Part 1 - Lafayette Bar Association

PARTITION ACTIONS
By
David A. Blanchet
Dist. Ct. Judge, 15th JDC – Div. H
800 S. Buchanan St.
Lafayette, LA 70501
Telephone: (337) 269-5729
Charles G. Fitzgerald
Dist. Ct. Judge, 15th JDC – Div. M
800 S. Buchanan St., Ste. 505
Lafayette, LA 70501
Telephone: (337) 261-5125
Lafayette Bar Association,
Paula K. Woodruff Family Law Section
September 12, 2016
Table of Contents
Description
Pages
I. General Concepts
1
II. Valuation of Business Interests
6
III. Claims Between the Spouses Pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2801
9
IV. Practice Tips
12
Appendix 1
-ii-
I.
GENERAL CONCEPTS
1.
Classification of "Things"
The classification of a thing as community property or as separate property is determined
by when the thing is acquired and how the thing is acquired, when a legal regime exists between
spouses. If the answer to the "when" inquiry shows the thing was acquired prior to the
establishment of the legal regime, the property (thing) is the separate property of the spouse who
acquires it. In that instance, the answer to the "when" inquiry classifies the thing. The "how"
inquiry is immaterial and is not asked.
If the answer to the "when" inquiry shows that the thing was acquired during the legal
regime, then the "how" question must be asked. The answer to the "how" question determines
whether the thing is a community thing or a separate thing. Louisiana Civil Code article 23381
contains both the ''when" and the "how'' requirements for property to be classified as community
property. It defines community property as "property acquired during the existence of the legal
regime" (the ''when" element) in one of several ways (the "how'' element):
1.
Through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse;
2.
Acquired with community things or with community and separate things,
1
La. Civ. Code art. 2338 states:
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence
of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property
acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless
classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses
jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss
or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property not classified
by law as separate property.
1
unless classified as separate property under Article 2341;
3.
Donated to the spouses jointly;
4.
Natural and civil fruits of community property; and
5.
Damages awarded for loss or injury to community property.
Likewise, Article 23412 contains both the "when" and the "how" requirements for the
classification of property as separate property. It defines separate property as property acquired
prior to the establishment of a community property regime, or if acquired during the legal regime
(the "when" element), is acquired in one of several ways (the "how" element):
1.
With separate things or with separate and community things when the
value of the community things is inconsequential in comparison with the
value of the separate things used;
2.
By inheritance or donation to a spouse individually;
3.
Damages awarded to a spouse as a result of breach of contract or bad faith
management of community property by the other spouse;
4.
Damages resulting from management of separate property; and
5.
By voluntary partition of community property.
2
La. Civ. Code art. 2341 states:
The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property
acquired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime;
property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and community
things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in comparison
with the value of the separate things used; property acquired by a spouse by
inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in an
action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as a
result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community property by the other
spouse; damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection with the
management of his separate property; and things acquired by a spouse as a result of
a voluntary partition of the community during the existence of a community
property regime.
2
Running throughout the classification rules of Articles 2338 and 2341 is the principle of
real subrogation. Subrogation means the substitution of one thing or person for another thing or
person.3 The word real in civil law relates to a thing, distinguished from a person.4 Real
subrogation is, therefore, the substitution of one thing for another thing.5 This principle plays a
critical role in the classification of things in a legal regime.6
A thing acquired with another thing takes the classification of the thing by which it is
acquired. The labor and industry of a spouse is community; any thing acquired with it during
that regime is community. On the other hand, a thing acquired during the legal regime with a
separate thing is separate property. It is important to remember that, in many instances, before
we can classify a thing acquired during the legal regime, we have to classify the thing by which it
was acquired.
Furthermore, with one exception, the intention of the acquiring spouse in acquiring the
thing during the legal regime is immaterial; the issue is how the spouse acquired it. The
exception is in the declaration in the act of acquisition that property is acquired as separate
property.
3
Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1249.
4
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1430. The thing may be movable or immovable. Id. This
is not to be confused with the common law term "real," which refers to land. Id.
5
Comment (c), Revision Comments - 1 979 to La. Civ. Code art. 2341. The principle is applicable to
both separate and community property. ld. The new thing takes the place of the old. Id.
6
Things, in a legal regime, are classified as either community or separate things. La. Civ. Code art.
2335. However, a spouse may own an interest in a thing as separate property and another interest in that
thing as community property. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2335, 2341.1.
3
2.
Classification of “Obligations”
The principal purposes of classifying obligations are (1) to allocate or not allocate the
obligation in a community property partition, and (2) to determine the existence of
reimbursement claims.
The shorthand test for purposes of classifying obligations is "when" and "why." To this
end, Louisiana Civil Code article 2360 defines a community obligation as an obligation incurred
by a spouse (1) during the existence of a community property regime (the "when" inquiry) (2) for
the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse (the "why" inquiry).
Conversely, Article 2363 defines a separate obligation of a spouse as one incurred by that
spouse (1) prior to the establishment of a community property regime or (2) one incurred during
the existence of a community property regime though not for the common interest of the spouses
or for the interest of the other spouse.
The "when" inquiry is usually simple. Thus, the focus here is on the "why." First, the
beneficiary of the obligation is a person or persons — i.e., "the spouses" or "the other spouse" —
not property. Second, the intention of the obligor spouse in incurring the obligation determines
its classification if incurred during the legal regime.
Several conceptual errors appear in the jurisprudence. Some cases posit the classification
issue on whether the obligation was incurred "for the benefit of the community," whether it
"benefitted the community," whether it benefitted the "community estate," or whether "the
community was enriched or bettered by that obligation." All this, of course, is wrong. The
classification of an obligation doesn't depend upon its effect on property, but whether the
incurring of an obligation was intended to benefit identified people — the spouses jointly or the
non-incurring spouse.
4
3.
Classification Presumptions7
It goes without saying that classification presumptions play a large role in the
classification of assets and liabilities. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2340, 2361. For instance,
Article 2340 provides that things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of the legal
regime are presumed to be community. The known fact is the possession of a thing by a spouse
during the legal regime. The unknown fact is whether that thing is a community thing or a
separate thing. The classification of a thing as community or separate is an issue of fact. Ross v.
Ross, 857 So. 2d 384, 395 (La. 2003). Absent adequate rebuttal evidence, the unknown fact
(classification) is determined by the known fact (possession during the existence of the LEGAL
regime) as a result of the evidentiary presumption. Kenneth Rigby, Selected Community Property
Issues: Getting the Theory Right, 10th Annual Family Law Seminar, at 18-21 (2006) (emphasis
added).
It is important to note that it is possession of the thing during the legal regime which
triggers the presumption. Acquisition, on the other hand, is not required to trigger the
presumption; only possession is required. The time of acquisition of a thing may be unknown;
but if a thing is possessed during the legal regime, it is presumed to be community. When and
how acquisition of a thing occurred is important in the classification of a thing. It is not important
in determining whether a presumption of community exists. Possession is.
7
Classification presumptions play an important role in applying the reimbursement rules of the
legal regime contained in La. Civ. Code arts. 2364-2368. As noted previously, each reimbursement claim
must have a community component and a separate component. In other words, there are two
classification issues: the thing used and the thing benefitted, etc., or the obligation satisfied. A legal
presumption as to the community classification of each may or may not exist. If it does, and there is not
any countervailing evidence, the thing used or benefitted, etc., or the obligation satisfied, is classified, by
operation of the evidentiary presumption, as community property.
5
II.
VALUATION OF BUSINESS INTERESTS
In Louisiana, a juridical person is an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as
a corporation and partnership. La. Civ. Code art. 24. Thus, a corporation owns its assets, and the
parties own the stock of the corporation. The value of that stock depends on the assets and
liabilities of the corporation. The stock is an incorporeal movable.
1.
Business Valuation Approaches and Methods
In valuing ownership interests in closely held companies, there is a hierarchy of the terms
approach, method, and procedure.8
1.
Approach is the broadest of the three terms.
2.
Method refers to general ways to implement approaches.
3.
Procedure means the specific calculations, data used, and other details involved in
a specific method.
Business Valuation Approaches and Methods9
Approaches
Methods
Income
Discounted future returns
Capitalized returns
Market
Guideline public companies
Guideline merged and acquired companies
Post transactions
Buy-sell agreement
Rules of thumb
8
S. Pratt, The Lawyer's Business Valuation Handbook, at 82, American Bar Association (June 2000).
9
Pratt, supra note 8, at 85.
6
Asset-based
2.
Adjusted net asset value
• Going-concern basis
• liquidation basis
• Hybrid basis
Excess earnings (sometimes classified as
"hybrid")
Court Decisions of Consequence
In Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 3d 393 (La. 01/21/09), the Louisiana Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the application of minority discounts and marketability discounts in
determining a partner’s one-third interest in a Louisiana partnership.
The facts in Cannon were fairly typical of partnership withdrawal cases: a minority partner
withdrew and sought the payment of the value of his interest from the majority-controlled
partnership. The holding of the Supreme Court, however, was anything but typical. Justice Traylor,
who authored the Cannon opinion, explained:
Minority discounts and other discounts, such as for lack of
marketability, may have a place in our law; however, such discounts must
be used sparingly and only when the facts support their use.FN4 Here, the
district court determined the value of the assets owned by the company and
then applied a discount.FN5 Under the particular facts of this case, though,
the use of a discount was unwarranted and, therefore, the district court
abused its discretion in applying such a discount. The buyers of the
partnership interest at issue are the two remaining partners in the
partnership. These two partners will not be subject to a lack of control as
would a third party, as each has an equal say in the control of the
partnership, and, because the partners have already determined to purchase
the partnership share themselves by opting to continue the partnership and
avoid liquidation, neither is lack of marketability an issue. Furthermore,
discounting the market value of the partnership's property would be
inequitable. The withdrawing partner should not be penalized for doing
something the law allows him to do,FN6 and the remaining partners should
not thereby realize a windfall profit at his expense.
FN4. Nationally, the trend in law is away from applying such discounts. See, e.g., 7 La. Civ.
L. Treatise, Business Organizations § 4.11 (2008).
7
FN5. Although the district court did not clarify which type or types of discount it was
applying, based on the language contained in the Reasons for Judgment, we believe that
the discount was a combination of both minority and marketability discounts, totaling
35%.
FN6. C.C. art. 2822 provides that "[i]f a partnership has been constituted without a term, a
partner may withdraw from the partnership without the consent of his partners at any time,
provided he gives reasonable notice in good faith at a time that is not unfavorable to the
partnership."
Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added).
In Thomson v. Thomson, 978 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 3d Cir. 02/27/08), the third circuit
affirmed the trial court's application of minority discounts of 20%, 30% percent, and 0 %percent to
various LLCs in which the parties had interests.
The more significant aspect of the Thomson case, at least in the opinion of this author, was
the appellate court's ruling concerning evidentiary presumptions. Specifically, the court held that
once it was shown that expenses and obligations arose during the marriage, the statutory presumption
provided by Article 2361, i.e., that obligations incurred during the legal regime are presumed to be
community debts, may be rebutted only through presentation of facts proving the obligations to be
separate. Further, the third circuit held that such a presumption "is rebuttable upon proof by clear
and convincing evidence that the debt was not incurred for the benefit of the community." Hence,
once the presumption arises, the burden of proof is on the objecting spouse to prove "by clear and
convincing evidence" that the obligations were not community.
In Statham v. Statham, 986 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/11/08), the second circuit held that
(i) Mrs. Statham failed to rebut the presumption that the diamond ring she wore was community
property, (ii) the trial court could assign 90% of insurance brokerage business goodwill to Husband,
and (iii) Mrs. Statham was further unable to prove that post-termination company distributions
8
received by Mr. Statham were community assets.
As to the valuation of the business, the trial court accepted the opinion of Mr. Statham's
appraiser who was retained two months before the trial. He concluded that the business was worth
$220,008.00 including a total goodwill value of $207,094.00. He then assessed 90% of the goodwill
value to the personal goodwill of Mr. Statham, as opposed to enterprise goodwill. The trial court
ultimately valued the business at $34,000.00 (as opposed to wife's appraisal of $310,766.00).
In affirming the trial court's finding as to value, the second circuit explained that the evidence
adduced at trial established that only about 20% of Mr. Statham's policies renewed automatically;
and due to the type of insurance he sold, he had to shop or re-offer policies to at least 80% of his
customers each year. The court also noted that Mr. Statham maintained regular contacts with
customers and engaged activities such as taking them to lunch or hunting. Wife failed to show
specifically which income she felt entitled to receive as a result of automatic renewals.
III.
CLAIMS BETWEEN THE SPOUSES PURSUANT TO LA R.S. 9:2801
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 limits the claims that may be asserted in a community
property partition proceeding to claims “between the spouses” which arise (1) from the matrimonial
regime or (2) from their co-ownership of former community assets.10
10
La. R.S. 9:2801provides, in part:
A. When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or
on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the
matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property
following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the
action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon
termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a proceeding,
which shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules . . . .
9
“A claim between the spouses that arises during a matrimonial regime does not necessarily
arise from that matrimonial regime.”11 In other words:
A matrimonial regime is a system of principles and rules governing the
ownership and management of the property of married persons as between
themselves and toward third persons. La. Civ. Code art. 2325. Unless a claim
of one spouse against the other spouse arises out of that system of principles
and rules, it may not be asserted in a Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801
partition proceeding.12
By way of example, the types of claims that arise from the matrimonial regime of the
community of acquets and gains and which are properly asserted in a community property partition
action pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2801 include reimbursement claims, La. Civ. Code
arts. 2364 - 2368, an accounting for community property under the control of a spouse at the
termination of the community property regime, La. Civ. Code art. 2369, damages for fraud or bad
faith in the management of community property, La. Civ. Code art. 2354, and reimbursement claims,
La. Civ. Code arts. 2364 - 2368.13
On the other hand, the types of claims that arise from the co-ownership of former community
property following termination of the matrimonial regime and which are properly asserted in a
community property partition action include a claim for damages for failure of a spouse to preserve
and manage prudently former community property under his control in a manner. La. Civ. Code art.
La. R.S. 9:2801(A) (emphasis added).
11
Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 59 La. L. Rev. 465, 517 (1999).
12
Id. at 517 n. 280.
13
See id. at 517-18.
10
2369.3.14
1.
Damages for Mismanagement?
One of the special management provisions of Matrimonial Regimes law is Louisiana Civil
Code article 2369.3, which states: “A spouse has a duty to preserve and to manage prudently
former community property under his control . . . in a manner consistent with the mode of use of
that property immediately prior to termination of the community regime. He is answerable for
any damage caused by his fault, default, or neglect.”
This duty is one of three duties imposed upon spouses with reference to the management of
community property and co-owned former community property. During the existence of the
legal regime, a spouse has a negative duty not to commit fraud or be in bad faith in the
management of community property. La. Civ. Code art. 2354. This is a duty that continues
during the existence of the legal regime.
The next duty arises at the moment of the termination of the legal regime. A spouse owes
an accounting to the other spouse for community property under his control at the termination of
the legal regime. La. Civ. Code art. 2369. This duty focuses upon a moment in time. La. Civ.
Code art. 2369.3, cmt.(c). The duty to account is the duty to explain what happened to
community property under the spouse's control at the moment of termination of the community.
That duty may be fulfilled by producing the property or satisfactorily explaining the disposition
of it. See In re Succession of Caraway, 639 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
The third duty is the one described above, La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3, an affirmative duty
imposed upon a spouse who has former community property under his control, to preserve and
14
See id. at 518.
11
manage that property in a manner consistent with the mode of use of the property immediately
prior to the termination of the legal regime. Id.
2.
Reimbursement Claims.
See last year’s materials.
IV.
PRACTICE TIPS
12
APPENDIX 1
An example of an effective sworn Detailed Descriptive List is set forth as follows:
STATE OF LOUISIANA
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally came and appeared the defendant, who
respectfully presents to this Honorable Court a detailed, descriptive list of all property belonging
to the community regime previously existing between he and the plaintiff.
A.
COMMUNITY IMMOVABLES:
No.
Description of the Property
Title
Fair Market Value
1.
111 Boardwalk, Lafayette, LA
Joint
$10,000,000
2.
101 Sunrise Lane, Sunset, St. Landry Parish, LA
(0.43 acre lot)
Joint
Being appraised
B.
COMMUNITY MOVABLES:
No.
Description of the Property
Title
Fair Market Value
Business Interests
1.
Paul, LLC
Wife
$200,000
2.
Chris Company (12.5% interest)
Husband
Being determined
3.
Janet's Collection Agency, Inc.
Husband
$ 0.00
4.
Jenny, L.L.C. (51% interest)15
Joint
To be divided in kind
5.
Susie-Q, L.L.C.
Joint
To be divided in kind
6.
Jamie, L.L.C.
Joint
To be divided in kind
15
This entity owns the following immovable property (real property):
•
159 J. Lee Boulevard, Lafayette, Lafayette Parish, LA 70508 (15.15 acres).
•
3711 Divorce Road, Lafayette, Lafayette Parish, LA (house).
•
Lonesome Highway (LA Highway 35), Rayne, Acadia Parish, LA 70578
•
Lots 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11, Broke Subdivision Phase 1, Rayne, Acadia Parish, LA
13
7.
Divorce Masters, L.L.C.
Husband
To be sold
8.
Big Daddy, Inc.
Husband
$ 0.00
9.
Little Daddy, Inc.
Husband
To be divided in kind
Financial Accounts
10.
Bank of Obama Savings Acct. # 21590778
Wife
$ 250,000
02/18/2011
11.
Bank of Obama Checking Acct. # 2159008
Wife
$ 19,446.60
02/18/2011
12.
George Bush Savings Acct. # 80772768768
Wife
$ 104,950.73
01/14/2011
13.
George Bush CD # 124121431 16
Wife
$ 100,000
02/18/2011
14.
George Bush CD # 12423413
Wife
$ 103,922.19
02/28/2010
15.
George Bush CD # 1052379
Wife
$ 110,078.70
07/27/2010
16.
Bradford Life Insurance Co. IRA # 7111231423
Wife
$ 5,799.23
07/11/2011
17.
Bradford Life Insurance Co. Roth IRA #
7128234
Wife
$ 10,005.86
07/11/2011
18.
Bradford Life Insurance Company, NonQualified Variable Annuity # 71284374
Wife
$ 8,627.73
07/11/2011
19.
Home Bank CD # 25534
Wife
$ 108,487.71
07/10/2011
20.
Cade Bank Savings Acct. # 30000154634
Wife
$ 71,079.06
01/03/2011
21.
Cade Bank Savings Acct. # 40456465
Wife
Needed
22.
Cade Bank Savings Acct. # 400013524
Wife
Needed
23.
Cade Bank CD # 40001212702
Wife
$ 103,329.48
01/04/2011
16
This CD was partitioned to Wife by Consent Judgment dated July 11, 2011.
14
24.
Cade Bank CD # 1153345
Wife
$ 100,000.00
01/04/2011
25.
Legions Bank CD # 00814853245
Wife
$ 105,464.48
07/11/2011
26.
Legions Bank Checking Acct. # 9711345
Wife
$ 100.00
01/14/2011
27.
USB IRA # 04479523
Wife
$ 48,388.88
01/30/2011
28.
George Bush Savings Acct. # 8078445263
Joint
$ 121,170.29
07/11/2011
29.
George Bush CD # 1241037655
Joint
$ 100,000.00
07/11/2011
30.
George Bush CD # 1243391419
Joint
$ 100,000.00
07/11/2011
31.
Ford Life Insurance Company, Non-Qualified
Variable Annuity # 712297599
Joint
$ 93,746.37
07/11/2011
32.
Ford Life Insurance Company, Non-Qualified
Fixed Annuity #712614648
Joint
$ 335,501.29
07/11/2011
33.
Cade Bank Checking Acct. # 1704453622
Joint
$ 8,454.13
01/14/2011
34.
Cade Bank CD # 40001212974
Joint
$ 102,650.42
07/21/2011
35.
GIN USA Annuity and Life Insurance
Company, Non-Qualified Annuity # 90372407
Joint
$ 100,000
surrender value07/11/2011
36.
Legions CD # 814845624
Joint
$ 108,816.43
06/24/2011
37.
Legions CD # 8141233
Joint
$ 107,438.00
07/11/2011
38.
USB RMA Acct. # 0005
Joint
$ 11,796.34
06/30/2011
39.
ABA Accumulator Elite Annuity, NonQualified # 307 697 663
Husband
$ 51,093.46
surrender value-12/31/10
15
George Bush Checking Acct. # 562614304217
(previously George Bush Joint
Checking#741501023)
Husband
N/A
41.
George Bush CD # 12344
Husband
$ 100,000
02/18/2011
42.
Ford Life Insurance Co. IRA # 234234
Husband
$ 5,734.64
01/31/11
43.
JR Ewing & Co., 310 shares common stock
Husband
N/A; to be divided in kind
44.
New Orleans Life Fixed Annuity, NonQualified # 532342
Husband
$ 107,346.97
surrender value-02/04/11
45.
Royal IRA # 234234
Husband
$ 5,025.94
12/31/2010
46.
USB IRA # 18547654
Husband
$ 4,971.00
11/30/2010
40.
Motor Vehicles, Boats, Trailers, ATV's
47.
2006 Cadillac Escalade
(VIN: 18987980808)
Wife
Being determined
48.
2009 Ford 150 Pickup
Husband
$ 23,000
49.
2006 Kabota Tractor
Husband
$ 15,000
50.
2000 John Deer
Husband
$ 5,000
51.
1969 Oliver Tractor
Husband
$ 1,000
52.
Bushhog
Husband
$ 2,000
Miscellaneous Movables
53.
Household Furniture, Fixtures, and Similar
Movable Effects
N/A
To be appraised
54.
Miscellaneous Tools
N/A
To be appraised
17
Partitioned between the parties pursuant to that certain Consent Judgment dated July 11, 2011.
16
C.
COMMUNITY LIABILITIES:
No.
Description of the Liability
Title
Balance
Joint
$471,635.84
(as of 10/08/2012)
1.
JP Morgan Chase Loan No. — 0001
2.
JP Morgan Chase Home Equity Loan No. —
0002
Husband
$0.0018
(as of 12/05/2012)
3.
Capital One Loan No. — 0003
Husband
$0.0019
(as of 12/05/2012)
4.
Chase (Visa) Credit Card Acct. -0004 (previously
account number x0032)
Husband
$0.00
(as of 12/05/2012)
D.
HUSBAND'S CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE
MATRIMONIAL REGIME AND CO-OWNERSHIP
OF FORMER COMMUNITY PROPERTY:
No.
Description of Claim
1.
2.
3.
Value
Use of separate funds to pay the mortgage indebtedness owed to J.P.
Morgan Chase Loan No. –0001 subsequent to regime termination.
½ of $266,889.24
$133,444.62
Use of separate funds to pay homeowners insurance premiums for
111Boardwalk subsequent to the termination of the legal regime.
½ of $30,176.45
$15,088.22
Use of separate funds to pay property taxes for 111Boardwalk
subsequent to the termination of the legal regime.
½ of $27,594.68
$13,797.34
18
The principal balance on October 17, 2009, was $184,194.70. This community indebtedness was
fully satisfied by Husband subsequent to the termination of the community regime. See infra Reimbursement
Claim No. 4.
19
The principal balance on October 17, 2009, was $93,035.58. This community indebtedness was fully
satisfied by Husband subsequent to the termination of the community regime. See infra Reimbursement
Claim No. 5.
17
No.
4.
5.
6.
Description of Claim
Value
Use of separate funds to pay the indebtedness owed to JP
Morgan Chase Home Equity Loan No. — 0002 subsequent to
the termination of the legal regime.
½ of $176,855.95
$88,427.98
Use of separate funds to satisfy that certain Capital One Loan
No. — 0003 subsequent to the termination of the legal regime.
½ of $97,136.19
$48,568.10
Use of “separate property” (1/14th ownership interest in CF
Properties, LLC) during the existence of the legal regime for the
satisfaction of community obligations.
½ of $53,137.80
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
$26,568.90
Use of “separate property” (CGF shares of stock) during the
existence of the legal regime for the satisfaction of community
obligations.
½ of $117,474
$58,737
Reimbursement credit for funds advanced to Wife for attorney’s
fees, a community obligation, pursuant to that certain Temporary
Order dated 10/5/2009.
½ of $10,000
$5,000
Reimbursement for the use of separate funds for the
post-termination capital calls of Paul, LLC.
½ of $459,095.18
$229,547.59
Reimbursement credit for the allocation to Wife of the use of
100% of the community portion of the parties' 2009 federal and
state tax refund, all in accordance with the stipulation that was
made in Open Court and read into the record on Oct. 18, 2010.
½ of $44,330.26
$22,165.13
Reimbursement credit for the allocation to Wife of the use of
100% of that certain UBS Financial Services Account (RMA)
No. –0005, all in accordance with the stipulation that was made
in Open Court on October 18, 2010.
½ of $ 13,106.83
$6,553.42
Use of separate property for the satisfaction of community
obligations. The separate property is more specifically that
certain Paine Weber Investment Account –0006, having a value
of $86,506.85 at the time of marriage.
½ of $ 82,000
$41,000
18
No.
13.
14.
15.
Description of Claim
Value
Use of separate property to satisfy tax loan indebtedness owed to
Wife's parents.
½ of $6,410.73
$3,205.36
Post-termination use of separate funds to pay for renovations to
marital residence pursuant to construction contract signed by Wife
Allie.
½ of $47,501.93
$23,750.97
Use of separate funds post-termination for the satisfaction of the
credit card balance associated with Chase (Visa) Account —8758.
½ of $6,000.00
$3,000.00
19
20