Working
Paper Series 2013/2
Does the EU Need an Asian
Pivot? Some Reflections
Giles Scott-Smith
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Papers in this series:
The Politics of Differentiated Integration in
the European Union: Origins, Decision
Making and Outcomes, Douglas Webber,
Oct 2012 (2012/1)
The EU’s Higher Education Cooperation
with Australia, Monique Breaz, Dec
2012 (2012/2)
Australia and ASEM: The First Two
Years, Melissa Conley Tyler and Eric
Lerais, May 2013 (2013/1)
Does the EU Need an Asian Pivot?
Some Reflections, Gilles Scott-Smith,
Dec 2013 (2013/2)
MEEUC Working Papers 2012/2
Does the EU need an Asian Pivot? Some Reflections
Giles Scott-Smith
University of Leiden
ABSTRACT1
The announcement of an “Asian Pivot” or “Re-Balancing” by President Obama and his then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011-2012 signalled a shift of US interests more to the
Asia-Pacific region, in line with the growing importance of the region for global
political governance and economic growth. This caused some concerns in Europe that the
transatlantic alliance was being reduced to second place by Washington, and raised the
question of whether the EU should follow suit with its own “Asian Pivot”. Making use of
some recent thinking on the capabilities-expectations gap and grand strategy, this paper
covers the debate on this issue, looking at the views and opinion that have been put forward,
and asking what an EU “Asian Pivot” might mean in the current context.
1
This paper is based on Professor Scott-Smith’s keynote address at the Australian and New Zealand European
Union Centres joint conference at ANU in September 2013. The conference was organised by the EU Centre at
RMIT, the Monash European and EU Centre (MEEUC), the EU Centres Network of New Zealand and the ANU
Centre for European Studies. The paper is co-published with the Australian National University and also
available at http://ces.anu.edu.au/research/publications
Introduction
This paper offers a review, a kind of tour d’horizon, of recent studies coming out of
transatlantic think tanks, research centres and the media on the implications of the US shift to
the Asia-Pacific region, and its meaning for the EU.
Twenty years ago Christopher Hill published one of the most influential pieces of analysis of
the EU as an evolving institutional phenomenon: “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or
Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”. 2 Hill’s thesis was that “the Community’s
capabilities have been talked up, to the point where a significant capability-expectations gap
exists” whereby it was perceived by others to fail to achieve all it aspires to. To assess this,
Hill looked at Europe’s existing and “conceivable future functions” in the international
system. Those functions associated with EU-US relations are of interest here. Firstly, Hill
saw the EU as “the single most important actor” for managing world trade, and, crucially, its
rising status as “a second western voice in international diplomacy…. because of a perceived
need to provide an alternative view to that of the United States, both within the western world
and on behalf of it.” Concerning conceivable functions, he outlined a list of six: a
replacement for the Soviet Union in the global balance of power; a regional pacifier; a global
intervener; a mediator of conflicts; a bridge between rich and poor nations; and joint
supervisor of the world economy. Bearing in mind Hill’s thesis, it is worth taking a look at
contemporary opinion on the question: does the EU need an Asian pivot in order to enhance
its global role?
Leading By Example? The US Pivot
The year 2011 marked what appeared to be a significant shift in the world-view of the United
States. The then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined a pivot to Asia in “America’s
Pacific Century” in Foreign Affairs, and President Obama was actively projecting his nation
as a “Pacific power” in pursuit of a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement with eight other
signatories.3 Both Obama and Clinton emphasised that greater attention to the Asia-Pacific
was based on calculations of future economic growth and the substantial benefits of increased
engagement with an expanding market for technological developments, trade and investments.
Of course, US foreign policy specialists were quick to point out that George W. Bush had
already signalled an “Asian shift” with increased outreach to India and Indonesia. And before
2 C. Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’,
Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3 (1993), pp. 305-327.
3 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century,’ Foreign Affairs, November 2011. On the TPP see the
Office of the Trans-Pacific Trade Representative at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.
4 that, Bill Clinton had opened the path to rapprochement with Vietnam. Before long, some
were claiming that the entire 20th century looked like an Asian century, it being the site of the
main wars fought by the US. And you can go further back, to Commodore William Perry and
the “black ships” visiting Japan in 1856, and perhaps the dominant motif of American
engagement with Asia: John Hay’s “Open Door” notes to China in 1899-1900, insisting on
mutual agreement among the powers for an equal and open trading system with China. One
could argue that this remains the basis for US policy today – the biggest change, of course, is
with China itself.
The military dimension to the pivot has since garnered most of the attention, but Hillary
Clinton outlined five other fields of activity that it would involve: strengthening bilateral
security alliances; deepening America's relationships with rising powers, including China;
engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment and
advancing democracy and human rights. A renewed commitment to a military presence in the
region was only one part of the process of bolstering the US as the principal actor in the
region with ability to shape (or at least ensure) the direction of the region’s foremost political
and economic architecture.
Nonetheless, any increased US military presence in the Pacific was going to raise issues with
China as the most obvious competitor. As some have noted, the fact that the Pentagon has
been the one government institution to determine what the Pivot meant in practice has
attracted more attention for the military dimension than it perhaps deserves.4 Already in mid2012, at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced
that 60 per cent of US naval assets would be moved to the Indo-Pacific region by 2020. His
successor, Chuck Hagel, used the same forum in 2013 to add that 60 per cent of overseasbased US Air Force units would be stationed in the Asia-Pacific by the same date.5 These
figures are not insubstantial, and have raised concerns whether the US build-up, however
benign it may be presented, effectively translates into empowering allies such as the
Philippines (in the South China Sea) and Japan (in the East China Sea) into being more
belligerent. Instead of stability, instability could result as a visible military presence triggers
otherwise avoidable counter-reactions.
Military deployments, naval cooperation, and security dialogues are certainly part of the deal
as Washington seeks to bring partners together within overlapping security networks: US
Marines in Darwin; Australian participation in US carrier groups; increased collaboration
with Indonesia; common vision statements with Vietnam and Thailand; naval exercises with
South Korea; the possible return of a US base to the Philippines, with the idea to loosely link
4 Trefor Moss, ‘America’s Pivot to Asia: A Report Card,’ The Diplomat, 5 May 2013, available at
http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/05/americas-pivot-to-asia-a-report-card/
5 Chuck Hagel, ‘The US Approach to Regional Security,’ Shangri-La Dialogue 2013, available at
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/firstplenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d
5 these bilateral manoeuvres under a form of US tutelage; and capped in the short term with
the meeting of Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) defence ministers in
Hawaii in 2014. Flexibility, deployability, leverage, and projection are key words here, along
with perhaps the central Obama term: Options. Suggestions of Containment as per 1947 do
not really work. On the contrary, outreach to the Chinese leadership to deflate concerns have
met with some results. Already in the Pentagon’s Sustaining US Global Leadership of
January 2012 the Pivot was recast as a re-balancing of assets, something essential with the
winding down of the South Asian conflicts and the unnecessary prolongation of a major
presence in peaceful Europe. Whereas the ‘pivot’ could be interpreted as a short-term
response to immediate concerns (i.e. the rise of China), the casting of US moves as a ‘rebalancing’ fits with Obama’s pitch that this is simply a new chapter in the long-running US
role in the Pacific over many decades. This is central to the soft-sell approach directed
towards the Chinese. In April 2013 Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Martin Dempsey met with his
Chinese counterpart in Beijing to explain US wishes to be “more engaged” as a stabilising
power in the region. In August Secretary Hagel and his counterpart General Chang Wanquan
announced further military-to-military exchanges and cooperation.6 The Obama-Xi Jinping
“informal summit” in June managed to create an apparent air of congeniality even though
contentious topics such as cyber-crime and North Korea were tabled, in stark contrast to the
current dismal relations and cancelled meetings between the US President and his Russian
counterpart, Vladimir Putin. However, few imagine that such photo-opportunity pleasantness
will hold when real interests clash – particularly in view of the prognoses that China’s
leadership is shifting to a more nationalist-minded elite, less in awe of US power, or US
demands.7
There is some merit to Hagel’s claim that the military dimension is no more than part of
“primarily a diplomatic, economic and cultural strategy.”8 In March 2013 National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon re-calibrated Hillary Clinton’s original five-point blueprint so that
there was no emphasis on the military dimension. It is a strategy of smart diplomacy, linking
hard, soft, and durable power initiatives to revive long-running, and open up new, security
alliances and free trade agreements, and position the US as the central power able to oversee
stability and growth in the region. But stability – the maintenance of the status quo – is hardly
a neutral term, and is obviously opposed to disruptive moves by rising powers. The military
presence is intended to back up a US-orchestrated Asia-Pacific order which includes China,
but this is wishful thinking. As one commentator has put it, “the elephant in the pivot-room is
that China and the US are still competitors in too many areas. The American vision of an
Asia-Pacific is one that China simply does not share. China is not interested in championing
the region’s democratic institutions. It feels excluded from US programs, and instinctively
6 ‘Dempsey to China: US Seeks Stabilizing Influence in Asia,’ Voice of America, 22 April 2013,
available at http://www.voanews.com/content/dempsey-to-china-us-seeks-stabilizing-influence-inasia/1646440.html
7 David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American
Power (New York: Crown, 2012), pp. 413-414.
8 Hagel, ‘The US Approach’.
6 leans towards competing with US-led initiatives rather than joining them.”9 China is not
interested in the United States profiling itself as the “regional security provider.”10
Rival systems are therefore emerging across the Pacific. The United States has the edge in the
security field, as the overall positive response of ASEAN members to American overtures has
shown. Those nations remaining cool – most notably India – do so without any pro-Chinese
sentiment in mind, or – like Vietnam – have some serious historical baggage to overcome.
Economically, however, the cards are held by China. The much-heralded Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) is progressing, with Japan joining the group of eleven other negotiating
partners in 2013, but the question remains to what extent the TPP can become a hard reality
against competing economic frameworks. The China-Japan-Korea free trade initiative, which
would link up three economies that represent over 20 per cent of global GDP, potentially cuts
right across the TPP, showing that Japan is willing to play all sides in search of growth and
the South Koreans are following the economic realities of existing East Asian manufacturing
and trade networks. Supply chain economics certainly favour China. In 2013 the Financial
Times reported that East Asian states are increasingly tracking the yuan instead of the US
dollar. China is the largest creditor and exporter nation and the Chinese currency is now the
main trading currency in the region.11
An EU Pivot: Necessary and Desirable?
While debate rages on the causes, merits and durability of these wide-ranging US initiatives,
they have certainly raised the question of what Europe should or could do in response. After
the first expressions of concern over a US ‘exit’ from European affairs, talk of an EU Pivot or
– more modestly – Mini-Pivot has emerged from various commentators and think tanks. As
with the US, this drew complaints from those who argued that such a move had already
begun years ago. The Commission declared in its 1995 Long-Term Policy for China-Europe
Relations that “relations with China are bound to be a cornerstone in Europe’s external
relations,” and its 2001 Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership
targeted increased trade and investments.
Several points emerge from the barrage of think tank and media reports on this since 2011:
1) The US shift is a challenge to fundamental economic interests in Europe.
This is expressed in concerns that the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) will take precedence
over the recently-begun Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The
9 Moss, ‘America’s Pivot to Asia’.
10 Ulrick Speck, ‘Europe, the United States, and Asia,’ Carnegie Europe, 1 December 2011,
available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/2011/12/01/europe-united-states-and-asia/bkh1
11 ‘China’s currency is rising in America’s backyard,’ Financial Times, 22 October 2012.
7 transatlantic economic circuit involves around 54 per cent of global GDP, two-thirds of
global banking assets, and three-quarters of the financial services market. Between 20012010 more than 60 per cent of US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was channelled to Europe,
compared with 3.7 per cent to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).12
Now the US has stated that regulatory agreements achieved through the TPP will set the
standard for any transatlantic deal. The European Commission sees it as potentially boosting
GDP by a modest 0.5 per cent.13 The European Center for International Political Economy
estimates US exports to the EU could grow by 17 per cent, and EU exports to the US by 18
per cent. Notwithstanding, the US has now stated that regulatory agreements achieved
through the TPP will set the standard for any transatlantic deal. Should the TPP gain
agreements first – and it probably will, considering the long-running disputes between the US
and the EU that need to be overcome – it could have serious consequences for major sectors
of the EU economy such as agriculture and manufacturing. Yet a successful transatlantic deal
would once again reinforce the prominence of the US-EU axis in the global economy (and,
potentially as spill-over, global public policy in general), and put pressure on others within
the stalled Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).14 In some ways the TPP and
TTIP represent the real re-balancing that is at stake: does the United States first solidify the
dominance of the transatlantic trade axis, or does it rely on that being successful whatever the
circumstances and go for trans-Pacific expansion?
2)
The US Pivot inevitably brings expectations about the EU’s role.
The United States will continue its Asia-Pacific focus regardless of what the EU does, but it
will also be following EU moves to see if they support or cut across their initiatives.
Washington sees the EU’s input solely in terms of supporting US initiatives, with the
assumption that such a united front will have a more telling impact internationally. But this
brushes over the economic and financial competition between the two, and anyway, does the
EU simply want to follow the Pivot’s agenda? Does the EU accept the US version of
“regional stability”? Determined Atlanticists definitely think it should. As Karl Kaiser and
Manuel Muniz put it, “the US cannot be expected to accept European passivity and
‘neutrality’ while carrying the burden of the region's stability,” simply shifting the “burdensharing” problem – which has been around for fifty-odd years – from the Atlantic to the
Pacific.15 To these thinkers it is not primarily about Asia, its about the impact Asia has on the
transatlantic relationship.16
12 The Transatlantic Economy 2011: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade and Investment between the
United States and Europe, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
13 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/
14 Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, ‘US-EU Free Trade Agreement: Global Game-Changer?’
23 February 2013, available at http://pjmedia.com/blog/u-s-eu-free-trade-agreement-globalgamechanger/?singlepage=true
15 Karl Kaiser and Manuel Muniz, ‘Europe, too, needs an Asian pivot’, Europe’s World, Summer
2013, available at
8 3) The US Pivot raises questions about NATO.
NATO has increasingly been profiling itself as a global security provider since the 1990s,
which has been reinforced by its large-scale engagement in Afghanistan and its array of fortyone partnerships and close working relations with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South
Korea. Secretary-General Rasmussen was keen to expand these relations in order to give
NATO a more visible stake in the Asia-Pacific. The proposal for a high-level NATO-China
Council to complement the existing Council with Russia is now taken very seriously.
Whereas a decade ago it appeared as if Asian security was becoming dominated by a joint
China-Russia conglomerate (via the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty
Organization and the broader Shanghai Cooperation Organization), those fears have now
receded as China has proved itself unwilling to be tied to Moscow’s belligerent nationalism.17
Nevertheless, there is still the serious issue of what NATO can actually provide as a distinct
organisation separate from US foreign policy. This could encompass training, joint exercises,
and information-sharing, but most of the value-added component can be provided by the
United States alone or, possibly, via other existing institutions.18 And as US military assets
(and strategic concerns) move away from Europe, so NATO as a transatlantic organisation,
and particularly the European input, will be put under further strain. As recently as June 2011
the Organization was described as close to being “a collective military irrelevance” by the
outgoing Secretary of Defence Robert Gates.19
Does the EU have a Grand Strategy?
Overall, while some claim that there has been a deliberate EU Pivot since 2011, a closer
examination reveals a series of moves without any particular agenda or Big Idea, other than
coming in on the Obama-Clinton slipstream “as part of a broader US-led strategy aimed at
keeping China in check and displaying the unity of the Western liberal-democratic family.”20
The more unkind have simply dismissed it as a kind of “bandwagoning”.21 2012 did give us
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton's “Asian Semester” and confirmation in the
Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in June 2012 that “an essential element
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/Arti
cleID/22140/language/en-US/EuropetooneedsanAsianpivot.aspx
16 These authors reiterated the need for “joint rebalancing” in ‘Why Europe also needs an Asian
Pivot,’ Project Syndicate, 5 September 2013, available at http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/why-europe-also-needs-an-asian-pivot-by-karl-kaiser-and-manuel-muniz
17 Marcel de Haas, ‘Partners and Competitors: NATO and the (Far) East,’ Atlantisch Perspectief, 3
(2013), pp. 9-14.
18
For example the famed five-eyes arrangement bringing together the intelligence resources of the US, the
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
19 Robert Gates, ‘Reflections on the Status and the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance,’ Brussels,
10 June 2011, available at
http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Activities/Activitiesoverview/tabid/1292/E
ventType/EventView/EventId/1070/EventDateID/1087/PageID/5141/Reflectionsonthestatusandfuture
ofthetransatlanticalliance.aspx
9 in the security architecture of the region is provided by the US’s network of bilateral alliances”
and that the EU has “a strong interest in partnership and cooperation” to back this up.22
Catherine Ashton and Hillary Clinton issued a joint statement at the Asia Regional Forum on
cooperation in and with the Asia-Pacific in July 2012. The high-level Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM), active since 1996, has taken on renewed significance, ties within ASEAN’s
Regional Forum are improving, and efforts are being made to gain an invitation to the East
Asia Summit.
But whereas the US strategy exhibits a multilayered smart power approach, the EU is unable
really to claim a strategy at all. A recent assessment of the ten existing strategic partnerships
by the Spanish think tank FRIDE (Foundation for International Relations and Foreign
Dialogue) reveals a patchwork of ambitious but half-realised agreements with no particular
interlinkages.23 Economic interests dominate, and in a way this is not surprising. While the
transatlantic region remains by far the pre-eminent axis for investments, in terms of volume
EU-Asia trade had already surpassed that of the EU-US in the 1990s. Around one third of EU
exports head to the region, and the opening up of Arctic trade routes could provide a further
boost. On average, 25 per cent of the holdings of East Asian central banks is in Eurodenominated assets.24 But these facts do beg the question of whether the EU can do more to
safeguard these interests, in a more coordinated fashion than simply searching for more free
trade agreements. Optimistic observers such as Michael Smith think they perceive an EU
grand strategy, linking the pursuit of security, economic, and value-based interests through
the promotion of, as stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS), “an international order
based on effective multilateralism.”25 There may be some merit to this, considering the EU’s
contribution to the creation of the ASEAN+3 forum, the provision of large-scale development
and humanitarian aid, and assistance for democratic transitions in Cambodia, East Timor, and
more recently Burma. The way forward is partnership, not power. The Europe China
Network’s Bates Gill and Andrew Small see a basis for a new trilateralism, echoing the 1970s
but this time with China replacing Japan.26
20 Nicola Casarini, ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the Right Balance between the
US, China and ASEAN,’ EUISS Analysis, September 2012.
21 Laurence Norman, ‘EU looks to its own Asia Pivot,’ 3 May 2012, available at
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/05/03/eu-looks-to-its-own-asia-pivot/
22 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, 11492/12, Council of the
European Union, 15 June 2012.
23 Giovanni Grevi (ed.), Mapping EU Strategic Partnerships, FRIDE, 2010.
24 Nicola Casarini, ‘The European ‘pivot’,’ EUISS Analysis, March 2013.
25 Michael Smith, ‘A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU’s
changing global role,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 18/2 (2011), p. 151; A Secure Europe in a
Better World, 12 December 2003, p. 9, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
26 Bates Gill and Andrew Small, Untapped Trilateralism: Common Economic and Security Interests
of the European Union, the United States and China, Europe China Research and Advice Network,
2012.
10 Smith’s claim that the EU fulfills the criteria for projecting a grand strategy recognises that
all such strategies “are inherently competitive in nature, and must take into consideration the
grand strategies of other major powers.” What is more, “as China and Russia do not offer
what might be called a comprehensive ‘vision’ for global governance, it may be that the EU’s
main challenger here will be the US, at least in the short to medium term.”27 The contrast
between the EU and US also produces opportunities, as Nicola Casarini of the European
Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) has noted:
The European ‘pivot’ provides a broadly complementary – rather than alternative – political
presence to that of the US, in particular in promoting sets of multilateral-based rules and
standards. Yet there is a major difference between the two: Washington’s rebalancing
towards Asia seems primarily aimed at keeping China in check. By focusing on strengthening
its security alliances in the area, the US pivot risks (if not properly managed) causing
increased polarization and the emergence of zero-sum ‘great games’. The European pivot, by
contrast, is untrammeled by binding military alliances and is not aimed at/against any
particular country in the region. It is no coincidence that it is in places like Beijing, Seoul,
Delhi and the ASEAN Secretariat that the European pivot has found some of its strongest
supporters.28In other words, the EU’s lack of a security dimension is an advantage because it
avoids involvement in disputes such as the South China Sea. As Jonas Parello-Plesner puts it
in the East-West Center’s Asia Pacific Bulletin, “the lack of a substantial military presence in
the Asia-Pacific grants the EU greater freedom of maneuver” to pursue its own trade
strategy. 29 Casarini has also backed such an approach because there is “a window of
opportunity” to occupy the space between the two major rivals.30 Evidence supports this, with
major free trade deals with South Korea and Singapore secured, and negotiations ongoing
with India, Japan and Malaysia. China’s sudden interest in a bilateral investments agreement
reflects the rapid increase in Chinese holdings in European infrastructure during the
Eurocrisis, and any such agreement could greatly benefit the EU (at present only 2-3 per cent
of European outward investments are tied to China).31 Some point to Taiwan, with its
considerable economic and financial linkages in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
around the region, as offering still more untapped possibilities.32 One of Christopher Hill´s
“conceivable future functions” for the EU was to be a second western voice as an alternative
to the US. Maybe Asia is the place to do it.
27 Smith, ‘A liberal grand strategy,’ p. 159, 160
28 Casarini, ‘The European ‘pivot’.’
29 Jonas Parello-Plesner, ‘What is Europe’s role in Asia-Pacific?’ Asia Pacific Bulletin, 203
(February 2013), available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/grading-europe-in-the-asiapacific-european-foreign-policy-scorecard-2013
30 Casarini, ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Asia Pacific.’
31 European Commission: Trade, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/countries/china/
32 Patrick Messerlin, ‘The much-needed EU pivot to east Asia,’ East Asia Forum, 28 March 2013.
11 However, this also creates disadvantages. With no confirmed stake in security questions, the
EU is susceptible to adapting to other national agendas. In this context the determination of
China to keep maritime disputes off the agenda of both ASEAN and ASEM in 2012, and the
EU’s acquiescence with this (or, at least, the acquiescence of certain key EU member states),
was a potential sign of things to come. Likewise, there is the danger that this approach will
simply transplant the security “free-rider” accusation Americans have directed at Europe for
many years from the Atlantic to the Pacific (or, worse – double it).
The EU Dilemma: One for All, All for One?
This brings up the most important issue at stake in any talk of a so-called Asian Pivot for
Europe: to what extent can it actually be carried out in a coherent fashion? Michael Smith
claims it can. He acknowledges that a strategic move like the US “pivot” is usually reserved
for nation states, not international organisations, and for good reasons – it depends on the
successful coordination of all elements of diplomacy, with coherent and complementary
methods and goals.33 He makes a good case for the EU, but also very easily passes over the
fact that it has not been functioning very effectively as a single unit in international affairs in
recent years.
Other studies verify the gaps between theory and reality on this point. A revealing 2013
report by researchers at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations indicates that the
EU’s “effective multilateralism” is little more than wishful thinking. Covering international
negotiations since the introduction of the ESS in 2003 on issues such as environmental
protection, health, food, water, education and transport, the report gives a “fragmented and
weak” picture where EU representatives often either did not pursue anything resembling
effective multilateralism, or pursued national agendas instead. Strategic goals were lacking,
mainly due to the absence of a joint position. There was a lack of communication and
coordination both across different negotiating fora, and between EU and member state levels
of activity.34 One might respond that these are matters of low politics dealt with by a diverse
array of experts, and that matters of high politics do after all express the necessary unity. But
there are problems at that level as well. The EU’s diplomatic presence is looking very
cumbersome: the troika of Van Rompuy, Barosso and Ashton, added to which the
determination of the larger member states to be present at the major venues, involves a large
entourage lacking “one credible interlocutor”.35
33
Smith, ‘A liberal grand strategy.’
34 Louise van Schaik and Barend ter Haar, ‘Why the EU is not promoting effective multilateralism,’
Clingendael Policy Brief, 21 (June 2013), available at http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/why-eunot-promoting-effective-multilateralism. The full study will be available as E. Drieskens and L. van
Schaik (eds), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: External and Internal Reform (London:
Routledge, 2014).
35 Jonas Parello-Plesner, ‘Europe’s Mini-pivot to Asia,’ China-US Focus, 6 November 2012.
12 Yet the EU’s influence is perceivable in other ways. A useful study by David Scott has
shown how since the 1990s the EU has promoted multilateralism (i.e. a rule-based normative
international system) as opposed to China’s greater interest in multipolarity (i.e. opposition to
great power hegemony, generally interpreted as US unilateralism). Yet in recent years there
seems to have been a convergence in the two parties’ usage, with Beijing adopting a more
temperate line. Scott points out that the usage of the term “multilateralism” is not necessarily
the same for both, with the EU’s normative stance balanced by China’s more strategic
opportunism. Thus “Multilateralism makes China look good, whereas multilateralism serves
as a compensation for EU weaknesses to operate in a multipolar Great Power way.”36
However, a socialising effect could be discernible, whereby the EU’s strong advocacy is
drawing the Chinese leadership into its normative way of thinking. Perhaps the EU scores
better on this point than many realise.
Three points are worth exploring here in slightly more detail: the coordination between the
EU institutions and the member states, the security dimension, and the role of the European
External Action Service (EEAS).
1) EU – Member State Coordination
As the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Foreign Policy Scorecard for 2013
demonstrates, the coordination problem has come out strongest in relation to China. The two
EU-China summits in 2012 were overshadowed by bilateral deals involving Ireland, Poland
and Central Europe, and in particular Germany. There is no agreement among the member
states on how to approach China – whether to push an agenda shaped by trade interests,
democratic values, or regional cooperation and security. The EU is ostensibly pursuing all
three through the high level dialogues of the EU-China strategic partnership, but bilateral
arrangements have instead set the tone. The hope of many in recent years that China could
play a decisive role in ‘solving’ the Euro-crisis (by buying up government bonds) has not
been realised, but neither has it completely disappeared. With German-Chinese trade at an
all-time high, in 2012 Angela Merkel visited China twice and set herself up as the main
leader of consequence for the Eurozone. Both leaderships agree that debt reduction is the
only solution, and neither feel they should pay for it either. Merkel has shown an
unwillingness to back any move that could damage trade relations, including failing to
support her own solar power industry’s anti-dumping complaint against China. Even the
intended EU-China investment agreement is regarded lukewarmly by the Germans (and by
the British, but for other reasons) as entering territory they would rather manage at the
national level. It must be added that this stance has not prevented Germany from continuing
to be a vocal proponent of human rights and the Tibetan issue in recent diplomacy, in line
36
David Scott, ‘Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Beyond: EU-China Understandings of the
International System,’ International Relations, 27 (2013), p. 43.
13 with the EU’s overall position. 37 But this all demonstrates a problematic multi-level
diplomacy rather than a coherent platform pursued consistently at the European level. In the
view of a European Council on Foreign Relations report it has also split the EU between the
“frustrated market openers” and the “cash-strapped deal seekers” and allowed China to
exploit the differences.38
2) The Security Dimension
This point also involves Germany, or rather, “Germany’s culture of excessive military
restraint.”39 Recent polls have shown that while Germans tend to trust the military as an
institution, there remains very low support for actually using it for anything proactive. This
has been demonstrated by German reticence to get involved in NATO’s Operation Unified
Protector in Libya, and in an absence of input into the development of the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP). The old joke that NATO was established to keep the Americans
in, the Russians out, and the Germans down is now outdated because the Germans now seem
intent on keeping themselves down better than anyone else could. The large-scale NATO
mission in Afghanistan has stretched both the political will and the military capabilities of
European nations to the limit, and security issues in Asia – aside from low-key liaison – are
predominantly dealt with on a bilateral basis, as with the defence and security agreements
signed by the UK and Japan in July 2013. In the words of Christian Leuprecht, the EU has an
“underdeveloped security-military imagination,” and in current economic circumstances this
is unlikely to change in the short term.40
However, the security dimension is complicated if the issue of the global arms trade is
included. From this perspective Europe is very active in Asia, with European defence firms
successfully selling land-, sea-, and air-based hardware across the continent. But it is the
longer-term partnership arrangements being developed by, for instance, Airbus, Eurocopter,
and Saab with nations across the region that point the way ahead. This is not just a
competitive market between European and American corporate giants, but the joint
development of systems specifically for Asian-Pacific terrain.41 The long-term ramifications
of these developments are as yet unclear.
37 EU Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013: China, pp. 25-38, available at
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013
38 Francois Godement and Jonas Parello-Plesner with Alice Richard, ‘The Scramble for Europe,’
ECFR Policy Brief, July 2011.
39 Kaiser and Muniz, ‘Europe, too, needs an Asian pivot’
40 Remarks at the Atlantische Commissie International Seminar, ‘Support in Society for the Armed
Forces: Perspectives from North America and Europe,’ The Hague, 1 July 2013.
41 Robbin Laird, ‘America Pivots to Asia: Europe Arms It,’ The Diplomat, 16 August 2013,
available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/16/america-pivots-to-asia-europe-arms-it/
14 3) The Role of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
Some see the EEAS as the future solution, able to develop “an umbrella strategy” to bridge
both intra-European and transatlantic differences.42 Asia needs to be “mainstreamed” into EU
thinking on international affairs, across all policy fields, something that cannot occur through
bilateral deals, and EEAS may be the missing ingredient to achieve this.43 But there are clear
challenges to overcome. There is the fact that cooperation between the Service and the
Commission is not yet optimal, with the latter holding on to its premier status in areas such as
trade, development, and global governance. There is the problem of an effective division of
labour between the Service and the national diplomatic apparatuses, with the Service entering
a crowded diplomatic landscape as if it is representing another state, when it clearly
represents more – or less? – than that. Burden-sharing has so far been forced by budgetary
constraints rather than any commitment to a deeper integration of foreign policy. Member
states still tend to keep the high priority matters for themselves and leave the difficult
dossiers such as human rights to the EU, letting the EEAS take the flak. There is also the fact
that even within the Service itself the smaller member states feel the agenda and capabilities
are being set by the “big three”. As ever, much time and energy is devoted to commoninterest formation rather than outreach.44 As a result, the expected transfer of power from
national to supranational diplomacy has not occurred, but while to claim synergy between the
two apparatuses is perhaps going too far, nonetheless, adaptation is producing a certain
complementarity. Germany, Italy, and Sweden have become the main promoters of foreign
policy integration, although, as stated above, German commercial policy is determinedly
national in outlook. Meanwhile the UK pursues “pragmatic cherry-picking” for its national
agenda, and France, with the highest percentage of national diplomats serving in the EEAS
(31, representing 3.4 per cent of its total staff), regards it as another tool for furthering
national interests in a European guise. Europeanisation is thus second to
intergovernmentalism. As a recent report by the European Policy Center put it:
The rise of Asia is broadly reflected in national diplomatic networks, as member states
strengthen their presence in China and elsewhere in the region, even if this requires cutting
down representation in other parts of the world. While member states rush after emerging
trade opportunities, the EU is criticised for making little progress on strategic partnerships
with rising powers. The emphasis on economic competition makes political unity harder to
reach and does not encourage strategic thinking from a broader European perspective.
42 Speck, ‘Europe, the United States, and Asia.
43 Norio Maruyama, ‘Mainstreaming Asia in EU Strategic Thinking,’ Carnegie Endowment, 23
September 2011, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/23/mainstreaming-asia-in-eustrategic-thinking/8mum
44 Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik (eds), The European External Action Service: Preparing
for Success, Clingendael Paper No. 1, December 2010, available at
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20110200_clingendael_paper_1.pdf. See also the
discussion at ‘The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies – Partners or Rivals?’
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 24 January 2013, available at The European External Action
Service and National Diplomacies – Partners or Rivals?
15 Partners like Russia and China which have used divide-and-rule tactics when dealing with
Europe continue to be successful. Even the EU member states that are the most committed to
a common foreign policy fall into the trap of competing national priorities.45
Referring to nationally-driven priorities as a ‘trap’ ignores the fact that the thinking behind
them is very deliberate. Competition rather than cooperation sets the current trend.
Conclusions
In terms of Hill’s thesis on Europe’s “conceivable future functions”, the results after twenty
years are mixed. The multipolar world has moved beyond any simple notions of a global
balance of power. The EU has introduced important regional policies in its neighbourhood
but cannot be regarded as a regional pacifier. It does act as a global intervener and mediator
of conflicts, but on a limited scale. Its development aid does act as a bridge between rich and
poor nations, but obstacles remain to fully open trade agreements. Its role as joint supervisor
of the world economy has taken a serious hit with the Eurocrisis. To add a provocative note
to this, and to Hill’s thesis in 1993, one could argue that the EU’s capabilities are no longer
being talked up – or that if they are, there is less expectation that they can deliver. This may
seem overly negative, but it could also be seen as a positive reality check.
45 Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik (eds), The European External Action Service and National
Diplomacies, European Policy Center Issue Paper No. 73, March 2013, pp. 9-10, available at
http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=3385&cat_id=2
16 So does the EU need an Asian Pivot? Inevitably, this review of opinion revealed no
consensus. Those Atlanticists focused on the transatlantic relationship clearly think so, for
fear of risking further EU-US “drift”. EU-focused opinion is more divided, recognising the
need for more coordinated action. But even here, it is easier to say what this action should not
involve. It should not simply be triggered by a United States following its own interests. It
should not mean simply chasing a better transatlantic relationship in the transpacific arena. It
should not mean becoming a tool of Asia-Pacific nations looking to manoeuvre amongst
themselves and with the US. It should not be based on an assumed superiority. The Eurocrisis
has damaged the EU’s profile as the prime example of regional integration, a positive
outcome of which would be a more pragmatic and realistic approach to the rest of the world,
on an equal basis.46 The UK’s uncertain position, with a referendum on membership looming,
and a woeful level of public debate on the EU’s value, could have a major impact on the
European Union’s presence in the Asia-Pacific.
Neither is the United States (or China) the only game-changer in town. The growing IndiaJapan relationship, with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of 2011 and
this year’s strengthening of the Strategic and Global Partnership in security affairs, has shown
once again how fluid global politics and alliances have become in the last decade or so. In
December 2012 Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe called for a “democratic security
diamond” together with India, Australia, and the United States “to safeguard the maritime
commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.”47 The security
environment is fluid and many actors are searching for new lines of approach.
In this scenario, Ashton’s announcement of an “Asian semester” was probably just right –
low key, no grandstanding, declaring the EU’s interest and presence in the region but not
seeking to dominate the agenda. Existing capabilities may not add up to grand strategy,
whatever the claims of its ardent admirers. The EU is unable to bring all its resources to bear
on a definable set of goals in the region, and this is irresolvable due to its very nature as a
multi-layered, multipronged, multispeed organisation. Neither do the sum of national
interests and strategies add up to a whole – in fact, quite the opposite. Much depends on the
development of the EEAS into a credible diplomatic force. Yet this does not mean that the
EU has no impact. The stage-by-stage building of partnerships and the gradual secretion of
normative systems, across all areas of public policy, represent a “hidden” power that
contrasts with the “all or nothing” approach of the United States. Perhaps the “keep calm and
carry on” school of thought on Europe’s place in the world strikes the right note after all.
46 Sanne van der Lugt, ‘Approaching an EU-China Deadlock,’ Clingendael: Global Issues and Asia,
15 July 2013.
47 Shinzo Abe, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,’ Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012,
available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-indiaby-shinzo-abe.
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20