Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
IN PRESS: Primatologie
Running head: Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
The Imitative Behaviour of Children and Chimpanzees:
A Window on the Transmission of Cultural Traditions1
Mark Nielsen
Early Cognitive Development Unit, School of Psychology, University of Queensland
1
With apologies to Whiten, Horner, and Marshall-Pescini (2005)
1
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
2
Abstract
Humans engage in a multitude of complex social activities that, depending on such things
as shared history, proximity, language and identification, can be engaged in differently
from one community to another. Humans are a cultural species: But we are not the only
ones. An array of behaviours indicative of cultural variation has been identified in
chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, that has yet to be found in any other nonhuman
animal. However, the breadth and depth of these behaviours seem insignificant when
compared to the profound cultural variation inherent in human social behaviour. The
source of differences between humans and chimpanzees in the proliferation of cultural
traditions may be attributed to differences in the way these species engage in imitation.
Human children show a strong tendency to imitate the actions of others at the expense of
producing the functional outcomes of those actions, a tendency that chimpanzees do not
show. It is argued that this tendency is an outcome of young children’s motivation to be
social and to interact with others, and it is this that has driven the proliferation of human
culture.
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
3
Imagine traveling to England for no other reason than to take ‘high tea’. How will
the tea be presented? What food will be served as accompaniment? What will the pot and
cups look like? Now imagine going to Japan, and ask yourself the same questions. The
answers will be very different yet, broadly speaking, the outcome will be the same: You
will have had tea (and traveled far, and no doubt paid much, for the privilege). The fact
that differences remain in the way English and Japanese people take tea is an outcome of
their distinct cultural traditions. Such cultural traditions underpin not just differences
between English and Japanese tea drinkers, of course, but the multitude of complex social
activities that are engaged in differently from one human community to another. Human
social behaviour is profoundly culturally varied. But we are not the only primate species
to display differences in behaviour that can be attributed to cultural traditions.
An array of behaviours indicative of cultural variation has been identified in
chimpanzees and orangutans. For example, chimpanzees from Gombe in Tanzania use
60-centimeter-long sticks to fish driver ants out of their nests. They then swipe their free
hand along the stick, obtaining a large ball of edible ants in the process. Adopting a less
efficient approach, chimpanzees from the Tai Forest in the Ivory Coast fish for ants using
shorter sticks on which only a few ants are gathered. These ants are then transferred
directly into the chimpanzee’s mouth. Thirty-nine such group specific traditions have
been documented in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2001), and 19 in orangutans (van Schaik
et al., 2003). This level of behavioral diversity reflects a complexity of cultural variation
that has yet to be found in any other nonhuman animal.
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
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As impressive as it may be, the 39 distinct cultural traditions identified in
chimpanzees seem insignificant when compared to an even cursory reflection on the
variety of traditions that permeate human social behaviour. Indeed, differences between
humans and our closest living relatives in the breadth and complexity of cultural
traditions seem profound. What, then, might lie at the heart of these differences? For
many authors the development and intergenerational transmission of culture is built
around a capacity for imitation (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Heyes, 1993; Meltzoff,
2005; Tomasello, 1999a; Whiten, 2005; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2003). One
could therefore reasonably expect differences to be found in the imitative behaviour of
chimpanzees and humans. In the following pages I explore some of the evidence in
support of this expectation, with a focus on comparisons between human children and
chimpanzees, and outline how recent research findings can provide insight into the
possible origins of differences in the proliferation of human and chimpanzee cultures.
Before continuing, it would be customary to define my terms. What do I mean by
culture? What do I accept imitation to entail? Unfortunately, doing so is no easy task.
With regard to ‘culture’, more than 300 scholarly definitions are available (J. R. Baldwin,
Faulkner, Hecht, & Lindsley, 2006). Not wishing to add to this list, I will adopt a
definition that has been previously used for comparative purposes (e.g., van Schaik et al.,
2003; Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten et al., 2001). Thus, the term ‘culture’ is herein taken to
represent a system of socially transmitted behaviours that are customary or habitual in
one community but absent in another community, and where such variation cannot be
explained by ecological or genetic differences alone.
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
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With regard to imitation, during the last decade there has been a proliferation in
the number of terms used to define and describe different ways in which individuals can
copy others. This terminology has been useful in providing a framework for studies of
social learning and for providing a way of characterising the types of social learning
mechanisms distinct populations, such as different species or children of different ages,
tend to use. Unfortunately, the number of definitions now available and the lack of
concurrence over what they mean and how to correctly apply them has led to some
confusion and disagreement on how particular studies are to be interpreted. Where some
see imitation others see alternative mechanisms of social learning, such as mimicry
(copying another’s behaviour without understanding its functional significance) or
emulation (where the focus is on reproducing the outcome of another's behaviour but not
the process by which it was achieved) (e.g., Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Tomasello, 1999b;
Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Texidor, & Bard, 1996). In an attempt to avoid any such
confusion, here I will use ‘imitation’ to refer very broadly to instances where individuals
reproduce an action or actions they have witnessed being produced by another. I leave it
to the reader to decide whether the copying behaviours I describe would be better defined
using social learning descriptors other than imitation.
A final point regards the two principal populations that are to be contrasted here:
children and chimpanzees. The majority of studies investigating imitation in great apes
have used adult animals. Comparing adults of one species with the young of another may
seem invalid or improper. However, there are several reasons why such comparisons can
be defensibly made. If the young of a species exhibit a particular behaviour, then it can be
reasonably assumed that adults have the capacity to exhibit this behaviour also. The
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
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converse is an obviously less valid assumption. Absence of, or diminution in, a behaviour
in the young of a species may represent immature development rather than a true speciestypical deficit. Where our aim is to identify uniquely human traits, or the evolutionary
origins of them, we want to be sure that we do not draw incorrect conclusions by
assessing individuals who might not have had the requisite developmental opportunities.
Why, then, not compare adult chimps with adult humans? First, a number of reviews
(e.g., Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2003; Tomasello & Call,
1997) have highlighted similarities in the cognitive abilities of young human children and
great apes – reviews that are primarily based on research involving adult apes. In this
context, it is important that any inter-species comparisons are not conflated by
differences in mental capacity. Further, as attested to in the review that follows,
documenting ontogenetic changes in children’s behaviour can provide considerable
insight into the ways our species may differ from those closely related to us – insights
that would not be evident if focus was placed only on adults. Of course, it should be
acknowledged that, in contrast to the ever-growing literature on human children, there is
scarce cross-sectional or longitudinal data on the development of imitation in nonhuman
primates (for some exceptions see Bjorklund & Bering, 2003; Tomasello & Carpenter,
2005a). Research documenting the ontogeny of imitation in each great ape species is
certainly needed to compliment the data derived from studies conducted with adult
animals.
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
Using the broad definition previously outlined, a capacity for imitation has been
well-documented in chimpanzees (for recent reviews see Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005b;
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
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Whiten, 2005). Moreover, the results of some controlled experiments indicate that the
imitative behaviour of children and chimpanzees may not be all that dissimilar. For
example, Horner and Whiten (2005) showed wild born chimpanzees and 3- to 4-year-old
children how to obtain a reward from an opaque box. A human model first removed a
bolt on the top of the box, revealing a hole into which a stick was inserted. The model
then opened a door located on the front of the box and, by inserting the stick, retrieved
the reward (food for the chimpanzees, a sticker for the children). Because the box was
opaque the subjects could not see the causal relation between the actions and the desired
outcome. When given the box to explore, both chimpanzees and children copied what the
model had done. They first removed the bolt and placed the stick into the top hole and
then opened the door and placed the stick into the hole at the front. The authors
interpreted this as evidence of imitation in both species. However, Horner and Whiten
also documented some interesting inter-species differences.
In addition to the opaque box, Horner and Whiten (2005) tested their subjects for
imitation using a transparent box. The actions occurring inside the box could now be
seen, making it obvious that when the stick was inserted into the top hole it struck a
barrier and made no contact with that part of the apparatus from which the reward could
be retrieved. The action involving the top hole could be clearly seen to have no causal
relation to the desired outcome. When the same actions that had been modeled on the
opaque box were modeled on the transparent box, the chimpanzees ignored the first
action and instead copied only the model’s insertion of the tool into the front hole. They
focused principally on replicating the actions that were causally related to the desired
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
8
outcome. By contrast, the children imitated the model’s entire sequence of actions,
including the obviously irrelevant insertion of the stick into the top hole.
The findings of Horner and Whiten (2005) reflect those in other studies that have
found a far greater fidelity in copying behaviour by children compared to other apes (e.g.,
Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, in press; Tomasello,
Savage-Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993; Whiten et al., 1996). Indeed, unlike chimpanzees,
children consistently show a predilection for copying the specific means an adult uses to
produce a particular outcome, even if a more efficient method is available. Recent
research indicates that this predilection emerges during the second year.
Copying Actions Over Outcomes
In a cross-sectional study of children aged 12, 18, and 24 months, an adult model
demonstrated how to open three novel boxes using an arbitrary object (e.g., a plastic
block) to manipulate a switch located on the front of each box (Nielsen, 2006,
Experiment 1). Correctly manipulating the switch, which was different for each box,
disengaged a hidden latch and released the box’s lid, enabling a desirable toy to be
retrieved. The children could have copied the model’s behavioral means of activating the
switches (i.e., used the object) or they could have devised their own means (i.e., used
their hands – something the model did not do). Two control conditions established that
children of all age groups could easily activate the switches by hand if shown how but
that they would not spontaneously attempt to do so, either by hand or by object, in the
absence of modeling.
Surprisingly, 12-month-olds opened as many boxes as did 24-month-olds when
the model used an object to activate the switches. This counterintuitive finding can be
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees
9
explained by the specific actions the children employed when attempting to get the boxes
open. Whereas the 24-month-olds tried to open every box using an object, as was
modeled to them, the 12-month-olds only attempted to open the boxes with their hands.
Eighteen-month-olds showed reactions that were intermediate between the older and
younger age groups. All age groups were equally successful at getting the boxes open,
but because the 24-month-olds, and to a lesser extent the 18-month-olds, persisted in
using the objects, their ability to activate the switches was diminished. With regard to
getting the boxes open, these children would have been better off employing their own
behavioral means of activating the switches (i.e., their hands) and ignoring the actions
used by the model.
In a subsequent study (Nielsen, 2006, Experiment 2), 12-month-olds did use an
object in an attempt to activate the switches, but only when the model had successfully
used an object after first ‘attempting but failing’ to activate the switches by hand. Thus, it
appears that 12-month-olds did not fail to copy the model’s object use because they could
not use the object, but rather because they did not interpret this action to be the most
efficient alternative available (see also Gergely, 2003; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly,
2002).
Thus, from around the middle of their second year children begin to show a
tendency for copying the specific actions of an adult model, even if by doing so they fail
to achieve the modeled outcome. This tendency is not strong at the beginning of the
second year. It was rare for the 12-month-olds in Nielsen (2006) to attempt to touch a
switch using an object; they used their hands instead. Thus, although these toddlers
attempted to reproduce the result of the model’s actions (i.e., opening the boxes), they did
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 10
not copy the behavioral means used by the model (i.e., using an object). It appears that
12-month-olds, like chimpanzees, are more prone than 18- and 24-month-olds to ignore
seemingly irrelevant actions and to devise their own ways of bringing about the modeled
outcome. How might we explain this pattern of findings?
A growing body of research has shown that the generation of action shares
common neural and cognitive mechanisms with the recognition of actions performed by
others (for reviews see chapters in Hurley & Chater, 2005). The production of matched
behaviour – forming an equivalence between what we see and what we do – thus appears
to rely on the same capacities as recognising matched behaviour – detecting an
equivalence between what we do and what we see (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Mitchell,
2002; Nadel, 2002). Perhaps chimpanzees and young human children are not particularly
good at matching their own actions to the actions they have seen performed by others. If
so, one could reasonably expect them to show deficiencies in recognizing when others are
imitating them.
Imitation Recognition in Children and Chimpanzees
A number of studies have investigated the ability of young children to detect
when an adult is copying their behaviour (Agnetta & Rochat, 2004; Asendorpf,
Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996; Eckerman & Stein, 1990; Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff &
Decety, 2003). One way imitation recognition has been assessed is by having infants sit
opposite two adult experimenters. One adult replicates everything the infant does while
the second adult replicates the actions of a previously tested infant (commonly presented
via pre-recorded video). Thus, both adults exhibit typical infant behaviour, but only one
is directly imitating the infant. From 9 months of age infants look more, and smile more
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 11
frequently, to the imitating rather than to the non-imitating adult. Infants also tend to
repeat the particular gesture that is being imitated and engage in ‘testing’ behaviour (i.e.,
systematically varying activity while closely watching the imitating adult) to see if their
mismatching gestures will be copied. It is therefore generally accepted that children from
a young age can recognise when their own actions are being imitated. What about
chimpanzees?
The first study to directly investigate imitation recognition in any nonhuman
animal was recently published by Nielsen, Collier-Baker, Davis, & Suddendorf (2005;
see also Paukner, Anderson, Borelli, Visalberghi, & Ferrari, 2005) . Nielsen et al. had an
adult human imitate the postures and behaviours of Cassie, a male, captive-born
chimpanzee. In a series of control conditions the same experimenter exhibited: (a) actions
that were contingent on, but different from, Cassie’s actions; (b) actions that were not
contingent on, and different from, his actions; or (c) no action at all. Cassie showed more
‘testing’ sequences and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when
he was not. Moreover, when the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in
the experimental condition back to Cassie some 4 months later, these actions now failed
to elicit any testing sequences or repetitive behaviour. However, a live imitation
condition did. Cassie’s responses to being imitated were therefore similar to the
responses of young human children.
The afore-cited studies indicate that chimpanzees and children younger than 12months can recognize when another is imitating them. It would appear that the imitative
behaviour of chimpanzees and young children cannot be explained by a disruption of, or
diminution in, their ability to match their own actions to the actions being performed by
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 12
others. An alternative proposal is that children from the middle of their second year
become increasingly motivated to be social and to promote shared experience with
others, and this motivation manifests itself in the way children approach tasks of
imitation (Carpenter, 2006; Nielsen & Slaughter, in press; Nielsen, Suddendorf, &
Dissanayake, 2006).
The Social Function of Imitation
There is a long-standing though often neglected view that imitation can serve two
distinct but complementary developmental functions: A cognitive function that promotes
learning about events in the world and an interpersonal function that promotes children’s
sharing of experience with others (J. M. Baldwin, 1894; Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff &
Gopnik, 1993; Mitchell, 1987; Nadel, Guérini, Pezé, & Rivet, 1999; Tomasello, 1999a;
Uzgiris, 1981; Wallon, 1934). Uzgiris (1981) argued that as children get older their
motivation to copy others changes according to these two functions. Young toddlers are
primarily motivated to imitate in order to acquire new skills whereas older toddlers may
imitate in the same context in order to satisfy social motivations.
The variant nature of the functions of imitation is highlighted by changes during
the second year in the way pre-verbal infants interact with each other. Towards the
middle of the second year children begin to coordinate their own actions with the
thematic specifics of a social partner’s play, and this helps generate and sustain ongoing
interaction (Eckerman, Davis, & Didow, 1989; Eckerman & Didow, 1989; Nadel &
Baudonnière, 1980, 1982; Nadel, Baudonnière, & Fontaine, 1983; Nadel & Fontaine,
1989). Children show a preference for engaging with objects that are similar to ones
chosen by their play partner, and tend to use the common object in a similar way. When
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 13
this copying behavior is performed in concert with the play partner, and the partners do
not solely adopt one role but alternate between model and imitator, it is referred to as
synchronic imitation (e.g., Asendorpf & Baudonnière, 1993; Nadel, 2002).
In controlled studies of synchronic imitation, an adult experimenter continuously
models simple actions on a series of objects (e.g., tapping a toy hammer on the ground) to
children who have a duplicate of the object available to them (Asendorpf et al., 1996;
Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). To be classified as synchronic imitation, children must
not only reproduce the actions of the experimenter but do so continuously and
simultaneously for a certain amount of time. Using this approach, Nielsen and
Dissanayake (2004) assessed 86 toddlers for synchronic imitation at intervals of three
months from 12 to 24 months of age. Toddlers sat on a play mat opposite an
experimenter. The experimenter took an object and offered the toddler a duplicate of the
object. The experimenter continuously modeled an action for 15 seconds and then
performed a second action with the same object for a further 15 seconds. This procedure
was repeated on an additional three objects. Toddlers were classified as imitating
synchronically if they took the duplicate object and, while the experimenter was
modeling the action, copied him continuously for at least 3 seconds (following Asendorpf
et al., 1996). The duration of the sequence was coded for as long as the toddler
maintained imitation of the modeled action and continued to look at the experimenter at
least once every ten seconds.
When aged 12 and 15 months, the infants exhibited little to no synchronic
imitation. It was not until 18 months of age that they began to exhibit sustained imitative
sequences, and by the 24-month session toddlers were spending approximately one third
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 14
of the 120-second episode engaging in synchronic imitation with the experimenter.
Importantly, the actions Nielsen and Dissanayake (2004) used in administration of the
synchronic imitation task were simple (e.g., banging a hammer on the ground). It is thus
unlikely that the low exhibition of synchronic imitation by 12 and 15 month olds can be
attributed to changes in their ability to either produce or copy the modelled actions.
Indeed, Nielsen and Dissanayake noted that when the children were younger it was not
uncommon for them to reproduce the target actions of the experimenter during
administration of the task; they just did not copy him continuously and simultaneously.
When younger, the children engaged in imitation but not synchronic imitation. It has thus
been argued that when toddlers engage in synchronic imitation they do so primarily
because they want to be social and to interact with the experimenter (Nielsen &
Dissanayake, 2003; Nielsen & Slaughter, in press; Nielsen et al., 2006).
Uzgiris (1981) also speculated that because young toddlers engage in imitation
primarily to promote learning about events in the world they will focus more on copying
what was done rather than copying the way it was done. Older toddlers, by contrast, will
copy a model in order to engage socially and to sustain interaction. This speculation is
reflected in the previously discussed findings from Nielsen (2006) where 12-month-olds,
unlike 18- to 24-month-olds, tended not to use the same behavioral means as the model to
bring about the target outcomes.
Putting the Social Explanation to Test
To date, only two empirical studies have experimentally manipulated the
sociability of a model in order to investigate how differences in the availability of social
interaction impacts children’s copying behaviour (Gergely & Király, 2004, May; Nielsen,
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 15
2006). In Nielsen (2006, Experiment 3), 18- and 24-month-old children were shown how
a miscellaneous object could be used to open each of the three previously-introduced
boxes (see p. 7; section titled “Copying Actions Over Outcomes”). In a ‘social’ condition
the model was typically engaging and interactive whereas in an ‘aloof’ condition the
model acted in a detached and disinterested manner: She avoided eye contact and did not
direct any attention towards the child. The social disposition of the model affected the
children differently. Eighteen-month-olds opened the same number of boxes regardless of
condition, but were more likely to copy the model’s object use when she acted socially.
In contrast, 24-month-olds used an object at equivalent rates across conditions but opened
less boxes when the model was aloof and unengaging. Following Uzgiris (1981), it was
argued that 18-month-olds copied the specific actions of the social model in order to
sustain interaction and convey mutuality with her. In the absence of social reinforcement,
they focused instead on copying what was done rather than copying the way in which it
was done. For 24-month-olds, the lack of social interaction provided by the aloof model
reduced their motivation to produce the modelled outcome. Rather, they copied her
specific actions in an attempt to initiate interaction. These arguments are in line with
perspectives that assert a social and communicative role in young children’s copying
behaviour (for an alternative view see Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2005).
No study has directly manipulated the sociability of the model in any test of great
ape imitation. Nevertheless, there are hints in the literature to suggest that apes do not
treat imitative exchanges in the same communicative manner as young children. Two
species of chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) and 18-month-old human
children were observed whilst engaged in an object-directed imitation task involving an
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 16
adult human model (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). All three
species showed episodes of joint attention involving the model and the objects. However,
the bouts of joint attention were longer in the children and they spent more time looking
at the model’s face. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll (2005) suggest that
these inter-species differences might have arisen because the chimpanzees were looking
at the model to see what she was doing or was likely to do next, whereas the children
looked to share interest. They further suggest that this might indicate that although apes
know that others have goals and perceptions, unlike children, they have little desire to
share them.
If chimpanzees are not inclined to use imitation as a mechanism for social
interaction, long-lasting interactions about an object through the alternation of imitating
and being imitated are unlikely to be built. That is, evidence of synchronic imitation in
chimpanzees is likely to prove elusive. Recent evidence that chimpanzees, unlike 18- and
24-month-old children, are uninterested in social games substantiates this point
(Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). It is also likely that structured comparison of the
responses of children and chimpanzees to being imitated will yield communicationbased, inter-species differences. For example, as part of the previously introduced
longitudinal study (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2003, 2004), we tested young children for
imitation recognition using a procedure similar to the one employed to assess chimpanzee
imitation recognition (Nielsen et al., 2005). Anecdotally, the children clearly found it
amusing when they understood that they were being imitated. Testing frequently
developed into a game, accompanied by giggles and squeals of delight. The children
would even go to great lengths to produce sequences of behaviour that were as difficult
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 17
as possible for the experimenter to copy. Cassie, the captive chimpanzee, showed none of
these signs.
Conclusion: The Social Drive to Imitate and the Transmission of Culture
From the middle of their second year children will persist in reproducing the
exact, at times maladaptive, actions of an adult model – even at the expense of producing
the outcome of those actions. Comparable evidence of this kind of imitative behaviour in
our closest living relatives has not been forthcoming. That chimpanzees will not slavishly
copy a model, as do human children, cannot be attributed to competence. Recall that in
the study by Horner and Whiten (2005), when the box was opaque the chimpanzees
copied the adult model’s full behavioural sequence – the redundant components were
omitted only when the causal relation between the actions and their outcomes was made
apparent. They were thus capable of performing the modelled actions. Evidence of
imitation recognition also suggests that chimpanzees are not in some way deficient in
matching across seen and felt modalities. Rather, the argument put forward here is that,
unlike chimpanzees, children are motivated to copy others in order to be social and to
promote shared experience with the model. This social motivation manifests itself in a
pull towards copying how something was done rather than what was done.
Over 5 million years of distinct evolutionary history has resulted in a seemingly
infinite array of cultural variants in humans, and 39 in chimpanzees. Given the wellargued position that imitation is a fundamental component of the transmission of culture
(e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2005; Heyes, 1993; Meltzoff, 2005; Tomasello, 1999a; Whiten,
2005; Whiten et al., 2003), differences should prevail in the imitative behaviour of these
two species. Based on the arguments presented here, the principle difference lies with a
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 18
peculiarly human tendency to imitate actions over outcomes. For us, at least as children,
means are more important than ends. With regard to cultural traditions, this makes
intuitive sense. If one thinks about distinguishing cultures, it is how things are done that
is most relevant, not what is done. That the Japanese and the British drink tea provides far
less insight into their respective cultural traditions than the way they do so. Doing things
the way those around us do things lies at the heart of the transmission of culture. A
tendency to behave in this way is evident in the way human children imitate from the
middle of their second year.
It has been argued here that young children’s focus on copying actions over
outcomes is a function of their motivation to be social and to interact with the model. The
maturation of domain general cognitive abilities are likely to be important in the
emergence of this motivation (Stone, 2005). Other components of development, such as
emotional engagement (Hobson, 2004), intention reading (Tomasello, 1999b; Tomasello
& Carpenter, 2005b; Tomasello et al., 2005) and receptivity to being taught (Csibra &
Gergely, 2006; Gergely, in press; Gergely & Csibra, 2005) may also play a role.
Establishing which of these components of development (and others) determine why
young children imitate in the way they do will no doubt form the foundation for much
ongoing research and debate. The line between the imitative abilities of human children
and chimpanzees remains somewhat blurred. The use of imitation as a form of
communication may yet prove to be a distinguishing feature between our closest
evolutionary relatives and us.
Imitation in Children and Chimpanzees 19
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