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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
ISSN 2455-9164 www.trpubonline.com
Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2017
© 2017 Thomson & Ryberg Publications. All Rights Reserved
Acceleriated Learning, Mental Imagery, Perception
and Conscious Experience: Contributions of Rene
Descartes
Linda K Newsome1 and Mammy M Helou1*
*Corresponding Author: Mammy M Helou, 
Given the debatable issues related to the subjective nature of the conscious experience, which resist
the objective analysis and empirical evidence required by physical science (Armstrong, 1981), the
relationship and the nature of the connection between the body and the mind, and its impact on the
processes of mental imagery (McDaniel and Einstein, 1986), and perception and learning (Meier,
2000), continue to be an interesting area of research. A literature review of the representative literature
published on the Mind-Body problem clearly indicates that a unanimous agreement has not been
reached in terms of the relationship between the mind, soul and consciousness on the one hand; and
the brain, body and senses on the other. This study presents a fourfold analysis. First, Descartes’
argument for a version of mind-body dualism is discussed. Secondly, objections to Descartes’
arguments are considered. Thirdly, the current study evaluates the validity of Descartes’ argument in
light of the discussed objections. Finally, this study concludes with an evaluation of the contributions
of Rene Descartes’ argument to the processes of mental imagery, perception, conscious experience,
and accelerated learning.
Keywords: Mental imagery, Conscious experience, Perception, Experiential learning, Accelerated learning, Rene
descartes
‘je pense, donc je suis; cogito ergo sum’
empirical evidence required by physical
science (Armstrong, 1981), the relationship
and the nature of the connection between the
body and the mind, and its impact on the
processes of imagery (McDaniel and
Einstein, 1986), and perception and learning
(Meier, 2000), remains an interesting
(Rene Descartes, 1637)
Introduction
In light of the debatable issues related to the
subjective nature of conscious experience,
which struggle with objective analysis and
This article can be downloaded from http://www.trpubonline.com/journals.php
9
Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
research area. A literature review of the
representative books and academic articles
published on the Mind-Body problem,
clearly indicate that a unanimous agreement
has not been reached in terms of the
relationship between the mind, soul and
consciousness on the one hand, and the brain,
body and senses on the other (Velmans, 2002).
Accordingly, the current research paper aims
at casting further light on this area of
research, by exploring and evaluating the
level of contributions of the French
philosopher and mathematician Rene
Descartes’s work on issues of mental
imagery, perception, conscious experience,
and accelerated learning.
the fact that the conscious mind controls the
behaviour and actions in everyday life, is
also accepted (Velmans, 2002). Nevertheless,
this begs the questions of: How does the
conscious mind exert its influence? Are the
body and the mind of distinct or the same
substances? If they are of distinct substances,
are they somehow connected? If yes, how?
Furthermore, how does this affect mental
imagery, perception, conscious experience
and learning, let alone accelerate learning?
In other words, does the mind control the
brain or vice versa? Or, are they so
undistinguishably interconnected to the
point that the question of which is in control
does not truly apply?
To this end, this study is fourfold. First, a
presentation of Descartes’ argument for a
version of mind-body dualism is provided.
Secondly, the objections to Descartes’s
arguments are analysed. This is followed by
an evaluation of the validity of Descartes’
argument in light of other scholars and
philosophers’ voiced objections. Finally, the
current study discusses Descartes’
contributions to the processes of mental
imagery, perception, conscious experience
and learning.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(plato .stanfor d.edu/e ntries/mentalimagery/#MeaConMenlma), first published
in 1997, with substantive revision in 2014,
defines visual mental imagery as a quasiperceptual experience, that is, it is similar to
perceptual experience, but takes place in the
absence of an external stimuli; and is
believed to play a crucial part in all thought
processes. It is a routine experience, being a
regular feature of our daily life. Furthermore,
according to Yates (1966) and Paivio (1986),
imagery plays a salient role in the memory.
It has been colloquially referred to as
‘visualising‘, ‘having a picture in the head’,
‘picturing‘, ‘seeing a mental image/picture’,
…etc.
Even though there seems to be an
agreement to the fact that the part that exerts
control in everyday life is the conscious
mind, up to this date there is no accepted
theory of Mind-Body interaction (Stam, 1998;
and Velmans, 2002), which has unfortunately
had a drastic impact on the acceptance of
mental causation in various fields of study,
including medicine, philosophy and science
(Velmans, 2002). That is, the effects of the
mind on the body is accepted, in as much as
Furthermore, given Kouyoumdjian’s
(2012) experience, in addition to facilitating
learning, imagery further accelerates it.
Unlike other scholars who claim that
information derived from imagery is
different to that derived out of perception,
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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
Thomas (1999) argues that mental imagery
supports some inference that leads to new
knowledge about the world. Given the lack
of harmony with the various views, featured
in the representative literature on imagery,
perception – including students’ perception
(Krunic and Helou, 2008; and Lee and Lee,
2016), conscious experience and learning
(Helou and Helou, 2008), the current research
study considers and evaluates the notions
and work of the French philosopher, Rene
Descartes, in this area, as a means of casting
further light on this intriguing, but highly
debated, area of study.
St. Thomas Aquinas were amongst Rene
Descartes precursors, whose writings feature
interesting parallel views and corresponding
thoughts to that of Descartes. Given both the
objections to and the agreements with
Descartes’ Mind-Body dichotomy, the
current study aims at evaluating the level of
contributions of Rene Descartes’ arguments
to imagery, perception and learning.
Substance Dualism, Mental
Imagery, Perception and
Learning
This section presents Descartes’ argument
for a version of mind-body dualism. Given
this debatable issue (Nagel, 1994), the nature
of the connection between the body and the
mind, and its impact on imagery, perception
and learning, continues to be uncertain
(Cytowic, 1988). As per Substance dualism,
Descartes argued that man consists of a
compound of two inharmonious and
different kinds of substances: a physical
mechanical body and an incorporeal soul
(Descartes, Second Meditations, in Nagel,
1987), which notably he also defined as mind,
intellect, intelligence, reason, and as ‘I’ or the
‘cogito’. He explained that mental life goes on
in the soul (Bechtel, 1988). To Descartes, the
question of whether the mind is a different
substance from the body is a legacy. He
mentioned that while the body is visible and
tangible, that is, it has a definite shape,
location and occupies space; the mind is
intangible, that is, it is the perceiving. He
argued that sense perceptions and appetite are
contingent upon having a body, but thinking
is not. It is the ‘I’ that thinks. According to
Descartes, the activity of thinking, which is
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), was a
seventeenth
century
‘rationalist’
philosopher, mathematician and scientist.
He contended that the mind is better known
than the body, the body and the mind are
two distinct and separate substances
(Cottingham et al., 1988), and that there is
systematic causal interaction between them.
Other ‘materialist’ philosophers, who saw
weaknesses in Rene Descartes’ Cartesian
system (Cottingham, 1988), argued for the
opposite, that is, the mind and the body must
in some sense be the same, as such, the states
of the mind are reducible to brain states
(Shaffer, 1971; and Searle, 1994).
On the one hand, various scholars and
theologians have criticised Descartes’
Cartesian dualism (Cottingham, 1988). This
included Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1997;
and Malcolm, 1997), Pierre Gassendi (Ryle,
1949), Jesuit Pierre Bourdin and Gisbertus
Voetius (Cottingham, 1988). On the other
hand, various other thinkers, scholars and
theologians shared similar arguments to that
of Descartes. For example, St. Augustine and
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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
independent from the body, defines the ‘I’,
as in, ‘But what am I? A thing that thinks.
What is that? A thing that doubts,
understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is
unwilling, and also imagines and has
sensory perceptions’ (Descartes, Second
Meditations, in Nagel, 1987: 83).
states, ‘I can achieve an easier and more
evident perception of my own mind than of
anything else’ (Descartes, Second
Meditations, in Nagel, 1987: 86). He
concludes that the mind is better known than
the body. Nevertheless, Descartes’ claim that
the mind is ‘transparent’, is rather doubtful,
as he failed to prove it, or even discuss it.
To address the epistemological puzzle of
how we gain certain knowledge of the world,
through sense perception or understanding,
Descartes takes a case of ordinary perception
and considers the changes to the sensory and
secondary properties (smell, taste, visibility,
colour, size, form, temperature, shape,
hardness, ease of handling) of a piece of wax.
Once put by the fire, it is reduced to primary
properties, namely ‘extended, flexible, and
changeable’ (Descartes, Second Meditations,
in Nagel, 1987: 84). Descartes further argued
that the true nature of the wax is not revealed
by the senses or through the faculty of
imagination, but through intellect,
understanding and the ‘scrutiny of the mind
alone’ (Descartes, Second Meditations, in
Nagel, 1987: 85). Descartes concludes that
‘perception now requires a human mind’
(Descartes, Second Meditations, in Nagel,
1987: 85).
Objections to the Cartesian
Dualism
Subjecting all knowledge to the test of
‘radical doubt’, to derive his point of
certainty, namely, the ‘thinking thing’, or the
’cogito’, raised the anger, rage, fury and
hostility of other philosophers, scholars and
theologians (Cottingham, 1988), who voiced
their objections to his ‘dualist’ Mind-Body
approach. This section presents the
objections voiced against Descartes’
arguments. First, Substance dualism
presents a major problem for Descartes in
terms of his provision of an explanation as
to how the mind and the body interact in
their separate realms. That is, the most
famous objection to Descartes Mind-Body
dualism relates to the notion of causal
interaction between the radically different
and independent substances of the mind and
the body. On the one hand, the mind,
independent of the body, does the thinking;
while, on the other hand, imagination,
sensation and purposeful movement of the
body do not take place without the mind
(Popper and Eccles, 1981).
Building on his argument for how one
develops an understanding of the primary
properties of wax through purely mental
scrutiny, Descartes explains that he now
knows himself more distinctly. The more he
understands and learns about things, the
better he understands and learns about
himself. Descartes explains that the mind or
intellect, as distinct from the body,
understands and reflects on itself. Towards
the end of his second meditation, Descartes
Descartes explains that, ‘the idea we have
of the body and the mind in union are
different from, and irreducible to, the ideas
we have of either extended matter, or of
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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
thinking substance’ (Descartes, 1649; The
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http:/
/www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/
descarte,htm). Nevertheless, their ‘union’
does not explain the sensory and motor
communication between the spirit mind and
the physical body. In a book titled, The
Passions of the Soul, the last of Descartes
published work, which he commenced in
1943 as a synthesis of his exchanges with
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia about
theorising ‘the passions’, namely, the nature
of happiness, passions and ethics, and
completed in 1649; he explains his version
of the mysterious dichotomy of the mind
and the body, and argues that the pineal
gland, located in the centre of the brain, is
the site of interaction. Nevertheless, this still
failed to solve the causal interaction
problem, being a main concern that the
criticising scholars and ‘materialist’
philosophers have raised in opposition to
his version of Mind-Body dichotomy. If
anything at all, it has actually created further
confusion in relation to how both the mind
and the body interact with the pineal gland
itself, an issue that was not discussed in the
book. In summary, Descartes failed to offer
an explanation of the causal interaction
between the mental and the physical
substances.
‘body’, and the ‘ghost’ is the ‘spirit’ in the
body (Priest, 1991). Ryle (1949) describes the
‘dogma of the ghost in the machine’, or ‘The
Official Doctrine’, as a philosopher’s myth.
On this conception, mind is inside the body,
controls it and is in contact with it through
the brain. For example, it is the brain that
tells you that you are hungry, but it is the
mind that determines what you desire to eat.
Even if ‘popular dualism’ is true, there is
no empirical evidence that the mind can
survive death of the body. It could well be
that the problem lies in the manner in which
the mental and physical processes are
perceived. Perhaps as Ryle (1949) suggests,
a ‘category mistake’ is made. It might be the
case that the mind involves structure or
organisation of a considerable number of
mental states, as opposed to an additional
thing or a category of its own, that is, ‘No
ghost in the machine, just ghostly machines’.
Is Descartes’ Argument
Valid?
This section presents an analysis and
evaluation of the validity of Descartes’
argument in light of the above voiced
objections. Does the fact that ‘there is
thinking happening’ justify the argument
that ‘I exist’? Has Descartes derived a valid
argument in light of the various objections
voiced against the Substance dualism
conception? Although it is a matter of
personal faith, from a religious point of view,
the substance dualist notion of the mind and
body is widely accepted. For example, the
Church believes in the immortality of the
soul and the Day of judgement, where the
body will stand in the flesh in the hands of
Another main objection to the Cartesian
dualism is that, if there truly is a division
between the mind and the body, Descartes
has failed to draw the dividing line
(Churchland, 1987). Gilbert Ryle’s (1949)
metaphor of Descartes’ ‘ghost in the
machine’, portrays substance dualism’s
conception of a human; the ‘machine’ as the
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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
the Lord awaiting judgement, while the mind
rushes through the chapters of the good and
the bad deeds that have been committed in
this world. From a cognitive point of view,
human capabilities including the use of
language, mathematical calculations and
abstract reflections represent mental
phenomena (Sterelny, 1990), which go
beyond physical explanations.
chemical change in the brain changes the
mental perceptions (Hofmann, 1969). On 16
April, 1943, after Hofmann (1969)
accidentally ingested a small amount of LSD
(Reed, 2008), he stated that he felt he was
being, ‘… affected by a remarkable
restlessness, combined with a slight
dizziness. At home, I lay down and sank into
a not unpleasant intoxicated-like condition,
characterized by an extremely stimulated
imagination. In a dreamlike state, with eyes
closed (I found the daylight to be
unpleasantly glaring). I perceived an
uninterrupted stream of fantastic pictures,
extraordinary shapes with intense,
kaleidoscopic play of colors. After about two
hours this condition faded away’ (Hofmann,
1969: 15).
What about the brain-dependence of
consciousness? May be the strongest
argument against Substance dualism is the
evidence that reason, emotion and
consciousness are not independent from the
effects of the brain. The brain-dependent
character of consciousness is evident in drug
ingestion, brain and nerve damages and
other degenerative diseases. It may well be
that consciousness is physically explainable,
as evidence suggests that it is neutrally
dependent. But whether it automatically can
bridge the ‘explanatory gap’, still remains to
be seen. Ingesting drugs, for example, affects
the central nervous system by altering the
manner in which the cells in the brain
communicate to one another. Drugs can act
as antagonists, which mimic the effects of the
neurotransmitters, or as antagonists, which
block the effects of the neurotransmitters
(Krivanek, 2000). The effects of these
chemical changes and the rise of tissue in the
body have the ability to cause mood and
alertness changes, as well as altered states
of consciousness (Krivanek, 2000).
Shortly after, on 19 April, 1943, Hofmann
(1969) performed a self-experiment, whereby
he intentionally ingested LSD. He started
that he experienced abrupt and severe
deviations in perception (Reed, 2009). As he
was going home on a bicycle, his condition
first declined as he was going insane, but
soon his condition turned into one of
pleasure (Reed, 2009). He stated that, ‘…
Little by little I could begin to enjoy the
unprecedented colors and plays of shapes
that persisted behind closed eyes.
Kaleidoscopic, fantastic images surged in on
me, altering, variegated, opening and then
closing themselves in circles and spirals,
exploding in colored foundations,
rearranging and hybridizing themselves in
constant flux …’ (Reed, 2009).
Ingesting LSD, a ‘consciousness-altering
drug’ (Krivanek, 2000: 22), blocks the
neurotransmitter serotonin (Gregory and
Zanawill, 1987). In addition to affecting the
functioning of the body, the resulting
Furthermore, habitual use of many drugs
can eventually lead to impaired processes.
For example, the constant use of the drug
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Int. J. Educ. Teach & Learn. 2017
Linda K Newsome and Mammy M Helou, 2017
MDMA causes depression, higher order
cognitive changes, anxiety, and destruction
of the neurotransmitter serotonin and
psychosis. Thus, the physical intake of drugs
affects the state of the consciousness. In this
sense, Descartes’ conception of the mind as
a sort of motherboard of the computer is
invalid.
Descartes strongly argued that mental life
creates mental imagery, mind activity
facilitates perception, and mental scrutiny
leads to understanding and learning. As a
concluding statement, it is worthwhile to
note that the reason why Rene Descartes was
called the father of contemporary Western
philosophy, is because much of the
successive Western philosophy has
primarily been a response to his valuable
work and salient contributions, which
continue to be analysed by modern-day
scholars and philosophers.
Conclusion
This study concludes by presenting an
evaluation of Descartes’ contributions to the
processes of mental imagery, perception and
experiential learning. It is interesting to note
the different views, and, at times, conflicting
conclusions, deduced by various scholars in
terms of the nature, relationship and
connection between the mind and the body
(Armstrong, 1981), and their impact on
mental processes, imagery and learning.
Campbell (1970) for example, discusses
totally different underlying assumptions
involved in studying the Mind-Body
problem, namely that of ‘homogeneity,
individuality and reality of matter’
(Campbell, 1970: 4). Although several
limitations exist in relation to the
assumptions
underlying
studies
investigating the Mind-Body problem, it is
worthwhile to note the contributions that the
existing literature makes to further the
understanding of mental processes as related
to imagery, perception and learning.
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