Country Report
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA:
THE CASE OF THE KIM YOUNG SAM
ADMINISTRATION, 1993–1998
SUNG DEUK HAHM* AND KWANG WOONG KIM**
This article examines the nature of political and institutional reform initiatives that have been carried out under former president Kim Young Sam.
How effective have they been in consolidating democracy in Korea? Specifically, we examine why the Kim Young Sam government’s political
reform campaigns have been limited, and explore the impact of this limitation on his institutional reform initiatives and the process of consolidation
of democracy in Korea.
We argue that Kim Young Sam’s initial political reform campaigns have
contributed to creating a favorable environment for his institutional reform
efforts. However, limitations of these initial political reform campaigns
such as political funding and bribery scandals have hampered institutional
reforms. We also argue that these difficulties were intensified by public dissatisfaction with Korea’s poor economic performance and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance. As a result, Kim Young Sam’s
moral legitimacy as a civilian and reform-oriented leader toward the public
has totally evaporated.
Therefore, experiences under the Kim Young Sam administration are
just trials and errors of democratization that show another failure in presidential leadership in Korea. These experiences will negatively affect the
consolidation process of democracy in Korea by increasing the public’s distrust of government as a whole. As a result, democratic consolidation in
Korea is being delayed.
When he started on February 25, 1993, President Kim Young Sam (hereafter referred as KYS) sketched out a “New Korea,” with clean government
and politics, a strong economy, a morally healthy society, and a unified
Korea, the so-called “freer and more mature democratic society.” To
accomplish building such a democratic society, KYS stressed the importance of changing unethical habits and corrupt practices among public
*Korea University
**Seoul National University; Korean Civil Service Commission
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 1999
(pp.479 –494). © 1999 Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148, USA, and 108
Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895
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officials and citizens in addition to building democratic institutions and
procedures often outlined in a minimal definition of consolidated democracy1 (Kim and Shin 1996; Linz 1990; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1995;
Przeworski 1991). In particular, as the first civilian government since 1963,
KYS’s government promised to reform bribery and corruption practices,
establish social order, and reinvigorate the weak national economy he had
inherited from the previous Roh Tae Woo administration.
Therefore, democratization in Korea required a strong rejection of old
patterns of politics that were quite authoritarian and lacked lawful public
order by removing the military–authoritarian enclave rather than sustaining an alliance with it. Consequently, institutionalization and elite
convergence do not figure prominently in KYS’s goal of democratic consolidation in Korea. Instead, purification and purging of old practices
were the most critical elements of KYS’s scheme for democratization, the
so-called “negative democratic consolidation” (Kim and Shin 1996).
Therefore, for KYS, it was immoral and undemocratic to continue cooperation with former dictators and their supporters who seized power by
military coups and who massacred people demanding political freedom
and equality. What mattered more to KYS in building a democratic country was no longer national reconciliation or consensus; it was the purging
of past ills and the rectifying of past wrongs.
In this context, KYS’s reform efforts to build a new democratic society
are largely divided into two categories. First are political reform campaigns which emphasize the containment, reduction, or removal of any
serious challenges to democratization, the so-called “negative democratic
consolidation” (Kim and Shin 1996). These include the purging of unethical public officials including former presidents, military officials, and high
government officials, as well as eliminating unethical habits and corrupt
practices. More important, these initial political reform campaigns contributed to creating a favorable environment for the second category of
reform efforts aimed at building democratic institutions and procedures.
Often outlined in a minimal definition of consolidated democracy, these
so-called “positive democratic consolidation” initiatives sought “institutional reform efforts” in government.
It is obvious that KYS’s civilian government undertook quite a few
innovative and unprecedented political reform campaigns and institutional reform initiatives that represent a sharp break with previous military authoritarian regimes. Among other political reform campaigns, as
the first civilian president of a country dominated by former military
elites, KYS had to assert the principle of civilian supremacy over the military which had been the most powerful institution in Korea for three
decades by purging many “politicized” military officers.
KYS also briskly dismantled the core power bloc of the so-called “TK
group,” a well-entrenched cadre of elites from the Taegu-Kyungbuk province with close personal ties to previous presidents. His main institutional
tactic was to disclose publicly all his personal assets, the “public official
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481
wealth registration system,” thereby pressuring ministers, members of the
National Assembly, and high civil servants to follow suit. Forced to reveal
wealth they could only have acquired illegally, many public officials
resigned. Furthermore, Korea’s last two presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and
Roh Tae Woo were arrested and indicted for an illegal army mutiny in
1979, the sanctioning of the 1980 Kwangju massacre, and administering
political slush funds while they were in office.
KYS also enacted the “Registration of Monetary Assets in a Real
Name,” also known as the “real name bank account system,” to abolish
the popular practice of banking money under fictitious names which had
facilitated political corruption and tax evasion. Furthermore, KYS actively
supported enactment of the “local government autonomy legislation.” In
fact, for the first time in 35 years, elections were held for local public officials including governors and mayors, some 5,700 posts that had previously been filled by central government appointments. In addition,
administratively, KYS’s government sought to set up “small but strong
government” and “clean and transparent government” as its policy goals
through the establishment of the “Presidential Commission for Administrative Reform.” Therefore, KYS’s government gave hope to the people
who suffered or were disappointed by corrupt practices under the military authoritarianism of the past. At the beginning of his presidential
term, KYS was very popular with 94% job approval rating and gave a very
good impression in terms of trust to the people (Chosun Ilbo 1998; Korea
Gallup 1993).
However, while these political reform campaigns garnered public support, as time passed, KYS’s leadership for reform encountered difficulties.
This was evident after the disappointing results of the 1995 local government elections. Specifically, KYS’s institutional reform efforts confronted
many political obstacles and eventually failed because of the “Hanbo
Steel” company bribery scandal and the revisions of the Labor Law and
the National Security and Planning Agency (the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) Law. In addition, the KYS government’s moral legitimacy
as a civilian government evaporated due to his second son’s involvement
in the Hanbo scandal and a presidential election money scandal involving
KYS himself. In particular, these difficulties were intensified by public
dissatisfaction with Korea’s poor economic performance and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance in late 1997. As a result,
the moral and procedural legitimacy of the KYS administration as a civilian and reform-oriented government evaporated.
In this context, this article examines the nature of political and institutional reform initiatives that have been carried out under KYS. How effective have they been in consolidating democracy in Korea? In short, this
article examines why the KYS government’s political reform campaigns
have been limited and explores the impact of this limitation on his institutional reform initiatives and the process of consolidation of democracy in
Korea. To do this, first, we introduce the KYS government’s important
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institutional reform initiatives in detail. Second, we examine the impact of
limitations of the political reform campaigns, particularly the political
funding scandal on institutional reform efforts. Finally, we analyze the
causes of limitations of the KYS government’s institutional reform efforts
in greater detail.
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INITIATIVES
As noted earlier, the “institutional reform initiatives” were aimed at
building democratic institutions and procedures. Even though these institutional reform efforts were initiated by KYS, they generally aimed at
broadening the social basis of his reform politics by drawing wide public
support through the encouragement of “bottom-up” participation from
the people. Therefore, the participation of the general public and clarity of
all reform efforts were given top priority in these institutional initiatives.
In previous regimes, reform agendas normally came from the president. It
is, therefore, atypical to take the general public’s opinions directly into
decision-making in authoritative and bureaucratic organizations for institutional reform (Ahn 1997).
In addition to some innovative institutional changes in reform policies,
the KYS administration has placed much emphasis on “administrative
reform” that are perceived as essential to establishing a new relationship
between state and society. The administrative reform actions appeared to
have dual political objectives for the KYS administration. The first was to
enhance political support from the public by implementing reform initiatives for a clean and efficient government at the beginning stage of the
KYS administration. This was especially important for KYS who had a
narrow victory with 43% of electoral support in the presidential election.
The second was to increase political control over the bureaucracy by demonstrating the supremacy of presidential power. This was also important
for KYS who spent most of his political career in the minority party.
In this context, the KYS administration institutionally sought to reform
corrupt practices in the public sector to satisfy the people’s expectations.
First, the government implemented the “real name bank account system”
to reform money-dominated politics through tight control from the flow
of capital informally to the formal flow of capital in the summer of 1993.
This new system displayed KYS’s strong will for clean government and
was praised and supported by the people.
Second, the KYS government implemented the “public official wealth
registration system.” The goal of this new system was to control public
officials’ attempts to increase their wealth by using their public offices
through comparing their wealth before and after their pubic service. In
this context, KYS himself publicly announced that he would not receive
money from any interest groups. In addition, KYS tried to be frugal, for
example, by having a noodle lunch with his invited guests regularly in his
residence, the Blue House.
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483
Third, in order to reform the government more systematically, the KYS
administration established the “Presidential Commission on Administrative Reform” (PCAR) in April 1993, two months after the inauguration.2
The PCAR was organized in order to attain certain goals: to change
bureaucratized institutions and practices presently prevailing in the government; to establish democratic and efficient administrative services; and
to build a lean, clean, and strong government (see Kim 1996; PCAR 1995
for details). The most notable feature of the PCAR is that “bottom-up”
strategies have been applied, by utilizing the Working Committee under
the Regular 15-Member Commission, and the proposals raised by the general public, while a “top-down” strategy was adopted for identifying the
major reform areas and issues in the previous regimes (Ahn 1997; 1995).
As of March 1995, the PCAR had successfully concluded deliberations
on a total of 34 major reform proposals, such as the enactment of the
“Administrative Procedures Act.” Since its establishment, the PCAR has
recommended and eventually implemented many programs to decrease
the level of public inconvenience in the context of public services. Significant outcomes produced by the PCAR are the introduction of an
“ombudsman system” based on the newly enacted “Administration Regulation and Service Improvement Act,” the “unified real-estate registration system,” and the expansion of the “public day care system.” These
include cutting many administrative regulations and procedures for automobile registration, residence-moving registration, factory establishment,
customs services, etc. Among them, the most notable program is the
so-called “one-stop service” which helps people to do two things at once
when they visit a public office. This service program was initially created
by the Korean Ministry of Home Affairs and later adapted by PCAR.
PCAR diffused this program to local governments to decrease the level of
citizens’ inconvenience when visiting public offices. The goal of all these
programs of the KYS government is to provide better service to the public,
the so-called “customer-oriented services.”
Fourth, the KYS administration reorganized the structure of central
government in March 1993 and December 1994 (see Kim 1996; PCAR 1995
for details). These reorganizations have brought about a reduction of central government positions, including four ministers, five vice-ministers,
and more than 1,000 administrative public servants. These institutional
cutbacks were initiated partly by the need to establish a norm of “small
government.” Another main purpose of this reorganization was to
improve the administrative efficiency through an effective policy coordination, especially in economic and industrial policy areas, by eliminating
overlapping organizational functions (Jung 1995; PCAR 1995). Therefore,
this reorganization resulted in the merger of several central government
ministries. Most notably, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was reorganized into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE), which was
created by combining the EPB and the Ministry of Finance.
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Fifth, the KYS administration also tried to deregulate many administrative regulations in the area of economic activities by forming an
“Anti-Regulation Special Committee.” In addition, the Audit and Inspection Board created an “Anti-Corruption Special Committee” to clean up
bribery and corruption practices among public officials. Through these
initiatives, the KYS administration tried to end corrupt practices in the
public sector and to increase the level of public satisfaction by providing
better services. In this context, the public also expected a different level of
political activities from politicians. In particular, the public anticipated
more policy-oriented political activities which escaped from the
money-and special interest-related politics. Under these circumstances,
the KYS government revised many politics-related laws such as the election law and political funding law to reform politics.
Sixth, the most important institutional reform among many KYS
administration’s efforts is the comprehensive implementation of “Local
Government Autonomy System” in June 1995. In the past, the Korean
Ministry of Home Affairs had full authority to appoint chiefs of local governments and therefore entirely control local government administration.
Under this new local government autonomy system, chiefs of local governments including governors, mayors, and county superintendents are
elected directly by the people for the first time in 30 years. With this
system, a variety of central government powers were formally delegated
to local governments under the name of “decentralization” and
“localization.”
LIMITATIONS OF POLITICAL REFORM CAMPAIGNS
While the institutional reform initiatives have garnered public support,
KYS’s leadership encountered political difficulties because of his illegal
political funding in the presidential election of 1992, two policy initiatives
for new security and labor laws, the Hanbo Steel company bribery scandal
and his second son’s involvement in this scandal. Specifically, the KYS
administration’s institutional reform efforts were confronted with many
political obstacles, notably in the third year of his term, particularly after
the disappointing results of the 1995 local government elections, which
called into question the credibility of KYS’s presidential leadership. Some
of the original supporters who put KYS into power were disappointed by
KYS’s style of leadership for reform, the so-called “rule of man” rather
than “rule of law.” His style of leadership began to be denounced as
“civilian dictatorship” by the press.
They also were disillusioned by what they perceive as a slow pace of
change. After a strong start, KYS failed to deliver on his reform agenda.
He was lulled into overconfidence when his approval ratings seem to
allow him to sustain leadership without actually engaging the machinery
of government. Therefore, the KYS administration seemed to be quite
unable to accommodate the general public’s desire for reform policies.
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485
Most importantly, all these political difficulties for KYS came from his
inherent political power base and his political funding for the 1992 presidential election.
Political Funding Crisis
In August 1996, both Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were convicted
of charges brought against them.3 Chun Doo Hwan was convicted of taking bribes and violently suppressing student demonstrations in Kwangju
in 1980. Roh Tae Woo was found guilty of taking bribes from major industrialists and supporting Chun’s action in 1979 and 1980. A number of high
ranking government officials from the Chun and Roh regimes also were
convicted on similar counts. In addition, a number of industrialists were
also tried and convicted on bribery charges. All except one general were
found guilty. In December of 1996, Chun, Roh, and others appealed these
cases to the Korean Supreme Court. Prior to this appeal, these individuals
were successful in gaining reduced sentences. Chun’s sentence was
changed from death to life in prison, while Roh’s prison term was
reduced. The convicted industrialists were given probation. In early 1997,
former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Rho Tae Woo were finally sentenced to life and 17 years in prison, respectively, partly because of their
involvement in political funding with chaebols (see Hahm and Plein 1997
for details). In December 1997, KYS in consultation with President-elect
Kim Dae Jung issued presidential pardons to the two former presidents.
At present, the impact of these presidential pardons remains to be seen.
Korea is undergoing the process of democratization while wrestling
with its own past. The events surrounding the two former presidents were
indicative of this process at work. While many Koreans supported the
effort in economic development, they have long been ambivalent about
those who have been in charge. This is particularly notable in the case of
the two former presidents. The positive aspect of this event is that Korea is
seeking to move forward by making its past leaders accountable to the
rule of law. On the negative side, these actions appear in part to violate
Korea’s effort to abide by the rule of law. This is so because the Kwangju
massacre is beyond the statute of limitations in legal terms. In addition,
for his political interest, KYS sought these cases to divert people’s attention from his political difficulties.
Ironically, these bribery scandals of two former presidents over political and campaign contributions were closely connected with KYS’s
political funding in his presidential 1992 campaign. In fact, KYS himself
was elected by illegally spending huge amounts of political funding for
his election. Thus, from the beginning, the KYS administration did not
have “moral legitimacy.” Since he has been active in politics for the last 40
years, it is certain that KYS has to share some responsibility for the misconduct of politics to a great extent. However, he behaved as if he had
nothing to do with past wrong-doings (Kim 1996). This KYS government,
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without moral legitimacy, tried to reform politics—therefore falling into a
self-contradictory trap.
What is worse is that the public eventually acknowledged that KYS’s
second son, Kim Hyun Chul, invested the remaining political funding
money, nearly $10 million from his farther’s previous presidential election, in the Hansol corporation, a sibling company of Samsung, one of the
big chaebols. The person who managed this political funding investment
is Kim Ki Sup, former assistant director of the National Security and
Planning Agency. He once worked for the Hotel Shilla, a branch company
of Samsung. Interestingly, the Hansol corporation, with relatively little
experience in the telecommunications industry, surprisingly got permission for the personal communication system monopoly. This reflects
exactly an “iron triangle” among politics, bureaucracy, and business in
Korea. Without the abolition of this corrupt iron triangle, democratization
in Korea permanently has two faces: reform on the surface, but corruption
in reality. Therefore, the KYS government lost its moral legitimacy as
a civilian and reform-oriented government to the public because of his
shady political funding in 1992. These political damages negatively
affected KYS’s institutional initiatives for reform.
Policy Actions to the Authoritarian Practices
The bribery scandal for political funding was just one of a number of
crises faced by the KYS administration in 1996 and 1997. Two policy initiatives led by the KYS administration were the source of considerable political and social discord. In December 1996, the KYS administration pushed
legislation through the National Assembly that revised laws dealing with
internal security arrangements and organized labor. The laws were
passed in a controversial meeting of the legislature where opposition parties were excluded from participation. The new security law was met with
resistance by those who felt that too much power still remained in the
hands of Korea’s National Security Planning Agency (NSP).4 This institution has long been seen as a threat to civil liberties in Korea.
In the same session, a controversial labor law was passed. Adopted
ostensibly to satisfy expectations under Korea’s membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the law
was seen as eroding guarantees for lifetime employment in firms. Particularly nettlesome to labor were provisions that delayed until the year 2000
formal recognition of numerous labor groups.5 Without such recognition,
these groups are essentially illegal. The new labor law met with massive
strikes on a scale unparalleled in Korean history. In the midst of this
turmoil, the KYS administration and the ruling New Korea Party suffered
a loss of legitimacy as both domestic and international groups, including
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
criticized both the process by which the legislation had been passed
and the substance thereof. Responding to this criticism, the KYS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA
487
administration reconsidered its hard-line stance against popular and
labor demonstrations and engaged in efforts to resolve this crisis. As a
result, the KYS administration disappointed many by the manner and
content of the new labor law and the security law that it passed. This was
seen by many as a return to the authoritarian practices of the past. The
results of these events directly eroded KYS’s political leadership (see
Hahm and Plein 1997).
The Hanbo Bribery Scandal
KYS’s political difficulties intensified with another bribery scandal in
early 1997. After being inaugurated president, KYS publicly announced
that he would not receive any money from business for political funding.
We strongly believe that he did not receive any money from business
during his tenure. Unfortunately, however, his closest staff in the Blue
House (the Korean office of the president) received almost $4 million from
business as bribes and nearly $3 million from special interest groups as
courtesy. With these corruption scandals, the public questioned the close,
corrupt relationship between politicians and business. These public suspicions increased in light of corrupt political funding for the 15th National
Assembly election on April 11, 1996 even with the KYS government’s
active efforts to ensure a clean election. Indeed, most politicians illegally
spent 10 or 20 times more than the limits of political funding stated in the
election law.
These suspicions are revealed in the context of the Hanbo Steel company scandal. It was discovered that many presidential staff members and
high ranking public officials had received bribes from the Hanbo Steel
company in return for their putting pressure on banks to extend credit
to the company. In addition, many influential politicians received bribes
from the Hanbo Steel company secretly to protect Hanbo Steel’s bank
credit and to neglect violations of the Hanbo Steel company in National
Assembly inspections. In these situations, the public distrust for not only
politicians, but also politics as a whole, rapidly increased.
In the process of the investigation of the Hanbo Steel company scandal, the public realized that KYS’s second son, Kim Hyun Chul received
bribes from the Hanbo Steel company and other business corporations.
These bribes were used to illegally influence the Hanbo Steel company’s
secret bank credit, the selective monopolistic permission to privatize
broadcasting corporations, and selection of the main monopolized corporation for personal communication systems. Consequently, Kim
Hyun Chul was convicted for his illegal involvement in these affairs. In
October 1997 (and February 1998), the court handed down a three-year
jail term to him for bribery and tax evasion.6 This sentence marks the
first time a court has slapped tax-evasion charges on bribe money allegedly received in the form of a political donation. Kim Hyun Chul’s associate, Kim Ki Sup received an 18-month suspended term for arranging
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the bribes. With these scandals, poor economic performance and IMF
financial assistance in late 1997, KYS’s moral legitimacy as a civilian
leader for the public had totally evaporated. For example, at that time,
KYS’s popularity was very low and his ratings in the polls were in the
single digits (Chosun Ilbo 1998).
Therefore, the KYS administration has become associated with practices that the public had expected to be a thing of the past. People began to
get a sense of hypocrisy about prosecuting past bribery scandals while the
KYS administration was under a cloud of suspicion. In this environment,
it is natural for the people to distrust public officials including KYS, his
administration, and politicians in general. The last presidential election
was a repudiation of the KYS presidency. Indeed, considering that KYS’s
party fractured, resulting in two presidential candidates running against
Kim Dae Jung, there was a clear lack of satisfaction for the KYS administration within his own ranks.
PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INITIATIVES
It is true that KYS’s political difficulties negatively affected his institutional efforts on government reform. Unfortunately, institutional initiatives for reform were undertaken when public confidence in the
government was devastatingly low because of KYS’s political difficulties,
poor economic performance, and man-made disasters such as the collapse
of a major Han River bridge and an underground gas explosion in Seoul.
But we cannot neglect the inherent problems of KYS’s institutional reform
initiatives themselves. Thus, in this section we examine these problems in
detail.
Even though the real name bank system and the public official wealth
registration system are innovative mechanisms in preventing corrupt
practices in Korean politics, there have been many loopholes in their
implementation. Therefore, these systems have to be revised to abolish
the loopholes for accomplishing their original objective; their impacts on
politics remain to be seen (Kang 1995).7 As a result, our analysis for the
problems of institutional reform initiatives focuses on the PCAR, reorganization of the structure of central government for better policy coordination, and strengthening the local government autonomy system.
Presidential Commission for Administrative Reform (PCAR)
The KYS government established PCAR as a direct commission for the
president to reform the public sector. Even though the PCAR claimed that
its reform programs had been successful in pursuit of deregulating, putting public convenience first, and simplifying administrative procedures
(PCAR 1995), corruption and bribery practices in the public sector became
prevalent in reality (see Kim 1996 for its critical assessment). It is widely
understood that political factors prevented the PCAR from being actively
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489
involved in management reform in government agencies. In fact, the
political influences on personnel administration in the public sector continued as much as those of previous regimes.8
In this environment, the morale of government officials has rapidly
deteriorated. Therefore, it is very difficult to reform government or public
administration without reforming politics because public affairs are
closely connected to politics. In addition, there has been no emphasis on
the enhancement of bureaucratic specialization in government reform
efforts. We could not see any reform efforts to increase specialization for
bureaucrats in specific areas of public affairs qualitatively. Even though
the government always emphasizes the importance of education and
training of bureaucrats, education and training are generally used to cultivate bureaucrats who do not have formal positions in the government, not
for the enhancement of their knowledge.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the KYS administration established too
many presidential committees and commissions to implement reform
activities whenever necessary. This institutional diversification of reform
strategy narrowed the PCAR’s activities dramatically. These diversified
institutional reform strategies have contributed to creating a weak coordination of reform activities. As a result, a lack of the PCAR’s supervision
authority over the government agencies’ management reform activities
was blamed for the dissatisfaction with PCAR activities among the public
(Ahn 1997). In sum, the most notable criticism of PCAR is that it has been
concerned with too many small problems without any systematic direction for administrative reform (Kang 1995; Kim 1996).
Reorganization of Central Government
The administrative reorganization proved that KYS’s leadership is sufficient to control career bureaucrats. However, symbolic politics were prevalent in the reorganization. The KYS administration has emphasized its
intention to improve administrative efficiency through institutional cutbacks. But this intention was not well supported by actual reorganization
(Jung 1995). Indeed, the total number of public officials and the size of the
budget of central government have been increased after this reorganization (see Kyung Hyang Shinmun 1997 for details).
In addition, although it is appropriate to give more responsibility to the
Prime Minister’s Office, there is a danger that the administration may continue to face the problems of insufficient coordination and inefficiency
brought about by its lack of political influence and budget authority (see
Kim 1996 for a critical assessment). As a whole, the gap between what the
government wants or expresses from this reorganization and the available
evidence for supporting these expectations is profound. Indeed, the total
number of public officials and the size of the budget of central government have increased after this reorganization (see Kyung Hyang Shinmun
1997 for details).
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Local Government Autonomy System
Fortunately, among the KYS administration’s institutional reform efforts,
the formal implementation of the local government autonomy system
opened decentralization and localization practices for providing better
services for citizens. Under this new system, each local government
responds to citizens’ demands and satisfies their expectations as much as
possible. As positive effects of this new system, each local government
tries to introduce new and innovative practices in their administration to
provide better services to their citizens and establish an accountable
administration.
A negative effect of this new system occurred when citizens’ demands
undermined local government’s administrative efficiencies because their
demands were excessive and beyond the financial and administrative
capabilities of local governments. Indeed, most local governments are not
yet financially sound and not administratively and financially independent of the central government. In addition, there are three layers in local
governments: city-county-ward or eup-myun-dong, at least one of which
has to be removed from the local government structure to enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of local administration.9 Furthermore, behind
the services in local governments, there has always been corruption and
bribery. These practices may be a natural tendency for Koreans who
strongly believe that if you receive something from someone, then you
have to return something to that someone. However, all of these trials and
errors can be interpreted as learning exercises and lessons in democracy.
Discussion
In sum, even with the government reform efforts, we notice many public
officials’ bribery scandals, such as the national revenue serviceman’s public revenue extortion and construction-related public officials’ corruption.
As a result, the KYS administration has become associated with practices
that the public expected to be a thing of the past. Specifically, through
anti-corruption efforts, the KYS government examined many government
officials more closely. However, these anti-corruption efforts failed
because bribery and corruption in the public sector were so prevalent. A
more negative effect of the government’s anti-corruption efforts was the
rapidly declining morale of public officials. Government officials are not
always actively engaged in administration in order to avoid inspection.
Thus, as the KYS administration tried to reform the public sector more in
the name of “clean government,” the more the public officials’ corruptions
grew.
Second is the impression that the KYS government’s institutional
reform activities are seen as window dressing rather than dedicated
efforts at reform. In other words, the institutional reform activities are
symbolic rather than substantive reforms of institutional arrangements
and processes. This is partly because of the bureaucratic resistance to the
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491
sudden, unprepared and politically-driven reform activities. Bureaucrats
see reform activities as a source of instability and a burden of uncertainty
to the bureaucracy. In fact, the KYS administration’s government reorganization initiatives are often checked and challenged by strong but unspoken bureaucratic resistance. This is also partly because of the current
constitutional tenure limit to the president (Hahm and Plein 1995; 1997;
Moon and Ingraham 1998). This presidential 5-year tenure limit appears
to yield a political feature in Korea: KYS won the political and administrative reform game early in his term, and the bureaucrats won later. These
situations are well summarized following our interview with a government official, who argued “the main cause of failure of the KYS government’s reform efforts is that KYS did not know how to control public
officials.”
It is neither sufficient nor satisfactory to reform the Korean government
in the uneven way discussed above. It is true that the magnitude of the
latest institutional initiatives for reform is much greater than those of previous regimes. Also, it may be too early to arrive at some conclusive evaluation of these institutional initiatives for reform. Institutional initiatives
for reform of government stopped short of initial goals probably because
there was not enough time to work on them. It is difficult, perhaps
impossible to find the one sure cure-all for successful reform. The government will have to undergo trials and errors before evolving to a higher
level of incorruptibility (Kim 1996).
CONCLUSION
KYS’s reform efforts to build a new democratic society are divided into
two categories. The first are political reform campaigns which emphasize
the containment, reduction, or removal of any serious challenges to
democratization. These initial political reform campaigns contributed to
creating a favorable environment for the second category of reform efforts
aimed at building democratic institutions and procedures. However, the
limitation of these initial political reform campaigns have hampered institutional reforms. Specifically, even though the KYS government emphasized its political accountability and legal responsiveness to the public so
many times, the public did not believe the government’s intention at all
because of their low level of trust in KYS and his administration.
This is due to three major sources of disappointment in KYS: bribery
scandals, policy actions to the authoritarian practices, and symbolic
reform efforts. First, the KYS administration has become associated with
practices that the public expected to be a thing of the past. People began to
get a sense of hypocrisy about prosecuting past bribery scandals while the
KYS administration was under a cloud of suspicion. Second, the KYS
administration disappointed many by the manner and content of the new
labor and security laws. This was seen by many as a return to the authoritarian practices of the past. The results of these events directly eroded
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KYS’s political leadership. Third is the impression that the KYS government’s institutional reform activities are seen as window dressing rather
than sincere efforts at reform. In other words, the institutional reform
activities are symbolic rather than substantive reforms of institutional
arrangements and processes. Therefore, the KYS administration’s reform
efforts were ultimately unsustainable.
Many scholars who study the process of democratization in Korea
argue that Korea experienced: first, “decline or demise of authoritarianism;” second, “transformation of democracy;” and third, “consolidation
of democracy” (Burton and Ryu 1997; Hahm and Plein 1997; Han 1995; Im
1996; Kim and Shin 1996). In particular, they argue that experiences under
KYS can be defined as the process of consolidation of democracy. However, we argue that these experiences under the KYS administration are
just trials and errors of democratization as another failure in presidential
leadership in Korea. They will negatively affect the consolidation process
of democracy in Korea by increasing the public’s distrust of government
as a whole. As a result, the public will increasingly blame poor presidential leadership for the resulting paralysis.
Furthermore, these experiences will undermine public perceptions of
the legitimacy of presidential leadership. The respective legitimacy deficits will further exacerbate the resulting paralysis. Closing the “governability gap” is increasingly elusive in Korea. However, this does not mean
that the process of democratization in Korea will be reversed. Despite all
the trials and errors in reform politics under the KYS administration,
democracy remains a valued goal in Korea. But the democratic consolidation in Korea is proceeding rather slowly and is even being delayed. Based
on these observations, we argue that democratization in Korea is a slow
process that is best measured by institutional rather than individual
accomplishment. Therefore, perhaps the true success of democratization
was not whether KYS was successful or unsuccessful but that power was
peacefully transferred from the ruling party to a minority party with the
free presidential election and inauguration of Kim Dae Jung.
Acknowledgment
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the World Congress of
the International Political Science Association, Seoul, August 17–20, 1997.
Valuable criticisms and constructive suggestions were provided by the
Governance reviewers. The financial support of the Korean Institute of
Legislative Studies is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
1.
Our explanation is mainly based on Linz and Stepan (1996) which provides
the following working definition of democratic consolidation. First is the
“behavioral dimension.” In this dimension, no significant actors spend their
resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
493
regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the
state. Second is the “attitudinal dimension.” In this dimension, a strong
majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs. Third is the “constitutional dimension.” In this dimension, governmental and nongovernmental forces become subject to the
resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions
sanctioned by the new democratic process.
In fact, the KYS administration installed many presidential committees and
commissions such as the Economic Deregulation Committee (through the
Economic Planning Board), the Commission of Business Regulation
(through the Ministry of Commerce), the “Saegyehwa” (globalization) Committee, and the Presidential Committee of Educational Reform to implement
substantial reform initiatives.
In early 1990, faced with growing opposition in the National Assembly, the
Democratic Justice Party of President Roh Tae Woo merged with the two
leading opposition parties. Among those brought into the party was KYS,
of the progressive Reunification Democratic Party, and Kim Jong Pil, representing the more conservative National Democratic Republican Party
(Hahm and Plein 1997). In late 1995, the prospects of party stability were
called into question due to the arrests of former presidents Roh Tae Woo
and Chun Doo Hwan. KYS’s role and response to these arrests reveal a political actor uncertain as to how to position himself in the midst of controversy.
In April 1996, a narrow victory in the Korean National Assembly elections
signaled that the credibility of the Kim administration had been preserved
to some degree. KYS sought to distance himself from his predecessors,
going to such lengths as to rename the political party which he headed prior
to the election.
This revision aimed at extending greater investigative powers to the NSP to
investigate those who organize or praise anti-state organizations, or fail to
report anti-state elements to the law enforcement authorities. The NSP has
complained of difficulties in detecting espionage cases due to lack of investigative power. However, the opposition party argued that the revision may
lead to human rights violations and the intervention of the NSP in political
affairs.
With this revision, employers could lay off workers at their discretion, as
long as they can show a “pressing need for business operation.” This revision also could permit workers to form multiple unions at single workplace
beginning in the year 2000.
In November 1997, Kim Hyun Chul was freed from the jail sentence during
his appeal.
In fact, the real name bank system practically was abolished to increase
savings during the IMF crisis in late 1997.
For example, a special high school, college, and birthplace have been major
determinants for the appointment of ministers or vice-ministers in government rather than performance and special knowledge. There has been no
system of autonomy or insulation from political influence in the promotion
of bureaucrats. KYS failed to reverse embedded traditions in Korean government. In this context, KYS’s second son easily intervened in the promotion of very important positions of the government.
For example, we now often see administrative conflicts among local governments, notably in the area of waste disposal.
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