water
Article
The Relationship between Effective and Equitable
Water Allocation, Local Rice Farmer Participation
and Economic Well-Being: Insights from Thailand’s
Chiang Mai Province
Saowalak Kosanlawit, Peeyush Soni * and Ganesh P. Shivakoti
Agribusiness Management, Agricultural Systems and Engineering, School of Environment,
Resources and Development Asian Institute of Technology, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand;
[email protected] (S.K.); [email protected] (G.P.S.)
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +66-2524-5480
Academic Editor: Davide Viaggi
Received: 25 January 2017; Accepted: 25 April 2017; Published: 2 May 2017
Abstract: This research investigates the relationship between equitable water allocation, participation
in the local irrigation operation, and improved economic well-being. The study area consisted of
the rice-growing districts of Doi Saket and Mae On in Thailand’s northern province Chiang Mai,
where locals have adopted a participatory farmer-managed irrigation system. The samples were
150 small-scale rice farmers who were divided into four groups by their membership: community
irrigation (CI); community irrigation and enterprise (CIE); and farmland location (head-end or tail-end
of the irrigation canal). The findings revealed a strong relationship between the three variables.
Specifically, despite less advantageous farmland locations, the tail-end CI farmers outperformed in
the dry-season and annual paddy yields per household. The higher paddy yields translated into
higher household earnings. The improved economic well-being of the tail-end CI farmers could
be attributed to their active participation in the local irrigation operation. Another contributing
factor was equitable water allocation, which is the product of the farmers’ active participation as
their irrigation demands and concerns are constantly acknowledged and addressed. Importantly,
the findings verified the effectiveness and usability of the participatory irrigation system in tackling
the problem of inequitable water allocation between the head-end and tail-end farmers. Moreover,
the participatory irrigation scheme was readily implementable since it required no additional
investment, only active local participation.
Keywords: community irrigation; community enterprise; equity; paddy; Thailand
1. Introduction
In general, the economic well-being of farmers is closely tied to the degree of their involvement in
the management and allocation of irrigated water. The farmer-managed irrigation system contributes
to higher agricultural yields and greater earnings. In other words, a positive correlation exists between
an irrigation management system that encourages the participation of local farmers, and increased
farm productivity and higher incomes [1–10].
By the 1990s, Thailand had decentralized the governance of natural resources, conferring
greater responsibilities upon sub-district administrations and providing fiscal opportunities for local
development planning [11]. Irrigation officials were in charge of involving the wider public in
information and consultation in the water governance processes [12]. Participation in agricultural
water management by farmers and local leaders were coordinated by government agencies at the
local level, and subsequently developed a collaborative water distribution plan [11]. The success of an
Water 2017, 9, 319; doi:10.3390/w9050319
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Water 2017, 9, 319
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irrigation system is largely governed by the participative dynamics between the resource appropriators
and other actors [13–15]. Moreover, participatory irrigation management promotes the equitable and
sustainable use of water, and contributes to increased farm productivity and improved economic
well-being [16]. Participatory irrigation management is ideal for successful and sustainable irrigation
management [17] where the participation-based equitable water allocation and increased crop yields
and earnings are positively correlated. The contributions of various stakeholders in working closely
with irrigation policy and management (e.g., information and time schedule) of the local irrigation
system are essential [17]. Furthermore, the participatory irrigation system safeguards the interests of
other stakeholders with differing desires and purposes for water use [18].
The efficient and equitable water allocation between farmers at the head-end and tail-end of an
irrigation network is crucial to the livelihoods and sustainability of the farming community along
the irrigation network [19]. This is of particular concern as the farmlands near the head-end of an
irrigation network normally benefit from the constant supply of irrigated water, whereas those towards
the tail-end are often faced with irregular water supply. In fact, efficient irrigation practices have
contributed to an increase in paddy yields [20–25]. In Thailand, rice is the essence of life. It permeates
all aspects of the lives of people from all walks of life. The influence of rice is not only felt at the level of
ordinary citizens, it also prescribes the roles and responsibilities of government leaders [26]. However,
increasing population and consumer demand places more burden upon the world’s small-scale rice
farmers. Rice production could be increased through better understanding of input-use efficiency
and effectiveness [27]. Existing research on the relationship between equitable water distribution,
participation in the local irrigation operation, and improved economic well-being of Thai farmers is
very limited.
Therefore, this research investigates the relationship between equitable irrigation water
distribution, the active participation of rice farmers in the local irrigation operation, and their
economic well-being. The study area was the rice-growing districts of Doi Saket and Mae On in
Thailand’s northern province of Chiang Mai, where the local residents have embraced the participatory
farmer-managed irrigation system. The district of Doi Saket is located at the head-end of the Mae
Kuang irrigation canal, and Mae On is towards the tail-end of the irrigation system. The samples
included 150 rice farmers from the Doi Saket and Mae On districts. The rice farmers were divided into
four groups according to their membership (i.e., a community irrigation (CI) member or a community
irrigation and enterprise (CIE) member) and farmland location (i.e., head-end or tail-end of the
irrigation system).
In this study, the CI members were local farmers who had mutually agreed to a set of rules and
restrictions regarding irrigation water management, and participated in local irrigation operation and
management. Their single source of income was from the sale of paddy rice to the nearby rice mills.
In contrast, the CIE members were local farmers participating in the running of the local irrigation
operation who sold paddy seeds through the local community enterprise and the leftovers to the local
rice mills. The paddy seed community enterprise is a channel through which paddy farmer-members
can efficiently supply (sell) their crops to various markets. Like the CI, the CIE members have agreed
on a set of protocols regarding water allocation and management. Both CI and CIE groups selected
for the questionnaire were registered with the government and relied on irrigated water from the left
main canal of the Mae Kuang irrigation canal. However, unlike the CI, CIE members are provided
with business information and access to different markets.
2. Materials and Methods
As stated previously, effectiveness and fairness of water allocation performance are important
aspects of the economic viability of irrigation projects. The issues addressed in these performance
parameters [28] include whether: (a) a sufficient volume of water is available to irrigate the crops
being grown; (b) farmer groups are provided with an equitable water distribution service and their
fair share of water; (c) water is delivered when it is needed, and at the required flow rate and duration;
Water 2017, 9, 319
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and (d) the water is effectively utilized [29]. The water-delivery-service performance measures deal
with issues of water volume, flexibility (adequacy), reliability, and equity [30,31].
In this research, data collection was conducted using a questionnaire. Prior to the collection of
data, a group of local farmers were informally interviewed to gather preliminary data for questionnaire
development. The questionnaire included the respondents’ demographics, land use, access to irrigation,
participation in the local irrigation operation, and income sources. In addition, data on farm size,
paddy yields, their reactions on the current irrigation operation and practices, and the aggregate
household incomes were collected. The research sample size consisted of 150 small-scale rice farmers.
The participating farmers were divided into four groups consisting of 23 CI and 43 CIE head-end
farmers, and 23 CI and 61 CIE tail-end farmers. The smaller sample of CI farmers (46 vs. 104) was
attributed to the fact that many CI farmers travelled to the city or Bangkok to seek employment
for supplementary income. The data collection was carried out from 2014–2015 through structured
interview sessions using a questionnaire, and the results were aggregated based on the positive
responses given by the participants [32]. The interview sessions were carried out with the assistance
of the local office of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and Chiang Mai’s Cooperative Auditing
Department (CAD).
The test statistics of the Exact Sig. (2-sided) and the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of Chi-Square,
and linear regression correlations were used to analyze the relationship between the irrigation practices
(i.e., equitable water allocation), the participation of the local farmers in the irrigation operation, yield
and their household incomes. To examine the effectiveness and fairness of the water allocation,
the research questionnaire undertook measurements along four dimensions: water volume, schedule
flexibility, reliability and equality [30]. The statistical significance of the observed association was
measured by the Exact Sig. (2-sided) and the Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of Chi-Square test statistics.
The Chi-squared test investigated differences between the population proportions for the different
adaptation options. The Monte Carlo exact test was used as there were variables which had less
than five responses. Regression (linear) correlation analysis was used for quantifying the general
relationships between the variables. The regression analysis also examined the causal relationships
between the quantitative variables.
The study area focused on the rice-growing districts of Doi Saket and Mae On in Thailand’s
northern province of Chiang Mai, where the local residents have embraced the participatory
farmer-managed irrigation system. Chiang Mai Province is 300 m above sea level and 700 km north
of the capital, Bangkok. It is surrounded by high mountain ranges with a total area of 20,107 km2 .
The province consists of 25 districts, 204 sub-districts and 1915 villages. The district of Doi Saket is a
rural agricultural area whose residents rely on rice growing for their livelihoods. The district is located
at the head-end of the Mae Kuang irrigation canal, branching out from the Mae Kuang Udomthara
reservoir. In contrast, the district of Mae On is located at the tail-end of the Mae Kuang irrigation
canal. Like Doi Saket, Mae On is also a rural agricultural area with paddy fields accounting for a large
proportion of land use, as shown in Figure 1.
The Mae Kuang Udomthara reservoir is an earth-compacted dam that receives water from the
Mae Kuang River. The reservoir’s high, normal and low water levels are +387.80 m MSL (mean sea
level), +385.00 m MSL; and +350.00 m MSL, respectively. Its normal capacity is 263 mcm and the
highest and lowest capacities are 295 mcm and 114 mcm, respectively. The reservoir caters to an area
of 46,880 ha [33].
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Figure 1. Location map of the study area.
Figure 1. Location map of the study area.
3. Results
The Mae Kuang Udomthara reservoir is an earth-compacted dam that receives water from the
Mae Kuang River. The reservoir’s high, normal and low water levels are +387.80 m MSL (mean sea
3.1.level),
Demographics
+385.00 of
m Respondents
MSL; and +350.00 m MSL, respectively. Its normal capacity is 263 mcm and the
Table 1 tabulates the demographics and the average paddy cultivation land of the 150 sampled
farmers. The majority of the respondents were male household heads with limited formal education.
3. Results
3.1. Demographics of Respondents
Water 2017, 9, 319
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Table 1 tabulates the demographics and the average paddy cultivation land of the 150 sampled
farmers. The majority of the respondents were male household heads with limited formal education.
Despite
large family
sizes (family
members
>4); the >4);
average
paddy field
sizefield
was 1.92–3.04
per
Despite
large family
sizes (family
members
the average
paddy
size was ha
1.92–3.04
ha
household.
per household.
Table 1.
Demographics
and average
paddy paddy
cultivation
land ofland
the 150
sampled
farmers.
Table
1. Demographics
and average
cultivation
of the
150 sampled
farmers.
Gender
Farmer
Gender
Farmer
Male
Female
Male
Household
Average
Status in Family
Household
Members
Paddy
Status in Family
Average Paddy
Members Household
Cultivation
Cultivation
High
≤4
>4
Resident
LandLand
(ha) (ha)
Household
Head
Resident
Medium
High
≤4
>4
Head
Head-end
Educational Level
Educational Level
Low
Medium
Female
Low
CI (n = 23) (%)
23 (100)
0 (0)
19 (83)
4 (17)
0 (0) Head-end
6 (26)
17 (74)
21 (91)
2 (9)
2.08
CIE (n = 43) (%)
38 (88)
5 (12)
30 (70)
3 (7)
10 (23)
17 (40)
26 (60)
27 (63)
16 (37)
1.92
CI (n = 23) (%)
23 (100)
0 (0)
19 (83)
4 (17)
0 (0)
6 (26)
17 (74)
21 (91)
2 (9)
CIE (n = 43) (%)
38 (88)
5 (12)
30 (70)
3 Tail-end
(7)
10 (23)
17 (40)
26 (60)
27 (63)
16 (37)
CI (n = 23) (%)
23 (100)
0 (0)
17 (74)
0 (0)
6 (26)
3 (13)
20 (87)
21 (91)
2 (9)
3.04
Tail-end
CIE (n = 61) (%)
54 (89)
7 (11)
41 (67)
7 (12)
13 (21)
21 (34)
40 (66)
37 (61)
24 (39)
2.40
CI (n = 23) (%)
23 (100)
0 (0)
17 (74)
0 (0)
6 (26)
3 (13)
20 (87)
21 (91)
2 (9)
Notes:
head-end
irrigation
Saket and
Mae On,
CIE The
(n = 61)
(%)
54and
(89) tail-end
7 (11) of the
41 (67)
7 (12)canal
13refer
(21) to
21the
(34)districts
40 (66) of Doi
37 (61)
24 (39)
2.08
1.92
3.04
2.40
respectively;
andhead-end
CI and CIE
thethe
community
irrigation
andofthe
irrigation
Notes: The
and denote
tail-end of
irrigation canal
refer to farmers
the districts
Doicommunity
Saket and Mae
On, respectively;
and CI and
CIE denote
the community
irrigation
farmers
theeducation
communitylevels
irrigation
andlower
enterprise
and enterprise
farmers,
respectively.
The low,
medium
andand
high
denote
thanfarmers,
respectively. The low, medium and high education levels denote lower than primary school, between primary
primary
school, between primary and high school, and bachelor’s degree or above, respectively. The
and high school, and bachelor’s degree or above, respectively. The demographic values in the parentheses are the
demographic
values
in the
parentheses
are the percentage of each group total.
percentage
of each
group
total.
Figure 2 presents the factors that the farmers perceived as causes of a yield gap (the discrepancy
Figure
2 presents
factors
farmers
perceived
as causes
of a yield
gap (the
between the
expected
paddythe
yield
andthat
thethe
actual
yield).
The farmers
equally
attributed
thediscrepancy
poor
between
the
expected
paddy
yield
and
the
actual
yield).
The
farmers
equally
attributed
the poor
actual yield to the lack of community participation in the local irrigation operation and management
yield to theweather
lack of conditions
community(22%),
participation
the
local irrigation
operationinputs
and management
(22%) actual
and unfavorable
followedinby
sub-standard
agricultural
(21%),
(22%)
and
unfavorable
weather
conditions
(22%),
followed
by
sub-standard
agricultural
inputs
the state’s inefficient operation and management of the irrigation system (19%), and harvest damage (21%),
the(16%).
state’s inefficient operation and management of the irrigation system (19%), and harvest damage
and loss
and loss (16%).
Lack of community participation (22%)
22%
22%
16%
19%
21%
Government's inefficient irrigation
operation (19%)
Substandard agricultural inputs (21%)
Harvest damage and loss (16%)
Unfavorable weather conditions (22%)
n = 150
Figure 2. Causes of poor crop yields as perceived by the sampled farmers (% of total).
Figure 2. Causes of poor crop yields as perceived by the sampled farmers (% of total).
3 illustrates
the participating
farmers’
responses
the fairness
of the allocation
water allocation
FigureFigure
3 illustrates
the participating
farmers’
responses
(%) on(%)
theon
fairness
of the water
practice,
whereby
the
tail-end
farmers
would
be
unable
to
grow
rice
in
the
dry
season
due
insufficient
practice, whereby the tail-end farmers would be unable to grow rice in the dry season to
due
to
water.
The
results
indicated
that
65%
and
61%
of
CI
and
CIE
head-end
farmers
viewed
the
practice
insufficient water. The results indicated that 65% and 61% of CI and CIE head-end farmers viewed
as
unfair
to
their
tail-end
counterparts;
and
44%
and
53%
of
CI
and
CIE
tail-end
farmers
regarded
the practice as unfair to their tail-end counterparts; and 44% and 53% of CI and CIE tail-end farmers
it asitunfair.
Importantly,
the the
findings
imply
thatthat
most
farmers
were
willing
to resolve
thethe
issue of
regarded
as unfair.
Importantly,
findings
imply
most
farmers
were
willing
to resolve
inequitable
irrigated
water
distribution
and
restore
fairness
in
the
community.
issue of inequitable irrigated water distribution and restore fairness in the community.
Percentage
(%)
Percentage
(%)
Water2017,
2017,9,9,319
319
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Water 2017, 9, 319
of17
17
66of
6 of 17
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
65
65
61
61
44
44
4
4
53
53
55
55
16
16
15
15
57
57
18
20
18
52
26
20
52
31
30
26
25
19
31
30
25
9
19
9
CI
CIE CI (n=23) CIE CI (n=46) CIE
CI
CIE CI (n=23) CIE CI (n=46) CIE
(n=23) (n=43)
(n=61)
(n=104)
(n=23) (n=43)
(n=61)
(n=104)
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
No
No
Yes
Yes
No answer
No answer
Figure3.3.The
Therespondents’
respondents’responses
responseson
onthe
thewater
waterdistribution
distributionpractice
practicewhereby
wherebythe
thetail-end
tail-endfarmers
farmers
Figure
Figure
3. The
respondents’
responses onpaddy,
the water
distribution
practice
whereby
the %
tail-end
farmers
would be
be
unable
to
where
NONO
= unfair
andand
YES
= fair
of %
group
total).
would
unable
to plant
plantthe
thedry-season
dry-season paddy,
where
= unfair
YES
= (in
fair (in
of group
2 =
would
be unable
to plantofthe
dry-season
paddy,
where is
NO
= unfair at
and
YES
= fair
(in14.531,
% of group
2
The
Exact
Sig.
(2-sided)
the
Chi-square
test
statistics
significant
5%
level
(χ
df
total). The Exact Sig. (2-sided) of the Chi-square test statistics is significant at 5% level (χ = 14.531,=df6,
total). The
Exact Sig. (2-sided) of the Chi-square test statistics is significant at 5% level (χ2 = 14.531, df
< 0.05).
=P-value
6, P-value
< 0.05).
= 6, P-value < 0.05).
Figure
perceptions
regarding
thethe
predictability
and and
adequacy
of the
Figure 44presents
presentsthe
thefarmers’
farmers’
perceptions
regarding
predictability
adequacy
of
Figure 4 presents the farmers’ perceptions regarding the predictability and adequacy of the
irrigated
water.water.
The high
predictability
contributecontribute
to better decisions
water utilization
the irrigated
Thelevels
highoflevels
of predictability
to better in
decisions
in water
irrigated water. The high levels of predictability contribute to better decisions in water utilization
[34,35].
In Figure
4, 22%
10% of
andand
CIE tail-end
the disadvantageous
location
utilization
[34,35].
In and
Figure
4, CI
22%
10% of farmers,
CI anddespite
CIE tail-end
farmers, despite
the
[34,35]. In Figure 4, 22% and 10% of CI and CIE tail-end farmers, despite the disadvantageous location
of
their
farmlands,
perceived
that
availability
of
the
irrigated
water
was
predictable
and
adequate,
disadvantageous location of their farmlands, perceived that availability of the irrigated water was
of their farmlands, perceived that availability of the irrigated water was predictable and adequate,
whereas
only
and 7%whereas
of CI and
head-end
farmers
did.
Predictability
thePredictability
key to the
predictable
and9%
adequate,
onlyCIE
9% and
7% of CI
and CIE
head-end
farmersisdid.
whereas only 9% and 7% of CI and CIE head-end farmers did. Predictability is the key to the
perceived
adequacy
of
water
supply
[36].
In
fact,
further
observations
revealed
that
the
local
leaders
is the key to the perceived adequacy of water supply [36]. In fact, further observations revealed
that
perceived adequacy of water supply [36]. In fact, further observations revealed that the local leaders
of
the
CI
tail-end
farmers
played
a
crucial
role
in
the
allocation
and
scheduling
of
the
irrigated
the local leaders of the CI tail-end farmers played a crucial role in the allocation and schedulingwater.
of the
of the CI tail-end farmers played a crucial role in the allocation and scheduling of the irrigated water.
irrigated water.
100
100
Percentage
(%)
Percentage
(%)
80
80
9
9
13
13
7
7
30
30
60
60
40
40
78
78
20
20
0
0
63
63
22
22
30
30
48
48
10
10
51
51
39
39
15
15
22
22
63
63
8
8
41
41
Predictable and
Predictable and
adequate
adequate
Predictable and
Predictable and
inadequate
inadequate
51
51
Unpredictable
Unpredictable
CI (n=23)
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=46)
CIE
CIE
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=46)
CIE
(n=43)
(n=61)
(n=104)
(n=43)
(n=61)
(n=104)
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
Figure 4. The respondents’ perception of the predictability and adequacy of the irrigated water (in %
Figure
4. The
perceptionof
ofthe
thepredictability
predictabilityand
andadequacy
adequacyofofthe
the irrigated
water
(in %
Figure
The respondents’
respondents’
water
of
of
group4.total).
The Monte perception
Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
of the chi-squared
statistic isirrigated
significant
at (in
the%
1%
of
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
1%
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
1%
level
level (χ2 = 16.769, df = 6, P-value = 0.01).
2 = 16.769, df = 6, P-value = 0.01).
level
(χ2 = (χ
16.769,
df = 6, P-value = 0.01).
3.2. Evaluation of Water Distribution Service to Individual Farm Units
3.2.
3.2. Evaluation
Evaluation of
of Water
Water Distribution
Distribution Service
Service to
to Individual
Individual Farm
Farm Units
Units
Figures 5–8 illustrate the sampled farmers’ responses (%) on water allocation and distribution
Figures 5–8
the
sampled
farmers’
responses
(%)
allocation and
5–8 illustrate
illustrate
thevolume,
sampledschedule
farmers’flexibility,
responsesreliability,
(%) on
on water
water
and distribution
distribution
alongFigures
four dimensions:
water
and allocation
equality, respectively.
along
reliability, and
and equality,
equality,respectively.
respectively.
along four
four dimensions:
dimensions: water
water volume,
volume, schedule
schedule flexibility,
flexibility, reliability,
Percentage
Percentage
(%)(%)
Water 2017, 9, 319
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2017,9,
9,319
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Water
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
7 of 17
of17
17
77of
5
17
5
17
78
78
7
4
7
4
63
63
13
13
87
87
3
3
46
46
51
51
3
15
3
15
3
4
3
4
55
55
82
82
38
26
38
26
CI (n=23) CIE (n=43) CI (n=23) CIE (n=61) CI (n=46)
CIE
CI (n=23) CIE (n=43) CI (n=23) CIE (n=61) CI (n=46) (n=104)
CIE
(n=104)
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
Figure 5. The respondents’ knowledge of water volumes demanded by and supplied to their
Figure 5.
respondents’
knowledge of water
volumes
demanded
by and by
supplied
to their farmlands,
Figure
5. The
The
respondents’
of water
volumes
demanded
and
supplied
to such
their
farmlands,
where
4 denotes knowledge
full knowledge
of the
water volume
whereas
0 denotes
no
where 4 denotes full knowledge of the water volume whereas 0 denotes no such knowledge and instead
farmlands,
where
4
denotes
full
knowledge
of
the
water
volume
whereas
0
denotes
no
knowledge and instead relies on traditional wisdom (in % of group total). The Monte Carlo Sig.such
(2relies on traditional wisdom (in % of group total). The Monte
Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared
2of
knowledge
and insteadstatistic
relies on
traditionalatwisdom
(in %
group df
total).
The Monte
Carlo Sig. (2sided)
of the chi-squared
is significant
the
1%
level
(χ
=
34.004,
=
9,
P-value
<
0.01).
statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 34.004, df = 9, P-value < 0.01).
sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 34.004, df = 9, P-value < 0.01).
Percentage
Percentage
(%)(%)
Specifically, Figure 5 compares the participating farmers’ responses (%) on their knowledge of the
Specifically,
Figure 55by
compares
the
farmers’
responses
knowledge
of
the
compares
theparticipating
participating
farmers’
(%) on their
the
waterSpecifically,
volumes demanded
and supplied
to their farmlands.
The
results showed
thatknowledge
as many asof
78%
water
volumes
demanded
by
and
supplied
to
their
farmlands.
The
results
showed
that
as
many
as
water
volumes
demanded
by and supplied
to their
farmlands.
Theknowledge
results showed
that volumes
as many as
as they
78%
and
87%
of head-end
and tail-end
CI farmers
lacked
“scientific”
on water
78%87%
and
87%
of head-end
andMeanwhile,
tail-end
CI 63%
farmers
“scientific”
knowledge
onCIE
water
volumes
as
and
head-end
and tail-end
CI farmers
lacked
“scientific”
knowledge
on water
volumes
as they
relied
on of
traditional
wisdom.
andlacked
46%
of
head-end
and tail-end
farmers
had
they
relied
on
traditional
wisdom.
Meanwhile,
63%
and
46%
of
head-end
and
tail-end
CIE
farmers
relied
on
traditional
wisdom.
Meanwhile,
63%
and
46%
of
head-end
and
tail-end
CIE
farmers
had
minimal “scientific” knowledge of water volumes.
hadFigure
minimal
“scientific”
knowledge
ofvolumes.
water volumes.
minimal
“scientific”
knowledge
of water
6 illustrates
the
farmers’
responses
on the flexibility of the water distribution schedule.
Figure
6
illustrates
the
farmers’
responses
onthe
the
flexibilityof
of
the
water
distribution
schedule.
Figure
6
illustrates
the
farmers’
responses
on
water
distribution
schedule.
The flexible irrigation system contributed to a degree
of flexibility
continuity
inthe
daily
water
distribution
[37]. In
The
flexible
irrigation
system
contributed
to
a
degree
of
continuity
in
daily
water
distribution
The
flexible
irrigation
system
contributed
to
a
degree
of
continuity
in
daily
water
distribution
[37].[37].
In
Figure 6, 61% (4% + 57%), 48% (18% + 30%), and 35% (9% + 26%) of head-end CI, tail-end CIE and
CI
In Figure
6, 61%
(4%
+ 57%),
48%+scheduling
(18%
30%),
and
35%
(9%
+
26%)
ofCI,
head-end
tail-end
Figure
6,rated
61%
(4%
57%),
48%
(18%
30%), +and
35%
(9% flexible
+ 26%)
of
head-end
tail-end CI,
CIE
and
CI
farmers
the +current
irrigation
as very
and
supple,
indicating
their
high
CIE
and
CI
farmers
rated
the
current
irrigation
scheduling
as
very
flexible
and
supple,
indicating
farmers
rated
the
current
irrigation
scheduling
as
very
flexible
and
supple,
indicating
their
high
satisfaction with the flexibility of the current water distribution schedule to matches their water
their high satisfaction
with the flexibility
of thewater
current
water distribution
to matches
their
satisfaction
with the flexibility
of the current
distribution
scheduleschedule
to matches
their water
demands.
water demands.
demands.
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
4
4
57
57
13
13
26
26
CI (n=23)
CI (n=23)
26
26
26
26
46
46
2
2
CIE
CIE
(n=43)
(n=43)
Head-end
Head-end
9
9
26
26
18
18
30
30
48
48
21
21
26
26
5
17
17
5
7
7
41
41
7
7
37
37
8
8
22
22
15
15
23
23
36
36
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
CI (n=23) CIE (n=61) CI (n=46)
CIE
CI (n=23) CIE (n=61) CI (n=46) (n=104)
CIE
(n=104)
Tail-end
Total
Tail-end
Total
Figure6.6.The
Therespondents’
respondents’responses
responseson
onirrigation
irrigationschedule
scheduleflexibility,
flexibility,where
where44denotes
denotesvery
veryflexible
flexible
Figure
and
0
denotes
inflexible
(in
%
of
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
Figure
6. The respondents’
on irrigation
flexibility,
4 denotes
flexible
chi-squared
and
0 denotes
inflexible (inresponses
% of group
total). Theschedule
Monte Carlo
Sig. where
(2-sided)
of the very
2 = 44.725, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
is significant
atinflexible
the 1%
level
(χ
and
0 denotes
(in
%level
of group
total). df
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared
= 12,
P-value
< 0.01).
statistic
is significant
at the
1%
(χ2 = 44.725,
statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 44.725, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
Water 2017, 9, 319
8 of 17
Water 2017, 9, 319
100
100
60
60
40
5
40
52
20
Percentage (%)
80
Percentage (%)
Water 2017,809, 319
0
8 of 17
5
15
52
23
15
3
15
61
9
4
22
23 53
17
9
3 66
15
61 39
4
CI (n=23) CIE (n=43)
22
53
Head-end
17
20
2
26
2
CI (n=23)
39
16
66
CIE (n=61)
Tail-end
16
2 41
26
2
29
41
CI (n=46)
29
72
18
37
72
18
37
36
4
8 of 17
3
4 2
3 1
2 0
CIE (n=104)
1
Total 36
0
0 Figure 7. The respondents’ responses on the reliability of water distribution, where 4 denotes very
Figure 7. CI
The
respondents’
responsesCIon
the reliability
of water CI
distribution,
where
4 denotes very
(n=23)
CIE (n=43)
(n=23)
CIE (n=61)
(n=46)
CIE
(n=104)
reliable and 0 denotes unreliable (in % of group total). The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chireliable
and
0
denotes
unreliable
(in
%
of
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
squared statistic
is significant at the 1% level
(χ2 = 82.697, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
2
statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ = 82.697, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
Figure
7. The
responses
on responses
the reliability
water
distribution,
where 4distribution
denotes very to their
Figure
7 respondents’
illustrates the
farmers’
onofthe
reliability
of water
reliable
and
0
denotes
unreliable
(in
%
of
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of theand
chifarmlands.
The findings
revealed that
53% of head-end
CIE farmers
vieweddistribution
it as unreliable;
61%
Figure
7 illustrates
the farmers’
responses
on the reliability
of water
to theirthat
farmlands.
squared statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 82.697, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
80
60
40
20
0
40
Percentage (%)
100
60
20
0
Percentage (%)
and 66% of tail-end CI and CIE farmers perceived that the distribution of the irrigated water was
The findings
revealed that 53% of head-end CIE farmers viewed it as unreliable; and that 61% and
relatively unreliable. The unreliable water delivery of the state-controlled irrigation system
Figure 7 CI
illustrates
farmers’
responses
reliability of the
water
distribution
their
66% of tail-end
and CIEthe
farmers
perceived
thaton
thethe
distribution
irrigated
waterto
was
relatively
contributed to the local farmers’ inability to grow crops and hostile sentiment [38]. However, significant
farmlands.
Theunreliable
findings revealed
that
53% ofof
head-end
CIE farmers viewed
it as unreliable;
and
that 61% to the
unreliable.
The
water
delivery
the
state-controlled
irrigation
system
contributed
portions of water are absorbed by the soil or evaporated by heat, leading to significant water loss
and
66% of tail-end
CItoand
CIEcrops
farmers
perceived
that the distribution
of the
irrigated portions
water wasof water
local
farmers’
inabilityThis
grow
and
hostile sentiment
[38]. However,
significant
during transport.
problem
could
be mitigated
by the construction
of concrete
irrigation channels [39].
relatively
unreliable.
The
unreliable
water
delivery
of
the
state-controlled
irrigation
system This
are absorbed
by the8,soil
evaporated
by heat,
leading
to significant
loss during
In Figure
theor
farmers’
responses
(%) on
the equality
of waterwater
allocation
revealedtransport.
that most
contributed to the local farmers’ inability to grow crops and hostile sentiment [38]. However, significant
problem
could
be mitigated
by the
construction
of practice
concreteasirrigation
farmers
perceived
the current
water
distribution
equitable. channels
The results[39].
indicated that 74%
portions of water are absorbed by the soil or evaporated by heat, leading to significant water loss
(13%
+ 61%)
(2% + 32%+
33%) of(%)
head-end
and CIEof
farmers,
69% (39%
+ 30%) of
tail-most
In
Figure
8, and
the 67%
farmers’
responses
on theCI
equality
water and
allocation
revealed
that
during transport. This problem could be mitigated by the construction of concrete irrigation channels [39].
end
CI
farmers
rated
the
current
water
allocation
practice
as
equitable.
Equitable
water
allocation
and 74%
farmersInperceived
current water
distribution
The results
indicated
that
Figure 8, the
the farmers’
responses
(%) on thepractice
equalityas
ofequitable.
water allocation
revealed
that most
distribution
is
critical
to
the
success
and
sustainability
of
the
farmer-managed
irrigation
system
[40].
(13%
+ 61%)
and 67%
(2% + water
32%+distribution
33%) of head-end
and CIE
farmers,
and 69%
farmers
perceived
the current
practice asCI
equitable.
The
results indicated
that(39%
74% + 30%)
of (13%
tail-end
CIand
farmers
rated
the33%)
current
water CI
allocation
practiceand
as 69%
equitable.
Equitable
+ 61%)
67% (2%
+ 32%+
of head-end
and CIE farmers,
(39% + 30%)
of tail- water
100rated the current
1 allocation and
2toallocation
2
end CI farmers
water
practice
as
equitable.
Equitable
water
allocation
and distribution
is
critical
the
success
and
sustainability
of
the
farmer-managed
4 irrigation
13
17
21farmer-managed
26
distribution
critical to the success32
and sustainability
of
the
irrigation
system
[40].
system
[40]. is80
39
13
61
17
61
9
2 33
32
26
30
39
2
21
9
30
30
46
26
47
13
46 15
27
3
1
17 28
4 2
27
3 1
27
22
30
28
CI (n=23) CIE (n=43) CI (n=23) CIE (n=61) CI (n=46) CIE (n=104)
9
47
13
26
17
Head-end
Tail-end
Total27
22
15
9
7
33 7
2 0
1
0
CI (n=23)
CIE responses
(n=43) CI
CIEof(n=61)
CI (n=46) where
CIE (n=104)
Figure 8. The
respondents’
on(n=23)
the equality
water distribution,
4 denotes equitable
and 0 denotes inequitable (in % of group total). The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic
Head-end
Tail-end
Total
is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 54.063, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
Figure
Therespondents’
respondents’
responses
on
equality
of water
distribution,
wherewhere
4 denotes
equitable
Figure
8. 8.The
responses
onthe
the
equality
of water
distribution,
4 denotes
equitable
3.3.
Participation
in the Irrigation
Operation
and
0
denotes
inequitable
(in
%
of
group
total).
The
Monte
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
and 0 denotes inequitable (in % of group total). The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared
Figure 9at graphically
participation in the local irrigation operation and
= 54.063, dfthe
= 12,farmers’
P-value < 0.01).
is significant
the 1% level (χ2presents
statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 54.063, df = 12, P-value < 0.01).
maintenance and their sense of ownership in the local irrigation system. As many as 91% of tail-end
farmers, whose
paddy yields
and income from the paddy sale were the highest, actively
3.3.CI
Participation
in the Irrigation
Operation
3.3. Participation
Operation
participatedin
in the
the Irrigation
operation and
maintenance of the local irrigation system, compared with 65% and
Figure 9 graphically presents the farmers’ participation in the local irrigation operation and
21% for head-end CI and CIE farmers.
Figure 9 graphically
presents
the farmers’
participation
in theAs
local
irrigation
and
maintenance
and their sense
of ownership
in the local
irrigation system.
many
as 91% of operation
tail-end
CI farmers,and
whose
yields
and income
paddysystem.
sale were
highest,
maintenance
theirpaddy
sense of
ownership
in the from
local the
irrigation
As the
many
as 91%actively
of tail-end CI
participated
the operation
of the
the local
irrigation
system,
with 65%
and
farmers,
whoseinpaddy
yields and
andmaintenance
income from
paddy
sale were
the compared
highest, actively
participated
21%
for
head-end
CI
and
CIE
farmers.
in the operation and maintenance of the local irrigation system, compared with 65% and 21% for
head-end CI and CIE farmers.
Percentage (%)
Water 2017, 9, 319
Water 2017, 9, 319
100
80
60
40
20
0
9 of 17
9 of 17
91
65
51
21
Yes
92
79
49
35
61 58
9
No
Head-end CI
(n=23)
66
39 42
34
8
Yes
No
Active participation in the irrigation A sense of ownership in the local
operation and maintenance
irrigation system
Head-end CIE
(n=43)
Tail-end CI
(n=23)
Tail-end CIE
(n=61)
Figure 9. The respondents’ participation in the local irrigation operation and their sense of ownership
(in % of group total). The Exact Sig. (2-sided)
(2-sided) of
of the
the chi-squared
chi-squared statistics
statistics are
are significant
significant at the 5%
level (χ
(χ22==32.356,
32.356,
= P-value
3, P-value
< 0.05
for regular
irrigation
maintenance
χ2 = 11.7743,
df = 3,
dfdf
= 3,
< 0.05
for regular
irrigation
maintenance
and χ2and
= 11.7743,
df = 3, P-value
P-value
0.05sense
for the
sense of ownership).
= 0.05 for=the
of ownership).
The effective
effective maintenance
maintenance of
the irrigation
irrigation canals
canals requires
requires labor
labor contributions
contributions from
the local
local
The
of the
from the
residents
[4].
In
this
research,
it
was
found
that
all
four
groups
of
farmers
were
given
the
residents [4]. In this research, it was found that all four groups of farmers were given the responsibility
responsibility
by
their
local
leaders
to
maintain
a
certain
length
of
the
irrigation
canal,
corresponding
by their local leaders to maintain a certain length of the irrigation canal, corresponding to the location
to the
of their
farmlands.
However,CIthe
head-end
CI and
CIE farmers
little to the
of
theirlocation
farmlands.
However,
the head-end
and
CIE farmers
contributed
littlecontributed
to the maintenance
of
maintenance
of
the
irrigation
system,
given
the
advantageous
location
of
their
farmlands
and the
the irrigation system, given the advantageous location of their farmlands and the constant supply
of
constant water
supplywith
of irrigated
minimal of
effort.
The efficiency
irrigation
system to
is
irrigated
minimal water
effort. with
The efficiency
an irrigation
systemof
is an
positively
correlated
positively
correlated
to
the
appropriators’
self-governing
abilities
and
their
individual
level
of
the appropriators’ self-governing abilities and their individual level of participation [41]. In addition,
participation
In addition,
withinregard
to irrigation
a sense ofsystem,
ownership
in the
irrigation
system,
as
with
regard to[41].
a sense
of ownership
the local
as many
as local
92% of
tail-end CI
farmers
many as
92%
tail-end CI
farmers agreed
theirrigation
long-term
sustainability
of the local irrigation
agreed
that
theoflong-term
sustainability
of thethat
local
system
was the responsibility
of every
system
was
the
responsibility
of
every
local
resident,
indicating
a
strong
sense
of
ownership.
a
local resident, indicating a strong sense of ownership. Thus, a sense of ownership
is the keyThus,
to the
sense
of
ownership
is
the
key
to
the
success
of
a
participatory
irrigation
management
[42].
success of a participatory irrigation management [42].
Figure 10
10 presents
presents the
the farmers’
farmers’ responses
responses (%)
the issues
issues of
of the
the impact
impact of
of irrigation
irrigation policy
policy
Figure
(%) on
on the
change,
their
understanding
of
irrigation
policy
and
practices,
irrigation
schedule,
and
water
change, their understanding of irrigation policy and practices, irrigation schedule, and water allocation
allocation information
theonly
first8%
issue,
only 8%
tail-end
CI affected
farmers by
were
affected
by
information
sharing. Onsharing.
the firstOn
issue,
of tail-end
CIof
farmers
were
changes
in the
changes
in
the
irrigation
policy
due
to
their
active
participation
in
the
local
irrigation
operation,
thus
irrigation policy due to their active participation in the local irrigation operation, thus enabling them
enabling
them
to be better
prepared.
Meanwhile,
many asCIE
45%farmers
of head-end
CIE farmers
were
to
be better
prepared.
Meanwhile,
as many
as 45% ofashead-end
were affected
by changes
affected
by changes
in thepolicy,
wateradistribution
policy,
phenomenon
most
attributable
to their
in
the water
distribution
phenomenon
mostalikely
attributable
to likely
their low
participation
in
low
participation
in
irrigation
operation
and
management,
making
them
slower
to
adjust.
irrigation operation and management, making them slower to adjust. On the second issue, On
36%the
of
second issue,
36% ofwere
tail-end
CIoffarmers
awarepolicy
of current
irrigation due
policy
and practices,
due
tail-end
CI farmers
aware
currentwere
irrigation
and practices,
largely
to their active
largely to their
participation
in the localand
irrigation
operation
and management,
by
participation
in active
the local
irrigation operation
management,
followed
by head-endfollowed
CI farmers
head-end
CI
farmers
(27%),
tail-end
CIE
(19%)
and
head-end
CIE
farmers
(18%).
(27%), tail-end CIE (19%) and head-end CIE farmers (18%).
On the
of of
thethe
irrigation
scheduling,
the four
groups
farmers
thatagreed
information
On
theissue
issue
irrigation
scheduling,
the
four of
groups
ofsimilarly
farmers agreed
similarly
that
regarding theregarding
opening and
closing ofand
theclosing
water gates
the local
office
was provided
in a
information
the opening
of theby
water
gatesirrigation
by the local
irrigation
office was
timely
manner.
Specifically,
31%
of
tail-end
CI
farmers
agreed
on
this
point,
followed
by
head-end
provided in a timely manner. Specifically, 31% of tail-end CI farmers agreed on this point, followed by
CI (26%), tail-end
CIE
(23%) CIE
and(23%)
head-end
(20%) CIE
farmers.
the lastOn
issue,
as many
of
head-end
CI (26%),
tail-end
and CIE
head-end
(20%)On
farmers.
the last
issue,asas37%
many
tail-end
CI
farmers
frequently
discussed
irrigation-related
problems
and
concerns
with
other
farmers
as 37% of tail-end CI farmers frequently discussed irrigation-related problems and concerns with
to findfarmers
solutions,
by head-end
CI (28%)
and CIECI
(18%),
tail-end
CIE (17%)
farmers.CIE
other
to followed
find solutions,
followed
by head-end
(28%)and
and
CIE (18%),
and tail-end
participation of local farmers in the maintenance and operation of the local irrigation system
(17%)The
farmers.
contributes
to irrigation
sustainability
higher crop
[43–46].
management
The participation
of local
farmers inand
the the
maintenance
andyields
operation
of theIrrigation
local irrigation
system
strategies
formulated
and
implemented
by
the
farmers
proved
more
successful
and
sustainable
than
contributes to irrigation sustainability and the higher crop yields [43–46]. Irrigation management
the state-initiated
irrigation
strategies [47].
the
statistical
testsuccessful
results of and
the linear
regression
strategies
formulated
and implemented
by Moreover,
the farmers
proved
more
sustainable
than
correlations
showed
that
the
farmers
with
higher
paddy
yields
are
those
who
actively
participated
the state-initiated irrigation strategies [47]. Moreover, the statistical test results of the linear regression
in the local irrigation
operation
(Table
2). higher paddy yields are those who actively participated in
correlations
showed that
the farmers
with
the local irrigation operation (Table 2).
Water 2017, 9, 319
10 of 17
Water 2017, 9, 319
10 of 17
100
Head-end
CI (n=23)
Water80
2017, 9, 319
Percentage (%)
Percentage (%)
60
100
40
80
20
60
0
40
20
10 of 17
45
36
28
27
19
18
26
19
31
20
Head-end
CIE (n=43)
Head-end
CI (n=23)
37
23
28
18
17
8
45
Impact
28 from the
irrigation policy 19
change 8
37
36
31
Understanding
of Irrigation
scheduling
Information
sharing
28
27
26
23
20
18 policy 19
18 farmers
irrigation
and
with other
17
practices.
Tail-end CI
(n=23)
Head-end
CIE (n=43)
Tail-end
CIE (n=61)
Tail-end
CI
(n=23)
0
Figure
10.
The
respondents’
responses
issuesofofscheduling
impactfrom
from
irrigation
policy
change,
Figure
10. from
The
respondents’
responses onofthe
the Irrigation
issues
impact
irrigation
policy
change,
their their
Tail-end
Impact
the
Understanding
Information
sharing
understanding
of irrigation
policyand
and
practices,
and
information
sharing
(in %(n=61)
of % of
understanding
irrigation
policy
practices,
irrigationschedule
schedule
and
information
sharing
(in
CIE
irrigationofpolicy
irrigation
policy
and irrigation
with
other
farmers
group
total).
Monte
CarloSig.
Sig.
(2-sided) of
statistics
areare
significant
at theat1%
change
practices.
group
total).
TheThe
Monte
Carlo
(2-sided)
of the
thechi-squared
chi-squared
statistics
significant
thelevel
1% level
2 = 61.527, 50.983, 38.764 and 35.483 for the first, second, third and fourth issues, respectively; and the df
(χ2 =(χ61.527,
50.983, 38.764 and 35.483 for the first, second, third and fourth issues, respectively; and
and
P-value
are 12
Figure
10.
The
respondents’
responses on the issues of impact from irrigation policy change, their
the df and P-value
areand
12<0.01).
and <0.01).
understanding of irrigation policy and practices, irrigation schedule and information sharing (in % of
Table total).
2. Relationship
between
farmer
information
sharing of water
allocation/active
in
group
The Monte
Carlofarmer
Sig.
(2-sided)
of the chi-squared
are significantparticipation
at the
1% level
Table
2. Relationship
between
information
sharing ofstatistics
water allocation/active
participation
in
irrigation
operation
and
agricultural
yields
(ha/ton).
(χ2 = 61.527, 50.983, 38.764 and 35.483 for the first, second, third and fourth issues, respectively; and the df
irrigation operation and agricultural yields (ha/ton).
and P-value are 12 and <0.01).
Pearson Correlations of Linear Regression
ANOVA
Number of
Respondents
Paddy Yield in
Annual Paddy
Paddy Yield in
0.37
Dry-Season
0.37
0.27
Annual
Paddy
Yields
Mean
F
Sig.
Pearson Correlations
of
Dry-Season
Yields
Square
ANOVA
Table 2. Relationship between farmer information
sharing of water allocation/active
participation
in
Number
of
150
0.37Linear Regression
40.29
22.71
0.000
Active participation in the irrigation
irrigation operation and agricultural
yields (ha/ton).
Respondents
operation and maintenance
150
0.33
15.38
0.000
Paddy Yield
Annual
Mean 14.92
150
0.23
16.05 ANOVA
8.28 F 0.005Sig.
Farmer information sharing of water
Pearson
Correlations
of Linear
Regression
in
Dry-Season
Paddy
Yields
Square
Number of
allocation
150
Active participation in the irrigation Respondents
150
operation
and maintenance
150150
Active participation
in the irrigation
3.4. Yield Performance and Agricultural Income
operation and maintenance
Farmer information sharing of
FarmerFigures
information
of water
11sharing
and 12
illustrate
water allocation
allocation
150150
the150
dry
150season
150
0.23
0.33
0.33
12.44
11.83
0.001
Mean
40.29 F 22.71 Sig.0.000
Square
15.38 22.71
14.920.0000.000
40.29
15.38
14.92
16.05
8.28 0.0000.005
8.28 paddy
and16.05
the annual
12.44
11.830.0050.001
12.44
11.83
0.001
Percentage (%)
Percentage (%)
0.23 yields per household
paddy
0.27
0.27
yields per household of the four groups of farmers, respectively. Contrary
to conventional notion,
the tail-end CI farmers outperformed both the head-end CI and CIE farmers in dry season paddy
3.4. Yield
Performance
and
Agricultural
3.4. Yield
Performance
and
AgriculturalIncome
Income
outputs per household (Figure 11), and entire year paddy yields per household (Figure 12).
Figures
11 and
illustratethe
thedry
dry season
season paddy
per
household
and and
the annual
paddypaddy
Figures
11 and
1212
illustrate
paddyyields
yields
per
household
the annual
yields
per
household
of
the
four
groups
of
farmers,
respectively.
Contrary
to
conventional
notion,
yields per household
of the four groups of farmers, respectively. Contrary to conventional notion, the
100
More
than
18 tons
the tail-end
CI farmers
outperformed
bothhead-end
the head-end
CI CIE
and farmers
CIE14farmers
in
dry
season
paddy
14 both the
15 CI and
tail-end
CI farmers
outperformed
in dry
season
paddy
outputs
26
28
2
30
7
outputs 80
per household (Figure
11 paddy yields per household (Figure 12).
9 11), and entire year
per household (Figure
11),
and
entire
year
paddy
yields
per
household
(Figure
12).
4
9
19
19
13.1 - 18 tons
60
28
22
22
22
22
100
40
More than 18 tons
14
14
15
8.1 - 13 tons
26
26
28
2
30
30
56
37
7
44
80
11
9
20
38
4
9
19
20
19
13.1 - 18 tons
13
600
9
28
224
3.1 - 8 tons
22
22
22
CIE
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=46)
CIE
40 CI (n=23)
8.1 - 13 tons
26
(n=43)
(n=61)
(n=104)
30
56
37
Less than or equal to 3
44
20
38
tons
20
13Head end
9 Total
4 Tail end
3.1 - 8 tons
0
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=23)
CIE
CI (n=46)
CIE
Figure 11. The respondents’
yields per household (n=104)
(in % of group total). The Monte
(n=43)dry-season paddy(n=61)
Less than or equal to 3
Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 36.863, df = 12, P-value <
tons
Head end
Tail end
Total
0.01).
Figure
respondents’dry-season
dry-season paddy
paddy yields
(in(in
% of
total).
The Monte
Figure
11. 11.
TheThe
respondents’
yieldsper
perhousehold
household
%group
of group
total).
The Monte
2 = 36.863, df 2= 12, P-value <
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
1%
level
(χ
Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ = 36.863, df = 12,
0.01).< 0.01).
P-value
Water
Water
2017,
9,
319
Water 2017,
2017, 9,
9, 319
319
11
11 of
of 17
17
Percentage(%)
(%)
Percentage
100
100
80
80
28
28
52
52
60
60
40
40
20
20
00
23
23
17
17
22
22
28
28
64
64
44
44
25
25
18
18
37
37
58
58
24
24
18
18
24
24
21
21
20
20
15
15
44
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
(n=23)
(n=43)
(n=23)
(n=61)
(n=46)
(n=104)
(n=23) (n=43) (n=23) (n=61) (n=46) (n=104)
99
21
21
Head
Head end
end
18
18
10
10
Tail
Tail end
end
More
More than
than 19
19 tons
tons
12.1
12.1 -- 19
19 tons
tons
5.1
5.1 -- 12
12 tons
tons
Less
Less than
than or
or equal
equal to
to 55 tons
tons
Total
Total
yields
per
household
(in
total).
The
Carlo
Figure
Therespondents’
respondents’annual
annualpaddy
paddy
yields
household
(in
of group
total).
The Monte
Figure 12.
12. The
The
respondents’
annual
paddy
yields
perper
household
(in %
% of
of%group
group
total).
The Monte
Monte
Carlo
2 =
22 = 35.665,
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
1%
level
(χ
df
=
15,
P-value
<<
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
1%
level
(χ
35.665,
df
= 15,
Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1% level (χ = 35.665, df = 15, P-value
0.01).
P-value
0.01). < 0.01).
Percentage(%)
(%)
Percentage
These
equitable
water
allocation
and
distribution
among
the
These findings
findings
could
be
attributed
toto
equitable
water
allocation
andand
distribution
among
the tailtailThese
findings could
couldbe
beattributed
attributedto
equitable
water
allocation
distribution
among
the
end
CI
farmers
(Figure
8),
which
is
the
direct
result
of
their
active
participation
in
the
local
irrigation
end CI farmers
(Figure
8), which
is the direct
their of
active
in the local
tail-end
CI farmers
(Figure
8), which
is the result
directof
result
theirparticipation
active participation
in irrigation
the local
operation
and
(Figure
Specifically,
in
11,
many
as
of
CI
operationoperation
and management
management
(Figure 9).
9).
Specifically,
in Figure
Figure
11, as
as11,
many
as 30%
30%
of tail-end
tail-end
CI
irrigation
and management
(Figure
9). Specifically,
in Figure
as many
as 30%
of tail-end
farmers
achieved
an
average
dry
season
paddy
yield
of
more
than
18
tons
per
household,
despite
the
farmers
achieved
an an
average
drydry
season
paddy
yield
of more
than
18 tons
perper
household,
despite
the
CI
farmers
achieved
average
season
paddy
yield
of more
than
18 tons
household,
despite
less
advantageous
location
of
their
farmlands.
In
Figure
CI
lessless
advantageous
location
of of
their
farmlands.
InIn
Figure
12,
nearly
two-thirds
(64%)
of
tail-end
CI
the
advantageous
location
their
farmlands.
Figure12,
12,nearly
nearlytwo-thirds
two-thirds(64%)
(64%) of
of tail-end
tail-end CI
farmers
could
produce
in
excess
of
19
tons
of
paddy
rice
per
household
annually.
farmers
could
produce
in
excess
of
19
tons
of
paddy
rice
per
household
annually.
farmers could produce in excess of 19 tons of paddy rice per household annually.
Figure
13
illustrates
the
total
household
income
from
the
sale
of
paddy
rice
of
the
participating
Figure 13
13 illustrates
illustrates the
the total
total household
household income
income from
from the
the sale
sale of
of paddy
paddy rice
rice of
of the
the participating
participating
Figure
farmers.
The
sale
of
paddy
rice
is
the
main
source
of
income
of
small-scale
farmers
in
many
poor
farmers.
The
sale
of
paddy
rice
is
the
main
source
of
income
of
small-scale
farmers
in
many poor
poor
farmers. The sale of paddy rice is the main source of income of small-scale farmers in many
agricultural
countries
[48].
In
Figure
13,
as
many
as
39%
of
tail-end
CI
farmers
could
generate
agricultural
countries
[48].
In
Figure
13,
as
many
as
39%
of
tail-end
CI
farmers
could
generate
agricultural countries [48]. In Figure 13, as many as 39% of tail-end CI farmers could generate
household
household income
income from
from
the
sale
of
paddy
in
excess
of
THB
300,000
(1
USD
THB
35).
household
income
from the
the sale
sale of
of paddy
paddyin
inexcess
excessof
ofTHB
THB300,000
300,000(1
(1USD
USD===THB
THB35).
35).
100
100
80
80
34
34
60
60
40
40
30
30
20
20
00
27
27
99
26
26
39
39
24
24
33
33
32
32
44
44
37
37
25
25
36
36
32
32
37
37
36
36
37
37
22
22
17
17
77
66
55
55
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
(n=23)
(n=23) (n=43)
(n=43) (n=23)
(n=23) (n=61)
(n=61) (n=46)
(n=46) (n=104)
(n=104)
Head
Head end
end
Tail
Tail end
end
More
More than
than 300,000
300,000 baht
baht
150,001
150,001 -- 300,000
300,000 baht
baht
50,001
50,001 -- 150,000
150,000 baht
baht
Less
Less than
than or
or equal
equal to
to 50,000
50,000
baht
baht
Total
Total
Figure
Figure 13. The
The respondents’
respondents’ annual
annual household
household income
income from
from the
the sale
sale of
of paddy
paddy rice
rice (in
(in %
% of
of group
group total,
total,
US$
=
The
Carlo
Sig.
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
is
significant
at
the
11 US$
=
THB
35).
Monte
(2-sided)
of
the
chi-squared
statistic
significant
US$ = THB 35). The
Carlo Sig. (2-sided)
is
at the 1%
1%
22
2
level
(χ
=
16.409,
df
=
12,
P-value
>
0.01).
16.409,dfdf
= 12,
P-value
> 0.01).
level (χ ==16.409,
= 12,
P-value
> 0.01).
The
improved
The improved
improved household
household income
income
was
attributed
to
effective
water
distribution
(i.e.,
flexible,
The
household
income was
was attributed
attributed to
to effective
effective water
water distribution
distribution (i.e.,
(i.e., flexible,
flexible,
reliable
and
equitable
water
distribution)
and
their
active
participation
in
the
local
irrigation
reliableand
andequitable
equitable
water
distribution)
and active
their participation
active participation
in irrigation
the local operation,
irrigation
reliable
water
distribution)
and their
in the local
operation,
in
paddy
yields.
However,
the
of
operation,inresulting
resulting
in greater
greater
paddy
yields. despite
However,
despite
the advantageous
advantageous
location
of their
their
resulting
greater paddy
yields.
However,
thedespite
advantageous
location of location
their
farmlands,
farmlands,
9%
and
5%
of
the
head-end
CI
and
CIE
farmers
earned
less
than
THB
50,000
per
household
farmlands,
9%
and
5%
of
the
head-end
CI
and
CIE
farmers
earned
less
than
THB
50,000
per
household
9% and 5% of the head-end CI and CIE farmers earned less than THB 50,000 per household from the
from
sale
paddy
rice. It
noting that
the
size of
head-end
CIE
group
was
relatively
fromofthe
the
sale of
ofrice.
paddy
It is
is worth
worth
thatfamily
the family
family
of the
the
head-end
CIE
groupwas
wasrelatively
relatively
sale
paddy
It isrice.
worth
notingnoting
that the
size size
of the
head-end
CIE
group
small,
with
households
with
fewer
than
four
family
members
accounting
for
40%
of
the
total;
small, with households with fewer than four family members accounting for 40% of the total; and
and that
that
Water 2017, 9, 319
12 of 17
Water 2017, 9, 319
12 of 17
Percentage (%)
small,
with households
with fewer
than
family members
for 40%
of the total;
and
their average
paddy cultivation
land
perfour
household
was onlyaccounting
1.92 ha (Table
1). Higher
farmland
that
their
average
paddy
cultivation
land
per
household
was
only
1.92
ha
(Table
1).
Higher
farmland
productivity contributed to higher income for the farmers, and thereby the decline in poverty [5,49].
productivity
contributed
higher
income
for the farmers,
and thereby
decline
poverty [5,49].
Figure 14
presents to
the
annual
household
agricultural
income the
from
otherin sources
of the
Figure
14
presents
the
annual
household
agricultural
income
from
other
sources
of the
participating farmers (other than the sale of paddy rice to the local rice mills). The findings revealed
participating
farmers (other
sale of
to thehardly
local rice
The findings
revealed
that both the head-end
(96%)than
and the
tail-end
CIpaddy
(100%)rice
farmers
hadmills).
any sources
of income
other
that
both
the
head-end
(96%)
and
tail-end
CI
(100%)
farmers
hardly
had
any
sources
of
income
other
than from the sale of their produce to the local rice mills. In contrast, the head-end (51%) and tail-end
than
from
the
sale
of
their
produce
to
the
local
rice
mills.
In
contrast,
the
head-end
(51%)
and
tail-end
(17%) CIE farmers could earn additional income from other sources.
(17%) CIE farmers could earn additional income from other sources.
100
80
60
40
20
0
4
96
4
11
26
23
2
2
14
12
71
2
100
83
98
66
49
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
CI
CIE
(n=23) (n=43) (n=23) (n=61) (n=46) (n=104)
Head end
Tail end
More than 40,000 baht
20,001 - 40,000 baht
5,001 - 20,000 baht
Less than or equal to 5,000
baht
No other income sources
Total
Figure 14. The respondents’ household agricultural income from sources other than the sale of paddy
Figure 14. The respondents’ household agricultural income from sources other than the sale of paddy
rice (in % of group total). The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the
rice (in % of2 group total). The Monte Carlo Sig. (2-sided) of the chi-squared statistic is significant at the 1%
1% level
(χ = 62.696, df = 15, P-value < 0.01).
level (χ2 = 62.696, df = 15, P-value < 0.01).
4.
Discussion
4. Discussion
The
distribution
service
to individual
farmfarm
unitsunits
demonstrated
that water
The evaluation
evaluationofofthe
thewater
water
distribution
service
to individual
demonstrated
that
volume
information
of
the
respondents’
knowledge
(Figure
5)
was
vital
to
rice
cultivation
given
that
it
water volume information of the respondents’ knowledge (Figure 5) was vital to rice cultivation given
is
imperative
that
the
rice
fields
are
adequately
flooded
prior
to
rice
planting.
Given
the
low
level
of
that it is imperative that the rice fields are adequately flooded prior to rice planting. Given the low
education,
the likelihood
that the farmers’
experience-based
knowledge (i.e.,
traditional
wisdom)
to be
level of education,
the likelihood
that the
farmers’ experience-based
knowledge
(i.e.,
traditional
less
precise
greater
than
if greater
the evaluation
wasevaluation
conductedwas
using
a ratingusing
scale [34].
Interestingly,
wisdom)
to was
be less
precise
was
than if the
conducted
a rating
scale [34].
despite
a
lack
of
scientifically
measured
information,
the
farmers’
traditional
wisdom
consistently
Interestingly, despite a lack of scientifically measured information, the farmers’ traditional
wisdom
proved
correct.
Training
of local
farmers
as part
of theasprocess
crucial
[50].is The
respondents’
consistently
proved
correct.
Training
of local
farmers
part ofisthe
process
crucial
[50]. The
responses
on the
irrigationon
schedule
flexibility,
illustrated
(Figure 6)illustrated
that water distribution
scheduling
respondents’
responses
the irrigation
schedule
flexibility,
(Figure 6) that
water
flexibility
was
important
as
the
water
flow
rates
vary
considerably
at
the
beginning
of
the
planting
distribution scheduling flexibility was important as the water flow rates vary considerably
at the
season
(the
land
preparation
period)
and
once
the
rice
has
been
planted
[51].
Even
within
the
beginning of the planting season (the land preparation period) and once the rice has been plantedsame
[51].
locality,
rice cultivation
could take
place at different
timesplace
during
the growing
season.the
Thus,
it is
Even within
the same locality,
rice cultivation
could take
at different
times during
growing
necessary
thatitschedule
flexibility
is integrated
into irrigation
operation
management
to ensure
season. Thus,
is necessary
that schedule
flexibility
is integrated
intoand
irrigation
operation
and
consistent
water
supply
throughout
the
entire
irrigation
system.
management to ensure consistent water supply throughout the entire irrigation system.
Furthermore,
ourobservations
observationsalso
alsorevealed
revealedthat
thatlocal
local community
community leaders
leaders played
played aa vital
vital and
Furthermore, our
and
influential
The local
local leaders
leaders are
are the
influential role
role in
in effective
effective and
and equitable
equitable water
water allocation
allocation to
to the
the farmlands.
farmlands. The
the
first
contact
point
whom
the
farmers
approach
when
a
water
distribution
issue
arises,
e.g.,
unreliable
first contact point whom the farmers approach when a water distribution issue arises, e.g., unreliable
or
When farmers
farmers are
are unable
unable to
to agree
agree on
on aa mutual
mutual solution
solution to
to aa water
or inadequate
inadequate water
water volumes.
volumes. When
water
distribution
problem,
they
tend
to
seek
interventions
from
the
local
leaders
[52].
In
this
research,
it
was
distribution problem, they tend to seek interventions from the local leaders [52]. In this research,
it
discovered
that,
upon
listening
to
a
complaint,
the
local
leaders
raise
the
issue
with
the
local
irrigation
was discovered that, upon listening to a complaint, the local leaders raise the issue with the local
officials
responsible
for the operation
the primary
irrigation
as thecanal,
local leaders
and farmers
irrigation
officials responsible
for theofoperation
of the
primarycanal,
irrigation
as the local
leaders
are
responsible
for
the
secondary
and
tertiary
irrigation
canals,
respectively
[53].
and farmers are responsible for the secondary and tertiary irrigation canals, respectively [53].
The
irrigation system
system (FMIS)
(FMIS) is
is efficient
efficient and
The farmer-managed
farmer-managed irrigation
and can
can achieve
achieve equitable
equitable water
water
distribution,
The farmer-managed
farmer-managed
distribution, as
as opposed
opposed to
to the
the agency-managed
agency-managed irrigation
irrigation system
system (AMIS)
(AMIS) [54].
[54]. The
irrigation
system can
can better
better serve
serve the
the irrigation
irrigation needs
needs of
of the
the local
local residents.
residents. However,
However, water
irrigation system
water allocation
allocation
performance is better with the local government, and funds are available for customizing allocation
to fit local conditions and providing irrigation advisory (extension service) to farmers [55].
Water 2017, 9, 319
13 of 17
performance is better with the local government, and funds are available for customizing allocation to
fit local conditions and providing irrigation advisory (extension service) to farmers [55].
Participation in agricultural water management by the local people is coordinated by government
agencies at the local level. Local government agencies developed the working plan of operation
and maintenance of the local irrigation system in collaboration with local leaders and farmers [11].
The farmers’ contributions to the maintenance and repair of the local irrigation system are essential to
a successful participatory irrigation scheme [17]. In addition, farmers participating in the irrigation
operation have greater access to farming water, and subsequently increased income [56]. These findings
can be attributed to the equitable water allocation and distribution (in timely fashion) among the
tail-end CI farmers (Figure 8), which are the direct result of their active participation in the local
irrigation operation and management (Figure 9); on the other hand, 21% and 58% of head-end CIE
farmers had less active participation and a sense of ownership, respectively. The local agency is
instrumental in deciding the working days, determining the labor and cash contributions of the
farmers to clean the canals and to organize making these issues routine [57]. The local agency
motivates to improve participation that contributes to improving the performance of fair water
allocation. Upgrading maintenance standards is also a necessary part of irrigation development.
Specifically, in Figure 11, as many as 30% of tail-end CI farmers achieved an average dry season
paddy yield of more than 18 tons per household, despite the less advantageous location of their
farmlands. In Figure 12, nearly two-thirds (64%) of tail-end CI farmers could produce in excess
of 19 tons of paddy rice per household annually. The improved household income is attributed
to the effective water distribution (i.e., flexible, reliable and equitable water distribution) and the
tail-end CI farmers (mostly from higher socio-economic status) actively participating in the local
irrigation operation, resulting in greater paddy yields (Figure 13). Therefore, higher farm productivity
contributes to higher income for the farmers and thereby the decline in poverty.
Nevertheless, despite the advantageous location of their farmlands, 9% and 5% of head-end CI
and CIE farmers earned less than THB 50,000 per household from the sale of paddy rice. The members
and their community leaders have begun to explore new marketing channels and other activities to
add value to their rice product (Figure 13). In comparison, the CIE farmer group could earn additional
income from other sources as community enterprise membership provides CIE farmers with access to
other marketing channels and new markets. The small community enterprises run by a large group
of sophisticated proprietors are more successful than those endowed with a smaller stock of human
capital [58–60].
Overall, our research findings revealed a strong relationship between effective irrigation operation,
active participation by farmers in the irrigation operation, and their household earnings. The findings
indicated that, by comparison, the tail-end CI farmers outperformed economically, as evident in the
fact that 30% and 64% of tail-end CI farmers could produce more than 18 tons of dry season paddy,
and more than 19 tons of paddy per household annually. Their improved economic well-being could
be attributed to their active participation in the local irrigation operation, whereby 91% of tail-end CI
farmers actively participated in the local irrigation operation and 92% expressed a sense of ownership
in the system. The effective and equitable irrigation water allocation also contributed to the higher crop
yields and household income as the farmers’ irrigation demands and concerns were recognized and
addressed as a result of their active participation. Therefore, local policy-makers need to duly recognize
the value of participation and to promote a profound change in government officers’ attitudes towards
local leaders and farmers. Moreover, it is a testimonial to the possibility of collective action under
self-governing institutions, and aims at a solution in the ever-increasing sector to achieve the full
potential of public sector irrigation performance. Identifying the factors that contribute to effective
water management by local leaders can make a valuable contribution in determining where the added
efforts are needed. The implication of this study for local level participation to be more effective
is organization of joint participatory training of the FMIS and AMIS farmer leaders facilitated by
Water 2017, 9, 319
14 of 17
local agencies and irrigation officials, which eventually ensure that indigenous level management is
integrated in such trainings.
The research findings are expected to shed light on the relationship between the participatory
farmer-managed irrigation system, the active participation in the local irrigation operation, and the
economic well-being of small-scale farmers in Thailand, in light of the fact that existing publications
on this topic are mostly based in other countries. Moreover, the findings verify the effectiveness and
usability of the participatory farmer-managed irrigation system in tackling the chronic problem of
inequitable water allocation between head-end and tail-end farmers, given that water distribution
inequality contributes to unequal household incomes. Importantly, the participatory farmer-managed
irrigation scheme is readily implementable as it requires no additional financial investment and
new technology, but rather the active participation of the local farmers in irrigation operation
and management.
This empirical research, nevertheless, contained certain limitations. Given that the study period
was limited to two years (2014–2015), the length of time needs to be extended in future research so that
an understanding of the relationship between equitable water distribution, local active participation,
and economic well-being can be established over a much longer timeframe. In addition, the study
area was limited to one province (Chiang Mai Province), so future research should encompass several
provinces in different regions of the country for inter-provincial and inter-regional comparison.
5. Conclusions
This research investigated the relationship between equitable irrigation water distribution,
rice farmers’ active participation in the local irrigation operation, and their economic well-being.
The research findings revealed a strong relationship between effective irrigation operation (i.e., flexible,
reliable and equitable irrigation water distribution), the active participation of the rice farmers in
the local irrigation operation, and their improved household earnings. Specifically, despite their less
advantageous farmland location (towards the tail-end of the irrigation canal), the tail-end CI farmers
outperformed other groups of farmers economically, as evidenced by the fact that as many as 30%
of the tail-end CI farmers (vs. 26% for the head-end group) could produce more than 18 tons of dry
season paddy per household; and that 64% of tail-end CI farmers (vs. 52% for the head-end group)
could produce more than 19 tons of paddy per household annually. The higher paddy yields translated
into higher household earnings for the farmers.
The improved economic well-being of the tail-end CI farmers was attributed to their active
participation in the local irrigation operation and management, as evident in the findings that 91%
of tail-end CI farmers actively participated in the maintenance and operation of the local irrigation
system; and that 92% literally identified themselves as an owner of the irrigation system. Another
contributing factor of higher paddy yields and household income was the equitable irrigation water
allocation and distribution (39% of tail-end CI farmers perceived water distribution as equitable),
which is was the product of the farmers’ active participation in the local irrigation operation as their
irrigation demands and concerns were constantly recognized and addressed.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to express gratitude to the officials at the Royal Irrigation Department,
the Cooperative Auditing Department, and the Department of Agricultural Extension. Financial sponsorship
from Thailand’s Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives is gratefully acknowledged. Sincere
appreciation goes to the community leaders and farmers for the interview data. Special thanks also to the journal
editor and anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and comments.
Author Contributions: Saowalak Kosanlawit contributed to the research design, methodology, fieldwork,
analysis, and paper write-up. Peeyush Soni and Ganesh P. Shivakoti contributed to the research design, analysis,
and paper write-up.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Water 2017, 9, 319
15 of 17
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