COMPARING DIRECT DEMOCRACY PROCESSES IN SOUTH.1
Mariana Lopes Alves 2
INTRODUCTION
Since Rousseau presented his ideas related to popular sovereignty a lot has
being said about democracy in occident. The theme that usually comes together
with the idea of legitimacy may be old, but it hasn’t diminished its importance.
Today, discussing new forms of political freedom is regaining attention from
academics and politicians. There’s an important aspect related to the rebirth of the
discussion concerning the “old democratic political institutions” and as LeDuc
(2002) shows it seems to “reflect the mood of the times”. This is what has happened
to the participatory and direct democracy instruments that are becoming a
“political trend” related to the democratic innovations, not only in the political
theory but also in practice.
A lot of examples can illustrate this, not only the traditional forms of
participation, such as social movements, associations, petitions, protests, but also
new institutional forms of participation are growing, such as the participatory
budgeting, that has being growing as an interesting democratic instrument not
only in South America, were it has born, but also in Europe and Africa (Allegretti,
2010), or the participatory planning of urban soil, with instruments such as the
comprehensive plans. In the same direction but with a different component (the
direct decision making process) are the direct democracy mechanisms (DDM)
specially the popular initiatives of law, and popular consultations such as
referenda and plebiscites. Other instruments are still finding its regulations but
have already proved to be effective, such as the use of internet as a participatory
instrument. All these examples form part of the “mood” LeDuc has mentioned.
These political instruments, of deliberative or direct democracy, are being seen as
important complementary instruments to the traditional representation form of
democracy in many countries with positive results over the citizenship and the
political organization.
Especially in South America, the participatory instruments have gained a lot
of attention over the past decade. Porto Alegre (Brazil) is always mentioned on the
1
An extended version of this work was presented as a prerequisite of a master degree in Political
Sciences at the University of Salamanca (supported by Fundación Carolina). It was later on modified in
the framework of the project “Participatory Budgeting as innovative tool for reinventing local institutions
in Portugal and Cape Verde? A critical analysis of performance and transfers” funded by Portuguese
FCT (PTDC/CS-SOC/099134/2008).
2
Junior researcher at Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal.
1
literature for its important role implementing the participatory budgeting3 that is
now one of the most defused participatory instruments. Thus the direct democracy
mechanisms have also gain ground over the last years in the region, essentially for
it huge use in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay.
Despite the growth in use and interest on the theme, there are still some big
controversies related both to the meaning of the employment of these instruments,
and to the instruments themselves. The first is associated with the different
dynamics and “levels” of inception of these instruments in similar democracies
(LeDuc, 2002; Butler y Ranney, 1994). The authors have being asking: why
countries considered in the same democratic development stage use more or less the
different forms of participation? Or, which elements lead or cause the adoption of a
non-traditional democratic instrument? The second controversy is related to the
instruments themselves. The question is now: Are all direct democracy instruments
the same? Even when two countries call a referendum, or have a popular initiative
of law with the same “nomenclature” can they be considered similar instruments?
In this paper we discuss both of this controversies related to the new
democratic instruments, focusing especially on the use of direct democracy
instruments4 in South America. First we propose a method of classification of DDM
in the selected countries, based on the idea that DDM can’t be used as dummy
variable (Bowler, Donovan, 2004), we try to incorporate other variables that helps
us classify South Americans experiences. We latter test some independent
variables that help us understand the differences found in each case. These
variables try to identify the correlation between the results and institutional
elements, such as the party fragmentation index, and the differences in their
regulation5. This is a primary approach and should be considered an exploratory
attempt to answer some of the questions we have proposed before.
1
DIRECT DEMOCRACY MECHANISMS AROUND THE WORLD.
As said, in the last few years political scientists’ interest in participatory
process has increased, and this movement is not without reason and is a
consequence of their growth around the world. LeDuc (2002) shows that since the
middle of the 70´s, direct democracy instruments, such as referenda are gaining
ground in many countries as a complement to the representative democracies.
3
See for instance AVRITZER, Leonardo. Modelos de Deliberação Democrática: uma análise do
orçamento participativo no Brazil. In: Boaventura de Sousa Santos. (Org.). Democratizar a Democracia.
Rio de Janeiro: Record, p. 01-678, v. 2002.
4
We have reduced the discussion in this paper to referenda and plebiscites, nevertheless the popular
initiative of law is also considered a DDM, considering its peculiarities we could not add this particular
discussion in this paper but this instrument is going to be considered in a extended version to be published
soon.
5
We have also tested some variables related to the political culture, however these results are not
presented in this paper.
2
Some examples are noticeable, like Switzerland, but they are not alone in this
process. The author has studied 58 nations worldwide, of which 39 had at least
one national popular consultation between 1975 and 2000. Accordantly to Butler
and Banney (1994) data, between 1793 and 1993 popular consultations were used
over 420 times in different countries across the globe. Their data shows that in this
period 27 European countries had a national referendum at least one time, in
Africa 37, and Asia 11. Until 1993, in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand had 39
and 13 popular consultations respectively. The USA is the country with most
consultations in number, nevertheless they never used direct democracy on a
national level in this period and some states lack legislation in this matter.
After 1990, the use of DDM was significantly expanded in many
democracies worldwide. In America, for instance, more than 100 public
consultations were presented to citizens until 2005 (Althman, 2005). The map
below shows the countries that adopt direct democracy instruments in their
legislation, and those that don´t, it also shows the ones that have used it at least
once (either at national or local level) after 1980 (Image 1)
IMAGE 1- JUSRISTICTION AND USE OF DDM IN THE WORLD, AFTER 1980.
Source: International IDEA
According to Althman (2005) in South America there are many DDM
models, and its use has also increased over the past years. The author uses a
typology that identifies four main categories present in Latin systems. [1] The
advisory referenda: non-binding consultation, that are so designated in Argentina,
3
for example. [2] Plebiscite: queries usually associated with constitutional reforms.
That is the most common type of DDM in the region, with examples from Peru
(1993), Panama (1992 and 1998), Guatemala (1994), Ecuador (1995), Venezuela
(1999 and 2000) and Brazil (1963 and 1993). In addition, many countries name
the consultations that allow popular veto [3] “referenda”, however, the
terminology and legal prevision varies deeply from a country to another6.
According to the author, only Uruguay uses this instrument systematically. Finally,
the [4] "recall" that allow to remove the power of an elected official, was used only
in Venezuela (2004), despite the legal provision in Colombia and Peru.7 We
consider that the ambiguity in the terminology is not a main factor that can
influence our analyze cause we agree with some authors that conceptualize most
DDM especially referenda, and plebiscites as an “way of expressing citizens
opinion or will – in free and secret ballots – about a policy that was or could be
adopted at national or local level by the authorities”8 (Benevides, 1991:34)
One of the questions that the theory has not yet been able to answer is:
What makes some countries use more DDM than others? LeDuc (2002) notes that
while countries like Switzerland, Ireland and Italy have use the DDM extensively,
other countries used it only in very specific and unique situations, such as Brazil,
Canada and Norway. In South America these distinctions are also very clear and,
the explanation doesn’t seems to relate to de democracy development index,
LeDuc suggests that while many countries with high level of democratic
development are using DDM, others, with the same characteristics "live happily
without using them."
In that sense, Lissidini (2007) emphasizes that although studies of direct
democracy have not been able to explain the rise of referenda in the world or the
differences in its dynamics, is possible to identify three current explanations for
the phenomenon in literature. The first is that the use of DDM would is expanded
when citizens political skills and political resources are expanded. The second
explanation connects the use of DDM with the increase of the political disaffection
and loss of confidence, finally, part of the theory considers that the DDMs are
instruments of "false populism" and are used only to obtain political advantages.
However, none of these explanations, as the author points, is conclusive and
studies are still under development.
2
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
6
In Brazil, for instance, the difference between a referenda and a plebiscite depends on the “time” of a
consultation, if its placed before the discussion of legislators it is a plebiscite, if it is about an already
approved law or policy it is a referendum (Alves, 2010).
7
See Lissidini (2007), for an expanded review on the constitutional incorporation of DDM in South
America.
8
Free translation.
4
Our selection of cases was determined by two kinds of control variables:
geographic and temporal. The strategy of our approach is an area and "era" study.
Keep in mind that the control by area is not the most refined, but in exploratory
studies this method is accepted (Lijphart, 1971). The main risks are
overgeneralizations about the region without taking into account countries
specificities (Pliscoff, 2003). Also, for our analysis we´ve selected the period after
the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). Therefore we’ve chosen a
period from 1985 to 20099. This period was selected because it ensures that most
countries in the region were already in progress of re-democratization10.
However, the selection of cases was not made without exceptions11.
Althman’s(2005) data shows that countries behave varies in the region since
they present a higher or lower rate of DDM use. Thus it's worth asking, which
factors are related to a greater or minor use of these mechanisms in South
America. We test two main hypotheses in this paper, the first, raised by Lijphart
(1984) and Althman (2005) concerning the importance of institutional context in
this dynamics, i.e. the possibility of popular initiative determinates the use of DDM.
Bowler and Donovan (2004) have tested this hypothesis with positive results in
the USA. The second hypothesis is inductive as we test if there’s a positive
correlation between the use of DDM and the political fragmentation of a country.
The reader should keep in mind that it is not our intention to exhaust or give a
definitive answer the question but in this exploratory approach we could already
find some interesting results.
3
DDM IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AMERICA (1985-2009)
The process of democratization in South America followed the new
democracies' trend of widening participation, and this can be noted in the legal
organization concerning the DDM in all countries studied. In table 2, it possible to
observe the types of DDM that each country foresees in its legislation. The
“mandatory” are referenda and plebiscites that are binded to some specific theme,
for example, the referenda to approve constitutional amendments. The facultative,
as the name implies, are those which the political actors have the option to
9
When the data was selected.
The exceptions are Chile y Paraguay.
10
11
It is worth highlighting two important observations about the data selection. The Argentina, Chile and
Paraguay cases cannot be taken carelessly and, in the dynamics of DDM use analysis’, these countries
were excluded from the sample for two simple reasons. The first is that Paraguay and Argentina did not
use DDM in the period selected. The second is the peculiarity of the Chilean case, as consultations
between 1988 and 1989 were made in the period of dictatorial government. Since this factor could cause
errors in the comparison, this country was also excluded. Nevertheless, these countries are included in the
samples in the measurements of relation with the independent variable “fragmentation” and
“polarization” since, in this analysis, the "no use" was considered a relevant data.
5
summon it or not. The initiative in this case belongs to the constituted powers, the
traditional elected authorities. The existence of the popular initiative is considered
by the theory of direct democracy as a feature with greater explanatory value on
the dynamics of DDM as we’ve seen (Lijphart, 1984). Regarding South America,
although this correlation is not as strong as we would expect, it shouldn’t be
ignored.
The last column of Table 2 shows whether the results of the consultations
are binding or not. In other words, if they obligate authorities to follow the results
of the consultations when developing public policies or don’t. In Argentina, Chile,
Colombia and Paraguay there are cases where the results of the consultations are
not binding, in all other countries this connection is stronger, and most DDM are
binding at some level.
TABLE 1 NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING DDM
Legal provision of DDM at national level X=provision
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Recall
Popular
initiative
Facultative
Mandatory
Country
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Bidding
Sometimes
Always
Always
Sometimes
Sometimes
Always
Sometimes
Always
Always
Always
Source: IDEA database; produced by the author.
Not only the countries are differentiated by their legislation but mainly by
the way the instruments are used. In Table 3 we find two important information in
this regard, the first is relative to the number of consultations and the second to
the themes or issues presented to the public on these occasions. When measuring
the first data in the table, “number of consultations”, only the moments of
consultation are taken into account, i.e., how many times the population faced a
DDM ballot. But most of these consultations are not singular, and presents more
than one question to citizens therefore we also have to consider this variable.
6
Thus, the second data shown in table 2 regards to each issue raised in the
consultations. This is the example of the May 1997 referendum in Ecuador, where
it was held a public consultation that sought not only to convene a national
constituent assembly, but also to ratify the mandate of the President of the
Congress at the time, Fabián Alarcón, and to dismiss President Abdullah Bucaram.
Also the consultation presented to the population other issues ranging from
electoral rules to Justice reform. In this sense, if we take into consideration the
issues of consultation, Ecuador is the South American country that has presented
the most questions to its population in the period under analysis. In total, fortythree questions/topics were presented, corresponding to 43.9% of the issues
presented in all countries.
However, does that mean that Ecuador is the country that most uses DDM in
the region? If we take into account the different times that the DDM were used,
that is, the different moments of consulting the population, Uruguay occupies the
first place among the countries of the region, with 10 national consultations,
followed by Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia. On the other hand, Argentina,
Paraguay, and Chile are the countries that used the least DDM in the region, with
none official national consultation being held (see note 9).
Nevertheless, the number of times that the population was consulted cannot
be a factor considered in isolation, as Bowler and Donovan (2004) suggests they
can’t be considered as dummy variables (presence or absence: 0/1). Just because
Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela are the countries that had presented the most
DDMs in the region does not mean that the character of these countries regarding
the use of direct democracy is the same. It is important to notice other variables
influencing their dynamics.
TABLE 2CONSULTATIONS FREQUENCY (1985-2009)
Country
Amount of
consultations*
10
7
30,3
21,2
Amount of
questions/themes
14
43
14,3
43,9
Venezuela
6
18,2
8
8,2
Bolivia
4
12,1
10
10,2
Colombia
3
9,1
17
17,3
Brazil
2
6,1
5
5,1
Peru
Argentina
1
-
3,0
-
1
-
1,0
-
Chile
-
-
-
-
Paraguay
-
-
-
-
33
100,0
98
100,0
Uruguay
Ecuador
Total
%
%
7
*In democratic periods.
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
In terms of time, it is not possible to define a period of predominance of the
use of DDM in the region. In South America history, four years are highlighted with
an equal number of consultations: 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. In chart 1, we can
observe the time line of consultations in the period under analysis by taking the
region as a whole. As for chart 2, it presents the data for each country separately.
Although it is possible to observe a greater intensity and frequency of use of DDM
after 2003 (chart 2), the data are not sufficient to demonstrate any significant
tendency.
An interesting temporal results shows that despite the global tendency
found in some analysis that participatory consultations usually overlaps traditional
ballots (LeDuc, 2002), in the region this trend is not confirmed. In the period
between 1985 and 2009, only 33% of the consultations coincided with electoral
years. In 67% of the cases, the consultations were conducted in years in which no
national ballots took place.12
CHART 1 Timetable of DDM use in South America(1985-2009)
4
3
2
1
0
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
12
Executive or legislatives.
8
CHART 2 Timetable of DDM use in South
So
America by Country (1985-2009)
(1985
3
Bolivia
2
Brasil
Colombia
Ecuador
1
Perú
Uruguay
Venezuela
0
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
One of the strongest tendencies perceived from the descriptive data is
regarding the consultations' issues. As noted in chart 3, there is a predominance of
consultations on
n constitutional reforms and State organization in the region. In this
chart, we considered individually each questions/issues
questions/issues placed in a consultation
since many issues can be addressed in the ballot. For example, Bolivia's 2004
referendum, which covered topics such as the Nationalization of oil exploration
companies, as well as the definition of the destination of the profits from the
commercialization of gas and oil. DDMs concerning the economy, reform of the
judiciary and individual liberties appear more
mor occasionally.
9
Chart 3 Themes of popular consultations in South America (1985-2009)
(1985
N=98
40
30
20
10
Social Policies
Recall /
Presidential
Elections
Individual rights
and freedoms
Privatization /
Nationalization
Judicial Reform
Economy
State Organization
Constitutional
Reform
0
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
Finally, chart 4 shows the frequency of each type of initiative. We can see
that, despite some authors deem that the increased use of DDM in the region may
be linked to a "false populism" (Lissidini, 2007), presidents are responsible for the
proposal of 33% of the DDMs,, while the parliament presented 49% of the
consultations, and 15%, that is 5 consultations, were made by the popular
initiative (4 of these cases in Uruguay and 1 in Venezuela).
CHART4 DDM INITIATIVE ORIGINS (1985-2009)
2009)
3%
15%
Parliament
49%
President
Popular
Constitutional assembly
33%
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
3.1 TYPOLOGY
10
Previously it was said that the DDM analysis shouldn’t rely on the frequency
of use taken as a dummy variable (0 or 1). Thus, we use a multivariable measure to
classify countries regarding their dynamics concerning popular referenda
considering both the frequency of use and citizens participation in these ballots.
The frequency classification is inductive and demonstrates the inclination of the
country for the use of DDM, while the electoral participation has a greater role
regarding public support or the importance/confidence people attributed to these
mechanisms. We have then categorized the comparative results into high, medium
and low, in order to observe the existing distinctions. Tables 4 and 6 show the
measurements used in the construction of the model presented in Table 7.
TABLE 3 CONSTRUCIÓN DE LA CLASSIFICACIÓN (USE)
USE
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total
Use frequency
Mean
Standard
Deviation
4
2
3
7
1
10
6
33
4,71
1,19
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
High
5,9
Medium
Low
3,5
The consultations mean in the region is 5 per country. Taking the standard
deviation into consideration, we’ve defined three groups according to the criteria
selected (High>6>Medium>3>Low). According to this classification, Uruguay,
Ecuador and Venezuela, have high levels of use of DDM, Bolivia was ranked as
medium use, Peru, Brazil and Colombia as low. Argentina, Chile and Paraguay were
classified as "No use". Another interesting data is related to the voter’s turnout at
11
these consultations. Table 5 shows the participation rate in the DDM per country.
The distinctions in this case are clear, with countries such as Uruguay presenting
more than 88% of electoral participation, while in Colombia 75% of citizens’
abstained in these ballots. However, comparisons between countries cannot take
into account only the percentage of voters’ turnout in the DDM, because for each
country this value may represent different things depend on the traditional
turnout percentage.
Table 4 Voters’ turnout in Direct Democracy Consultations.
% DDM Participation Mean
Bolivia
73,8
Brazil
75,0
Colombia
25,4
Ecuador
63,3
Peru
70,4
Uruguay
88,2
Venezuela
49,7
Source: C2D database; produced by the author.
Thus, in order to compare countries behavior on DDM turnout, we first
made a comparison within the same country between voters’ turnout in traditional
(representative elections) and nontraditional (DDM) ballots. Therefore, DDM
turnout rates were compared in each case with electoral turnout of that year, or, in
cases of mismatch, with the immediately preceding election. The results are
comparative values that show "variability in participation rates" other than simply
the DDM turnout. As in the previous case, the mean was compared and the
standard deviation was used to define the categories low, medium, and high in the
participation index13.
It is important to notice that the European and North American trend
(LeDuc, 2002; Banney and Butler, 1994) is repeated in South America. Our data
shows that voters’ turnout tends to be about 15% lower in non-traditional ballots.
That result is the same in all consultations, but the turnout rate may vary
depending on the theme of the consultation. LeDuc draws attention to the fact that
on the most important referenda in Europe the turnout are similar to the
traditional ballots; he also indicates that there is an important political advertising
campaign change related to DDM that can influence these numbers.
13
High>-7,63>Medium>-12,57>Low
12
Table 6 shows the data concerning South American countries differences in
voters’ turnout on tradition and nontraditional ballots. Note that as the global
trend, in our cases the difference is negative, i.e., voters are more involved in
traditional election than in DDM. However, there are examples where DDM turnout
is higher, for instance the Recall in Venezuela in 2004. At that time the population
was asked whether they were for or against the recall of President Hugo Chavez.
70% of the electorate participated in this ballot, and the "no" won with 59% of the
valid votes. Nevertheless, at the preceding election, in 2000, only 56.5% of the
electorate attended the polls14.
TABLE 5 PARTICIPATION INDEX
PARTICIPATION
Difference between
participation DDM and
traditional ballots (%)
-4,48
-11,33
-21,06
-9,68
-9,28
-0,83
-14,04
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total
-10,10
2,47
Source: C2D and IDEA database, produced by the author.
High
Medium
Low
-7,63
-12,57
The comparison of each outcome is presented in Table 7. This index allows
us to observe the distinct dynamics in each country. For example, although
Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela use DDM in the same intensity considering the
presence or absence of DDM, in Venezuela the voters participation is 14% lower in
DDM, while in Uruguay the difference is 0,83%, and in Bolivia is 4.48%.
14
The reader must keep in mind that this measurement has some weakness. For instance, an ongoing
studies on participatory instruments in Portugal and Cape Verde have shown its capability to bring people
that usually don’t rely or participate in traditional forms of democracy to participate in the political
decision making process. Therefore, using the turnout percentage doesn’t allow us to see if the same
person has voted in both ballots, or, of the DDM electorate differs from the tradition electorate not only in
number but in terms of “who” is participating.
13
In the same vein are Peru and Ecuador. Although Ecuador presents a “high”
level of DDM use and Peru a “low” (with only one consultation), participation rates
in the two countries doesn’t vary. This means that the fact that a country uses
more DDM does not mean that people will participate more in it, therefore, the
level of participation, or voters’ turnout on DDM doesn’t depend on the frequency
in which they are used.
TABLE 6COUNTRIES CLASSIFICATION INDEX (USE X PARTICIPATION)
PARTICIPATION
High
High
USE
Medium
Medium
Uruguay Ecuador
Low
Venezuela
Bolivia
Peru
Brazil/Colombia
Low
*Paraguay, Chile y Argentina were classified as “no use”.
3.2 WHAT EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES?
So, what explains the differences between countries? In this session we test
some hypotheses in this matter seeking for some indicators that can explain
previous results.
3.2.1 DOES INSTITUTIONS MATTERS?
The first hypothesis with which we´ve worked is that there is a relation
between institutional designs and the dynamics of use and participation as
mentioned previously. Using data from Table 2, we may observe comparatively in
each case how is the “presence or absence” varies within the type of legal
mechanism, the use and participation in each country. As seen, in all South
American countries there is a legal provision for facultative consultations and,
since it is a constant data, it has no explanatory power. Therefore we should focus
our analysis on the columns "Mandatory", "Popular Initiative" and “Binding".
14
TABLE 7 LEGAL PROVISIONS, USE AND PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH
AMERICAN DDMS.
Legal provision of DDM at national level X=provision
X
X
X
X
X
X
Recall
Popular
initiative
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
PARTICIPATI
ON
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Biding
USE
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Facultative
Mandatory
Country
Sometimes
Always
Always
Sometimes
Sometimes
Always
Sometimes
Always
Always
Always
No use
Medium
Low
No use
Low
High
No use
Low
High
High
No use
High
Low
No use
Low
Medium
No use
Medium
High
Low
Source: C2D and IDEA database, produced by the author.
There isn´t a clear relation or a tendency easily identified in this table.
However, the data show that the legal organization has some weight, even though
it does not define the results. As proposed by Lijphart (1984), in all countries that
do not allow the convening of the instruments by popular initiative, the DDM have
not being used. The only exception is Brazil, which hasn´t popular initiative of
referenda and plebiscite and has used these instruments15, nevertheless, as
presented in the table, the usage level is "low". However, the opposite cannot be
said, - that the legal provision of popular initiative is related to a “high” use of
DDM-, since there are countries like Colombia and Peru which does foresee
popular initiative but also have a low level of use of DDM.
Thus, it is possible to establish that there is an apparent relation between
the legal provision of popular initiative and the amount of DDM used. However,
that is not a relation of sufficiency or necessity, since not all countries that foresee
popular initiative use the referendums more frequently, but all those who do not
use the referendums, do not foresee the popular initiative. But this is not a strong
relation given the case of Brazil, Colombia and Peru. What seems to exist in this
case is that, in the countries with popular initiative, there is a larger tendency to
15
Brazil only has popular initiative of law, that means that citizens can present a project of law in
Congress.
15
the use of DDM. However, we consider that this data is not sufficient to reach
definitive conclusions
3.2.2 POLARIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION
The correlation tests between the use of DDM, polarization and
fragmentation were performed with three different indicators. The indicators used
were [1] the legislative polarization perceived by the parties about themselves as
well as [2] the perception of other parties. We then contrasted these
measurements with the use of DDM. To assess the relation of this variable with the
fragmentation we used [3] the effective number of parties as an indicator.
These tests are important because they allow us to distinguish in terms of
fragmentation and polarization between those countries using and with no use of
the DDM. The causal hypothesis is that the more a system is fragmented or
polarized; more DDM will be used. We suggest that this is due to the opportunity to
use it as a mechanism for policy approval by the minorities in congresses. The data
above shows that Uruguay is a strong example of this behavior (Lissidini, 2007).
The data in Table 9 shows a high statistical significance in the relation
between polarization and use; and fragmentation and use. Alone with this data we
have strong reasons to believe that the means between groups are equal or that
polarization and fragmentation are related to the use of DDM. But to determine
exactly where the correlation is significant is necessary to refine this
measurement.
TABLE 8 VARIANCE TESTS BETWEEN FRAGMENTACION,
POLARIZACION AND EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES.
9.1. ANOVA test – DDM use x Polarization perception of the other
parties (Mean)16
Sum of
df
Estimator
F
Sig.
squares
Between
53,468
3
17,823
35,845
,000**
groups
Within
24,364
49
,497
groups
Total
77,832
52
2.2. 299.2. ANOVA test – DDM use x Polarization perception of the
party itself (Mean)
Sum of
df
Estimator
F
Sig.
squares
Between
39,584
3
13,195
85,877
,000**
groups
Within
7,529
49
,154
16
Due to unavailability of data, Ecuador did not enter in the number of effective parties measurement.
16
groups
Total
47,113
52
9.3. ANOVA test – DDM use x Effective number of Parties (Mean)
Sum of
squares
37,896
df
Estimator
F
Between
3
12,632
6,307
groups
Within
194,291
97
2,003
groups
Total
232,187
100
Source: C2D, OIR database, produced by the author.
Sig.
,001**
A complementary test allows us to compare variances between groups. This
helps us to visualize whether the variation between “high”, “medium”, “low” and
“no use” are equal or are concentrated in a certain category.17 Table 10 presents
the results for all three indicators. In the first two cases, the polarization data don´t
indicate a clear tendency, but the correlation between both the 'perception of the
other parties' an 'the party itself' are located when we compare "low" and
"medium" levels, and in the comparison between "medium" and "high".
Considering the “perception of the other parties” there is a strong relation between
the groups "no use" and "high" use, but this is not confirmed concerning “the
perception of the party itself”. When we take into account “the perception of the
party itself” countries with "low" use of DDM vary in relation to all others groups,
and not only with the group "medium" as in the first measurement. The significant
relations were highlighted in the table 18.
The test with the fragmentation variable presents a clearer relation
between the groups. According to this test (Table 10.3), the correlation is
concentrated among countries with "low" and "high" usage level. The effective
number of parties is not significant to explain the distinction between "no use" and
"medium" use, but is a strong explanatory variable comparing opposite levels. The
“low and high” rates, varies within the effective number of parties, therefore, this
can be considered an important indicator to determine whether countries will
have much or little use of the DDM. But we should be careful with these results
because the table also shows that the effective number of parties is not relevant to
determine why a country uses DDM or not. It only explains in some extent the
variation degree considering those that do use DDM.
17
In our case, we chose the Boferroni test because it is the most conservative test among those that
complement the Anova, since it penalizes the significance by number of groups and by quantity of
possible comparisons.
18
The relations are dual, so they were only highlighted in one direction. The High-Low relation is
identical to the Low-High, for example
17
TABLE 9 COMPARING ANOVA TESTS.
TEST
Bonferroni
10.1. Comparing variance between groups.
DDM use x Polarization perception of the other parties (Mean)
(I) DDM Use
(J) DDM Use
Mean
Std. Error
Difference
(I-J)
No use
Low
-1,57833(*)
,43973
Medium
High
Low
No use
Medium
High
Medium
No use
High
TEST
Bonferroni
,005
,72000
,46418
,764
-1,86545(*)
,43398
,000**
1,57833(*)
2,29833(*)
-,28712
,43973
,27811
,22411
,005
,000**
1,000
-,72000
,46418
,764
Low
-2,29833(*)
,27811
,000**
High
-2,58545(*)
,26893
,000**
No use
Low
1,86545(*)
,28712
,43398
,22411
,000**
1,000
Medium
2,58545(*)
,26893
,000**
10.2. Comparing variance between groups.
DDM use x Polarization perception of the party itself (Mean)
(I) DDM Use
(J) DDM Use
Mean
Std. Error
Difference
(I-J)
No use
Low
-1,91056(*)
,24444
Medium
High
Low
No use
Medium
High
Medium
No use
High
Sig.
-,52333
,25803
Sig.
,000**
,288
,02303
,24125
1,000
1,91056(*)
1,38722(*)
1,93359(*)
,24444
,15460
,12458
,000**
,000**
,000**
,52333
,25803
,288
Low
-1,38722(*)
,15460
,000**
High
,54636(*)
,14950
,004*
No use
Low
-,02303
-1,93359(*)
,24125
,12458
1,000
,000**
Medium
-,54636(*)
,14950
,004*
10.3. Comparing variance between groups.
DDM use x Effective Number of Parties (Mean)
TEST
(I) DDM Use
(J) DDM Use
Bonferroni
No use
Low
Mean
Difference
(I-J)
-,09928
Std. Error
,86877
1,000
-,66667
,93165
1,000
-1,48559
,83575
,472
,09928
-,56739
-1,38631(*)
,86877
,53608
,34337
1,000
1,000
,001**
Medium
High
Sig.
Low
No use
Medium
High
Medium
No use
,66667
,93165
1,000
Low
,56739
,53608
1,000
High
High
No use
Low
Medium
-,81892
,48074
,550
1,48559
1,38631(*)
,83575
,34337
,472
,001**
,81892
,48074
,550
Source: C2D, OIR database, produced by the author.
18
4
CONCLUSIONS
The discussion concerning new freedoms and aspects of modern
democracies around the world is gaining ground, especially regards direct
democracy and participatory mechanisms. These mechanisms are being seen by a
large part of the theory as complement to the representative democracy, with
positive effects on accountability, and in citizens’ political culture (O'Donnell,
2007; Bowler, Donovan, 2002).
In that sense, after the 90’s we have observed an expansion in regulation
and implementation of DDMs around the world. Of the 58 democracies with
highest rates of democratic freedoms in the world, 39 have had at least one
national consultation in recent years (LeDuc, 2002). The same trend is confirmed
in South America and after the third wave of democratization, all new democratic
Constitutions in the region had foreseen at least one form of direct democracy.
However, some global trends aren’t necessarily reproduced in the region.
Regarding the consultation moment, while in most countries DDM ballots tend to
happen at the same time as the traditional elections, in South America this
tendency isn’t the same. Another concern that some authors have argued
regarding DDM is the “false populism” of direct democracy, yet, this is also
mitigated by the data concerning their initiative, given that the heads of the
executive (in South American case, presidents) usually aren’t responsible for the
consultations convene in the region. However, in countries in which presidents
assume that central role, it is necessary to take caution and analyze the use of DDM
as a political legitimacy instruments that could be overtaking the representative
institutions, but for now this remain as a hypothesis.
It is also important to take into account that different countries have
different dynamics with respect to the DDM, and part of the theory suggests that
this may be related both to the institutional design, (party fragmentation and
polarization of the political system), and also to the civic culture. In this study
we’ve tested the first two variables.
The hypotheses tests presented in this study shows that in South America
similar institutional designs do not mean similar results. The variable "initiative"
has relative explanatory power, and the results do not support a linear correlation
between the existence of popular initiative and the degree of DDM use in a country,
as part of the theory suggests. But we consider that these results are not sufficient
to draw a definitive conclusion and further tests should take place. It is inductive
considering that the possibility of popular convening should widen participation,
therefore we bear in mind that this negative result could be affected by other
variables such as knowledge about the existence of those mechanisms or the
19
number of signatures required for the initiative as previous studies suggest (Alves,
2010; Bowler and Donovan, 2004)
We’ve found the strongest relations in our tests in terms of fragmentation
and political polarization. Accordantly with our measurements there is a
significant relation between the frequency of DDM use and the effective number of
parties in Congress. That relation is especially significant among countries with
high and low levels of DDM use. This result may indicate that the DDM can be used
by the opposition as a mechanism for approving policies through popular support
were the majority in congress is not possible to obtain.
We consider that these findings, even though are primarily exploratory are
important and contribute to the investigations in this field. Recent studies indicate
an increasing growth of participatory instruments in the world with great power of
positive change and enlargement of the real state of citizenship. To ensure that the
DDM is fulfilling its role of approach the citizens to the politics and enlarge real
citizenship, we should analyze carefully the different dynamic in its use. This study
is an exploratory attempt in this direction. We draw attention to the dangers of not
differentiating the dynamics of each country, and analyze direct democracy based
only in the absence or presence of DDM. The tests performed are primary and
require further studies persuading these answers.
20
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