Why did PSOE lose in the general elections in Spain in 2011? An

Why did PSOE lose in the general
elections in Spain in 2011?
An analysis of electoral behaviour
Tomáš Došek
Instituto de Iberoamérica
Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration
University of Salamanca
https://sites.google.com/site/tomasdoseklatam/
[email protected]
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference “Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis”,
November 28-29, 2013, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Stucture of the Presentation
 Context
 Research Design
 Theoretical framework and
hypothesis
 Data, method and variables
 Results
 Conclusions
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
1/13
Context
 General elections in Spain (November 2011)
 PSOE electorally punished – one of the last
elections in Europe and one of the harshest lost
 Fatigue (8 years in government), economic crisis,
unemployment, bad communication
 93.3% of the people considered that the economic
situation in the last 4 year worsened (a lot)
More of a defeat of PSOE than victory of PP
– PSOE lost more than 4m votes (2008)
– PP improved only moderately
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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Context: electoral results
2011
2008
Votes
PP
10,866,566
PSOE
7,003,511
IU
1,686,040
Other parties 4,459,308
Total valid
24,348,886
% valid
44.63
28.76
6.92
19.69
Votes
10,278,010
11,289,335
969,946
2,911,393
25,734,863
% valid
39.94
43.87
3.77
12.42
Abstention
(31.06%)
9,172,740
(26.15%)
11,113,050
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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Research Design
 “Restricted variance” problem
Fraile & Lewis-Beck (2013)
-
Exogenize economic perceptions
(agreggate economic measures)
- Pooled cross-sectional design
- Economy matters
Different research question
=> What factors led the socialist
voters from 2008 to abandon
electorally PSOE in 2011?
Martín & Urquizu-Sancho (2012)
Kennedy (2012), Chari (2013)
-
More qualitative studies
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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Theoretical framework and hypothesis
 Traditional voting behaviour literature, recent studies on elections in the
time of crisis, qualitative studies of the last elections
 Test of rival models for the explantation of voting behaviour of PSOE
voters (2008)
 Crisis responsibility

Who is to blame? (Anderson & Hecht 2010; Karyotis & Rüdig 2013; Tillman 2011; Bartels 2011)
 Evaluation of PSOE performance

Retrospective voting (Fioirina 1981; Bartels 2011; Dalton & Anderson 2011)
 PP more capable to handle unemployment

Valence issues (Clarke & Whitten 2013; Clarke et al. 2011; Martín and Urquizu-Sancho 2012)
 New Primer Minister

Personalization of politics (Rico 2009 and 2010; Rohrschneider & Schmitt-Beck 2010)
 15-M movement

Social movilization & Discontent with politics (Chari 2013)
 Few analysis of the last elections (Fraile & Lewis-Beck 2013; Martín &
Urquizu-Sancho 2012; Kennedy 2012; Chari 2013)
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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Data, method and variables
 Panel survey n° 7711 (Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas, October 2011-January 2012)
 Limited sample: voters of PSOE from 2008 who voted for
PP, IU, other party, did not vote or remained loyal to PSOE
=> Dependent variable (Nominal, 2+ categories)
 Independent variables:
– Pre-electoral: evaluation of the PSOE government (3C),
preference for the future Prime Minister (3C), capacity to handle
the most important problem (3C)
– Post-electoral: responsibility for the economic crisis (4C), opinion
about the 15-M movement (int.)
 Control variables:
– proximity to PSOE (dummy), functioning of democracy (int.),
ideology (int.), sex (dummy), age (int.), educational level (3C)
 Multinomial logistic regression
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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Results
 All parties: Proximity to PSOE
 PP:
 Next Prime Minister, Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Capacity on
unemployment, Approval of 15-M activities (negatively)
 IU:
 Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Approval of 15-M movement
(positive)
 Other parties
 Retrospective evaluation of PSOE, Capacity on unemployment, Next
Prime Minister (to a lesser extent)
 Abstention
 Next Prime Minister, Capacity on unemployment, Responsibility for
the crisis
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
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PP
b
Sex (RC: Man)
Woman
Age
Educational level (RC: None or primary)
Secondary
Higher
Ideology
Proximity to PSOE (RC: No)
Yes
Responsibility for crisis (RC: Other factor)
Government
International economic situation
Banks
Next prime minister (RC: Rubalcaba)
Rajoy
Other person
Evaluation of PSOE (RC: Good)
Regular
Bad
Capacity on unemployment (RC: PSOE)
Partido Popular
Other party
Functioning of democracy
Approval of 15-M
Constant
IU
Odds
ratio
-0.048
(-0.219)
-0.022**
(0.008)
0.953
0.01
(0.256)
-0.289
(0.274)
0.318***
(0.085)
1.01
0.978
0.749
1.374
b
Odds
ratio
0.085
(0.234)
0.002
(0.009)
1.088
0.870**
(0.295)
1.013**
(0.295)
-0.087
(0.093)
1.372
1.002
1.564
0.917
Other political party
Odds
b
ratio
0.069
(0.202)
-0.01
(0.007)
1.072
0.326
(0.257)
0.746**
(0.267)
0.005
(0.083)
1.386
0.99
2.108
1.005
Abstention
Odds
b
ratio
0.101
(0.295)
-0.041***
(0.012)
1.106
0.378
(0.335)
-0.497
(0.412)
0.071
(0.104)
1.459
0.96
0.608
1.074
-0.773**
(0.234)
0.462
-1.576***
(0.276)
0.207
-1.807***
(0.225)
0.164
-1.177***
(0.329)
0.308
0.617
(0.324)
-0.732*
(0.302)
-0.151
(0.29)
1.853
0.402
(0.413)
-0.415
(0.351)
0.166
(0.338)
1.495
0.36
(0.341)
-0.27
(0.311)
0.362
(0.274)
1.433
1.112**
(0.397)
-0.66
(0.435)
-0.4
(0.413)
3.04
2.604***
(0.318)
1.26***
(0.32)
13.514
0.02
(0.559)
0.576
(0.386)
1.02
0.668
(0.376)
0.712*
(0.305)
1.951
0.521
(0.55)
1.392*
(0.544)
1.685
0.973*
(0.478)
1.529**
(0.496)
2.646
0.988**
(0.33)
0.228
(0.308)
0.068
(0.049)
-0.127**
(0.042)
-2.545
(0.894)
2.685
0.908**
(0.345)
0.729
0.786**
(0.269)
0.936
0.015
(0.045)
1.263
0.036
(0.043)
-2.424
(0.906)
0.536
0.273
1399
2.478
0.481
0.86
3.524
4.021
1.256
1.071
0.88
0.66
1.181
1.778
1.180*
(0.542)
1.156**
(0.578)
3.254
0.19
(0.384)
-0.316
(0.282)
-0.066
(0.055)
0.234***
(0.06)
-3.678
(1.032)
1.21
4.776
0.763
1.437
2.037
4.614
2.194
1.015
1.037
0.517
0.67
1.524**
(0.442)
0.926
(0.394)
4.592
-0.252
(0.642)
0.58
(0.676)
0.777
1.274*
(0.624)
1.641**
(0.555)
-0.079
(0.073)
-0.043
(0.055)
-1.112
(1.066)
3.573
2.524
1.786
2.524
0.924
0.958
Nagelkerke R2
McFadden R2
N
Robust standard erros in paretheses
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Reference category (RC) for the dependent variable is PSOE and for independent variables are indicated in parentheses and
bold
0
0
.1
.1
.2
.2
Probability of vote
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Probability of vote
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7
.8
.8
.9
.9
1
1
Results: Proximity to PSOE
1
2
PP
3
4
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
7
8
Abs.
9
10
PSOE
1
2
PP
3
4
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
7
8
Abs.
9
10
PSOE
9/13
Results: Responsibility
Probabily of vote
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Responsibility: International Economic Situation
Probability of vote
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Responsability: Government
1
2
3
PP
4
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
7
8
9
Abs.
10
1
PSOE
2
3
PP
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
7
8
9
Abs.
10
PSOE
Probabililty of vote
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Responsibility: Other
Probability of vote
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Responsibility: Banks
4
1
2
PP
3
4
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
7
8
Abs.
9
10
PSOE
1
2
PP
3
4
5
6
Ideology
IU
Other
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
7
8
Abs.
9
10
PSOE
10/13
Results:
1
0
.1
.1
.2
.2
.3
Probability of vote
.4 .5 .6 .7
Probability of vote
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7
.8
.8
.9
.9
1
Evaluation of PSOE & Capacity on unemployment
Good
Regular
Evalutation of PSOE in Government
PP
IU
Other
Abs.
Bad
PSOE
PSOE
PP
Capacity on Labour Politics
PP
IU
Other
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
Other
Abs.
PSOE
11/13
0
.1
.1
.2
.2
.3
Probability of vote
.4 .5 .6 .7
Probability of vote
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7
.8
.8
.9
.9
1
1
Results:
Next PM & Approval of 15-M
Rubalcaba
Rajoy
Next Prime Minister
PP
IU
Other
Other
Abs.
PSOE
0
1
2
PP
3
4
5
6
Approval of 15M
IU
Other
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
7
8
Abs.
9
10
PSOE
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Conclusions
• Different alternatives – different reasons – bilateral
opossition
• Combination of short and long-term factors
• Responsibility for the crisis rather limited
explanatory power
• Justification of multinomial logistic regression in
multiparty/multi-option context
• Other case studies of incumbent parties punished
in Hungary, Bulgary, Ireland (LeDuc & Pammett)
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference – European University Institute – November 28-29, 2013
13/13
Why did PSOE lose in the general
elections in Spain in 2011?
An analysis of electoral behaviour
Tomáš Došek
Instituto de Iberoamérica
Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration
University of Salamanca
https://sites.google.com/site/tomasdoseklatam/
[email protected]
2013 EUDO Dissemination Conference “Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis”,
November 28-29, 2013, European University Institute, Florence, Italy