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Children’s Prosocial Lie-Telling in Politeness Situations and its Relation to Social
Variables
Mina E. Popliger
Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology
McGill University, Montreal
PhD in School/Applied Child Psychology
June 2011
A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in School/Applied Child Psychology
© Mina Popliger 2011
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Abstract
Due to the multi-faceted nature of lying, the development of children’s lie-telling
has received the attention of psychologists, educators, parents, and legal
professionals. While recent research has focused on the conceptual understanding
and moral evaluation of truth and lies, as well as children’s actual lying
behaviours, there has been little investigation of social variables related to the
development of children’s lie-telling behaviour. Therefore, the current research
program sought to investigate social variables related to children’s prosocial lying
in politeness situations. Prosocial lies are evaluated differently from lies told to
conceal a transgression, yet have not been the focus of a comprehensive
examination in the developmental literature. This dissertation comprises two
manuscripts that collectively contribute to the literature by exploring children’s
truth- and lie-telling in a politeness situation, and social variables related to its
development. The first manuscript reports on two studies that investigated
motivational and social factors affecting children’s lying. In addition, the
relationship between prosocial lying and children’s moral understanding and
evaluation of prosocial scenarios was examined. In Study 1, 72 children from the
2nd and 4th grades (Age: M = 8.38 years, SD = 0.56) participated in a disappointing
gift paradigm with either high or low consequences for lying. Children were
more likely to lie in the low-cost than high-cost condition. In Study 2, 117
children from preschool to late elementary school (Age: M = 8.04 years, SD =
2.03) also participated in a disappointing gift paradigm with high or low costs for
lying, as well as answered questions regarding prosocial moral vignette scenarios.
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Parents completed questionnaires regarding their parenting styles and family
emotional expressiveness. Lying was more common when the consequences for
doing so were low- as compared to the high-cost condition. Preschoolers,
compared to older children, were least likely to tell a prosocial lie in the high-cost
condition. In addition, prosocial liars had families who expressed positive
emotions infrequently, and relied on an authoritative parenting style. Finally,
there was an interaction between the prosocial liars and their evaluations of the
protagonists’ and recipients’ feelings in the vignettes. Given the obtained results
supporting social variables as a factor in the development of children’s prosocial
lying, the second manuscript sought to examine whether children display the same
behaviours as their parents when telling the truth or a lie in a politeness situation.
Forty-seven parent-child dyads (ranging in age from 7 to 15 years), were told to
pretend to like a drink that either tasted good or bad. Adult raters who viewed the
drink descriptions were unable to accurately differentiate the truths and lies.
Adults were also biased in their overall evaluations; they perceived the parents as
being truthful and children as being lie-tellers. In-depth video analysis of parents
and children’s expressive behaviours revealed no differences between parents and
their children. Taken together, findings from these two manuscripts provide
theoretical and empirical support to examine social variables in relation to the
development of children’s truth- and lie-telling.
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Résumé
En raison de la complexité du comportement déceptif, plusieurs professionnels,
tel que psychologues, éducateurs, professionnels en droit, et même parents, ont
mis leur attention sur l’étude du développement de comportement déceptif. La
majorité de chercheurs ont investigués la compréhension et l’évaluation des
mensonges, de la vérité, et le comportement déceptif des enfants. Cependant,
plusieurs ont négligés l’étude des indices sociaux reliés au développement du
comportement déceptif chez les enfants. De plus, l’évaluation des mensonges
prosociales n'ont pas été l’objet d’un recherche compréhensive dans la littérature
développemental. Par conséquent, ce programme de recherche a examiné les
indices sociaux liés au comportement des enfants dans des situations de politesse.
Compris dans ce mémoire sont deux manuscrits discutant le comportement
véridique et déceptif des enfants en situation de politesse, et les indices qui
peuvent contribués au développement de ces comportements. Le premier
manuscrit comprend deux études qui ont examinées les facteurs de motivation et
indices sociaux affectant les mensonges des enfants. En outre, la relation entre les
mensonges prosociales, l’évaluation des situations de courtoisie, et la
compréhension morale de ces comportement a été évaluée. La première étude
comprend 72 enfants de la 2e et 4e année, qui ont participés dans un paradigme de
« cadeau décevant» avec de sévères ou légères conséquences. Les résultats
indiquent que les enfants ont une tendance de mentir plus souvent face à des
conséquences légères. La deuxième étude comprend 117 enfants entre la prématernelle et le primaire, (M = 8.04 ans, SD = 2.03), qui ont participé dans un
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paradigme de « cadeau décevant» avec de sévères ou légères conséquences. Ces
enfants ont aussi lu des vignettes de scénario de moralité et ont répondu à des
questions sur leur compréhension des vignettes. Leurs parents ont complété des
questionnaires sur le comportement expressif et émotionnel de leur famille et sur
leur style parental. Les résultats indiquent que les enfants ont une tendance de
mentir plus souvent face à des conséquences légères. Il avait des tendances
développementales puissent que les enfants en pré-maternelle étaient les moins
susceptibles de faire un mensonge prosociale lors de sévère conséquence. En
outre, les menteurs prosociales avaient proviennent de famille qui expriment
rarement des émotions positives et ont un style parental autoritaire. De plus, il y
avait une interaction entre les menteurs et leurs évaluations des sentiments des
protagonistes et des récipients dans les vignettes. Les résultats indiquent que les
indices sociaux sont enfaite liés au développent du comportement déceptif
prosociale. Alors, le but du deuxième manuscrit est d’évalué si les enfants et
leurs parents utilisent les mêmes comportements expressifs et non-expressifs lors
d’un mensonge ou de vérité. Quarante-sept pairs de parent-enfant (enfant entre 7
à 15 ans) on été demandé de faire semblant d'aimer une boisson qui goûtait bon ou
mauvais. Évaluateurs qui ont regardé les clips vidéo des descriptions des boissons
ont été incapables de différencier les vérités des mensonges. Les évaluateurs ont
été polarisés dans leur évaluation puisse qu’ils ont perçu les parents comme étant
véridiques et les enfants comme étant menteurs. Une analyse détaillée des
comportements expressifs des pairs n’indiquent aucunes différences entre parent
et enfants. Pris ensemble, les résultats de ces deux manuscrits fournissent un
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appui théorique et empirique pour améliorer notre compréhension des indices
sociaux par rapport au développement de comportement véridique et déceptif chez
les enfants.
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Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I extend my sincere appreciation to my doctoral
supervisor, Dr. Victoria Talwar. Your guidance, support, wisdom, and patience
on my doctoral journey far surpass anything I could have expected. I thank you
for investing your time into helping me reach and attain each one of my personal
and professional objectives, and for having the confidence in me to succeed.
Words cannot duly express the experiences I’ve acquired working along your
side, and I am truly grateful for your mentoring and friendship. I value the
relationship we have built and look forward to many years of continued
collaboration.
I would also like to acknowledge the members of my advisory committee
for your support and guidance throughout the dissertation process. The insightful
comments and suggestions provided by Drs. Kim Cornish, Kristine Onishi, and
Ingrid Sladeczek have contributed to the successful completion of this
dissertation.
I appreciate and recognize the contributions of Drs. Angela Crossman and
Neda Faregh. It has been a real pleasure working and learning from each of you
and I feel privileged to have had such an opportunity.
To my amazing and wonderful Talwar labmates who have been there from
the beginning to share in the long and arduous hours of data collection and in the
final stages with revisions and words of encouragement: Christine Saykaly, SarahJane Renaud, Cindy Arruda, and Shanna Williams. Your laughter, liveliness and
energy always made the hours merely seem like minutes and provided me
friendships that I truly treasure. My doctoral experience would not have been the
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same without each of you by my side. You really are a great group of girls and
for that I thank you!
I also acknowledge the girls of my cohort, especially Danielle Ostfield,
Meredith Gillespie, Marjorie Rhodes, and Krista Ritchie who made the road
towards completion memorable with your enthusiasm, dedication and excellence.
My family, whom without I would not have been able to achieve a goal I
set out for myself long ago. I am privileged that you taught and enabled me to
believe that I can accomplish anything. Your continued support through it all
cannot be properly acknowledged in words but through the actions of hard work
and perseverance.
My A-team at home: Avi, Abby and Ali, each of you light up my life in
ways far beyond anything I could have ever imagined. Your confidence in me to
succeed and never-ending passion for adventure made getting through each day
(and night) a little less of a challenge.
A sincere thank you goes to the many families who participated in these
projects and who willingly gave up their time to contribute to and make this
research endeavour not only possible, but enjoyable.
Finally, the completion of this research and my doctoral degree was made
possible by doctoral research fellowships granted from the Fonds de recherche sur
la societé et la culture (FQRSC) and from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
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Contribution of Authors
The manuscripts presented in this dissertation are co-authored however I am the
primary author on each. The first manuscript is co-authored by Drs. Victoria
Talwar and Angela Crossman, while the second manuscript is co-authored by Drs.
Neda Faregh, Angela Crossman, and Victoria Talwar. As primary author, I
developed each of these studies (including selection of instruments, research
questions, and data analyses), as well as wrote the current dissertation in its
entirety. My doctoral supervisor, Dr. Talwar, has supported this endeavour in an
advisory capacity during the conceptualization of these studies, formulation of the
research questions, and writing of the manuscripts. Dr. Crossman was involved in
the data analyses and editorial revisions of both manuscripts. Finally, Dr. Faregh
served in an advisory capacity during the data analysis of the second manuscript.
These studies were supported by a research grant awarded to Victoria Talwar &
Angela Crossman by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada.
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Table of Contents
Abstract................................................................................................................... ii
Résumé.................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements............................................................................................... vii
Contribution of Authors......................................................................................... ix
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... x
List of Tables and Figures................................................................................... xii
List of Appendices .............................................................................................. xiii
Chapter 1. Introduction...................................................................................... 14
Chapter 2. Review of Literature ....................................................................... 18
What is Lying?...................................................................................................... 19
Children’s Conceptual Understanding and Moral Evaluation of Lies.................. 20
Lie-Telling Behaviour............................................................................………... 22
Socialization of Lying...................................................................…………….... 32
Goals of the Research Program............................................................................. 35
Chapter 3. Manuscript 1 ................................................................................... 39
Predictors of Children’s Prosocial Lie-Telling:Motivation, Socialization
Variables, and Moral Understanding
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 40
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 41
Study 1…………………………………………………………………………...49
Method .................................................................................................... 50
Results and Discussion.............................................................................. 52
Study 2………………………………………………………………………….. 55
Method…………………………………………………………………...61
Results and Discussion..............................................................................65
General Discussion ...………………………………………………………........71
References ............................................................................................................84
Bridging Manuscripts............................................................................................ 97
Chapter 4. Manuscript 2 ................................................................................... 98
Does the Apple Fall Far From the Tree? Detecting Deception in Parents and
Children
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 99
Introduction .........................................................................................................100
Method ............................................................................................................... 108
Results ................................................................................................................ 111
Discussion .......................................................................................................... 116
References .......................................................................................................... 123
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Chapter 5. General Discussion......................................................................... 133
Bibliography ......................................................................................................152
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List of Tables and Figures
Manuscript 1
Table 1. Means (Standard Deviations) of Socialization Variables by Type
of Child…………………………………………………………………………. 91
Table 2. Means (Standard Deviations) of Socialization Variables by Plausibility
of Children’s Answers to Follow-up Questions……………………………........92
Figure 1. Percentage of prosocial lie-tellers among second and fourth graders
in high- and low-cost conditions in Study 1..……………………………………93
Figure 2. Percentage of prosocial lie-tellers in high- and low-cost conditions
among preschoolers, early and late elementary school children in Study 2.……94
Figure 3. Child ratings of the protagonists’ feelings about telling the truth or lie,
ranging from 1 (very very bad) to 6 (very very good): Veracity x Type of Child
interaction………………………………………………………………………..95
Figure 4. Child ratings of the recipients’ feelings about being told the truth or a
lie, ranging from 1 (very very bad) to 6 (very very good): Veracity x Type of
Child interaction…………………………………………………………………96
Manuscript 2
Table 1. Means (Standard Deviations) of Raters’ Accuracy in Detecting Truths
and Lies by Age Group…………………………………………………………130
Table 2. Means (Standard Deviations) of Positive and Negative Behaviour
Scores for Children and Parents Telling Truths and Lies………………………131
Figure 1. Detection accuracy rates of children and parents truth and
lie videos……………………………………………………………….……….132
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List of Appendices
Appendix A. Parent Consent Form – Study 1…………………………..……..166
Appendix B. Parent Consent Form – Study 2…………………………..……..167
Appendix C. University Students (Adult) Consent Form – Study 2…………..168
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The reasons for lying and situations in which one might tell a lie vary
considerably. Why do people lie? What motivates someone to tell a lie? How do
we know when to lie and when it is appropriate to do so? Is honesty really always
the best policy? These are important questions whose answers are not clearly
understood because research in the area of the development of lying is still in its
infancy. Specifically, while lying is a social behaviour that is influenced by the
benefits and consequences of telling a lie in different situations, the development
of lying has not been examined in relation to social variables. Most
developmental research on lying has focused on understanding and evaluating
truth- and lie-telling scenarios across different developmental periods (e.g.,
Bussey, 1992, 1999; Broomfield, Robinson & Robinson, 2002; Siegal & Peterson,
1996, 1998), on children‟s actual lying behaviour to conceal a transgression (e.g.,
Lewis, Stranger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b,
2008), and on the ability to conceal a lie by successfully avoiding detection (e.g.,
Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002b, 2008). These studies have generally
found that children are able to distinguish between truths and lies, can
differentiate between lies told to conceal a transgression (i.e., antisocial lies) and
those told to be polite (i.e., prosocial lies), and begin to tell lies with some success
during the preschool period. Being able to successfully tell a lie requires
cognitive capabilities (e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee 2002b, 2008) and
an understanding of the context in which a lie may be told (e.g., Lee & Ross,
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1997). However, it seems likely that in addition to cognitive variables, social
variables might also play a role in the development of children‟s lying behaviours.
Children acquire the beliefs, values, and behaviours deemed significant
and appropriate early in development within their family units through the process
of socialization. Indeed, research on the development of children‟s social
competence (e.g., Denham & Grout, 1992), aggression (e.g., Dodge, Coie, &
Lyman, 2006), and self control (e.g., Hoffman, 1988) has found that family and
various social factors play an important role in the development of these early
behaviours. Furthermore, since children evaluate the acceptability of different
types of lies (i.e., antisocial and prosocial lies) depending on the context, it is
important to examine whether social variables may also be related to children‟s
lie-telling. For example, a child might learn that lying is bad when they are
punished following a transgression (e.g., being denied a privilege after lying about
breaking a glass vase). Yet, children also may learn that sometimes lying can
have desired outcomes, as when they observe their mother saying she liked a
friends‟ new haircut (to spare her friends‟ feelings), but later, out of the friends‟
presence, confessed to thinking it looked horrible. In order to better understand
how children learn to use and reconcile these social rules and etiquette, examining
social factors related to the development of children‟s lying behaviour is
necessary. As a result, the overall objective of the present research program was
to look at the lie-telling behaviours of children and parents in politeness
situations, and social variables related to its development.
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By looking at social variables related to the development of lying both
theoretical and practical contributions can be made. Theoretically, this
investigation contributes to knowledge about children‟s social development by
examining children‟s motivations when choosing to tell a lie or the truth in a
politeness situation. This provides information regarding children‟s
understanding of interpersonal communication, as they reconcile the rules
governing social interactions. In addition, consideration of another‟s feelings
when telling a lie also provides information regarding children‟s moral
development and the factors that children consider when deciding to tell the truth
or a lie. Practically, this program of research has implications for the design of
school wide programs aimed at fostering moral and social development. In
addition, the role of motivation in relation to children‟s honesty and lying
behaviour are also important for educators to consider. Finally, professionals
working in legal contexts might use the results from this research program to
support children‟s abilities to stand trial as credible witnesses, and to be better
informed about children‟s motivations to lie in court when there are high costs for
choosing to do so.
This dissertation includes two manuscripts (Popliger, Faregh, Crossman,
& Talwar, 2011; Popliger, Talwar & Crossman, in press) that, together, comprise
this program of research exploring social variables related to children‟s truth- and
lie-telling in politeness situations. While each of the studies is presented in
separate manuscripts, they represent a continuous progression of this line of
inquiry. Specifically, the first manuscript (Popliger et al., in press) describes
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children participating in a disappointing gift scenario, and where their conceptual
and moral understanding of various lie scenarios was evaluated. Parents
completed questionnaires about their family environments (e.g., parenting styles
and family emotional expressiveness). In the second manuscript (Popliger et al.,
2011), children and their parents were told to describe a pleasant and unpleasant
drink as tasting good in order for them to each tell a truth and a lie. Child and
parent verbal and nonverbal expressive behaviours when telling truths and lies
were examined for similarities and differences.
In the thesis that follows, the two related manuscripts entitled “Predictors
of children‟s prosocial lie-telling: Motivation, socialization variables, and moral
understanding” (Popliger, Talwar & Crossman, in press) and “Does the apple fall
far from the tree? Detecting deception in parents and children” (Popliger, Faregh,
Crossman, & Talwar, 2011), are presented in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Each
manuscript contains its own introduction, methods, results and discussion
sections. Chapter 2 thoroughly reviews the research literature on lying and social
factors believed to relate to its development, while the final chapter (Chapter 5)
integrates and discusses the findings of the two manuscripts and their
contributions to our knowledge.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of the Literature
Despite early interest in lying by developmental psychologists (Hartshorne
& May, 1928; Piaget, 1932/1965), most empirical research on this topic is more
recent (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b,
2008). This research has been spurred by both theoretical and practical interests.
Theoretically, research on lying contributes to a greater understanding of
children‟s social and moral development. Practically, research on lying is of
interest to parents and professionals who work with children (e.g., educators,
social workers) who wish to facilitate and promote children‟s honesty. In general,
research on lying tends to fall into one of two areas; (a) the conceptual
understanding and moral evaluation of truth and lies, and (b) the production of
actual lying behaviours. However, despite recent interest in these two areas,
several aspects of lying remain largely unexplored. In particular, few studies have
explored the relation between children‟s evaluations of truth and lies and their
actual truth- and lie-telling behaviour. Furthermore, there has been little
examination of the influence of the motivational contexts or the social factors
related to the development of lying throughout childhood. However, prior to
embarking on an investigation about the development of lie-telling in children and
variables related to its development, it is important to first define lying as it has
been looked at in the literature and to review the existing literature on children‟s
moral understanding of lies and actual lie-telling behaviour.
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What is Lying?
According to both researchers and philosophers (e.g., Bok, 1978;
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Vrij, 2002), lying is an intentional act that serves
various functions, taking on either a simple (e.g., denying taking the last cookie)
or more serious (e.g., lying under oath in court) form. Lies occur when one
attempts to instil a false belief in another, and are defined by the perspective of
the liar (Lee & Cameron, 2000). These intentional communications depend on
the knowledge and beliefs of both the liar and the lie-recipient. DePaulo and
colleagues distinguished between three types of lies: outright lies or falsifications,
whereby the information conveyed is different from the truth; exaggerations,
which are overstated facts; or subtle lies, which are statements that conceal
information or lies by omission (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein,
1996). Furthermore, motivations for telling lies have been reported to be due to
both the self‟s and others‟ interests (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1996; Newton, Reddy &
Bull, 2000). Self-oriented lies (often referred to as “antisocial lies”) are those told
for personal advantage, to avoid punishment, to give a positive impression, or to
protect one‟s self from embarrassment or disapproval, whereas other-oriented lies
(often referred to as “prosocial lies”) are told for the sake of preserving social
relations or to be polite (DePaulo et al., 1996).
While most research has focused on defining lies in terms of what the liar
knows to be true and intends for the other to believe, these attempts inadequately
address the social and cultural factors that play a key role in defining what a lie is.
Sweetser (1987) pointed out that what the liar knows to be true is often not
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considered within the context of the lie. Thus, a deliberately false statement may
be more or less of a lie depending on the type of setting in which it occurred,
whether the lie helped or harmed another, or whether the lie was rewarded or
punished. From an early age, children learn to attach particular social
implications to different types of lies (e.g., Piaget, 1932/65). This tendency to lie
according to different social contexts continues into adulthood, where one
becomes more skilled at using expected outcomes to differentiate the contexts in
which lies are more or less permissible. Since an essential goal of social
communication is to try to help and not harm (Sweetser, 1987), lies that conform
to this rule are typically considered less of a lie than those lies that violate this
rule.
Children’s Conceptual Understanding and Moral Evaluation of Lies
Several studies have examined the development of a moral understanding
of truths and lies in the childhood years. These investigations indicate that
children‟s knowledge of lie- and truth-telling emerges early (e.g., Bussey 1992,
1999; Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998; Wimmer, Gruber & Perner, 1984). Piaget‟s
work in deception among children (1932/1965) found age differences for
children‟s definitions and evaluations of various types of false statements (i.e.,
mistakes and lies). According to Piaget, children younger than 6 years of age had
an over-inclusive definition of lies that included swearing, mistaken guesses, and
exaggerations. Children between the ages of 6 and 10 years defined lies as
statements that were untrue, but did not differentiate between different types of
intentions, whereas by 10 and 11 years of age, lies were typically defined as
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intentional false statements. With regards to moral evaluations, younger children
judged lies that were less forthcoming and those that were less likely to be
punished as less naughty, whereas older children judged lies as naughty
independent of punishment. Thus, early research indicated that young children
used over-inclusive definitions of lies.
However, more recent research suggests that children understand the
concept of lies earlier than first found by Piaget. Siegal and Peterson (1996)
reported that many preschoolers, aged 4 or 5 years, did not hold over-inclusive
definitions of lying. Instead, they found that children were quite successful at
distinguishing false statements from mistakes. By taking care to clarify questions
for children, requiring that they decide between a lie and a mistake instead of a lie
and non-lie, many children were found to respond correctly. Furthermore, Siegal
and Peterson (1998) reported that not only were children aged 3 to 5 years able to
differentiate between a lie and a mistake, but they were also able to distinguish
between negligent and innocent mistakes. In another study, Bussey (1992) had
children from kindergarten, 2nd, and 5th grades listen to vignettes in which a child
protagonist lied about a misdeed. She reported that fewer children in kindergarten
(73%) correctly labelled the statements as a lie, than children in the 2nd (98%) or
5th (99%) grades. Nevertheless, 70% of the children in kindergarten were able to
correctly identify and distinguish lies and truthful statements. Even though young
children appreciated the naughtiness of lying, they had more difficulty
appreciating the value of truthfulness. In addition, the kindergarten children were
found to rely on punishment as the basis for their moral judgments, suggesting
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that even preschoolers had rudimentary evaluative reactions to violations of moral
standards. Therefore, in contrast to work by Piaget, which found that children had
over-inclusive definitions of lies, more recently it has been shown that even young
preschool children are capable of distinguishing between different types of false
statements. Thus, young children may have a more developed understanding of
deceptive intentions than once thought. Moreover, young children evaluate
different types of lies (e.g., antisocial and prosocial lies) in different ways. Lies
told to conceal misdeeds or to harm others are regarded less positively than lies
told to be polite or to benefit others. Despite children‟s conceptual understanding
and evaluative ratings of truths and lies, relatively little is known about children‟s
actual truth- and lie-telling behaviours.
Lie-Telling Behaviour
Research examining children‟s actual lying behaviour is fairly recent.
This is due in part to ethical and methodological concerns that researchers have
faced when attempting to investigate children‟s actual lie-telling behaviours. To
curtail the early ethical concerns of having children lie, research on children‟s lietelling behaviour began by having children engage in situations where they were
told to “pretend” to like something (e.g., Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979).
Recently, children‟s lying has been examined in more naturalistic settings in
which children could spontaneously choose to tell the truth or a lie without
harmful consequences (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002b, 2008; Talwar, Murphy & Lee,
2007).
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As mentioned, children‟s lie-telling behaviours were first examined by
having children behave in a deceptive way by telling them to pretend to like
something. Feldman and colleagues designed a paradigm whereby participants
were instructed to test different drinks and then act in a deceptive manner to
convince another about the taste of a beverage (Feldman et al., 1979; Feldman,
Tomasian, & Coats, 1999; Feldman & White, 1980). Such scenarios resembled
situations where people lie to be polite to another (e.g., lying about the taste of a
meal that your friend just made for you). Age differences were reported in terms
of the participants‟ nonverbal ability to conceal their deceptions. Specifically,
children in the 7th grade and college-age were better able to conceal their facial
expressions than children in the 1st grade (Feldman et al., 1979). Thus, these
findings suggested that with age children may become better at deceiving others.
The reason for the obtained age differences might also be due to the fact that
being asked to pretend to behave in a certain way requires skills (e.g., emotion
regulation, inhibitory control, verbal ability) beyond those necessary for simple
and natural deception. This in turn may make it difficult for children under the
age of 6 years to successfully mask their emotional expressions when required. A
consistent pattern of age differences was also found by Feldman and colleagues
(1999) in their sample of adolescents. Older adolescents (aged 14 to 16 years)
were better able to deceive than younger adolescents (aged 11 to 13 years). This
was determined by having undergraduate observers attempting to detect their lies.
Raters detected the older adolescents‟ lies less often than the younger adolescents
when watching videos of their nonverbal behaviours during drink descriptions.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
24
Overall, younger children were found to be not as good liars compared to older
children and adolescents, as they often gave away their deception by being unable
to successfully conceal their nonverbal behaviours and avoid detection.
Antisocial lie-telling. More recent research has looked at lying in
naturalistic settings, however, the emphasis in such research has largely been on
children‟s antisocial lie-telling behaviours (i.e., lying to conceal a transgression or
misdeed; e.g., Chandler, Fritz & Hala, 1989; Lewis, Stanger & Sullivan, 1989;
Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b). For instance in one study, children
aged 3 years were instructed not to peek at a toy when an experimenter left the
room (Lewis et al., 1989). Lewis and colleagues (1989) found that most 3-yearolds who peeked either denied having done so or would not answer. Of the 33
children tested, 29 peeked, 11 falsely denied peeking, 7 children gave no
response, and 11 admitted to having peeked. However, Lewis and colleagues
(1989) could not conclude with certainty that children‟s denials were deliberate
attempts to mislead. Since no control group was included it was possible that
children did not realize they peeked, thus, that was the reason they denied having
done so.
Polak and Harris (1999) replicated the procedure used by Lewis et al.
(1989) with 3- and 5-year-olds, and included a control group of children who
were permitted to touch the toy. Polak and Harris (1999) found that compared
with children in the permission condition (allowed to touch the toy), children who
were prohibited (told not to touch the toy), hesitated to touch the toy and actually
touched the toy less often, as they viewed doing so as a transgression. Talwar and
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
25
Lee (2002b) found comparable results as reported by Polak and Harris (1999). In
particular, the majority of children aged 3 to 7 years peeked in a toy guessing
game even when they were told not to, and the majority of children who peeked
initially, later lied about their transgression. However, while older children were
able to maintain their lies when asked follow-up questions about their behaviour,
younger children were poor at maintaining their lie and were more likely to reveal
verbal cues to their deceit. Subsequent studies have found similar developmental
patterns (Talwar, Gordon & Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008). In general, research
on children‟s antisocial lie-telling behaviours has consistently reported that false
denials of minor misdemeanours are widespread among children and that young
children are not very good at maintaining their lies when asked follow-up
questions regarding their actions.
Prosocial lie-telling. While most research on children‟s lie-telling
behaviour is devoted to whether children will lie to conceal a transgression, few
studies have looked at the ability of children to produce prosocial lies (i.e., told to
benefit others, or to foster amicable relations). Yet research on children‟s moral
and conceptual knowledge of lies has found that children evaluate lies differently
based on whether they are told for antisocial or prosocial reasons (e.g., Bussey,
1999). Thus, children‟s actual prosocial lie-telling behaviour may differ from
their antisocial lie-telling behaviour.
Related research regarding children‟s prosocial lie-telling abilities is the
use of display rules in politeness situations (e.g., Cole 1986; Saarni 1984).
Politeness situations (e.g., telling someone who has given you an ugly gift that
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
26
you like the present) are times when one may tell a prosocial lie in order to adhere
to rules of interpersonal communications and not harm others in their verbal
communications (Sweester, 1987). Saarni (1984) placed 1st, 3rd, and 5th grade
children in a situation where their expectations for a desirable toy were not met.
After receiving a desirable gift and promised another one, the children were given
an undesirable gift. Saarni‟s examination of nonverbal behaviours that regulated
the children‟s emotional expressions in this disappointing situation revealed that
older children had an increased ability to mask their internal states and that girls
showed this ability earlier than boys. Overall though, she found that children in
the 1st grade still demonstrated some ability to regulate their disappointment by
concealing their negative facial expressions after receiving the disappointing gift,
yet they were not as good as the older children. Furthermore, Cole (1986) found
evidence of masked disappointment in preschool aged children when they were
presented with an undesirable toy. However, these behaviours were only present
when the gift-giver was in the room. When the children were alone, the same
regulated reactions were not noted and children openly displayed negative affect.
That is, positive expressions were associated with the gift-giver‟s presence but
when alone, there was less smiling in general. Unfortunately these early studies
of the use of display rules were limited in determining whether the children were
in fact disappointed with the prize or whether they told an actual prosocial lie to
conceal their disappointment, since analyses were only conducted on children‟s
nonverbal, and not their verbal behaviours.
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27
To date, there have only been three studies which have examined
children‟s prosocial lie-telling. The first study was conducted by Talwar and Lee
(2002a), who used a modified version of the classic Rouge Task, called the
Reverse Rouge Task (Gallup, 1970; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Children aged
3 to 7 years participated in the Reverse Rouge Task with an experimenter. Prior
to meeting the children, the experimenter placed a visible mark of lipstick on her
own nose. She asked the children if she looked okay before she had her picture
taken and then left the room. A confederate then asked the children if the
experimenter looked okay before she had her picture taken. This created a
situation whereby the children had to decide whether to tell a prosocial lie when
explicitly asked about the appearance of the experimenter. Fifty-five of the 65
children replied that the experimenter looked okay for the picture, and thus told a
prosocial lie. Similarly, Talwar, Murphy and Lee (2007) found that the majority
of children between 3 and 11 years (77%) told a gift-giver they liked a
disappointing gift that they had confessed to their parents as not liking, also
demonstrating children‟s ability to tell a prosocial lie. Furthermore, they found
that children‟s prosocial lie-telling increased with age, as more children aged 9 to
11 years chose to tell a lie as compared to children aged 3 to 5 years. Finally, Xu
and colleagues also found that as age increased in childhood, more children were
likely to tell prosocial lies (Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar & Lee, 2010). Therefore, these
studies report some support for the claim that young children are not candid truthtellers in all situations, and rather were able to verbally deceive in a prosocial
manner when in a politeness situation.
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28
Research linking lie-telling understanding and behaviour.
Understanding the relationship between one‟s conceptual understanding of lying
and one‟s lying behaviour is important because most techniques aimed at
encouraging truth-telling are premised on the assumption that behaviour can be
influenced by what one knows to be true or false (see Talwar, Lee, Bala, &
Lindsay, 2002). However, research with adults shows that this relationship may
not necessarily be straightforward, as Batson and colleagues found that simply
knowing something is right or wrong does not necessarily mean that one will
behave in such a way, a term they coined “moral hypocrisy” (Batson,
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson & Thompson, 2001;
Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney & Stongman, 1999). To date, few
studies have directly examined the assumption that children‟s understanding of
lies is related to their lie-telling behaviour (Talwar et al., 2002; Talwar, Lee, Bala,
& Lindsay, 2004; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Xu et al., 2010). Talwar and colleagues
(2002) found children‟s understanding of lies and their actual lie-telling behaviour
to be unrelated. Whereas most children gave negative ratings to others‟ lies, most
also lied about their own transgressions. In contrast, Talwar et al. (2004) found a
modest correlation between children‟s understanding of lies and the lies they told.
Children who said that they should tell the truth in a vignette scenario were more
likely to tell the truth when asked about someone else‟s transgression, and this
relationship increased with the age of the child. Similarly, Talwar and Lee (2008)
reported a significant relation between children‟s moral evaluations of
hypothetical scenarios and their lying behaviour. Xu and colleagues (2010) found
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29
prosocial liars were more likely to rate prosocial lies positively and this
relationship was significant. Nevertheless, the failure to obtain a strong and
consistent relation among lie behaviours and understanding has important
implications for our understanding of children‟s lying behaviours and on
promoting methods of honesty. However, since these results are based on few
studies, more research is necessary to better understand the relationship between
lie-telling understanding and behaviour in different lie contexts.
Detection of deception. No discussion of lie-telling would be complete
without consideration of one‟s actual ability to successfully deceive others (i.e., to
avoid detection). If a lie is not believed because the lie-teller reveals “cues” to
their deceit, then their lie has not been successful and can have negative
repercussions for the lie-teller. In order to successfully deceive another, the lieteller must be able to regulate and maintain the different aspects of their
behaviours that might otherwise reveal their lie. For example, if a child takes the
last cookie from the cookie jar, and when questioned by a parent about the
situation, denies any knowledge of it yet has crumbs all over his shirt, the lie will
be easily detected. As social communicators we depend on verbal and nonverbal
behavioural cues to determine when someone is telling the truth or a lie (Ekman,
Friesen, & O‟Sullivan, 1988; Ekman & O‟Sullivan, 1991). There are also
affective and cognitive processes that need to be regulated in order to maintain the
plausibility of a lie. For example, when a child receives an ugly knitted striped
sweater from his grandmother for his birthday when he was hoping to get a new
bicycle, the child needs to regulate his disappointment if he is to preserve the
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
30
relationship between himself and his grandmother. The child could do this by
inhibiting the expression of his actual thoughts ( such as, “why did you give me
this ugly sweater when I was really hoping for a shiny new bicycle?”) and
concealing his true affect by smiling (rather than frowning or crying), and saying
“thank you” (instead of, “this is the worst gift ever!”). One needs to be successful
in concealing verbal and nonverbal behaviours when a lie is told because being
caught in a lie might cause harm to oneself as well as be harmful to the lierecipients‟ feelings and to the interpersonal relationship.
In order to investigate children‟s abilities to successfully lie and avoid
detection, studies on adult raters‟ evaluations of children‟s truths and lies have
been examined. Feldman and colleagues had naïve observers evaluate the video
clips of children in the 1st and 7th grades, as well as college students who were told
to either tell a lie or a truth (Feldman et al., 1979; Feldman et al., 1999).
Observers were better able to distinguish between the lies and truths of the
younger rather than older children as based on their nonverbal behaviours.
Specifically, college-aged students appeared significantly more pleased when they
lied than when they told the truth, and it seemed as though they were actively
exaggerating their nonverbal facial expressions in order to compensate for their lie
and convey the appropriate meaning. Therefore, this research suggested that
children‟s abilities to successfully deceive increases with age.
In an attempt to distinguish between the behaviours of truth- and lie-tellers
in spontaneous situations, researchers have also examined verbal and nonverbal
behaviours using in-depth behavioural analyses (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
31
& Lee 2002b). On the basis of their nonverbal behaviours, adult raters in Lewis et
al.‟s study were unable to differentiate between the group of children who lied
and the group who had no response during follow-up questioning of their
behaviours, after participating in a temptation resistance paradigm. In contrast,
coders trained to analyze children‟s facial and bodily behaviours using Izard and
Dougherty‟s MAX system coding of facial expressions (1982), found group
differences between the truth-tellers and the liars. Truth-tellers showed fewer
behavioural cues when they responded verbally to “Did you peek?”, whereas lietellers changed their positive behaviours when responding, showing an increase in
smiling and relaxed facial expressions. Furthermore, Talwar and Lee (2002b)
examined children‟s regulation of their verbal statements in order to determine
whether children were able to successfully verbally maintain their lie (i.e.,
demonstrate “semantic leakage control”). They reported that children were
generally poor at semantic leakage control, and naïve raters were able to identify
the majority of the lie-tellers on the basis of verbal statements made in the context
of a lie. Finally, Talwar and Lee (2002a) had naïve university students and
trained coders watch video clips of children‟s behaviours while in a prosocial lietelling situation. Most university student participants failed to differentiate
prosocial truth- and lie-tellers in terms of their nonverbal expressive behaviours.
In addition, the trained coders also found few differences between the two groups.
Together these findings suggest that children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviour
may be difficult to distinguish by adults based on subtle nonverbal differences. In
contrast, when children‟s verbal statements were considered, detection accuracy
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32
improved (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002b), as young children were not successful at
maintaining their initial lie statements during follow-up questioning, thus
allowing for their lies to be detected more easily and more often.
Summary. It appears that by the preschool years, children are already
capable of producing lies with the intention to deceive others. Children under the
age of 5 years have been shown to differentiate truthful statements from lies and
evaluate them differently. Research also indicates that children are able to tell
both antisocial and prosocial lies. Meanwhile, there is limited and mixed findings
with regards to the possible relationship between children‟s moral evaluations of
truth- and lie-telling scenarios and their actual lie-telling behaviours, which is
important when considering the premise on which most programs of promoting
honesty are based. It has also been shown that lies can be detected easily when
verbal statements of children during follow-up questioning are examined and to a
lesser extent when analyzing their nonverbal behaviours while making such a
statement. Finally, numerous studies have demonstrated that younger children are
more likely to be detected in telling lies than older children.
Socialization of Lying
Though lying is a social behaviour, most studies that examine the
development of truth- and lie-telling behaviours focus on the cognitive abilities of
children (e.g., Chandler et al., 1989; Newton, Reddy & Bull, 2000; Polak &
Harris, 1999; Talwar, Gordon, et al., 2007), and overlook the role that social
factors might play. Through the process of socialization, children are taught the
benefits and consequences of lying in different situations (Saarni & Von Salisch,
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33
1993). However, exactly which aspects of children‟s social worlds contribute to
lying behaviour is not as clear since no study has examined this question despite
researchers highlighting the need for such investigation (e.g., Talwar &
Crossman, in press).
Bandura‟s social cognitive theory of learning (1986) discusses the idea
that much of human learning occurs in a social environment by observing others.
Knowledge, rules, skills, strategies, beliefs and attitudes are acquired and
behaviours are reinforced based on these observed outcomes. It follows then that
with regards to lying, children may learn what is and is not considered acceptable
based on the different reactions that result when they see their parents lie or tell
the truth. In addition, differences in parents‟ own behaviours may relate to
whether or not a child will tell a lie or the truth in a given situation. For example,
Baumrinds‟s (1971) typology of authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive
parenting has yielded a consistent picture of the types of parenting styles thought
to enhance or mitigate the successful socialization of children. Authoritative
parenting has been shown to assist children in developing instrumental
competence by explaining the consequences of children‟s behaviours,
encouraging children to talk about their feelings, and telling children expectations
regarding their behaviours, important aspects that may determine whether or not a
child will lie or tell the truth (Robinson, Mandleco, Olsen, & Hart, 1995). In
addition, Newton et al. (2000) found that the mother in their case study did not
generally punish transgressions, but rather corrected or disputed the lie. Children
may also learn the consequences of lying growing up in social environments
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34
where there is a high probability that they will be punished if their lies are
revealed. These children may be motivated to lie in order to avoid negative
consequences and thus might learn to lie if it is believed that punishment is
imminent.
Within the family children learn about emotions, emotional
expressiveness, and rules regarding how to appropriately express their feelings
(Halberstadt, Cassidy, Stifter, Parke, & Fox, 1995; Saarni, 1979). Family
expressiveness is the predominant style of exhibiting verbal and nonverbal
expressions within a family and is found to be related to children‟s understanding
of emotions, display rules, and social values (e.g., Denham & Grout, 1992).
Saarni and Von Salisch (1993) reported that the growth in complexity of
emotional expression within the family is inseparable from the sorts of
relationships children have. For example, children who grow up in homes of
abuse or with an alcoholic parent seem to operate with a somewhat different set of
rules about how and with whom to express their feelings in comparison with
children who grow up in homes without these difficulties. Such rules are revealed
most clearly as expectations that people hold about whether to express how one
feels genuinely, or deceptively. The consequences of appropriate regulation of
emotional expressivity relates to the likelihood of children‟s lie-telling behaviours
by communicating expectations about the reactions they are likely to encounter
when they choose whether to tell a truth or a lie. Since differences in children‟s
social environments influence whether or not children will display or mask their
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35
true feelings, an examination of parenting styles and family emotional
expressiveness in relation to children‟s actual lie-telling is warranted.
Therefore, while lying is a social behaviour, social variables in relation to
the development of lying are overall missing in the literature. This is surprising
given that social factors are suggested in numerous studies as having a unique role
in children‟s lie-telling abilities (e.g., Lee & Ross, 1997; Talwar, Murphy et al.,
2007). Furthermore, in accordance with Bandura‟s theory of social cognitive
learning, children learn through their social experiences with others. Thus, the
learning that occurs in the family throughout the first few years of development is
central for the development of different types of behaviours. Nevertheless, social
variables in children‟s environments have not been explicitly examined with
regards to the development of children‟s lie- and truth-telling. In light of this gap
in the literature, the overall goal of the current research program was to directly
examine the relationship of social factors on the development of lying behaviours
in childhood.
Goals of the Research Program
The present research program has at its core two primary goals. The first
goal is to contribute to the developmental lie-telling literature by examining
predictors of prosocial lie-telling in politeness situations. The second goal is to
examine the possible relationship between social factors and children‟s lie-telling
behaviours. These goals contribute to our knowledge about lie-telling behaviours
and have direct implications for practice (e.g., the design of intervention and
prevention programs, and child witness testimonials). Across two manuscripts
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36
described in this dissertation, several research questions will be addressed in order
to achieve these goals.
In the first article (Popliger, Talwar & Crossman, in press), predictors of
children‟s prosocial lie-telling in a politeness situation were examined in two
experimental studies. In these studies, children participated in a disappointing gift
paradigm, and answered questions concerning their understanding and evaluations
of prosocial scenarios. In addition, parents completed questionnaires regarding
their family environment. The first research question examined whether the
likelihood of children telling a prosocial lie would change when the motivational
context for doing so was manipulated. That is, when there was a low-cost to
oneself for telling a lie, it was expected that more children would be motivated to
tell a lie and spare the feelings of the gift-giver. In contrast, when there was a
high-cost to ones‟ self for telling a lie (i.e., that they would lose a desirable gift),
fewer children were expected to lie. It is important to specify at the outset that the
degree of cost involved was determined from the perspective of the lie-teller and
not the lie-recipient. Certainly, the contexts produced by such manipulations
differ and could elicit corresponding differences in behavioural motivations, and
might be best examined in a separate investigation. The second research question
examined the role that parenting styles and family emotional expressiveness had
on children‟s likelihood to tell a prosocial lie. It was expected that prosocial liars,
compared to truth-tellers, would have parents who scored higher on the
authoritative dimension and had overall high levels of emotional expressiveness
displayed in their families. Finally, children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour,
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37
children‟s moral evaluations of lies, and children‟s evaluations of protagonists‟
and recipients feelings when told the truth or a lie were examined. It was
expected that prosocial liars would evaluate prosocial lie scenarios more
positively, would provide positive ratings of the protagonists‟ feelings when
telling a lie, and would believe that the lie-recipient would be pleased about being
told the lie. By addressing these research questions, Popliger and colleagues
provides a unique contribution to the literature in terms of both the development
of children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour and the influence of social factors on
children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviour.
In the second article (Popliger, Faregh, Crossman, & Talwar, 2011), the
expressive behaviours of parents and children were examined as they told the
truth and a lie. Parents and children were told to behave in a deceitful manner and
convince another about the taste of a drink. This situation is similar to prosocial
situations in everyday life where a child may be instructed to “pretend” to like
something to be polite. Therefore, in order to assess whether children behave in a
similar manner as their parents in such situations, their truth- and lie-telling
behaviours while participating in the same task were examined. Based on social
cognitive theory, it was expected that parents and children would be similar in
their expressive behaviours when telling a lie. More specifically, it was predicted
that parents and children‟s truths and lies would be detected at a similar rate by
naïve adult raters. In addition, in-depth video analyses of nonverbal behaviours
were conducted to investigate similarities and differences in parents‟ and
children‟s use of positive and negative behaviours when telling a truth or a lie.
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38
Again, it was predicted that children and parents would be similar in the positive
and negative expressive behaviours they displayed when lying and telling the
truth. The design of this study allowed for the expressive behaviours of parents
and children telling truths and lies to be analyzed for similarities or differences
when participating in the same task. The combined results from this program of
research offer new evidence and direction for the role of social variables in the
development of children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviours.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
CHAPTER 3
Manuscript 1
Predictors of Children‟s Prosocial Lie-Telling:
Motivation, Socialization Variables, and Moral Understanding
Mina Popligera, Victoria Talwara, and Angela Crossmanb
a
Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology, McGill University,
Montreal, Quebec
b
John Jay College, City University of New York, New York, NY
39
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
40
Abstract
Children tell prosocial lies for self- and other-oriented reasons. However, it is
unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect their lying. Further, it is
unclear whether children‟s moral understanding and evaluations of prosocial lie
scenarios (including perceptions of vignette characters‟ feelings) predict their
actual prosocial behaviours. These were explored in two studies. Study 1: 72
children (36 second graders and 36 fourth graders) participated in a disappointing
gift paradigm in either a high-cost condition (lost a good gift for a disappointing
one) or a low-cost condition (received a disappointing gift). More children lied in
the low-cost (94%) than high-cost condition (72%), with no age difference. Study
2: 117 children (42 preschoolers, 41 early elementary, and 34 late elementary
children) participated in either a high- or low-cost disappointing gift paradigm and
responded to prosocial vignette scenarios. Parents reported on their parenting
practices and family emotional expressivity. Again, more children lied in the
low-cost (68%) than high-cost condition (40%), however, there was an age effect
among children in the high-cost condition. Preschoolers were less likely than
older children to lie when there was a high personal cost. Also, compared to
truth-tellers, prosocial liars had parents who were more authoritative but
expressed less positive emotion within the family. Finally, there was an
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
41
interaction between children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour and their evaluations
of the protagonists‟ and recipients‟ feelings. Findings contribute to understanding
the trajectory of children‟s prosocial lie-telling, their reasons for telling such lies,
and their knowledge about interpersonal communication.
Predictors of Children’s Prosocial Lie-Telling:
Motivation, Socialization Variables, and Moral Understanding
From an early age, children are socialized to be truthful in most social
contexts. However, they are also taught, explicitly or implicitly, not to tell the
blunt truth in some social situations where the truth may be trivial or hurtful to the
recipient (Sweetser, 1987). Learning to tell lies for the benefit of others (i.e.,
prosocial lies) is arguably important if children are to be perceived as polite and
considerate. Prosocial lies are motivated by the desire to make others feel good,
or to spare the feelings of the recipient and foster amicable social relationships
(DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Unlike antisocial lies (e.g.,
told to escape punishment, for material gain), which are told solely for personal
benefit, prosocial lies have some benefit for the lie–recipient (e.g., to be polite or
to make another feel better) and are not intended to cause harm to another
individual. These lies are rated less negatively and considered more socially
acceptable (e.g., Bussey, 1999; Walper & Valtin, 1992). For adults, prosocial lies
are common, told daily (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and are a significant part of
maintaining social relationships (DePaulo & Jordan, 1982; Kashy & DePaulo,
1996). Less is known about children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour.
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42
To date, the majority of research on the development of children‟s lying
has focused on whether children lie to conceal transgressions (e.g., Lewis,
Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999, Talwar & Lee 2002a), on when
children begin to lie intentionally to trick others (Peskin, 1992), and on how
successful children are in telling lies of trickery (Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola,
1979). Findings suggest that these lies emerge in the preschool years and that
children‟s ability to maintain their lies improves with age. However, it remains
unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect children‟s prosocial lietelling and whether children‟s moral understanding and evaluation of prosocial
lies predict their prosocial behaviours. These issues are explored in the current
studies.
The development of prosocial lying has important implications for
understanding social development. It provides a window to view the process by
which children learn social skills necessary to communicate with others and form
social relationships. Prosocial lies are considered a type of behaviour that both
violates and upholds the basic rules of interpersonal communication. On one
hand, Grice (1980) suggested that one of the most fundamental conventions
governing interpersonal communication is the Maxim of Quality. This maxim
requires speakers to be truthful to their communicative partners. Prosocial lies
violate this maxim. On the other hand, Lakoff (1973) and Sweetser (1987)
suggested that there exist equally, if not more, fundamental communication rules
that require speakers to be amicable and to help, not harm, their communicative
partners. Prosocial lies adhere more to this set of rules. Brown and Levinson
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43
(1987) stress that there is always a tension between satisfying fundamental
conventions of communication (e.g., Maxim of Quality) and maintaining “face”
towards others. Although in most situations these two considerations promote
consistent behaviours to achieve a common communicative goal, in politeness
situations, they often collide. Such circumstances might require a strategic tradeoff between the two goals. Thus, children‟s developing ability to tell prosocial
lies provides a unique opportunity to examine their developing knowledge about
rules governing interpersonal communication. By examining children‟s prosocial
lying, we can explore whether children are capable of reconciling seemingly
contradictory rules of communication and using them adaptively across social
situations.
Children’s Moral Evaluations of Prosocial Lies
Several studies have addressed children‟s perceptions of prosocial lies,
focusing on the development of children‟s conceptual understanding and moral
evaluations of prosocial lying. Bussey (1999) reported that children aged 4 to 11
years labelled all untrue statements as lies, regardless of whether they were
antisocial or prosocial in origin. On the other hand, Lee and Ross (1997) found
that adolescents (12 to 17 years) and college students were less likely to identify
false statements told to protect another (i.e., prosocial lies) as lies than statements
that were intended to harm another (i.e., antisocial lies). Thus, in contrast to
children, many adolescents and adults do not identify untruthful statements told to
help another or to be polite as lies (Sweetser, 1987).
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
44
When asked to evaluate prosocial versus antisocial lies, young children
respond somewhat differently. In Bussey‟s (1999) study of 4- to 11-year-olds,
young children rated all lies negatively, however, they rated prosocial lies as less
negative compared to antisocial or pretense lies. Walper and Valtin (1992) found
that toward the end of elementary school, children provided negative ratings for
antisocial lies, but positive ratings for prosocial lies. Similarly, KeltikangasJaervinen and Lindeman (1997) reported that children 11 to 17 years regarded
lying to hurt a friend or for personal gain as very bad, whereas lies told under
duress or for a positive motive (e.g., to save or help a friend) were evaluated more
moderately. In fact, children (ages 4 to 9 years) in one study stated that a story
character should lie about liking a disappointing gift and when asked about the
feelings of the gift-giver, children thought the gift-giver would be happy to hear
the gift was liked and unhappy if told the gift was not liked (Broomfield,
Robinson & Robinson, 2002). Finally, Crossman et al. (2010) found that even the
youngest children in their study (ages 3 to 6 years) perceived prosocial lies as
more acceptable than self-serving lies.
Taken together, these studies suggest that from an early age, children
appreciate the differences among different types of lies and evaluate prosocial lies
less harshly than other types of lies. Furthermore, children‟s understanding and
moral evaluations of prosocial lying change with age, perhaps as they develop the
ability to consider the contradictory rules evoked by the politeness situation (i.e.,
the need to be truthful versus the need to be polite and avoid harm).
Children’s Prosocial Lie-telling Behaviour
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
45
To date, there are only a handful of studies that have examined children‟s
prosocial lie-telling behaviours (Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee,
2007; Xu, Boa, Fu, Talwar & Lee, 2010). Talwar and Lee (2002a) directly
examined the verbal and nonverbal behaviours of children‟s prosocial lie-telling
using a modified version of the classic Rouge Task (Gallup, 1970; Lewis &
Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Children aged 3 to 7 years participated in this Reverse
Rouge Task with an experimenter. Prior to meeting the children, the
experimenter placed a mark of lipstick on her own nose. She asked the children if
she looked okay before she had her picture taken and then left the room. Thus, the
children had to decide whether to tell a prosocial lie when explicitly asked about
the appearance of the experimenter. A confederate then entered and asked the
children if the other experimenter had looked okay before she had her picture
taken (to confirm children‟s true beliefs). Fifty-five of the 65 children said the
experimenter looked okay for the picture, and thus told a prosocial lie. Later,
adult detectors who viewed video clips of children‟s responses were unable to
distinguish between the children who told prosocial lies and those who did not.
Thus, children as young as 3 years of age were able to tell prosocial lies
successfully and avoid detection by adults. Interestingly, only 11% of children
explained that they had lied because they wanted to avoid causing embarrassment.
Therefore, children may have lied for a mixture of both self-oriented (e.g., to
avoid the potential negative consequences of telling the truth) and other-oriented
(e.g., to be polite, to avoid embarrassing the lie-recipient) motivations.
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46
In another study, Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007) used an undesirable gift
paradigm (adapted from Saarni, 1984) to examine whether children aged 3 to 11
years would tell prosocial lies to a gift-giver after receiving a disappointing gift.
Children were given a gift (i.e., a bar of soap) after playing a game and left alone
in the room to open it. Upon the experimenter‟s return, children were asked
whether they liked the gift. Children could either tell a prosocial lie about liking
the gift, or tell the blunt truth and confess their disappointment about the gift.
Overall, the majority of children (77%) told the gift-giver that they liked the gift,
while confessing to their parents that they did not like the gift. Older children
(aged 9 to 11 years) were more likely (84%) to tell a prosocial lie than the
preschool children (aged 3 to 5 years; 72%).
Finally, Xu et al. (2010) examined Chinese children‟s prosocial lie- or
truth-telling behaviours and their moral knowledge about truths and lies. Xu and
colleagues found that among children 7, 9, and 11 years of age, all were able to
correctly classify untruthful statements (including prosocial lies) as lies and
truthful statements as truths. However, it was only as age increased that children
were also more inclined to tell prosocial lies themselves (50% of 9-year-olds, and
60% of 11-year-olds). Furthermore, when asked why they lied, most younger lietellers were motivated to lie for self-oriented reasons (i.e., to avoid negative
consequences for themselves), whereas the majority of older lie-tellers were
motivated to lie for other-oriented reasons (i.e., avoiding hurting the feelings of
the gift-giver). These results indicate that children‟s ability to tell prosocial lies
increases with age. In addition, children‟s motives for telling prosocial lies also
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
47
appears to change with age, moving from self-serving motives at younger ages to
more prosocial motives later on. Thus, the significant age effect found by Xu et
al. (2010) and Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007) with regard to children‟s lie-telling
may reflect a developmental change in children‟s tendency to tell a prosocially
motivated lie. While these studies provide evidence that children can tell
prosocial lies in politeness situations, there is much that remains unknown
regarding prosocial lie-telling and its development. Specifically, because children
tell prosocial lies for both self- and other-oriented motivations, it is important to
manipulate the consequences of prosocial lie-telling to understand how
motivational factors may affect children‟s prosocial lie-telling.
Motivation. The studies described above (Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar,
Murphy et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2010) suggest that children‟s prosocial lie-telling
may reflect both self-oriented and other-oriented motivations. However, these
studies did not explicitly examine the role of motivational context on children‟s
lie-telling behaviour, as the consequences of lying were not manipulated, and
there was little at stake should children choose to tell a prosocial lie. Children
may decide to lie based upon an assessment of the consequences to themselves
versus the benefit to others. For instance, Talwar, Lee, Bala and Lindsay (2004)
found that children were less likely to conceal a parent‟s transgression if there
were potential negative consequences to themselves (high-cost), but if the
children could not be blamed for the transgression (low-cost), they were more
willing to lie for their parent. Thus, when telling a lie to benefit someone else,
children may be less likely to lie if they perceive a high cost to themselves.
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48
Because children‟s prosocial lie-telling has been largely examined in low-cost
situations where the consequences of lying are negligible (i.e., nothing lost),
research is needed to explore the role of motivation on children‟s prosocial lying
when the motivational context for telling a prosocial lie is manipulated. Therefore
a primary objective of the current studies was to examine the impact of
motivational context on children‟s prosocial lie-telling. Here, children were
placed in either a low-cost condition, where there were negligible consequences
of lying, or a high-cost condition, where there were negative consequences to
their own self-interests (i.e., they lost a desirable gift) if they told a lie. Prosocial
lies in the high-cost condition were lies told for truly prosocial motivations (i.e.,
prosocial other-oriented lies), whereby telling such lies would be for the benefit of
others, as there was no gain to the self for lying. In contrast, lies told in the lowcost condition were prosocial self-oriented lies, whereby telling a lie in this
situation was also self-serving. Even though the prosocial outcome remained the
same, the motivation to do so was not necessarily entirely selfless (i.e., children
could still keep their gift).
The Current Studies
The primary objective of this research was to examine how differences in
motivational context might relate to children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour. To
examine children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour, children were placed in a reallife politeness situation where they had to decide whether to tell the truth or lie. A
modified disappointing gift paradigm (Cole, 1986; Saarni, 1984; Talwar, Murphy
et al., 2007) was used to create this situation. Children were given an undesirable
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49
gift and then asked by the gift-giver whether they liked it. The undesirable gift
situation was chosen because it is not uncommon in children‟s lives (e.g.,
receiving clothes as a birthday gift), and young children are socialized to
dissemble their true feeling of dislike in such situations. From 4 years of age,
children are already able to dissemble their nonverbal (Cole, 1986; Saarni, 1984)
and verbal behaviours (Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007) to appear pleased about
receiving an undesirable gift. However, the current studies examined the
influence of motivational contexts on children‟s prosocial lie-telling as well.
Study 1
Children from the second and fourth grades were randomly assigned to
either a high- or low-cost condition. These two age groups were selected for
theoretical reasons. Specifically, it is during this age range that there is an overall
increase in children‟s prosocial lie-telling (i.e., Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay,
2002). Furthermore, at some point during the early and middle elementary school
age years, children acquire a greater social understanding of their relations with
peers and others, self-presentation becomes more important for children, and there
are greater social opportunities during which prosocial lie-telling may be more
likely to maintain amicable relations. It follows then, that fourth graders would be
more likely than second graders to tell prosocial lies. In the high-cost condition,
if children lied to spare the feelings of a disappointing gift-giver, the perceived
consequence was high because children lost a gift they liked. In contrast, if
children told the blunt truth, they would not have to keep the undesirable gift. In
the low-cost condition, children were able to keep the desirable gift in addition to
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50
receiving another (undesirable) gift. The perceived cost to children was low if
they lied because they had little to lose by telling the gift-giver they liked the gift.
It was expected that more children would lie in the low-cost condition, and that
older children would conceal their lies better in follow-up questioning.
Method
Participants
Participants were 36 second graders (17 females; M = 7.44 years, SD =
0.65), and 36 fourth graders (17 females; M = 9.31 years, SD = 0.47). Children,
who were primarily from middle-class and Caucasian families, were recruited
from schools in an urban North American city. All participants were seen at their
schools if parents consented to their participation. Half the children in each grade
were randomly assigned to either the high- or low-cost condition.
Materials
Two games were played. The first was a guessing game where children
had to name the identity of different objects based upon verbal clues. The second
was a memory game where children had to remember the location of matching
cards. Children received prizes for winning these games from a gift basket full of
toys. The desirable gift given to children was a colorful slinky. The undesirable
gift was a pair of knitted socks (desirable and undesirable gifts were chosen based
on pilot data). A small video camera was concealed in a bag on the opposite side
of the room to capture children‟s responses.
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51
Procedure
Children participated individually with a female researcher (E1). A
hidden camera was set up in a designated room within each participating school to
record children‟s behaviours. Children played different games and were told they
could win a prize from the gift basket. Children first played a guessing game with
E1 to provide an opportunity for children to win a gift. At the end of the game,
E1 picked a toy, wrapped in a brown bag, from the gift basket and gave it to the
children. All children received the desirable gift. Children were left alone for a
minute to examine the toy and then were asked by E1 upon her return whether
they liked their gift and what they planned to do with it. All children responded
that they liked the gift.
Next, children played a game with a second female researcher (E2) while
E1 left to get something from the classroom. E2 played a memory game with the
children. After the children had won the memory game, E2 informed them that
they had earned another gift. E2 told the children that she had made some of the
gifts herself and wanted to give them one of the gifts that she had made because
she was really proud of them. E2 explained to the children, “I want to give you a
special gift. I made it myself! I hope you like it!” Children were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions that manipulated the perceived consequences of
telling a lie (i.e., high-cost to self vs. low-cost to self). In the high-cost condition,
children were told by E2 that they could only keep one gift. If they wanted the
second gift, they had to trade their first gift to keep the second gift. In the lowcost condition, children were told by E2 that they could keep both gifts (i.e., they
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
52
did not need to trade in their gift to keep the second one). In both conditions, E2
then gave children the disappointing gift wrapped in a brown bag. Children were
left alone to open the gift. E2 returned to the room and asked the children how
they liked the gift. To examine children‟s abilities to maintain their lie and give
plausible explanations, E2 then asked children what they liked about the gift and
what they planned to do with it. Finally, E2 left the room and E1 returned to
escort the children back to their classrooms. Before leaving, E1 noticed the
second gift and asked about it. E1 asked the children if they liked the gift and
whether they would prefer to have another gift instead. All children said they
preferred to have another gift and chose a second gift from the gift basket. All
children were allowed to keep the first gift as well.
Children were classified as prosocial lie-tellers if they told E2 that they
liked the disappointing gift, but later indicated to E1 that they did not like the gift.
If children told both experimenters that they did not like the gift, they were coded
as blunt truth-tellers. In addition, children‟s answers to E2‟s follow-up questions
were coded as being plausible or implausible explanations. An example of a
plausible answer demonstrating a child‟s ability to maintain their lie was “I like
how soft they look and can wear them on a cold day”, whereas an example of an
implausible explanation demonstrating a difficulty in maintaining their lie was “I
don‟t know [what I like about them]” or “I would give them away”.
Results and Discussion
Overall, 83% of children told a prosocial lie about liking the undesirable
gift. A binary logistic regression was conducted to determine which factors might
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53
predict children's prosocial lie-telling. For this and all subsequent logistic
regression analyses, the predictor variables were children‟s age group (second
grade vs. fourth grade), sex, and condition (high-cost vs. low-cost). Significance
was assessed by a Block 2 test (also known as the 2 difference test). In this test,
the retention of the interaction term in a model must increase the variability
accounted for in order to justify using a more complex model (Menard, 2002).
The logistic regression analyses with children‟s prosocial lie-telling
behaviour as the predicted variable revealed that the best fit model included age
group, sex and condition, without any interaction terms, as significant predictors
of children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour, χ2 (3, N = 72) = 8.37, p = 0.039,
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.19, with 83% of cases correctly classified by this model. Only
condition was a unique significant predictor of children‟s prosocial lie-telling
behaviour, ß = -1.89, Wald = 5.25, p = 0.02, odds ratio = 1.51. More children lied
in the low-cost condition (94%) than in the high-cost condition (72%) (see Figure
1). Thus, when telling a lie was costly to oneself, children were more likely to tell
the blunt truth. However, when their personal interests did not conflict with the
desire to be polite, almost all children lied and said they liked the disappointing
gift. It might have been easier for children to tell a lie when there was a selforiented motivation for lying rather than for truly prosocial other-oriented
purposes. There were no significant age differences in children‟s prosocial lying
under these varying conditions (Figure 1).
Next, children‟s abilities to conceal their lies by maintaining the lie in E2‟s
follow-up questioning was examined. The logistic regression analysis with
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54
children‟s explanations (plausible vs. implausible explanation) as the predicted
variable revealed that the best fit model included age group, sex and condition,
without any interaction terms, as significant predictors of children‟s explanations,
χ2 (3, N = 61) = 12.37, p = 0.01, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.26, with 71% of cases
correctly classified by this model. Child age group was a unique significant
predictor of children‟s explanations indicating that as age increased, participants
were more likely to maintain and conceal their lie, (ß = -1.36, Wald = 4.40, p =
0.04, odds ratio = 1.033). Specifically, fourth graders concealed their lies more
effectively to E2 (79%) than second graders (56%) by providing a plausible
explanation during follow-up questioning. This was consistent with previous
studies (e.g., Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007), where older children were better at
maintaining their prosocial lies than younger children. Child sex was also found
to be a significant predictor of their explanations, with females (83%) concealing
more effectively than males (52%), (ß = 1.75, Wald = 7.13, p < .001, odds ratio =
1.033). Condition, however, was not a unique predictor of children‟s
explanations.
Given the findings regarding the influence of motivational context on the
development of children‟s lie-telling, a second study was conducted with a
different sample of children from a broader range of ages (4 to 12 years). Because
previous studies have found developmental differences in children‟s prosocial lietelling behaviour between preschool and older school-age children (e.g., Talwar,
Murphy et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2010), when the motivational context was not
manipulated, replicating the findings of Study 1 using a wider age range might
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55
provide more insight into prosocial lie telling behaviour. Specifically, since it
was found that more fourth graders told prosocial other-oriented lies than second
graders, it might be that preschool children indeed tell prosocial lies but if they
do, they are more likely to be prosocial self-oriented rather than other-oriented
lies. As antisocial lies (i.e., self-gain lies told to conceal a transgression and avoid
punishment) have also been shown to emerge earlier than prosocial lies (e.g.,
Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b), the likelihood that preschoolers would tell more
self-oriented prosocial lies seems reasonable. Also, given that the findings of
Study 1 differentiate between two different types of prosocial lies depending on
the motivational context (i.e., prosocial other- and self-oriented lies), it is
important to extend these findings and to examine social and cognitive correlates
of prosocial lie-telling in different motivational contexts. In particular, the
influence of socialization variables (i.e., parenting practices and emotional
expressivity within the family) on children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour was
examined as potential predictors of lying under different motivational contexts.
Finally, the relationship between children‟s moral understanding and their
prosocial lie-telling behaviours was also explored in relation to children‟s
prosocial lie-telling across motivational contexts.
Study 2
Prosocial lie-telling among children 4 to 12 years of age was examined
using the disappointing gift paradigm. In order to replicate and extend the
findings from Study 1, children‟s prosocial lie-telling was examined in three
groups of children (preschoolers, early elementary school age, and late elementary
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56
school age) in Study 2. Similar to Study 1, half the children in each age group
were randomly divided into either a high- or low-cost condition. It was expected
that preschoolers would be least likely to tell a prosocial lie, especially if they
were in the high-cost condition. It was also expected that children‟s ability to
conceal their lies during follow-up questioning about their gift would increase
with age, regardless of whether they were motivated to tell prosocial lies for selfor other-oriented purposes. In addition, because prosocial lie-telling is a form of
social communication, used to be polite in some situations, it is valuable to
investigate socialization variables in relation to such lies to better understand
children‟s motivations for telling prosocial lies.
Social factors. Most studies on children‟s lie-telling have examined
cognitive factors related to the development of lying (e.g., Chandler, Fritz, &
Hala, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee,
2008). However, lying is an interpersonal exercise developed through social
influences as well. Social domain theory (Turiel, 1983) suggests that children‟s
social knowledge and moral reasoning (e.g., about lying) distinguish moral,
social-conventional and personal acts and their consequences, and that this
knowledge is constructed through children‟s experiences (Smetana, 1999).
Specifically, although antisocial and prosocial lies violate moral rules, telling the
truth in prosocial contexts, such as politeness situations, violate socialconventional rules. Through interactions with their environments, typically
parents, children develop the ability to differentiate and apply these rules over
time (Smetana, 1999). Although it has yet to be examined empirically, there is
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57
some research to suggest that different types of lie-telling might be influenced by
different aspects of parent-child interactions. From a young age, children are
socialized to be honest and not to tell antisocial lies, while their prosocial lietelling behaviour may be overlooked or even encouraged and modeled by parents.
Children may be taught either explicitly or implicitly to tell prosocial lies to be
polite or to protect the feelings of others. Such lies may be seen as preferable to
telling the truth in some social contexts (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Talwar, Gordon
et al., 2007). Therefore, parents play a role in transmitting messages to their
children that some lies are acceptable whereas other lies are not.
There has been no direct examination of the influence of family or social
factors on children‟s lie-telling behaviour. Yet, it has been suggested that in
response to social-conventional transgressions (e.g., blunt truth-telling in
politeness situations), authoritative mothers tend to emphasize social order, but
for moral transgressions (e.g., antisocial lie-telling), they emphasize consequences
to the welfare or rights of victims (Smetana, 1999). As children begin to
experiment with lying, authoritative parents might respond to antisocial lies as
moral violations and focus on harm. On the other hand, children who bluntly tell
the truth in politeness situations may elicit instruction on social mores from
parents, such as “If you can‟t say anything nice, don‟t say anything at all.”
Hence, authoritative parents may have children with better social skills who are
more likely and better able to tell prosocial lies that are other-focused rather than
self-focused in appropriate situations (Talwar & Lee, 2008). However, parents
who are not authoritative do not tend to show consistency in their responses to
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58
social transgressions. Such parents might give mixed messages, blurring
children‟s social knowledge distinctions.
Further, since prosocial lying is related to the emotional and social
understanding of others, parenting practices that facilitate the appropriate
expression of emotions within the family context (e.g., Halberstadt, Cassidy,
Stifter, Parke, & Fox, 1995) may also influence children‟s prosocial lie-telling.
That is, discussing and expressing both positive and negative emotions openly and
freely within the family may make it more salient for children to learn to express
their emotions while in situations that require them to tell prosocial lies. For
example, Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007) found that when parents discussed the
feelings of the gift-giver, children were more likely to tell prosocial lies and they
were more convincing. In addition, family expressiveness has been found to be
related to one‟s social skills, such as children‟s understanding about emotions and
social values (Denham & Grout, 1992). It may be that positive emotional
expressiveness promotes prosocial behaviour by modeling positive display rules
in a disappointing gift situation, whereas negative family expressiveness models
negative reactions in such situations. Conversely, negative family expressiveness
may promote prosocial lying in children as a strategy to avoid negativity in their
social partner.
Thus, the current study examined parenting practices and emotional
expressivity within the family in relation to children‟s prosocial lie-telling in
different motivational contexts. Children‟s parents completed questionnaires
assessing their parenting styles and the emotional expressiveness within the
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59
family. It was expected that for children in the high-cost condition, prosocial
liars, compared to truth-tellers, would have parents who scored higher on their
authoritative parenting style rather then the authoritarian or permissive indices. In
addition they were expected to have overall high levels of emotional expressivity,
especially for positive emotions expressed. For children in the low-cost
condition, prosocial liars, compared to truth-tellers, were expected to have parents
who scored similarly on all indices of parenting styles assessed, and there would
not be a strong relationship with either positive or negative emotions expressed
within the family.
Behaviour and understanding. It is unclear whether children‟s prosocial
lie-telling behaviours are related to their conceptual moral understanding of lies in
politeness situations or evaluations of others‟ feelings. While a number of studies
have examined children‟s moral and conceptual knowledge of lies (e.g., Bussey,
1999; Broomfield et al., 2002; Lee & Ross, 1997), and a few studies have
examined children‟s lie-telling behaviour (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002a, Talwar,
Murphy et al., 2007), little research has examined their relation. Yet, the
relationship between children‟s social and moral conceptions of lying and their
actual behaviours is important because the purpose of socialization is to ensure
that children not only know morally what is right or wrong and conventionally
what is appropriate or inappropriate, but also that they act accordingly.
The few studies that have examined the relation between children‟s moral
understanding and their lie-telling behaviour have found mixed results. In one
study, Talwar et al. (2002) found that children‟s understanding of lies was
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60
unrelated to children‟s lie-telling to conceal their transgressions. However,
Talwar et al. (2004) found a modest correlation between children‟s understanding
of lies and their lie-telling for another. Talwar and Lee (2008) also reported a
significant relation between children‟s lying and their moral evaluations when a
more comprehensive measure of children‟s understanding was used. Specifically,
children who gave higher ratings to the protagonists‟ truthful behaviours in
hypothetical scenarios were more likely to confess their own wrongdoing when
asked. To date, only one study has examined the nature of the relationship
between behaviour and understanding in children‟s prosocial lie-telling. In a
study with Chinese children, Xu et al. (2010) found that prosocial liars were more
likely to rate prosocial lies positively and this tendency increased with age.
However, Xu and colleagues only examined children‟s prosocial lie-telling
behaviour in relation to their moral judgments of vignette scenarios (i.e.,
evaluating the goodness or badness of the lie situation) and did not address
children‟s evaluations of the protagonists‟ or the recipients‟ feelings. Broomfield
et al. (2002) suggested that there were developmental differences in children‟s
consideration of others‟ feelings when evaluating prosocial stories, and Heyman,
Sweet and Lee (2009) reported that older children do indeed evaluate lie-telling
more positively and truth-telling more negatively in politeness situations when
considering the implications to others. However, neither study examined this in
relation to actual lie-telling behaviours.
The relationship between children‟s moral evaluations of lies, their
understanding of protagonists‟ and recipients‟ feelings, and their actual prosocial
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61
lie-telling behaviours in a disappointing gift situation was explored in Study 2.
Children answered questions about their understanding and evaluations of
prosocial lie- and truth-telling scenarios. Specifically, for children in the highcost condition, prosocial liars were expected to evaluate the prosocial lie scenarios
most positively when compared to the truth-tellers. For children in the low-cost
condition, no differences were expected. Since liars in the high-cost condition
were telling prosocial lies for other-oriented reasons with a cost to their own self
interests, it was expected that they would have a more mature understanding of
the conventional and moral behaviour in politeness situations and thus there
would be a greater relationship between their behaviour and evaluations. Finally,
prosocial liars in the high-cost condition were expected to evaluate the
protagonists as doing something good and the recipient as pleased about being
lied to, whereas truth-tellers were expected to evaluate the protagonist as doing
something less good and the recipient as being upset about the lie. No differences
were expected among the prosocial liars and truth-tellers in the low-cost condition
in terms of their evaluations of the protagonists‟ and the recipients‟ feelings.
Method
Participants
Children from 4 to 12 years of age (N = 117; 64 boys and 53 girls)
participated. There were 42 preschoolers (4-6 years, 23 boys and 19 girls,M =
60.10 months, SD = 8.60), 41 early elementary school children (7-9 years, 21
boys and 20 girls, M = 97.22 months, SD = 7.50), and 34 late elementary school
children (10-12 years, 20 boys and 14 girls, M = 132 months, SD = 8.20). Half of
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62
the children in each age group were randomly assigned to either the high- or lowcost condition. Children were recruited via advertisements in a free local paper
targeted at families from an urban North American city. Families, who were
primarily middle class and Caucasian, were seen at a university research
laboratory.
Measures
Child measures. Similar to Study 1, two games were played with each
child: a guessing game and the memory game. Children received prizes for
winning these games. The desirable gift was either a colorful slinky or Silly
Putty; the undesirable gift was either a pair of knitted socks or a bar of soap
(desirable and undesirable gifts were chosen based on pilot data). A video camera
was concealed in a bag on the opposite side of the room to capture a frontal view
of the child‟s face.
Moral vignettes. Four prosocial vignettes adapted from Bussey (1999)
were used to examine children‟s moral evaluations. There were two prosocial
true and two prosocial lie stories. The vignette protagonists‟ sex corresponded to
the sex of the given child. A sample prosocial true story was “Belinda‟s mother
baked some cookies that Belinda thought tasted awful. Belinda‟s mother asked
Belinda if she liked the cookies. Belinda said „No, they don‟t taste very nice‟.”
After children were read each scenario, they were asked a series of questions.
First, children were asked whether they believed the vignette‟s character told the
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63
truth or a lie. Next, children were asked to provide a moral evaluation, by
determining how good or bad it was for the protagonist to have lied or told the
truth. Children were shown a moral response card with the following 6 point
Likert scale to assist in their responses: very very bad (1; three black X‟s), very
bad (2; two black X‟s), bad (3; one black X), good (4; one gold star), very good
(5; two gold stars), and very very good (6; three gold stars). Children used the
same moral response card to rate how they thought the protagonist would feel for
having lied or told the truth, and how the lie- or truth-recipient would feel after
having been told the truth or a lie.
Parent measures.
Parenting styles. The Parenting Styles and Dimensions QuestionnaireShort Form (PSDQ-SF; Robinson, Mandleco, Olsen, & Hart, 1995) was used to
measure parenting styles. The PSDQ-SF is a 32-item self-rated inventory devised
to assess authoritative, authoritarian and permissive parenting styles, and specific
parenting practices within each of these styles. The questionnaire is intended for
use by parents of preschool and school aged children. Items are rated on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always), with scores based on the
primary subscales and their respective parenting factors. Some items are reversed
scored.
The Authoritative style factor consists of 15-items with Cronbach‟s  =
0.91. Sample items for this dimension include “explains consequences of the
child‟s behaviour” and “takes into account child‟s preferences in making family
plans”. The Authoritarian style factor consists of 12-items with Cronbach‟s  =
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64
0.86. Sample items of this dimension include “explodes in anger towards child”
and “uses physical punishment as a way of disciplining child”. The Permissive
style factor consists of 5-items with Cronbach‟s  = 0.75. Sample statements of
this dimension include, “states punishments to child and does not actually do
them”, and “appears unsure on how to solve child‟s misbehaviour”.
Family expressiveness. The Self-Expressiveness in the Family
Questionnaire (SEFQ; Halberstadt et al., 1995) measures parenting practices that
foster emotional and social understanding. The SEFQ is a 40-item scale designed
to examine the frequency of emotional expressiveness within the family context.
Items are scored on a 9-point Likert scale, with scores ranging from 1 (not at all
frequently) to 9 (very frequently). Both positive and negative expressiveness
items are represented on the scale. There are 22 positive expressiveness items
(e.g., “praising someone for good work”, “telling someone how nice they look”)
and 18 negative expressiveness items (e.g., “blaming one another for family
troubles”, “quarrelling with a family member”). Scores are obtained by averaging
responses for each subscale, with higher scores representing greater levels of
expressiveness. Cronbach alphas ranging from 0.85 to 0.94 have been
demonstrated for subscales of positive and negative expressiveness and the
combined scale.
Procedure
Two sessions took place at a university research laboratory at least one
week apart. Children participated individually in both sessions with trained
researchers. During the first session, the same procedures described in Study 1
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65
were conducted with regard to the disappointing gift paradigm. At the second
session, children were read the moral vignettes and answered questions. Parents
completed questionnaires as they waited for their children during the first session.
Results and Discussion
Lie Behaviour
Overall, 52% of children told a prosocial lie about liking the undesirable
gift received from E2. A binary logistic regression was conducted to determine
which factors might predict children‟s prosocial lie-telling. For this and all
subsequent logistic regression analyses, the predictor variables were children‟s
age group (preschool, early elementary, or late elementary), sex, and condition
(high-cost or low-cost). Significance was assessed by a Block 2 test (also known
as the 2 difference test).
The logistic regression analysis with children‟s prosocial lie-telling
behaviour as the predicted variable revealed that the best fit model included age
group, sex, condition, and the Condition x Age Group interaction as significant
predictors of children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour, Nagelkerke R2= 0.09, 2
(4, N = 117) = 15.58, p = 0.004, with 70% of cases correctly classified by this
model. Condition was a unique significant predictor of children‟s prosocial lietelling behaviour, ß = -3.98, Wald = 12.21, p = 0.001, odds ratio = 0.71. More
children lied in the low-cost condition (68%) compared to children in the highcost condition (40%). This was the same pattern of results that was found in
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66
Study 1. Thus, children were more likely to tell a lie about a disappointing gift to
the gift-giver when they had little to lose by telling such a lie.
There was also a significant interaction between condition and age group
(ß = 1.41, Wald = 7.16, p = 0.007, odds ratio = 3.53, see Figure 2). While the
majority of children lied in the low-cost condition regardless of age, younger
children were less likely to tell a prosocial lie in the high-cost condition.
Specifically, though only 20% of preschoolers told a lie in this condition, 40% of
early elementary school and 65% of older elementary school children lied. This
was consistent with what was expected, as older children were more likely to lie
in the high-cost situation. Similarly, Xu et al. (2010) found that older Chinese
children were more likely than younger children to tell prosocial lies for otheroriented reasons. Together, these results suggest that with age, children are more
likely to tell prosocial lies motivated by other-oriented rather than self-oriented
outcomes.
Next, the additional value of socialization variables for predicting
children‟s prosocial lie-telling was examined using a binary logistic regression
analysis. The predictor variables were entered in the first step, and the social
variables (PSDQ-SF Authoritarian mean score, PSDQ-SF Authoritative mean
score, PSDQ-SF Permissive mean score, SEFQ Positive mean score, and SEFQ
Negative mean score) were entered on a second step. The first step was
significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.15, 2 (4, N = 111) = 13.65, p < 0.05. After
controlling for age, sex, condition, and the Age Group x Condition interaction, the
second step was also significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.39, 2 (5, N = 117) = 17.56, p
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67
< 0.01, with 72% of cases correctly classified by this model. PSDQ-SF
Authoritative mean scores were a significant predictor of lying (ß = 1.50, Wald =
6.95, p < 0.01, odds ratio = 4.49), whereby prosocial liars had parents who scored
higher on this measure (M = 4.25, SD = 0.47) than nonliars (M = 4.01, SD = 0.42),
consistent with expectations (see Table 1). In addition, SEFQ Positive mean
scores were a significant predictor of lying (ß = -0.03, Wald = 6.46, p = 0.01, odds
ratio = 0.97), whereby prosocial liars had parents who scored lower on their
positive emotional expressiveness (M = 7.57, SD = 0.86) than nonliars (M = 7.67,
SD = 0.79) (Table 1). Although these effects were relatively small, perhaps
children with lesser amounts of positive expressiveness seek such feedback
through prosocial lying. These results demonstrate that prosocial lie-telling is
related to social variables. Finally, the interaction terms between the PSDQ
scores, SEFQ scores, and motivation condition were entered on the third step.
The third step was not significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.33, 2 (5, N = 117) = 10.18,
ns.
Children’s Abilities to Maintain Their Lies to Follow-up Questions
Children‟s responses to follow-up questions after receiving the
disappointing gift were examined to determine whether they provided plausible or
implausible explanations. To determine how good children were at maintaining
their lies, a binary logistic regression was conducted on children‟s explanations
(plausible vs. implausible) as the dependent variable. The overall regression
model only approached significance, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.15, 2 (3, N = 61) = 7.29,
p = 0.063, with 72% of cases correctly classified by this model. Nevertheless, age
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68
group was a significant predictor of children‟s abilities to maintain their lies, (ß =
-0.89, Wald = 6.37, p = 0.01, odds ratio = 0.41). More specifically, there was an
age trend whereby preschoolers were less likely to conceal their disappointment
based on their verbal responses (M = 1.19, SD = 0.40) than were early and late
elementary school children (M = 1.31, SD = 0.48, and M = 1.22, SD = 0.43,
respectively). This trend was consistent with previous studies (e.g., Talwar &
Lee, 2002b; Xu et al., 2010), which also report an increased ability for older
children to tell and subsequently maintain their prosocial lies.
Next, the additional value of socialization variables for predicting
children‟s explanations was examined using a binary logistic regression analysis.
The predictor variables were entered in the first step, and the social variables
(PSDQ-SF Authoritarian mean score, PSDQ-SF Authoritative mean score, PSDQSF Permissive mean score, SEFQ Positive mean score, and SEFQ Negative mean
score) were entered on a second step. Refer to Table 2 for means and standard
deviations of the social variables according to the plausibility of children‟s
answers. After controlling for age group, sex and condition, the second step was
not significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.25, 2 (5, N = 61) = 4.89, ns. Thus the
socialization variables assessed did not predict children‟s abilities to maintain
their prosocial lies during follow-up questioning.
Moral Understanding
Children‟s classifications and evaluations of statements made by story
characters as lies or truths were analyzed using 3 (Age Group: preschool, early
elementary, or late elementary children) X 4 (Type of Child: high-cost condition
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69
prosocial liar, low-cost condition prosocial liar, high-cost condition blunt truthteller, or low-cost condition blunt truth-teller) X 2 (sex) x 2 (Character Veracity:
lie or truth) analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with veracity as a repeated measure.
First, children‟s accuracy at identifying prosocial lies and truths was examined as
the dependent variable. Analyses revealed a significant veracity effect, F(1, 80) =
10.78, p = 0.002, partial eta = 0.12, and Veracity x Age interaction, F(2, 80) =
5.08, p = 0.004, partial eta = 0.11. Overall, out of a possible score of 2, children
were better able to identify prosocial lies (M = 1.82, SD = 0.62) than prosocial
truths (M = 1.39, SD = 0.82). Preschoolers‟ lower accuracy was due to their
difficulties classifying prosocial truths (M = 0.60, SD = 0.85) compared to
prosocial lies (M = 1.61, SD = 0.76), whereas older children were able to classify
prosocial truths (early elementary: M = 1.81, SD = 0.54, late elementary: M =
1.75, SD = 0.51) and prosocial lies accurately (early elementary: M = 1.84, SD =
0.63; late elementary: M = 2.00, SD = 0). Xu and colleagues (2010) also reported
that almost all children in their sample aged 7 to 11 years were able to identify
lies and truths correctly. Similar to Bussey (1999), the familiarity with prosocial
lie-telling scenarios in one‟s everyday lives may have contributed to the overall
better identification of lies by children in all age groups, even more so for the
elementary school aged children where these situations are generally more
common.
Another repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with children‟s
evaluations of the prosocial scenarios as the dependent variable. There was a
significant main effect for veracity, F(1, 80) = 9.40, p = 0.003, partial eta = 0.105,
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70
and for age, F(2, 80) = 8.69, p < 0.001, partial eta = 0.18. Overall, with the most
positive evaluation of 6, prosocial truths were evaluated as being better (M = 3.45,
SD = 1.35) than prosocial lies (M = 2.81, SD = 1.20). Preschoolers tended to be
harsher in their evaluations (M = 2.50, SD = 1.34) than the early and late
elementary school children ((M = 3.27, SD = 1.19 and M = 3.05, SD = 1.25,
respectively). This finding was again consistent with Xu et al. (2010) who also
reported that prosocial lies became less negative between the preschool and
elementary school years.
Next, children‟s ratings of the vignette protagonists‟ feelings in the
prosocial lie and truth scenarios were compared. There was a significant main
effect of veracity, F(1, 80) = 6.69, p = 0.017, partial eta = 0.87, as children
indicated that protagonists were likely to feel better when they told the truth (M =
4.88, SD = 1.71) than when the protagonist told a lie (M = 4.14, SD = 1.91).
There was also a significant Veracity x Type of Child interaction, F(3, 80) = 5.32,
p = 0.004, partial eta = 0.07. Post hoc analyses revealed that in the high-cost
condition, blunt truth-tellers thought the protagonist would feel better if they told
the truth rather than lied (p < .01), whereas prosocial lie-tellers thought the
protagonist would feel good whether they told the truth or a lie (see Figure 3).
Similarly, for children in the low-cost condition, blunt truth-tellers thought the
protagonist would feel better if they told the truth rather than lied (p < .05), while
prosocial lie-tellers thought the protagonist would feel good whether they told the
truth or a lie (Figure 3). However, prosocial lie-tellers in the low-cost condition
rated the protagonists‟ feelings less positively than prosocial lie-tellers in the
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71
high-cost condition (p < .05). Therefore, while both groups of children followed
the same pattern of results for their evaluations of the protagonists‟ feelings,
children in the low-cost condition were less positive about the protagonists‟ lying
behaviour compared to their high-cost counterparts.
A final repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare children‟s
ratings of the vignette recipients‟ feelings in the prosocial lie and truth scenarios.
There was a significant Veracity x Type of Child interaction, F(1, 80) = 9.10, p =
0.017, partial eta = 0.15. While blunt truth-tellers in the high-cost condition
thought the recipient would feel the same if they were told the truth (M = 4.38, SD
= 2.32) or a lie (M = 4.48, SD = 2.19), prosocial lie-tellers thought the recipient
would feel better if they were told a prosocial lie (M = 5.68, SD = 1.76) rather
than the truth (M = 3.52, SD = 1.96, p < .01). In the low-cost condition, blunt
truth-tellers thought the recipient would feel better if they were told the truth (M =
5.15, SD = 2.68) than a lie (M = 4.37, SD = 2.65, p < .05), whereas the prosocial
lie-tellers thought the recipient would feel better if they were told a prosocial lie
(M = 4.97, SD = 2.48) rather than the truth (M = 4.03, SD = 2.24, p < .05), see
Figure 4. Hence, children‟s evaluations of the recipients‟ feelings differed
depending on whether they were assigned to the high- or low-cost condition and
whether they themselves told a prosocial truth or a lie. The prosocial lie-tellers in
both conditions rated the lie scenarios as more positive than the true scenarios,
however the difference was even greater for children in the high-cost condition.
On the other hand, it was only the blunt truth-tellers in the low-cost condition who
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72
rated the true scenarios as more positive than the lie scenarios from the recipients‟
perspective.
General Discussion
The current study investigated children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviours
and variables that might increase the likelihood of predicting whether children
would tell a prosocial lie in a politeness situation. Overall, 68% of child
participants, ranging in age from preschoolers to late elementary school children,
lied and said that they liked a disappointing gift given by another. This rate was
similar to previous research findings on children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviours
(e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2010). Across
the two studies, the motivational contexts of children‟s prosocial lying were
manipulated revealing that children were more likely to lie (81%) when they
perceived a low personal cost. In addition, socialization variables, namely
parenting practices and family emotional expressivity, were related to children‟s
prosocial lie-telling behaviour. Finally, children‟s understanding and evaluations
of different moral scenarios, the protagonists‟, and the recipients‟ feelings were
examined in relation to children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour. Children better
identified prosocial lies as compared to prosocial truths, yet they evaluated the
truths as being more acceptable. Children who told prosocial lies evaluated the
moral behaviour of others and the recipients‟ feelings differently than children
who told prosocial truths. These findings are discussed in detail below.
Motivation
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73
To determine whether children were motivated to tell prosocial lies for
self-oriented (i.e., to avoid negative consequences) or other-oriented outcomes
(i.e., to be polite), the motivational contexts of a politeness situation were
manipulated. Across two studies, children‟s lie-telling behaviour varied in these
different motivational contexts. For children in both studies, when there was a
high personal cost, children were less inclined to tell a lie. However, when there
was little cost to themselves, children were more likely to lie to the gift-giver and
tell her that they liked the gift. Furthermore, this tendency to lie generally
increased with age. As expected, older children were more likely than preschool
children to tell a prosocial lie that was other-oriented in the high-cost condition
(Figure 2). Therefore, with age there was a developmental change in children‟s
tendency to tell a truly prosocial lie. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
there were still quite a few children who lied in the high-cost condition in both
studies. This indicates that even though young children may be more likely to tell
a prosocial lie for self-oriented purposes, there are still at least some who chose to
behave in a prosocial way (and lie for other-oriented purposes). Children‟s
prosocial lying even when there is a cost to themselves may reflect the influence
of socialization, whereby children are exposed to others telling lies in politeness
situations from an early age and are taught about the importance of being polite in
such situations in order to spare another‟s feelings (Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007).
Furthermore, the fact that at least some young children and more older children
lied in the high-cost situation may also be related to children‟s developing
perspective taking and empathy abilities. These skills are necessary when
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74
deciding whether or not to tell a prosocial lie in a politeness situation, and they are
both more developed in older as compared to younger children (e.g., Findlay,
Girardi, & Coplan, 2006; Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1992).
Xu et al. (2010) also found that older children were more likely to tell a lie
for prosocial reasons, as did Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007). Taken together with
the current results, these findings suggest that children‟s tendency to lie in
politeness situations is influenced at least in part by motivational factors and the
ability to reconcile acting for self- or other-oriented purposes. Whereas younger
children were motivated to lie in such situations for self-oriented outcomes and to
avoid negative consequences to themselves (i.e., losing out on a good gift), older
children were increasingly motivated to tell lies for prosocial other-oriented
outcomes, even when contrary to their self-interests. Because a significant age
difference was found in Study 2 that included a group of young preschoolers, and
not in Study 1, which only included elementary school children, the argument that
preschoolers have difficulties reconciling the contradictory rules of interpersonal
communication in politeness situations is further supported. By early elementary
school age, children seem better able to understand and reconcile the rules
governing interpersonal communication, and further to use these rules adaptively
in social situations to maintain amicable relations with others.
Children’s Ability to Conceal Their Lies
Based on previous studies, it was hypothesized that older children would
be better able to maintain their lies during follow-up questioning, demonstrating
an understanding that they must be aware of their verbal statements following an
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75
initial lie to avoid detection. In Study 1, the child‟s age was significantly
associated with their ability to provide plausible explanations for their lies,
regardless of motivational context. In Study 2 there was a developmental trend
for the different age groups. Consistent with previous studies (Polak & Harris,
1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b; Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007), among prosocial liars,
older children were better able to adequately conceal their lies and conceal
information that would expose the truth. It may be that the cognitive skills (i.e.,
memory capacity, inhibitory control, planning) necessary to maintain an initial lie
statement during follow-up questioning have not yet been fully developed in
young children (Talwar & Lee, 2008). As such, young children‟s true thoughts or
feelings are more easily revealed, and thus their lies more often detected.
Interestingly, in Study 1, girls were better at concealing their lies when
compared to boys. However, no sex differences were found in Study 2. These
findings are consistent with the mixed results in the literature concerning sex
differences in children‟s abilities to use verbal display rules in politeness
situations (e.g., Cole, 1986; Davis, 1995; Garner & Power, 1996; Saarni, 1984). It
could be that sex-role socialization factors were influencing their behaviours
(Saarni, 1984). Girls may receive greater socialization to be polite, to inhibit
negative expressions, and may be overall more concerned about hurting another‟s
feelings as compared to boys (e.g., Fabes et al., 1994; Fuchs & Thelen, 1988;
Garner & Power, 1996). Therefore, girls may learn earlier than boys that they
need to follow-up their lies with other congruent statements. It may also be that
there are non-verbal differences in girls‟ and boys‟ abilities to maintain their lies
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76
(e.g., Davis, 1995, Fabes et al., 1994). Another possibility may be that girls‟ are
better than boys at concealing their lies due to better developed inhibitory control
abilities (e.g., Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996). Further research is needed to examine
the differential impact of socialization factors on girls‟ and boys‟ lie-telling
behaviour.
Social Variables
While previous studies have suggested a need to examine social variables
and their relation to children‟s lie-telling behaviour (e.g., Lee & Ross, 1997;
Talwar & Lee, 2008), no study has empirically examined this relationship. The
current studies found that two social variables (i.e., parenting styles and family
emotional expressivity) were related to children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour,
regardless of motivational context. Children who told a prosocial lie had parents
who were more authoritative in their parenting styles than did blunt truth-tellers.
This finding was consistent with Robinson and colleagues (1995) who showed
that parents using an authoritative parenting style helped their children develop
instrumental competence that in turn fosters effective social skill development.
Being able to politely say to another that a gift they gave you was something you
liked, when indeed you did not (and thus tell a prosocial lie), is an important
social skill necessary to foster amicable relations with others.
The current studies also found that how frequently emotions are expressed
within the family was related to children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour.
Specifically, when compared to children who told the truth about their dislike of
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77
the disappointing gift, prosocial lie-tellers had families who expressed positive
emotions less frequently within the family. This finding was somewhat
unexpected as it was the reverse of the predicted relationship and did not differ
with regards to children‟s motivational context. Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007)
reported that when parents discussed the feelings of others‟ with their children
following their receipt of a disappointing gift, children subsequently were more
likely to tell a convincing prosocial lie when asked about the gift by the gift-giver.
Talking about feelings and expressing emotions authentically would correspond to
high scores on the family expressiveness scale. However, when telling prosocial
lies, one must refrain and dissemble the expression of authentic emotion, and thus
families that foster appropriate use of prosocial lie-telling for other-oriented
motives and model this behaviour for their children might score lower on the
family expressiveness scale. Similarly, as Jones, Abbey and Cumberland (1998)
pointed out, it may be that the relationship between positive emotional
expressiveness and prosocial display rule use is not as strong as negative types of
emotional expressiveness within the family and general display rule use.
The current studies‟ findings suggest that more research is needed to better
understand how social factors influence the development of children‟s prosocial
lying in different motivational contexts. As yet, this is an area that has received
little attention. Employing different methodological techniques to examine
socialization variables (e.g., using a longitudinal design, interviews with parents)
related to children‟s prosocial behaviours throughout childhood may provide
additional insights into the developmental paths of prosocial lie-telling and the
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78
role of social variables in children‟s lie-telling behaviour. Specifically, by
looking at children‟s lying behaviours over time the influence of specific social
variables on children‟s lie maintenance might become clearer, and through
parental interviews, other social variables might be identified for further
examination.
Moral Understanding and Evaluations
In Study 2, children‟s moral understandings and evaluations of prosocial
scenarios and their actual prosocial lie-telling behaviours were examined.
Consistent with previous studies (Bussey 1992, 1999; Talwar et al., 2002),
children were more accurate at identifying prosocial lie scenarios as compared to
prosocial true scenarios, with the youngest children having most difficulty
identifying the prosocial true scenarios as such. It may be that children are better
able to accurately identify lies rather than truths in prosocial situations, because
prosocial lies (which are socially acceptable) are more frequently observed by
children in daily life compared to blunt truth-telling in such situations. That is,
most children learn early in their development that telling the blunt truth in certain
social situations (e.g., when receiving a gift that they do not like) might be
perceived as being rude rather than appropriate, and could ultimately jeopardize
any amicable relation between themselves and the “poor” gift-giver.
In the current studies, children evaluated prosocial truths as more
acceptable than prosocial lies. Older children gave higher ratings of acceptability
for prosocial lies compared to preschoolers, who generally appeared to have
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79
difficulty understanding the nuances of the prosocial scenarios and rated them
more harshly. Bussey (1999) also reported that the younger children in her
sample (aged 4 years) evaluated prosocial scenarios more negatively compared to
older children. Further, Walper and Valtin (1992) reported that it was only
towards the end of elementary school that children were best able to identify and
evaluate prosocial lie scenarios as less negative than other types of lie scenarios
(i.e., antisocial lie scenarios). Thus, with age children become better able to
identify and evaluate prosocial truth and lie scenarios in a way that is comparable
to adults.
The current studies also examined children‟s evaluations of the
protagonists‟ and the recipients‟ feelings in prosocial scenarios in relation to their
actual behaviour in a politeness situation. In general, most children reported that
the protagonist would feel better if they told the truth rather than lied in the
prosocial scenarios, contrary to the results reported by Heyman and colleagues
(2009). In addition, children in the current studies generally reported that the
recipient would feel okay regardless of whether they were told the truth or a lie.
Significant interactions between children‟s moral evaluations of the protagonists‟
and recipients‟ feelings and a child‟s prosocial lying were also found.
Specifically, truth-tellers (in both motivational contexts) differentiated the
scenarios in a manner consistent with their own behaviours; truth-telling was
evaluated as better than lie-telling in the prosocial scenarios. Lie-tellers were
more equivocal. While those from the high-cost condition rated the protagonist in
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80
the lie scenario as feeling better than liars from the low-cost condition, there was
little difference in lie-tellers‟ ratings of the lie and true scenarios overall.
Results differed slightly for perceptions of lie recipients. Lie-tellers
indicated that recipients would feel better if they were told a lie rather than the
truth, with lie-tellers in the high-cost condition rating lies more positively than
those in the low-cost condition. Here, truth-tellers were more equivocal. Truthtellers in the high-cost condition did not rate the recipient as feeling better or
worse if they were told a truth or a lie, whereas those in the low-cost condition
indicated that recipients would feel better about being told the truth rather than a
lie. Overall, lie-tellers rated the outcome of lies told to another as more positive
than did truth-tellers. Thus, children‟s perceptions of appropriate social behaviour
in politeness contexts seem, in some instances, to comport with their actual lietelling (or truth-telling) decisions.
The current studies‟ examination of children‟s lie-telling and moral
evaluations is unique in several ways compared to previous studies (e.g.,
Broomfield et al., 2002; Bussey, 1999). Most studies examining children‟s lietelling behaviour and their moral understanding of lies have focused on children‟s
lies to conceal a transgression, either for themselves or for another (Talwar et al.
2002; Talwar et al., 2004; Talwar & Lee 2008). These studies have found a
limited relation between children‟s lie-telling behaviour and their moral
evaluations. The current studies specifically examined children‟s prosocial lietelling behaviour and evaluations of prosocial lies and truths. Knowing that lies
told to conceal a transgression and those told for prosocial purposes differ in their
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81
rate of occurrence and development, it is not surprising that the relation between
children‟s actual behaviour and their understanding of different lie scenarios
differ as well. Only one previous study has specifically examined the relation
between prosocial lies and moral evaluations. Similar to the current studies, Xu et
al. (2010) reported finding that Chinese lie-tellers‟ moral knowledge and action
were related. However, unlike Xu et al., the current studies also examined
children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour in relation to children‟s evaluations of
the protagonists‟ and the recipients‟ feelings in prosocial vignette scenarios.
Considering the evaluative reactions of others when both telling and being told a
prosocial truth or lie is important as it reveals children‟s awareness of moral
standards in interpersonal situations from the perspective of another (Bussey,
1999). If children anticipate self-disapproval when telling the truth and selfapproval when telling a lie in prosocial scenarios, they are more likely to act in
ways that are congruent with such beliefs (Bandura, 1986), as it is arguably the
anticipation of such self-evaluative reactions that ultimately guides one‟s social
behaviour.
The current studies provided empirical support for the relation between
behaviour and moral understanding from the perspectives of others in prosocial
situations. Specifically, the prosocial truth-tellers provided more positive ratings
of the protagonists‟ feelings when they told the truth in a vignette scenario,
whereas prosocial lie-tellers rated the recipients‟ feelings as more positive when
they were told a lie in a vignette scenario. While it is important to acknowledge
that all children partook in the lie scenario at least one week before they evaluated
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82
the different vignette scenarios, previous research (e.g., Talwar et al., 2002, Xu et
al, 2010) has found that children‟s evaluations are not affected by whether they
are first presented with the vignettes or the lie scenario. Moreover, all children in
Study 2, regardless of their behaviour in the disappointing gift paradigm,
evaluated truth-telling in the prosocial vignettes as more acceptable than telling
lies. Nevertheless, because all children participated in the behavioural paradigm
prior to the conceptual questioning, the direction of the relationship between
behaviour and moral evaluations needs to be explored further in future studies. In
the current studies, the aim was to capture children‟s spontaneous natural
prosocial lie-telling behaviour. To do this, any prompting or cueing to children
about the motive of the research needed to be minimized or eliminated. Had the
conceptual questioning come prior to the behaviour, children might have been
more attuned to lie-telling behaviour in general and possibly altered their
“natural” tendencies. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that more research is
needed to better understand the relationship between moral action and moral
understanding.
Conclusions
Children in the current studies were most likely to tell a prosocial lie when
there was a low perceived personal cost. However, the tendency to tell a
prosocial lie that was other-oriented in its outcome increased with age, especially
for children in a high-cost condition where the stakes of telling the lie were
greater and children had something to lose by lying. Indeed for children in the
low-cost condition, no age difference was found across the age range, yet more
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
83
preschoolers told prosocial lies that had a self-oriented outcome. Therefore, it
seems that only among older children was prosocial lie-telling truly prosocially
motivated, for other-oriented purposes. Moreover, when children told a prosocial
lie, older children were better able to maintain their lie during follow-up
questioning compared to younger children, indicating greater maturity in their
mastery of deception. In addition, compared to truth-tellers, prosocial liars were
more likely to have parents who had an authoritative parenting style, yet reported
less frequent expressions of positive emotions within the family, regardless of
motivational context. Finally, children‟s prosocial lying or blunt truth-telling (in
the different motivational contexts) was related differentially to their moral
understanding and evaluations of vignette scenarios, and to their perceptions of
story protagonists‟ and recipients‟ likely feelings. This research was a first step
towards clarifying the mechanisms underlying the development of children‟s
prosocial lie-telling abilities and suggests that further investigation into the role of
social and cognitive factors is needed. The current findings begin to provide a
better picture of the developmental trajectory of children‟s prosocial lie-telling,
their motivations for telling such lies, and their knowledge about rules governing
interpersonal communication.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
84
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Table 1
Means (Standard Deviations) of Socialization Variables by Type of Child
__________________________________________________________________
PSDQ-SFa
SEFQb
c
Authoritative Authoritarian Permissive
Positivec Negative
Type of child
__________________________________________________________________
Lie-teller
4.25 (0.46) 1.77 (0.35) 2.06 (0.59) 7.57 (0.86) 4.35 (1.09)
Truth-teller
4.00 (0.42) 1.79 (0.47) 2.05 (0.62)
7.67 (0.79) 4.32 (1.14)
__________________________________________________________________
Notes.
a
Parenting Styles and Dimensions Questionnaire – Short Form.
b
Self-Expressiveness in the Family Questionnaire.
c
Means in the column below differ significantly between lie- and truth-telling
children (p < .05).
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Table 2
Means (Standard Deviations) of Socialization Variables by Plausibility of
Children’s Answers to Follow-up Questions
__________________________________________________________________
PSDQ-SFa
SEFQb
Authoritative Authoritarian Permissive Positive Negative
Type of answer
__________________________________________________________________
Plausible
4.19 (0.49) 1.77 (0.35) 2.13 (0.62) 7.57 (0.79) 4.35 (1.13)
Not Plausible
4.47 (0.29) 1.68 (0.32) 1.80 (0.38)
7.56 (0.86) 4.32 (1.26)
__________________________________________________________________
Notes.
a
Parenting Styles and Dimensions Questionnaire – Short Form.
b
Self-Expressiveness in the Family Questionnaire.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
Figure 1. Percentage of prosocial lie-tellers among second and fourth graders in
high- and low-cost conditions in Study 1.
93
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
Figure 2. Percentage of prosocial lie-tellers in high- and low-cost conditions
among preschoolers, early and late elementary school children in Study 2.
94
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95
Figure 3. Child ratings of the protagonists‟ feelings about telling the truth or lie,
ranging from 1 (very very bad) to 6 (very very good): Veracity x Type of Child
interaction.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
Figure 4. Child ratings of the recipients‟ feelings about being told the truth or a
lie, ranging from 1 (very very bad) to 6 (very very good): Veracity x Type of
Child interaction.
96
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97
Bridging Manuscripts
The initial step in establishing the current program of research was to
empirically examine whether social factors are related to the development of
children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviours. Lee and Ross (1997) and Talwar,
Murphy et al. (2007) speculated that family and social variables are involved in
children‟s learning about truthful and untruthful behaviours, but no investigation
had yet been conducted. The first manuscript (Popliger et al, in press) in this
program of research reported empirical support for parenting styles and family
emotional expressiveness to be related to children‟s truthful and lying behaviours
in a politeness situation. Given these results, the next step was to examine
whether children displayed the same behaviours as their parents when telling the
truth or a lie in a similar politeness situation. Thus, the second manuscript
explores the expressive behaviours of parents and their children as they
participated in the same task, whereby they were each told to tell a truth and a lie
by pretending to like the taste of a drink. This task created a situation similar to
everyday situations such as telling someone you liked their haircut or a meal they
cooked for you, when in fact you do not. Furthermore, it was a task that could be
used with both parents and children. A further objective of this study was to
investigate how accurate naïve adults were in their ability to detect the truth and
lie statements of parents and their children in this politeness situation.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
CHAPTER 4
Manuscript 2
Does the Apple Fall Far From the Tree? Detecting Deception in Parents and
Children
Mina E. Popligera, Neda Faregha, Angela Crossmanb and Victoria Talwara
a
Department of Educational & Counselling Psychology, McGill University,
Montreal, Quebec
b
John Jay College, City University of New York, New York, NY
98
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99
Abstract
Children learn expressive behaviours similar to those displayed by their parents,
as children often imitate or model behaviours they see their parents doing. While
this type of social learning about expressive behaviours is well documented in the
literature, when it comes to the development of children‟s lie-telling behaviours,
no research has examined whether children and parents have similar expressive
cues when deceiving. The current study examined parents‟ and their children‟s
ability to deceive when asked to pretend to like a bad tasting drink. Forty-seven
parent-child dyads (children ranged in age from 7 to 15 years) participated in a
drink tasting task. Adult raters viewed video clips of parents‟ and children‟s true
and false drink descriptions. Overall, adult raters detected parents‟ and children‟s
true and false statements at a similar accuracy rate (54%). Adults perceived
parents as being genuine and truthful, whereas they were more likely to rate
children as lie-tellers. Furthermore, in-depth video analyses revealed that parents
and children were similar in their nonverbal expressive behaviours when lying.
However, parents displayed more negative behaviours than children when telling
the truth. Results supported the hypothesis that parents and children displayed
similar expressive behaviours when telling a lie, even though they were not
detected similarly by adults. Implications for future research are discussed.
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100
Does the Apple Fall Far From the Tree? Detecting Deception in Parents and
Children
Lying is a social behaviour. Lies are usually told in the context of a social
exchange between at least two people, where the lie-teller delivers a message that
is intended to deliberately mislead the lie-recipient. In order to be successful and
avoid detection, the lie-teller must maintain the lie by making sure that follow-up
statements are congruent with the initial lie, and that their nonverbal behavioural
cues do not contradict their verbal message. Research has shown that maintaining
one‟s verbal and nonverbal behaviours while lying requires cognitive control
(e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar, Gordon & Lee, 2007), however, since lying
is also social in nature, social variables related to lie-telling and maintenance are
also important to consider when examining the development of truth- and lietelling in children (Lee & Ross, 1997; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007). Yet, to
date, social factors related to lying in children have largely been overlooked in the
literature.
From an early age, children are taught the value of honesty from the
messages they receive from their parents (e.g., Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). For
example, parents often emphasize the value of truth-telling with stories such as
“George Washington and the Cherry Tree”, where a young boy declares to his
father that he cannot tell a lie when asked if he chopped down the cherry tree.
However, children also learn that there are some benefits of lying, as they observe
their parents‟ behaviours in certain social contexts such as politeness situations
(e.g., hearing a parent tell a friend they liked the dinner the friend made, and later
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
101
reveal that it tasted awful). So while parents transmit messages of honesty and try
to behave in honest ways so that their children will see the value in being truthful,
children also witness their parents‟ behaviours when lying. Thus, children may
learn not only about honesty from their parents, but also may learn how to lie by
observing their parents, and may show similar lying or truthful behaviours as their
parents. Therefore, in an effort to better understand how children learn to lie, the
present study examined the truthful and lying behaviours in a sample of parents
and their children.
Lies and Successful Lie-telling
Lies are defined as an intentional false statement to deceive another (Bok,
1978; Vrij, 2002). Research shows that children know the difference between
truths and lies (Piaget, 1965; Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998), and they are capable
of telling different types of lies with moderate success from an early age
(Feldman, Jenkins & Popoola, 1979; Lewis, Stranger & Sullivan, 1989; Polak &
Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b, 2008). With regard to children‟s
actual lie-telling, 3-year-old children have been shown to tell antisocial lies (i.e.,
lying to conceal a transgression) following requests by a researcher not to look at
a forbidden toy (e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b). In addition,
prosocial lies (i.e., lies told in politeness settings, to benefit others, and to foster
amicable relations) are frequently told by children aged 6 years and older (Talwar
& Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007; Xu, Boa, Fu, Talwar & Lee, 2010).
Finally, Feldman and colleagues (Feldman et al., 1979) also showed that children
6 years and older are capable of deceiving another when told to pretend to like a
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
102
drink. Therefore, children begin to tell antisocial lies in the preschool years and
they tell prosocial lies in politeness settings by the early elementary school years.
However, in order to tell a lie successfully, it is also important that the lie-teller be
able to avoid detection by others.
A number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the success of
children‟s lie-telling by examining whether adults could accurately detect
children‟s lies from their truths on the basis of verbal and nonverbal behaviours
(e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b; Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi,
Renaud & Williams, 2009). In general, findings have been mixed depending on
both the age of the child, and whether children‟s verbal or nonverbal behaviours
were considered in the investigation. Several studies have suggested that
regardless of expressive behaviours and age of the child, adults accurately
detected children‟s truths more often than children‟s lies (e.g., Edelstein, Luten,
Ekman, & Goodman, 2006; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006). This response
pattern may be related to a truth bias that people have when judging the
statements of others, especially children. Other studies have found that when
adults were shown videos of children‟s nonverbal behaviours when lying to
conceal a transgression or for politeness reasons, adults consistently had difficulty
differentiating between truths and lies. For example, adult raters were unable to
differentiate between the videos of children who lied and those who did not (e.g.,
Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b). However, in-depth analyses of
children‟s behaviour when lying revealed that there existed subtle nonverbal cues
that the adults were not able to detect (Saarni, 1984; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). In
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103
contrast, when verbal statements were examined, children‟s lies were more easily
detected (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2002b, 2008; Talwar et al., 2009). More
specifically, Talwar and Lee (2002b) reported that younger children (between the
ages of 3 and 5 years) as compared to older children (between the ages of 6 and 8
years) appeared to have less control over the regulation of their verbal rather than
nonverbal behaviours when required to maintain their lies. In addition, age
differences in detection ability were also found when adults viewed videos of
children pretending to like a drink (Feldman et al., 1979). Adults were more
accurate at detecting the lies told by children in the 1st grade as compared to
children in the 7th grade and college-aged, on the basis of their nonverbal
behaviours.
Therefore, while it has been shown that children are able to tell lies in
various situations, their ability to be successful lie-tellers has been found to vary
as a function of the age of the child and the expressive behaviour (verbal or
nonverbal) observed. However, it may be that other factors related to children‟s
success at lie-telling are also involved. More specifically, the expressive
behaviours children observe their parents demonstrate when telling a lie might
play a role in how successful children are when lying since they may in turn
model these behaviours themselves when telling lies.
Socialization and Lying
Bandura‟s social cognitive theory of learning (1986) discusses the idea
that much of human learning occurs in a social environment. By observing
others, knowledge, skills, strategies, and beliefs are acquired. Through
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104
socialization, children may learn the behaviours they see their parents doing,
which subsequently influences the expression of their own behaviours. This
learning may be direct or indirect by means of imitation, identification, or
communication of expectancies (Saarni & Von Salisch, 1993). Children may
learn directly how to behave when parents overtly encourage them to lie in some
contexts in order to adhere to politeness standards (Cole & Mitchell, 1998;
Talwar, Murphy, et al., 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2002b). For example, when meeting
a person with an unusual appearance (e.g., physical deformity), many children are
told not to stare at or speak bluntly about the unusual appearance; rather, they are
socialized to dissemble their actual thoughts and feelings, and encouraged to act
and speak normally. Children may also imitate the behaviour of others when they
see that lying in certain situations may be rewarded (e.g., an older child who
knows that the tooth fairy does not exist, sees his parent lie to an excited younger
sibling following their first lost tooth). Children might model such behaviour in
future similar interactions. Furthermore, in an effort to identify with their parents‟
behaviours, a child may take on correspondingly similar behavioural strategies
they noted to work successfully for their parents (e.g., complimenting a friends‟
new hairdo to preserve the friendship). Therefore, children may be socialized
directly and indirectly to behave in a similar manner as their parents when lietelling. The current study sought to examine this question by looking at whether
children behave in a similar way as their parents when telling truths and lies.
Specifically, the truthful and lying behaviours of parents and children when told
to pretend to like a drink were investigated for similarities and differences.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
105
Researchers have found that children learn expressive behaviours and
strategies from their parents (e.g., Campos, 1989; Davidov & Grusec, 2006;
Dodge, Coie & Lyman, 2006; Garner & Power, 1996). For example, within the
first year, caregivers regulate their babies‟ emotional arousal by controlling their
exposure to events or by holding, stroking or soothing the infant (Campos, 1989;
Jahromi, Putnam & Stifter, 2004). By the middle of the first year, babies
evidence strategies for regulating their own emotions. Furthermore, parenting
practices used for expressing emotions have been linked to children‟s own
emotion regulation and expressiveness (Davies & Cummings, 1994; Garner &
Power, 1996; Jones, Abbey, & Cumberland, 1998). Indeed, mothers who
emphasized positive emotions and deemphasized negative ones in their parentchild interactions tended to have children who were better able to conceal
disappointment and other negative emotions (Garner & Power, 1996; Jones et al.,
1998). Conversely, children who were exposed to frequent displays of negative
emotions at home often displayed high levels of negative emotionality themselves
and were not very good at regulating their emotions (Davies & Cummings, 1998;
Eisenberg, et al., 2001). Therefore, children appear to behave in similar ways as
their parents when it comes to expressing and regulating their emotions.
In certain cases, children learn that concealing one‟s emotional
expressions is preferable to the truth (Eisenberg & Murphy, 1995; Talwar,
Murphy et al., 2007). For example, children might be encouraged by a parent to
tell someone that a bad tasting meal was good, and thus tell a prosocial lie in order
to be polite and maintain amicable relations. In these cases, deceptive emotional
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
106
expression is encouraged, as children are socialized to hide or mask negative
emotions that are deemed unacceptable, a skill that also facilitates effective
deception (Saarni & Von Salisch, 1993). It may be that children whose parents
are good at concealing their true emotions when lying are themselves more
successful liars who can avoid detection.
To date only two studies have examined parents‟ influence on children‟s
development of lie- and truth-telling behaviours. Hartshorne and May (1928)
reported finding that high levels of parental honesty increased children‟s
consistency of honesty across situations. More recently Talwar, Murphy et al.
(2007) found that when children received an undesirable gift from a gift-giver,
detailed discussions with their parents regarding the importance of how to be
polite facilitated the appropriate displays of children‟s verbal and nonverbal
behaviours, as children were encouraged to tell a lie and say they liked the gift to
the gift-giver. Therefore, when parents provided explanations for the causes and
consequences of others‟ emotional reactions, children were subsequently better at
masking their disappointment and told a lie in order to not hurt the gift-givers‟
feelings. This study suggested that children are socialized to tell a lie in a
politeness situation due to parental expectations regarding appropriate behavioural
etiquette in this context. However, no study has specifically examined the truthand lie-telling behaviours of parents and their children. Therefore, it may be that
children learn to be effective (or ineffective) liars by observing and modelling
their parents‟ behaviours in such politeness contexts. Examining parents and
children‟s truthful and deceptive statements about liking a bad tasting drink (a
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situation similar to telling someone they liked the meal that was prepared), and
the verbal and nonverbal expressive behaviours used to avoid detection will
contribute to our understanding of how children learn to lie successfully.
Current Study
The current study investigated the truth- and lie-telling behaviours of
parents and children. Children (aged 7 to 15 years) and their parents participated
in a drink tasting task where they were told to tell a lie and a truth about a good
tasting or a bad tasting drink (adapted from Feldman et al., 1979). This age range
was selected because research shows that children are generally 6 or 7 years of
age when they start to tell lies in politeness situations (Talwar & Lee, 2002;
Talwar, Murphy, et al. 2007; Xu et al., 2010). In addition, using the drink tasting
paradigm resembles a familiar situation such as being polite about the taste of bad
tasting food or drink.
The drink descriptions of all parent and child participants were videotaped
and shown to university students who rated the veracity of children‟s and parents‟
statements. The university students were asked to determine whether the
individual they saw in the video segment was telling a lie or a truth based on how
much they believed the individual liked (or disliked) the drink. In addition,
children‟s and parents‟ nonverbal expressive behaviours were analyzed
independently by two trained coders to identify whether nonverbal expressive
behaviours were similarly displayed by both parents and their children. Using this
paradigm, a situation was created whereby children and parents could be observed
engaging in the same truth- and lie-telling scenario.
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It was predicted that parents and children would be similar in both the
verbal and nonverbal behaviours displayed when lying and telling the truth.
Specifically, it was expected that adult raters would detect parents and their
children at similar accuracy rates when telling truths and lies. In addition, it was
expected that children and their parents would display similar rates of positive and
negative nonverbal expressive behaviours when told to convince another about
their liking of a drink.
Method
Participants
Forty-seven parent and child participant pairs were recruited from the
general population of an urban city from advertisement in various publicly
distributed newspapers and magazine flyers. Children were from three
developmental age groups, 7 to 9 years of age (N = 15, M = 8.55 years, SD = 0.82;
8 females), 10 to 12 years of age (N = 16, M = 11.36 years, SD = 1.03; 8 females),
and 13 to 15 years of age (N = 16, M = 14.70 years, SD = 0.83; 11 females).
Parent participants ranged in age from 30 to 62 years (M = 43.55 years, SD =
6.80; 40 females). The majority were of Caucasian origin. One hundred adults
(M = 20.37 years; SD = 1.65; 77 females) were recruited from an urban city
university to serve as naïve raters of video clips. All participants were seen
individually.
Materials and Procedure
Drink tasting task. The current study employed a taste-testing task
similar to the procedure used by Feldman and colleagues (Feldman et al., 1979;
Feldman, Tomasian & Coats, 1999). After consenting to participate, parents and
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their children were told they would be individually taste-testing two beverages in
order to try to convince an interviewer that the drink tasted good. One beverage
was pleasant tasting (Five-Alive citrus drink), and the second beverage was
unpleasant tasting (Five-Alive citrus drink prepared with a drop of vinegar).
Therefore the task was designed to produce one truthful and one untruthful
description of the taste of the drink by each participant. Participants were
informed that they would be videotaped during the interview. A camera was
placed in the room so as to record the head and shoulder areas of the participants.
In order to facilitate participants‟ understanding of the task, each participant first
practiced describing a neutral drink (i.e., water). Participants were told that for
each of the two drinks, they should first take a sip of the drink and then provide a
description of how much he or she liked the drink. The order of the drinks was
counterbalanced across participants. The interviewer was blind to which tasting
drink the participants were describing. After the participant had sampled the
drink and given their drink description, the interviewer asked several follow-up
questions: “What does the drink remind you of?”, “Where would you drink this?”,
and “Who would like this drink?” Participants‟ descriptions of the drink were
approximately 1 minute in length.
Preparation of video segments. Video segments of parent and child
participants engaging in the beverage taste-testing task were prepared using
Windows Movie Maker. The video segments of parent and child truth and lie
descriptions were presented to adult raters using MediaLab, a computer software
program for psychology experiments. Four video series were prepared, that
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included a random selection of children and their parents‟ drink descriptions with
a balanced representation of children from each of the three age groups (segments
from approximately 8 children from each age group and their parent were shown
in each video series, for a total of approximately 48 videos per series). A single
drink description (either true description of parent and child or lie description of
parent and child) was included in each video series, so that adult raters viewed
any given parent or child once, as they watched only one video series. Each video
series included approximately 12 truth and 12 lie descriptions.
Adult detection. Adult raters were undergraduate university students who
individually viewed 1 out of a possible 4 video series using MediaLab. After
consenting to participate, adults were told that participants in the video segment
tasted drinks that were either good or bad tasting. Furthermore, the adults were
told that the video segments were shown at random and therefore an equal chance
existed that the participant in the particular segment was telling the truth or a lie
about their liking the drink. In addition, adult raters remained blind as to the
relationship among participants (i.e., that they were parents and children).
Following each video segment, raters responded to, “Do you think that the
individual told the truth?” using “yes” or “no” options. Responses were recorded
in MediaLab.
In-depth video analysis. Two independent trained coders viewed each of
the video segments that appeared in the video series. The coders were instructed
to focus on the presence (coded as “1”) or absence (coded as “0”) of expressive
behaviours seen in the video segment. The coders watched each segment between
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3 and 5 times to code for these behaviours. Coders first watched the videos
without sound and then once they were certain that all of the nonverbal
behaviours had been coded, they watched the video once more with sound. As
based on Saarni (1984) and Talwar and Lee (2002a), the behavioural coding
system consisting of five behavioural categories (eye movement, appearance,
facial expression, body language, and vocalization), and several subcategories
were used. Positive and negative behaviour scores were calculated from this
coding system. Positive behaviours consisted of: eye contact, big smile, slight
smile, relaxed mouth, and positive tone of voice (5 behaviours in total). The
negative behaviours were: avoid eye contact, looks away, rapid glances, downturned mouth, press/bite lips, knit eyebrows, sober mouth, fidgets, still, nervous
touching, and negative tone of voice (11 behaviours in total). A subset of videos
was assessed for interrater reliability. The percentage of agreement was found to
be 84% (SD = 12%, range = 72-96%). Any differences that arose between the
coders were resolved by co-reviewing the given clip until agreement was
ultimately reached.
Study design. The design of this study was: 4 (age group: 7-9 years vs.
10-12 years vs. 13-15 years vs. parent) X 2 (family status: parent vs. child) X 2
(veracity of video: true drink description vs. lie drink description).
Results
Overall Detection
Overall accuracy rates were calculated for each child and parent based on
the ratings provided by the adult viewers. Mean scores ranged from 0
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(inaccurate) to 1 (accurate) in detecting lies as lies and truths as truths. Overall,
raters detected truths (M = 0.54, SD = 0.14) and lies (M = 0.54, SD = 0.14) at the
same rate, t(99) = 0.28, ns.
A repeated measure general linear model analysis was conducted with the
mean adult accuracy scores of videos viewed as the dependent variable. Veracity
was the within-subject variable (detection of truth or lie), while family status
(parent or child) was the between-subject variable, and age group (7-9 years, 1012 years, 13-15 years, or parent) was a covariate. Adult raters detected children as
well as they detected parents, as family status explained 0% of the variance in
detection (F(1, 85) = 0.01, ns; partial η2 = 0.00). There were also no significant
differences among children‟s age groups with regards to the detectability of their
truths and lies, F(1, 85) = 0.05, ns; partial η2 = 0.001, refer to Table 1 for the
mean detection rates of truths and lies by participant age groups. Furthermore,
there was also no significant main effect for veracity, F(,85) = 1.07, ns; partial η2
= 0.01). There was however a significant Veracity x Family Status interaction,
F(1, 85) = 6.30, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.07. Specifically, detectability was highest
when children were telling lies and when parents were telling truths (Figure 1).
Signal Detection Analysis
To examine whether adult raters were able to discriminate between truth
and false descriptions and whether they favoured a particular response (i.e.,
judged all children as lying or all adults as being honest), additional analyses were
conducted using signal detection theory. Signal detection theory assesses the
raters‟ ability to discriminate between truths and lies (a function of individual hit
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rates and false alarm rates; d’) and the degree to which they evince a detection
bias (i.e., identify all stimulus videos as liars regardless of actual veracity,
criterion c).
Discrimination. Calculating raters‟ discrimination ability (d’) takes into
account the number of lies that were detected as lies (hit rate) and the number of
truths that were labelled as lies (false alarm rate). Values close to zero indicate
poor discrimination with performance close to chance, whereas d’ scores further
away from zero reflect better discrimination abilities. The mean d’ value for
children was M = -0.14 (SD = 0.27), whereas the mean d’ value for parents was M
= 0.17 (SD = 0.31). Individual t-tests were performed to determine whether raters
discrimination was different from chance. Here, each analysis was compared to 0
(representing no ability to differentiate between truth and lies). Discrimination
for both children (t(99) = 3.17, p <.002) and parents (t(99) = 4.90, p < .000)
significantly differed from chance, however in opposite directions. The negative
direction of the difference for adults‟ discrimination of children (d’ = −0.14)
suggests that adults did not label the truth and lies correctly (i.e., they
discriminated between the lie-tellers and truth-tellers, but tended to indicate that
truth-tellers were lying more often than when they detected actual liars).
Response bias. Another part of detection is raters‟ tendency to select one
response (i.e., lying) repeatedly, independent of their actual ability to discriminate
between truth-tellers and lie-tellers. Calculating raters‟ bias takes into account
whether raters tend to favour a lie response (values below 0) or a true response
(values above 0). A criterion c score of 0 indicates no bias. The mean criterion c
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114
score for adults‟ rating of children was M = -0.20 (SD = 0.40), whereas the mean
criterion c score for adults‟ rating of parents was M = 0.23 (SD = 0.45). Using
individual t-tests, each criterion c score was compared to 0 (no bias). Raters were
found to be significantly biased in their responding for both children (t(99) = 4.91, p < .000) and parents (t(99) = 5.18, p < .000). Thus, it appears that adult
raters were biased towards rating children as liars and to rate parents as truthtellers.
Detection of Parent-Child Dyads
Since it was of primary interest to determine whether parent-child dyads
were detected at a similar rate for both their truth and lie descriptions, further
analyses were performed. First, difference scores were computed for adult
viewers‟ accuracy rates of parents and their children for both their truth and lie
descriptions. That is, if parent 1‟s lie was detected 50% of the time and child 1‟s
lie was detected 50% of the time, the difference between these two scores would
be 0. Therefore, a difference score of 0 would indicate similarity in detection
rates between the parent-child dyad, whereas scores above 0 indicate that children
were detected more accurately than parents, and scores below 0 indicate that
parents were detected more accurately than their children. Next, individual t-tests
were conducted using the difference scores that were calculated. These tests were
compared to 0, indicating no difference between the corresponding parent-child
pairs. Regarding the detectability of parent-child truth statements (M = 0.16, SD
= 0.32; range = -0.50 to 0.80), the t-test was significant (t(46) = 3.37, p = 0.002),
demonstrating that parents and their children were not similar in the detectability
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of their true statements. Similarly, the t-test for parent-child lie statements (M =
-0.16, SD = 0.32; range = -0.85 to 0.44), was also significant (t(46) = -3.58, p =
0.001). Therefore, parents and their children were not detected at the same rate by
adult raters for their truthful or deceptive drink descriptions.
Nonverbal Behavioural Analyses
The means and standard deviations of the positive and negative behaviours
displayed by parents and children in the truth and lie scenarios are seen in Table
2. To examine the nonverbal behaviours of parents and children when telling
truths and lies, a repeated measures general linear model analysis was conducted
with positive and negative behaviour scores as the dependent variable. Veracity
(lie or truth drink description) was the within-subject variables, family status
(parent or child) was the between-subject variable, and age group (7-9 years, 1012 years, 13-15 years, or parent) was a covariate. There were no significant main
effects for veracity (F(1,85) = 0.05, ns), family status (F(1,85) = 0.33, ns), or age
group (F(1, 85) = 0.51, ns). There were also no significant interactions.
Therefore, overall parents and children displayed similar amounts of positive and
negative behaviours when lying or telling the truth.
Next, difference scores were computed for parents and their children‟s
nonverbal behavioural displays. Specifically, four difference scores were
calculated: parent-child true positive scores, parent-child lie positive scores,
parent-child true negative scores, and parent-child lie negative scores. Using ttests to compare difference scores to 0 (indicating similar behavioural displays),
parent-child true negative scores (M = -0.05, SD = 0.16; range -0.36 to 0.36) were
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found to be significantly different from zero, t(46) = 2.17, p = 0.04. All other ttests were not significant. Thus, in general parents and their children had similar
nonverbal behaviours. However, when telling the truth parents had more negative
expressive behaviours than their children.
Discussion
The present study examined the truth- and lie-telling behaviours of parents
and their children as they participated in the same drink tasting scenario. It was
hypothesized that parents and children would be similar in their expressive
behaviours as they lied or told the truth about a drink. Specifically, it was
expected that parents and children would be detected at a similar rate when adults
viewed their drink descriptions, and that parents and children would display
similar rates of positive and negative nonverbal behaviours. The hypothesis was
partially supported, such that similarities were found between the parent-child
dyads in terms of their nonverbal expressive behaviours, yet adult raters were
unable to accurately detect the veracity of the statements of parents and children
at similar rates.
Detectability
Adult viewers rated the veracity of parents and children telling a truth and
a lie about the taste of a drink. Overall, adult viewers accurately detected the truth
and lie descriptions at a similar rate. In addition, children were detected as well as
adults, and there were no differences with regards to the developmental age
groups of the children. There was, however, a significant interaction effect in
terms of the veracity of the drink description and whether the adult was watching
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the parent or child video. Specifically, adult raters were more accurate in
detecting the lies of the children and the truths of the parents.
Several studies have examined the detectability of truths and lies told by
adults (O‟Sullivan, 2005; Vrij & Mann, 2005) and children (e.g., Leach, Talwar,
Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2004; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). These studies have generally
found that the detection accuracy rates for truths and lies are at around chance
level (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ekman & O‟Sullivan, 1991; Vrij & Mann,
2005). That is, people are not any better than chance at distinguishing when an
adult or a child is telling a truth or a lie. The present findings are consistent with
these previous results, as the overall detection accuracy for parents and children
was at 54%. On the other hand, Bond and DePaulo (2006) and Edelstein and
colleagues (2006) have suggested that there is a truth bias among individuals
when detecting others‟ deceptive behaviours, as participants tended to be more
accurate at detecting others‟ truths rather than their lies. The results of this study
were somewhat consistent with this suggestion, as adult raters tended to rate
parents as truth-tellers. That is, the raters were biased in the way they rated the
drink descriptions, such that they perceived the parents in the video clips as being
more genuine and honest than the children, and rated the videos accordingly.
Therefore, sources of bias that might be related to the response patterns of the
adults in this study should be investigated in future studies. It may be that adults
were better able to detect the truths of other adults because of their familiarity
with the way adults express themselves or a fundamentally biased belief that what
people say is truthful. Alternatively, children‟s behaviour in the drink tasting task
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may not have been salient to adult raters, and thus resulted in a biased response
pattern when viewing child drink descriptions. However, for adults who are also
familiar with children and their behaviours (e.g., parents, educators, and sameaged peers) their perceptions of children‟s behaviour may be different from
undergraduate students who generally have fairly little daily experience with
children. As a result, such individuals likely know that children generally are not
very good liars and thus could more easily detect their lie statements. There is
some support for the role that experience with children may have in detection
accuracy of children‟s lies (e.g., Crossman & Lewis, 2006; Morency & Krauss,
1982; Westcott, Davies & Clifford, 1991), and therefore a bias in terms of
experience with the population that is being detected might be important to
consider in future studies.
Developmental research suggests that lies told by younger children are
easier to detect as compared to older children and adults (e.g., Feldman et al.,
1979; Feldman et al., 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b). Difference in detection rates
between younger and older children may be due to the increased control required
over one‟s expressive behaviours when attempting to deceive successfully, that
may be too much for younger children to manage. Nevertheless, the present
results did not find any age differences in detection accuracy. This might be due
to the number of children per age group that participated in this study. It is
possible that had there been more children in each of the age groups, greater
differences may have emerged. Another possibility might be that children were
not highly motivated to tell convincing lies, as the situation was not one where the
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119
stakes were particularly high should their lies be revealed. Therefore, children
may not have taken the task seriously enough to express the specific behaviours
they may or may not have leaked when telling lies in real-life situations, and thus
as a group children did not differ from each other.
The hypothesis that parents and children would be detected at similar rates
was not supported by the data. That is, parents and children were not similar in
how well their truths and lies were discriminated by adult viewers. While it may
be that parents and children were indeed not similar in their drink descriptions, it
is also possible that the adult detectors were not good detectors overall. That is, it
may be possible that more subtle cues to deception are present in both parents and
their children, but that these cues are not easily detected by others when assessing
the veracity of statements.
Nonverbal Expressive Behaviours
In the present study, parents and their children were not found to be
detected at similar rates. However, it may be possible that children learn more
subtle behaviours from their parents, as children observe their parents‟ lie-telling.
For this reason, the nonverbal expressive behaviours of parents and children were
examined. Specifically, it was found that parents and children did not differ in the
expression of both positive and negative behaviours when telling a lie, and
positive behaviours while telling the truth. However, parents tended to display
more negative expressive behaviours than children when telling the truth. It may
be that, given the study‟s design, the parents exhibited more negative behaviours
when telling the truth about liking a good drink because they wanted to over-
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120
conceal their behaviours in comparison to their descriptions given for the bad
drink so that both drink descriptions would sound convincing. This type of
reasoning to avoid detection may be too advanced for younger children and thus
they intuitively demonstrated fewer negative behaviours when telling the truth
about their liking of a drink. Nevertheless, there was some support for the
hypothesis that children and parents do display similar expressive behaviours
when telling the truth or a lie.
While this study was first to examine the expressive behaviours of parents
and children in a lie-telling situation, the results are consistent with previous
research that has found that the displays of emotion used by parents with their
children were similar to the emotional expressions used by the children (e.g.,
Campos, 1989; Davies & Cummings, 1998; Jones et al., 1998). That is, children
may learn to use the same expressive behaviours to obtain expected outcomes in
situations resembling ones in which they observed their parents succeed. Thus,
findings from the current study suggest children may have similar emotional
expressive behaviours as their parents in politeness situations. Children may have
learned to use such expressive display strategies through direct or indirect
encouragement from their parents (Saarni & Von Salisch, 1993). In addition,
given that the means of the positive and negative behaviours displayed were
mostly similar among parents and children, suggest that some similarities do exist
between parents and their children when telling the truth or a lie, though
additional research would be needed to further support this claim. Nevertheless, it
would be interesting for future studies to examine the influence of other
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socializing agents (i.e., peers, siblings) on the development of children‟s lietelling.
Future Directions
Although parents and children were not detected at a similar rate by the
adult viewers in this study, there was some support for parents and children
demonstrating similar nonverbal expressive behaviours. It may be that the
“pretend-like” conditions of the task demands did not elicit truly deceptive
behaviours from participants. Therefore, future studies might consider a more
naturalistic lie-telling scenario to examine the truth- and lie-telling behaviours
among parents and children, one where the consequences for telling a lie are more
significant. In addition, social competence, family emotional expressiveness, or
one‟s Machiavellian orientation, might be other variables to look at in relation to
the veracity behaviour of children and their parents (see Feldman et al., 1999;
Halberstadt, Cassidy, Stifter, Parke & Fox, 1995; Kraut & Price, 1976), as these
variables have been suggested to be related to truth- and lie-telling but have not
yet been examined empirically. These variables may have a mediating or
moderating role in the deceptive emotional displays of parents and children.
Overall, when children and parents were observed to tell truths and lies in
the same paradigm (i.e., as they described the taste of a drink), their drink
descriptions were not found to be significantly related to each other, nor were
their statements detected accurately by naïve adults. Meanwhile, there was a
tendency for adult detectors to perceive children as liars and parents as truthtellers. Finally, the fact that similarities in the positive and negative behaviours of
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parents and children when telling truths and lies were obtained may suggest that
the apple does not fall far from the tree when it comes to the lie-telling behaviours
of parents and children. These findings suggest that further examination of
parents and children‟s deceptive expressive behaviours is needed.
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123
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most people can`t ``read`` others, but a few can. In R. E. Riggio & R. S.
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Saarni, C. (1984). An observational study of children‟s attempts to monitor their
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Saarni, C., & Von Salisch. M. (1993). The Socialization of emotional
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everyday life (pp.106-125). New York: The Guilford Press.
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children‟s understanding of questions about lies and mistakes.
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on fire? Detecting children‟s lies. Applied Developmental Science, 13,
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Table 1
Means (Standard Deviations) of Raters’ Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies by
Age Group
Age Group
7 to 9 years 10 to 12 years 13 to 15 years
Parent
__________________________________________________________________
Truths
0.54 (0.26)
0.39 (0.25)
0.45 (0.22)
0.63 (0.25)
Lies
0.51 (0.31)
0.72 (0.18)
0.59 (0.23)
0.45 (0.29)
__________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
Means (Standard Deviations) of Positive and Negative Behaviour Scores for
Children and Parents Telling Truths and Lies
__________________________________________________________________
Positive Behavioursa
Negative Behavioursb
Mean (SD)
Mean (SD)
__________________________________________________________________
Children
True
Lie
2.94 (1.22)
2.96 (1.28)
3.94 (1.54)
4.15 (1.57)
Parent
True
2.98 (1.31)
4.51 (1.65)
Lie
2.68 (1.35)
4.40 (1.52)
__________________________________________________________________
Note. a: total score out of 5; b: total score out of 11
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132
Detection Accuracy
1
0.8
0.6
Truth
Lie
0.4
0.2
0
Child
Parent
Family Status
Figure 1. Detection accuracy rates of children and parents truth and lie videos.
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CHAPTER 5
General Discussion
“Lying increases the creative faculties, expands the ego, and
lessens the frictions of social contacts.”
-Clare Booth Luce (1903-1987)
“One may sometimes tell a lie, but the grimace that accompanies it
tells the truth.”
-Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
While lying is a behaviour that is a common feature of people‟s daily
interactions, the developmental research community still knows relatively little
about this complex behaviour. The existing literature on lying provides
information regarding children‟s moral understanding abilities (Broomfield,
Robinson & Robinson, 2002; Siegal & Peterson, 1996, 1998), developing
cognitive and verbal skills (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee 2002b, 2008),
empathy and perspective taking (Findlay, Girardi & Coplan, 2006; Newcombe &
Huttenlocher, 1992; Peskin, 1992), and children‟s testimonials in court (e.g.,
Lyon, 2000; Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2002). However, despite these
investigations, several areas of lying remain for the most part unexamined.
Perhaps most notably absent from the literature is an examination of the role that
social factors may have on the development of lying throughout childhood. This
is surprising given that from an early age, children are socialized to learn the
benefits and consequences of lying in different social situations (Saarni & Von
Salisch, 1993), and several researchers (e.g., Lee & Ross, 1997; Talwar &
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134
Crossman, in press) have highlighted the need to examine aspects of children‟s
social environment in an effort to better understand the emergence and
development of truth- and lie-telling in childhood. Furthermore, while most
research efforts have focused on lying for antisocial reasons (i.e., to conceal a
misdeed or escape punishment), few studies have extensively explored children‟s
lie-telling for prosocial reasons (i.e., to be polite or maintain social relations).
Thus, the current program of research sought to provide original contributions to
our knowledge of lying by addressing these gaps in the literature. In light of this
objective, the manuscripts comprised in this dissertation examined predictors of
children‟s prosocial lie-telling and social variables related to the development of
lying in childhood.
The current research program comprised two manuscripts that examined
social variables related to children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviours. The first
manuscript examined children‟s prosocial lying behaviour under different
motivational contexts, their moral understanding and evaluative ratings of
prosocial scenarios, and familial-social variables related to truth- and lie-telling.
The second manuscript investigated the expressive behaviours of parents and their
children as they both participated in a politeness task where they were told to tell
a lie and a truth. The findings from these studies add to the existing literature on
the development of children‟s lying by contributing to knowledge in two broad
areas. First, these studies advance our understanding of children‟s lie-telling
behaviours, particularly in prosocial situations. Second, these studies provide
empirical support for the influence of social variables on children‟s truth- and lie-
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135
telling behaviours. Consequently, these results also have implications for
understanding children‟s social and moral development, and practically for
individuals working with children in domains where lies are common, specifically
in educational and legal settings. These contributions are discussed below.
Prosocial Lie-telling
The two manuscripts discussed herein broaden the knowledge base related
to children‟s lie-telling in politeness situations. Prior to the current research,
Talwar and colleagues (Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Murphy, et al., 2007)
found that children aged 6 years tell prosocial lies for both self-oriented (e.g., to
avoid possible negative consequences for telling the truth) and other-oriented
(e.g., told for the benefit of others) reasons. However, children‟s motivations for
telling these different lies were not well understood as the consequences for
telling these lies were never manipulated in the testing situation. By manipulating
the consequences of telling lies in the study design, children‟s motivations for
telling prosocial lies may become clearer. Popliger, Talwar and Crossman (in
press) were the first to consider children‟s motivations for telling lies in this
context.
Previous research on children‟s lie-telling has generally examined lying
when there is little at stake for the lie-teller. For instance most research has
examined children‟s antisocial lying (e.g., Lewis, Stranger & Sullivan, 1989;
Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002b, 2008), where children are often
placed in a temptation resistance paradigm and told not to touch or look at a
particular object. Later they are asked about their behaviour by an examiner.
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Should the child choose to tell a lie, there is little to lose for the child, as chances
are when they leave the research laboratory they will unlikely see the examiner
again or discuss the matter further. Similarly, when children‟s prosocial lies were
examined in politeness situation, children did not lose anything if they told a lie
and said they liked the disappointing gift (Talwar, Murphy et al., 2007) or did not
reveal a visible mark on the examiner‟s face (Talwar & Lee, 2002a). Thus, prior
research has primarily examined low-stakes lies and has not examined the
influence of motivational context on children‟s lie-telling.
The studies in the first manuscript uniquely manipulated a politeness
situation so that it would be possible to look at prosocial lie-telling for different
motivational purposes. Specifically, children were randomly assigned to either a
low-cost condition (i.e., the consequences for lying were negligible) or a high-cost
condition (i.e., negative consequences to own self interest if a lie was told; lost a
desirable gift) to examine their prosocial lying in different motivational contexts.
Using the disappointing gift scenario, child participants found themselves faced
with the choice to tell a lie when they had to give up a desirable gift or when they
were not required to. Children in Study 1 were more likely to lie in the low-cost
situation as compared to those in the high-cost situation. Here, interestingly there
was no age difference between the rates of lying among children in the second
and fourth grade in the different motivational contexts. However, children in
Study 2 were not only more likely to tell a lie in the low-cost situation when there
was nothing to lose, but a significant age group by condition effect was also
found. Specifically, for children in the high-cost condition, more children aged 6
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137
years and above chose to tell a prosocial lie (53%), as compared to preschoolers
(20%). Nevertheless, the fact that at least some young children still chose to tell
prosocial lies might suggest that even at a young age, children pick up on
messages from others to tell lies in politeness situations. Yet, it appears that not
until children are in grade school that the majority tell prosocial lies successfully
and for seemingly truly prosocial reasons.
The developmental age trend that was found in the studies comprising the
first manuscript are consistent with those reported in the few studies that have
examined children‟s prosocial lie-telling. For example, Xu et al. (2010) reported
that 7-year-olds (40%) told fewer lies than the group of 9- and 11-year olds (50%
and 60%, respectively) among their sample of Chinese children. Furthermore, Xu
and colleagues also asked children about their motives for telling lies, and found
that the motives changed with age, moving from self-serving motives when
children were younger to more prosocial motives later on. Talwar, Murphy, et al.
(2007) also found that fewer preschoolers (72%) told prosocial lies in an
undesirable gift situation, as compared to early (80%) and late elementary (84%)
school children. These rates are considerably higher than what were reported in
Study 2. It may be that part of the discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that
the current studies found an age trend specific to children telling prosocial lies in
a high-cost condition where there were real consequences to the child‟s lying. In
contrast, the procedure employed by Talwar, Murphy et al. (2007) had negligible
outcomes for children should they choose to lie, thus revealing higher rates of
lying in their sample. Alternatively, the developmental age differences found
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among children‟s prosocial lying may have to do with children‟s increased
opportunities to tell such lies. Elementary school children spend a large part of
their daily interactions with peers, wherein several opportunities may arise to
practice, obtain feedback, and modify one‟s prosocial lie-telling skills. As a result
of the increased opportunities, children may become more likely to tell lies that
are other-oriented prosocially motivated, as they become more apt to doing so.
This is consistent with the literature that suggests it is not until the school years
that the majority of children demonstrate prosocial behaviours (see Eisenberg,
Fabes, & Spinard, 2006).
The current findings also contribute to knowledge regarding children‟s lietelling via the examination of children‟s prosocial lying behaviour and their
conceptual and moral evaluations of prosocial scenarios. Specifically,
preschoolers were found to have the most difficulty differentiating between
prosocial truths and lies when compared to elementary school children.
Nevertheless, the preschoolers were better able to classify the prosocial lies than
the truths, suggesting that preschoolers begin to appreciate that in certain
situations (such as politeness situations), it is sometimes preferred to tell a lie
rather than the blunt truth if they are to be effective social communicators.
Similar findings relating to age differences in conceptual and moral evaluations
have also been reported by others (Broomfield et al., 2002; Bussey, 1999; Walper
& Valtin, 1992). Interestingly, children in Study 2 tended to evaluate prosocial
truth scenarios as more acceptable than prosocial lie scenario. This may signify
that though children learn from the messages of those in their environment that
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telling a lie in politeness situations is sometimes preferred, children are still trying
to reconcile this information with the more predominant messages they receive,
about the importance of truth-telling in order to be perceived as good and honest
people.
While no relation was found between children‟s prosocial lying and their
own moral evaluations of prosocial scenarios in Study 2, an interesting pattern of
findings did emerge when children were asked about the protagonists‟ and the
recipients‟ feelings. Children who told the truth in both the high- and low-cost
conditions were more likely to evaluate the protagonist when telling the truth as
feeling better than when a lie was told. In contrast lie-tellers in the high-cost
compared to the low-cost condition tended to rate the protagonist in the lie
scenario as feeling better than when the truth was told. In line with these findings,
when the recipients‟ feelings were taken into account, the lie-tellers in the highcost compared to the low-cost condition rated that the recipient would feel better
if they were told a lie rather than the truth. On the other hand, truth-tellers in the
low-cost condition evaluated the recipient as feeling better when told the truth as
compared to a lie. The study was the first to consider the perspective of the
protagonist and the recipient in relation to lying behaviour by asking children to
evaluate how they thought the characters would feel when told the truth or a lie.
This unique contribution adds to the understanding of children‟s motivations to
tell either a lie or a truth in a prosocial scenario, and might also be important when
children tell other types of lies. Future research should continue to examine
children‟s understanding of others‟ feelings when telling a lie in a comprehensive
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140
manner, and then to generalize this type of questioning to more naturalistic
paradigms (i.e., asking children explicitly how they think the lie-recipient would
feel after having been told a lie) in an effort to better understand the situational
contexts of children‟s reasoning for telling prosocial lies as compared to truths.
Finally, the results of the current program of research contribute to
findings related to children‟s success at telling lies convincingly by avoiding
detection. Previous research (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a,
2002b; Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009) has found mixed
findings when it comes to detecting truths and lies in children depending on the
age of the child and the expressive behaviour observed (i.e., verbal or nonverbal
behaviours). The current results are consistent with this literature. Specifically,
when children in the first manuscript were asked follow-up questions following
their behaviour in a politeness situation, older children were better able than
younger children to conceal their initial statements by not revealing information
that might otherwise expose the truth. Interestingly a sex effect was also found in
Study 1, whereby girls were better at concealing their lies than boys. It may be
that girls are socialized earlier than boys about the need to maintain their lies
during follow-up questioning with other congruent statements so as to not be
detected. It is also possible that girls may be better than boys‟ at concealing their
lies due to better developed inhibitory control abilities (e.g., Bjorklund & Kipp,
1996). However, given that no sex effect was found in Study 2, more research is
needed to examine sex differences in children‟s verbal ability to conceal their lies
and avoid detection.
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The second manuscript examined the deception detection abilities of
adults when viewing children and their parents‟ descriptions regarding the taste of
a drink. When adult viewers rated the drink descriptions, they were only 54%
accurate in detecting true and lie statements. Adults were not significantly
different from chance in their detection accuracy, a rate that is comparable with
previous detection studies (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ekman & O‟Sullivan,
1991; Vrij & Mann, 2005). Similarly, when a comprehensive coding system was
implemented to examine specific positive and negative behaviours of parents and
children as they described the taste of a drink, truths and lies were not
distinguishable from each other. In fact, parents as a group had more negative
behaviours when telling the truth. This may reflect parents‟ attempt to fool others
by over-controlling their expressive behaviours and not display exclusively
positive behaviours when telling the truth. Children, on the other hand, did not
display as much of this behaviour. On the whole, parents and children did not
differ in their displays of nonverbal behaviours however more research is needed
to further explore this question. In addition, in order to generalize these detection
results, it will be important for future research to examine the detection abilities of
other groups of adult detectors including but not limited to parent samples and
those who have experience with children‟s behaviours on a regular basis (e.g.,
peers, siblings, teachers). Furthermore, detection studies that evaluate the
behaviours of truth- and lie-tellers via in-depth momentary analyses as well as
detection in real time is necessary in order to have a better understanding of the
conditions where lying can be most accurately detected.
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Contribution of Social Factors to the Development of Truth- and Lie-telling
The findings of this study offer an original contribution to the literature by
extending our understanding of factors related to the development of children‟s
truth- and lie-telling behaviours. This program of research provides the first
evidence to suggest that social factors are indeed related to children‟s lying
behaviours by providing support for this claim in two separate studies that
examined different variables employing methodologically distinct approaches.
Specifically, in the first manuscript parenting styles and family emotional
expressiveness were found to relate to children‟s prosocial lie-telling behaviour in
a disappointing gift situation, regardless of whether the motivational context was
high or low risk. Compared to truth-tellers, children who told a prosocial lie were
more likely to have parents whose parenting style was authoritative rather than
authoritarian or permissive. Being polite and telling someone that you liked a gift
that you really were not fond of, requires social competence and an understanding
of the rules governing social interactions. Seeing as authoritative parents are
generally more likely to explain the consequences of their children‟s behaviours
and to develop their children‟s social competence, as it turns out, they also have
children who are more likely to tell a prosocial lie in a politeness situation.
Prosocial liars were also more likely to have families who reportedly had less
frequent positive emotional expressiveness. Since telling a prosocial lie requires
one to refrain from expressing genuine emotion, it may be that children only see
few positive emotional displays exhibited by their parents when they are telling
lies in politeness settings. It also may be that since the measure of emotional
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143
expressiveness used in this study assesses the frequency in which emotions are
expressed, it may be that when deception is examined as a behaviour of interest,
fewer emotions are observed, yielding correspondingly lower scores on this
particular index. Other measures of emotional expressivity might represent the
nature of the expected relationship more clearly and better inform our overall
understanding and applicability of findings to other similar groups of children.
In the second manuscript, the expressive behaviours of a sample of parents
and children were examined for similarities and differences when telling truths
and lies. Findings here pointed to similar behaviours displayed among parents
and their children when telling lies, and less so when telling the truth. It seems
then that children learn directly or indirectly behaviours from their parents about
the appropriate way they are expected to behave in politeness situations regardless
of the overriding message children also receive from their parents to be honest
and truthful. However, whether parents and children are actually similar in their
behavioural displays still requires rigorous analysis that includes replicating the
present findings within other types of politeness situations where the stakes for
telling a lie range from low to high costs. Nevertheless, these findings offer
directions for future areas of research to consider other social variables (i.e.,
attachment, social competence, or social perspective taking) that may additionally
contribute to the development of children‟s lie-telling behaviours. In so doing,
variables related to the prediction of children‟s honest and dishonest behaviours
might be better understood.
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Implications
The findings presented in this dissertation offer several theoretical and
practical implications. First, the results contribute to a better understanding of
children‟s social development. Being able to tell lies in politeness situations is a
common social skill used to ensure smooth and amicable relations with others.
Though telling lies in most situations is punished and viewed poorly, being able to
masterfully understand the parameters of particular social situations that may
require telling a lie in order to be polite, is a behaviour that few preschoolers yet
most early elementary school aged children have been shown capable of
employing successfully. Therefore, these results support the argument that by age
6 years, most children are able to reconcile the rules governing social
communications and to understand the paradox of lying; sometimes a lie can be
used as good whereas more commonly lying is condemned. Telling a lie in a
politeness situation for prosocial reasons is different than when telling lies for self
interests, and seems to have its own developmental trajectory that is only in the
beginning stage of being better understood.
The current findings contribute to understanding children‟s moral
development. More specifically, children as young as 4 years of age were found
to not only differentiate between truths and lies, but they were also able to rate
prosocial lies as less bad than prosocial truths. In addition, by taking into
consideration the feelings of the lie-recipient and the story‟s protagonist when
evaluating the goodness or badness of a situation, a more comprehensive
understanding about how children decide to behave in different contexts was
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achieved. Seeing as children‟s evaluative ratings were found to be related to the
decisions they make when faced with the choice of telling the truth or a lie in
prosocial situations, an investigation of the same variables in relation to antisocial
situations seems warranted, as consideration of others‟ feelings have also not been
examined in such contexts. Moreover, whether the lie-recipient has their own
something at stake (i.e., their pride) or they engaged with a cross tone during
questioning might also yield different relations with associated social variables.
Several of these aspects need to be further explored prior to generalizing the
present findings beyond the sample on which they were obtained.
Findings from this program of research have educational implications.
Specifically, teachers and other school personnel could be made aware of social
variables that are related to children‟s honesty and lying behaviours. In addition,
it is important for professionals working with children in schools to understand
that children‟s lie-telling may be influenced by their motivation to deceive in
different contexts, as even with a small manipulation of the perceived
consequences for lying or telling the truth, the rate of children‟s lying was found
to differ. Since a simple manipulation of the costs of lying was successful in
obtaining differential results when the lie-recipient was an unfamiliar adult,
considering the peer group as a context within which high stakes lies may be told
to maintain peer acceptance, is important for generalizing these findings to
prosocial lying situations other than a disappointing gift scenario. Lying in other
high stakes situations within a school environment (e.g., cheating, copying
homework) might also be better informed from the related variables discussed in
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146
this program of research. School psychologists may also benefit from these results
when working with particular populations where lying is more common, such as
children with behavioural difficulties. Knowing that children‟s motivations to tell
the truth or to lie varies depending on whether the consequences for telling a lie
are high or low, and that family variables are also important, effective behavioural
programs for children with lying problems might be created that are aimed at
taking these variables into account. Similarly pointing out different contexts were
lying might be encouraged may also foster better social competence, and perhaps
peer acceptance among these children. Furthermore, school wide programs that
foster honesty may benefit from open discussions of different types of lies, the
consequences of lying, and consideration of others‟ feelings when lying and
telling the truth in order to develop a greater appreciation of the roles of
intentionality and perspective taking when evaluating children‟s actions.
The current studies also provide educators and parents with information on
the influence of the social environment on children‟s honest and dishonest
behaviours. Specifically, parenting styles and family emotional expressiveness
were identified as two variables which influence the development of children‟s
lie-telling behaviour. It is also likely that other social variables such as peer
relations or overall social competence may play a role in the development of
children‟s lie-telling behaviours. As the current studies were first to examine
social variables related to children‟s lie-telling behaviour, further research should
examine these and other social variables in relation to prosocial and other types of
lies (i.e., antisocial lies) in order to provide support for the expected relationship
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
147
between social variables and the development of lying behaviour and
understanding.
Finally, findings from the current studies also have legal implications.
When children are asked to testify in judicial proceedings regarding past events,
the issue of their ability to competently stand trial often comes up (see Perner,
1997). Mostly it is debated as to whether children can be reliable sources of
information when recalling past events and whether young children can accurately
tell the truth when requested. Child participants in both manuscripts
demonstrated that they were indeed able to tell a lie when they had the motive to
do so and when someone else asked them to pretend to do so. In addition,
children were also able to distinguish between true and lie vignettes. Together,
these results suggest that most children by the age of 6 years are able to lie and
understand the consequences of doing so. Notably, the fact that the rate of
children‟s truth- and lie-telling was found to differ when the motivational context
was manipulated also has important legal implications. This was the first study to
systematically manipulate the motivational context of children‟s lying and results
suggest that children‟s motivation are essential to consider since children‟s
behaviour differs depending on whether children perceive a little or a lot is at
stake should the trth be told. Such motivational manipulations are especially
important ot consider within a legal context where by definition the consequences
for telling lies are higher and more severe.
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Directions for Future Research
The combined results of the studies comprised in this program of research
offer several suggestions for future research endeavours seeking to better
understand the development of children‟s lie-telling behaviours. First, children‟s
prosocial lying was found to be related to parenting styles and family emotional
expressivity. In addition, there were similarities in the expressive behaviours
exhibited by parents and their children when they were told to describe a drink
that either tasted good or bad. However, seeing as these were the first empirical
studies to examine social variables in relation to children‟s lying, and the research
program was focused on lies in politeness situations, it is important for future
research to examine social variables related to children‟s antisocial lying as well.
It may be that these same variables are also important in predicting the rates of
children‟s antisocial lying behaviours or that other social variables may be
involved. For example, how close one is with the lie- or truth-recipient in terms
of their attachment relationship, or parents‟ level of supervision of their child‟s
activities are other variables that may be related to the likelihood of antisocial lieor truth-telling. It would be important to also examine whether characteristics of
the lie-teller (e.g., sex or age) interact with similar characteristics of the lierecipient to effect rates of lying.
As the current research found some support for children behaving in a
similar way as their parents when telling lies and truths, future research should
also explore other social sources of influence on children‟s lying behaviour. For
example, it is not known what role the media or peers may play in influencing
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
149
children‟s truth- and lie-telling behaviour. Messages are bountiful on the internet,
in news headlines, and in fictional stories regarding the value of honesty and the
consequences of the dishonest behaviours of others. However, the effects of these
messages on children learning of their own honest and dishonest behaviours have
not yet been examined. In addition, given that by the time children are aged 6
years, they start to spend most of their days with similar aged peers and have
plenty of opportunities for observing their behaviours, interactions, and outcomes,
it would also be worthwhile for studies to examine the deceptive behaviours of
children and their similar aged-peer groups.
There are also several cultural messages that children are exposed to in
their daily lives, such as an individualistic or collectivist ideology seen in the
North American and East Asian cultures. In collectivists‟ societies of East Asia,
there is a strong emphasis on others and behaving for the good of the group. In
contrast, in the individualistic North American societies, the emphasis is on the
individual and one‟s own self interests. Researchers have demonstrated that with
regards to evaluations of truths and lies, children from these two cultures differ
(e.g., Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Ma, Xu, Heyman & Lee, 2011). It
follows then, that the results obtained in the first manuscript, in terms of parenting
styles and family emotional expressivity being related to children‟s truth- and lietelling behaviour, may be true only for children in Western societies. Therefore,
examining social factors related to children‟s lie-telling in general, and prosocial
lying in particular, in cultures that value the interests of others over the self, is
certainly worthwhile as well for it would provide additional information regarding
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
150
the role of one‟s cultural environment on the relation between lying and social
variables.
Finally, while the current research was methodologically strong by
investigating the role of social factors in the development of children‟s lie-telling,
using both parent questionnaires and having parents and children behave in the
same paradigm, alternate methodologies might also be useful to help move the
lying literature forward in new directions. For example, future research might
explore social variables via in-depth interviews with parents about the messages
they send to their children with regards to honesty. Alternatively, conducting lie
paradigms in children‟s homes or videotaping lies as they naturally occur, rather
than in the confines of a research laboratory, might also provide a more complete
understanding of the development of children‟s truthful and lying behaviours. In
addition, given that children considered the feelings of the lie-recipient when
telling a prosocial lie, it might be interesting to have parents question children
about their behaviours and the motivations for their lie-telling decisions
immediately upon discovery. Finally, using a paradigm designed to elicit lies
naturally (either antisocial or prosocial lies) from both parents and children is
suggested in an effort to examine their displays of nonverbal behaviours when
telling prosocial lies of various motivational contexts, and researchers are
encouraged to be creative in their quests to develop such a paradigm.
Concluding Remarks
The current dissertation focused on children‟s lie-telling in politeness
situations and on how social factors influence its development. Results provide
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
151
support for the idea that most children tell lies starting at a young age, and that
they appear to tell lies for truly prosocial reasons in high and low cost contexts
more regularly beginning at 6 years of age. In addition, children‟s truth- and lietelling behaviours were related to the protagonists‟ and recipients‟ feelings in
vignette scenarios, suggesting that children take others‟ feelings into account
when choosing between telling the truth or a lie. Perhaps one of the most exciting
contributions of this research program was the empirical examination of and
support for social variables and the role that families play in the development of
children‟s lie-telling. While several studies have suggested that social factors
may play a role in the acquisition and maintenance of honest and dishonest
behaviours, the studies discussed in this dissertation provide empirical support for
this claim. The combined results from this research program highlight the
importance of examining social factors in relation to the development of honest
and dishonest behaviours, and understanding factors that influence how children‟s
truth and lie-telling behaviours are fostered.
Running head: PROSOCIAL LIE-TELLING
152
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Appendix A
Parent Consent Form - Study 1
166
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Appendix B
Parent Consent Form – Study 2
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Appendix C
University Students (Adult) Consent Form – Study 2
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