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State, Violence and Terrorism
The Guardian: ‘Suicide bomb kills 16
Israelis in hotel’
On March 28th 2002, Jewish Passover, a Palestinian suicide bomber walked into the
lobby of The Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel and detonated. The bomber killed 30
people and injured 154; the attack came to be known as the Passover Massacre.
The group responsible, Hamas, otherwise known as The Islamic Resistance
Movement, coordinated the attack to disrupt peace talks between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation. This essay aims to examine the use of violence
and terrorism in the controversial Palestinian/Israeli conflict, focussing specifically on
the Palestinian group Hamas’ use of terrorism as a strategy of resistance against the
presence of Israel in Gaza and occupation of the West Bank and against what could
be argued as Israeli state terrorism. The arguments put forward in this essay will be
made with reference to a newspaper article in The Guardian that reports on the
suicide bombing. Firstly, this article will be analysed with a view to understanding the
perspective of The Guardian and context and adequacy of the report, in order to
understand the influence of the media’s perspective on defining a terrorist attack.
Secondly, the incident itself will be discussed in reference to Gus Martin’s categories
of terrorism in order to define the act, the perpetrators and context. Thirdly, once the
attack has been defined, the controversial debate surrounding Hamas and Israel will
be discussed. And lastly this essay will aim to conclude whether this particular case
is in fact evidence of dissident terrorism in Hamas or state terrorism on the part of
Israel.
In the very first paragraph of the report (See Appendix 1), The Guardian’s Suzanne
Goldenburg describes the hotel bombing as ‘a crushing blow to efforts at the Arab
summit to open a new chapter with the Jewish state.‘(Goldenburg, S The Guardian
Mar, 2002) Immediately, the context and impact of the attack is made clear and sets
the tone for the article which focuses on the implications the incident has on the
prospect of peace in this volatile region. The attack came just hours after Yasser
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Arafat spoke of peace between Palestinians and Israelis at an Arab league summit in
Beirut, when news of the bombing broke
‘the summit was thrown into chaos with the Lebanese hosts blocking Mr Arafat from
addressing Arab leaders via satellite link. The Palestinian delegation marched out. It
was eventually persuaded to remain in Beirut overnight, but the outburst exposed the
internal rivalries among the 22 Arab League states.‘ (Goldenburg, S The Guardian
Mar 2002)
This attack is clearly a case of terrorism, with an aim to disrupt the peace talks; it
was a highly effective strategy for Hamas. Hot on the heels of the outbreak of the
second Palestinian intifada in 2000, the attack came after a series of suicide attacks
against Israel, and proved to be the final straw, leading ‗to the reinvasion of much of
the West Bank by Israeli forces in Operation Defensive Shield in March and April
2002.’(Levitt, M 2006:4) These repercussions were predicted in The Guardian article
as Goldenburg notes;
‗Many in Israel saw yesterday's attack as an event which could goad the Israeli prime
minister, Ariel Sharon, into launching a crushing military offensive on the West Bank
and Gaza. An Israeli government spokesman talked of a "Passover massacre",
vowing "far-reaching responses against Palestinian Authority facilities".‘
(Goldenburg, S The Guardian Mar 2002)
The Guardian report also gives the impression that the summit included a lot of
squabbling and corruption between Arab leaders, mentioning the Syrian and
Lebanese addresses ‗unsettled‘ (Goldenburg, S The Guardian Mar 2002) feeling
about Arafat’s gesture of peace towards Israel. Overall, the description of the summit
and the reaction to the hotel bombing does give an impression of Israeli bias within
the article. With most of the squabbling coming from the Israel opposing Arab
countries and descriptions of the Syrian presidents ‗ramblings‘(Goldenburg, S The
Guardian Mar 2002) for example. When analysing the Guardian report further,
notably Hamas are described as ‗attacking‘ Israelis in order to ‗goad the Israeli prime
minister, Ariel Sharon, into launching a crushing military offensive’ (Goldenburg, S
The Guardian Mar 2002) as a response. There is no mention of retaliation on the
part of Hamas, no mention of the numerous Israeli raids on Gaza during the brutal
fighting that had been taking place during the second intifada. The article fails to give
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the full context of the fighting between Hamas and Israel focussing quite simply on
the effect of the attack on peace talks. By doing this, the resulting public opinion
could see the incident as an unjustified attack on innocent people in order to
deliberately disrupt peace. The reason why Hamas want to disrupt these peace talks
is not explained allowing for The Guardian correspondents interpretation to dominate
the article.
There are number of problems involved in defining terrorism, as it is subject to
context and perspective. Therefore instances such as the suicide attack in Netanya
could be categorised as any of the different forms of terrorist violence, depending on
a person’s interpretation. For example, Hamas are viewed as terrorists by the US,
UN and EU but many Palestinians believe they are freedom fighters and have
democratically elected them to govern Gaza and the West Bank. There are ‗literally
scores of definitions of terrorism [that] have been offered by laypersons, academics,
and policy professionals to describe the elements of terrorist violence.‘(Martin, G
2010:56) But for the purpose of this essay, the categories used to define this attack
will be provided solely by Gus Martin. Terrorist groups such as Hamas will more
often than not regard themselves as freedom fighters, fighting a noble cause that
they are even willing to give their life for. In the case of Hamas, this noble cause is
the freedom of Palestinians from occupation and repression. But can the Hamas’
hotel bombing in Netanya actually be justified as noble? Using Gus Martin’s
categories of terrorism, Hamas can be defined as a dissident terrorist group, antistate in terms of its dissidence towards Israel, who despite denial, still maintain a
degree of authority in the Gaza strip and occupy the West Bank. Martin describes
dissident terrorism as violence ‗directed against existing governments and political
institutions, attempting to destabilise the existing order as a pre-condition to building
a new society.‘ (Martin, G 2010:150) And as Hamas’s goal is to liberate Palestine
from the Israeli occupation and establish an Islamic state on what is currently Israeli
land, it clearly fits into this category. ‗Regardless of which model fits a particular antistate movement, their common goal is to defeat the state and its institutions.’ (Martin,
G 2010:150) Hamas could also be categorised as a communal terrorist group, a
group fighting for the Palestinian cause, which evolved from the intifada; a communal
uprising against Israel. There is also the religious aspect of Hamas that allows it to fit
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into the religious definition of a terrorist group. As the Islamic Resistance Movement
for Palestine its aims are to establish an Islamic state; it believes ‗that the land of
Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations until
Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it,
should not be given up.‘ (Hamas Charter 1988) And that ‗Israel will exist and will
continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.‘
(Hamas Charter 1988) The group’s commitment to this radical form of Islam has
allowed for its most powerful weapon against Israel; suicide bombing, rewarding the
bombers with Islamic martyrdom. ‘Founded in December 1987 when the first
Palestinian Intifada broke out. Hamas‘ military wing is the Izzedine al-Qassam
Brigade, which first appeared in January 1992‘ (Martin, G 2010: 358) and carries out
its military operations. Alongside this military wing, Hamas has a political wing; as
the governing party of Gaza, Hamas is also a political group that is involved in social
programs such as building schools and hospitals which allowed for its strong support
among Palestinians and becoming the main rival to the PLO. ‘It provides services—
clinics, after-school programs, food distribution centers—that the Palestinian
Authority fails to offer. It has demonstrated that it can hurt Israelis when, in the eyes
of Palestinians, the Israelis have been hurting them.‘ (Levitt, M 2006:6) As the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation were viewed by many Palestinians as corrupt
and involved in Israeli politics, the public wanted a group who revenged their
grievances and fought for their freedom and what they believed to be their rightful
homeland. This is the reasoning behind Hamas’ disruption to the peace talks, the
reasoning not mentioned in the Guardian article.
‗Hamas made a concerted effort from 1994-1996 to establish itself as the prominent
Palestinian Liberation Organisation. At the time, the PLO was deeply committed to
the peace process, and Hamas was equally committed to sabotaging the process.
The movement conducted a number of significant bombings, shootings, and acts of
sabotage. It was during this period that Hamas set the precedent – and honed the
methodology – for Palestinian suicide bombings.’ (Martin, G 2010:358)
It is this violence that has earned Hamas its terrorist label. But could Hamas have
resisted against Israel in any other way? It is often debated that groups fighting for
the Palestinian cause have no other means to rival such a huge military power such
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as Israel, and terrorist violence is the most accessible and effective method. There is
some debate however, that non-violence during the first Intifada with the PLO
actually had a positive impact on the peace process. The first intifada saw a mix of
Palestinians that advocated violence as a tactic but also many activists who wanted
to remain non-violent.
‗It could be argued that five years of mostly non-violent intifada forced the Madrid
Conference, from which came the Oslo process and the first legitimisation of
Palestinian territorial rights. Nonviolence worked, though it was still so
counterintuitive to that warrior culture that its success is largely dismissed as
incomplete and a fluke.‘ (Hastings, T 2004:191)
Terrorist violence, however, was the weapon of choice of Hamas for the Palestinian
cause; arguably Hamas are a product of their environment. After years of violence
and repression, Palestinian resistance has evolved throughout the conflict. ‘The
selection of terrorism as a strategic methodology is a process based on the
experiences of each insurgent group, so that its selection is the outcome of an
evolutionary political progression.‘ (Martin, G 2010:78) Its use of violence, particular
its suicide campaign, erupted out of retaliation to Israeli attacks such as the
‗February 1994 Hebron massacre when Baruch Goldstein killed and wounded scores
of Muslim worshippers at the Ibrahim mosque on the holy site of the cave of
patriarchs.’ (Martin, G 2010:358) The Guardian describes Hamas as ‘goading’ the
Israeli government into violent retaliation but some could argue that Israeli actions
have goaded Hamas into the use of force.
‗As ruthless as [Hamas] has been, their opponent – the Israeli government – have
regularly applied repressive measures against them and their supporters, including
physically coercive interrogations, the destruction of homes, and assassinations.
This repression has fuelled fresh support for the rebellions.‘ (Martin, G 2010:53)
The article in The Guardian reminds us of this, as the Israeli Defence Force offensive
in Gaza and the West bank has been justified through the attack in Netanya. And if
Hamas’ actions are in response to the actions of Israel, could it be argued that Israel
is a terrorist state? Or are Israel’s actions and policies simply an example of state
defence in response to the terrorist threat? Groups fighting for the Palestinian cause,
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such as Hamas, are seen by the state of Israel as a threat thus legitimising its
response to attacks such as the Passover Massacre. But, when examining Israel’s
actions with reference to state terrorism, it’s possible it will fit into the state terrorism
category outlined by Gus Martin. Martin defines state terrorism as a form of violence
that ‗can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain or
internally against domestic enemies.‘ (Martin, G 2010:99) Israel’s enemies are
groups fighting for the Palestinian cause both externally in the case of the
Palestinian diaspora or internally in occupied Gaza and the West bank.
‗It is the business of the state to use, or threaten, violence in order to protect the
society to which it belongs, from internal and external disruption. Indeed Weber‘s
famous analysis that the state is the entity that ‗claims monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory‘ presupposes that the very existence of
the state is determined by the right to use violence.‘ (Claridge, D 1996:48)
This is this kind of justification that Israel use when confronted for its actions towards
the Palestinians, however it can be argued that the history of the conflict can
undermine the justification for the use of force. The Palestinians have been involved
in an armed struggle against Israel since Israel’s establishment on what was formally
British Mandatory Palestine in 1948, they have fought and lost many wars over their
right to live in what is their indigenous homeland and have been refused the right to
self-determination.
‗Palestinian terror may be a symptom but it is the Occupation that is the cause. The
Occupation, the Israeli peace camp stresses, constitutes the infrastructure of terror.
Nor does terror come only from ―the ground.‖ Terror, when directed against a
subjugated and powerless civilian population like the Palestinians in Gaza, is equally
reprehensible. The wholesale onslaught of Israeli planes, missiles, tanks, bulldozers
and troops on densely populated civilian centres, the levelling of whole
neighbourhoods as we are witnessing at this moment, can only be called state
terrorism.‘ (Halper, J electronic intifada May 2004)
Groups fighting for the Palestinian cause are no match for the use of force
implemented by the powerful Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and its non-state acting
groups involved in its defence. By using this unequal monopoly of power against the
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Palestinians as a form of defence, Israel is committing terrorism itself. Though there
are many definitions of terrorism, most academics agree that it involves political
violence that is intended to generate fear and communicate some kind of message,
this can be said for Israel’s actions toward Hamas and the Palestinian people. ‗A
report from Israel‘s International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism noted that
state-sponsored terrorism can achieve strategic ends where the use of conventional
armed forces is not practical or effective.‘ (Martin, G 2010:109) Indeed Israel’s use of
terrorist violence has been highly effective; it could even be argued that the ‘goading’
from Israel that encourages the use of terrorism by Palestinian groups such as
Hamas are keeping them under the international terrorist definition that means they
will not be legitimately recognised by the international community and thus their right
to a secure national homeland is ignored.
To conclude, with Israel fitting into the category of a state terrorist as well as Hamas
fitting into the dissident terrorism category, the blame for the attack on the innocent
civilians in The Park Hotel in Netanya can be placed on both parties. This incident is
a case of terrorism from above as well as from below, and thus the conflict as it
stands shows no sign of resolution and breeds terrorism. Tom Hastings remarks that
the key to possible peace is recognising that both Palestinian terrorist groups and
the state of Israel use terrorist violence as a strategy and the best form of counterterrorism begins with ‘recognising two sides of the same coin and accepting both
levels of responsibility‘. (Hastings, T 2004:234)
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Bibliography
Books
Claridge, D (1996) State Terrorism? Applying a Definitional Model in Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 8, no.3, p.47-63, London: Frank Cass
Crenshaw, M (1995) Terrorism in context Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University Press
Hastings, T (2004) Nonviolent Response to Terrorism North Carolina: McFarland
Makdisi, S (2008) Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, New York:Norton
Martin, G (2010) Understanding Terrorism: challenges, perspectives, and issues
London: Sage
Electronic Resources
Goldenburg, S (2002) Suicide Bomb kills 16 Israelis in hotel 28th March 2002
URL:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/28/israel1 [04/04/11]
Hamas Charter (1988) URL: http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm [05/05/11]
Halper, J (2004) Israel‘s "state terrorism" in Gaza 14th May 2004
URL:http://electronicintifada.net/content/israels-state-terrorism-gaza/5081 [10/04/11]
Karmon, E (2009) Israel's War on Hamas - Understanding its Causes and its Stakes
URL:http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/609/c
urrentpage/1/Default.aspx [04/05/11]
Levitt, M (2006) Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the service of Jihad
URL:http://www.eaazi.org/ThorsProvoni/levitt/Levi0300110537.pdf [10/04/11]
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Appendix 1
Suicide bomb kills 16 Israelis in hotel
Middle East in crisis as carnage in Netanya and infighting at Beirut summit send peace
hopes diving.
A Palestinian suicide bomber walked into a hotel lobby crowded with Israelis gathered for the
ritual Passover meal last night, dealing a crushing blow to efforts at the Arab summit to open
a new chapter with the Jewish state.
Police said 16 people were killed and more than 140 wounded after the bomber detonated a
large bag of explosives in a dining room of the Park hotel in the seaside town of Netanya. It
was one of the deadliest attacks in 18 months of fighting.
The explosion tore through the hotel, blowing out walls and windows and overturning tables
and chairs. "Suddenly it was hell," said one of the guests, Nechama Donenhirsch, 52. "There
was the smell of smoke and dust in my mouth and a ringing in my ears."
Televised scenes showed screaming women, wailing ambulances, cloaked bodies and shop
awnings buckled by heat. Israeli police reported that several of the wounded were in "lifethreatening condition".
The Islamic militant group Hamas told an Arab satellite television station that it was
responsible for the attack. The bombing threatened to derail the latest US truce mission,
which survived two suicide attacks last week. George Bush denounced the bomb attack as
"callous, cold-blooded killing".
The Palestinian Authority said it "strongly condemned" the bombing and Palestinian security
sources said Yasser Arafat had ordered the arrest of four key militants in the West Bank.
Many in Israel saw yesterday's attack as an event which could goad the Israeli prime
minister, Ariel Sharon, into launching a crushing military offensive on the West Bank and
Gaza. An Israeli government spokesman talked of a "Passover massacre", vowing "farreaching responses against Palestinian Authority facilities".
The bomb went off at about 7.20pm, as dozens of guests settled down for the Passover
Seder in the dining hall.
Netanya has been targeted several times by Palestinians during the 18-month intifada, due
to its proximity to the West Bank border. On March 2 Palestinian gunmen killed two Israelis,
including a baby, in the same area as last night's attack.
The town had been put on maximum alert after warnings of attacks during the Passover
holiday. But it is impossible to prevent suicide attacks, said Netanya's mayor, Miriam
Feyerberg. "This is a city that can be infiltrated from many different directions." Ms
Feyerberg, who witnessed the carnage, said: "I saw little children, bodies. And I want to say
something to the Arab leaders in Beirut. This is not resistance. This is murder."
The bombing offered a cruel contrast to attempts by Saudi Arabia to contain the IsraeliPalestinian conflict by conjuring up the prospect of a broad Arab peace.
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Minutes after Crown Prince Abdullah outlined for the first time his ideas for a land-for-peace
deal with Israel in Beirut yesterday, the summit was thrown into chaos with the Lebanese
hosts blocking Mr Arafat from addressing Arab leaders via satellite link.
The Palestinian delegation marched out. It was eventually persuaded to remain in Beirut
overnight, but the outburst exposed the internal rivalries among the 22 Arab League states.
While the crown prince appealed to the Israeli public to put their trust in peace, Syria's
Bashar Assad called on Arab leaders to support the Palestinian uprising, and condemned
the Jewish state as a "living example" of terrorism.
An Arab newspaper said last night it had received an email it believed to be from Osama bin
Laden, denouncing the Saudi peace initiative and praising Palestinian suicide attacks.
Associated Press said the language of the email, sent to al-Quds a-Arabi, a London-based
daily, resembled that used in previous statements by Bin Laden.
The two-day meeting opened in Beirut with two key moderate leaders distancing themselves
from the proceedings after Israel barred Mr Arafat from leaving his headquarters in
Ramallah. Jordan's King Abdullah withdrew early yesterday, and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak
stayed home.
Palestinian officials said Mr Arafat waited in a Ramallah television studio for hours yes
terday listening to a succession of speeches before giving up on his fellow Arab leaders and
delivering his speech to al-Jazeera television.
"He was kept waiting from 11am to 2.30pm," said Majdi Khaldi, an adviser to Mr Arafat and a
member of the delegation. "We cannot accept that."
After the Palestinian leader was put on hold for a speech by Mr Assad, "we understood the
message: that the summit chairman will not allow Mr Arafat to make his speech - even if he
wants to".
At first the Lebanese organisers said they pulled the plug on Mr Arafat because they feared
a live broadcast could be hijacked by Mr Sharon. Later, they blamed technical reasons and
egos.
"Our Palestinian friends wanted their chairman to speak first, and when they saw the list was
long, they lost patience," said Ghassan Salameh, Lebanese summit spokesman.
The explanations suggest that more radical states such as Syria and Lebanon were working
behind the scenes to deflect attention from Prince Abdullah's peace proposal.
In his speech on al-Jazeera, Mr Arafat endorsed the Saudi initiative. However, Mr Assad and
Lebanon's President Emile Lahoud were deeply unsettled by the gesture towards their
sworn enemy.
Some of those reservations were acknowledged by Prince Abdullah yesterday, who
toughened the original conditions of his proposal and down graded its reward for Israel.
The changes are a reversion to traditional Arab positions: a full Israeli withdrawal from lands
occupied since the 1967 war, a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, and the right
of return for Palestinian refugees - which was absent from the original proposal.
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In an unusual appeal to Israelis, Prince Abdullah said that if their government accepted the
plan: "We will not hesitate to accept the right of the Israeli people to live in security with the
people of the region."
Hopes that other states would rally behind the Saudi initiative to produce a collective Arab
vision for peace were undercut by Syrian and Lebanese addresses.
"The real danger resides in our collective submission to 'pressures' to put an end to the
resistance and intifada in return for halting aggression, totally discarding the occupation,"
said Mr Lahoud. He called for the return of all Palestinian refugees to their homes.
In a rambling discourse on terrorism and the aftermath of September 11, Mr Assad called on
Arab states to support the uprising and to sever - or suspend ties - with Israel until peace
was achieved. "It's time to save the Palestinian people from the new holocaust they are
living in," he said.