No. 16-273
In the Supreme Court of the United States
GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Petitioner,
v.
G.G., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER,
DEIRDRE GRIMM,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Brief of Amici Curiae
the State of West Virginia, 18 Other States, and the
Governors of Kentucky and North Carolina
Supporting Petitioner
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
[email protected]
(304) 558-2021
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
ELBERT LIN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
THOMAS M. JOHNSON, JR.
Deputy Attorney General
JULIE MARIE BLAKE
Assistant Attorney
General
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI ........1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .........5
I.
Auer Deference Erodes The Judicial Role In
Protecting The Interests Of The States
Through Application Of Clear-Statement
Rules ......................................................................7
II. Auer Deference Particularly Has No Place In
Interpreting Statutes Enacted Under The
Spending Clause ................................................. 12
III. The Particularly Egregious Application Of
Auer In This Case Requires This Court’s
Intervention ........................................................ 15
IV. Respondent In The BIO Shows No Reason
For This Court Not To Rely On Federalism
Principles To Overrule Or Limit Auer ............... 21
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24
COUNSEL FOR ADDITIONAL AMICI ................... 25
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes and Regulations
20 U.S.C. § 1686 .................................................... 1, 16
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 ..........................................8
34 C.F.R. § 106.33 .......................................................2
Cases
Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) ................................................ 22
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edu. v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006) ................................................ 23
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985) ................................................ 13
Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997) .......................................... 2–3, 5
Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 2:16-cv-524 (S.D. Ohio) ………………………..3
Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ.,
470 U.S. 656 (1985) ................................................ 15
Bond v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).................................. 9–10, 16
Bond v. United States,
564 U.S. 211 (2011) ..................................................8
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
488 U.S. 204 (1988) .......................................... 15, 18
Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel.
Charlene F.,
526 U.S. 66 (1999) .................................................. 13
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ................................................ 11
iii
Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
529 U.S. 576 (2000) ............................................ 6, 18
Com. of Va., Dep't of Educ. v. Riley,
106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997)............................ 14, 20
Davis v. Monrone Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999) .......................................... 22–23
Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013)............................................ 19
EEOC v. FLRA,
476 U.S. 19 (1986) .................................................. 21
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) ..................................................8
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) ................................................ 12
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) .......................................... 17–18
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) ...................................... 8–10, 23
Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305 (1988) ................................................ 16
McCrory v. United States,
5:16-cv-238 (E.D.N.C.) (filed May 9, 2016) ……...3
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)...................................... 19–20
Nebraska v. United States,
No. 4:16-cv-3117 (D. Neb.) (filed July 8, 2016) ….3
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) ..................................................9
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981).............................................. 12–13
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984) ............................................ 14, 23
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947) ................................................ 10
iv
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist.,
106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).................................. 15
Sheriff v. Gillie,
136 S. Ct. 1594 (2016)............................................ 10
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. (SWANCC) v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) ................................................ 11
Sossamon v. Texas,
563 U.S. 277 (2011) ................................................ 14
Texas v. White,
7 Wall. 700 (1869) ....................................................8
U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc.,
508 U.S. 439 (1993)................................................ 21
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001) ................................................ 10
United States,
2016 WL 3877027 .............................................. 1, 20
United States,
No. 7:16-cv-054, 2016 WL 4501323
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2016) ...........................................3
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)............................................ 21
Other Authorities
Administrative Law As the New Federalism,
57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008)....................................... 17
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) .......................... 11–12
Idaho Amicus Br,
Texas v. United States,
No. 7:16-CV-00054 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2016) …....3
v
Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. Statistics,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Inst. of Educ. Scis.,
Digest of Education Statistics……………………….3
Philip Hamburger,
Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014)………11
State Amicus Br.,
G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board,
No. 15-2056, 2016 WL 2765036
(4th Cir. May 10, 2016) ......................................... 22
State Amicus Br.,
G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board,
No. 15-2056, 2015 WL 7749913
(4th Cir. Nov. 30, 2015) ................................... 17, 22
States’ Mot. For Inj.,
Texas v. United States,
No. 7:16-cv-054, 2016 WL 3877027
(N.D. Tex. July 6, 2016)……………………………….1
States’ Reply Br.,
Texas v. United States,
No. 7:16-cv-054, 2016 WL 4501323
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2016)..…………………………….3
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI
This case is about whether federal agencies
receive deference when they attempt to impose
conditions on the States’ receipt of federal funds,
especially when those conditions conflict with the
plain text of the statute authorizing the grant and
when they appear for the first time in an informal
letter issued without opportunity for notice and
comment. The U.S. Department of Education is
seeking, via a novel interpretation of Title IX, to take
from the States a decision that Congress explicitly
left to the discretion of local schools—namely,
whether to separate school restrooms based on sex.1
And it is attempting to do so behind the veil of a form
of deference that several Justices of this Court have
called into serious question.
For more than forty years, the States have taken
federal education funding on the clear understanding
under Title IX that “nothing contained herein shall
be construed to prohibit any educational institution
receiving funds . . . from maintaining separate living
facilities for the different sexes,” 20 U.S.C. § 1686,
1 Amici are the States of West Virginia, Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin and the
Governors of Kentucky and North Carolina. For a list of state
laws affecting the local management of schools that would need
to be modified or abandoned in light of the Department’s new
interpretation of Title IX, see App. 194a–197a n.8; States’ Mot.
For Inj., Texas v. United States, 2016 WL 3877027 at 9–10
nn.8–20 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2016). Pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 37.2(a), amici have timely notified the parties of their
intent to file this brief and the parties consent to the filing of
this brief.
2
including “separate toilet, locker room, and shower
facilities on the basis of sex,” so long as the facilities
are “comparable,” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.
Notwithstanding this clear statement by
Congress affirming the States’ freedom to choose
whether to separate restrooms by sex, the
Department asks this Court to defer to a recent
unpublished opinion letter. Therein, the Department
claims to make it discriminatory for a school to
separate male and female bathrooms, unless each
student is allowed to select either bathroom in
accordance with that student’s asserted gender
identity.
Expansively reading this Court’s decision in Auer
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), the Fourth Circuit
gave
the
Department’s
new
interpretation
controlling deference. Soon afterwards, emboldened
by this ruling, the Department (along with the
Department of Justice) issued a “Dear Colleague”
letter threatening the States with loss of all
education funding under Title IX unless every public
school in the country allowed students to select
restrooms, showers and dormitories based on their
expressed gender identity. App. 126a. The
Department thus seeks to bootstrap the Fourth
Circuit’s decision, which rested in turn on the
agency’s own informal opinion letter, to rewrite a
federal statute and dictate national policy.
If the Fourth Circuit’s decision stands, States
that do not wish to comply must either relinquish
control over policies designed to protect student
privacy and safety or else forfeit their entire share of
3
$55.8 billion in annual federal school funds.2 Many
States have thus challenged this extraordinary
intrusion into their schools, and a federal district
court in Texas recently entered a nationwide
preliminary injunction against it.3
2 Not counting funds paid directly to state education agencies,
or funds paid for non-elementary and secondary programs, the
national amount of direct federal funding to public elementary
and secondary schools alone exceeds $55,862,552,000 on
average annually. Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ. & Inst. of Educ. Scis., Digest of Education Statistics,
Table 235.20, available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
d15/tables/dt15_235.20.asp?current=yes. For instance, West
Virginia’s public elementary and secondary schools receive an
average of $380,192,000 in federal funds annually, $1,343 per
pupil, which amounts to about 10.7 percent of the State’s
revenue for public elementary and secondary schools. Ibid.
Texas likewise stands to lose more than 19 percent of its
primary and secondary public education budget under the
Department’s new directive. States’ Reply Br., Texas v. United
States, No. 7:16-cv-054, 2016 WL 4501323 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3,
2016).
3 App. 183a–184a (brought by a 13-state coalition of the States
of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin); McCrory v. United States, 5:16-cv-238
(E.D.N.C.) (filed May 9, 2016) (brought by North Carolina); Bd.
of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 2:16-cv-524 (S.D. Ohio) (filed June 10, 2016) (brought by an
Ohio school district); Nebraska v. United States, No. 4:16-cv3117 (D. Neb.) (filed July 8, 2016) (brought by a 10-state
coalition of the States of Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska; North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Wyoming); see also Idaho Amicus Br, Texas
v. United States, No. 7:16-CV-00054 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2016)
(supporting the 13-State Texas suit). This injunction applies
nationally, including to “the government’s activities in
jurisdictions within the Fourth Circuit,” such as West Virginia
and South Carolina. BIO at 23; see also Pet. 32.
4
As sovereign States, amici have a strong interest
in the review and reversal of the Fourth Circuit’s
decision.
If
upheld,
the
Fourth
Circuit’s
unprecedented application of Auer will not end with
school buildings, but will have ramifications far
beyond Title IX, empowering agencies to make
unilateral changes to States’ obligations relating to
health care, transportation, energy, and a host of
other contexts.
5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The time has come for this Court to revisit the
doctrine of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)—a
judge-made theory of deference that has been
criticized by several Justices of this Court; that
perpetually bedevils and divides the lower courts;
and that improperly concentrates an extraordinary
amount of power in federal agencies to the detriment
of the States and the public. Pet. at 18–25.
While there are many reasons to reconsider or
cabin Auer, this case presents an ideal opportunity to
explore the fundamental conflict between this
doctrine, which affords controlling deference to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation,
and federalism canons designed to ensure that
Congress speaks explicitly when it alters the
traditional balance of power between the federal
government and the States. Pet. at 36–37.
In particular, when Congress places conditions
on the States’ receipt of federal funds under the
Spending Clause, this Court has long required that
Congress provide clear notice of the States’
obligations at the time they accept the funds. This
Court has similarly required a clear statement
whenever Congress makes a State liable for suit and
whenever it displaces an area of traditional state
authority, such as local control over school policy.
Auer deference, by contrast, presupposes the
ambiguity of both a federal statute and federal rule
and binds the States to whatever novel
interpretation of the rule the agency devises at
whatever time it chooses to do so. Armed with this
doctrine, agencies can impose controlling obligations
6
on the States in policy areas ranging from education
to telecommunications to labor and employment.
The circumstances of this case illustrate
dramatically the ways in which Auer deference can
deprive the States of control over local policy by
eroding constitutional checks on legislative power,
cutting States out of the federal rulemaking process,
and coercing them to comply with federal directives
on pain of losing federal funding. Title IX expressly
permits schools to separate living facilities based on
“sex,” which courts and the Department have long
understood to refer to biological males and females.
But the Department now invokes Auer to impose a
new obligation on the States to permit students to
use the bathroom consistent with their professed
gender identity. It does this by purporting to find
ambiguity in, and newly interpret, the same word in
its implementing regulation—“sex”—that has
appeared in Title IX for forty years.
Worse, the Department bases its interpretation
on an unpublished, informal opinion letter issued in
response to an inquiry made at the onset of this very
dispute. In so doing, the Department deprived the
States and the public of notice and an opportunity to
comment—the
fundamental
safeguards
that
Congress placed in the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) to invest agency rulemaking with legitimacy.
This Court’s cases make clear that, absent those
procedural protections, an agency interpretation
appearing in an opinion letter receives no deference
under Chevron. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Under the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning, however, the same letter would receive
7
controlling deference when an agency purports to
interpret the same word in an implementing rule.
Worst of all, the Department now relies on the
Fourth Circuit’s decision to seek to impose a
nationwide policy governing access to school
restrooms, locker rooms, and dormitories. To
threaten the States with loss of all of their billions of
dollars of federal education funding if they fail to
adhere to the Department’s command is, plain and
simply, coercion—and this Court’s federalism
jurisprudence does not permit it.
Part I of this brief describes how federal courts
have historically applied clear-statement rules in
order to preserve the federal-state balance and how
Auer deference is inconsistent with these rules. Part
II explains why this clear-statement approach must
take precedence over Auer deference in the Spending
Clause context. Part III explains why it would be
particularly inappropriate to defer to the
Department’s self-serving opinion letter in this case.
Finally, Part IV responds to arguments raised in the
BIO, none of which negates the conclusion that this
Court should grant certiorari to overrule Auer or at
minimum make clear that the doctrine does not
apply in the Spending Clause context.
I.
Auer Deference Erodes The Judicial Role In
Protecting The Interests Of The States Through
Application Of Clear-Statement Rules
Auer deference represents an abdication of the
judicial role in policing the separation of powers,
which exists to protect the interests of the States and
ultimately the liberties of the people.
8
A. “[T]he preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the
preservation of the . . . National government.”
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)
(quoting Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869)). As
“James Wilson observed[,] . . . ‘it was a favorite object
in the Convention’ to provide for the security of the
States against federal encroachment and . . . the
structure of the Federal Government itself served
that end.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) (quoting 2 Debates in
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 438–39 (J. Elliot 2d. ed. 1836)).
For example, Article I of the Constitution
protects state control over local matters by limiting
Congress’s authority to specified, enumerated
powers. Id. at 550. Each bill, moreover, must win the
approval of the Senate, “where each State received
equal representation and each Senator was to be
selected by the legislature of his State.” Id. at 551.
And, of course, each law must win the approval of
both houses of Congress and secure the President’s
approval (or override a Presidential veto), which
makes it inherently difficult for the federal
government to displace state law. U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 3.
Far from protecting state sovereignty for its own
sake, however, “[t]he structural principles secured by
the separation of powers protect the individual as
well.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222
(2011). By protecting the interests of the States, the
separation of powers ultimately secures “‘the
liberties that derive’” to individual citizens “‘from the
9
diffusion of sovereign power.’” New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (internal quotation
omitted). “Just as the separation and independence
of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
Courts also play a critical role in preserving the
structural safeguards of federalism by interpreting
laws in a manner that protects the role of the States
in Congress. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
Specifically, when this Court interprets a statute, it
recognizes that “‘Congress legislates against the
backdrop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions” that
are “grounded in the relationship between the
Federal Government and the States under our
Constitution.” Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2088 (2014) (citation omitted). Under these
presumptions, absent a plain statement by Congress
to the contrary, this Court will read a statute to be
“consistent with principles of federalism inherent in
our
constitutional
structure.”
Ibid.
These
“background principles of construction” make it
“‘incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
overrides’ the ‘usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers.’” Id. at 2088–89 (citing Gregory,
501 U.S. at 460).
For example, under the Tenth Amendment and
broader constitutional principles of federalism, for
Congress to displace traditional spheres of state
authority or preempt state law, it “must make its
10
intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452.
Without a “clear and manifest” statement, this Court
will not read a statute to preempt “the historic police
powers of the States,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), or to permit an
agency to regulate a matter in “areas of traditional
state responsibility,” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089; see
also Sheriff v. Gillie, 136 S. Ct. 1594, 1602 (2016)
(finding “no cause” for construing federal law “in a
manner that interferes with States’ arrangements
for conducting their own governments”) (internal
quotations omitted).
B. The Auer doctrine, under which a court
affords controlling deference to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, cannot be
squared with judicial enforcement of these clearstatement rules, which require that Congress speak
clearly in statutory text if it intends to disrupt the
normal balance of power between the federal
government and the States.
To be sure, courts at times defer under Chevron
to formal agency rules and decisions that purport to
interpret ambiguous statutory terms. But in such
cases, a court must first assure itself that Congress
explicitly intended to delegate interpretive authority
to an agency, and that the agency acted with the
degree of formality required by Congress under the
APA—which in the case of rules requires notice and
an opportunity to comment. See Pet. at 23 (citing
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–34
(2001)). These protections help ensure that States
have a meaningful role in both the legislative and
11
rulemaking processes before courts defer to a
regulatory interpretation.
Moreover, Chevron itself commands courts to
apply any clear-statement rules before deferring to
an agency’s interpretation. Under Chevron, “[i]f a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.”
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). Therefore, this
Court has applied clear-statement rules, rather than
defer to a contrary agency position, when necessary
“to avoid the significant constitutional and
federalism questions raised by [an agency’s]
interpretation.” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty.
(SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172–74 (2001).
There is, if anything, even more reason to give
interpretive priority to clear-statement rules over
deference when confronted with an agency’s
purported interpretation of its own rule. Under Auer,
a court provides controlling deference to an agency’s
preferred interpretation of a rule without first
discerning either whether that interpretation accords
with Congress’s intent or whether the States had an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.
This is an “abandonment of judicial office,” Philip
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 316 &
n.25 (2014), which allows agencies to simultaneously
make, execute, and interpret rules without any of the
structural checks imposed by the Constitution, John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
12
96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 654 (1996). The combination
of all three powers of government into one
unaccountable agency dissolves the limits on federal
power that were designed to protect the States and,
ultimately, the people. See Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Unlike Congress, administrative
agencies are clearly not designed to represent the
interests of States.”).
Amici are not aware of any case in which this
Court has ever applied Auer deference when
interpreting a statute subject to a clear-statement
rule. This should not be the first. Rather, this Court
should grant certiorari to resolve the tension
between Auer deference and the judiciary’s historic
role in protecting the interests of the States through
clear-statement rules. Auer should be overruled, or if
it is retained in some fashion, cabined to the extent
necessary to honor the federal-state balance in our
constitutional system.
II. Auer Deference Particularly Has No Place In
Interpreting Statutes Enacted Under The
Spending Clause
It is, moreover, particularly inappropriate for a
court to abandon a clear-statement approach in favor
of Auer deference when construing laws enacted
under the Spending Clause, where States must
decide whether or not to accept certain costly
obligations in exchange for receipt of federal funds.
Under the Spending Clause, “if Congress intends
to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys,
it must do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). That is
13
because spending statutes are “much in the nature of
a contract: in return for federal funds, the States
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”
Ibid. And Congress’s power to make these contracts
“rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract’”; that
is, “[t]here can . . . be no knowing acceptance if a
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to
ascertain what is expected of it.” Ibid. Congress,
accordingly, may not “surpris[e] participating States
with post acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.” Id.
at 25.
The “crucial inquiry” for a court interpreting a
spending statute, therefore, is “whether Congress
spoke so clearly that [the court] can fairly say that
the State could make an informed choice.” Id. at 24–
25. Simply put, courts “must interpret Spending
Clause legislation narrowly, in order to avoid
saddling the States with obligations that they did not
anticipate.” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret
F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 84 (1999)
(Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
This requirement of congressional clarity is
heightened where, as under Title IX, Congress asks
the States to relinquish their historic immunity from
suit as one condition of receiving federal funds. In
the Eleventh Amendment context, “Congress may
abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making
its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985). While Congress may choose
either to abrogate sovereign immunity directly or (as
in Title IX) make waiver of sovereign immunity a
14
condition to receipt of federal funds, the test in either
case is the same: Congress’s intent must be
“expressly and unequivocally stated in the text of the
relevant statute.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277,
290–91 (2011). This clear-statement rule recognizes
“the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in our federal system.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984).
Because these clear-statement rules require
Congress to speak directly to whether States are
bound to a particular obligation, there is no room for
courts to afford binding deference to an agency under
Auer when a Spending Clause statute “is susceptible
of multiple plausible interpretations.” Sossamon, 563
U.S. at 287. As the Fourth Circuit recognized in an
earlier case, “in the event of ambiguity,” the clearstatement rule prevents a court from “defer[ring] to a
reasonable interpretation by the agency, as if we
were interpreting a statute which has no
implications for the balance of power between the
Federal Government and the States.” Com. of Va.,
Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc).4 Rather, “[i]t is axiomatic that
statutory ambiguity defeats altogether a claim by the
Federal
Government
that
Congress
has
unambiguously conditioned the States’ receipt of
federal monies in the manner asserted.” Ibid.
A related problem with applying Auer to
Spending Clause legislation arises because Auer
4 The Fourth Circuit panel below completely ignored this
federalism limit on spending statutes, raising a serious
question about whether the court disregarded its own en banc
precedent.
15
presumes that the same deference is owed to agency
interpretations regardless of when the interpretation
is made. But the Pennhurst canon, as Respondent
acknowledges, requires that Congress provide notice
“‘at t[he] time’ the funds are received.” BIO at 28–29
(citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656,
669–70 (1985)). The clear-statement rule, therefore,
prevents the federal government from “modify[ing]
past agreements with recipients by unilaterally
issuing guidelines through the Department of
Education” at any later time. Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997).
Indeed, retroactive regulatory power does not exist in
any circumstances absent a clear statement from
Congress. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,
488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
In short, because Auer deference would routinely
expose sovereign States to lawsuits and other
obligations based on novel interpretations of rules
imposed by agencies many years after the States
first receive federal funds, it cannot apply in the
Spending Clause context. Certiorari is warranted to
cabin the doctrine or abandon it altogether.
III. The Particularly Egregious Application Of Auer
In This Case Requires This Court’s Intervention
This case vividly illustrates the prejudice that
States can suffer if a court fails to apply clearstatement rules in Spending Clause cases and
instead uncritically defers to agency interpretations
under Auer. Indeed, for several reasons, the
extraordinary deference that the Fourth Circuit
afforded the Department’s novel interpretation here
16
makes this an ideal vehicle to reconsider or cabin
Auer’s scope.
First, as explained above, the Pennhurst canon
and other clear-statement rules should apply to
prevent the Department from imposing novel
obligations on the States even if Title IX were
ambiguous on the point in dispute. That is because
Congress must speak clearly when intruding on an
“area[] of traditional state responsibility,” Bond, 134
S. Ct. at 2089, such as control of schools, “perhaps
the most important function of state and local
governments,” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, even
if it were true, as the Department has claimed, that
Title IX’s reference to “sex” were somehow
ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the States, not in favor of the Department’s
preferred and newfound construction of the law.
But as it happens, Title IX is not ambiguous on
the key interpretive question, namely, whether it
requires schools to permit students to choose
whichever public restroom is consistent with their
gender identity.5 Rather, Title IX promised the
States that they may decide at the local level
whether to “maintain[] separate living facilities for
the different sexes.” 20 U.S.C. § 1686. At the time of
Title IX’s passage, dictionaries defined “sex” as a
biological category based principally on physical
anatomy, App. at 53a–55a; Pet. at 34–35, and this
5 App. 126a. Under the Department’s “Dear Colleague” letter,
no medical diagnosis or treatment would be required before a
student could self-identify as another gender and gain
admission to the restroom of the other sex. App. 130a.
17
biological understanding prevailed in every prior
case to consider the question of restrooms, State
Amicus Br., G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board,
No. 15-2056, 2015 WL 7749913 at *7–8, 14 & n.1 (4th
Cir. Nov. 30, 2015) (surveying cases). To extend Auer
deference to an agency interpretation that prohibits
States from doing what Congress has clearly
authorized turns federalism on its head. As a result,
States will be subject to conditions that they could
not possibly have voluntarily or knowingly accepted
at the time they first opted into the Title IX regime.
Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
Second, the application of Auer deference here is
particularly troubling because the Department’s
interpretation was adopted for the first time in an
informal, unpublished opinion letter that was sent by
a relatively low-level official at the outset of this very
dispute. Because agencies are not subject to
structural checks that provide “adequate protection
against agency failure to take federalism concerns
seriously,” the only way in which States can
influence regulatory action is through the APA’s
“opportunities for state notification and participation
created
by
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
procedures
and
amplified
by
substantive
requirements of agency explanation and reasoned
decisionmaking.” Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Law As the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023,
2083–84 (2008). Uncritical deference to informal
opinion letters thus robs the States of any role in the
rulemaking process. And it deprives the States of
any semblance of notice to guide their future actions.
While Pennhurst requires clear statutory notice at
the time States accept federal funds, the Department
18
adopted its interpretation in this case only after the
school board had allegedly violated the statute. It is
fundamentally unfair, and indeed, impermissibly
retroactive, to impose regulatory obligations on the
States in this manner. Cf. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208.
Third, and related, the principal justification for
Auer—that agencies are in a better position to
interpret
ambiguous
terms
in
their
own
regulations—has no purchase here. The Department
purported to interpret the term “sex”—a plain
English word that appears both in Title IX and in the
implementing rule. There is no indication that
Congress considered the term “sex” ambiguous or
intended to delegate to the Department the authority
to interpret it; nor is there any reason to believe the
Department has any special expertise in elucidating
the meaning of that word. Where “the underlying
regulation does little more than restate the terms of
the statute itself,” any rationale for Auer deference
disappears. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257.
Moreover, to defer to an agency’s interpretation of
a rule that merely parrots the statute would lead to
inconsistent and absurd results under this Court’s
case law. This Court has held that no deference is
owed to an agency’s interpretation of a statute when
that interpretation is “contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law.”
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. But under the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, an agency’s opinion letter would
be entitled to controlling deference so long as the
agency had also issued a rule that mirrored the
statutory text. That is not the law.
19
If it were, agencies would have no incentive to
make difficult policy choices and to submit those
choices to the public for comment. Rather, the Fourth
Circuit’s approach encourages agencies to issue
vague regulations (perhaps doing no more than
restating the statutory standard) and fill in the gaps
later through informal pronouncements. Decker v.
Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). This form of rulemaking would insulate
agencies even further from political accountability to
the detriment of the States and the general public.
Fourth, and finally, to impose new conditions on
the receipt of federal funds on which the States rely
to supply basic services such as education raises
serious constitutional concerns about whether the
federal government is improperly coercing the States
to make policy changes that the federal government
could not otherwise impose through ordinary
political channels.
Only four years ago, this Court warned that
“Congress may use its spending power to create
incentives for States to act in accordance with federal
policies. But when ‘pressure turns to compulsion,’ the
legislation runs contrary to our system of
federalism.” Nat’l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (internal citation
omitted). These concerns about improper coercion are
heightened where, as here, the regulatory obligation
originates with the Department, rather than the
States’ representatives in Congress. With minimal
political accountability, the Department has
20
threatened States that do not comply with its
guidance letters with the loss of all their schools’
federal funding. App. 99a. This “financial
‘inducement’” is “much more than ‘relatively mild
encouragement.’” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.
Ct. at 2604. Rather, the threatened loss of 100% of a
State’s federal education funding—almost as much
as 20% of a State’s entire school budget—“is
economic dragooning that leaves [States] with no
real option but to acquiesce.” Id. at 2605.
School districts throughout the country share
nearly $56 billion in annual funding that the federal
government directs to education. These funds
amount to an average of 9.3 percent of total spending
on public elementary and secondary education
nationwide, roughly $1,000 per pupil. In some
States, however, like Arizona, Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Texas, the numbers reach higher and comprise
nearly 20% of the total school budget. State PI Mot.,
Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-054, 2016 WL
3877027 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2016).
It is unconscionable to use this money, much of
which goes to poor and special-needs children, as a
cudgel to make the States relinquish their authority
to decide at the local level how best to manage their
facilities. Under such circumstances, this case
presents a “Tenth Amendment claim of the highest
order.” Riley, 106 F.3d at 570 (en banc) (Luttig, J.).
And if this intrusion into state sovereignty were
permitted, nothing would stop federal agencies from
imposing similar conditions on the States in a host of
other regulatory contexts. This Court’s intervention
21
is required to overrule or cabin Auer and reduce the
incentives for federal agencies to dictate national
policies through opinion letters at the expense of the
States and their citizens.
IV. Respondent In The BIO Shows No Reason For
This Court Not To Rely On Federalism
Principles To Overrule Or Limit Auer
Respondent advances various arguments in the
BIO as to why this Court should decline to examine
the conflict between Auer and the principles of
federalism inherent in this Court’s clear-statement
rules. None is persuasive.
First, Respondent argues that any consideration
of the Spending Clause clear-statement rule has
been waived. BIO at 28. That is incorrect. As long as
the particular question presented is preserved, this
Court will not deem waived any “particular legal
theories advanced by the parties.” U.S. Nat’l Bank of
Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
446 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). After
all, “[p]arties cannot waive the correct interpretation
of the law simply by failing to invoke it.” Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2101 n.2
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (citing, e.g., EEOC v.
FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 23 (1986) (per curiam)).
Here, the Board has continuously raised and
litigated the propriety of applying Auer deference to
Title IX and its implementing regulations. A party
cannot waive a particular argument as to why Auer
should not apply in this case. That is especially true
where, as here, this Court is the first tribunal with
the authority to overrule or cabin its prior decision in
22
Auer. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239–40
(1997). And in any event, the States raised this
specific argument in depth in their briefs before the
Fourth Circuit at both the panel and petition for en
banc stages—so Respondent can hardly argue
inadequate notice.6
Second, Respondent claims that “Title IX puts
recipients on notice of liability for all forms of
intentional
discrimination
for
purposes
of
Pennhurst.” BIO at 28–29. That too is wrong. In the
cases Respondent cites, this Court was careful to
narrowly circumscribe liability to “deliberate
indifference” to “known” violations of the statute.
Davis v. Monrone Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
633 (1999). This rigorous standard was adopted to
ensure that States would only be held liable in cases
where Title IX had “long provided funding recipients
with notice that they may be liable.” Id. at 643–44.
Here, there can be no argument that the States were
deliberately indifferent to their known obligations,
when Title IX contained an express provision
authorizing the States to provide separate restrooms
based on sex and where the interpretation on which
the Department now relies did not appear until
decades after the States first accepted federal funds.
And if Respondent is suggesting that a statute
places the States on notice so long as it identifies the
States as bound by its prohibitions, however vaguelyworded the obligations on the States might be, that
6 See State Amicus Br., G.G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., No.
15-2056, 2015 WL 7749913 at *8 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 2015)
(panel); State Amicus Br., id., 2016 WL 2765036 at *4–5 (4th
Cir. May 10, 2016) (petition for rehearing en banc).
23
argument is squarely inconsistent with governing
precedent. A clear statement is necessary both to
make a statute apply to the States and to show if the
statute applies in the particular manner claimed.
E.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edu. v.
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); Gregory 501 U.S.
at 460–70.
Third, Respondent argues that the Pennhurst
clear-statement rule does not apply to “requests for
injunctive relief,” but rather “merely [to] the
availability of ‘money damages.’” BIO at 28–29. But
in Davis, this Court applied the same heightened
standard—deliberate
indifference
to
known
obligations—to claims for money damages and claims
for other “particular remedial demands” under Title
IX. 526 U.S. at 648; see also Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99–02 (holding that an
“unequivocal expression of congressional intent” is
required to waive sovereign immunity, which applies
both to claims for damages and injunctive relief).
And, in any event, Respondent seeks money damages
in this case, and therefore, cannot escape application
of the clear-statement rule. BIO at 11, n.10.
In short, the Fourth Circuit’s decision laid waste
to this Court’s longstanding federalism decisions by
deferring to the Department’s novel interpretation of
its rule. Certiorari is therefore warranted to resolve
the conflict between Auer and this Court’s federalism
jurisprudence and affirm that agencies cannot
impose new obligations on States, on pain of losing
millions in federal funding, under statutes enacted
by Congress under the Spending Clause.
24
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick Morrisey
Attorney General
Elbert Lin
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Thomas M. Johnson, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Julie Marie Blake
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State Capitol
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
[email protected]
(304) 558-2021
Counsel for Petitioner
September 27, 2016
25
COUNSEL FOR ADDITIONAL AMICI
LUTHER STRANGE
Attorney General
State of Alabama
DOUGLAS J.
PETERSON
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General
State of Arizona
ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General
State of Nevada
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General
State of Arkansas
WAYNE STENEHJEM
Attorney General
State of North Dakota
SAMUEL S. OLENS
Attorney General
State of Georgia
MICHAEL DEWINE
Attorney General
State of Ohio
DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General
State of Kansas
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General
State of South Carolina
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
State of South Dakota
JIM HOOD
Attorney General
State of Mississippi
HERBERT SLATERY III
Attorney General
State of Tennessee
TIMOTHY C. FOX
Attorney General
State of Montana
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
State of Texas
26
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah
PATRICK L. MCCRORY
Governor of North
Carolina
Through counsel
BRAD D. SCHIMEL
Attorney General
State of Wisconsin
MATTHEW G. BEVIN
Governor of Kentucky
Through counsel
Mark Stephen Pitt
General Counsel
Office of the Governor of
Kentucky
State Capitol, Suite 101
700 Capitol Avenue
Frankfort, KY 40601
(502) 564-2611
[email protected].
Robert C. Stephens
General Counsel
Office of the Governor of
North Carolina
20301 Mail Service
Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-0301
(919) 814-2027
[email protected]