A systematic analysis of an East Asian philosophy
Meritocracy in Confucianism: an inquiry
Module:
Justice in Confucianism
Lecturer:
Dr. Paulus Kaufmann
Characters:
82’838
Semester:
Spring 2015 / Autumn 2015
Due Date:
Zurich, January 12th 2015
Studies:
Major: Psychology
Minor: Philosophy
Degree:
Bachelor of Science – Third Year
“He who exercises government by means of virtue may be compared to the North Star,
which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.” – Confucius (The Analects 2,1)
Benjamin Bargetzi Ÿ Baarerstrasse 11 Ÿ CH-6300 Zug
+41 79 393 96 18 Ÿ [email protected] Ÿ 13-742-077
I. Content of “Meritocracy in Confucianism: an inquiry”
1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1
2. The inquiry....................................................................................... 3
2.1. Confucian Philosophy................................................................. 3
2.1.1. The Great Harmony .............................................................. 3
2.1.2. The virtues of the noble ......................................................... 9
2.2. Reign of Excellence ................................................................... 12
2.2.1. The Art of Shōgi ................................................................... 13
2.2.2 Democratic meritocracy ....................................................... 17
3. Review and Conclusions ............................................................... 24
4. Bibliography .................................................................................. 25
1. Introduction
Imagine you were to organize a dinner at your place, for which you invite a few friends: a chemist, a plumber and a geography teacher. Whilst talking about the value of filial piety in modern
societies, a pipe in the kitchen suddenly bursts. Not having any expertise with the wrench, you
seek help from your friends. Who would you now ask to have a look at the damage?
Imagine further that you were working on a very important project that needs to be presented to
the superordinate manager by noon. The other two members of your team have years of experience for the case at hand, whilst your understanding of the matter is rather limited. Do you think
that your voice should matter as much as the thorough elaborations of your partners?
In both cases, however justified it may be, most people would intuitively agree to let those handle the tasks who are best suited for it. By such trusting in someone's ability, authority - understood as the explicit or implicit right to command and to be obeyed (Wolff, 1998) - is granted.
Even though such distribution of authority appears to be rational for the contexts treated above, it
is questionable to uncritically expand this idea to the political discourse when asking whose
opinions should be taken into account to make political decisions. Since governing a state clearly
has more important long-term impact on masses of people than preventing a flooded kitchen or
handing in a marketing project, it remains unclear whether people’s voices should also be graded
depending on their expertise and suitableness in the political decision context.
Such promising, but intuitively deterrent ideals of having only the most able govern a state are
associated with the concept of meritocracy. A meritocracy is a system of rule that allocates positions of influence to individuals with credit and achievement, aiming for an ideal world in which
every citizen occupies the position that he or she deserves (this ideal world has been sophisticatedly illustrated by Michael Young in his satire “Rise of the Meritocracy” in 1958). Whilst such a
merit-based form of state seems to be strongly at odds with democratic ideology, it finds support
in Confucian thinking1, the tradition of which also emphasizes humanitarian values important to
defenders of democracy (Chan, 2015, p. 13-16). It may thus be better to think of meritocracy and
democracy as two anchors on a continuum rather than strict antagonists – and there may even be
ways to combine the two concepts.
1
It is unclear whether Confucianism should be treated as a form of practice that falls within the category of religion or rather as a
pragmatic ethic that integrates specific metaphysical assumptions (Chen, 2012, p. 181-182). Throughout the rich history of Confucian thinking, there have been both schools that treated Confucianism as a religion, whereas others were exclusively concerned
with behavior in the empirical world (Chen, 2012, p. 58-61; p. 102-105). The following paper will interpret Confucian literature
in the latter understanding, for it wishes to avoid talking about Confucianism as a dogmatic and unified ideology.
1
To investigate whether this idea of a “democratic meritocracy” results in contradiction or not, the
relationship between the concepts of democracy and meritocracy will be analysed from the perspective of traditional Confucianism, emphasizing on the compatibility of the two.
Having said that, it seems to be essential not to think of Confucian philosophy as a unified tradition, but rather as a compilation of ideas concerning recurring principles. To use a cosmological
metaphor, we can think of Confucianism as a thinking circling around a common centre. As
such, each thinker has to be understood in the specific context of his time, since different Confucian schools emerged due to (sometimes radically) new hermeneutical approaches closely tied to
socio-political and historical changes.
These inconsistencies across Confucian tradition must be borne in mind when investigating the
concept of a democratic meritocracy, and so the first chapter of the paper will be dedicated to the
analysis of the most fundamental and frequently applied principles to which almost every Confucian thinker would agree. This section aims for clarification of the terms that will be used repeatedly in later parts of the thesis and will focus primarily on the very original Confucian literature2.
Following these insight, it will be investigated how the concepts of democracy and meritocracy
should best be understood in a Confucian context. For the definition of the latter, the philosophy
of state proposed by Ogyū Sorai3 will serve as a first point of reference, used to get a general
idea of what a Confucian meritocracy could look like. Since Sorai desired to move classic Confucianism away from the traditional central concern on individual self-cultivation, and emphasized a radical and authoritarian reconstruction instead (McMullen, 2001, p. 252), delicate contrasting with and careful analysis of Sorai’s model may also provide insights into a less radical
meritocratic form of state that would still be congruent with the Confucian principles elaborated
in the first chapter of the paper. In other words, this section will try to approximate the concept
of Confucian meritocracy over the analysis of that which it is not.
A third step written in front of this background will help to relate and bridge the concepts that
have been investigated in the first chapters and will treat this paper’s central question of whether
there is space for democratic elements in Confucian meritocracy or not.
A final step will then summarize the arguments of this paper that concern perspectives on how to
overcome the assumed contradiction that lies inside the notion of a democratic meritocracy.
2
Primarily treating three of the nine great books of Confucianism: Liji, Mengzi and The Analects.
It is important to bear in mind that Ogyū Sorai’s political philosophy concerned the Tokugawa period of Japan, whereas philosophers like Daniel Bell or Ruiping Fan primarily treat Confucianism in China. However, since this paper tries to avoid talking
about Confucianism as a unified concept and reduces it to fundamental principles that can be found across different historical
contexts instead, the parallels necessary for this comparison may be given.
3
2
2. The inquiry
2.1.
Confucian Philosophy
Whilst thinkers may argue that The Analects of Confucius represent Confucianism adequately,
this intuitively given belief needs to be revised facing the fact that The Analects were not solely
written by Master Kong himself (551-479 BCE), but also incorporate the thoughts and interpretations of Confucius’ students and their students. One feels like searching for a needle in a haystack trying to combine such strings of interpretations with other Confucian classics and converge them on a single tradition. Having said that, there are certain principles that glue these
branches to a specific body of thought and especially the ideal of a harmonious society is of such
importance that influential modern scholars claim harmony to be “the Confucian way” (Li, 2013,
p. 10; Bell, 2014, p. 2-3). Here, the term He (和) is repeatedly used to describe balanced4 interactions of two or more individuals from which agreement emerges (Li, 2013, p. 9). Individuals
who become part of this harmony (和) are to each other in the same way that resonant instruments are to their play or how food goes together to create a tasty meal (Li, 2013, p. 23-25).
With this picture in mind, most Confucian scholars would agree that harmony is both a desirable
end in itself (an intrinsically valuable state of society) and a fundamental mean for human flourishing (Li, 2013, p. 10). The following section will now investigate the meaning of this “human
flourishing” for a Confucian society and how this goal relates to the concept of He.
2.1.1. The Great Harmony
In Liji, the idea of Da Tong (大同) is mentioned. 大同, whilst literally meaning5 “the great unity”, is frequently translated as the great harmony and refers to the highest ideal of Confucian
social order (Bell, 2010, p. 23), describing a utopian golden age in which the people and the state
function like a single entity. The core principle of this harmonious society is known as the idea
of Tian Xia Wei Gong, of having the world shared in common by all (Bell, 2010, p. 23).
4
To have a balanced interaction means that both parties pay mutual respect to each another (the Analects, 1, 13) and are thus
treated the way that they deserve to be treated (Fan, 1997, p. 435). It should be noted that “balanced” does necessarily mean
“equal” in a Confucian context (meaning that all parties are given equal status and length of speech in interactions), but that this
“balanced” is closely tied to the idea of appropriate treatment (禮), which will be subject to investigation of later parts.
5
The Hanzi in this paper have been translated using both “COLLINS, Harper (2005): Collins Chinese Dictionary. California:
HarperCollins” and “WIEGER, Léon (1965): Chinese Characters: their origin, etymology, history, classification and signification.
New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corporation”.
3
The following quote concerning the perfect society of Da Tong will give a first sense of the
world that Confucius was longing for. Since this golden age is idealized and scholars widely
agree (Bell, 2010, p. 24-25) on the necessity of reaching this highest form of harmony (Li, 2013,
p. 134-136), its analysis will allow the thesis to carve out values central to Confucian ethics:
“When the Great Way was practiced [1], the world was shared by all alike [2]. The worthy and the able were promoted to office [3] and men practiced good faith [4] and lived
in harmony. Therefore they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons
only their own sons [5]. The aged were cared for till the end of their lives [6], […] while
the young were nurtured in growing up [7]. Provisions were made to care for widows,
widowers, the orphaned and the sick [8]. [...] [A]ll evil plotting was prevented and
thieves and rebels did not arise, so that people could leave their outer gates unbolted.
This was the age of Great Harmony.” (Bell, 2010, p. 23)
The first sentence tells us that Da Tong (the world in which Tian Xia Wei Gong is fully applied)
is something that lies at the end of a process: at the end of a way that is walked on by practicing
certain attitudes [1;2]. Under the assumption that an ideal society would also be governed by
ideal rulers (Li, 2013, p. 137-138), the men deemed suitable for being “promoted to office”
(which means that they will take on positions of authority) have to be both “worthy” and “able”
in their highest forms [3]. The character used for “worthy” in Liji’s paragraph Liyun-Datong
(Liji, 9, 1) is read as Xian (賢). The character of Xian is composed of an upper part 臤 and a
lower part 貝. Whilst 貝 alone is read as “worthy” in a very materialistic meaning, 賢 together
can also mean “virtuous”. Converging these thoughts, it seems plausible that the Da Tong society requires the most virtuous and able to rule6.
Furthermore, the notion of rule [3] shows that even in this utopian world of perfected harmony,
there is still no equality of status. Having said that, the harmony of this world may even stem
from certain dimensions of human inequality7 (Fan, 1997, p. 435-436). When Confucius says
that “[t]he noble man is in harmony but does not follow the crowd” (the Analects, 13, 23), it
6
Since the rule of the greatest seems to be necessary (Li, 2013, p. 138) for establishing a truly harmonious society, the abovementioned Great Way may also be related to the qualities of virtue and ability.
7
This claim can both be understood in an intra- and international context. In the international context, which will not be emphasized in this paper, this absence of sameness means that cultural diversity between nations is still present in the world of Da Tong
(Li, 2013, p. 143-146; Bell, 2010, p. 27-28). This observation allows for another, essential point to be made: when the world is
shared by all in common, this does not mean that there are no more nations in the world or that cosmopolitanism has been established, but rather that different internally harmonious nations cooperate with each other in a benevolent manner that still leaves
space for national interests (Bell, 2010, p. 24-27).
4
seems reasonable to assume that the concept of harmony (He) needs to be separated from the
concepts of uniformity and equality: Da Tong is the great unity, not the great uniformity. The
ways in which The Analects talk about noble men and a crowd suggests that there exists a certain
type of man who is more valuable than others. If the promotion of these worthier citizens to office is part of the way that leads to Da Tong [1;3], then certain hierarchical relations between the
noble and the common man contribute to the establishment and perseverance of harmony (Bell,
2010, p. 27). And indeed, Confucius assumes that if a virtuous, noble man governs a society, “all
the stars” will turn towards him just as they turn towards the “North Star” (the Analects, 2, 1). In
this quote, Confucius uses the astronomical relation between the brightest star “Polaris” and the
seven stars of the asterism known as “Big Dipper” to show that the citizens’ behaviour will follow the demonstrations of those who occupy positions of authority. These rulers serve as moral
examples for the people (the Analects, 13, 1), insofar as their conduct aligns with virtue and inspires citizens to imitate their behaviour (Li, 2013, p. 118-119). It is for this reason that the rule
of virtuous men relates to citizens “practicing good faith” [4], because noble role models encourage other people to behave appropriately (Li, 2013, p. 118).
These people of good faith act with the common good in mind (Chan, 2007, p. 184), which
means that they expand their concerns to include the whole society. It is not surprising that the
people living in a society of great harmony do then not “regard as parents only their own parents,
or as sons only their own sons” [5], but that they also care for people that are not part of their
family. But this is not to say that strangers will be treated the same as family members. As Daniel Bell (2010, p. 27) puts it: “[t]he Confucian idea is that ties should be extended from intimates
to others, but with diminishing intensity”. To use a metaphor, one can imagine the degree of care
to be like ripples that form on the water’s surface after a stone has been thrown into a lake.
Whilst the family lies at the epicentre of this circular pattern, the intensity of kindness decreases
as the person someone interacts with grows more and more distant in terms of familiarity.
Such levelling of applied kindness depending on the type of bond that is shared also brings about
the principle of filial piety (孝): the duty to take care of one’s elderly parents. This duty does not
simply include material or monetary support, but rather a genuine concern with the wellbeing of
the elderly in the family (Bell, 2010, p. 77). And it is this practice of home-based care and fulfilment of responsibilities towards family members that helps children cultivate a sense of concern that may later expand to include people outside the family (Bell, 2010, p. 77). With referring back to the ripples on the water’s surface, the intense care for one’s aged parents learnt at
home may start to be applied to other elderly people inside the society as well. It makes therefore
sense that the citizens of the Da Tong society care for the aged “till the end of their lives” [6].
5
But not only do the young look after the elderly, families also do their best to raise their children
with the same compassion they themselves receive [7]. The family becomes the basic building
unit of society in which mutual compassion and care between parent and child are cultivated.
And it is exactly this exchange and practice of compassion that, when spread throughout society,
allows people to transcend conflict and to reach a state of Great Harmony. Filial piety is thus
referred to as “the root of [all] humanity and compassion” (the Analects, 1, 2): from the stable
roots of home-learnt compassionate concern, the Great Way follows [1] – and the practice of this
Great Way will eventually create a world of superior harmony.
It becomes clear that the concept of harmony should not be understood as something static, but
as a continuous dynamic process (Li, 2013, p. 9) that functions like a spiral. Just like living in a
state of respect and peace allows families to become harmonious, stable and nourishing relationships inside the individual family expand to include others, increase the overall social cohesiveness and make citizens function together akin to the arrangement of tones in a symphony.
Social relationships lie at the heart of Confucian ethics and the ideal society thus looks upon
“widows, widowers [and] the orphaned” just as they look upon the sick [8]. This is because, for
the Confucian observer, the former lack something just as fundamental for human happiness as
the latter: being without health is as grave a case as being without social bonds (Bell, 2010, p. 6).
After the paper has now given a first impression of the social values that constitute a society of
harmony, a central political aspect remains: private property. The very idea of having “all people
share everything in common” [2] suggests that in an ideal world, there is no such thing as private
property8. Indeed, Confucius advocated his students to live a simple life that is satisfactory only
because of shared feelings of happiness (the Analects, 14, 11; Bell, 2015, p. 143-144). And so he
praised his favourite student Yan Hui for his enthusiasm towards a life of extremely limited material goods: “Hui was indeed a worthy! With a bamboo bowl of rice and a gourd cup of water he
lived in a back alley. Others could not have endured his misery but Hui never changed from his
happy disposition" (the Analects, 6, 11). Confucius calls Yan Hui a “worthy”, a noble man, who,
in his virtue, is indifferent to the temptations of a materialistic life. This modest life leaves space
to foster what is truly important for us: social relationships, families, and friends. With disregard
to the pursuit of wealth and possession, a noble man’s desires are reduced to the basic needs of
Yan Hui: a place to sleep and a minimum to eat and drink. If one does not take too much for
himself, there is enough left for the ones in need. To reach the ideal of Tian Xia Wei Gong [2]
8
The concept of „sharing“ doesn't necessarily exclude private property on its own. The production means could still be owned
by a few who are benevolently sharing them with everyone. However, as will be shown later on, it seems plausible that the idea
of private property is harmful to the world of Da Tong and is thus sought to be abolished.
6
now simply means to generalize this abandonment of materialistic desires from the individual to
every person in the collective. However, this ideal should not be understood in terms of the government’s interventions in the market for the sake of a just distribution of goods that would eventually result in harmonious societies (Fan, 1997, p. 428-431; Bell, 2010, p. 8-10). It is quite the
opposite for Confucianism: in the Da Tong world, people will have cultivated a specific mentality out of which they do no longer desire luxury. As such, they become as indifferent to materialistic values as Yan Hui and cherish the social values elaborated above instead. Metaphorically,
the golden age does not shine brightly because of gold or jewels, but because of the people’s
pure hearts. The rulers in Da Tong will therefore primarily be concerned with the fulfilment of
their roles as moral examples, rather than wasting thoughts on increasing a nation’s wealth.
However, it should not be overlooked that Confucius himself pointed out that the ruling politicians first have to secure conditions in which the citizens’ basic needs are met and only then
should they be educated about the virtuous life (the Analects, 13, 9; Bell, 2010, p. 87). Similarly,
Mengzi (372-289 BCE) warns that people who lack the basic means of subsistence are easy to go
morally astray (Mengzi, 1A, 7). A certain amount of property is therefore needed to ensure harmony in a Confucian state: if my family has to starve, I may decide to steal for their sake. The
distribution of goods and resources may thus concern the glorious rulers insofar as the basic human needs of the common citizens have to be met.
But does this also apply to the noble man? Mengzi further states that the noble man would not
change his virtuous character no matter what dire situation he may encounter (Mengzi, 3B, 7).
The noble even prefers death to being unworthy: he rather starves than to steal a single leaf of
bread (Mengzi, 6, 7). The distribution of goods for the sake of preventing immoral actions is
only needed for the normal, but not for the noble man. These exemplary men rather wish to have
no life at all than to live an immoral one: such virtuous convictions are the pillars of Da Tong.
But however fascinating the thought of such a peaceful society – freed from selfish desires and
resting on the shoulders of ultimately virtuous men – may be, the world has not yet reached this
state9. There is an associated concept to Da Tong (大同) that refers to this imperfect world,
called Xiao Kang (小康): the Small Tranquillity. In this world, “the Great Way has fallen into
[…] obscurity […], [since] [e]very one loves above all others his own parents and cherishes as
9
To be precise, according to Confucian legends, there has in fact been a “Golden Age of Great Harmony” before the time in
which Confucius and Mengzi taught. Confucius talks about never having seen the practice of the Great Way by the ancient Sage
Kings in Liji 9,1, but he also says that his ideals are in harmony with theirs. It becomes evident that Confucius’ description of Da
Tong refers to an ancient state of the world – for which a renaissance is sought. The description of this golden age in the LunyuDatong is written in past tense, which means that Confucius is indeed referring back to long forgotten times. But for the pity of
man, this ideal world has fallen into oblivion, leaving mankind only with an imperfect, disharmonious world.
7
children only his own sons” (Liji, 9,2). The people further accumulate goods and “exert their
strength for their own advantage”, rather than believing that all under heaven is made for everyone and using strengths and abilities for the sake of others. In this world, the kindness and care
learnt at home remain privileges for those close to the individual: the ripples do not expand to
include strangers and harmony is hindered from spreading throughout society. Without this concern for the wellbeing of everyone, the people start to gather goods for their own use and the
goal of achieving a luxurious life becomes desirable.
If the world of Da Tong is imagined as the symphony that combines tones in the most harmonious way, there are many disharmonious errors in the melody of Xiao Kang. Neither can one find
care for the elderly that would expand beyond the boarders of the family [5;6], nor is there sufficient care for orphans and the sick [8]. Greed and selfishness dominate the mind of man and virtue is thus nowhere to be practiced. This imperfect world is associated with the concept of aristocracy: the rule of noble blood10. It is said that Xiao Kang is a time of “family inheritance”, in
which those in power believe that “their states should descend in their own families” (Liji, 9,2).
This inheritance of political authority contradicts the principle of Da Tong according to which
“the worthy and able have [to be] promoted to office” [3]. Even if one of these aristocratic descendants was to have a truly noble father, there is no guarantee that the son would inherit the
father’s virtue and ability (Bell, 2015, p. 125-127), for blood does not carry greatness. From a
Confucian perspective, it is essential to have only the very best serve as moral examples. But
since the rulers in Xiao Kang are mostly concerned with their own family and not with the greater good of social harmony, a dying monarch will rather pass on his position of authority to his
own son than to make sure that the state is governed by noble men. Following the moral example
of their political superior, the high-ranking officials will also make sure to support their offspring
via their influence and connections as to give them undeserved advantages. They thus hinder the
ones best suited for governing from reaching the position that they should occupy.
In this world of Xiao Kang, noble thinking is neither spread from one family to neighbouring
families nor from the ruler to his subordinates. It is for this reason that the Great Way fades into
oblivion and is no longer practiced. Converging what has been analysed so far, the bridge that
separates the Small Tranquillity from the Great Harmony is the constant cultivation of virtues
pursued by every citizen of every hierarchical status. It is for this reason that the following section will analyse the nature of this self-cultivation that lies at the heart of human flourishing.
10
To avoid conceptual confusion, the original meaning of “aristokratía” (the rule of the best) will be used as the definition of
political meritocracy in following sections. Aristocracy on the other hand will be understood in the meaning given to the term in
later times: the rule by those from privileged classes and families.
8
2.1.2. The virtues of the noble
The second glue that helps to relate the diverse tradition of Confucian thoughts is the concept of
“Ren” (仁). One could go as far as to view Confucianism as a set of ideologies rooted11 from
thoughts on “Ren” (Li, 2013, p. 20-21; Sun, 1991, p. 5-8). Despite philosophers’ different interpretations of Confucian classics, their argumentations mainly concern ideas and practices associated with 仁, which has mostly been translated as “humaneness”, “kindness” and “benevolence”.
Oddly enough regarding the centrality of the concept, the term “Ren” occurs for seventy-five
times throughout The Analects, without being explicitly defined even once. Confucius only describes situations in which one can feel a sense of Ren, without catching its meaning in concrete
words. It is for this reason that a direct translation of Ren seems to bear danger of not doing justice to the scope of the term12. What can be said is that the Chinese character “Ren” (仁) is composed of two parts, being a left half of a character read as “people” (亻), and a right half embodying the number two (二), which indicates that Ren as a Confucian concept has to be understood in the context of interactions between individuals. Ren is the virtue of treating others right:
the golden rule of doing to others only what you would like to have done upon you (the Analects,
15, 24). But the scope of Ren does not stop here: it has further been translated as “love” and “altruism”, which is why Ren could also be understood as the endeavour of trying to develop a general disposition of kindness towards other people (Fan, 1997, p. 435-436).
The concept of Ren is one of five cardinal Confucian virtues called Wuchang (五常) and occupies a central position among them, since the other four virtues of Wuchang follow from Ren
(Fan, 1997, p. 436; Sun, 1991, p. 8-10). Amongst these consequences, there is loyalty (Xin) and
wisdom (Zhi). It is not hard to see how these two concepts are related to Ren: if one has developed the virtue of kindness, he would never betray a friend, no matter how much money he is
offered for it. Following the so-far established framework of Confucian ethics, Zhi too has to be
understood in a social context. That is to say that wisdom facilitates the understanding of other
people’s concerns and of what is therefore right and wrong (Mengzi, 3A, 4). Someone who is
wise knows how to treat others – and because of his cultivated Ren, he will do so. On the other
hand, only because of his kindness is he able to show empathy and concern for his neighbours
and is can thus learn about people’s needs. Without such fundamental disposition of care, one
would not start to develop wisdom of what is right and wrong – and without such knowledge, the
11
Having said that, it seems essential not to try reducing Confucian ethics to the principle of Ren (or any single concept) only.
The paper will respectively apply the most appropriate translations for Chinese characters given by the specific situation in
which the term is used. Sometimes, it will also use terms like “Ren“ to refer to the entire set of different meanings.
12
9
strive towards a harmonious society will only be a hollow fantasy. The rule of the worthiest
treated above is therefore primarily (but not solely) the rule of the most benevolent: the rule of
those politicians who care for their people the most.
Since Ren can both be read as humane-ness (the state of being truly human) and benevolence, the
concept also appears to have a central metaphysical position in Confucian thinking. When
Mengzi13 talks about “the principles of our [human] nature” (Mengzi, 6A, 1), he indeed assumes
human beings to share certain unchangeable attributes. But rather than assuming human beings
to be able to find virtues inside14 them, he believes that “the mind of compassion is the beginning
of humaneness” and that it is as natural to have this beginning as it is to have limbs (Mengzi, 2A,
6; Tucker, 1998, p. 117). This beginning of Ren manifests itself in moments when one’s heart is
torn apart upon seeing someone else struggle – the one filled with Ren cannot endure to just
stand by and feels the need to intervene (Mengzi, 7B, 31). Taken together, these quotes imply
that Mengzi believes human beings to have certain potentials right from birth, which can be cultivated to become virtues. It is the intuitive feeling of compassion that first awakens a humans’
kindness and by cultivating these feelings, the individual is able to reach higher degrees of Ren
(Fan, 1997; p. 435). It is for this reason that Mengzi doesn’t regard these virtues to be something
innate and already perfected, but as something that needs to be developed and nourished in social
interactions. To replace the metaphor of the stained diamond, Mengzi rather believes humans to
be born with innate seeds that have to be continuously cared for. Thanks to these seeds, we have
a natural sense for what is the right thing to do and are therefore equipped with a compass to
direct the practice of virtuousness: being kind to others is something natural for humans. In other
words, for humans to be benevolent is simply to live qua human. This life according to one’s
nature is believed to result in both the best life for the individual and mankind as a whole (Fan,
1997; p. 431-432). At the heart of the Confucian ethos thus lies the constant cultivation of the
seeds one has been born with: cultivating them is to become more and more benevolent and wise
– which simply means to become more and more human. From this perspective, living a fulfilled
life means to be deeply rooted in mutually benefitting social bonds. And these bonds can expand
to tie together a whole society; to serve as a solid foundation for achieving the Great Harmony.
13
This passage follows the thinking of Mengzi, since he was ambitious to provide the specified and concrete explanations about
the nature of Ren that The Analects (or rather Confucius himself) did not give (Tucker, 1998, p. 115-116).
14
Throughout Confucian history, metaphysical approaches vary greatly. Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Song Dynasty such as
Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi were ambitious to reawaken the traditional Confucianism of Mengzi and Confucius after Buddhism and
Daoism dominated Chinese philosophy in the Tang Dynasty. However, the Cheng-Zhu school still incorporated thoughts inspired
by Buddhism and Daoism into their Confucian interpretations and developed a perspective on human nature where virtues such
as Ren are treated as something lying inside the very essence of man (Tucker, 1998, p. 116-117). To use a metaphor, one can
imagine human beings to hold a hidden, naturally clean diamond in their heart, stained by the dirt of excessive desires, but yet
able to be purified by knowledge of the world and oneself.
10
However, for the common man, Ren is not consistent. An embittered, cruel old lady who saves a
girl's life out of a moment of benevolence under some specific circumstances displays a temporary state of benevolence, but such Ren is transient. The true practice of Ren, however, means
"[t]o fully overcome selfishness and keep to propriety" (the Analects, 12, 1). This propriety,
sometimes translated as ritual for its association with ceremonial behaviour back in ancient China, is generally known as Li (禮). According to Confucius, the people in the golden age practiced
Li to a degree that fully regulated social and political relations – and this regulation of human
interaction needs to be recreated to reach the Great Harmony once again (Yao, 2000, p. 19-22).
Mengzi (3A, 4) explicitly names the kind of relations that require a specific form of manner:
parent and child, husband and wife, friend and friend, old and young, ruler and subject. These
relations are mostly hierarchical, but that does not make them unilateral: whilst son and wife
obey father and husband, the latter have a duty of protecting the former (Yao, 2000, p. 35-36).
These behavioural rituals give a society structure and thus stability, what allows for Ren to be
spread. If the people on the streets, inside the family and in government positions treat each other
with the respect that a specific social role (such as the family father or a government official)
deserves, then social order is maintained. Li can thus be thought of as a guidance for citizens, so
that they act in accordance with the Great Way: following the rules and duties of propriety serves
as an everyday training ground to practice manner and care (Yao, 2000, p. 35-36). This constant
practice guides the process of self-cultivation (Analects, 12, 1) and enables consistent benevolence: Li is the compass that directs Ren. It follows that kindness is not equally applied in a Confucian society: a mother or a friend should always be loved more than a stranger, and so should
those be who are of high virtue and good character (Fan, 1997, p. 435).
The relationship between Li and harmony (He) becomes clear now. Li regulates the intensity of
kindness based on differences in age and social status: in Confucian societies, the application of
care for other citizens is not equal. Quite the opposite, Confucian ethics regard the maintenance
of specific inequalities as something inherently desirable, for only when the elderly and the weak
are cared for more than the healthy adult can a state be harmonious. But this does not mean that
one would not care for the stranger at all: one shall love all humans, but not all humans equally
(Fan, 1997, p. 435). This unequal application of Ren is the heart of harmony (the Analects, 1,
12). The state should therefore not promote total equality and make equal what is naturally unequal (in terms of virtue, ability and familial closeness), but it should maintain a “harmonious
state among unequals” (Fan, 1997, p. 436). Only when the intensity of expressed Ren matches
the relationship and the relative status between people can a state achieve Great Harmony.
11
And this is where the fifth pillar of Wuchang comes in: Yi (義) or righteousness. The term “Yi”
denotes one of the five relations of Li15, namely the one between ruler and ruled (Fan, 1997, p.
436). From this perspective, to be righteous means to behave in the specific manner expected
from one's role as either ruler or subject. In Liji, righteousness is defined as "the accordance of
actions with what is right" (Liji, 31, 20) and to do the right means to facilitate the manifestation
of He in society (Li, 2013, p. 32-33). The average citizen can now be righteous insofar as he or
she "honours the worthy" (Liji, 31, 20) – namely the noble men and thus (ideally) the government. On the other hand, as mentioned before, the proper and therefore righteous behaviour for
the political ruler is to act as a moral example, which means that the politician inspires his citizens to imitate his actions and attitudes16.
Converging this analysis of the principles of Wuchang, the virtuous, idealised ruler is wise, loyal, of good heart and kind, is equipped with propriety and he inspires his people to cultivate their
seeds of virtue. Consistent with these thoughts, Mengzi repeatedly advocated to Chinese emperor
Liang Hui Wang that “benevolence and righteousness” shall be his “only themes” (Mengzi, 1,1),
which implies that “Ren” and “Yi” are the defining characteristics of a noble ruler – and only
within these virtues can one understand what is meant by Confucian merit.
2.2.
Reign of Excellence
Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) was an ardent critic of his own time, already sensing the decline of the
socio-political system characteristic for the Tokugawa-period of early modern Japan (16031868). He was one of the most conservative Confucian scholars, but not in the sense that he
would follow The Analects or Mengzi to the letter: for Sorai, the highest philosophical authorities
are the early kings of the decayed golden age, not Confucius himself (Lidin, 1993, p. 9-10). His
thoughts therefore partially deviate from traditional Confucianism17 in the sense that he emphasizes less on the adherence to idealized principles, but rather understands them as being embedded in institutions (McMullen, 2001, p. 258). But that does not mean that the concepts of Ren, Li
and Yi would not play a fundamental role in his philosophy.
15
The concept of Xin (loyalty) that was treated before also appears within these five regulations of Li, namely in the fidelity
between friend and friend (Fan, 1997, p. 436)
16
Needless to say, a corrupt and violent tyrant who inspires others to rape and murder is by no means righteous. The imitation
of the ruler needs to result in a better society, whereas “better“ is understood as “more harmonious“.
17
Which is understood as the philosophical body constructed in Liji, Mengzi and The Analects for this paper’s investigation.
12
In the Seidan, he describes a totalitarian state crowned by the Bakufu military regime and an absolute ruler (the Shogun) with absolutely no space for democratic elements18 that gives off a vibe
different from the calmness associated with the world of Da Tong in Liji (Lidin, 1993, p. 10;
McEwan, 1969, p. 74-75). It is for this reason that the comparison and contrast of Ogyū Sorai’s
political ideals with the Confucian principles elaborated in the first chapter of this paper may
give rise to a more accurate understanding of the traditional Confucian meritocracy.
2.2.1. The Art of Shōgi
Classical Confucian ethics treat the cultivation of Ren through social interactions as the way to
perfect human nature. Every human being can achieve moral greatness, which is simply to say
that everyone can become human qua human. This is not to say that all men can become fully
equal in terms of morality and ability, but that everyone can reach a certain degree of nobility.
Still, all of mankind is born with the seeds meant to become human goodness one day and these
seeds can blossom through effort (Fan, 1997, p. 431-432). Sorai, however, clearly uses more
pessimistic terms to describe the common man compared to Mengzi or Confucius. He describes
them as being stupid, numerous and of small capacity. He further claims that these men only
hold aspirations for warmth and satiety, contrary to the noble man who also seeks intellectual
growth. This noble man is thus capable of learning and moral understanding, but unfortunately
few in numbers (McMullen, 2001, p. 252-254)19. For Sorai, these two categories are as distinct
as sky and land and the dichotomy seems to run deep enough for the common man to be deprived
of the natural right to be treated with the kindness and respect that traditional Confucianism
seeks to expand to all humans (McMullen, 2001, p. 253). In other words, the noble man does not
seem to have an obligation to show Ren towards the lower man. One gets the feeling that Sorai
views society in the distinction between an inferior herd of sheep, who are the stupid and passive
objects of control, and a few selected, superior leaders (McMullen, 2001, p. 253).
He justifies this diminishment by virtue and ability, whereas Sorai seems to understand virtue in
terms of how someone uses his abilities in the state. This pragmatic conceptualization translates
to a status hierarchy of classes characteristic for the Tokugawa period20, at the heart of which
lied the idea of labour division being linked to moral worth: a peasant had a higher status than a
18
The closest Sorai comes to participatory democracy is when he recommended to the Shogun that he should invite scholars,
townspeople and farmers, so that they could speak freely about the affairs in the country. The Shogun and other high officials
would simply listen, without interference. The government would thus be able to understand people’s concerns better, but this is
already the limit of the power from below that the citizens in Sorai’s state receive (Lidin, 1993, p. 11; McEwan, 1969, p. 84).
19
Members of a third category of people, the sages, are the founders of the Great Way and the reason why the age of Da Tong
has been as great as it was. It remains unclear whether Sorai believes that new sages can come forth in his or later times.
20
These classes are (ranked in order): Protectors (Samurai for Japan), peasants, craftsmen, and merchants at the bottom.
13
merchant precisely because of his higher productive value. This is to say that a peasant and his
work serve the prosperity of the state more, which Sorai regards as the economic aspect of a
peaceful state (Lidin, 1993, p. 3). Status is therefore allocated depending on one’s contribution to
society, what introduces meritocratic elements. But contrary to Confucius’ emphasis on mutual
respect through kindness, this hierarchical system of productive merit is created and maintained
through the institutionalisation of social relations through an economic framework of prestigious
goods, which signal to others the status of their holder (Lidin, 1993, p. 5-6). These goods define
what the proper manner of interaction between two individuals is. Again, this approach towards
Li is purely pragmatic. Sorai refers to the relations between father and son or ruler and subordinate as “things” (Maruyama, 1974, p. 84-85), which is a different understanding from classical
thinkers like Mengzi, who understand Li as something practical too, but still think of it as an
ideal. Sorai, however, is far from being an idealist and focuses on what is instead. That is to say
that he does not think of the hierarchical relation of father and son as something intrinsically
desirable, but as something desirable because it brings stability to the state. The social relations
that constitute Li are easily understandable even to the herd of common men: these regulations do
not need long explanations and they concretely teach the ways to achieve the warmth and satiety
the normal man so desperately desires. Since this common man is passive and unable, he needs
to be guided to do the right thing and to stay loyal to the ruler: here, Li is instrumentalized.
It does not seem too daring to conclude that Sorai does not dream of an eventual ideal world of
Great Harmony. In other words, whilst The Analects encourage people to constantly work on
themselves to create Da Tong, Sorai doesn’t believe that the world of Xiao Kang can ever be
transcended. His political thoughts concern a concrete moment in time, rather than utopia.
This becomes clear when Sorai says that even institutions designed by a sage will eventually
decay under the pressure of disruptive economic influences (McEwan, 1969, p. 30). He recognizes that harmony is something dynamic and not static, which is not yet directly contradicting
the thoughts of Mengzi and Confucius. But it seems plausible that the latter believe that once the
world of Da Tong is reached, mankind indeed has taken a great step forward, rather than thinking of this ideal society as something that will crumble eventually (Li, 2013, p. 1).
When Sorai says that “ruling a country is like dividing a Go-board into squares” (Lidin, 1993, p.
3), he introduces a metaphor for a structured system where individual play stones need to be arranged properly. The one entrusted with the task to establish this functional system is the ruler:
his position requires the most general ability, namely to adequately allocate positions in the state
(Tucker, 2006, p. 187). Sorai argues that the ruler therefore has to have absolute power, meaning
that no social secret must be hidden from his ears and that no one must move between parts of
14
the land without authorization (Lidin, 1993, p. 4). Sorai indeed advocated the Shogun to attach
his people to specific places in the country, from which not only they themselves, but also their
children and grandchildren must not leave without authorization. His rational is that if all citizens
are tied to a specific geographical place, the ruler is enabled to effectively organize the human
capital of a state and he can make sure to use the country’s resources to the fullest (Lidin, 1993,
p. 4). Sorai’s assumption that most people are inherently stupid and unable to understand what is
needed for a state to function may legitimize such intuitively disturbing ideas. Unsurprisingly,
classic Confucians like Mengzi and Kongzi too wish for a society in which “everyone is in his
place”, but they only speak in the context of politics and the relations of Li, with no reference to
geographical implications. And this idea of giving every citizen the status in society that he or
she deserves is exactly what the meritocratic procedure is seeking (Young, 1958).
Mostly, these procedures include ultracompetitive examinations that test for whatever the society
defines as merit. In a Confucian context, this merit denotes virtue and ability and the examinations must therefore be constructed in ways that allow testing the participants’ kindness, propriety and intelligence and their knowledge about different aspects of ruling, such as law, economics,
psychology, political philosophy, history and international relations (Bell, 2010, p. 15-18).
For Sorai, merit predominantly means production through hard work and people are thus
weighted according to their individual contributions to the state. However, it is worth noting that
the Shogun himself should be aware that he only has a general talent that makes him suitable for
politician’s promotion to office, but that he lacks specified knowledge. In the context of Seidan,
the ruler is virtuous only insofar as he fully completes the duties that come with his abilities –
namely to make the best decisions when structuring the state (Lidin, 1993, p. 5).
He should thus be open to advices from a small circle of counsellors. The ruler himself does not
have to be perfect; he only needs to be able to recognize which abilities suit which position in the
state and his advisors may compensate for his weaknesses. Further, despite his absolute power,
the ruler will not outrage the feelings of his citizens and provoke a revolution (McEwan, 1969, p.
78), for this would go against his duties. Regarding the fact that prosperity and stability are the
keystones of a state (Lidin, 1993, p. 6-8), one may conclude that the ruler’s foremost duty is the
prevention of revolution amongst his people21. In order to achieve this goal, the government
must fully understand its citizens’ concerns and feelings. But no matter how intelligent a ruler is,
he may never understand what if feels like to be a farmer (McEwan, 1969, p. 81). Sorai thus em
21
This reminds of Niccolò Machiavelli (1532)’s conception of the Principe who governs his people with kindness not because
he would be closely attached to them, but because it helps to preserve the state’s stability and therefore prevents revolution.
However, regarding the scope of this paper, the comparison of the two political philosophers needs to be subject to other work.
15
phasizes not only the static proposals treated above, but also a dynamic principle of change that
needs to be adhered to. He describes this principle with the following words:
“It is a general and lasting principle of the natural order that old things should pass
away and new things be brought into existence. Everything between heaven and earth is
subject to it, and no matter how much one may wish to preserve what is old, it is not
within our power to do so.” (McEwan, 1969, p. 77)
Here, Sorai draws an analogy between the natural cycle of birth and decay and the necessary fate
of a state. The virtuous ruler of Sorai’s conception lives in accordance with this principle and
does not hinder the new from rising when its time has come. This is needed for the state’s prosperity, since for Sorai, the short-lived periods of peace are a double-edged sword. In time without conflict, the higher classes are freed from labour and thus their minds become dull. However,
the man who grows up with hardships has to constantly forge his talents as to meet the challenges he encounters as part of his everyday functioning in the state (such as looking after a field).
Therefore, his mind becomes more flexible as he uses it, just as the muscle is strengthened by its
use (McEwan, 1969, p. 80). Similarly, a man who inherited his high office profits from benefits
he does not deserve – he does not know of the hardship that is necessary to become noble. Because his abilities then do not meet the requirements of his responsible position, he must not
keep it. From this follows a thought that has already been treated: the hereditary succession to
office is inconsistent with the idea of Confucian meritocracy22 (McEwan, 1969, p. 77-78).
If this principle of change is followed, the people from lower classes are inspired by their neighbours who rose to office and will work hard to achieve the same23 (McEwan, 1969, p. 79). This
will stabilize the state and create order. Likewise, the decay of a state follows when people hold
positions that they are not suited for. For Sorai, status should be closely tied to a certain distribution of goods. In his eyes, these goods (e.g. clothing, food, possession) function as a decorum
that shows to others the status of their holder. When the lower class craftsman sees the clothing
of a Samurai, he automatically knows that this man is of higher status than he is. Such distribution of goods supports the establishment of Li. But if a man of lower class suddenly owns goods
that are more prestigious than the goods held by the higher class, the foundation of the hierarchical system starts to shake: a merchant shall not possess the kind of apartment that is reserved
for the Samurai to have.
22
To preserve the stability of a state, one cannot just overthrow the existing hierarchy, even if some are in positions that they do
not deserve (McEwan, 1969, p. 77). Unworthy politicians need to be replaced step by step – just like spring replaces winter.
23
One has to bear in mind that for Sorai, this rising in status is mainly instrumental. As long as one or two men of worth are
promoted from the lower classes, this alone will be sufficient to inspire people and to create a new attitude in society (McEwan,
1969, p. 82). But only the fewest will eventually be promoted to office. 16
This close relation between economy, Li and harmony is found in Sorai, but not in Confucius or
Mengzi. The latter agree to the idea that existential needs throughout the population have to be
covered, but for Sorai, this serves the pragmatic purpose of avoiding revolution. Traditional Confucianism, however, wishes for existential needs to be covered primarily because doing so enables people to cultivate themselves and to become virtuous men. This comparison clearly reflects
the differences in optimism towards human nature the two camps hold. Whilst it is true that traditional Confucianism separates humans into the noble and the common too, this separation does
not result in discrimination of the common man. Since the noble man is by definition of high
Ren and thus concerned with the wellbeing of his fellow citizens, he will not regard them as
“passive objects of government”, but rather as children that need to be educated by means of
virtue. Traditional Confucians have high faith in human goodness and the moral potential of every individual – and whilst Sorai views the masses as play stones on the Shogun’s Go-table, they
have a different conception. The traditional noble ruler, who is like the North Star for his citizens, does not play Go: rather, he is a master in the individualistic art of Shōgi.
2.2.2 Democratic meritocracy
During the previous chapter, many points were raised that are frequently used as critique on the
idea of “the government based on merit”. Already the original essay by Michael Young (1958)
warns from the dark sides of a state that allocates positions of authority based on suitability
alone: corruption, ossification and legitimacy (Bell 2015, p. 150-151). Especially corruption (understood as the abuse of public office for personal profit) is regarded as one of the strongest arguments against meritocracies (Bell, 2015, p. 112). This seems reasonable, since the very core of
the meritocratic idea is threatened if the ones who should look after the state are mostly concerned with their own agendas: and this is why the benevolence and altruism associated with Ren
are of invaluable importance to the harmonious meritocratic state. From the traditional Confucian perspective, the abuse of power by politicians and the suffering of people go hand in hand,
which is why corruption can be seen as the greatest danger to harmony.24 For if a state is governed by noble men who work hard for their people, the citizens will be inspired to become vir
24
This can be proven the following way: In a Confucian state, harmony is thought to result from stable social relationships that
are hierarchically organized in ways that allow for mutual respect and trust, whilst every citizen (from the lowest farmer to the
highest office) is aware of his or her responsibilities. Corruption, however, is the abuse of public office for personal gains. If one
uses his political position to profit himself, both the fundamental principle of Ren, which commands to think of the needy first
(Bell, 2015, p. 143), and the responsibility that comes from being in a specific position with specific relations to others (the regulations of Li) are violated. Since it has been shown that Ren is the heart of Confucianism and Li is the way in which Ren should
be practiced, it follows that corruption is greatest danger to harmony and most likely one of the core aspects that separate Xiao
Kang from Da Tong.
17
tuous too, and Ren will spread among them, leading to a better society of mutual care. But under
rulers who are no inspiring examples, chaos will come forth and people will only care for themselves and their own families, but not for neighbours and their parents. The harmony of the Confucian society depends on the rulers’ righteous fulfilment of their responsibilities towards their
people and therefore, the highest offices should not rule with totalizing, unchecked power (Bell,
2010, p. 115). Contrary to Sorai’s conception, a traditional Confucian ruler does not only need to
be talented and wise, but he foremost needs to have a good heart and treat all his citizens with
appropriate respect (Mengzi, 4B, 56). Such a man would not abuse his powers. But in case that
someone passed the moral part of the meritocratic examinations by acting kind, without actually
being it, there needs to be a way to take this person out of office25. This need for the establishment of independent legal institutions with the formal power to check on rulers is regarded as an
instrumental legitimation for democratic elements in the Confucian state26 (Bell, 2015, p. 116;
Chan, 2007, p. 180-182).
Democratic ideology assumes that the voice of everyone should be treated equally and all citizens should thus be granted the possibility to express this voice through electoral participation or
direct voting, meritocratic thinkers believe that not all voices have to be listened to – or at least
not to the same extent (Bell, 2015, p. 151-152). These core assumptions result in procedural differences27: whilst some thinkers already regard the idea of one man, one vote as a sufficient condition for democracy (Bell, 2015, p. 1), a pure meritocracy gives voice only to those who are
judged to be qualified to raise their opinions in the political context. The predicate “democratic”
therefore denotes a context in which a defined population of voters is given the right to participate in or to delegate political decisions (Chan, 2007, p. 181). But again, from this contrast does
not follow that the support for meritocracy necessarily means increased support for authoritarian
25
Another antidote for the danger of corruption is to avoid the ossification of the state. Similar to Sorai’s principle of change,
traditional Confucianism too is ambitious to ensure that a state does not become frozen in hereditary family lineages and that
every noble man among the citizens can rise to office, regardless of social background. These political dynamics ensure that bad
leaders do not stay for too long, practically manifested by limited tenure of the politicians.
26
Even if the Confucian state will never endorse political equality as a fundamental moral principle, it can still add democratic
aspects to complement its political system. Such complementarity is called instrumental because it helps the state to achieve
higher degrees of harmony (Chan, 2007, p. 180-182; Chan, 2015, p. 7-9).
27
Besides fundamental differences in the process of electing authorities, meritocracy and democracy may also differ in other
regards such as liberal values and set of laws. Since this paper does not treat the question of rights and liberties, the term “democracy” will be defined as a political system rather than a set of values (Chan, 2007, p. 180-182). There are also certain economic
aspects such as the promotion of liberal markets that separate the two conceptions (Fan, 1997, p. 441-444; Bell, 2015, p. 4-6).
But since a traditional Confucian meritocracy is predominantly a political meritocracy (concerned with the distribution of positions of authority based on merit) and not an economic meritocracy (concerned with the distribution of wealth according to merit), this paper will focus on procedural and institutional approaches to analyse the concept of meritocracy (Bell, 2015, p. 4-5).
It is worth noting that Ogyū Sorai actually constructs a system in which aspects of economic meritocracy are seen. But this is true
only insofar as he stresses the importance of the unequal distribution of goods. On the other hand, Sorai wished to return to a selfsufficient agrarian society without money and market economy (Lidin, 1993, p. 6-9).
18
ism28: the two concepts need to be carefully separated, especially in the Confucian context.
It is therefore not surprising that classical Confucianism believes that the government only receives legitimacy when being accepted by its subjects (Mengzi, 9A, 5; Bell, 2015, p. 136). Politicians will win the people’s hearts when they firstly provide everyone with basic means of subsistence, and secondly respect the people and Confucian values. Here, legitimacy and the concept of He are closely related: the more legitimate the government is, the less it has to rely on
coercion – and therefore, the more harmonious its reign is (Bell, 2015, p. 136).
It becomes clear that Confucianism does not regard political participation as something that is
needed to live a good life. One only needs shelter, some food and stable social relationships, and
if a government can create the political framework for these circumstances to come forth, then
the people are satisfied and grant the ruling positions their legitimacy. Democratic elements have
therefore space in the Confucian society only insofar as they ensure that the people’s cultivated
needs are met better than they would have been otherwise29 (Chan, 2007, p. 185-186).
This approach offers a solution to one of the most far-reaching problems of meritocracy, namely
the judge regress30: who has the right to define the ones worthy of ruling? Or in the Confucian
context: who has the right to determine the questions and tasks that are part of the examinations
that claim to detect the noble men among the masses? Confucian ethics view legitimacy in the
context of social harmony, and so they can avoid an infinite regress: as long as the people can
live harmonious lives, there is no need to justify meritocracy (Bell, 2010, p. 32). The common
people trust and respect their leaders to a degree that allows for a strictly hierarchical political
order (Mengzi, 8A, 35). Thus, rather than emphasizing the rule by the people, Confucianism believes in the rule for the people by noble men (Bell, 2015, p. 138; Chan, 2015, p. 22).
Importantly, this “rule for the people” must not necessarily profit from democratic elements. If
someone is chosen as the leader of a state because he is kind, wise, loyal and decent, it is very
probable that he will actually care about the people’s concern, whilst someone trying to win a
democratic election may have a motivation that is not aligned with the principles of Ren (Chan,
28
Authoritarianism is a form of government in which the ruling institution actively constrains the masses by oppressive tactics
against opponents and prohibition of anti-regime activity (Linz, 2000).
29
Daniel Bell (2015, p. 116; p. 150) even proposes that democratic elements are necessary to avoid the scenario where people
cannot change their corrupted rulers. However, a purely meritocratic state could alternatively establish a constitution that defines
the duties and competences of specific positions of authority. The ruler who then violates the principles of the Great Way and
damages his people is not fit to rule and shall loose his right to exert influence immediately: to follow a ruler without virtue is not
propriety, but immorality (Mengzi, 1B, 8 and 11). However, the need for regularly control of the government opens space for a
democratic element: citizens may elect representatives who they trust. Indeed, this solution appears to be suitable to ensure the
promotion of social harmony. But from this follows only that democratic elements make sense to be implemented, but not that
they are necessary.
30
This term originates from the author, but the ideas associated with it can be found in other places (see Bell, 2015, p. 148-150
for an example).
19
2015, p. 84-87) – it is not purely altruism and love for the people, but also partially love for his
own power that will drive this man in his actions. Further, positions of authority should not be
distributed according to one’s ability to persuade people, but on one’s virtue and suitability for
the tasks at hand. But in democratic elections, the judgment of a politicians’ merit is up to the
voters to make and so the quality of democratically elected rulers depends on the ability of the
electors to recognize the best among the people (Bell, 2015, p. 2-3). For Sorai, this ability is so
rare that its possession already qualifies for occupying the highest office. But even if people
would be able to recognize the best among political candidates competing in electoral voting,
there is no guarantee that they will actually elect them. As long as people have not cultivated
their virtues to the degree where they are righteous in all their acts (meaning that they think of
the greater good first and only secondary of themselves), a father will elect his own son first and
not the neighbour’s, even if the latter would be better suited for office31.
In front of these respective strengths and weaknesses, the idea of a system that incorporates both
democratic and meritocratic elements is promising. The ideal system would complement the two
in ways that allow to select leaders with superior ability and virtue and to benefit all those affected by its political decisions at the same time. The system should find a balance between Sorai’s
proposal of a totalitarian rule and the rule of masses, who lack the wisdom to make good political decisions and who tend to vote based on their short-term economic interests, rather than to
consider the common good or the impact their votes have on others (Bell, 2015, p. 151-153).
A first solution to this concern is one of pluralistic vote: depending on ability and virtue, one’s
judgments receive more weight in the democratic process (Bell, 2015, p. 155). This could be
implemented in the way that certain individuals in a state can hand in more than one vote for a
case, whereas the common man can only hand in one vote. To avoid a judge regress, nationwide
competitive examinations open to everyone could be hold and depending on one’s performance,
people are put in different categories defined over the number of allowed votes. Regarding the
respect Confucianism shows for elderly people, senior citizens could also be given additional
votes (Bell, 2010, xiii-xiv). The problem with this approach is that people will then officially be
treated as being socially inferior – and there is a huge psychological difference between recognizing that one’s abilities are not suited for a political decision and being officially categorized as
such (Bell, 2015, p. 156). This psychological explanation finds support in Mengzi (4B, 31) when
31
Similarly, democratic voting that separates between voters and non-voters may result in decisions that go against traditional
Confucian values. These values endorse, amongst other things, the goal of promoting global harmony and so there is responsibility for a state to not only care for its own citizens, but rather for all people who are affected by its political decisions (Bell, 2010,
p. 24-28). For the sake of Great Harmony, people’s care must not stop at nation’s boarder: the government has to be concerned
about humans, not about citizens. A population of voters may prefer implementations that do not regard this principle.
20
he says that if the people are treated as inferiors, they will indeed become inferior. The regulations of Li only ask people to accept that there are those who deserve more respect than they
themselves: but this does not mean the acceptance of being actively treated as an inferior32.
A more promising approach to reconcile meritocracy and democracy is to make each system
responsible for different aspects of the political life. Daniel Bell (2015, p. 157-162) famously put
forward a two-chamber system, in which one institution is composed of democratically elected
leaders, whilst politicians of the second chamber are selected by a meritocratic mechanism. The
meritocratic chamber, whose members have proven to understand Confucian ethics and politics,
may treat issues that are directly related to the goal of promoting harmony and creating a world
of Da Tong, whilst the democratic chamber, whose members are liked by the people, may handle
affairs that concern the people more directly. This separation of functions is essential, for if the
two chambers were to decide on the same affairs, they would need to have equalized weight of
voices in order to fulfil the ideal of combining the two desiderata of democracy and meritocracy.
But since Confucianism stresses the importance of moral examples that harmonize the state from
the top, it seems plausible that in case of a draw, the meritocratic chamber’s proposal would be
implemented. This would result in a scenario where the politicians chosen by the people are silenced and thus the idea of one man, one vote would not truly be adhered to.
Different from this horizontal approach that reconciles the two systems on the central political
level, a vertical model separates their competence by subordinating one to the other: in the Confucian context, the democratic element is subordinated (Bell, 2015, p. 168). The vertical model
assumes that the people in small communities have better knowledge of the abilities and virtues
of their fellow citizens and are therefore able to make more adequate judgments of the to-beelected candidates’ merit. Complex decisions with high impact are made by those with the necessary experience and moral responsibility, whilst issues at the local level, that are usually easy
to understand and have no overly costly consequences in case of suboptimal decisions, are decided upon by the procedure of one man, one vote (Bell, 2015, p. 168). It is reasonable to assume
that the people who live inside and experience the everyday life of a society are able to make
accurate judgments with accompanied moral responsibility towards their neighbours. These people may not be qualified to govern larger parts of the state, but they are qualified to decide on
issues that directly affect their everyday lives.
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Furthermore, and this is where traditional Confucianism disagrees with Sorai’s conception, the relations of Li are not something instrumental, but rather already an end in itself. It is intrinsically desirable to have the son respect his parents more than his
friends or the wife to care more for her husband than for her neighbour. But these relations are not just instruments that lead to
harmony, they are also supposed to be harmonious and of mutual respect themselves, far from the feeling of being inferior.
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The paper will now introduce a model that is both horizontal and vertical and aspires to be congruent with Confucian principles. Here, enormously selective examinations of virtue and ability
select individuals for service in the highest office. This position treats the most pressuring issues
in the state, as well as those that have long-term impact on future generations or the whole of
mankind. Just like in the pure vertical model, democratically elected representatives handle issues that directly affect the people in a community, since their emotional closeness supports the
establishment of propriety. But after their election, the numerous candidates nominated by the
people undergo further training in political government and Confucian classics, to ensure that
they understand the fundamental position of Ren for ruling and commit themselves to the common good. Their teachers are elected through meritocratic mechanisms and are ideally former
politicians themselves. After a provisional time in which the candidates worked for the central
political institutions, they undergo meritocratic examinations that test for their suitability (Bell,
2015, p. 170-172). After passing the exam, the politician becomes responsible for structuring the
community in ways that support the higher goal of the central office: the promotion of harmony.
As investigated before, the family is the backbone of Ren that teaches care for other citizens:
foremost through filial piety, the children’s care towards their elderly parents. The politician on
the local level is therefore primarily responsible for implementing institutions that help to stabilize families and that show concern for the elderly: for he too has to act as a moral example.
Whilst the local politicians support the Great Harmony from the bottom of the state, the meritocratic office of noble men is concerned with the holistic long-term development of the society.
One thing to be learned from Sorai’s conception is that a politician who was raised in a family of
scholars will never know what it is like to walk in the shoes of a farmer. To control for the danger of corruption and to bridge this distance between rulers and subjects, a council that is democratically elected by the people advises the highest office. Decisions are still made by the few
wise, decent and altruistic members of the meritocratic element, but the ones who provide this
highest authority with ideas and additional perspectives are elected representatives of the people.
The candidates for this position undergo the same two-stage procedure as it is used on the local
level: by being nominated for office, they prove that their people trust them, and by passing the
numerous examinations, they prove that the judgment of the people was indeed accurate. Further, to prevent that the highest office simply ignores all advices from the representatives, the
circle of counsellors is given a two-third veto33.
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To the author’s knowledge, this kind of model has not been proposed before as a solution to the dilemma of democratic meritocracies. The author proposes this model in best faith after an extensive literature research. The model has been inspired by
literature from Michael Sandel (2009), Daniel Bell and Ogyū Sorai.
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Inside these practical implementations, neither does the term of a democratic meritocracy result
in contradiction, nor are fundamental concerns of the Confucian tradition hurt. The fundamental
metaphysical assumption that all citizens carry seeds meant to become virtue fosters optimism
towards the moral worth of democratic elements. This is to say that the masses can decide on
matters that are within their ability – the second quality that is asked for by Confucian merit. But
this does not mean that the Confucian state will ever become fully democratic: the one system
that creates both the desired social hierarchy of Li and ensures that everyone is “in his place” is
meritocracy. The meritocratic state allows for the establishment of harmonious relations exactly
because people are not treated equally, but according to their status. For the traditional Confucian, giving up on these intrinsically valuable hierarchical relations would create disharmony,
because if the people have no objective guarantee that they are truly governed by the most virtuous and able, the function of the politicians as moral examples would be lost. Metaphorically, if
the stars in the Big Dipper are all aligned horizontally, then the North Star has lost its special
position and thus the citizens will no longer turn towards the noble man. The two vertical models
treated above have therefore higher chances to be accepted by traditional Confucians than the
horizontal approach that delegates issues of similar importance to the chamber of noble men and
the chamber of democratically elected common men.
Lastly, the implementation of a democratic meritocracy needs to be understood in the context of
Confucian political evolution – in the context of Xiao Kang and Da Tong. In Xiao Kang, people
are selfish or primarily concerned with their own families and friends. Since they therefore do
not feel responsibility for other people and the promotion of harmony as the common good, corruption and disharmony will spread. Both people on the streets and in the government value personal gains higher than the needs of others and only a few walk on the path of altruism. However, when the families teach and the politicians inspire the cultivation of a virtuous character, the
people become more and more benevolent. Political leaders and their followers alike are then
fully committed to the creation of a society for all – and thus corruption will be minuscule (Bell,
2015, p. 120). The possibility of democratizing a Confucian meritocracy therefore increases
alongside the transition from a world of small tranquillity towards a world of great harmony: the
better in heart the common man becomes, the more people may be involved in political decisions
and the more legitimate becomes the fundamental assumption of democratic ideology that everyone holds the same worth and should therefore be given a voice in politics.
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3. Review and Conclusions
After a long history of abusive monarchs and cruel leaders, much of mankind feels intuitive
aversion to the “ruling of a few”. The consequent historical development of political philosophy
was the idealization of a state in which no one holds too much power and everyone’s voice matters. But one is forced to abandon the view that humanitarian values and meritocratic systems are
conceptually incompatible upon seeing that the Confucian tradition advocates extreme political
inequality, but is also essentially concerned with the wellbeing of its citizens. The presently paper aspired to investigate why traditional Confucians prefer meritocratic over democratic ideals
and how their specific interpretation of merit may open up the boarders between these concepts.
The first chapter therefore sought to draw a framework for the paper’s perspective on the terms
of discussion. This intention was realized by analysing the idealized world of Great Harmony, its
counterpart, the world of Small Tranquillity, and the five concepts of Wuchang, which, taken
together, enable a society to progress towards the world of Da Tong. These core principles have
then been related, whilst Ren and the Great Harmony served as central points of reference. In
summary, the ideal Confucian society functions on a circle of harmony that is supported both
from the bottom and the top: harmony spreads throughout society from the family as the basic
school of social concern, and at the same time, noble rulers act as inspiring moral examples of
compassion, wisdom, loyalty, righteousness and proper behaving.
The philosophy of radical thinker Ogyū Sorai with its totalitarian government and emphasis on
economic differentiation between citizens was then approached to relate Confucian values to the
concept of political meritocracy. Here, Sorai’s pragmatic conception served as a contrast to traditional Confucian ideology. A final chapter then analysed the strengths and weaknesses of democratic and meritocratic procedures, before exploring the circumstances under which the term of a
democratic meritocracy would not result in contradiction. The paper put forward three models
that could be used to create a Confucian society with more power for the people than traditionally granted. Lastly, it has been emphasized that as the world progresses towards a state of perfected Ren and Great Harmony, more and more people serve as moral examples for their counterparts inside the regulations of Li. And so, moral education is what makes democracy possible.
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