“Saying it ain’t doing it.” Infrastructure gaps in maritime search and rescue in the North of North
America.
Thomas S. Axworthy
“Promise of the Arctic” Conference
Seattle, Washington
May 29, 2013
1
Introduction
I want to thank Institute of the North and Pacific Maritime Magazine for taking the lead in organizing this
important conference on a key issue that unites Canada and the United States: how best to respond to
dramatic changes transforming the circumpolar Arctic. Institute of the North and the Walter and Duncan
Gordon Foundation have closely collaborated on multiple projects.
Alaskans face many of the same issues as Canada’s northern peoples and cooperation between the
government of Alaska and the governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut will be an
absolute necessity. But cooperation alone will not be sufficient.
In the 2013 Kiruna Declaration of the Arctic Council, representatives of Arctic states recognized the
importance of implementing the Agreement on Aeronautical and Marine Search and Rescue. The
declaration went on to “encourage the continued efforts to identify opportunities for complementary
infrastructure development and use.”1
Implementing the AAMSAR agreement is important because it is an international obligation. Some
heralded the Agreement as a step forward for the Council because it was the first binding agreement
negotiated under its auspices. Others claimed it simply put down on paper what had been happening for
years on the ground.
Yet, we continue to ask ourselves, “are we ready?”
In response to the emergence of increased activity in the Arctic, each Arctic country has taken a different
approach in developing the capacity to respond to search and rescue emergencies.
Russia is building ten search and rescue facilities along the Northern Sea Route and is avidly bolstering
the already largest icebreaking fleet in the world.
In Norway, investments were announced to construct a new port in the Svalbard region.2 These
investments will be complemented by the arrival of all-weather helicopters based on Svalbard in 2014.
Sweden led a study that included eleven states to examine opportunities to enhance information sharing
for quicker emergency responses.
For Canada and the United States, search and rescue responses have been remarkably similar to each
other, while being notably different from the rest of their Arctic neighbours.
History of Search and Rescue Investments in Canada and the United States
This spring, the Auditor General of Canada released a report on Federal Search and Rescue. The report
revealed personnel, training, SAR aircraft shortages and an overall lack of leadership across the many
departments that contribute to search and rescue.
1
2
Arctic Council, Kiruna Declaration (2013), 4.
Ministry of Transportation, “Northern Transport Plan 2014-2023,” Government of Norway (2012-2013).
2
Even more troubling, the Auditor General found that the search and rescue coordination centres are only
on full alert during regular business hours. If someone in Canada’s North is in distress on evenings or
weekends, they will be waiting much longer for help to arrive.3
This report comes two years after the Canadian Senate released an interim report that stated delays in
search and rescue equipment procurement are “discouraging and potentially dangerous.”4
The Auditor General could even trace the problems in Canada’s search and rescue regime to 1986, when
the federal government established the National Search and Rescue Secretariat. The Secretariat was
mandated to establish a national policy program and measure overall federal program performance.5
Almost thirty years later, Canada is still without a comprehensive search and rescue strategy and the
mandated performance measurement framework does not exist.6
In Canada, public statements have been made, but investments have not been delivered. And the
residents of Canada’s North know how the phrase “saying it ain’t doing it” has impacted their ability to
move safely through the region.
One area of high risk, in both Canada and the U.S., is insufficient icebreaking capacity. The U.S. Coast
Guard has only one active icebreaker, the Healy, with the Polar Star currently in its final stages of
preparing for active duty.7 Canada fares somewhat better than the U.S., with six icebreakers. The
Canadian Coast Guard estimates that it can respond to icebreaking requests within ten hours in the
Canadian Arctic.8 However, given the complexity of ice and with only 15% of navigable waters charted,
responding to requests in less than ten hours is not always possible.
In August 2010, Clipper Adventurer was grounded along the Nunavut-Northwest Territories border. The
shoal, combined with the sheer size of the Clipper Adventurer, almost spelled disaster for the 128
passengers and 69 crew members.
Luckily, the ship did not sustain structural damage, and its passengers were not in any immediate danger
while on the shoal. It took two days for the icebreaker Amundsen to arrive and help the passengers get off
the cruise ship. With air support three hours away and the nearest coast guard vessel more than a day
away, were we ready to respond if something went drastically wrong?
In Canada, like the U.S., Arctic icebreaking resources are staged in the Arctic from June to November
when marine traffic is higher. If an emergency occurs outside of these summer months, capacity to
3
Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 7: Federal Search and Rescue Activities,” Report of the Auditor General of
Canada (Ottawa, Canada: Office of the Auditor General, Spring 2013), 8.
4
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Sovereignty & Security in Canada’s Arctic (Ottawa,
Canada: Senate of Canada, March 2011), 40.
5
Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 7: Federal Search and Rescue Activities,” Report of the Auditor General of
Canada (Ottawa, Canada: Office of the Auditor General, Spring 2013), 26.
6
Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 7: Federal Search and Rescue Activities,” Report of the Auditor General of
Canada (Ottawa, Canada: Office of the Auditor General, Spring 2013), 24.
7
Mickey McCarter, “Coast Guard Reactivates Heavy Icebreaker Polar Star,” Homeland Security Today (17
December 2012), http://www.hstoday.us/industry-news/general/single-article/coast-guard-reactivates-heavyicebreaker-polar-star/2a0db1f3398371a11a8aaf3de2e0c429.html.
8
Canadian Coast Guard, “Icebreaking Levels of Service: Performance Targets,” Canadian Coast Guard (2013):
http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/Performance-Targets#A3.
3
respond diminishes, leaving residents proportionally more vulnerable. Alaskans saw this vulnerability
first-hand this past winter, when a fuel tanker headed for Nome became stranded, taking three weeks and
international support to complete the fuel delivery.
Public Perceptions on Readiness
The large gap between what exists to respond to emergencies and what is needed, is evident to northern
residents on both sides of the border. In 2011, Northern Canadians ranked the ability to respond to
disasters and emergencies second and third on a list of what impacts their lives in Northern Canada. Over
85% agreed that responding to disasters and emergencies were important.9
When asked if the Canadian Arctic was “well equipped” to respond to these elements, only 40%
responded positively, less than half of those who thought emergency response was important. When
asked if Canada was ready to respond to a disaster, only one out of ten were confident that if a disaster
occurred, there would be equipment and personnel to respond.10
Lack of confidence in emergency response is not isolated to Canada. Last week, Institute of the North
released the findings of their Arctic public opinion poll. Of the Alaskans polled, capacity to respond to
disasters was ranked the most important issue in the American Arctic, closely followed by capacity to
respond to emergencies, such as search and rescue.11
Perceptions of readiness among Alaska’s residents were consistent with the findings of the Canadian
public opinion poll. Residents on both sides of the border feel that their countries are not ready to
respond to emergencies in the Arctic.
Being ready to respond to disasters and emergencies is critical across the North American Arctic. If
Northern residents know we are not prepared, what are policy makers doing to address the issue?
Bilateral Collaboration between Canada and the United States
Both countries have committed to investing in resources to mitigate the risks that lead to emergencies in
their northern regions. These commitments include calls for a new approach to research and policy
making -- one that reaches across borders and brings people together who are more alike than they are
different.
These statements are opening the door for international research collaborations, such as ours, to positively
impact public policy on both sides of the border while maintaining a much-needed northern focus. Both
countries agree that capacity to respond to search and rescue emergencies are an issue that needs to be
examined.
9
Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey
(Toronto: Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, January 2011), 21.
10
Ibid.
11
Institute of the North, Survey of Alaskans’ Opinions on the Arctic (Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.: Institute of the North,
2013), 22.
4
Just this month, a Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Relations has called for bilateral cooperation
with the United States on initiatives to enhance the success of both countries’ successive chairmanships of
the Arctic Council.12
Similarly, the White House’s newly released Arctic Strategy calls for the U.S. government to pursue
innovative strategies and foster partnerships.13 In this report, search and rescue capacity is a priority
among many decision makers. The White House strategy on Arctic Affairs mirrors the approach of many
institutions that impact U.S. Arctic domestic and foreign policy.14 Overall, the level of consensus among
stakeholders on the need for investment in marine search and rescue is only rivaled by how strongly
Alaskans feel the need to be prepared to respond to disasters and emergencies.15
However, we must remain watchful to ensure that these recommendations become reality. In the past few
weeks, it was announced that the U.S. Coast Guard will be rolling back its summer Arctic icebreaking
capacity. No longer having resources based on Alaska’s northern coast could delay a search and rescue
response in a region that is expected to see increased traffic during the summer shipping season. This
announcement is a reminder of our mutual histories of making recommendations for emergency
preparedness, without the requisite investments to achieve results.
The need to invest in marine infrastructure in Canada and the United States can be viewed as a challenge
in the 21st century Arctic. And strategic investments in marine search and rescue are vital to respond to
emerging threats in the region. The grounding of the Clipper Adventurer and the three-week odyssey to
bring fuel to remote communities in Alaska can be a symbol of the dangers of living and travelling in the
Arctic.
Or, they can be real-life examples that inform policy options for our governments – governments that
know they need to take on the imminent challenge of being prepared for emergencies in a region that is
like no other in the world.
The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation looks forward to collaborating with Institute of the North
over the next three years to explore and inform innovative strategies in Arctic emergency preparedness.
Our northern residents can no longer afford toprolong the history of just saying we need search and rescue
investments in the Arctic.
As the Arctic continues to rapidly change, policy makers and stakeholders must be decisive and proactive
in their response. So the next time we ask Alaskans and Northern Canadians, “are we ready?” the answer
must be yes.
Thank you.
12
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Canada and the Arctic Council: An
Agenda for Regional Leadership (Ottawa, Canada: House of Commons, 2013), 69.
13
White House, White House Arctic Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2013): 3.
14
These decision makers include the Alaskan Northern Waters Task Force; the Coast Guard; the Department of
Defense; U.S. Geological Survey; the Congressional Research Service (2012); BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Commission; and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
15
U.S. Committee on Marine Transportation, U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for
Action February 2013 (Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, 2013), 92.