IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
William C. Williams,
Petitioner
v.
The Pennsylvania Department of
Correction,
Respondent
BEFORE:
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No. 371 M.D. 2014
Submitted: November 26, 2014
HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
FILED: February 4, 2015
Before this Court for disposition in our original jurisdiction is the
Preliminary Objection to Petition for Review (PO) in the nature of a demurrer filed
by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) to the pro se Petition
for a Writ of Mandamus (Petition) filed by William C. Williams.
Williams, an
inmate at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Retreat, petitioned this Court to
order the Department to award him duplicate credit for time served toward each of
his five related consecutive sentences and to correct his minimum and maximum
release dates.1 For the reasons that follow, we will sustain the Department’s PO.
The relevant facts as averred by Williams are as follows. On April 18, 2001,
Williams was convicted by a jury of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County of Murder in the Third Degree, Causing an Accident While Not Properly
Licensed, Fleeing or Attempting to Allude Police Officers, Aggravated Assault,
and Receiving Stolen Property. (Petition at vii.) All the above charges stemmed
from Williams’ February 11, 2000 arrest for stealing a car in Atlantic City, New
Jersey and driving said vehicle to Philadelphia where, due to his reckless attempts
to elude capture, he caused the death of one person and serious bodily injury to
another individual. (Petition at vii.) On June 18, 2001, Williams was sentenced to
the following terms of incarceration:
1. Fifteen (15) to Thirty (30) years for Murder in the Third Degree.
2. One (1) to Two (2) years for Causing an Accident While Not Properly
Licensed, to run consecutively to the Murder in the Third Degree
charge.
3. One (1) to Two (2) years for Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police
Officers, to run consecutively to the Causing an Accident While Not
Properly Licensed charge.
4. Four (4) to Eight (8) years for Aggravated Assault, to run
consecutively to the Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police Officers
charge.
1
Williams also filed an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, which we
granted by an Order filed on August 7, 2014.
2
5. One (1) to Two (2) years for Receiving Stolen Property, to run
consecutively to the Aggravated Assault charge.
(Petition, Ex. B.)
In each sentencing order, the sentencing judge indicated that Williams was
to receive pre-sentence credit from February 11, 2000 to June 18, 2001, “if not
already credited.” (Petition, Ex. B.) Williams’ sentence was aggregated to twentytwo (22) to forty-four (44) years. (Petition, Ex. A.) The Department awarded
Williams credit on his aggregated sentence from February 11, 2000 to June 18,
2001 and calculated Williams’ minimum release date as February 11, 2022, and his
maximum release date as February 11, 2044. (Petition, Ex. 4.)
Thirteen years later, Williams sought relief through SCI Retreat’s inmate
grievance process. (Petition at viii-ix.) Specifically, Williams requested that the
Department apply the credit for time served from February 11, 2000 to June 18,
2001 to each of his five consecutive sentences instead of to his aggregate sentence.
(Petition, Ex. C.) After the internal grievance process failed to provide relief,
Williams appealed to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances & Appeals on
April 21, 2014. (Petition, Ex. C.) On May 20, 2014, the Chief Grievance Officer
concluded that Williams’ sentence calculation was correct and denied Williams’
appeal. (Petition, Ex. E.)
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Williams filed the instant
Petition requesting a writ of mandamus ordering the Department to grant him
credit for time served of one year, four months, and eight days on each of his five
related consecutive sentences and to change his minimum release date to October
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3, 2017 and his maximum release date to October 3, 2036. (Petition at 4.) The
Department filed a PO in the nature of a demurrer contending that Williams’
Petition is legally deficient.2
Therein, the Department asserts that Williams’
Petition fails to show that he has a clear right to the relief requested and that the
Department has a corresponding duty to award the duplicate time credit and
recalculate Williams’ minimum and maximum dates. (Department’s PO ¶¶ 14-21.)
“[M]andamus is an extraordinary writ of common law, designed to compel
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists a clear legal
right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and want of any other
adequate and appropriate remedy.” Bronson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 421
A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa. 1980). This Court may issue a writ of mandamus when a
petitioner proves that the Department incorrectly computed his maximum and
minimum sentences. See McCray v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 872
A.2d 1127, 1130-31 (Pa. 2005) (stating that “[w]here discretionary actions and
criteria are not being contested, but rather the actions of the Department in
computing an inmate’s maximum and minimum dates of confinement are being
challenged, an action for mandamus remains viable as a means for examining
whether statutory requirements have been met”).
2
In ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we must admit all wellpleaded material facts and any inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. Danysh v. Department
of Corrections, 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). “The allegations of a pro se
complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by
attorneys.” Id. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer “should be sustained only in
cases that are clear and free from doubt and only where it appears with certainty that the law
permits no recovery under the allegations pleaded.” Sweatt v. Department of Corrections, 769
A.2d 574, 577 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
4
In support of its PO, the Department argues that its duty is to follow the trial
court’s sentencing order and that, based on that order, Williams is not entitled to
have pre-sentence credit applied to each separate charge for which he was
convicted. By requesting the same pre-sentence credit be applied to each of his
five consecutive sentences, the Department argues that Williams “is requesting five
times the amount of time he actually spent in pre-trial detention.” (Department’s
PO ¶ 14.) Because the sentencing order states that credit should be awarded for
time served “if not already credited,” the Department argues that it properly
followed the trial court’s order by applying time served credit to Williams’
aggregate sentence. (Department’s PO ¶ 19.)
In response, Williams argues that this Court’s precedent establishes that
duplicate time credit may be given to related charges, and that each of his five
charges are related. He further argues that the phrase “if not already credited” in
the sentencing order should be read to provide him with credit for time served so
long as a credit was not already applied to another separate or unrelated charge.
Williams contends that if the trial court wanted the time served credit to apply to
the aggregate sentence it would have applied the credit to only one of his
consecutive sentences.
In assessing whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate we must first
determine whether Williams has a clear right to relief. Credit for time served is
governed by Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9760. The
relevant portion of Section 9760 provides as follows:
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After reviewing the information submitted under section 9737
(relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the court
shall give credit as follows:
(1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be
given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of
the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a
result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall
include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial,
pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
…
(4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on
another charge growing out of an act or acts that occurred prior to
his arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
of any sentence resulting from such prosecution shall be given for
all time spent in custody under the former charge that has not been
credited against another sentence.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9760(1), (4). Section 9760(1) authorizes credit for time spent in
custody prior to sentencing for the specific charge or conduct for which a sentence
is imposed.
Section 9760(4) addresses situations where a defendant receives
multiple sentences and “makes it clear that time credit on a sentence can only be
given when it has not already been credited against another sentence.” Taglienti v.
Department of Corrections, 806 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
Williams’ position is that this Court’s precedent only prohibits applying
multiple time served credits when the sentences are attached to unrelated charges.
Williams specifically relies on Taglienti, where this Court addressed a mandamus
petition seeking recalculation of credit for time served. In that case, the inmate
sought time served credit in Pennsylvania that had already been credited toward an
unrelated charge for which he was incarcerated in Virginia. Id. at 989. We
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granted summary judgment to the Department because, in part, “there [was] no
allegation that the offense for which Taglienti was serving time for in the State of
Virginia and the offenses for which Taglienti was convicted of in Pennsylvania
[were] related.” Id. at 992.
Williams’ reliance on Taglienti is misplaced. Our holding in Taglienti, that
an inmate could not receive credit for an unrelated charge, does not foreclose the
same result when the charges were the result of a single criminal episode. “The
operative rule” of cases addressing credit for time served “is that a defendant
should receive credit only once for time served before sentencing.”
Commonwealth v. Merigris, 681 A.2d 194, 195 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also Bright
v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 831 A.2d 775, 779 n.5 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003) (noting that “a writ of mandamus will not lie against the
Department to perform an illegal act by awarding pre-sentence credit for a period
of incarceration that was already applied to another sentence”). Section 9760(1)
requires that credit be given “for all time spent in custody as a result of the
criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the
conduct on which such a charge is based.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9760(1) (emphasis
added). Merely because Williams’ criminal conduct, which was perpetrated in a
single criminal episode, resulted in five separate convictions and sentences does
not provide Williams with five times the credit. Courts in this Commonwealth do
“not deal in ‘volume discounts.’” Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723, 726
(Pa. Super. 1992). Williams was incarcerated for one year, four months, and eight
days while awaiting sentencing.
Section 9760(1) of the Sentencing Code
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authorizes the Department to provide Williams credit for that amount of time, and
nothing more.
Next, mandamus will not lie unless the Department had a corresponding
duty.
“The Department is an executive branch agency that is charged with
faithfully implementing sentences imposed by the courts.” McCray, 872 A.2d at
1133. As such, “the Department has a duty to credit [Williams], as well as all
inmates, for all statutorily mandated periods of incarceration.” Id. However, the
Department lacks the authority to “adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or
delete sentencing conditions.” Id. In other words, the Department must calculate
an inmate’s minimum and maximum release dates in accordance with the
sentencing order. Id.
Upon review of the sentencing order we conclude that, by applying credit for
time served to Williams’ aggregate sentence, the Department computed Williams’
minimum and maximum release dates in accordance with the trial court’s
sentencing order. The sentencing order states that Williams was to receive time
credit for his pre-sentence incarceration between February 11, 2000 and June 18,
2001, “if not already credited.”
(Petition, Ex. B.)
Because the Department
provided Williams with this time served credit when it applied the credit to his
aggregate sentence, the Department did not have a duty to apply five separate
credits for the time Williams served while awaiting trial and sentencing.
In sum, Williams has not shown that he has a clear right to multiple time
served credits and that the Department has a corresponding duty to award such
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credits. Accordingly, we conclude that mandamus will not lie in this case and
sustain the Department’s PO.
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RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
William C. Williams,
Petitioner
v.
The Pennsylvania Department of
Correction,
Respondent
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No. 371 M.D. 2014
ORDER
NOW, February 4, 2015, “Respondent’s Preliminary Objection to Petition
for Review” is SUSTAINED and Petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ of Mandamus”
is DISMISSED with prejudice.
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RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge