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Global Citizenship with Chinese
Characteristics: Nationalism and
Global Citizenship in Developing
China
∗
Leif Anderson
This work is produced by OpenStax-CNX and licensed under the
†
Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0
Abstract
The integration of the world's communities due to globalization has led to a widespread re-negotiation
of conceptions of citizenship. Educationalists throughout the world are debating the role of global citizenship in policy objectives. In China, a transition to a neo-liberal framework has integrated the formerly
closed society into the globalized world.
However, China's development goals remain an exclusionary
project. In this context, an emerging nationalism premised on a victimization narrative, resistance identity, and ethnocentric positioning marks contemporary Chinese citizenship discourse, thus limiting the
possibility of a shift towards global citizenship discourse in Chinese education policy. Despite integration
into the neo-liberal world economy, historical circumstances make the modern Chinese state a reluctant
implementer of external ideologies and social theories. A Chinese global citizenship initiative premised
on a foreign denition is sure to be met with resistance. Although evidence of prospective global citizenship exists in China, it's survival is dependent on an internal negotiation of meaning based on Chinese
conceptions, and an institutional level implementation that could only be called Global Citizenship with
Chinese Characteristics.
1 Introduction
This chapter examines identity, nationalism, and citizenship in the context of China and it's ascension to
the main stage of globalization. Emphasis will be on how these concepts are manifesting in China's national
education policy and curriculum.
It is argued that an emerging assertive nationalism and an identity of
resistance to international ideologies are prevalent in China's institutional framework, particularly in education systems, thus limiting the capacity for conceptions of global citizenship to emerge.
Given China's
rapid development and increasing capacity to assert itself in international aairs, an examination of the
potential implications of these concepts in the discourse of global citizenship education is presented. Modern
globalization has created a world of economic, political, nancial, social, technological, and educational interdependence. This interdependence has instilled a global society of mobility and cross-cultural cooperation.
As a result, education systems around the world are debating and implementing global citizenship concepts
∗
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into policy initiatives. Due to the interconnectedness of globalization, the eects of domestic citizenship education policies are sure to reverberate throughout the world. Global citizenship policies in every nation-state
have signicance in the globalized world, however China's exponential development rate make for a case of
special signicance requiring close examination.
2 Current Discourse in Global Citizenship Education
Although an international linking of economic and cultural processes has existed throughout history, the
depth and range of this trend in contemporary globalization has created an immense challenge for scholars
and policymakers attempting to negotiate the meaning of global citizenship education. Two prevalent themes
in the global citizenship debate are the balancing of a global and national citizen concept in curriculum policy
and the balancing of the demands of global citizenship education with the required education outcomes of the
knowledge economy. As Moutsios (2008) has noted, recent education reforms are. . .being aligned to policies
of economic competitiveness. Curriculum reform, on one hand, emphasizes the formation of skills related
to the new economy, and on the other, stresses the re-formation of allegedly threatened cultural identities
(p.515). In addition, Moutsios argues that the demands of the neo-liberal global economic model are causing
a decline in democratic participation in `knowledge societies' and having a detrimental eect on citizenship
education initiatives.
In this context, one might theorize that China's developmental success is linked to
the absence of democratic processes. While liberal democratic states struggle with politically negotiating
the global economy, a one-party authoritarian system like China's might be proving to be a rather eective
model for the twenty-rst century.
On the balancing of global and domestic conceptions of citizenship, theoretical discourse is built around
the development of cosmopolitan societies and the role of patriotism and nationalism within this framework. Debates over the roles of and relationship between cosmopolitanism and patriotism are raging. Papastephanou (2008) has noted that if one takes patriotism to be a form of chauvinism or takes cosmopolitanism to be a form of chauvinism or takes cosmopolitanism to entail hostility to all particular attachments,
the relationship of the two becomes one of incompatibility (p.170).
Under this premise, incompatibility
between patriotism and cosmopolitanism require state-centered entities to make a choice between the two.
Liberal democratic societies may be able to balance the two concepts through political parties, interest
groups, and individual choice, however, citizens of one-party systems like China's are largely bound to the
path the state chooses to take. Under this premise, Waks (2008) has discussed nationalism as a barrier to the
cosmopolitan experience, with regard to the nationalistic and statist biases in the projects of state schools
systems, multiculturalists and postmodernists have for several decades challenged these, proposed non-biased
alternatives and also taken note of countervailing multi-cultural and post-modern trends (p.214-215). The
question to bear in this essay is the depth of nationalistic and statist bias in the Chinese education system
and whether multiculturalist and postmodernist voices are being heard in policy processes.
3 Clashing Civilizations and an Educational Security State?
In perhaps the strongest argument against the possibility of global citizenship in contemporary society,
Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis suggests a world of ethnically and culturally bonded
civilizations in political, economic, and military conict with one another is coming, despite the international
linking of society through globalization. Proponents of global citizenship argue that 21st century identity
can be developed along the lines of a common humanity. For Huntington (2003), global citizenship, or what
he calls universal civilization, is not possible as humanity is divided into subgroups-tribes, nations, and
broader cultural entities normally called civilizations. If the term civilization is elevated and restricted to
what is common to humanity as a whole, either one has to invent a new term to refer to the largest cultural
groupings of people short of humanity as a whole or one has to assume that these large but not-humanity-wide
groupings evaporate (p56-57). For Huntington, global citizenship is impossible as the bounds of identity
and `othering' is too strong for global citizenship conceptions to form, even in a neo-liberal world.
`Othering' is a natural, albeit mostly detrimental, aspect of cross-cultural interaction which facilitates
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conceptions of nationalism, identity, and positioning as will be further discussed later. First coined by Said
(1979) in his timeless analysis of Orientalism, or what he dened as, the ontological and epistemological
distinction made between `the Orient' and. . .'the Occident ', `othering' has developed to encompass the implicit and explicit categorization of cultural traits along the lines of perceived notions of us and them
(p.2).
According to Huntington, the civilizational `us' and extracivilizational `them' is a constant in hu-
man history (p.129). Intra- and extra-civilizational dierences are formed from feelings of superiority or
inferiority between dierent groups, fear and lack of trust of other groups, diculty of communication, and
lack of familiarity with assumptions, social practices, motivations, and social relationships of the `other'
(ibid). Huntington's thesis asserts that developing China is set to form one of the core civilizations at odds
with other core civilizational entities.
Despite political and ideological dierences of other nations in the
region, China's sheer size and ethnic similarity with the cultures of other East Asian nations will allow it to
become the leader of the East Asian region in a clash of civilizations. This assertion challenges the notion
of global citizenship education and suggests that regional citizenship may be an academic consideration for
21st century citizenship discourse.
On the role of Asia and, particularly, China in the clash of civilizations, Huntington cites the economic rise
of several East Asian nations in what he calls the Asian armation. Attributes of the Asian armation
include an increasing condent, assertive, and nationalist Asia region; and an Asia with increasing continuity
and collective identity when facing against the West, yet still fragmented and hostile to one another. On
the cultural reconguration of global politics and the politics of identity, Huntington asserts Asia will be the
site of a cultural homogenization of the `lesser China's', such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc, which
will become linked with the mainland based on cultural bonds.
Additionally, as China begins to form a
core state in the civilizational order, Huntington claims the coming emergence of a Greater China and a coprosperity sphere where China forms cultural bonds with periphery states with cultural ties such as Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese. Huntington's overall thesis suggests one of cross-civilizational
conict, and thus limited opportunities for global citizenship. However, the integration of lesser states into
a core state suggests the possibility of regional citizenship.
Education systems that embrace notions of global citizenship have the capacity to provide a preventative
response to the gloomy scenario laid out by Huntington. Advocates of global citizenship might argue that
the eects of globalization require some semblance of global citizenship in policy initiatives.
globalization links the world along competitive lines.
However,
Spring (2006) has argued global competition has
created an educational security state that has brought together the military demands of the nation-state
with educational plans for growth and development (p.5).
Under this premise, universal civilization or
global citizenship is limited by national development goals which emphasize bottom-line economic outcomes
rather than common humanity in a globalized world. For Spring, global competition actually accentuates,
rather than reduces, notions of `othering'. The opening of the world to alternative ideologies, cultures, and
identities causes a reactionary rejection of the global citizen, as opposed to an embrace. Spring's denition
of an educational security state is that:
. . .the
government attempts to mold and control the learning of children and youth for economic and
military purposes, and the government incorporates educational planning into national economic and military
planning. The educational security state places science and math along with the teaching of economic and
religious ideologies at the center of the school curriculum because of their importance for industrialization,
militarization, national patriotism, and cultural cohesion (Spring, 2006, p.3).
With an emphasis on national economic and military development, cultural cohesion, and patriotism
in education policy initiatives throughout the globalized world, there are limited opportunities for global
citizenship. Critical examination of the objectives of educational security policy initiatives and active political
participation of citizens of the world's respective citizens may limit the detrimental eects of the educational
security state on global citizenship.
As a counter-point to Huntington and Spring's theses, one could argue that global interconnectedness
and international mobility bridges the cultural divide that drives the clash of civilizations.
In terms of
global citizenship education, international education itself might be seen as a vehicle for bridging cultural
divides. Lingard and Rizvi (2009) have examined the depth of academic mobility in globalizing education
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policy. Despite `othering' tendencies of national policy discourse, the widespread international mobility of
students exposes them to alternative ideologies and viewpoints, thus allowing for global citizenship regardless of whether or not it is a policy target of world education systems.
Internationalizing curriculum is
one means of bridging cultural divides and instituting global citizenship.
Lingard and Rizvi's analysis of
internationalizing curriculum initiatives reveal three interrelated categories: facilitating study abroad and
educational exchange to broaden and enrich students' cultural experiences; learning about other languages
and cultures as a way of developing their skills of intercultural communication; and preparing graduates to
work in the global knowledge economy (2009, p.173). The rst two points are easily applicable to global
citizenship, but global knowledge economy skills under the pretense of internationalization could also be
linked to exclusive national policy goals. Studies of international students in the U.S., primarily from India
and China, reveal that an overwhelming number are studying technology, math, and science elds (Burnelli,
2010, Lingard and Rizvi, 2009). Given the intense global competition in the knowledge economy, notions of
international student mobility as a means for global citizenship may be superseded by national security and
intellectual property concerns given the elds of study primarily taken by international students. The study
abroad experience itself may expose students to cultures and ideologies they have been previously taught to
resent, but are a few years abroad enough to undo the systematic indoctrination of a decade of instruction
in the educational security state?
4 Identity, Citizenship, and Nationalism in Modern China
A 2004 article by Helen Haste examining the construction of citizenship in a globalized, neo-liberal 21st
century has made some striking observations of contemporary citizenship (Haste, 2004). These observations
make a fruitful discussion when looked at through the lens of Chinese citizenship education. First, Haste
observes a clear distinction between what are typically labeled stable and transitional/changing societies.
In stable societies, participation in political processes and a sense of identity are essentially the status
quo, while transitional societies are more actively engaged and focused on carving out a distinct identity.
Despite the adoption of neo-liberal economic principles throughout much of the world, one should not be
surprised that individual states actively seek to arm a sense of national identity dierentiated from other
states, despite economic ideological similarities, through the construction of national narrative and collective
memory.
China's economic reforms and subsequent rise to prominence have set the benchmark for the
modern transitional state, the current political system limits the active engagement Haste has citied, but
as this essay will explore the construction of a distinct Chinese identity are a signicant focus of citizenship
education.
On the construction of identity, Castells (1997) has observed three major forms and origins: legitimizing
identity, resistance identity, and project identity. Legitimizing identity might be dened as the process of
justifying the ideology, customs, norms, aims of a given group in an eort to claim its role in the world.
Resistance identity is marked by a collective eort by a group to protect itself against any perceived threats
of indoctrination or assimilation by an external entity. Project identity can be labeled as the participation
of group members in a collective project with the expected outcome of exemplifying the redeeming qualities
of the given group.
China's transition to a neo-liberal economy via the Reform and Opening Policy of
Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s has inspired an active negotiation of identity in modern China.
While
Castells implies that the above-mentioned forms of identity construction are individually applied on a case
by case basis, China's identity negotiation represents a unique case where all three forms converge to form
a distinct identity. On legitimizing identity, the dissonance between a free market economy and a one-party
communist system require the systematic legitimization of the current government system. On resistance
identity, the neo-liberal model has connotations of Westernization and democratization, two concepts the
CCP are inclined to distance the nation from. With a stinging collective memory of colonialism and imperial
conquest, an identity built on the concept of resisting undesirable foreign ideals is emerging.
On project
identity, China's economic reformation and development represent a national project bent on repositioning
China as a leader in world aairs.
Identity built on legitimizing the Party, resisting foreign ideals, and
a collective project of building a dominant society make contemporary China perhaps the most unique of
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the transitional societies. Political participation remains limited, but active engagement with identity is
thriving.
Haste's second observation is that nationalism is a surprising presence in contemporary citizenship.
While identity remains a critical source of nationalistic conceptions, Haste cites narrative and positioning.
For Haste, nationalism is not universal or a unitary concept but is transmuted by each state through its
own cultural narratives (p.414).
For citizen construction through narrative, formal education programs
provide the most explicit means of message transmission. Haste's analysis of narrative cites several types;
such as shared, competing, and taken-for-granted narratives, as well as narratives that locate, explain, and
justify the citizen and the nation (p.420). The concept of positioning, or how the collective or individual
views itself in relation to other actors, is an active and constantly changing process, especially in the era of
globalization where constant uctuations in power are prevalent. Haste observes that a particularly useful
feature of. . .positioning is the slant it gives to minority status and the management of being `othered'-as well
as othering (p.433). While Haste suggests that nationalism is not necessarily a bad thing, she observes that
a 'pathologized' nationalism is associated with an ideology of exclusion, in which the outgroup is cast as
a threat to the `purity' of the nation by virtue of race, religion, or language (p.416-417). Despite China's
integration into the world economic model, scholars have noted a rise in a rather pathologized nationalism
in modern China, built on a victimization narrative and ethnocentric positioning (Anderson, 2011, 2010,
Zakaria, 2009, Gries, 2005).
As discussed earlier, globalization is forcing education systems around the world to balance both global
and national citizenship and citizenship with knowledge economy demands.
China is no exemption.
As
Zakaria notes, Beijing is negotiating the same two forces that dene the post-American world more broadlyglobalization and nationalism. On the one hand, economic and technological pressures are pushing Beijing
towards a cooperative integration into the world.
But these same forces produce disruption and social
upheaval in the country, and the regime seeks new ways to unify an increasingly diverse society (2009,
p.88). Thus, a strong nationalism is emerging in modern China. Since China has abandoned an orthodox
commitment to communism, the Communist Party has been using nationalism as the glue that keeps China
together (Zakaria, 2009, p.122).
Since nationalism and identity are easily transmitted through formal
education systems, evidence of nationalism initiatives is found in Article 6 of the Education Law of the
People's Republic of China, which states that the State conducts education among educatees in patriotism,
collectivism, socialism, as well as in the importance of ideals, ethics, discipline, the legal system, national
defense and national unity (Spring, 2006, p.205). The presence of an emerging assertive nationalism casts
an ominous shadow of doubt on prospective global citizenship in developing China.
Recent scholarship has identied the cultural narratives and positioning processes of modern Chinese
nationalism.
Gries (2005) has examined a paradigm from a narrative of victor to one of victimization in
Chinese nationalism.
The victimization narrative emphasizes the humiliating events of China's modern
history, such as the Opium Wars, Treaty Ports, Boxer Rebellion, Colonialism, the Japanese Occupation,
Taiwan's autonomy, and the West's perceived interference in China's contemporary internal aairs. Thus,
this narrative simultaneously projects both a resistance and legitimizing identity by demonizing foreign ideals
and absolving domestic authorities of any internal responsibility for past tribulations. On positioning, Gries
cites numerous examples of dehumanizing rhetoric of the other in nationalistic discourse designed to propel
the Chinese ethnicity to the top of the social order. Gries' analysis of modern Chinese nationalism suggests
it is developing into the highly assertive and pathologized version as observed by Haste. In his analysis of
history curriculum in East Asia, Vickers (2009, 2002) has observed primordial conceptions of ethno-cultural
and historical identity and a sense that China's economic rise is a natural process placing China in its rightful
place in a international social hierarchy. China's economic reforms and subsequent rapid development instill
a collective project identity with connotations of ethnocentric positioning.
Haste's nal observation of citizenship in the globalized era is the dissolution of the left-right spectrum. . .and
the fragmentation of old ideological boundaries, particularly in Western democratic states (p.414). China's
one-party system and its ability to censor, manipulate, and indoctrinate has limited opportunities for ideological fragmentation. However, instances of dissent have periodically emerged, particularly in the infamous
incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989. As a response to this event, Party leaders convened at a National
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Morality Conference to formulate a plan to prevent any future subversion (Vickers, 2009). The result was
a Patriotic Education Campaign, implemented in schools systems as a catalyst for assertive anti-foreign
nationalism in the education system (Shirk, 2008, p. 62-63). Although other factors have been inuential,
this policy has certainly contributed to the collective resistance identity and surging nationalism in modern
China.
Other instances of dissent against the nationalistic discourse of the Party line in China have also periodically emerged, such as in fringe provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, analysis of the negotiation of
global citizenship in China should also include observation of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Although mainland
China still persists that Taiwan remains an entity of the mainland and remains a domestic concern, a half
century of democracy has created a sense of Taiwanese identity distinct from the ideology of China proper.
Liu and Hung's (2002) analysis of history curriculum in Taiwan revealed that prior to the 1990s Chinese
identity was emphasized, but Taiwanese identity was been given greater emphasis recently.
According to
Liu and Hung, this shift in conceptions of identity in Taiwan, has been part cause, part consequence of the
democratization process and the shift of political power away from the KMT old-guard and towards more
`nativist' Taiwanese elements (p.567). In the future, whether Taiwan attempts to proclaim independence or
becomes integrated into mainland China, the shift in Taiwanese conceptions of identity are likely to remain
ingrained. How mainland China copes with Taiwan's conceptions of identity and citizenship is likely to be an
indication of how global citizenship in China is conceived on a grander scale. That is, Taiwanese perceptions
of civic engagement are likely to remain forever distinct from the party line of the mainland. If Taiwan's fate
is that of independent nation or semi-autonomous territory of the mainland, similar to the One country,
two systems model of modern Hong Kong, one presumes this would occur as the result of a progressive,
exible shift in the mainland towards citizenship conceptions on the global level.
As for Hong Kong, since its release from British control and integration into the Chinese political sphere,
the ideological split between the mainland and Hong Kong has already induced the title of One country, two
systems.
The allowance of such a circumstance might suggest that Beijing is indeed capable of adopting
some notion of global citizenship.
Perceptions of a historical lack of political autonomy in Hong Kong,
whether under Beijing or the British, suggest signicant diculty in producing a history curriculum from
a local perspective (Vickers, 2002). Vickers' study outlines the attempts of Hong Kong history curriculum
developers to implement a local perspective despite political pressure from external forces. In doing so, they
have come under pressure to ensure that syllabuses conform to the `orthodox' interpretation of Hong Kong's
identity and status sanctioned by Beijing (Vickers, 2002, p.587). Although the Hong Kong-mainland China
relationship may exist under the title of One country, two systems pressure from Beijing for Hong Kong
educational authorities to conform to a particular identity suggests that the mainland is not comfortable with
notions of exible identity and dynamic citizenship. Like Taiwan, future negotiated intercourse in identity
and citizenship between mainland China and Hong Kong may make enticing qualitative evidence of China's
capacity to implement global citizenship into its policy discourse. Beijing's acceptance of the ideological range
and active civic engagement of Hong Kong's residents as an integral part of modern Chinese citizenship would
present an optimistic vision of the future of global citizenship in China.
5 Nationalism and Global Citizenship in China's Social Studies Curriculum
Cultural and political observers of developing China frequently cite a growing assertive nationalism. Despite
the illusions of prospective global citizenship in globalization discourse, education policy goals concerning
identity in China are built around Spring's conception of an educational security state. Despite the liberalization of international education, policy objectives of cross-cultural interaction are less about global citizenship
and more about global competitiveness and national strength. Under Spring's educational security state,
international education policy comprises a know your enemy rationale. The educational security state is
prevalent in all education systems in the world, but as this chapter examines citizenship in China, that will
be the focus. Lingard and Rizvi (2009) eloquently sum up the educational security state in international
education by asserting, the educational rationale underlying international education was largely concerned
with the development of skills, attitudes, and knowledge, so that, upon their return, graduates could make
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a robust contribution to national development (p.169).
While international education has emerged as a
requirement of developing societies, the exposure to alternative ideologies is often viewed as a threat to the
state. As previously discussed, the aftermath of the 1989 incident in Tiananmen Square inspired a Patriotic
Education Campaign designed to inoculate the masses from ideologies challenging the Party line and the
accepted cultural narrative.
Although media remains a highly eective means for constructing collective
identity, education systems are perhaps the most explicit institutional means.
The construction of identity is assisted by numerous social factors in our lives; however, this section will
consider the inuence of social studies curriculum in modern China as a signicant force in constructing
Chinese identity and citizenship. Vickers (2009) has provided an illuminating analysis of the national social
studies curriculum in China's secondary school system.
Titled Thought and Politics and consisting of
four textbooks: Economic Life (jingji shenghuo), Political Life (zhengzhi shenghuo), Cultural Life (wenhua
shenghuo), and Life and Philosophy (shenghuo yu zhexue), the standard secondary social studies course in
mainland China provides the basis for an indoctrination of identity, nationalism, and citizenship in developing China. Due to the dissonance of China's political ideology and its reform and neo-liberal development
strategy, the Thought and Politics course highlights Castells (1997) three aspects of identity construction: project, resistance, and legitimization, in an eort to justify the neo-liberal development model while
maintaining the illusion of socialism.
On project identity, Vickers argues that the Thought and Politics course explicitly sells the national
development strategy as a collective eort to re-establish the Chinese state in its rightful place in the world
order. While some scholars argue that global integration may open the door for the emergence of global citizenship, Vickers' examination of Chinese social studies curriculum suggests China's integration into the world
economy is something of a means to an end where the development model in an exclusionary project for domestic citizenry. On resistance identity, Vickers analysis conjures the image of Chinese nationalism narrative
as described by Gries (2005) victimization narrative. A curriculum of emphasis on the past transgressions
of foreign entities upon China deects domestic criticism of social, economic, and political problems and
ensures a state of perpetual skepticism and resentment of alternative ideologies. Thus, a highly nationalistic
narrative built around an anti-foreign discourse has emerged which protects the state, ensures enthusiastic
participation in a collective project identity which re-positions China along ethno-centric lines, and limits
the opportunity for the emergence of global citizenship. Finally, as an extension of the Patriotic Education
Campaign, social studies curriculum actively seeks to legitimize the communist party leadership as the sole
entity in civic engagement.
Vickers asserts that modern curriculum exhibits a paradigm shift away from
glorifying the contribution of the party in modern history to linking the party to past eras of greatness. In
this way, the predominant role of the party over fringe territories and minorities is justied. Although this
is largely a domestic citizenship issue, if we are to consider the possibility of global citizenship in China, the
roots of such a phenomenon is likely to be found in active, liberal citizenship on the domestic level before it
can shift to the global scale. Finally, the active legitimization of the party's role in China's development via
social studies curriculum eectively handicaps the capacity for global citizenship in contemporary China.
Although the theoretical conceptions of global citizenship remain in ux and in a state of debate, the
core attributes are likely to be built around the ideas of liberal democracy, human rights, freedom of the
press and speech, and multiculturalism. These concepts highlight much of the contestation between China
and the West. A simplied denition of global citizenship would imply that cross-cultural understanding
comprises the rudimentary vision of global citizenship. However, the Western vision of global citizenship is
bound to expand to the above mentioned attributes. Historical circumstances, collective memory, nationalistic narratives, resistance identity, and primordial conceptions of ethnic positioning in China as outlined in
this chapter suggest that external attempts to convert China's education policymakers to a global citizenship ideology it likely to be met with resistance. China's reforms and development over the past thirty-ve
years could be argued as being premised on external economic ideologies. However, the frequent labeling
of policy initiatives as being X with Chinese characteristics shows that mainland is wont to maintain a
distinct semblance of autonomy in its domestic aairs despite the obvious external inuences. Even if the
attributes of the Western conception global citizenship is privately regarded as desirable within party circles,
a historical legacy of colonialism, invasion, and exploitation suggest that eorts to convert China to an ethos
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of global citizenship will be met with resistance, perhaps out of mere spite. Jones (2002) has highlighted the
conscious attempts of China's education system to dissuade young people from adopting foreign ideologies
despite China's integration into the world economy. To prevent the adoption of seditious ideologies, such as
political pluralism and regional independence, and to prevent blind West-worshipping, the central government has called for intensied moral education (deyu) and the construction of `socialist spiritual civilization'
while making populist appeals to nationalist sentiment and launching sporadic campaigns against `spiritual
pollution ' (p.547). As discussed earlier, the aftermath of the 1989 incident in Tiananmen Square provided
the catalyst for a moral and ideological education focused on strengthening patriotism, faith in the Party,
and cultural pride (ibid.
p.559-560).
While the West perceives notions of democracy, human rights, and
peaceful evolution as key components of global citizenship, Jones contends that Chinese history education
regards these concepts as the sugar-coated bullets of `reactionary enemy forces' conspiring to undermine
China (p.559-560). Clearly, proponents of global citizenship are facing an uphill climb if hoping to convert
China's educationalists to a doctrine of global citizenship. At worst, examination of social studies curriculum
suggests evidence of Huntington's clash of civilizations emerging.
6 Reasons for Optimism
Thus far, this examination of nationalism and identity in modern China paints a rather bleak picture of
the capacity of global citizenship to emerge. Although party leaders and education policymakers seem to be
constructing a culture of resistance to global citizenship, some evidence of exible and active citizenship does
exist, suggesting that global citizenship in China is not necessarily a lost cause. Although Zakaria (2009)
has cited nationalism, censorship, intellectual property violations, support of world dictators, and clear antiJapanese and anti-American sentiment as detriments to China's global citizenship capacity, he also observes
instances of openness and reform.
For instance, Zakaria cites instances of Chinese scholars and students
seeking political reform and studying the democratic processes of so-called rival states. Additionally, Zakaria
highlights a recent mainland television series examined the development of history's great powers with
unusual respect and admiration for the openness and democratic processes of Western civilization. Although
Jones (2002) presents a rather pessimistic view of curriculum reform in China's social studies, she does
acknowledge that many people are wont to claim, `I love the country, but not the Party' (ai guo bu ai dang),
indicating that it is perfectly possible to be patriotic without supporting the regime or political system
(p.563).
A recent study of Chinese students' knowledge and perceptions of China and the U.S. revealed
objective viewpoints of both.
According to the study, Chinese students held extensive knowledge of U.S.
history, geography, socioeconomic system, and education. Although they admired the U.S. socioeconomic
and education system, they resented American hegemonic inuence in world aairs and China's domestic
issues. In their perceptions of China, they expressed patriotic pride in China's rapid development, but were
concerned with education quality and economic inequality (Zhao, Zhou, & Huang, 2008). Finally, Guthie's
(2009) analysis of the eect of globalization on China revealed the emergence of a rational-legal system at the
institutional level leading to a more active citizenship in Chinese society. Citing the recent implementation
of laws related to labor, contracts, arbitration, property, and rural democracy, Guthrie suggests a modern
China on its way to widespread democracy and active citizenship.
Thus, there may be cause for some
cautious optimism for the future of global citizenship in China; however, the realization of Chinese global
citizenship education still requires a signicant ideological shift at the policy level.
7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined nationalism and the potential for the implementation of global citizenship in
modern China. Despite some optimistic evidence of an emerging framework of active domestic citizenship
which could lay the foundation for a global turn, institutional barriers and the circumstances of China's collective consciousness limit the capacity for a timely adoption of global citizenship principles. In the backdrop
of a potential clash of civilizations, an educational security state has endorsed a nationalistic ideology into
Chinese education systems designed to inoculate citizens from liberal and alternative ideologies despite the
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Chinese integration into the global economy and international education system. National education policy
has helped to construct an identity of nationalism premised on a collective national project of resistance and
legitimization. A collective memory and cultural narrative of victimization has created a culture of resistance against foreign ideals and justied an ideology of ethnic positioning. Although it could be argued that
several nations are attempting to negotiate global citizenship under related circumstances, China's rapidly
increasing global inuence suggest that the repercussions of its global citizenship negotiation will reverberate
strongest throughout the world.
It is my hope that global citizenship in China is not wholly rejected on the premise it exhibits the Western
notions of democracy and human rights which denote the contestations of China-Western relations. Given the
collective memory of humiliation in Chinese society, one can understand the need to maintain autonomy and
development with Chinese characteristics. Through critical examination of the possibilities and potential
of global citizenship, it is my hope that the concept emerges in the minds of Chinese leadership as a practical
and desirable trait for modern Chinese society. For Western observers of China, it must be accepted that
historical implications will force an abandonment of the concept should global citizenship be perceived as
an indoctrination of foreign ideals and an unwanted interference in China's domestic aairs. The path to
Chinese global citizenship is through exposure to the concept through international education and other
aspects of globalization, followed by the internal negotiation of the meaning through Chinese policymakers
and educationalists, and nally the independent implementation of core principles and variations in what
might be called global citizenship with Chinese characteristics.
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