COMPARING DIRECT DEMOCRACY PROCESSES IN SOUTH.1 Mariana Lopes Alves 2 INTRODUCTION Since Rousseau presented his ideas related to popular sovereignty a lot has being said about democracy in occident. The theme that usually comes together with the idea of legitimacy may be old, but it hasn’t diminished its importance. Today, discussing new forms of political freedom is regaining attention from academics and politicians. There’s an important aspect related to the rebirth of the discussion concerning the “old democratic political institutions” and as LeDuc (2002) shows it seems to “reflect the mood of the times”. This is what has happened to the participatory and direct democracy instruments that are becoming a “political trend” related to the democratic innovations, not only in the political theory but also in practice. A lot of examples can illustrate this, not only the traditional forms of participation, such as social movements, associations, petitions, protests, but also new institutional forms of participation are growing, such as the participatory budgeting, that has being growing as an interesting democratic instrument not only in South America, were it has born, but also in Europe and Africa (Allegretti, 2010), or the participatory planning of urban soil, with instruments such as the comprehensive plans. In the same direction but with a different component (the direct decision making process) are the direct democracy mechanisms (DDM) specially the popular initiatives of law, and popular consultations such as referenda and plebiscites. Other instruments are still finding its regulations but have already proved to be effective, such as the use of internet as a participatory instrument. All these examples form part of the “mood” LeDuc has mentioned. These political instruments, of deliberative or direct democracy, are being seen as important complementary instruments to the traditional representation form of democracy in many countries with positive results over the citizenship and the political organization. Especially in South America, the participatory instruments have gained a lot of attention over the past decade. Porto Alegre (Brazil) is always mentioned on the 1 An extended version of this work was presented as a prerequisite of a master degree in Political Sciences at the University of Salamanca (supported by Fundación Carolina). It was later on modified in the framework of the project “Participatory Budgeting as innovative tool for reinventing local institutions in Portugal and Cape Verde? A critical analysis of performance and transfers” funded by Portuguese FCT (PTDC/CS-SOC/099134/2008). 2 Junior researcher at Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal. 1 literature for its important role implementing the participatory budgeting3 that is now one of the most defused participatory instruments. Thus the direct democracy mechanisms have also gain ground over the last years in the region, essentially for it huge use in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay. Despite the growth in use and interest on the theme, there are still some big controversies related both to the meaning of the employment of these instruments, and to the instruments themselves. The first is associated with the different dynamics and “levels” of inception of these instruments in similar democracies (LeDuc, 2002; Butler y Ranney, 1994). The authors have being asking: why countries considered in the same democratic development stage use more or less the different forms of participation? Or, which elements lead or cause the adoption of a non-traditional democratic instrument? The second controversy is related to the instruments themselves. The question is now: Are all direct democracy instruments the same? Even when two countries call a referendum, or have a popular initiative of law with the same “nomenclature” can they be considered similar instruments? In this paper we discuss both of this controversies related to the new democratic instruments, focusing especially on the use of direct democracy instruments4 in South America. First we propose a method of classification of DDM in the selected countries, based on the idea that DDM can’t be used as dummy variable (Bowler, Donovan, 2004), we try to incorporate other variables that helps us classify South Americans experiences. We latter test some independent variables that help us understand the differences found in each case. These variables try to identify the correlation between the results and institutional elements, such as the party fragmentation index, and the differences in their regulation5. This is a primary approach and should be considered an exploratory attempt to answer some of the questions we have proposed before. 1 DIRECT DEMOCRACY MECHANISMS AROUND THE WORLD. As said, in the last few years political scientists’ interest in participatory process has increased, and this movement is not without reason and is a consequence of their growth around the world. LeDuc (2002) shows that since the middle of the 70´s, direct democracy instruments, such as referenda are gaining ground in many countries as a complement to the representative democracies. 3 See for instance AVRITZER, Leonardo. Modelos de Deliberação Democrática: uma análise do orçamento participativo no Brazil. In: Boaventura de Sousa Santos. (Org.). Democratizar a Democracia. Rio de Janeiro: Record, p. 01-678, v. 2002. 4 We have reduced the discussion in this paper to referenda and plebiscites, nevertheless the popular initiative of law is also considered a DDM, considering its peculiarities we could not add this particular discussion in this paper but this instrument is going to be considered in a extended version to be published soon. 5 We have also tested some variables related to the political culture, however these results are not presented in this paper. 2 Some examples are noticeable, like Switzerland, but they are not alone in this process. The author has studied 58 nations worldwide, of which 39 had at least one national popular consultation between 1975 and 2000. Accordantly to Butler and Banney (1994) data, between 1793 and 1993 popular consultations were used over 420 times in different countries across the globe. Their data shows that in this period 27 European countries had a national referendum at least one time, in Africa 37, and Asia 11. Until 1993, in Oceania, Australia and New Zealand had 39 and 13 popular consultations respectively. The USA is the country with most consultations in number, nevertheless they never used direct democracy on a national level in this period and some states lack legislation in this matter. After 1990, the use of DDM was significantly expanded in many democracies worldwide. In America, for instance, more than 100 public consultations were presented to citizens until 2005 (Althman, 2005). The map below shows the countries that adopt direct democracy instruments in their legislation, and those that don´t, it also shows the ones that have used it at least once (either at national or local level) after 1980 (Image 1) IMAGE 1- JUSRISTICTION AND USE OF DDM IN THE WORLD, AFTER 1980. Source: International IDEA According to Althman (2005) in South America there are many DDM models, and its use has also increased over the past years. The author uses a typology that identifies four main categories present in Latin systems. [1] The advisory referenda: non-binding consultation, that are so designated in Argentina, 3 for example. [2] Plebiscite: queries usually associated with constitutional reforms. That is the most common type of DDM in the region, with examples from Peru (1993), Panama (1992 and 1998), Guatemala (1994), Ecuador (1995), Venezuela (1999 and 2000) and Brazil (1963 and 1993). In addition, many countries name the consultations that allow popular veto [3] “referenda”, however, the terminology and legal prevision varies deeply from a country to another6. According to the author, only Uruguay uses this instrument systematically. Finally, the [4] "recall" that allow to remove the power of an elected official, was used only in Venezuela (2004), despite the legal provision in Colombia and Peru.7 We consider that the ambiguity in the terminology is not a main factor that can influence our analyze cause we agree with some authors that conceptualize most DDM especially referenda, and plebiscites as an “way of expressing citizens opinion or will – in free and secret ballots – about a policy that was or could be adopted at national or local level by the authorities”8 (Benevides, 1991:34) One of the questions that the theory has not yet been able to answer is: What makes some countries use more DDM than others? LeDuc (2002) notes that while countries like Switzerland, Ireland and Italy have use the DDM extensively, other countries used it only in very specific and unique situations, such as Brazil, Canada and Norway. In South America these distinctions are also very clear and, the explanation doesn’t seems to relate to de democracy development index, LeDuc suggests that while many countries with high level of democratic development are using DDM, others, with the same characteristics "live happily without using them." In that sense, Lissidini (2007) emphasizes that although studies of direct democracy have not been able to explain the rise of referenda in the world or the differences in its dynamics, is possible to identify three current explanations for the phenomenon in literature. The first is that the use of DDM would is expanded when citizens political skills and political resources are expanded. The second explanation connects the use of DDM with the increase of the political disaffection and loss of confidence, finally, part of the theory considers that the DDMs are instruments of "false populism" and are used only to obtain political advantages. However, none of these explanations, as the author points, is conclusive and studies are still under development. 2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 In Brazil, for instance, the difference between a referenda and a plebiscite depends on the “time” of a consultation, if its placed before the discussion of legislators it is a plebiscite, if it is about an already approved law or policy it is a referendum (Alves, 2010). 7 See Lissidini (2007), for an expanded review on the constitutional incorporation of DDM in South America. 8 Free translation. 4 Our selection of cases was determined by two kinds of control variables: geographic and temporal. The strategy of our approach is an area and "era" study. Keep in mind that the control by area is not the most refined, but in exploratory studies this method is accepted (Lijphart, 1971). The main risks are overgeneralizations about the region without taking into account countries specificities (Pliscoff, 2003). Also, for our analysis we´ve selected the period after the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). Therefore we’ve chosen a period from 1985 to 20099. This period was selected because it ensures that most countries in the region were already in progress of re-democratization10. However, the selection of cases was not made without exceptions11. Althman’s(2005) data shows that countries behave varies in the region since they present a higher or lower rate of DDM use. Thus it's worth asking, which factors are related to a greater or minor use of these mechanisms in South America. We test two main hypotheses in this paper, the first, raised by Lijphart (1984) and Althman (2005) concerning the importance of institutional context in this dynamics, i.e. the possibility of popular initiative determinates the use of DDM. Bowler and Donovan (2004) have tested this hypothesis with positive results in the USA. The second hypothesis is inductive as we test if there’s a positive correlation between the use of DDM and the political fragmentation of a country. The reader should keep in mind that it is not our intention to exhaust or give a definitive answer the question but in this exploratory approach we could already find some interesting results. 3 DDM IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH AMERICA (1985-2009) The process of democratization in South America followed the new democracies' trend of widening participation, and this can be noted in the legal organization concerning the DDM in all countries studied. In table 2, it possible to observe the types of DDM that each country foresees in its legislation. The “mandatory” are referenda and plebiscites that are binded to some specific theme, for example, the referenda to approve constitutional amendments. The facultative, as the name implies, are those which the political actors have the option to 9 When the data was selected. The exceptions are Chile y Paraguay. 10 11 It is worth highlighting two important observations about the data selection. The Argentina, Chile and Paraguay cases cannot be taken carelessly and, in the dynamics of DDM use analysis’, these countries were excluded from the sample for two simple reasons. The first is that Paraguay and Argentina did not use DDM in the period selected. The second is the peculiarity of the Chilean case, as consultations between 1988 and 1989 were made in the period of dictatorial government. Since this factor could cause errors in the comparison, this country was also excluded. Nevertheless, these countries are included in the samples in the measurements of relation with the independent variable “fragmentation” and “polarization” since, in this analysis, the "no use" was considered a relevant data. 5 summon it or not. The initiative in this case belongs to the constituted powers, the traditional elected authorities. The existence of the popular initiative is considered by the theory of direct democracy as a feature with greater explanatory value on the dynamics of DDM as we’ve seen (Lijphart, 1984). Regarding South America, although this correlation is not as strong as we would expect, it shouldn’t be ignored. The last column of Table 2 shows whether the results of the consultations are binding or not. In other words, if they obligate authorities to follow the results of the consultations when developing public policies or don’t. In Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay there are cases where the results of the consultations are not binding, in all other countries this connection is stronger, and most DDM are binding at some level. TABLE 1 NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING DDM Legal provision of DDM at national level X=provision Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Recall Popular initiative Facultative Mandatory Country X X X X X X X X X X Bidding Sometimes Always Always Sometimes Sometimes Always Sometimes Always Always Always Source: IDEA database; produced by the author. Not only the countries are differentiated by their legislation but mainly by the way the instruments are used. In Table 3 we find two important information in this regard, the first is relative to the number of consultations and the second to the themes or issues presented to the public on these occasions. When measuring the first data in the table, “number of consultations”, only the moments of consultation are taken into account, i.e., how many times the population faced a DDM ballot. But most of these consultations are not singular, and presents more than one question to citizens therefore we also have to consider this variable. 6 Thus, the second data shown in table 2 regards to each issue raised in the consultations. This is the example of the May 1997 referendum in Ecuador, where it was held a public consultation that sought not only to convene a national constituent assembly, but also to ratify the mandate of the President of the Congress at the time, Fabián Alarcón, and to dismiss President Abdullah Bucaram. Also the consultation presented to the population other issues ranging from electoral rules to Justice reform. In this sense, if we take into consideration the issues of consultation, Ecuador is the South American country that has presented the most questions to its population in the period under analysis. In total, fortythree questions/topics were presented, corresponding to 43.9% of the issues presented in all countries. However, does that mean that Ecuador is the country that most uses DDM in the region? If we take into account the different times that the DDM were used, that is, the different moments of consulting the population, Uruguay occupies the first place among the countries of the region, with 10 national consultations, followed by Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia. On the other hand, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile are the countries that used the least DDM in the region, with none official national consultation being held (see note 9). Nevertheless, the number of times that the population was consulted cannot be a factor considered in isolation, as Bowler and Donovan (2004) suggests they can’t be considered as dummy variables (presence or absence: 0/1). Just because Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela are the countries that had presented the most DDMs in the region does not mean that the character of these countries regarding the use of direct democracy is the same. It is important to notice other variables influencing their dynamics. TABLE 2CONSULTATIONS FREQUENCY (1985-2009) Country Amount of consultations* 10 7 30,3 21,2 Amount of questions/themes 14 43 14,3 43,9 Venezuela 6 18,2 8 8,2 Bolivia 4 12,1 10 10,2 Colombia 3 9,1 17 17,3 Brazil 2 6,1 5 5,1 Peru Argentina 1 - 3,0 - 1 - 1,0 - Chile - - - - Paraguay - - - - 33 100,0 98 100,0 Uruguay Ecuador Total % % 7 *In democratic periods. Source: C2D database; produced by the author. In terms of time, it is not possible to define a period of predominance of the use of DDM in the region. In South America history, four years are highlighted with an equal number of consultations: 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. In chart 1, we can observe the time line of consultations in the period under analysis by taking the region as a whole. As for chart 2, it presents the data for each country separately. Although it is possible to observe a greater intensity and frequency of use of DDM after 2003 (chart 2), the data are not sufficient to demonstrate any significant tendency. An interesting temporal results shows that despite the global tendency found in some analysis that participatory consultations usually overlaps traditional ballots (LeDuc, 2002), in the region this trend is not confirmed. In the period between 1985 and 2009, only 33% of the consultations coincided with electoral years. In 67% of the cases, the consultations were conducted in years in which no national ballots took place.12 CHART 1 Timetable of DDM use in South America(1985-2009) 4 3 2 1 0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Source: C2D database; produced by the author. 12 Executive or legislatives. 8 CHART 2 Timetable of DDM use in South So America by Country (1985-2009) (1985 3 Bolivia 2 Brasil Colombia Ecuador 1 Perú Uruguay Venezuela 0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Source: C2D database; produced by the author. One of the strongest tendencies perceived from the descriptive data is regarding the consultations' issues. As noted in chart 3, there is a predominance of consultations on n constitutional reforms and State organization in the region. In this chart, we considered individually each questions/issues questions/issues placed in a consultation since many issues can be addressed in the ballot. For example, Bolivia's 2004 referendum, which covered topics such as the Nationalization of oil exploration companies, as well as the definition of the destination of the profits from the commercialization of gas and oil. DDMs concerning the economy, reform of the judiciary and individual liberties appear more mor occasionally. 9 Chart 3 Themes of popular consultations in South America (1985-2009) (1985 N=98 40 30 20 10 Social Policies Recall / Presidential Elections Individual rights and freedoms Privatization / Nationalization Judicial Reform Economy State Organization Constitutional Reform 0 Source: C2D database; produced by the author. Finally, chart 4 shows the frequency of each type of initiative. We can see that, despite some authors deem that the increased use of DDM in the region may be linked to a "false populism" (Lissidini, 2007), presidents are responsible for the proposal of 33% of the DDMs,, while the parliament presented 49% of the consultations, and 15%, that is 5 consultations, were made by the popular initiative (4 of these cases in Uruguay and 1 in Venezuela). CHART4 DDM INITIATIVE ORIGINS (1985-2009) 2009) 3% 15% Parliament 49% President Popular Constitutional assembly 33% Source: C2D database; produced by the author. 3.1 TYPOLOGY 10 Previously it was said that the DDM analysis shouldn’t rely on the frequency of use taken as a dummy variable (0 or 1). Thus, we use a multivariable measure to classify countries regarding their dynamics concerning popular referenda considering both the frequency of use and citizens participation in these ballots. The frequency classification is inductive and demonstrates the inclination of the country for the use of DDM, while the electoral participation has a greater role regarding public support or the importance/confidence people attributed to these mechanisms. We have then categorized the comparative results into high, medium and low, in order to observe the existing distinctions. Tables 4 and 6 show the measurements used in the construction of the model presented in Table 7. TABLE 3 CONSTRUCIÓN DE LA CLASSIFICACIÓN (USE) USE Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total Use frequency Mean Standard Deviation 4 2 3 7 1 10 6 33 4,71 1,19 Source: C2D database; produced by the author. High 5,9 Medium Low 3,5 The consultations mean in the region is 5 per country. Taking the standard deviation into consideration, we’ve defined three groups according to the criteria selected (High>6>Medium>3>Low). According to this classification, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela, have high levels of use of DDM, Bolivia was ranked as medium use, Peru, Brazil and Colombia as low. Argentina, Chile and Paraguay were classified as "No use". Another interesting data is related to the voter’s turnout at 11 these consultations. Table 5 shows the participation rate in the DDM per country. The distinctions in this case are clear, with countries such as Uruguay presenting more than 88% of electoral participation, while in Colombia 75% of citizens’ abstained in these ballots. However, comparisons between countries cannot take into account only the percentage of voters’ turnout in the DDM, because for each country this value may represent different things depend on the traditional turnout percentage. Table 4 Voters’ turnout in Direct Democracy Consultations. % DDM Participation Mean Bolivia 73,8 Brazil 75,0 Colombia 25,4 Ecuador 63,3 Peru 70,4 Uruguay 88,2 Venezuela 49,7 Source: C2D database; produced by the author. Thus, in order to compare countries behavior on DDM turnout, we first made a comparison within the same country between voters’ turnout in traditional (representative elections) and nontraditional (DDM) ballots. Therefore, DDM turnout rates were compared in each case with electoral turnout of that year, or, in cases of mismatch, with the immediately preceding election. The results are comparative values that show "variability in participation rates" other than simply the DDM turnout. As in the previous case, the mean was compared and the standard deviation was used to define the categories low, medium, and high in the participation index13. It is important to notice that the European and North American trend (LeDuc, 2002; Banney and Butler, 1994) is repeated in South America. Our data shows that voters’ turnout tends to be about 15% lower in non-traditional ballots. That result is the same in all consultations, but the turnout rate may vary depending on the theme of the consultation. LeDuc draws attention to the fact that on the most important referenda in Europe the turnout are similar to the traditional ballots; he also indicates that there is an important political advertising campaign change related to DDM that can influence these numbers. 13 High>-7,63>Medium>-12,57>Low 12 Table 6 shows the data concerning South American countries differences in voters’ turnout on tradition and nontraditional ballots. Note that as the global trend, in our cases the difference is negative, i.e., voters are more involved in traditional election than in DDM. However, there are examples where DDM turnout is higher, for instance the Recall in Venezuela in 2004. At that time the population was asked whether they were for or against the recall of President Hugo Chavez. 70% of the electorate participated in this ballot, and the "no" won with 59% of the valid votes. Nevertheless, at the preceding election, in 2000, only 56.5% of the electorate attended the polls14. TABLE 5 PARTICIPATION INDEX PARTICIPATION Difference between participation DDM and traditional ballots (%) -4,48 -11,33 -21,06 -9,68 -9,28 -0,83 -14,04 Mean Standard Deviation Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total -10,10 2,47 Source: C2D and IDEA database, produced by the author. High Medium Low -7,63 -12,57 The comparison of each outcome is presented in Table 7. This index allows us to observe the distinct dynamics in each country. For example, although Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela use DDM in the same intensity considering the presence or absence of DDM, in Venezuela the voters participation is 14% lower in DDM, while in Uruguay the difference is 0,83%, and in Bolivia is 4.48%. 14 The reader must keep in mind that this measurement has some weakness. For instance, an ongoing studies on participatory instruments in Portugal and Cape Verde have shown its capability to bring people that usually don’t rely or participate in traditional forms of democracy to participate in the political decision making process. Therefore, using the turnout percentage doesn’t allow us to see if the same person has voted in both ballots, or, of the DDM electorate differs from the tradition electorate not only in number but in terms of “who” is participating. 13 In the same vein are Peru and Ecuador. Although Ecuador presents a “high” level of DDM use and Peru a “low” (with only one consultation), participation rates in the two countries doesn’t vary. This means that the fact that a country uses more DDM does not mean that people will participate more in it, therefore, the level of participation, or voters’ turnout on DDM doesn’t depend on the frequency in which they are used. TABLE 6COUNTRIES CLASSIFICATION INDEX (USE X PARTICIPATION) PARTICIPATION High High USE Medium Medium Uruguay Ecuador Low Venezuela Bolivia Peru Brazil/Colombia Low *Paraguay, Chile y Argentina were classified as “no use”. 3.2 WHAT EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES? So, what explains the differences between countries? In this session we test some hypotheses in this matter seeking for some indicators that can explain previous results. 3.2.1 DOES INSTITUTIONS MATTERS? The first hypothesis with which we´ve worked is that there is a relation between institutional designs and the dynamics of use and participation as mentioned previously. Using data from Table 2, we may observe comparatively in each case how is the “presence or absence” varies within the type of legal mechanism, the use and participation in each country. As seen, in all South American countries there is a legal provision for facultative consultations and, since it is a constant data, it has no explanatory power. Therefore we should focus our analysis on the columns "Mandatory", "Popular Initiative" and “Binding". 14 TABLE 7 LEGAL PROVISIONS, USE AND PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AMERICAN DDMS. Legal provision of DDM at national level X=provision X X X X X X Recall Popular initiative X X X X X X X X X X PARTICIPATI ON X X X X X X X X X X X Biding USE Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Facultative Mandatory Country Sometimes Always Always Sometimes Sometimes Always Sometimes Always Always Always No use Medium Low No use Low High No use Low High High No use High Low No use Low Medium No use Medium High Low Source: C2D and IDEA database, produced by the author. There isn´t a clear relation or a tendency easily identified in this table. However, the data show that the legal organization has some weight, even though it does not define the results. As proposed by Lijphart (1984), in all countries that do not allow the convening of the instruments by popular initiative, the DDM have not being used. The only exception is Brazil, which hasn´t popular initiative of referenda and plebiscite and has used these instruments15, nevertheless, as presented in the table, the usage level is "low". However, the opposite cannot be said, - that the legal provision of popular initiative is related to a “high” use of DDM-, since there are countries like Colombia and Peru which does foresee popular initiative but also have a low level of use of DDM. Thus, it is possible to establish that there is an apparent relation between the legal provision of popular initiative and the amount of DDM used. However, that is not a relation of sufficiency or necessity, since not all countries that foresee popular initiative use the referendums more frequently, but all those who do not use the referendums, do not foresee the popular initiative. But this is not a strong relation given the case of Brazil, Colombia and Peru. What seems to exist in this case is that, in the countries with popular initiative, there is a larger tendency to 15 Brazil only has popular initiative of law, that means that citizens can present a project of law in Congress. 15 the use of DDM. However, we consider that this data is not sufficient to reach definitive conclusions 3.2.2 POLARIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION The correlation tests between the use of DDM, polarization and fragmentation were performed with three different indicators. The indicators used were [1] the legislative polarization perceived by the parties about themselves as well as [2] the perception of other parties. We then contrasted these measurements with the use of DDM. To assess the relation of this variable with the fragmentation we used [3] the effective number of parties as an indicator. These tests are important because they allow us to distinguish in terms of fragmentation and polarization between those countries using and with no use of the DDM. The causal hypothesis is that the more a system is fragmented or polarized; more DDM will be used. We suggest that this is due to the opportunity to use it as a mechanism for policy approval by the minorities in congresses. The data above shows that Uruguay is a strong example of this behavior (Lissidini, 2007). The data in Table 9 shows a high statistical significance in the relation between polarization and use; and fragmentation and use. Alone with this data we have strong reasons to believe that the means between groups are equal or that polarization and fragmentation are related to the use of DDM. But to determine exactly where the correlation is significant is necessary to refine this measurement. TABLE 8 VARIANCE TESTS BETWEEN FRAGMENTACION, POLARIZACION AND EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES. 9.1. ANOVA test – DDM use x Polarization perception of the other parties (Mean)16 Sum of df Estimator F Sig. squares Between 53,468 3 17,823 35,845 ,000** groups Within 24,364 49 ,497 groups Total 77,832 52 2.2. 299.2. ANOVA test – DDM use x Polarization perception of the party itself (Mean) Sum of df Estimator F Sig. squares Between 39,584 3 13,195 85,877 ,000** groups Within 7,529 49 ,154 16 Due to unavailability of data, Ecuador did not enter in the number of effective parties measurement. 16 groups Total 47,113 52 9.3. ANOVA test – DDM use x Effective number of Parties (Mean) Sum of squares 37,896 df Estimator F Between 3 12,632 6,307 groups Within 194,291 97 2,003 groups Total 232,187 100 Source: C2D, OIR database, produced by the author. Sig. ,001** A complementary test allows us to compare variances between groups. This helps us to visualize whether the variation between “high”, “medium”, “low” and “no use” are equal or are concentrated in a certain category.17 Table 10 presents the results for all three indicators. In the first two cases, the polarization data don´t indicate a clear tendency, but the correlation between both the 'perception of the other parties' an 'the party itself' are located when we compare "low" and "medium" levels, and in the comparison between "medium" and "high". Considering the “perception of the other parties” there is a strong relation between the groups "no use" and "high" use, but this is not confirmed concerning “the perception of the party itself”. When we take into account “the perception of the party itself” countries with "low" use of DDM vary in relation to all others groups, and not only with the group "medium" as in the first measurement. The significant relations were highlighted in the table 18. The test with the fragmentation variable presents a clearer relation between the groups. According to this test (Table 10.3), the correlation is concentrated among countries with "low" and "high" usage level. The effective number of parties is not significant to explain the distinction between "no use" and "medium" use, but is a strong explanatory variable comparing opposite levels. The “low and high” rates, varies within the effective number of parties, therefore, this can be considered an important indicator to determine whether countries will have much or little use of the DDM. But we should be careful with these results because the table also shows that the effective number of parties is not relevant to determine why a country uses DDM or not. It only explains in some extent the variation degree considering those that do use DDM. 17 In our case, we chose the Boferroni test because it is the most conservative test among those that complement the Anova, since it penalizes the significance by number of groups and by quantity of possible comparisons. 18 The relations are dual, so they were only highlighted in one direction. The High-Low relation is identical to the Low-High, for example 17 TABLE 9 COMPARING ANOVA TESTS. TEST Bonferroni 10.1. Comparing variance between groups. DDM use x Polarization perception of the other parties (Mean) (I) DDM Use (J) DDM Use Mean Std. Error Difference (I-J) No use Low -1,57833(*) ,43973 Medium High Low No use Medium High Medium No use High TEST Bonferroni ,005 ,72000 ,46418 ,764 -1,86545(*) ,43398 ,000** 1,57833(*) 2,29833(*) -,28712 ,43973 ,27811 ,22411 ,005 ,000** 1,000 -,72000 ,46418 ,764 Low -2,29833(*) ,27811 ,000** High -2,58545(*) ,26893 ,000** No use Low 1,86545(*) ,28712 ,43398 ,22411 ,000** 1,000 Medium 2,58545(*) ,26893 ,000** 10.2. Comparing variance between groups. DDM use x Polarization perception of the party itself (Mean) (I) DDM Use (J) DDM Use Mean Std. Error Difference (I-J) No use Low -1,91056(*) ,24444 Medium High Low No use Medium High Medium No use High Sig. -,52333 ,25803 Sig. ,000** ,288 ,02303 ,24125 1,000 1,91056(*) 1,38722(*) 1,93359(*) ,24444 ,15460 ,12458 ,000** ,000** ,000** ,52333 ,25803 ,288 Low -1,38722(*) ,15460 ,000** High ,54636(*) ,14950 ,004* No use Low -,02303 -1,93359(*) ,24125 ,12458 1,000 ,000** Medium -,54636(*) ,14950 ,004* 10.3. Comparing variance between groups. DDM use x Effective Number of Parties (Mean) TEST (I) DDM Use (J) DDM Use Bonferroni No use Low Mean Difference (I-J) -,09928 Std. Error ,86877 1,000 -,66667 ,93165 1,000 -1,48559 ,83575 ,472 ,09928 -,56739 -1,38631(*) ,86877 ,53608 ,34337 1,000 1,000 ,001** Medium High Sig. Low No use Medium High Medium No use ,66667 ,93165 1,000 Low ,56739 ,53608 1,000 High High No use Low Medium -,81892 ,48074 ,550 1,48559 1,38631(*) ,83575 ,34337 ,472 ,001** ,81892 ,48074 ,550 Source: C2D, OIR database, produced by the author. 18 4 CONCLUSIONS The discussion concerning new freedoms and aspects of modern democracies around the world is gaining ground, especially regards direct democracy and participatory mechanisms. These mechanisms are being seen by a large part of the theory as complement to the representative democracy, with positive effects on accountability, and in citizens’ political culture (O'Donnell, 2007; Bowler, Donovan, 2002). In that sense, after the 90’s we have observed an expansion in regulation and implementation of DDMs around the world. Of the 58 democracies with highest rates of democratic freedoms in the world, 39 have had at least one national consultation in recent years (LeDuc, 2002). The same trend is confirmed in South America and after the third wave of democratization, all new democratic Constitutions in the region had foreseen at least one form of direct democracy. However, some global trends aren’t necessarily reproduced in the region. Regarding the consultation moment, while in most countries DDM ballots tend to happen at the same time as the traditional elections, in South America this tendency isn’t the same. Another concern that some authors have argued regarding DDM is the “false populism” of direct democracy, yet, this is also mitigated by the data concerning their initiative, given that the heads of the executive (in South American case, presidents) usually aren’t responsible for the consultations convene in the region. However, in countries in which presidents assume that central role, it is necessary to take caution and analyze the use of DDM as a political legitimacy instruments that could be overtaking the representative institutions, but for now this remain as a hypothesis. It is also important to take into account that different countries have different dynamics with respect to the DDM, and part of the theory suggests that this may be related both to the institutional design, (party fragmentation and polarization of the political system), and also to the civic culture. In this study we’ve tested the first two variables. The hypotheses tests presented in this study shows that in South America similar institutional designs do not mean similar results. The variable "initiative" has relative explanatory power, and the results do not support a linear correlation between the existence of popular initiative and the degree of DDM use in a country, as part of the theory suggests. But we consider that these results are not sufficient to draw a definitive conclusion and further tests should take place. It is inductive considering that the possibility of popular convening should widen participation, therefore we bear in mind that this negative result could be affected by other variables such as knowledge about the existence of those mechanisms or the 19 number of signatures required for the initiative as previous studies suggest (Alves, 2010; Bowler and Donovan, 2004) We’ve found the strongest relations in our tests in terms of fragmentation and political polarization. Accordantly with our measurements there is a significant relation between the frequency of DDM use and the effective number of parties in Congress. That relation is especially significant among countries with high and low levels of DDM use. This result may indicate that the DDM can be used by the opposition as a mechanism for approving policies through popular support were the majority in congress is not possible to obtain. We consider that these findings, even though are primarily exploratory are important and contribute to the investigations in this field. Recent studies indicate an increasing growth of participatory instruments in the world with great power of positive change and enlargement of the real state of citizenship. To ensure that the DDM is fulfilling its role of approach the citizens to the politics and enlarge real citizenship, we should analyze carefully the different dynamic in its use. This study is an exploratory attempt in this direction. 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