*Work in progress*
SUSTAINING A FUNCTIONAL VICE-PRESIDENCY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES OF THE, UNITED STATES,
ARGENTINA, MEXICO AND COLOMBIA.
This article analyzes and compares the historical developments of the American and
the Colombian, Mexican and Argentinian vice-presidencies to explain why the former
has survived and evolved while the latter failed to institutionalize. We argue that
inherent to the office of the vice-presidency are both a substantive and a legitimacy
dilemma related to each of the following dimensions: 1) the duties of the vicepresidency; 2) the selection procedures of the vice-presidency; and 3) the rules of
succession in case of the permanent of temporal absence of the president. The
effective resolution of each dilemma, irrespective of when it occurs, is required in
order for the office to endure. By comparing and analyzing the contrasting
experiences of the United States, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia, we explain which
institutional challenges must be resolved in order to sustain a functional vicepresidency. As will be shown, the U.S. has successfully resolved all of these, an
accomplishment that has produced a fully institutionalized vice presidency that serves
its constitutional functions. By contrast, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia have only
partially resolved the same institutional challenges, leading in each country to a vice
presidency that has not fully institutionalized and remains a potential source of
governmental instability. We develop a theoretical-analytical framework that
identifies institutional dilemmas inherent to the office of the vice president, and that
must be dealt with by constitutional designers and policy makers in order for a
presidential regime to have a functional vice presidency.
…
Our findings offer insights to constitutional designers and policy makers in other
presidential regimes.
Authors:
Leiv Marsteintredet, University of Oslo and University of Bergen
Hilmar Mjelde, University of Bergen, The Uni Research Rokkan Center
To be presented at ECPR General Conference, Montreal, August 2015.
1
Introduction
While the Framers created the office of the American vice-presidency primarily to
solve the issue of presidential succession, it has evolved to encompass a variety of
ceremonial, diplomatic, political and advisory functions beyond its very limited
constitutionally assigned duties (Baumgartner 2006, Goldstein 2008). By contrast, the
vice-presidency in Latin America has experienced great instability in most, if not all
nations, and the office has not developed stable, institutionalized duties that exceed
the often limited tasks assigned in the various constitutions in the region. Although
we believe that our arguments may be valid for the full region of the Americas, our
examples from Latin America will mainly focus on Colombia, Mexico and Argentina.
Accordingly, this article analyzes and compares the historical developments of the
American and the Colombian, Mexican and Argentinian vice-presidencies to explain
why the former has survived and evolved while the latter failed to institutionalize. We
argue that inherent to the office of the vice-presidency are both a substantive and a
legitimacy dilemma related to each of the following dimensions: 1) the duties of the
vice-presidency; 2) the selection procedures of the vice-presidency; and 3) the rules of
succession in case of the permanent of temporal absence of the president. The
effective resolution of each dilemma, irrespective of when it occurs, is required in
order for the office to endure.
While one could easily dismiss the contrast between the stable and evolving vicepresidency in the U.S. and the unstable and disruptive development in Latin America
as reflecting the contrasting political, social and constitutional developments north
and south of the Rio Grande, we argue that the story is not that simple. First,
constitutional changes and replacements in Latin America have often been related to
2
coups and regime changes, the role of the church (Gargarella 2013), presidential
powers (Negretto 2013), and reelection (Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor 2012). The
office of the vice presidency has not figured as a main cause of constitutional change
in Latin America. Second, the vice presidency has been considered of little
importance by academics and politicians alike. While we do not necessarily share this
view, it begs the question of why a series of countries in Latin America have
constantly reformed the office of the vice presidency by removing or installing it,
changing its rules of selection as well as the line of presidential succession. Third,
even in Latin America's institutionally and democratically most stable period - the
current Third Wave of Democracy - the vice presidency has been altered
constitutionally in countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras (twice), and
there have been serious debates about reform in Mexico (Madrid Hurtado 2005).
Moreover, Argentina as a case is comparable to the U.S. Despite regime instability
throughout most of the 20th century, Argentina has demonstrated remarkable
constitutional stability. It therefore poses an additional test of our argument. In other
words, despite constitutional stability, the vice presidency has been characterized by
under-institutionalization and instability. Fourth, also the U.S. has seen a series of
moments of crisis such as the civil war, deaths of several incumbent presidents, and
threats of secession. It is therefore relevant to explain also the stability of the U.S.
vice presidency.
Theoretical-analytical framework: creating and maintaining the office of the
vice-presidency
The vice-presidency is a special office within presidential regimes. A vice-president is
the designated successor of the president. Another fact that sets a vice president apart
3
from e.g. a regular minister in a presidential government is that (s)he normally cannot
be removed by the president. Often the vice president is elected by the people or an
electoral college and therefore enjoys popular legitimacy. 1 Therefore, presidential
regimes confront some of the same perils of succession that non-democratic regimes
do. In a non-democratic regime a designated successor has incentives to depose the
ruler so that the successor may take over (Brownlee 2007, Kokkonen and Sundell
2014). While the incentive structure for a vice president in a democratic setting may
work differently, there is no escaping the fact that the only person in government that
gains if a president loses power is the vice president. Considering also that a president
cannot remove the vice president, the vice presidency generates a set of dilemmas for
constitution framers and political players.
We propose that the creation and maintenance within a presidential regime of the
office of the vice-presidency entail three sets of substantive dilemmas, which all share
a legitimacy dilemma. We discuss first each substantive dilemma before we deal with
the legitimacy dilemma. First, rules of presidential replacement must be specified: in
case of the permanent of temporal absence of the president, rules regulating the
succession by the vice-president to the presidency are imperative. Constitutional
framers must decide whether or not to institute a vice presidency to take care of the
successor role, and how succession takes place. Normally in the case of the permanent
absence of the president, a vice president assumes the presidency with all its duties
until the next scheduled election is held.2 The logic is that if the vice president enjoys
1
In today’s Latin America, the exception to this rule is Venezuela, which in its 1999 constitution
installs a vice president selected by the president and who can also, like any minister of government, be
removed by the president.
2
This is particularly true if the vice president is elected popularly or through an electoral college. The
only exception to the rule is the 1886 constitution of Colombia. The 1886 constitution provided for a
4
the same popular legitimacy as the president, that person is enabled to rule
legitimately in place of the initially elected president. If there is no vice presidency,
the successor will not enjoy popular legitimacy even though he or she might hold
elective office for instance as a member of congress. Often a successor in a
presidential regime without a vice presidency is the Supreme Court president,
president of congress or a minister of government. If there is no vice president, the
successor is normally only a caretaker entitled only to organize new elections within a
specified time frame.3 The substantive dilemma connected to presidential replacement
lies with the potential peril of the vice presidency and the uncertainties of not having a
designated successor. With a vice president, a regime runs the risk of having a
potential magnet for, or at least inspiring rumours about, conspiracies in the midst of
government (Mecham 1959), but the gain is certainty that the successor also enjoys
popular legitimacy and ascension through established rules. In regimes without a vice
president the risk is confusion, indecision and political battles during the period of
crisis that a presidential replacement often is, while the benefit is that there is no one
in government that is guaranteed constitutionally to gain from a presidential fall, thus
avoiding rumoured or real conspiracies.
Secondly, rules of ascension to the vice-presidency must be laid out. Substantively,
criteria for eligibility and a mechanism of selection must be defined. Since the vice
president may become president, the criteria for eligibility tend to be the same, or at
vice presidency without giving the vice president a successor role; the designated successor was in fact
a congressionally elected designado.
3
There also exists combinations, for instance, featuring a designated successor whose only task is to
have congress organize an election of a permanent successor among its members (for instance in
today’s Chile and Mexico if the presidential vacancy occurs during the first two years of the
presidential period).
5
least not more lenient than that of the president. 4 With respect to the selection
mechanism, we can distinguish between popular election and presidential selection
(after popular election). With popular election, there are at least three formulas: 1)
election on the same ticket as president (i.e. as a team); 2) election independent of the
president on a separate ticket; or 3) the vice president is the candidate that receives the
second most votes in the presidential election. Each of these formulas raises
substantive dilemmas. If a president can handpick the vice president after being
elected, the president need only be concerned with finding the best possible candidate
to succeed him/her, but the drawback is the lack of popular legitimacy. If the vice
president is elected on the same ticket as the president, the vice president enjoys
popular legitimacy and is likely to be relatively close to the presidential candidate,
increasing the odds of a good working relationship between the two in government.5
However, the drawback is that other considerations than picking the most able
successor might dictate the choice; the vice presidential candidate might for example
be picked due to his or her ability to add votes to the presidential candidate in the
election.6 If the vice president is elected independent of the president on a separate
ticket, or as the second top vote-getter, the successor enjoys popular legitimacy, and is
probably both independent and a very able possible successor, but there is no
assurance that the vice president belongs to the same party as the president. The
4
There are some exceptions in early 19th century Latin American constitutions that allowed vice
presidents a lower yearly income than a president as a condition for election.
5
The latter depends very much on whether it is the presidential candidate that handpicks the candidate
for the vice presidency or whether it is the party through a convention or a primary that elects the
candidate for the vice presidency. We do not discuss here the selection mechanism for vice presidential
candidates (i.e. how a vice-presidential candidate is picked) since these rules are not written down in
constitutions and data is hard to find. We do, however, believe that the selection mechanism for the
vice presidential candidate is important, and it may play an important role for in particular the
development of duties of the vice president.
6
For discussions on this dilemma, see Wilmerding (1953) and Witcover (1992). For the electoral effect
of the vice presidency, see e.g. (Adkison 1982: 332, Baumgartner 2006: 72-80, 2008, 2012, Dudley and
Rapoport 1989, Goldstein 1982: 68-83, Natoli 1985: 41-46, Nelson 1988, Serrafero 1999: 143-145,
Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997).
6
incoming the vice president is in fact likely to be a competitor to the president, which
might create tensions between president and vice president and imperil the internal
workings of the government.
The third substantive dilemma concerns the duties of the vice presidency: a
substantive rationale for the creation and maintenance of the office (outside that of
being a successor) must be established. Also in this case, there are substantive
dilemmas. The issue is whether or not to give the vice president any executive or
legislative tasks. John Adams, the first U.S. vice president, viewed the vice
presidency as the most insignificant office ever invented (see, Wilmerding 1953).
Adams complained about not having anything to do while serving as vice president,
but there might be good reasons for this. The issue is that while a president might fire
a minister that does not perform well, this is not the case with the vice president. By
giving the vice president tasks and duties within the executive branch (or in congress),
there is an increased risk of conflict between the president and vice president over
policy issues, and the president may end up having to remove responsibilities from
the vice president if these are not performed well, but at the same time be stuck with
an inept vice president as successor. The benefit of giving a vice president duties is
that the vice president becomes familiar with the daily workings of the government
and is probably better prepared should (s)he be exalted to the presidency. It may also
become easier to recruit capable candidates to the vice presidency if the vice
presidency in fact offers interesting and challenging tasks for a top politician. The
duties of the vice presidency, however, are much less regulated constitutionally than
the issues of replacement and selection. Therefore, additional formal or informal
duties may be formulated or develop organically over time.
7
The legitimacy dilemma or challenge is basically identical for all three substantive
dilemmas: the rules regulating presidential replacement, the selection and duties of
the vice president must gain and maintain general acceptance by those empowered to
amend these rules. We argue that legitimacy may be gained or lost by how crises
related to the three substantive dilemmas are handled, and how the day-to-day duties
of a vice president are managed (preferably by avoiding crises). If crises surrounding
presidential succession or replacement are handled satisfactorily through the rules
stipulated by the constitution, the rules gain legitimacy and are strengthened.
Theoretically, there are several ways to conceptualize this argument; one is through
path dependency, critical junctures and positive feedback. A succession crisis might
well be understood as a critical juncture for a regime, which if handled satisfactorily,
generates positive feedback to the rule in question (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,
Mahoney 2000, Pierson 2004: 22-24), which in turn reinforces the status quo over
other alternative rules regulating presidential replacement. In contrast, if a crisis of
presidential replacement ends in a chaotic coup or civil war and thus is not resolved
satisfactorily, it would weaken the status quo, and constitution framers (i.e. those
empowered to amend the rules) are more likely to seek a rule change. If this latter
sequence plays out several times, we might observe what has been coined a reactive
sequence (Mahoney 2000), a phenomenon that to our knowledge is not much studied
in historical institutionalism. Although we believe that some rules regulating the vice
presidency are perilous, we do not necessarily believe that there exists one
equilibrium for these rules that all presidential regimes should adhere to in order to
stabilize and maintain the vice presidency. Rather, across regimes multiple equilibria
(i.e. a different set of rules regulating replacement, selection and duties) may survive
successfully (Pierson 2004: 44).
8
We do not propose that the chronology of replacement, selection and specification of
duties necessarily will follow the order described above when a polity devises a vicepresidency. In fact the rules regulating all dilemmas are set rather simultaneously
during the constitutional assembly. Nevertheless, we argue that unless the rules of
replacement and selection are institutionalized, a vice president is unlikely to gain
many duties. While the rules of replacement and selection are specific and related to
specific events, constitutions tend to underspecify the duties of the vice president.
Therefore duties are often regulated in laws and decrees, and the specification of the
vice president's duties occurs over time and after the constitution writing process. If
the rules of replacement and selection are unstable or still controversial, it seems less
likely that the vice presidency will evolve institutionally to take up and
institutionalize more duties than those specified constitutionally. If rules of
replacement and selection are institutionalized and accepted, the vice presidency can
evolve and obtain more duties than the ones specified constitutionally. Upon
explaining our choice of method, cases and data, we apply the framework to the cases
of the American and (case) vice-presidencies.
Method and case selection
The U.S., Colombian, Mexican and Argentinian vice presidencies were chosen as
cases on the basis two related criteria: relevance to the objective of the study and case
diversity (George and Bennett, 2004; Gerring, 2007; King, Keohane and Verba,
1994). As for relevance, the intention of this article is to increase our understanding of
which factors affect the development and maintenance of the vice presidency in
democratic presidential regimes. This, in turn, necessitates the examination of both
instances of vice-presidential success and failure as institutions of the government
9
apparatus. The much studied U.S. case, on the one hand, offers insights into how an
originally weak office has been transformed into a well-functioning and indispensable
one that complements the presidency, and has offered a role model for other
democratic presidential regimes seeking to solve the succession dilemma. Although
we believe that our story might be valid for many presidential regimes in the
Americas, we focus on Colombia, Mexico and Argentina. One pragmatic reason for
the case-selection is the availability of relevant literature. More important, however, is
that all three countries have had long experiences with constitutional rule. Argentina,
which is the only country with a specific literature on the vice presidency (Serrafero
1999, 2007, Sribman 2011), 7 is the only country that has maintained the vice
presidency without interruption (other than during military regimes) since the mid19th century. Colombia and Mexico offer throughout their histories contrasting
experiences with the vice presidency, but both have enjoyed constitutional periods
with and without the vice presidency. While both Colombia and Mexico removed the
vice presidency in the early 20th century, only Colombia has a vice president today.
Comparing these polar experiences thus enables us to discern which factors facilitate
or undermine the institutional viability of the office of the vice presidency.
Creating and maintaining the office of the vice presidency: the U.S. and
Colombian, Mexican and Argentinian cases
While in the U.S. the vice presidency has been maintained with minor changes (see
below) since the birth of the Constitution, Latin America has experienced a host of
changes with respect to the vice presidency and the rules of succession. Figure 1
illustrates the instability in Latin America by looking at the variation over time
7
But, see Aliaga P. et al. (2003) for an analysis of the Bolivian case.
10
rgearding the presence and absence of the vice presidency in Latin America since
independence.
<Figure 1 about here>
Even during the 3rd wave of democracy (starting in 1978 in Latin America), there is
evidence of instability in terms of the rules and practices surrounding the vice
presidency and the rules of succession. During this period Colombia (1991), Paraguay
(1992) and Venezuela (1999) have installed a vice presidency, while Honduras
reformed its 1982 constitution in 2003 to install a vice presidency, and removed it
again in 2008.8 Panamá changed its system from two to one vice president in 2004. In
both Mexico and Argentina former presidents (de la Madrid and Menem) have
suggested to install and remove the vice presidency, respectively (Madrid Hurtado
2005, Sribman 2011: 113).9 Ecuador reformed its rules of succession in 1998 after a
presidential fall in 1997 when it became clear that Ecuador lacked clear rules of
succession in the case of permanent absence of the president (Mejía Acosta and
Polga-Hecimovich 2010, Pérez-Liñán 2007: 28). As regards the duties of the vice
president, Nicaragua added duties for the vice president in 1995, while in Ecuador the
vice president lost duties both in the 1998 and 2008 reforms, and does no longer have
any constitutionally designated duties aside being the designated successor.
It is clear today that a vice president has also in Latin America become the default
form of succession. Nevertheless, the above are but some of numerous examples of
the continued instability of the vice presidency in the region. The following sections
8
The current system of succession is to have three presidential designates, of which Congress picks
one to succeed the president.
9
See also Valadés (2004) for an academic proposal to install a vice presidency in Mexico.
11
compare the experiences of the U.S. with a selection of Latin American cases in order
to close in on potential explanations for this difference.
Rules of presidential replacement
The United States
The U.S. Constitution is ambiguous as to whether the vice president becomes merely
the acting president or president for the remainder of the presidential term in case of
the elected president’s removal, death, resignation or inability ‘to discharge the
Powers and Duties’ of the office (The Constitution of the United States of America
2011: Article 2, Section 1). The matter was partially resolved in 1841 when President
William Henry Harrison died after only one month in office, and Vice President John
Tyler expeditiously took the oath of office, moved into the White House, and gave an
inaugural address to Congress, with the latter acquiescing to it, despite the lack of
constitutional clarity (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 137-8; 457).
While Tyler established the custom of the vice-president assuming the full presidency
upon the incumbent’s death, several instances of presidential disability and vicepresidential vacancy10, and the prospect of a double vacancy, underscored the need
for more elaborate rules of succession. The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution
in 1933 designated the vice president-elect to succeed the president-elect should s(he)
die; the 1947 Presidential Succession Act specified the order of succession, and the
enactment of the 25th Amendment (1967) codified vice-presidential succession to the
10
Presidents James A. Garfield and Woodrow Wilson were disabled for an extended period of time
following an assassination attempt (Garfield) and illness (Wilson). Vice Presidents George Clinton,
Elbridge Gerry, William R. King, Henry Wilson, Thomas A. Hendricks, Garret A. Hobart, and James
S. Sherman died in office. Vice President John C. Calhoun resigned. Presidents William Henry
Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William L. McKinley, Warren G.
Harding, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy died in office (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 363).
12
full presidency for the remainder of the president’s term should (s)he die, resign, or be
impeached. It also accomplished rules for filling vice-presidential vacancies and
procedures for managing presidential disability (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 337-8, 461,
471; Witcover 1992: 35-7; Goldstein 1997: 122-3; O’Connor et al. 2011: 270-71).
The 1996 Working Group on Presidential Disability sought to further clarify the 25th
Amendment, as particularly President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 disability highlighted
the incentives a president and the White House establishment may have not to invoke
it (Gilbert 2003; Kassop 2005; Abrams 1999).
In sum, policy makers and constitutional makers have taken a number of steps
towards eliminating the constitutional lacuna pertaining to several aspects of
presidential replacement. While members of the Working Group on Presidential
Disability concluded that not all presidential succession contingencies could be fully
addressed by any constitutional amendment (Gilbert 2003: 880), both the ultimately
consensual resolution of each past succession problem and the enactment of the 25th
Amendment go to show that the challenge of presidential replacement has effectively
been dealt with in the U.S. The restraint evinced by Vice Presidents Chester A.
Arthur and George H. W. Bush during the presidential disabilities of 1881 and 1981
have for example inspired confidence in orderly presidential replacement.
Argentina
Since the 1853 constitution, the rules regarding presidential replacement have
remained virtually unaltered: the vice president is to replace the president in case of
13
permanent or temporary absence from office. 11 Although there had been crises such
as the short civil war in 1859, and the failed assassination attempt of President
Sarmiento in 1873 could easily have ended in presidential succession (Serrafero 1999:
90), the first test of the rules of replacement came with President Juárez Celman's
forced resignation in 1890. Celman fell during a short-lived economic crisis that
sparked the 1890 Revolution. Masses in the streets led by a new generation of
politicians demanded the resignation of Celman and his vice president, among other
political elites, and were ready to install their president and vice president. The
rebellion, or revolution, managed to force Juárez Celman out of office, but Vice
President Pellegrini refused. Despite a grave crisis, the constitutional succession was
upheld and Vice President Pellegrini succeeded Celman rather successfully as
president, and managed to complete his term as president (López Rojas 2011: 572576, Serrafero 1999: 155-160). When President Sáenz Peña resigned prematurely in
January 1895, there was less confusion over the line of succession: Vice President
Uriburu took seat as president and finished the term. On later occasions, when not
interrupted by military coups and take-overs, the line of succession has been upheld in
Argentina following the precedent set by the early presidential resignations. Although
in Argentina there is a saying that the vice-president is the only coup-maker on a state
salary, the country has largely avoided coup mongering from vice presidents
(Sribman 2011: 11). The only partial exception is the forced resignation of Vice
President Alejandro Gómez in November 1958 under suspicion that he was
orchestrating a coup against President Frondizi (Castro 2009: 227-253), but even then
the succession of the vice president went as stipulated by the Constitution.
11
See Constitution of 1853, Article 75. Argentina is the constitutionally most stable country in Latin
America. With an interlude during Juan Perón's first regime, the 1853 Constitution survived until 1995.
The Argentine, and other Latin American constitutions, can be consulted at Cervantes Virtual,
http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/constituciones_hispanoamericanas/catalogo_paises/
14
Mexico
Mexico, on the other hand, provides probably the most turbulent history in the
Americas with respect to the vice presidency and the rules of succession. The vice
presidency existed in the country's first constitution after independence (1824), but
the office fell victim to the temptation of the successor to seek power. The first
president and vice president, Guadelupe Victoria and Nicolás Bravo, were both
generals and guerrilla fighters and heroes of the Mexican independence. The president
and vice president, however, belonged to different factions and masonic lodges
(Bazant 1985: 431-433). With the Centralists on the defensive, its leader Vice
President Bravo rebelled and tried to overthrow the president, but failed and was sent
into exile in 1827. The next vice president was no better: Anastasio Bustamente,
successfully removed President Guerrero in 1830 and ruled as acting president for
two years.12 The first two major conflicts in constitutional Mexico thus ended with the
vice presidents' attempt to coup their own presidents, and in Bustamente's case,
claiming the presidency on the basis of being the constitutional successor of the
president. It did not help that - pre party-politics - the president and vice president in
both instances came from opposing factions. These precedents led to six changes in
the rules of succession between 1824 and the Mexican revolution, including the
removal of the vice presidency in 1835, a brief restoration in 1846, removal in 1847,
restoration again in 1904, and final removal in 1917 (Bazant 1985, Hernández 2006,
Katz 1986).13
12
Guerrero had in 1829 successfully removed elected president Pedraza, but kept Bustamente as his
vice president.
13
The famous president Benito Juárez (1857-1872) also came to the presidential office claiming the
presidency as the successor. Juárez was elected Supreme Court President in 1855, and thus the
designated successor to President Comonfort. When Comonfort was couped in 1857 by Zuloaga during
Comonfort's own coup against the 1855 Constitution, Juárez was arrested. After Juárez's release,
15
Colombia
Like Argentina and the U.S., Colombia has been constitutionally quite stable, but
unlike these two countries, the rules of succession and the vice presidency have not
been stable features of the polity. Since 1886 Colombia enjoyed only one constitution,
with reforms, until 1991 (Negretto 2013: 168). While the liberal 1853 Constitution
included the vice presidency, the 1858 confederate Granadine Constitution abolished
it. The 1863 Constitution also excluded the vice presidency, while the 1886
Constitution reinstated the vice presidency only to see it abolished under the rule of
Rafael Reyes in 1905. The 1991 Constitution, however, reinstated the vice presidency
and the conventional rule of vice-presidential succession.14
Succession functioned to some extent as stipulated by the Constitution after the first
coup against the 1853 regime, which toppled President Obando. 15 After a military
interlude in 1854, vice president Mallarino was acting president from 1855 to 1857,
when he handed over power to President Obando (elected in 1856), and retook his
position as vice president (Bushnell 1971). During the 1886 regime until the
Thousand Days War, which erupted in 1902, succession also functioned, but the vice
presidency gained a relatively bad reputation.16 One reason is that during the 1886
regime, old and physically weak presidents were elected and the vice president had to
succeed the president. Both during President Rafael Nuñez's first term from 1888 to
1892, and his second term beginning in 1892, the vice presidents ruled while Nuñez
however, he used the Constitution to claim his right to the presidency and mobilise support in his
favour (Hamnett 1996).
14
For an overview and sources to Colombian constitutional history, see Osuna Patiño {, 2006 #1530}.
15
Although formally succession of the president for as long back as 1832 was not provided for
constitutionally. In practice, however, the vice president tended to act as president.
16
In the interlude between 1863 and 1886, the designado also at times acted as president and the office
was used to satisfy opposing factions within the parties (Posada-Carbó 1994: 636).
16
was in retirement in his hometown Cartagena. During the first term Vice President
Carlos Holguín ruled, while for the second term Nuñez left Vice President Caro as
acting president until Nuñez died in 1894 and Caro succeeded him (Deas 1986). For
the 1897 election, the presidential candidate was the old Sanclemente, who had not
been active in politics for years. The real president was to be his vice president,
Marroquín, who removed Sanclemente and succeeded him as president in 1900.
Despite adherence to the rules of succession, the use of the vice presidency as a real
power behind the curtain of the presidency may have influenced Rafael Reyes, who
sought dictatorial powers, to have his Vice President González Valencia resign in
1905, and then abolish the office in the constitutional reform of 1910 (Osuna Patiño
2006: 20-21).
Rules of vice-presidential selection
The United States
The rules of vice-presidential selection were the first of the three dilemmas outlined in
this article that was quickly and permanently resolved in the U.S. To begin with, the
U.S. Constitution of 1789 specifies clearly the eligibility criteria for the presidency an aspirant must be a natural born citizen of the U.S., at least 35 years old as well as a
resident of the U.S. for at least fourteen years, and the 1804 Twelfth Amendment to
the Constitution extended these requirements to the vice president (The Constitution
of the United States of America 2011: Article 2, Section 1).
The initial election mode did not survive the emergence of political parties, however.
As laid out in Article II, Section 1, the Electoral College elected both the president
and the vice president, with each elector casting two votes. The top vote-getter was
17
elected president, the runner-up vice president, and in 1796 this arrangement led to
the election of John Adams of the Federalists as president and Thomas Jefferson of
the Democratic-Republicans as vice president. Their adversarial relationship impelled
both parties to nominate both a presidential and a vice-presidential candidate in 1800
with the expectation that their electors would essentially ratify the constellation.
Instead, the constitutional inability of the college to discriminate between the two
votes produced a tie between Jefferson and Aron Burr, in spite of Jefferson being the
presidential designate. While Jefferson was eventually elected president (see,
Ackermann 2005), the Twelfth Amendment addressed this constitutional confusion
by providing for a separate vote for each office. If no vice-presidential candidate won
a majority of the electoral votes, the Senate would pick one of the top two vote-getters
as winner, provided a quorum of two-thirds of the senators and a majority decision
(Milkis and Nelson 2008: 453-5; Witcover 1992: 19-25). While the relationship
between presidents and vice presidents chosen by party leaders to unite party factions
or boost the electoral appeal remained strained until Franklin D. Roosevelt ushered in
the practice of presidential candidates choosing on their own their vice- presidential
candidate17, the rules laid out in the Twelfth Amendment settled constitutionally the
issue of vice-presidential selection.
Argentina
Argentina's 1853 Constitution is modelled on the U.S. Constitution in almost every
aspect relevant here. Similar to the U.S. the Argentine president and vice president
were elected on separate ballots in an electoral college, and if no candidate obtained a
17
In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the Democratic nomination convention selected Henry A.
Wallace as his running mate, or he would decline the nomination for president (Milkis and Nelson
2008: 460).
18
majority, Congress would choose between the two top vote-getters.18 Since the early
20th century and the establishment of relatively modern political parties in Argentina,
the vice president and president received almost equal amounts of votes in the
electoral college and the electors voted according to the suggested presidential and
vice-presidential tickets (Serrafero 1999: 145). Nevertheless, as pointed out in the
U.S. case, separate ballots for president and vice president opens up for the possibility
of split-ticket voting and a president and vice president from two different tickets. In
Latin America there have been several instances in which a president and a vice
president from different tickets have been elected, which has tended to cause
problems both in the management of the government as well as during episodes of
presidential succession. 19 In Argentina, this occurred in the 1868 election when
Sarmiento was elected president and Alsina vice president. Alsina, however, was not
Sarmiento's candidate, but the candidate of Sarmiento's opponent, Urquiza. What a
British minister at the time called a strange anomaly that could not be observed
anywhere else in the world, and an "incongruous coalition between two leading
characters of antagonistic parties...", 20 was in fact the result of Argentina merely
copying the U.S. Constitution. The surprising result did not have any immediate
negative consequences on the Sarmiento government, and the system was not
changed until 1995. One reason is that political parties were established early in the
country and saw to it that electors voted for their party's team, thus avoiding
18
This system was maintained until the 1995 Constitutional reform, with the sole exception during the
regimes of Juan Perón (1946-1955, 1973-1974).
19
The most famous example is from Brazil, which under its second republic (1946-1964) maintained
separate ballots for president and vice president under direct elections. In 1960 this lead to the election
of right-wing populist Janio Quadros as President, but his vice-presidential candidate Milton Campos
lost to left-wing incumbent vice president Goulart who had instant name recognition and was reelected
(Bethell 2008: 132-133). When Quadros resigned in 1961, Goulart became president and was later
couped by the military in 1964 (Stepan 1971).
20
Gould to Stanley on May 25, 1868, quoted in McLynn (1979: 323).
19
surprising results, and as such the Argentine experience resembles the U.S.
experience.
Mexico
One of the reasons why Mexico chose president and vice president of opposing
factions in 1824 is that the vice president was elected as the second top vote-getter
(Constitución de los Estados Unidos de México, título IV, sección 1, articles 79-86).
Compared to the formula of separate ballots for president and vice president, which
entailed a slight risk of president and vice president representing opposing factions or
parties, this formula guaranteed that the president and vice president would be the top
two opponents in the election. As evidenced above, this ended in two vicepresidential coup attempts during the two first constitutional governments in Mexico.
During the Constitutional debates in 1847 the mode of electing the vice president was
the prime motivation for removing the vice presidency (Galeana 2013: 210). When
President/dictator Díaz reinstalled the vice presidency in 1904, the president and vice
president were wisely enough elected as a team on the same ticket.
Colombia
The vice presidency has oftentimes been used as an office for power sharing and to
forge electoral coalitions. 21 One key cleavage in Colombia until the Rafael Reyes
presidency in 1904 was the degree of centralisation of power (Mazzuca and Robinson
2009), and the vice presidency played a role in the institutional build up to disperse
power. After 1832, vice-presidential elections were midterm elections (Constitución
21
Lalander claims this was the case with respect to the introduction of the vice presidency in
Venezuela in 1999 (Lalander 2012). In The Dominican Republic's constitutions of 1854 and 1858,
presidential and vice-presidential elections were also separated in time, probably inspired by the
Colombian example during the same period.
20
política del estado de Nueva Granada 1832, art. 97). This formula secured
independence of the vice president vis-à-vis the president and was probably
considered a formula for power sharing. From 1853 until 1858 the vice president was
even elected by direct popular vote under universal manhood suffrage (Bushnell
1971), so not only was the vice president elected fully independent of the president,
but also enjoyed direct popular legitimacy. When the vice presidency was restored in
1886 (after being abandoned in 1858), the rules of selection contrasted the 1853 rules.
Now the president and vice president were elected together on the same slate, and, as
we saw above, often the real presidential candidate was the candidate for the vice
president. As a contrast to the Constitutions of 1832 and 1853, the 1886 Constitution
secured continuity in power following presidential succession. However, with the
reforms of President Rafael Reyes in 1910, which all tended to concentrate power in
the presidency,22the vice presidency was abolished. Under the new 1991 Constitution,
the system of 1886 was restored with vice-presidential election on the same ticket as
the president. One of the motivations for restoring the vice presidency was to avoid
power vacuums in case of succession, and to avoid the practice during temporary
absence of the president of handing over the presidency to presidential designates
without democratic legitimacy and who had become designates so that the president
could repay a political favour (Constituyente 1991: 112-113).
22
Reyes period as president is considered dictatorial, see Deas (1986).
21
Duties of the vice-presidency
The United States
The statement by John Adams cited above is but one of many memorable similar
ones, all ridiculing the allegedly ill-conceived office. 23 The scant responsibilities
assigned to office by the Constitution – the vice president is the president’s successor
(although, as noted above, this provision offered little practical guidance for
presidential replacement), (s)he presides over the Senate and casts the tie-breaking
vote if required (The Constitution of the United States of America 2011: Article 1,
Section 3, Article 2, Section 1) ˗ contributed significantly to the derision. While the
vice president’s successor function in the case of the incumbent president’s death was
firmly established by Vice President Taylor’s resolute assumption of the presidency in
1841, the 20th century saw a gradual expansion in the office’s duties as well as
prestige. Theodore Roosevelt was both the first vice president to campaign
nationwide and successor to win nomination, and in his success contributed to the
new pattern of vice presidents being re-nominated. Vice Presidents Thomas R.
Marshall and Calvin Coolidge began the custom of meeting with the cabinet, while
vice presidents since John Nance Garner have functioned as congressional liaison,
advisors and emissary abroad. Moreover, the increased executive involvement
continued under Henry A. Wallace led to the decline of vice presidents presiding over
the Senate (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 455-61; Baumgartner 2006: 7-34).
In the post-war era, heightened concerns for vice-presidential readiness to replace the
incumbent president further entrenched and expanded the vice president’s role within
the executive branch. Vice presidents were integrated into the national security
23
For a list of these, see Baumgartner (2006: 3).
22
policy-making apparatus (since Albin Barkley); became an all-round spokesperson for
the president (since Richard M. Nixon); obtained more institutional resources,
including better office space, a redesigned vice presidential seal, new staff, an official
residence and a new and better designated air plane (from Lyndon B. Johnson through
Gerald Ford); and full access to presidential meetings and papers and an office within
the West Wing (since Walter Mondale). Vice presidents following Walter Mondale
have continued to aid the president in various informal and formal functions,
including representing the president at ceremonious occasions and as overseas
envoys, performing political and policy functions (by campaigning, acting as a
congressional liaison and presidential mouthpiece), and serving as a trusted advisor.
The latter is seen particularly in the choice by the three most recent presidents of
seasoned Washington insiders as their vice-presidential running mates (Baumgartner
2006: 112-33; Goldstein 1982, 2008, 2010; Walch 1997; Moe 2008; Milkis and
Nelson 2008: 461-71; Natoli 1985).
Over the last 200 years, then, the vice presidency has been transformed in terms on its
duties and prestige, and has become a tangible stepping stone to the presidency, with
14 vice presidents ascending to it, either by succeeding the president who died or
resigned, and/or being elected in their own right.24
Argentina
While the U.S. vice presidency have evolved and transformed in a cumulative fashion
over time, the same cannot be said for the Argentine (or any other vice presidency in
Latin America). Constitutionally, the Argentine vice president enjoys the same duties
24
Vice Presidents John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Tyler, Martin Van Buren, Millard Fillmore,
Andrew Johnson, Chester Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B.
Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, George H.W. Bush.
23
as the U.S. vice president: the vice president is the president's successor, presides over
the Senate, except during impeachment trials, and casts the tie-breaking vote if
required (Argentine Constitution 1994: arts. 57, 59, 88). 25 There has been no
significant development whatsoever in the executive, non-constitutional, duties of the
vice-presidency in Argentina. In fact, the above-mentioned Sarmiento-Alsina team of
opposites caused President Sarmiento to express to Alsina that "You don't meddle with
my government, limit yourself to ring the bell for the Senate sessions".26 Although
Sarmiento did not necessarily set the standard, it indicates that the duties of the vice
president in Argentina depend more on the president and the confidence the vice
president enjoys with the president, than on any institution or law. In his analysis of
modern vice-presidency, Sribman (2011) finds that the duties and visibility of the vice
president varies during a presidency, which normally tend to decrease during a
presidency as the relationship with the president have a tendency to become more and
more tense. In some historic and recent cases, this is in fact due to the duties of the
vice president. During the Mitre presidency (1862-1868), Argentina fought the War of
the Triple Alliance in Paraguay. With Mitre away leading the troops as General, Vice
President Marcos Paz ruled in Buenos Aires as acting president. As a powerful acting
president Paz's period in power was full of conflicts, including several ministerial
resignations and Paz's own unsuccessful attempt to resign (his resignation was denied
by Congress) (McLynn 1979). Argentina was not unique in this respect, and conflictridden periods of vice presidents acting as presidents with the president away in war
often backfired against the institutionalisation of a vice-presidential office. In modern
Argentina, one could even argue that the vice presidency has been weakened rather
25
Argentina is the only country in Latin America that still copies the U.S. model for the vicepresidency, and one of only three countries in which the vice president presides Congress or the Senate
(the other two being Uruguay, where the vice president enjoys a permanent vote, and Bolivia, where
the vice president also enjoys constitutional executive duties).
26
Quote from Castro (2009: 63), authors' translation.
24
than strengthened. The 1994 constitutional reform created the Chief of Cabinet office,
which was given large administrative, coordinating and oversight responsibilities
(Negretto 2013: 150-165, see also Argentine Constitution 1994, art. 100-101).
Although the responsibilities of the new Chief of Cabinet did not clash with the duties
of the vice president, it nevertheless reduced the possible "pool" of tasks that a vice
president could take over given a successful development of that office. Whereas the
Chief of Cabinet office has since then developed into a large and important office, the
vice presidency's office is negligible in comparison. President Menem himself pointed
to one reason why the vice president was not considered for any of the tasks given to
the new Chief of Cabinet, and of the distinct development of these two offices. In
1993/94 President Menem accepted the Chief of Cabinet as part of the constitutional
reform, which could be regarded as a curtailment of the president's power, under the
condition that the president remained the chief of the executive and could name and
replace the Chief of Cabinet. The latter would of course not be possible with a vice
president, and may partly explain the lack of success of the office in Argentina, and
Latin America: when problems between the president and vice president arise, the
former cannot replace the latter. These problems were exemplified to the extreme
with the tie-breaking vote in the Senate of Vice President Julio Cobos against the
government's position on an increased export tax for agricultural products in 2008.
Although the vice presidency naturally gained a lot of attention after this vote, it also
meant that Cobos lost all duties in government and President Fernández isolated Vice
President Cobos for the remainder of the period since Cobos effectively had become
part of the opposition (Sribman 2011). It may seem, then, that the institutional traits of
the vice-presidential office may work against or hinder the successful development of
institutional tasks for the vice president.
25
Mexico
The vice presidency in Mexico, when it existed, was not given any constitutional
duties in the 1824 Constitution. Nevertheless, the vice president would be acting
president in the president's absence. President and Caudillo Santa Ana ruled Mexico
on several occasions and twice he was accompanied by Gómez Farias as his vice
president (1833-1835, 1846-1847). Santa Ana, a military general, was not interested
in ruling and tended to leave power to Gómez Farías, whose rule in both cases
became the trigger to abolish the vice presidency in Mexico. In 1833-1835, Gómez
Farías infuriated the army and Santa Ana had to intervene and remove the vice
president and the vice presidential office. In 1846-1847, however, Santa Ana went
away to lead the army, and Gómez Farías tried to tax the Catholic Church. Upon
Santa Ana's return and intervention, Gómez Farías refused to resign and Santa Ana
had the office abolished for good (Bazant 1985: 430-437). The duties and ambitions
of the vice presidents in Mexico became one important argument of the president of
the Constituent Assembly, Carranza, against a vice presidency in the 1917
Constitution (see, Laborde 2006: 1885-1929).
Colombia
Under both the 1853 and the 1886 Constitutions (until 1905), a vice president's most
important duty was to be the president's successor. In fact, during the whole period
from 1886 until 1904, the vice president must be considered the real president, and in
several instances prior to 1858 the vice president ended up as the de facto president.
Establishing duties, the 1991 Constitution, deals first and foremost with the issue of
succession, but Luis Carlos Galán also considered the office to be an office to recruit
26
leaders and presidents. Other duties were not part of the motivations behind the
reform of the articles, but the vice presidency was seen as an institution that could
disperse presidential powers (Constituyente, 1991). The vice president was therefore
not given any specific duties in the Constitution of 1991 other than to perform the
duties the president asked. The first test for the president and vice president, however,
did not bode well for the vice-presidential office since the first elected vice president,
Humberto de la Calle (elected with President Samper in 1994) was sent to Spain as
Ambassador. De la Calle and Samper had both competed for the presidential
candidacy in the Liberal Party, and apparently de la Calle was best held at a distance.
When Samper came under investigation for receiving illegal campaign funds and was
in risk of impeachment, de la Calle came back from Spain to demand Samper's
resignation. When Samper won the impeachment vote in 1997, de la Calle resigned.
Since then the vice president has at times also been a minister in government and
tended to play a role in humanitarian work, but not necessarily played an important
role outside of elections.
Discussion and conclusions
The empirical discussions of the four country cases show that the institutional
dilemmas inherent to the vice presidency must be settled, lest the office at worst
undermine governmental stability, be removed or left without any significant duties.
Regarding the first dilemma – the rules of replacement, both the substantive and the
legitimacy aspects of it were effectively resolved in the United States and Argentina.
While their respective constitutions addressed the issue, the dilemma materialized
when the time came that an incumbent president needed to be replaced. Vice
Presidents Tyler (the U.S.) and Uriburu (Argentina) established the precedent in each
27
country that the vice president assumes the full presidency, and thereby paved the
way for future vice presidents to do the same. Successfully resolving the first crisis of
succession, we argue, would provide legitimacy for the Constitution as a whole, and
the rule of succession. Therefore the succession order was not effectively challenged
by other political actors in either the U.S. or Argentina, who, for good or bad, could
seek to alter the current constitutional arrangement. By contrast, the early vice
presidents of Mexico and Colombia acted as coup makers and de facto presidents,
respectively, and these practices, which were contrary to the constitutional texts,
undermined the office’s legitimacy by perverting the established rules of succession,
leading in both cases to its abolishment. While in the U.S. and Argentina, few
policymakers felt the need to scrutinize the office of the vice-presidency in order to
foment or improve stability or the functioning of government, the vice presidency
early on became identified with coup mongering and subject of constitutional debates
on how to improve stability in Mexico. Not surprisingly, the vice presidency was
considered an important factor and even a cause of the instability that Mexico
suffered, and consequently removed for good during the Mexican revolution. The
perversion of the succession rule by over-ambitious vice presidents is not unique to
Mexico in Latin America, and is one of the causes of the lack of stability and
institutional development of the office in the region. In countries such as e.g. Bolivia
(1966),27 vice presidents have stood behind or promoted coups against the presidents.
Such actions damage the legitimacy of the office, and increase the likelihood that
when a constitution is reformed or replaced, not an infrequent occurrence in Latin
America (see, Negretto 2013) the vice presidency is considered an institution of
instability, and consequently removed by the constitution framers.
27
Vice President René Barrientos removed elected president Paz Estenssoro from power in a coup, and
installed himself as president, being the designated successor and leader of a military regime.
28
Regarding the second dilemma - the rules of vice-presidential selection, there is also
interesting variation that help shed light on the U.S. stability and success of its vicepresidency vs. the other cases' relative failure. Vice-presidential selection of the
runner up to the presidency seems to be a particular pernicious electoral formula,
closely followed by the election of president and vice-president on independent
tickets. The challenge is to secure rules of vice-presidential selection that promotes
solidarity and trust between the president and vice president before the vicepresidential office is tarnished by conflicts between the two, which may lead to
discredit and abolishment of it. Even though the U.S. passed through both formulas,
and still uses the second, Congress dealt with the challenges presented by the rule of
vice-presidential selection in a manner that increased rather than decreased the
office’s legitimacy in the long-run. Already after one period with the political
adversaries of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson (Jefferson was runner-up), the
parties changed their nomination procedure to generate a united presidential-vicepresidential ticket. It might be by chance (see, e.g. Ackermann 2005), but the election
in Congress of Jefferson and Burr, as intended by the electorate and the electoral
college, followed up by the Twelfth amendment, resolved the dilemma of vicepresidential selection, and left the selection of the vice president to the political
parties and, later, the presidential candidates. These changes strengthened party
control over vice-presidential selection in a manner that would decrease the risk of a
sour relationship between the presidential pair, and consequently increase the chance
of the office’s survival. While it may be hard to argue for the automatic strengthening
of the vice-presidency's legitimacy, these changes removed factors that have
weakened the legitimacy of the vice presidency in other countries. Evidence from
Latin America shows that separate tickets for president and vice president increases
29
the risk of an adversary team compared to popular election of a united ticket. In the
U.S., as in Argentina between 1853 and 1994, however, this has not presented a
problem since the Electoral College has been maintained. Should the U.S. introduce
direct presidential election, we believe it would be advisable to unite the presidential
and vice-presidential ticket, which was done in Argentina in 1994. If anything the
example of direct vice-presidential election on a separate ticket in Brazil under the
second republic should serve as a warning. When President Quadros of the far right
resigned in 1961, the independently elected Vice President Goulart of the far left took
over the presidency. Three years later the military intervened claiming communist
influences in government (see e.g. Stepan 1971: 123-211). Mexico followed the
original U.S. procedure for vice-presidential election in 1824, electing adversaries to
the presidential and vice-presidential offices, which to a large degree may explain the
perversion of the rules of succession in this case, and its low legitimacy led to the
office's removal in 1846. Whereas electing political adversaries as president and vice
president might be likened to playing Russian roulette with the political regime, the
rules of vice-presidential selection have been used in Latin America to weigh in on
one of the greater regime questions that marred several countries in the region:
dispersion vs. concentration of power. Even though these issues mainly concerned the
power relations between Congress and the President, the example of Colombia's 1832
Constitution (and other countries such as the Dominican Republic in the mid 19th
Century) demonstrates that the vice presidency has been used to check presidential
powers. The history of the vice presidency in Latin America indicates that the
independent election of president and vice president, with mid-term vice-presidential
elections in the case of Colombia in 1832, destabilizes rather than checks government.
The Colombian experiment ended in 1858, and when President Rafael Nuñez in 1886
30
sought stronger and more centralized powers in the presidency, the Constitutional
reform assured that the president and vice president were elected together on the same
ticket.28
The dilemma of vice-presidential duties is the last of the three challenges for the
office’s successful establishment and maintenance. To the extent that the successful
resolution of the dilemmas of the vice presidency is a cumulative process, we argue
that the slow development and institutionalization of duties for the vice presidency
builds on the successful resolution of the two above-mentioned dilemmas. Only in
cases in which the dilemma of succession and selection of the vice president are
resolved in a manner that increases the legitimacy of the office, and the chances that
the president and vice president may be elected as a team, can meaningful duties
beyond that of succession be established. This has been the case in the U.S. in
particular after Roosevelt won the prerogative to select his running partner over the
parties in 1938. The continued success of succession with Truman, Johnson and Ford,
assured that there were no sudden breaches in the development of the duties of the
office, and the office of the vice presidency slowly expanded in its resources and
duties. Whereas both Colombia and Mexico failed in the first two dilemmas in their
handling of the challenges of the vice presidency, Argentina successfully maintained
the vice presidency after 1853. Although the failures in the Mexican and Colombian
cases are mostly explained by the factors cited above, the 19th century tradition of the
president participating in either internal or external wars as Commander-in-Chief left
the vice presidents in both these and other countries to rule (by contrast, President
28
One could argue that following this line of thought the vice presidency should have remained
abolished. President Nuñez, however, did not want to act as president at his high age (born in 1825),
and sought a close collaborator in the vice presidency to whom he could delegate power. He could
surely not have retired to Cartagena and his hacienda had he not had control over the vice-presidential
selection. See Melo (1989).
31
Lincoln stayed in Washington, D.C. during the Civil War). Combined with electoral
formula that secured adversarial presidents and vice presidents, these events
constituted basically a change in government. Often, these periods could lead to
conflicts with Congress as examples from Argentina and Mexico confirm, and
decrease the legitimacy of the office. Nevertheless, Argentina successfully maintained
the vice presidency through ordered succession and a wisely administered vicepresidential selection mechanism. The Argentine case demonstrates that the
successful resolutions of these challenges are only necessary, but not sufficient, for
the successful development of meaningful and important governmental duties for the
vice presidency. In Argentina, which follows the U.S. Constitution for the vicepresidential duties, the vice presidency has not developed its duties in a linear, or
stable, manner. Several factors may explain this, one is naturally the lower level of
institutionalization in the Argentine presidency altogether, but we believe this is not
the full explanation.
We want to highlight two key differences between the U.S. and Argentine case. The
first is that while the U.S. has maintained a two-party system, Argentina has a multiparty system. This opens for balancing the ticket by finding vice-presidential
candidates from other parties. Particular to the Argentine case, this meant the
important loss in the export-tax case for President Fernández in 2008 when Vice
President Cobos broke the tie and voted against his own government. More generally,
the political differences between a president and vice president may prevent the
devolution of duties to the vice presidency, and the ideological differences between a
president and vice president is, all else equal, higher if the two come from different
parties. Given that a president cannot remove the vice president, having a vice
32
president with ample duties following a different agenda than the president's party is
likely to generate problems. The other issue is the reelection of the president. While in
most countries in Latin America immediate reelection was prohibited during the latest
transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, today many regimes allow for
immediate presidential reelection (Corrales and Penfold 2014), and the rules of
presidential reelection are not stable in the region. In the U.S. through practice, the
incumbent president seeks reelection normally without opposition within the party29,
while the incumbent vice president often tries to run for president if the incumbent
president is constitutionally prohibited from running. This formula and its stability
prevent a conflict of ambitions between the president and vice president. In the
Argentine case, however, Sribman (2009) finds that relationships between president
and vice president tend to sour as the presidential periods advances.30 This may be
connected, in particular in the cases in which the president and vice president come
from different parties, to a conflict over the presidential nomination and election. If
the president is not assured that a vice president will not compete for the presidency in
the next election, this incentivizes a president to downplay the role of the vice
president. Only if the vice president is given duties can the office be used to nurture a
vice president's ambition for the presidency since duties in e.g. social or foreign
policy secure visibility for the vice president, which again may be used to launch a
presidential bid.
The institutional success of the vice presidency in the U.S. thus hinged on the
successful resolution of the succession and selection dilemmas, which occurred
29
There are some well known exceptions to this custom. In 1976, Ronald Reagan challenged
incumbent president Gerald Ford, and in 1980 Ted Kennedy challenged incumbent preisdent Jimmy
Carter. Such internal challenges are signs of unrest within the party, and in both cases the president lost
reelection.
30
Marsteintredet (2015) finds the same pattern for the Dominican Republic.
33
during the 19th century, and was not dependent on the entrance of a strong figure
such as Richard Cheney in the vice presidency. Compared to the Latin American
experiences, the U.S. was aided by a far less turbulent political history, although the
period leading up to and including the Civil War could have impacted the vice
presidency negatively. Nevertheless, had the political elites failed to address the
constitutional flaws of vice-presidential selection and succession, the vice presidency
may have been removed also in the U.S. In several Latin American countries, the
removal of the vice presidency became the natural solution to the ills of instability
that marred many countries in the region. The often adverse rules of succession and
selection converted the vice presidency into what Mecham (1959) coined a "magnet
for conspiracies". While removing the vice presidency did not provide regime
stability in Latin America, the vice presidency was considered by many constitution
framers, tasked after regime breakdown with the design of stable constitutions, as a
source of instability and therefore removed.
Historical institutionalism has mainly been occupied with path dependence and
positive feedback, defined as "developmental trajectories that are difficult to reverse"
(Hacker 2002: 54, cited in Pierson 2004: 31). Whereas the U.S. vice presidency over
time has become an institution and an office that is difficult to reverse, this is not the
case for many countries in Latin America. Countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and
more recently Honduras removed, reinstalled, and even removed again the vice
presidency. The introduction of the office of the vice presidency has therefore been
proven relatively easy to reverse (as well as institute). Theory on such sequences that
34
constitute reactive sequences or events is scant.31 The instability can be explained by
the lack of institutional defenses (or positive feedback) of the vice presidency and the
lack of institutional and economic interests in defending the office during
constitutional reform. Therefore constitution framers, who in Latin America often met
after regime turnovers or crises, could evaluate the continued existence, or possible
installment, of the vice presidency based on merits and its potential to provide
stability. The evaluation would, we believe, and as the evidence in the Mexican and
Colombian cases indicate, be based on the recent histories and experience with the
presence or absence of the office, and whether it played a role in the prior regime
crisis. The new Constitution would then be a reaction to the failed one and change the
formula for succession by either removing or installing the vice presidency. The vice
presidency would then be removed if constitution framers held that the institution had
played a role in the previous regime's fall, as in the case of Mexico in 1846, or
reversely installed or reformed it if the lack of a vice presidency in a previous period
generated a crisis of succession. The Latin American failure to address challenges and
dilemmas the inherent to the vice presidency would then often provide constitution
framers with arguments to remove the vice presidency. Void of an institutional
defense and interests vested in the office, it was easily removed after having been
identified as one (of several) culprit in the previous regime's demise.
The contrasting cases of the successful U.S. vice presidency and the Latin American
experiences bring insight to the conditions for both the success and failure of the
office. The institutional trait of an elected, non-removable successor of the president
31
But, see Mahoney (2000). Often reactive sequences within path dependency would
aim to explain a stable outcome. In this paper, we have focused on the instability
before reaching equilibrium.
35
generates several challenges for the political system that must be resolved for the
office to develop successfully. In the U.S. political elites confronted and resolved
these dilemma in a manner that strengthened the office over time, factors that were
necessary for the development of the modern, and powerful, vice presidency. In
several Latin American cases due to the same institutional traits, the vice presidency
was judged by the perverse incentives that the vice-presidential constitutional formula
for succession generates, and the office not only failed to develop successfully, it was
also removed (and reinstalled) numerous times. The case of the vice presidency
therefore not only teaches us about the contrasting experiences of the U.S. and Latin
American experiences, but it sheds some light into the conditions for reactive
sequences, which is one basic type of path-dependent analysis (Mahoney 2000: 509).
We believe that this paper raises several questions for further research into both the
vice presidency and its role in government and regime crises. Further, our cases
indicate that some formulas of vice-presidential selection might be more pernicious
for stability than others. Further studies into the real regime effects of the various
formulas of presidential succession are therefore warranted.
36
Figures:
Figure 1: The vice-presidency in Latin America
Notes: Data from Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2010.
37
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