard s Haijing 2101 (Photo:Japan Coast Guard)
31
However,someCMSofficialspointedoutthat
the administrative instructions and operational
procedures to exercise the right of hot pursuit
providedbyUNCLOSArticle111andtheArticle
12ofPRCLawonChina’stheExclusiveEconomic
ZoneandContinentalShelfwerenotyetestablished
atthetime.Asaresult,dangerousactionsbysuch
groups as maritime law enforcement agencies
frequentlyoccurred.ProfessorFengalsoindicated
that the problem was that the maritime law
enforcementagencieswerenotsosensitivetosome
externalfierceresponsesderivedfromtheiractitivies.
AtypicalexampleistheMarch2009Impeccable
incident.On March8,anintelligencecollection
shipofthePLAN,aCMSpatrolvessel,aFLEC
patrolvessel,andtwotrawlersharassedtheUSNS
Impeccable,aU.S.oceanographicship,whichwas
conductingoperationsinthewatersapproximately
120kmsouthofHainanIsland.Inthisincidentit
wastheFLECpatrolvesselandthetrawlersthat
playedacentralrole.Yuzheng 302wasdispatchedby
theMinistryofAgricultureSouthChinaSeaFishery
Bureautoexecuteamissiontotrack,monitor,and
drive away the USNS Impeccable, and started
chasingandwatching.Later,thetwotrawlersalso
sentbytheSouthChinaSeaFisheryBureauarrived
atthesiteanddroppedpiecesofwoodinthewater
directlyintheImpeccable’spathandaggressively
closed to approximately eight meters under the
commandofYuzheng 302.TheU.S.government
pointed out such obstructive actions violated
internationallawsandmadeaprotesttotheChinese
governmentaboutthe“unprofessionalmaneuvers
by the Chinese vessels.” Although there was a
PLANintelligencecollectionship,shedidnottake
partdirectlyintheobstruction.
MicheleFlournoy,UnderSecretaryofDefense
forPolicy,raisedthequestionofChina’sdangerous
actionsandstressedtheimportanceoftheMMCA
asamechanismtohandlesuchissuesattheU.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalksinJune2009.In
response,GeneralMaXiaotian,DeputyChiefof
PLAGeneralStaffDepartmentemphasizedChina’s
standpointregarding“reconnaissanceoperations”
byU.S.vesselsinChina’sEEZ.Bothpartiesagreed
toholdanMMCAspecialmeetingonthetheme
ofmaritimesafetyand“freedomofnavigation”in
China’sEEZ.ThemeetingwasheldinBeijingat
32
theendofAugust.Chinastressed“therootcause
ofmilitaryandsecurityproblemsintheairspace
andseabetweenChinaandtheU.S.isthelatter’s
frequentreconnaissanceandsurveillanceoperations
inandaboveChina’sEEZ,”and“thefundamental
solutiontotheproblem”hadtobe“thereduction
andhaltofthereconnaissanceoperations bythe
U.S.”
It is difficult to discuss the problems about
otheragenciesandactorsthanthenavyinMMCA
meetings. Air forces can participate in MMCA
aswellasnavies,sincetheagreementonMMCA
ofJanuary1998stipulatestheneedforpromoting
common understandings regarding activities
undertaken by their respective maritime and
air forces when operating in accordance with
international law, including the principles and
regimesreflectedintheUnitedNationsConventions
ontheLawoftheSea.”Nevertheless,Chinahas
beenthinkingoftheMMCAasaframeworkfor
cooperationbetweennaviesfromthebeginning.In
fact,theheadoftheChinesedelegationhasbeen
consistentlyaDeputyChiefofStaffofthePLAN.
Moreover,basically,otherChineseparticipantshave
exclusivelybeenPLANofficials.
In recent years, Beijing has been attempting
toreidentifythescopeoftheMMCAinabroader
context. A bilateral search and rescue exercise
(SAREX) of the U.S. Navy and the PLAN was
conductedintwophasesoffSanDiegoandinthe
SouthChinaSeainSeptemberandNovember2006,
respectively.Whilethisexercise was basedona
proposalbyWashington,AdmiralLiangGuanglie,
ChineseMinisterforNationalDefense,appreciated
PLAN Liaison officers prepare to embark aboard the amphibious
transport dock USS Juneau to observe a U.S.-Chinese combined
search and rescue exercise. (November 2006) (U.S. Navy photo)
Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior
theexerciseasaneffortoftheMMCAthat“has
enhancedexchangesbetweenthetwonavies.”There
seems to beadesireinBeijing behind this high
commendationtomaketheMMCAaframeworkto
discussmaritimesecurityissuesinabroadercontext
aswellastechnicalissuessuchasproceduresfor
maritimesafetyandnavigation.
A PLAN official notes that there are three
measurestoensuremaritimesafetyandnavigation:
Thefirstly,buildingmutualconfidenceinthemilitary
field;secondly,seekingaconsensusoninternational
laws;andthirdly,takingconcretestepsattheplace
toavoiddangerousapproachesandcollisions,and
inthevicinity,establishcommunicationtoconfirm
theintentionsofoneanothertopreventaccidents.
Healsosaysthatbuildingconfidenceinthemilitary
fieldistheessentialprerequisitefortheaccident
preventionmechanismtofunction.
Another expert regards the maritime “crisis
preventionmechanism”asa partofthe“mutual
confidencemechanismformaritimesecurity”and
definesthelatteras“anaggregationofframeworks
to build confidence and generate dialogue and
cooperation,aswellasaseriesofnorms,agreements,
andarrangements.”Basedonthisunderstanding,
someoftheChineseexpertsarguethatthesubstance
oftheMMCAshouldbedevelopedintwocontexts.
The first is to give a more concrete shape to
procedurestoensuremaritimenavigationsafetyand
flightsafety;however,apessimisticviewaboutthis
ideastillpermeatesinChina.Thesecondistowiden
thescopeof navalcooperation to nontraditional
securitytoformanoverallcooperationmechanism
andbuildconfidenceinthemilitary.Infact,the
Chinese side proposed in the MMCA annual
meetingheldinQingdaointheendofFebruary
2008to“addpositiveelementsfortheimprovement
and development of relations between the two
militaries”asabasicprinciplefortheMMCA.
Beijing has beenfocusingon restricting U.S.
militaryoperationsinitsownEEZ.Asaresult,the
MMCA’sfunctionasconfidencebuildingmeasures
(CBMs)topreventaccidentsthroughestablishment
ofcommonsafetystandardsisinrelativedeclinein
China’sunderstanding.ThisischangingMMCA’s
characterintoanavalframeworkofcooperationin
nontraditionalsecurityaffairs,onwhichagreement
andcooperationarerelativelyeasytoachieve.In
addition,thatthemainorganizationfordisruptive
actions against foreign military activities in the
watersclosetoChinaisshiftingtomaritimelaw
enforcementagenciesraisesanewchallengefor
neighboringcountriesaswellastheU.S.;namely,
howtoapproachthesenewactorsandmovetowards
sharingsafetystandardswithit?
33
Conclusions
Conclusions
Thewordcrisisisgenerallydefinedasadangerous
anddifficultsituationrequiringcriticaldecisions
tobemade.Acrisisforanationisanemergency
situationthreateningacountry’scorestructuressuch
assovereignty,systemsofthestate,andeconomic
development.Amongthesecrises,anationalsecurity
crisismeanstherebeingtheincreasedpossibilityof
acriticalsituationsuchasamilitaryconflict,which
directlythreatenssovereigntyandnationalinterests.
Crisis management in this context is defined as
actionstoremovethesetypesofcrisesandescalation
risks.
China has been unveiling lately an attitude
in which it makes no compromise on its “core
interests,”alongwithitsincreasingnationalpower
inrecentyears.Againstanactualorpotentialrisk
detrimental to the “core interests,” Beijing will
removesuchriskwithallavailablemeans.Besides
thisratherdefensivelogic,itisnoteworthythatthe
Chinesewayofperceivingacrisishasthestrong
tendency to take it as an opportunity to pursue
its own interests. For China, therefore, “crisis
management”iscontrollingcrisisescalationwhile
simultaneouslyfollowingnationalinterestsasmuch
astheycan.
Inpursuingthesemultipleobjectives,flexible
responses are permitted insofar as China can
maintain its fundamental ground on issues like
sovereignty.Furthermore,Chinatendstoclaimthe
legitimacyofitsactionsthroughblamingtheother
partyforcausingthecrisisandtherebyputtingitself
inapassiveposition.However,China,atthesame
time,seekstotaketheinitiativeinitsresponseto
acrisis.Thatis,acrisisitselfcontains,inChina’s
understanding, the achieving of two conflicting
goalsatthesametime.Inordertomaterializethese
thoughtsinresponsetoanactualcrisis,Chinaneeds
toproperlyuseawiderangeofmeans,whichis
consideredtobeamatterofpoliticalleadership.
The actual decision-making system in China is
centralized. Despite thediversificationofactors
involved in policy making and implementation,
China’sresponsetoacrisisisbasicallyunderthe
controloftheParty’sleadership.
Theseconceptualfeaturescanbeobservedin
China’sactualactions.IntheSino-Americanaircraft
36
collisionincidentin2001,Beijingstoodfirmagainst
Washington,demandinganapology.Atthesame
time, instead of sticking to “apologize,” China
acceptedthewords“verysorry”asan“apology”
from the UnitedStates, aiming to rapidlysolve
theproblemtomaintain“theoverallsituation”of
Sino-Americarelations.Chinasoughttomakeits
principlesandflexibilitycompatibleinitsresponse
to the incident. Moreover, in the discussions
withtheU.S.aboutasafetystandardofmilitary
operations based on the U.S.-China Military
MaritimeConsultativeAgreement(MMCA),China
simultaneouslypursuestwodifferenttargets:the
preventionofamilitaryaccidentandtherestraint
of U.S. military activities in China’s Exclusive
EconomicZone(EEZ).
Theconceptsofcrisisandexternalbehaviorof
Chinaoffersomeinsightsintocrisismanagement
betweenthecountriesinthisregionincludingJapan
andtheinternationalcommunityandChina.
Firstly,crisismanagementwithChinaispossible.
Chinadeeply understands the necessityofcrisis
managementespeciallyinthecontextofpreventing
acrisissituationfromescalating into a military
confrontation or clash. That China’s decisionmaking is centralized to a considerable degree
contributestopromotingdialogueordiscussionwith
Chinaoncrisismanagement.
On the other hand, as repeatedly noted in
this report, China tends to regard a crisis as an
opportunity to pursue its interests, and tries
to implement this policy in the middle of an
internationalcrisismanagementsituation.Thus,
apossibleformofcrisismanagementwithChina
wouldbethepreventionofanaccidentorsimple
misunderstanding escalating into a military
confrontation,anditisdifficulttorestrainChina’s
pursuanceofitsowninterests.Inapolicytoward
China, therefore, one must always prepare the
meansandfunctionsofengagementanddeterrence
inadditiontocrisismanagement.
Secondly, whileassumingChina’s pursuance
ofitsowninterests,thereistheneedtoinfluence
itspolicypreferences.AlthoughChina’sdecisionmaking still maintains its features as a highly
centralizedsystem,thenumberofactorsinvolved
Conclusions
inthepolicymakingprocessiscertainlyincreasing.
Theseactorsmaynotbedirectlyinvolvedinthe
process,whereastheyprovidetheChineseleadership
with information and/orsuggestions in order to
shapepolicypreferences.Accordingly,itispossible
that having discussions on crisis management
withChineseofficialsandexpertshasanindirect
influenceontheformationofthepolicypreferences
ofChina.Itisagainstthisbackdropthatthetrack
1.5and/ortrack2dialoguesaswellasthetrack1
dialogueanddiscussionareofgreatimportance.
Thirdly, a multilateral framework to share a
safetystandardfortheoperationofarmedforces
andmaritimelawenforcementagencieswithChina
shouldbeemphasized.Alessontobelearnedfrom
theexperienceoftheU.S.-ChinaMMCAisthateven
thoughbothcountriesaimedtoachieveashared
understandingofthesafetystandardsofmilitary
operations,themechanismconsiderablydependson
politicalrelationsbetweenthetwocountries.The
Japan-Chinadefenseexchangetendsnottofunction
adequatelyasthepoliticalrelationshipdeteriorates.
Thisisareasonwhyitisimportanttodiscussand
sharewithChinathesafetystandardsofmilitary
operationswithinamultilateralpracticalframework,
whichislesssusceptibletopoliticalconfrontation.
Forexample,countriesintheregionincludingJapan
shouldactivelyutilizetheWesternPacificNaval
Symposium(WPNS),whichthePeople’sLiberation
Army Navy (PLAN) has joined, and which is
establishinganinternationalstandardintermsofthe
safetymeasureswhennavalandcivilianshipsand
aircraftencounteroneanother.
Finally,itisworthnotingsomeimplicationsthe
analysisofthisreportforJapan-Chinarelations.In
itsdealingwithJapanovertheSenkakuIslands,
Chinaactivelytakesanoffensiveposturetopursue
itsowninterestsofbreakingJapan’seffectivecontrol
overtheislandsthroughsharplyincreasingactivities
ofthemaritimelawenforcementagencieswithin
Japaneseterritorialwaters.Chinasimultaneously
claims thelegitimacyofitsactions byasserting
thattheJapanesegovernment’sacquisitionofthe
ownershipoftheislandsin2012hasundermined
the“overallsituation”ofJapan-Chinarelations.This
couldberegardedastypicalbehaviorbyChinato
maintainlegitimacyandtotaketheinitiativeatthe
sametime,aspointedoutinthereport.
Given these Chinese actions, it is essential
to build a multi-layered mechanism for crisis
management between the two countries. The
defenseauthoritiesofJapanandChinaagreedthere
shouldbeamaritimecommunicationmechanism
thatconsistsofthreelevels,1)annualmeetingsand
working-leveldiscussions,2)ahigh-levelhotline
betweenthetwoauthorities,and3)communication
amongshipsandaircraft.Inadditiontotheearly
implementationofthismechanism,engagementwith
Chinesemaritimelawenforcementagenciesmust
bestrengthened.Thus,notonlyisamechanismfor
thedefenseauthoritiestopreventthesituationover
theislandsfromescalatingintoamilitaryincident
necessary,butalsocontinuingmeetingsonmaritime
issuesatseniorofficiallevelofrelatedministriesand
buildinganaccidentpreventionmechanismbetween
the maritime law enforcement agencies of both
countriesarebecomingurgentlyneeded.
The 3rd annual Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise
(WP-MCMEX) in Malaysia focuses on enhancing cooperation
among Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) navies and
maritime safety. (U.S. Navy photo)
37
Column
The Fire-control Radar-lock by a PLAN Vessel
JapaneseDefenseMinisterItsunoriOnodera
gaveanextrapressconferenceonFebruary5,
2013torevealthataPeople’sLiberationArmy
Navy (PLAN) Jiangwei II-class frigate had
directeditsfire-controlradarattheJapanese
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
destroyerYudachiintheEastChinaSeaaround
10a.m.onJanuary30.Healsoaddedthata
PLAN JiangkaiI-classfrigatebeamedwhat
is believed to be fire-control radar towards
a helicopter mounted on JMSDF destroyer
Onamiaround5p.m.onJanuary19.
,
The Chinese Navy s JiangweiⅡ-class frigate
,
(IHS Jane s [online news module])
The fire-control radar of a warship is
activatedbeforetheuseofweaponstotarget
other ships or aircraft. Defense Minister
Onoderadenouncedthe“veryabnormal”acts
andsaidthat“thiscouldhaveputusinavery
gravesituationifthingswentwrong.”Because
thiswasthe“mostabnormalcaseconsistingof
twoconsecutivedangerousincidents,”Tokyo
madethematterpublicandlodgedaformal
protesttoBeijingthroughdiplomaticchannels.
Immediately after the announcement by
Tokyo,someChinesemilitaryexpertsargued
that the radar-lock was a “legitimate selfdefenseaction” againstsurveillance patrols
byJMSDFvesselsandaircraftopposingthe
PLAN vessels. For instance, Huang Dong,
38
chairmanoftheMacaoInternationalMilitary
Society,stressedthattheChinesefrigatesmight
havehadnochoicebuttheradar-lockbecause
ofthecontinuedmonitoringbytheJapanese
vesselsand helicopter, whileadmitting that
afire-controlradarbeamissomethingthatis
used immediately before firing commences
andisthusverythreateninginpeacetime.He
addedthatafire-controlradar-lockgenerally
required“permissionfromanupperauthority”
becauseofitsriskynature.
Nonetheless, the Chinese Ministry of
NationalDefensedeniedthatthePLANvessels
hadlockedfire-control radarona Japanese
destroyerandhelicopter.China’sstatement,
issuedbytheMinistry’sInformationOffice,
said, “The PLAN vessel, while conducting
routinetraininginwatersintheEastChinaSea,
founditselfcloselyfollowedandmonitored
bytheJMSDFdestroyerYudachi.Radarson
thevesselwerekeptatnormalobservationand
alertlevels,anditsfire-controlradarwasnot
activated.”Thestatementfurtherinsistedthat
Japan’slongtimeandclose-inmonitoringand
surveillanceofChina’snavalshipsandaircraft
is the rootcauseofairand maritimesafety
issuesbetweenChinaandJapan.
This denial would imply that Chinese
military leaders understood the radar-lock
was a threatening activity and it was not
acceptableaccordingtointernationalcustoms.
Basically, not taking any dangerous action
againstapproachingshipsand/oraircraftin
peacetimeisanestablishedrule.TheIncident
at the Sea (INCSEA)Agreement between
thegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandthe
SovietUnionin1972providesthat“Shipsof
thePartiesshallnotsimulateattacksbyaiming
guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and
other weapons” to “ships of other Parties,”
and other international agreements have
similarstipulations.Furthermore,theCodefor
UnalertedEncountersatSea(CUES)developed
Conclusions
by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium
(WPNS), in which China takes part, offers
safetymeasuresincludingthatshipsshallnot
beamtheirfire-controlradaratshipsofother
Parties.
Although theCUESisa voluntarycode,
radar-locking by the PLAN vessel would
undermineChina’spositionagainstJapanand
ininternationalsociety;itisa transgression
of accepted international practice. Such
recognitionseemstoexistinChinesemilitary,
givenitscautiousstatementaboutthepossibility
of “international opinion being misled” by
“thefalseargumentthatTokyopropagatesto
disgracethePLA’snormalactionstomaintain
itspreparednessforwar.”
39